Threat Perception and the Guatemalan Genocide

Threat Perception and the Guatemalan Genocide John Gallant 10025373

POLS 838 Dr. Oded Haklai

December 7th 2016

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Table of Contents Introduction 3 Literature Review Symbolic Politics 4 Historical Context 5 Analysis Majority/Minority Relations in Guatemala 7 Symbolic Politics and Threat Perception 8 Conclusion 15 Index 17 Notes 18 Bibliography 21

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The historical trend of Guatemalan politics is one best characterized by state terror and

responses to it. This began with the events leading up to the 36-‐year Guatemalan civil war,

eventually erupting later into genocide. Created with the purpose of a proxy war between

central powers of the Cold War, this civil war capitalized on legacies of racism crystallized by

capitalist shift in the Guatemalan economy. Chief aggressors in this conflict began as leftist

forces in rural Guatemala against the military controlled state, but gradually moved into a

conflict along racial lines. This conflict against guerilla leftists in the countryside was a direct

product of communist fears instilled by the 1954 American-‐backed coup of Jacobo Arbenz’s

left-‐wing government.1 What ensued was an authoritarian pattern of military leadership,

defined by active suppression of opposition under the pretext of eliminating communist

subversives. However, the genocide itself did not formally occur until the coup and subsequent

assumption of leadership by Efrain Rios Montt and the Guatemalan Republican Front (GRF) who

began violent counterinsurgency operations against Mayans in countryside in fear of leftwing

challenges to the Ladino majority and state legitimacy.2

It is important to establish that the central object of analysis for this paper is the

Guatemalan genocide, rather than the civil war itself. Consequently, the following discussion

will attempt to answer the question how can one explain the extremity of violence against the

Mayans during the Guatemalan genocide? This paper will use the context of the Guatemalan

civil war to account for several elements present in the genocide. To elaborate, the context of

the Guatemalan civil war will be used to analyze the genocide and determine how threat

perception of the Mayans by the Ladino majority is concerned and the utility this has for elites

involved in Guatemala’s authoritarian patterns. In order to understand the rationale behind the

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Mayan genocide it is necessary to observe the historical treatment of Mayans in Guatemala, as

an object of a relationship defined through control. Consequently, the analysis will endeavor to

apply a model of threat perception to the case of the Guatemalan genocide and argue that

there was a strategic deployment of symbolic politics on part of the Guatemalan elite, leading

up to and into the genocide itself. This investigation will begin first with a literature review

surrounding the Guatemalan civil war, followed by a contextualization of the relationship

between the Ladino majority and Mayan minority, and lastly an analysis of the genocide

through a theoretical lens in a specific case study as well as in the elite context. To begin, the

scholarship regarding the Guatemalan genocide would suggest there is a gap in literature

surrounding the application of a threat perception model, and further defining state behavior

as terror instead of repression.

Literature Review

Symbolic Politics

Stuart Kaufman’s Nationalist Passions and Modern Hatreds provide a theoretical basis

for this analysis in the utility of threat perception models for studying ethnic conflict.34

Kaufman’s work argues that prejudice is a long term product of stereotypes and attitudes that

are communicated in the narratives and stories told defining the ethnic group.5 Specifically this

is done so through the manipulation of symbolic predispositions (SYPs) that function as

“durable inclinations people have to feel positively or negatively about an object,

corresponding to an emotion and can be specific or more abstract”.6 Relevant to the analysis of

this paper however Kaufman’s work argues that social threat to a majority is less likely to

encourage violence when compared to a physical threat, and therefore provides the basis of

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distinction for the Guatemalan state as an agent of terror instead of repression during the civil

war. This however comes in contrast to scholarship regarding rational choice explanations for

ethnic conflict, something that will be used for this paper. In particular Russell Hardin’s One for

All: The Logic of Group Conflict provides an account for group conflict informed by rational

choice approaches that is relevant to this analysis.7 This work argues among other approaches

in favour of a ‘hard-‐rationalist’ approach defining ethnic war as a rational pursuit of personal

security, not consistently yielding material benefits.8 Based on majority fears of loss of control

to Mayan minorities in Guatemala, this understanding of rational choice yields explanatory

capacity to the actions of state elites during the civil war and subsequent genocide.

History of the Guatemalan Civil War/Genocide

Barbara Levenson’s Adios Niño provides a historical account of Guatemala with relation

to the behaviour of the state in it’s role as the primary generator of social inequality into the

country’s contemporary society.9 Levenson argues that the conditions of state inequality are

rooted in strict adherence to Weberian notions of state function and as a result gave way to

increased criminal activity in Guatemala, a direct product of the civil war and genocide.10

Levenson’s analysis provides a valuable historical overview for this paper in the critical historical

overview of Guatemala. Specifically Adios Niño provides a broader context for the creation and

function of civilian defense units (PACs) in the country, an important element in the analysis

this paper will execute.11 From an anthropological standpoint however there is a need to

properly contextualize race relations in Guatemala between the Ladino majority and Mayan

minority. The Evolution of Racism in Guatemala: Hegemony, Science, and Anti-‐hegemony by

Richard N. Adams is an anthropological study that provides valuable insight into racism in

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Guatemala and it’s historical variations.12 Adams’ work addresses continuities and variations in

the use of ‘race’ and ‘racism’, recognizing a slow evolution to challenge the hegemonic ideas of

racism in Guatemala towards Mayans.13 This analysis is relevant to the paper as it provides the

sociological basis for a model of threat perception for the Guatemalan genocide. Given

anthropological accounts of minority-‐majority relations in Guatemala, this would serve to

explain to a degree the behaviour of the state in response. Carlos Figueroa-‐Ibarra’s Genocide

and State Terrorism in Guatemala, 1954-‐1996: An Interpretation provides a compelling analysis

of state violence in the country. Figueroa-‐Ibarra contends that the state undermined it’s own

legality in the enactment of genocide, specifically in the decision to move from clandestine

state terror to open violence.14 This analysis is of relevance to this paper in that it provides

support for the application of threat perception models to describe the civil war.

Given the overview there is a gap regarding application of threat perception models to

the Guatemalan genocide. Explanatory capacity has been given to historical legacies and the

behavior of the state and in turn accounts have been broad in their overview and explanation.

This paper will attempt to bridge the theoretical and practical gap by applying a model of threat

perception to the case of Guatemala.

Analysis

Majority-‐Minority Relations in Guatemala

Regarding the composition of Guatemalan society, it is divided principally between the

Ladino majority and the Mayan minority. Comprising 59.4% of Guatemalan demographics,

Ladino is the name given to the majority population characterized by Mestizo-‐Amerindian

heritage.15 This Mestizo majority is of mixed birth and is a product of Spain’s colonial legacy in

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Latin America, therefore explaining their presence as the dominant ethnic group. In contrast,

the Mayan community of Guatemala is composed of several indigenous groups: K’iche 9.1% of

the population, 8.4% is Kaqchikel, 7.9% Mam, 6.3% Q’eqcji, and lastly 8.6% being other Mayan

categories.16 To begin to explain the reason for the extremity of violence enacted towards the

Mayan population of Guatemala in the 1980s there is a need to understand the racial

hierarchies in place that were manipulated in the Guatemalan civil war. Specifically, racism in

Guatemala towards the indigenous population was informed by a biological context, that is to

say it was backed by a created scientific discourse. Borrowing from Euro-‐American colonial

understandings of race, the Maya were understood to be unquestionably depraved, requiring

of forced labor and guidance from the principally white/Mestizo Ladino population.17

Anthropological work has indicated that in the 1960s leading up to the civil war that these racist

structures have moved into a more non-‐hegemonic significance, meaning racist modes of

relation have moved further into cultural spheres and are horizontally disseminated instead of

solely vertical.18 However, in doing so these attitudes have given way to fears that Mayan

accommodation poses a threat to established Ladino power and thus a negotiation is required

to maintain a democratic model where the Ladino majority remains at an advantage.19 In

response to poor representation within the Guatemalan state, Mayan social movements

demanding land and wage reform formed in the 1960s while facing repression.20 This

repression culminated in the burning down of the Spanish Embassy on January 1st 1980, when a

group of Mayan civil rights leaders were trapped inside, laying groundwork for the URNG to

mobilize in the Mayan countryside leading into the Guatemalan civil war.21 The historical trend

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in the relationship between Guatemala’s Ladino majority and Mayan minority indicates an

established basis of tension, that if manipulated can evolve into a perception of threat.

Symbolic Politics and Threat Perception

Threat perception here is best indicated by counterinsurgency campaign initiated by

General Lucas Garcia and later Rios Montt against perceived communist subversives in

Guatemalan countryside. Referred to as Operacion Limpieza (Cleanup) –an offshoot of the

broader Operation Sofia counterinsurgency campaign, the military’s development and

deployment of civil defense patrols (PACs) in the 1980s to confront guerilla presence of the

Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit (URNG) in the countryside is influenced by a rational

calculus on the part of the Guatemalan military and state through manipulation of symbolic

politics.22

Comprised of civilians armed with rifles and machetes, these troops were mobilized to

support already established public presence of the military in Guatemala while being

conscripted into the atrocities that later became known as the Mayan genocide. These patrols

were comprised mainly of Ladino men in addition to captured Mayans in order to destabilize

guerilla opposition and consolidate military power in the Guatemalan state.23 While created by

the military with the intention of protecting the rural population from communist guerillas,

these patrols became the main actor aside from the military in over 200,000 deaths with 83% of

them Mayan and 17% Ladino.24

Given the extreme behavior of civil defense patrols as an extension of the Guatemalan

military under Lucas Garcia and later Rios Montt, some analysis can be offered regarding the

role symbolic politics has played. In particular, the pretext of suppressing communist guerillas is

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an insufficient explanation for the Mayan death toll of the Guatemalan Civil War and genocide,

suggesting that there is something distinctly irrational at least in part explaining this action. This

irrationality motivating the violence is a product of historical grievances fusing with perception

of threat, turning the perception of Mayans in the country into a symbolic predisposition (SYP).

A pivotal event in the usage of symbolic predispositions (SYPs) began with the outset of the

Guatemalan civil war with American funding of counterinsurgency efforts against the

communist insurgency MR-‐13 (Movimiento Revolucionario 13 Noviembre) that had previously

staged failed coups against the Guatemalan state in 1960. In particular, this American funding

and sharing of troops came in response to MR-‐13 forging relationships with pro-‐Soviet Partido

Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT).25 While these revolutionary movements were unsuccessful,

they were indicative of an authoritarian pattern that when combined with pre-‐existing racisms

in Guatemala erupted into the subsequent Mayan genocide. In simpler terms, the fear of

communism became conflated with the fear of Maya which provided a strong impetus for

mobilization of the Ladino majority.

It is here that a model of threat perception possesses utility for the Guatemalan case,

specifically the role SYPs play. Specifically, the pre-‐existing image of Mayans in Guatemala as

inferior to Ladinos functions as a symbol to which certain emotions are associated. In this case

these emotions associated with Mayans well into the 1990s were ones of fear, and the

perception that accommodation would mean unfathomable concessions on the part of Ladinos.

However, in order for SYPs to be manipulated, a process of framing of the Mayan threat was

also necessary by the Guatemalan elite. Framing of Mayans by the Guatemalan state was one

that occurred via the exploitation of pre-‐existing animosities coupled with authoritarian

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traditions. This move to authoritarianism has been through the introduction of increasingly

capitalist economics in Guatemala, resulting largely uneven development.26 What ensued was a

crystallization of class divisions across the country, increasing the likelihood of political violence

as a result. Introduction of right-‐wing authoritarianism in Guatemala took pre-‐existing

Mayan/Ladino divisions and magnified them through the lens of capitalist development.27

Indications of this shift towards increased capitalism can be found in the international response

to state terror in Guatemala, including US funding for the national intelligence apparatus.28

Further evidence of this is indicated by Israel’s support for the Guatemalan state beginning in

1971 through the support of counter-‐insurgency advice, as well as the supplying of arms to the

Guatemalan military.29Framing of the relationship between Mayans and Ladinos then occurred

first through the magnification of class divisions between the two, and then through

international support for this established frame. The historical context would then suggest that

Maya were perceived to pose a social threat in addition to an economic one, given the civil war

and genocide was enacted under the pretext of suppressing communist subversives.

This SYP combined with civilian defense patrols, best illustrates the perception of the

Mayan threat through the example of their deployment in Southern Quiché by the Rios Montt

presidency, specifically the town of Joyabaj.30 This town was subject to violence from the

Guerilla Army of the Poor in 1981, who kidnapped a Ladino mayor and killed his son in the

process.31 This provoked outrage from the town’s Ladino population and provided the

necessary impetus for the military and PACs to intervene.32 The military set up bases in Joyabaj

and shortly after coordinated the use of civil defense patrols to conduct massacres in the

countryside surrounding the town, targeting indigenous Mayan communities.33 These civil

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patrols were often made up of local Ladino members who had close family and military ties that

existed long before the civil war.34 The mode of violence enacted upon rural communities like

Joyabaj has been described as a form of ‘collective torture’ in that it is dictated by a policy of

‘scorched earth’ in which the PACs and military actively seek to eliminate methods of

reproducing and maintaining life through their massacres.35However, after the initial massacres

in the early 1980s the violence in Joyabaj and the surrounding hamlets became less

discriminatory, with massacres of both Ladino and Mayan communities at the hands of the

military and PACs.36 This would indicate that the pretext of exterminating communist

subversives in Southern Quiché for the military waned in favor of more ad hoc interests of the

commanders therein; often issues with family ties and rivalries.37 Towards the end of the

Guatemalan civil war in 1986 these groups became less centralized and more regional in

violence, with selective killings against local challenges to PACs.38

The events in Joyabaj and the surrounding area provide a strong case for the role of

symbolic predispositions (SYPs) in the Guatemalan genocide, with relation to how Maya are

perceived as a threat by Ladinos. The presence of an immediate physical threat in Joyabaj

inferred by the murder of a Ladino citizen provided sufficient impetus by the Ladino population

of the town to support the military/PACs and encourage their involvement through subsequent

massacres. This can be compared to broader instances of threat perception in Guatemala

insofar as Mayans became conflated with communist guerillas over the course of the civil war

thus American imperialism would suggest the perceptions of Mayans as a threat would be more

of an economic nature.

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However, this case presents a conundrum in terms of explaining how SYPs are involved in

the eventual breakdown of relations for the PACs and the Guatemalan military in Southern

Quiché. In particular, what has happened to symbolic predispositions relating to Mayans in

Joyabaj that the objective of racial extermination was shed in favor or pursuing more personal

interests? Using a threat perception model with this case, it appears that the sustainability of

SYPs can be called into question when the ability to enforce it becomes diminished. It appears

that absence of consistent and regular reinforcement of SYPs for the civil defense patrols and

Guatemalan military in the case of Joyabaj resulted in the gradual shift in focus away from

racially-‐motivated violence and movement towards more rational interests. This is to say that

the more splintered this aspect of the genocide became, the harder is was to maintain the

initial motivation. Indeed, this continued well into the resolution of the Guatemalan civil war as

civil defense patrols continued to enact more localized forms of violence that served

community interests instead.39 To wit, it seems that on a low enough level symbolic politics has

a tendency to give way to more a more rational calculus of interests as the sustainability of

symbolic predispositions becomes weaker. While the antithesis of symbolic politics, theories of

rationality are also applicable to the Guatemalan genocide insofar as the actions of elites are

concerned in the initiation of these atrocities.40

While symbolic politics and symbolic predispositions explain the actions of Guatemalans

during the genocide, the actions of the elite leading up to and during the genocide suggest

more of a calculation. Specifically, the circumstances surrounding the behavior of the

Guatemalan state and later Rios Montt’s GRF indicate a more deliberate approach to perceiving

Mayans as a threat and how this can be used for political gain. In particular, the decision to

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alternate between open state terror and clandestine violence illustrates an approach by the

Guatemalan state that is informed by maintaining legitimacy. Following the CIA-‐backed 1954

coup the USA praised Guatemala as a model of development, funding their agricultural and

manufacturing sector as well as the security apparatus.41 This government under Julio Cesar

Mendez Montenegro became characterized by a more clandestine violence, in which activists

and civil rights leaders were murdered or imprisoned.42 Indeed, this behavior often involved

death squads and violence that carried more of a psychological significance for Guatemalans

than a tangible physical one. For the Montenegro presidency then violent action occurred only

insofar as it did not call into question the legitimacy of the state in a more official sense.43

However, this 1954 coup marked a change into a more authoritarian cycle of leadership in

which the Guatemalan state was subject to several coups, eventually installing General Efrain

Rios Montt and the GRF in the 1980s. From here onward into the Guatemalan genocide, state

violence moved from clandestine beginnings into overt state terror. This state violence was

comprised of Rios Montt’s counterinsurgency campaign Operation Sofia and other sub-‐

operations characterized by massacres like the aforementioned ones in rural Quiché.44 The

shift towards state terror however suggests that legitimacy has become more difficult to

maintain for the Guatemalan state, and thus different measures need to be adapted. In terms

of threat perception then it would appear that Rios Montt’s presidency has taken a rational

choice approach to maintaining legitimacy and confronting challenges to the state. On the

surface this economic rational choice approach is indicated by the prioritization of eliminating

communist subversives in Guatemala in that they pose a threat to the national economy and

capitalist ideals. However, this would indicate another aspect to the rational calculus of the

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Guatemalan state in the decision to ‘play ball’ with American interests looking to preserve a

Cold War foothold against communism. On the level of political parties then the decision to

move towards open state violence by the GRF was one underpinned at first by the

extermination of communist subversives, and secondly by the manipulation of pre-‐existing

prejudices against the Mayan community. Given the racial dimension to the counterinsurgency

operations, the GRF’s decision to launch Operation Sofia was one informed by maintaining

legitimacy through manipulation of ethnic prejudices in Guatemala. In theoretical terms, the

Guatemalan genocide was informed by a strategic deployment of SYPs in order to maintain

legitimacy through avoiding falling victim to the authoritarian pattern of coup d’états that

defined politics until then. Given the analysis, the symbolic predispositions present up into the

Guatemalan civil war and genocide were ones informed by attempts by the state to maintain

legitimacy.

However, it would be dismissive to not acknowledge possible modifications or objections to

the argument this paper has presented. To elaborate, an analysis of manipulating ethnic

hatreds runs the risk of being informed by oversimplification of actors and elements involved.

Some argue that the Guatemalan genocide was not in fact a genocide but rather a politicide.45

This is because there was a period during the Guatemalan civil war in which Mayans ceased to

be the single target of state terror, and Ladinos were incorporated into the program of

violence. A similar criticism can be levelled at the fact that PACs both in Southern Quiché and

beyond were comprised of groups beyond simply Ladinos, but rather Mayans who were

conscripted to participate in their own atrocities as well.46 In response then we can return to

the utility of the threat perception model and how SYPs are concerned. This fact that the

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genocide didn’t function with a consistently targeted minority would perhaps mean that the

sustainability of SYPs with relation to the majority was undermined. The crisis of sustaining

symbolic predispositions into the civil war then can be attributed to the leadership in question,

in the eventual failure to continually frame SYPs in such a way that maintained a cohesion of

effort on part of the security apparatus.47 What ensued was a breakdown in the GRF and

previous leaderships’ framing of communist subversives eventually as Mayan minorities;

replaced with more regional motivations and attempts at self-‐preservation. Being aware of this

flaw regarding SYPs in explaining the Guatemalan case, other theories could then compensate

for this deficit in explanation possibly. Indeed, different aspects of Kaufman’s theory of

symbolic politics could explain the deviation from consistent targeting of Mayans during the

genocide due to a manipulation of the myth-‐symbol complex.48 This approach could explain the

change as a voluntary abandonment from following national myths regarding Mayans in favor

of more rational interests, suggesting that the dominant narrative used by leaders in Guatemala

possesses some inherent weaknesses in its enforcement.

Conclusion

This paper has endeavored to strike a balance in the relationship between two opposing

theories of ethnic conflict. That is to say symbolic politics accounts of threat perception

function as responses to rational choice approaches in that they explain accounts of ethnic

violence that defy rationality. The Guatemalan civil war and subsequent genocide present an

example of a complementary relationship between the two, and the nuances therein.

Guatemala illustrates how the manipulation of symbolic predispositions can function for

political gain, albeit in the short term. Specifically, the use of SYPs served as a bulwark against

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challenges to the legitimacy of the Guatemalan state and the Ladino majority, although these

degraded as the civil war continued and ultimately devolved into more regional concerns.

Further aspects of research could be directed to this change and how it relates to overall quality

of the Guatemalan state in turn. Indeed, how this primacy of localized interests relates to

contemporary notions of stability in Guatemalan politics and how this could shape the quality

of democracy for Guatemalans in the future.

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Index Guatemalan Republican Front GRF Symbolic Predispositions SYPs Civilian Defense Patrols (Spanish translation) PACs Guatemalan Revolutionary Unit URNG Movimiento Revolucionario 13 Noviembre MR-‐13 Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo PGT

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Notes 1 “MAR Data | Assessment for Indigenous Peoples in Guatemala." The Minorities at Risk Project. December 31, 2006. Accessed November 6, 2016. http://www.mar.umd.edu/assessment.asp?groupId=9002. 2 Deborah, Levenson-‐Estrada. Adiós Niño: The Gangs of Guatemala City and the Politics of Death. Durham: Duke University Press, 2013. 3 Stuart J. Kaufman Nationalist Passions. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015. 4 Stuart J. Kaufman Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. New York: Cornell University Press, 2001. 5 Ibid. 6 Stuart J. Kaufman Nationalist Passions. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015. 7 Hardin, Russell. One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995. 8 Ibid. 9 Deborah Levenson-‐Estrada. Adiós Niño: The Gangs of Guatemala City and the Politics of Death. Durham: Duke University Press, 2013. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Richard N. Adams. "6. The Evolution of Racism in Guatemala: Hegemony, Science, and Antihegemony." Histories of Anthropology Annual 1, no. 1 (2005): 132-‐180. Https://muse.jhu.edu/ (accessed November 6, 2016). 13 Ibid. 14 Carlos Figueroa Ibarra. "Genocide and State Terrorism in Guatemala, 1954-‐1996: An Interpretation." Bulletin of Latin American Research 32, no. S1 (2013): 151-‐73. Accessed November 06, 2016. doi:10.1111/blar.12111. 15 Central Intelligence Agency. "The World Factbook-‐ Central America And Caribbean: Guatemala." Central Intelligence Agency. November 10, 2016. Accessed November 21, 2016. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-‐world-‐factbook/geos/gt.html. 16 Ibid. 17 Richard N. Adams. "6. The Evolution of Racism in Guatemala: Hegemony, Science, and Antihegemony." Histories of Anthropology Annual 1, no. 1 (2005): 132-‐180. Https://muse.jhu.edu/ (accessed November 6, 2016). 18 Ibid. 19 Mario Roberto, Morales. "Ladino Es El Que No Quiere Ser Indio, Y Punto." Siglo Veintiuno, no. 15 (June 23, 1997). 20 Richard N. Adams. "6. The Evolution of Racism in Guatemala: Hegemony, Science, and Antihegemony." Histories of Anthropology Annual 1, no. 1 (2005): 132-‐180. Https://muse.jhu.edu/ (accessed November 6, 2016). 21 "Maya -‐ Minority Rights Group." Minority Rights Group. July 2008. Accessed November 06, 2016. http://minorityrights.org/minorities/maya-‐2/.

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22Simone Remijnse. "Remembering Civil Patrols in Joyabaj, Guatemala." Bull Latin American Research Bulletin of Latin American Research 20, no. 4 (2001): 454-‐69. Accessed November 06, 2016. doi:10.1111/1470-‐9856.00025. 23 Jeremy Ross, and Betsy Konefal. "Civil Patrols, Race, and Repression in Guatemala, 1982-‐1996." Undergraduate thesis, College of William and Mary, 2016. 24 "Truth Commission: Guatemala." United States Institute of Peace. Accessed November 06, 2016. http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-‐commission-‐guatemala. 25, G. De la Peña "Rural Mobilizations in Latin America since C. 1920’." In The Cambridge History of Latin America, 379-‐482. Cambridge University Press, 1995. 26 Carlos Figueroa Ibarra “Genocide and State Terorrism in Guatemala” 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Cheryl, Rubenberg. "Israel and Guatemala | Middle East Research and Information Project." Middle East Research and Information Project. Accessed November 27, 2016. http://www.merip.org/mer/mer140/israel-‐guatemala. 30Simone Remijnse. "Remembering Civil Patrols in Joyabaj, Guatemala." Bull Latin American Research Bulletin of Latin American Research 20, no. 4 (2001): 454-‐69. Accessed November 06, 2016. doi:10.1111/1470-‐9856.00025 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Deborah Levenson-‐Estrada. Adiós Niño: The Gangs of Guatemala City and the Politics of Death. Durham: Duke University Press, 2013. 36 Simone Remijnse. "Remembering Civil Patrols in Joyabaj, Guatemala." Bull Latin American Research Bulletin of Latin American Research 20, no. 4 (2001): 454-‐69. Accessed November 06, 2016. doi:10.1111/1470-‐9856.00025 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Stuart J. Kaufman Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. New York: Cornell University Press, 2001. 41 Deborah Levenson-‐Estrada. Adiós Niño: The Gangs of Guatemala City and the Politics of Death. Durham: Duke University Press, 2013. 42 Ibid. 43 Carlos Figueroa Ibarra. "Genocide and State Terrorism in Guatemala, 1954-‐1996: An Interpretation." Bulletin of Latin American Research 32, no. S1 (2013): 151-‐73. Accessed November 06, 2016. doi:10.1111/blar.12111. 44 Simone Remijnse. "Remembering Civil Patrols in Joyabaj, Guatemala." Bull Latin American Research Bulletin of Latin American Research 20, no. 4 (2001): 454-‐69. Accessed November 06, 2016. doi:10.1111/1470-‐9856.00025

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45 Carlos Figueroa Ibarra. "Genocide and State Terrorism in Guatemala, 1954-‐1996: An Interpretation." Bulletin of Latin American Research 32, no. S1 (2013): 151-‐73. Accessed November 06, 2016. doi:10.1111/blar.12111. 46, Deborah Levenson-‐Estrada. Adiós Niño: The Gangs of Guatemala City and the Politics of Death. Durham: Duke University Press, 2013. 47 Stuart J. Kaufman Nationalist Passions. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015. 47 Stuart J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds 2001

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Bibliography Richard N. Adams. "6. The Evolution of Racism in Guatemala: Hegemony, Science, and Antihegemony." Histories of Anthropology Annual 1, no. 1 (2005): 132-‐180. Https://muse.jhu.edu/ (accessed November 6, 2016). "MAR Data | Assessment for Indigenous Peoples in Guatemala." The Minorities at Risk Project. December 31, 2006. Accessed November 6, 2016. http://www.mar.umd.edu/assessment.asp?groupId=9002. Hardin, Russell. One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995. Ibarra, Carlos Figueroa. "Genocide and State Terrorism in Guatemala, 1954-‐1996: An Interpretation." Bulletin of Latin American Research 32, no. S1 (2013): 151-‐73. Accessed November 06, 2016. doi:10.1111/blar.12111. Kaufman, Stuart J. Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. New York: Cornell University Press, 2001. Kaufman, Stuart J. Nationalist Passions. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015. Levenson-‐Estrada, Deborah. Adiós Niño: The Gangs of Guatemala City and the Politics of Death. Durham: Duke University Press, 2013. "Maya -‐ Minority Rights Group." Minority Rights Group. July 2008. Accessed November 06, 2016. http://minorityrights.org/minorities/maya-‐2/. Morales, Mario Roberto. "Ladino Es El Que No Quiere Ser Indio, Y Punto." Siglo Veintiuno, no. 15 (June 23, 1997). "Truth Commission: Guatemala." United States Institute of Peace. Accessed November 06, 2016. http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-‐commission-‐guatemala. Remijnse, Simone. "Remembering Civil Patrols in Joyabaj, Guatemala." Bull Latin American Research Bulletin of Latin American Research 20, no. 4 (2001): 454-‐69. Accessed November 06, 2016. doi:10.1111/1470-‐9856.00025. Ross, Jeremy, and Betsy Konefal. "Civil Patrols, Race, and Repression in Guatemala, 1982-‐1996." Master's thesis, College of William and Mary, 2016. Cheryl, Rubenberg. "Israel and Guatemala | Middle East Research and Information Project." Middle East Research and Information Project. Accessed November 27, 2016. http://www.merip.org/mer/mer140/israel-‐guatemala.

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De la Peña, G. "Rural Mobilizations in Latin America since C. 1920’." In The Cambridge History of Latin America, 379-‐482. Cambridge University Press, 1995. Central Intelligence Agency. "The World Factbook-‐ Central America And Caribbean: Guatemala." Central Intelligence Agency. November 10, 2016. Accessed November 21, 2016. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-‐world-‐factbook/geos/gt.html.

Documents

Threat Perception and the Guatemalan Genocide