“Though it be European Law, Yet There is Method” Some Methodological Challenges of European...
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“Though it be European Law, Yet There is Method” Some Methodological Challenges of European Union Law Prof. Dr. Sebastian Martens, M.Jur. (Oxon.) sebastian.martens@uni- passau.de
“Though it be European Law, Yet There is Method” Some Methodological Challenges of European Union Law Prof. Dr. Sebastian Martens, M.Jur. (Oxon.) [email protected]
Though it be European Law, Yet There is Method Some
Methodological Challenges of European Union Law Prof. Dr. Sebastian
Martens, M.Jur. (Oxon.) [email protected]
Slide 2
Lecture structure: I.European Legal Method some preliminary
thoughts 1.The concept of legal method 2.The reason of a reasoning
3.Valid arguments 4.Functions of the reasoning II.Challenges for a
method of European Union Law 1.The diversity of expectations 2.The
unclear normativity of the legal sources a.The ever growing number
of legal sources b.Unresolved hierarchical problems 3.The vagenuess
of the texts a.One meaning and 24 language versions b.Politics and
open compromises III.Conclusion
Slide 3
I.European Legal Method some preliminary thoughts 1. The
concept of legal method : (with, to; indicating direction), (path,
way) Method as a systematic procedure to achieve a certain goal
What is the goal of a lawyer? Many different goals many different
legal methods Paradigmatic legal job: the judge Methods for a
judge: a method to come to the right decision a method to produce
the right decision
Slide 4
I.European Legal Method some preliminary thoughts 1. The
concept of legal method : (with, to; indicating direction), (path,
way) Method as a systematic procedure to achieve a certain goal
What is the goal of a lawyer? Many different goals many different
legal methods Paradigmatic legal job: the judge Methods for a
judge: a method to come to the right decision a method to produce
the right decision The right decision: the decision that will or
has to be accepted by its adressees
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2. The reason of a reasoning Reasons for accepting a judgment:
The authority of god or some higher person backing the judgment The
authority of the court itself The reasons given for the judgment
pragmatic truth or correctness: a proposition is true or correct if
there are no reasonable doubts about it The reasoning has to show
that there are no reasonable doubts as to the judgement Potentially
reasonable doubts to be addressed: All arguments brought forward in
the process All arguments generally used in the discourse (esp.:
the herrschende Meinung, leading opinion)
Slide 6
3. Valid arguments Distinguish: Legal arguments: backed by
legal sources Extra-legal arguments: backed by other authorities
Only legal arguments are valid within a legal system Courts as
institutions of a legal system may only use legal arguments
Extra-legal arguments have to be translated into legal arguments
Courts have to show why their arguments are (not) legally relevant,
ie. that the arguments can/cannot be backed by legal sources
Slide 7
4. Functions of the reasoning: 1.Within the judicial system For
the deciding judge: needs to reflect on the judgment and its
correctness For superior courts: can check the judgment For
inferior courts: can understand the judgment and apply its ratio
decidendi 2.Outside the judicial system With respect to the
specific process itself For the parties: are respected as subjects
For the general public: can controll the courts Independent of the
specific process: reasoning serves transparency and enhances
reliance
Slide 8
II. Challenges for a method of European Union Law 1.The
diversity of expectations Many different addressees The parties The
European institutions The member states The national courts The
general public Different national styles of judgments generate
different expectations A single style to meet all expectations? The
ECJ as creator of a common European legal method? in dubio pro
argumentatione
Slide 9
2. The unclear normativity of the legal sources a.The ever
growing number of legal sources Statute as paradigm of a legal
source in the Civil law Normativity traditionally binary Common law
allows for a third option: persuasive authority Traditional concept
insufficient to explain the normativity of European legal sources
New definition: A legal source is a normative sentence whose
normativity qua positiveness (Satzung) can be justified as being
legal within a legal system Normativity qua positiveness means
normativity independent of content just qua creation
Slide 10
Legal Sources of European Union law 1.Primary Law The treaties
Charter of fundamental rights 2.General Principles Distinguish: GP
derived from national law of member states GP derived from primary
and secondary Union law GP derived from international law
Normativity dependent on basis 3.International law International
law binding on EU only insofar as fundamental principles are
respected (freedom, democracy, human rights, Kadi-decision)
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299. [I]t is not a consequence of the principles governing the
international legal order under the United Nations that any
judicial review of the internal lawfulness [] is excluded by virtue
of the fact that that measure is intended to give effect to a
resolution of the Security Council []. 300. What is more, such
immunity from jurisdiction for a Community measure [] cannot find a
basis in the EC Treaty. 303. [Artt. 297, 307 EC {Artt. 347, 351
TFEU}] cannot [] be under- stood to authorise any derogation from
the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights
and fundamental free- doms enshrined in Article 6(1) EU as a
foundation of the Union. 304. Article 307 EC may in no
circumstances permit any challenge to the principles that form part
of the very foundations of the Community legal order, one of which
is the protection of fundamental rights, including the review by
the Community judicature of the lawfulness of Community measures as
regards their consistency with those fundamental rights.
Slide 12
4.Secondary law Art. 288 para. 1 TFEU: regulations, directives
and decisions No special normativity of legislative acts within the
meaning of Art. 289 para. 3 TFEU 5.Case-law Generally
factually-binding effect admitted ECJ reluctant to (openly)
overrule its precedents Stability of case-law promotes legal values
Open balancing of conflicting values important 6.Soft law Unclear
concept: Something between hard law and no law Unclear
normativity
Slide 13
6.Soft law (continued) Vague normative force as a reason for
increasing use a threat for the legal order 7.Customary law
Theoretically possible, but of little practical relevance
8.Academic writings The status of privately drafted principles The
value of a leading opinion (hM) The need for a European legal
community 9.Natural law (Currently) no direct recourse
possible
Slide 14
b.Unresolved hierarchical problems i.Hierarchical problems
within European Union Law Hierarchies within primary law?
Fundamental freedoms and human rights General principles and
secondary law The Mangold-case Changing the effect of directives by
inventing general principles? The normativity of aims and rules The
judiciability of aims Promoting the European Union and effet
utile
Slide 15
ii.Hierarchical problems among Europes many courts The ECJ and
national constitutional courts The ECJ and the ECtHR
Bosphorus-decision (30.6.2005 45036/98)
Slide 16
156. If such equivalent protection is considered to be provided
by the organisation, the presumption will be that a State has not
departed from the requirements of the Convention when it does no
more than implement legal obligations flowing from its membership
of the organisation. However, any such presumption can be rebutted
if, in the circumstances of a particular case, it is considered
that the protection of Convention rights was manifestly deficient.
In such cases, the interest of international co-operation would be
outweighed by the Conventions role as a constitutional instrument
of European public order in the field of human rights [] 165. In
such circumstances, the Court finds that the protection of
fundamental rights by Community law can be considered to be, and to
have been at the relevant time, equivalent [] to that of the
Convention system. []
Slide 17
ii.Hierarchical problems among Europes many courts The ECJ and
national constitutional courts The ECJ and the ECtHR
Bosphorus-decision (30.6.2005 45036/98) Opinion 2/13 and the
accession to the ECHR
Slide 18
245. The interpretation of a provision of EU law, including of
secondary law, requires, in principle, a decision of the Court of
Justice where that provision is open to more than one plausible
interpretation. 246. If the Court of Justice were not allowed to
provide the definitive interpretation of secondary law, and if the
ECtHR, in considering whether that law is consistent with the ECHR,
had itself to provide a particular interpretation from among the
plausible options, there would most certainly be a breach of the
principle that the Court of Justice has exclusive jurisdiction over
the definitive interpretation of EU law. 247. Accordingly, limiting
the scope of the prior involvement procedure, in the case of
secondary law, solely to questions of validity adversely affects
the competences of the EU and the powers of the Court of Justice in
that it does not allow the Court to provide a definitive
interpretation of secondary law in the light of the rights
guaranteed by the ECHR.
Slide 19
ii.Hierarchical problems among Europes many courts The ECJ and
national constitutional courts The ECJ and the ECtHR
Bosphorus-decision (30.6.2005 45036/98) Opinion 2/13 and the
accession to the ECHR The necessary claims of a legal system to
autonomy to sovereignty Interlocking legal orders and a necessary
modus vivendi of their courts Solange (as long)-deference:
residuary control and the protection of a minimal standard
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3. The vagenuess of the texts a.One meaning and 24 language
versions ECJ does not prefer any language version Same normative
force of all language versions Divergences hardly avoidable
Relevance of literal meaning weakoned Comparatively greater
importance of other arguments
Slide 21
25. According to the settled case-law of the Court, the meaning
and scope of terms for which EU law provides no definition must be
determined by reference to their usual meaning in everyday
language, while account is also taken of the context in which they
occur and the purposes of the rules of which they form part []. 26.
Additionally, interpreting a provision of Union law involves a
comparison of the language versions []. Where there is divergence
between the various language versions, the provision in question
must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and general scheme
of the rules of which it forms part []. 27. In this instance,
neither the usual meaning of the term spring, which may be
understood to mean either the point of emergence of the water or
the point of origin of the water more generally, nor the comparison
of the various language versions [] allay the doubts raised by the
referring court []. 28. It is therefore necessary, for the purposes
of the interpreta-tion sought, to consider the context [], as well
as considering the general scheme and purpose of that directive
more broadly. ECJ, 24.6.2015 C-207/14 (Hotel Sava Rogaka)
Slide 22
3. The vagenuess of the texts a.One meaning and 24 language
versions ECJ does not prefer any language version Same normative
force of all language versions Divergences hardly avoidable
Relevance of literal meaning weakoned Comparatively greater
importance of other arguments Context General scheme Purpose
Increase of judicial power by (possible) divergences
Slide 23
b.Politics and open compromises Need for consensus leads to
open compromises Intentionally vague drafting: Unclear rules Use of
recitals Use of aims instead of rules Normative decision avoided by
legislative organs and delegated to ECJ Special role of
teleological interpretation effet utile as a necessary tool to
develop European legal sources
Slide 24
III.Conclusion Value of a judgment lies in its reasoning Theory
of argumentation as (the) method for ECJ Special challenges for
ECJ: Variety of expectations Unclear normativity of legal sources
Vagueness of the texts Distinction between politics and law becomes
blurred in EU-Law Special features of EU-law force ECJ to be the
engine of integration ECJ as suitable institution to form a Europe
united in diversity?