Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Thursday’s Child
China’s Long March Toward Military Transformation
Information Age Metrics Working Group
Evidence Based Research, Inc.
February 18, 2005
2
China’s leaders have long recognized the need to modernize—indeed, to transform—PLA warfighting capabilities, especially the ability to command and to control more agile, better equipped forces operating according to “local wars under modern, high tech conditions” doctrine.
The “long march” to transform has not been an easy one, and has been hobbled by distractions and debate. Finally, for the past decade, the PLA seems to be getting it about right, and the way ahead looks more promising than many have expected.
3
This Presentation
• Factors motivating “transformation” of the PLA
• Use of wargames, simulations
• Institutionalizing transformation: The role of the research community as an agent for change
• Vignettes
4
Background and Motivation for Change
• 1970s, modern war games in the West• 1980s
– Falklands War– Bekka Valley Campaign– Operation Just Cause, Panama
• 1990s– Desert Storm: Wake up call for political leaders– 1995-96 Taiwan Strait crisis– Serbia/Kosovo
• 2000s– OEF and OIF
5
The Threat DebatePeople’s War Scenarios• Mobilize the population• Retreat but slow the invader• Multi-year war from the interior
RMA Scenarios• Preempt the superior—anti access• Asymmetric strategy—ASAT, info war• Destroy C2, prevent entry of logistics• Preemptive paralysis of the enemy
Local War Scenarios• Use of rapid reaction forces• Defend at border or frontier
People’s War Traditionalists• Major power threat• E.g., Russia, India, United States
RMA Enthusiasts• No war for 10-20 years• Time to develop leap-ahead capabilities and technology, develop new doctrine, tactics
Power Projection Advocates• Local wars on China’s periphery• E.g., Taiwan, Vietnam, Central Asian terrorists• More modern and professional
See Michael Pillsbury’s China Debates the Future Security Environment
6
The Goal: Shashoujian
• Simplistically interpreted as “assassin’s mace”– Shashou (hitman), Jian (mace, club sword)
• Roots in antiquity (Tang Dynasty, 618-907 A.D.)• Can be “weapons and equipment” and/or a
“combat method”• Think in terms of “airland battle” or “shock and
awe”• It is a way for the “inferior to defeat the superior”
See Jason Bruzdzinski, Chapter 10, Civil Military Change In China
7
Two Ironies
• Tsien Hsue-shen (Qian Xuesen)– U.S. educated, helped found JPL, worked
classified projects in WWII, expelled from U.S. prior to gaining citizenship, became father of China’s missile program (and was instrumental in establishing PLA OR)
• Sino-American Seminar on Methodologies in Defense Systems Analysis, 1987 and 1988
8
PLA Operations Research
• Models and simulations “main approach” to defense systems analysis
• Computerized simulations, ca. 1979-82• Four approaches to war games
– Semi-empirical (Lanchester)– Empirical (Dupuy)– Monte Carlo (Johnson)– Scientific/theoretical (von Neumann game theory)
9
Chinese War Game Development
• Naval doctrinal evaluation model, 1983• Cost/operational effectiveness of:
– Air defense, 1983– Ground artillery, 1985– Anti-aircraft artillery, 1985
• Great Wall I, tactical model, independent action forces, 1985
• Yangtse River II, division war game, 1986• Air defense battle simulation, 1987
10
War Game Example
• Developed by OR section at AMS about 1986-87
• Division/regiment level• Networked, PC-based• Graphics, data base, Chinese character
processing• Met commander’s requirements for
training
11
Initialize Data:Weapon Index, Unit Combat IndexEnvironmental Data, Attrition Index CoefficientScenario Play Data
Input Control Data
Display:Initial SituationInitial Index Ratio of Both SidesInitial Force Ratio of Both Sides
Manual Intervention Process
Command & Control Sub-Model
Movement Sub-Model
Nuclear Attack Sub-Model
Chemical/Artillery Fire Sub-Model
Air-Ground/Ground-Air Sub-Model
Display:Battle PlayForce TableTwo-Sided Index Attrition Rate
Start
Land Combat Sub-Model
Yes
End
No
Combat Ended?
12
Battle Laboratories
• CPX simulations for training, C2 evaluation, event/mission synchronization
• Got idea from U.S.– At least six battle labs have been stood up
• Other uses– Logistics training, LOGEX– Camouflage, concealment and deception
technology, techniques
13
14
15
16
Influence of Wang Shouyun
• Protégé of Qian Xuesen• Wrote Modern War Game in 1982• Leader of Chinese delegation, Sino-
U.S. Seminar on Methodologies in Defense Systems Analysis, 1987-88
• Secretary general of COSTIND, 1997• Died in a mysterious accident in Dec.
1997
17
Influence of T. N. Dupuy
• Numbers, Predictions and War published in 1977 and read in PLA OR circles
• Lecture tours to China from 1987-1990 +• Understanding War, 1987• Sino-American seminars• Mentioned in dispatches• Well known to Wang Shouyun, COSTIND• QJMA license to CDSTIC, 1988• Multi-front model development, 1989-90
18
Comprehensive National Power
• Chinese derived methodology• Complex, many elements and indices• AMS and CASS versions• Helps to show
– Status hierarchy in world politics– Power potential of rivals and partners– Who will best exploit RMA– Which side will win a war
• Also a rhetorical, political tool
See Michael Pillsbury’s China Debates the Future Security Environment
19
Acquisition Process
• Handout: Comparison of PRC and U.S. acquisition stages/milestones
• Comments on other procurement activities– Planning for visitors– Acquiring information abroad
• CDSTIC and NTIS
20
Institutionalizing Transformation
• State-level and PLA think tanks– CDSTIC, AMS, NDU
• Academic research centers– CAPS
• Semi-private think tanks– Shanghai RimPac Center for Strategic and
International Studies
• Have undergone major changes since late 1990s
21
Vignettes
• Air defense system RDT&E
• New, stovepipe research centers
• CAPS direct contract with PLA
• Radar displays
• Decision making is collective; a shared responsibility; trial balloons often used
