ThompsonMR - Off the Endangered List Philippine Democratization in Comparative Perspective

8/14/2019 ThompsonMR - Off the Endangered List Philippine Democratization in Comparative Perspective

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/thompsonmr-off-the-endangered-list-philippine-democratization-in-comparative 1/28

Off the Endangered List: Philippine Democratization in Comparative PerspectiveAuthor(s): Mark R. ThompsonSource: Comparative Politics, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Jan., 1996), pp. 179-205Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New YorkStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/421980Accessed: 10/01/2010 22:35

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=phd .

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,preserve and extend access to Comparative Politics.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/stable/421980?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=phd

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=phd

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/stable/421980?origin=JSTOR-pdf



Off the Endangered List

Philippine Democratization in Comparative Perspective

Mark R. Thompson

The Philippines has long been on the "most endangered ist" of new democracies.There have been more coup attempts (eight) in the Philippines than in any other

"third wave" democratizer.'1 t is one of only a few states to still face a Communistinsurgency. Moreover, many civilian, noncommunist politicians were openlydisloyal to the government of Corazon C. Aquino, including her vice president,Salvador H. Laurel. These political problems are compounded by socioeconomicdifficulties. The Philippines is plagued by extreme poverty and inequality, highdebt, and low growth, as well as by ethnic conflict (not to mention the series ofnatural disasters that has aggravated many of these factors), leading it to be rankedas one of the four new democracies outside of Africa facing the worst structuralwoes.2 Former President Aquino made little progress n remedying these problems:the

economy laggedever further behind its fast

growing neighborsin the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and only very limited social,particularly and, reform was undertaken. Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, andJohn Higley in their comparative study of democratization described thePhilippines as "a graphic instance of a democracy that remains unconsolidated."3

Yet something peculiar happened on the way to what appeared to be theinevitable breakdown of democracy in the Philippines. Since the failed December1989 coup there have been no significant armed challenges to the democraticregime. Instead, a dwindling New People's Army, a largely inactive Muslimseparatist movement, and a few isolated military rebels were self-destructingthrough nternal actional struggles while negotiating from a position of weaknesswith the government. Fidel V. Ramos's election as president n May 1992 was alsoa clear sign of growing political stability. Although he won with the tiniest ofpluralities (23.6 percent), five of his six major opponents conceded defeat, whichis quite unusual in a country where cries of electoral fraud are a long establishedritual. Ramos, whose Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats party won lessthan a fourth of the seats in the house of representatives nd placed only third n thenumber of senators elected, was nonetheless able to establish a workingrelationship with both houses of congress.

The recent successes of Philippinedemocracy

can be understoodonly

in thecontext of its previous difficulties. Relatively little has been written about the

179



Comparative Politics January 1996

Philippine ransition hat puts it into comparative political perspective.4 One reasonfor this neglect is that the Philippines is a problem child of the literature ondemocratization. Ferdinand E. Marcos was one of only very few "standpatterdictators" n a wave of worldwide democratization n which authoritarian-initiatedtransition often called regime extrication) was the dominant path to democracy.5As opposition to Marcos's regime mounted, he refused to begin the process ofdemocratization, and "the military as institution" did not force him to do so.Marcos clung to power as long as he could because, unlike more institutionalizeddictatorships, the personal character of his rule meant there were no collectiveinterests that could be saved once he relinquished office. He had to be broughtdown because he would never step down. Thus, democratization n the Philippines

had a revolutionary ogic more similar to the fall of Duvalier in Haiti, the shah ofIran, and Somoza in Nicaragua han to most successful democratizations. For muchof the dictatorship it appeared that Marcos would be defeated by the armedopposition and not the moderates. Democratization did not begin withregime-opposition negotiations leading to founding elections but rather with the"people power" revolt after rigged polls. Democratic legitimacy took longer toestablish and battles among opposition groups were bloodier in the Philippines thanin most other recent transitions. The legacy of the overthrow of Marcos explainsthe troubled nature of Philippine democratization compared to authoritarian-initiated transitions.

Philippine democracy was consolidated after the May 1992 elections, even if itremains risk-prone.6 Democratic transition, which is commonly distinguished romconsolidation, had been completed earlier. A new constitution, overwhelminglyapproved n February 1987, established democratic procedures and spelled out civilliberties, while after the May 1987 congressional and January 1988 local electionsall major politicians in the country were popularly elected (with Aquino herselfbeing widely seen to have been the winner of the February 1986 presidentialballoting). But continued armed challenges to the regime meant that democraticconsolidation, defined as strong popular support or democratic nstitutions and the

absence of major disloyal opposition to the regime, had not yet been achieved.While there is much evidence that Philippine democracy enjoyed popularlegitimacy after the success of "people power," the "overthrow" character of thePhilippine transition made the establishment of elite consensus difficult. Militaryopponents continued to seek power, not just defend institutional interests. Anumber of "moderate" politicians supported coup attempts against the regime.Communists remained revolutionaries, rather than adopting electoral means. Butconcessions to the military hierarchy and limits on socioeconomic reform gaveAquino's government he time it needed to hold a series of elections that graduallyundermined disloyal opposition and restored he pre-martial-law ules of the game.

Dangers to the Philippine's current state of relative political tranquility remain,

180



Mark R. Thompson

however. While there is presently no major disloyal opposition, a large gapbetween legitimacy and efficacy, or, to put it more simply, between democraticgovernment and good government, can allow the growth of antisystem forces,particularly when poor performance comes to be perceived as political crisis.Whether Filipino democracy can be sustained if the country does not progress(particularly conomically) is the major question facing Philippine political leaderstoday.

This article first contrasts authoritarian-initiated ransitions ypical of democrati-zation in institutionalized dictatorships with the overthrow transitions necessitatedby personalized nondemocratic rule. I then suggest that a standpatter dictatorshipadvantages armed opposition and that in the Philippines Communist nsurgents and

military rebels often appeared to be Marcos's most important enemies. Why themoderate opposition could take power despite the overthrow character of thetransition will then be briefly discussed. The third and fourth sections concern thetransition tself, the former concentrating on the challenges to and the latter on thesurvival of the Aquino government. The conclusion discusses democraticconsolidation and potential threats to democracy in the future.

Authoritarian-Initiated Transitions and Standpatter Dictators

While popular protest against dictatorship s usually the most spectacular aspect ofdemocratization, n most recent transitions authoritarian ulers themselves, thoughoften reacting to strong opposition pressure, actually initiated he process of regimechange before being forced to do so. Many nondemocratic egimes decided that therisks of holding on to power for too long were greater than the disadvantages ofdemocracy. This calculation derived from the collective interests at stake in thehighly institutionalized authoritarian egimes of southern Europe, Latin America,eastern Europe, and East Asia, regardless of whether they were military or civilian,Communist or anticommunist n character.7 "Overstaying" in power involved a

number of dangers for authoritarian ulers, from factionalization within the regime(that could eventually prompt a coup attempt) to popular alienation (which couldultimately ead to an insurrection). By initiating a transition, such hazards could beavoided, while hopes were high that at least some key interests could be protectedunder a democracy. Ex-authoritarians ften tried to win free elections (and whendefeated on their first try sometimes succeeded on the second, as in Lithuania andPoland), to maintain he status of a key state institution for example, the "militaryas institution"), to keep as many of their bureaucratic posts as possible, to avoidprosecution by the new regime, and/or to convert political power into economicwealth. It was considered better to give in and salvage something than to fight onand perhaps ose all.

181




The wisdom of an authoritarian-initiated ransition was shown by the dangers ofoverthrow. In the first transition of the current wave of democratization, inPortugal in 1974, the Salazar-Caetano egime clung to office despite its growingunpopularity n and outside of government. It was toppled by a nonhierarchicalcoup (the leaders of which were popularly called "the captains") that led to twoyears of political instability as junior and senior officers, the military and civilians,and radicals and moderates all clashed with each other. Portugal's difficultiesserved as an admonition to dictators not to miss the chance of insuring aninstitutionalized transition and influenced the development of the regime-negotiated transition model in Spain, many Latin American countries, Poland,Hungary, and much of French-speaking Africa.8

But in the Philippines, as well as in Haiti, Iran, Nicaragua, and Romania,warnings to initiate a transition before it was too late were ignored because of thepersonalistic nature of their regimes. Personal rule means there are few collectiveinterests that can be protected once power has been relinquished. Because theyserve no class, institutional, or other major social interests, personalisticdictatorships njoy little or no legitimacy outside of a small ruling circle of familyand friends. The politicization of the economy favors the nouveaux riches in powerand antagonizes the "old wealth" which lacks political connections. Dictators arelittle concerned about the professional standing of key state institutions becausethey are organized on the basis of loyalty more than on competence. Thispatrimonialization f the state makes the orderly removal of the dictator by themilitary hierarchy or ruling party organization unlikely. Since authoritarian familyaffairs" alienate so many social groups, there is little hope the regime can wincompetitive elections or retain an important place in society after the transition.Once they leave office, personalistic dictators usually must go into exile (if they arenot killed before they can flee).

Marcos's dictatorship was one of only a handful of highly personalisticdictatorships in the second half of the twentieth century.9 Although initiallyenjoying considerable egitimacy due to promises of reform after the declaration of

martial aw in 1972, support or the Marcos regime declined as corruption mountedand the circle of beneficiaries narrowed.'0 While the distribution of patronage haddominated politics before martial law, it had been tempered by democraticconstraints. With the advent of authoritarianism, restraints on personalaccumulation n high political office were removed.

Marcos's rule was centered around his family and friends, who patrimonializedstate institutions and extorted wealth from society. After declaring martial law,Marcos seized a number of his enemies' assets. Foreign investors (and severalFilipino firms) had to give 10-25 percent of their equity gratis et amore to Marcosor one of his associates in order to receive necessary government permits.'1Billions of dollars in foreign aid and loans to the Philippines ended up in private

182



Mark R. Thompson

bank accounts, a major cause of the country's debt crisis.'12 Government inancialinstitutions were looted, and the country's gold reserves mysteriously declined.'3The first lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos, the second most powerful person ingovernment controlling among other things a major ministry and the governorshipof Metro Manila), was notorious for her extortive business behavior andextravagant spending habits. Other Marcos-Romualdez amily members also heldhigh state positions in the government or state-controlled corporations (whichincreased in number rom sixty-five in 1970 to 303 in 1985), which they used forpersonal profit.'14 The financial reach of the Marcoses was further xtended througha kind of subcontracting of corruption to their close friends known as "cronycapitalism."'15

Armed forces chief of staff Fabiran Ver was not a military professional but a"political" general whose fortunes were tied to Marcos's (Ver had once served ashis chauffeur).16 Thus, an internal move by the military hierarchy against Marcos,similar to the army's removal of the authoritarian overnment n Argentina after theFalklands/Malvinas debacle, was ruled out after the assassination of Aquinodestroyed the Philippine president's credibility. Personalism precluded a transitioninitiated from within authoritarian tructures, making the overthrow of Marcosnecessary for democratization.

Marcos did liberalize his rule somewhat in the face of crisis. He allowed morepress freedom and often tolerated demonstrations after the lifting of marital aw in1981 and particularly after Aquino's killing in 1983. Elections were again heldregularly beginning in 1978, and the 1984 legislative polls were more competitivethan previous ones. But unlike the Uruguayan military regime, which yieldedoffice after losing a constitutional referendum and presidential election, Marcoshad no intention of letting himself be voted from power.17 He continued to rig theballoting to insure his hold on the presidency, and there were indications he wasplanning a dynastic succession to perpetuate amilial power.

When reformers win the upper hand against hardliners in institutionalizeddictatorships, they often begin by liberalizing authoritarian ule and, if social

pressure ncreases, proceed to democratize he regime. Reformers take these stepsbecause they have interests that can be better protected under democraticgovernment than with repression of popular protest.18 However, due to thepersonalistic nature of the Marcos regime, a move from liberalization todemocratization n the Philippines was blocked. Marcos lessened repression, not aspart of a reform effort, but as a strategic move in the face of mounting protest.When demonstrations ontinued to grow, he did not initiate democratic transitionbut instead planned a military crackdown because his "family business" wasdependent upon a continued monopoly on political power.'9 Personalistic rulerslike Marcos have usually remained standpatter dictators even after a politicalopening has taken place.

183




Radical and Moderate Opposition in an Overthrow Transition

A growing literature uggests that highly personalistic dictatorships are particularlyvulnerable to revolutions led by the most radical elements in the opposition.20Initiation of transitions by reformers within institutionalized authoritarian egimesusually privileges moderate oppositionists willing to negotiate with the regime andmarginalizes radicals who insist upon its overthrow. But under personal rule theprobabilities are reversed. Standpatter ictators must be toppled, and radicals, oftenarmed, seem in the best position to topple them.21

Armed revolutionary oppositions did not prosper under bureaucratic-

authoritarian egimes in South America in the 1970s and 1980s, and the Philippineswas the only country in Southeast Asia outside of Indochina with a majorCommunist guerrilla insurgency during this period. In better institutionalizedauthoritarian regimes, the military is sufficiently professional to subduerevolutionary militias. The patrimonialization f the Philippine military undercutits fighting effectiveness, antagonized much of the populace through arbitraryrepression, and thus helped transform a small Communist movement into a majorrevolutionary hreat. The New People's Army (NPA) grew from several hundredfighters before martial aw to 8,000 in 1980 and 20,000 in 1983 despite the neartripling of the size of the armed forces during this same period.22 Aside fromcorrupting institutional military structures, General Veer concentrated themilitary's elite battalions in Manila to protect Marcos, thereby sapping theantiinsurgency effort in the countryside. Socioeconomic decay under Marcos-declining real wages, rising rural poverty, growing landlessness, and rampantcorruption-also provided fertile ground for guerrilla growth. The Communistscapitalized on this explosive situation; their recruiting proved particularlysuccessful in coconut and sugar growing regions where "crony" monopolies keptwages low.23 Impressed by the NPA's armed strength and its allied "mass-based"organizations, politicians opposed to Marcos began to work closely with the

Communists in "united front" activities, particularly around the boycott of thefraudulent 1981 presidential elections.24 In the early 1980s it appeared that thePhilippines was heading down a via revolucionaria much like Nicaragua's.

In reaction to the patrimonialization f the military and the rise of a revolutionarychallenge, dissidents within the armed forces are likely to conspire against theregime.25 Unable to achieve changes through the military hierarchy, they insteadplot a coup from the lower ranks. In the Philippines, defense minister Juan PonceEnrile, whose authority had been undermined by General Ver, found a base ofsupport among junior officers upset by massive corruption n the armed forces.26Armed forces vice chief of staff Ramos, who had also been supplanted by Ver, waswell aware of the activities of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM).27

184



Mark R. Thompson

RAM began to plot a coup in the early 1980s and planned to establish a junta, asin Haiti after Duvalier's overthrow.

It has been suggested hat the key variable hat kept the Philippines rom succumb-ing to a revolution or coup was its democratic radition.'8 t is true that, compared oHaiti, Iran, and Nicaragua, where the toppling of personalistic dictatorships id notlead (at least directly) to the establishment of democracy, the Philippines had arelatively ong history of political pluralism going back to the "colonial democracy"of the American era.29 But how did this political tradition, which was far from theideal type of democracy, prove useful in the antidictatorship truggle?

Theorists of political clientelism have stressed that a largely landed oligarchydominated the two major-ideologically identical and socially interchangeable-

parties that regularly alternated in power in post-World War II Philippinedemocracy.30 Both the Liberals and the Nacionalistas were based on patron-clientpyramids that stretched from national politicians to local leaders, who in turnmobilized the poor peasantry. Characterized by observers as "raw democracy,"elections were expensive (they were based on material incentives, not ideologicaldebates) and violent (the economic stakes of holding political power were high).3'

Yet there were clearly defined rules of the game: the military was to stay neutral,allowing a "balance of terror" between regime and opposition at the local level,and the use of government patronage was limited by the state's small fiscalcapacity, giving the opposition a chance to compete through its own clientelistnetworks. "Structural" explanations of the collapse of Philippine democracy,stressing either the country's worsening socioeconomic problems or the rising costsof clientelism, overlook the sturdiness of the Philippine political system until themid 1960s.32 As long as the incumbent president did not go too far in seekingreelection and the opposition party had a good chance to win the country's highestoffice (as it did in 1946, 1953, 1961, and 1965), Philippine democracy despite allits weaknesses remained stable. Democracy broke down when Marcos violated therules of the game during his legal presidency through unprecedented electoralspending and election related violence. Marcos used the ensuing polarization of

Philippine politics to justify the declaration of martial aw.33 Dictatorship changedthe rules altogether, as patronage-hungry ocal politicians henceforth had tocompete for presidential avor.

Although the restoration of elections in 1978 (however fraudulent) reactivatedthe national political enemies of Marcos who had no chance to benefit from hislargess, the outrage after the assassination of Aquino in 1983 provided the popularsupport that old-guard politicians needed to offset Marcos's clientelist advantage.This electoral road has seldom been taken against personalistic authoritarianregimes. Unlike elite oppositionists in Nicaragua, who moved closer to theSandinistas after the killing of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, opposition politicians inthe Philippines broke their contacts with the radical eft to participate n elections.34

185




While Nicaraguan opposition politicians remained doubtful about the utility ofelections, Filipino oppositionists were confident they could build an antidictator-ship movement around the ballot box. This "moralist" side of Philippine politicshas been neglected in many studies of clientelism and "warlordism" n electoralcampaigns.35 When oppositionists were widely outspent and violently intimidatedby incumbents before martial law, they utilized their underdog position to makedirect moral appeals to the electorate. Drawing on U.S. models of urban reformmovements, they advocated, not populist politics against a corrupt elite, but rathera multiclass struggle "to save democracy" from abusive incumbents.36 Suchcampaigns drew on popular beliefs about good government and could evenoverride the greater material rewards offered the electorate by the party in power.37

Similar to Ramon Magsaysay's Manichean campaign rhetoric against incumbentpresident Elpidio Quirino in 1953, Corazon Aquino portrayed her presidentialbattle with Marcos as good versus evil.38 Seen from the perspective of clientelisttheory, Aquino had little electoral hope against her well funded (and armed)opponent, what Filipinos call the "goons, guns, and gold" factor. But throughmoral appeals she actually won the election, even if Marcos rigged the counting.39The U.S. government's role was also important: t learned some valuable lessonsfrom the Nicaraguan debacle and skilfully encouraged he traditional opposition totake part in elections held by Marcos.40 Further, Marcos's dependence on the U.S.meant he had to take into account its sensibilities, which may have deterred himfrom dealing more harshly with protestors. "People power" in February 1986 wasnot inevitable: he Enrile-RAM military coup could have succeeded, or, had it beenquickly crushed, a revolutionary alliance between politicians and Communistsmight have been formed. But Aquino's massive campaign mobilization made hersupport crucial in every opposition scenario. When the RAM coup was discovered,the crowds that formed to protect he military rebels were pro-Aquino, nsuring hatshe would be the victor of the anti-Marcos struggle.

The Troubled Transition to Democracy

In most authoritarian-initiated ransitions a freely elected president or parliament ssworn in at a late stage of the democratization process, after elections held undernew constitutional arrangements often negotiated between the regime andopposition. Conflicts of legitimacy in the new order are often resolved or at leastsignificantly moderated by election results. While there is sometimes a falling outamong former allies within the opposition after the end of authoritarianism, herules of the game are clear, and the winners at the polls have the undisputed rightto lead the new democratic system.

In the Philippines, however, Aquino's inauguration on the last day of "peoplepower" on February 25, 1986, was only the beginning of democratic transition.

186



Mark R. Thompson

Marcos rigged the elections, the "results' of which his puppet parliament, theBatasang Pambansa, duly ratified. The balloting was held in accordance with aconstitution hat had been hand-tailored o his dictatorship. Because Marcos wouldnot initiate the transition, t had to be made against him, marking a legal break withhis regime. As Aquino said in a proclamation ssued on March 26, 1986:

[T]he new government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of theFilipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines. .. .theheroic action of the people was done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973constitution.... the direct mandate of the people as manifested by their extraordinaryaction demands the complete reorganization f the government. ...4'

Such claims of revolutionary egitimacy aroused opposition from "loyalists" toMarcos who had enjoyed patronage and other privileges under the old politicalorder. Claiming that Aquino's cancellation of the constitution, abolition ofparliament, and replacement of local officials "elected" under the authoritarianregime were illegal, pro-Marcos politicians and military officers led five coupattempts timed to block each stage of development of the new electoral-constitutional order.42 Defense minister Enrile backed the "loyalist" claims andsecretly supported their coup attempts in an effort to turn the followers of thedictator he had helped topple into part of his new political base. Vice PresidentLaurel also behaved disloyally to the regime after he was denied much of thepolitical power promised when he withdrew his candidacy for the presidency infavor of Aquino. Given the revolutionary nature of "people power," Aquino nolonger felt agreements made under he old order were binding. Because it followedthe fall of Marcos and did not result from a negotiated settlement with the oldregime, Aquino's inauguration led to fierce battles, not only between hergovernment and the Marcos "loyalists," but also between former allies in theopposition over the new rules of the political game.

The most serious challenge faced by Aquino came from her erstwhile

revolutionary partners, the military rebels. The Enrile-RAM faction was not a"normal case" of a discontented military, if compared with Latin America, whereattempts to punish military wrongs carried out under dictatorship often threatenedthe survival of a new democracy. Several RAM members were reportedly notorioustorturers and feared prosecution. The newly formed presidential commission onhuman rights was the most serious attempt under the Aquino regime to investigatemilitary abuses. Enrile and RAM not only tried to fend off governmentinvestigations of military torture and murder of civilians, but also continued to plotto seize political power. Reappointed as defense minister nstead of head of a junta,as he had hoped, Enrile claimed that he and RAM were the rightful victors of theanti-Marcos struggle.43 After RAM supported the "loyalist" coup plot in

187




November 1986, Enrile was fired as defense minister. But he remained dangerousbecause his "boys" in the military still threatened he regime. The bloody August1987 and December 1989 RAM-led coup attempts were variations on the failedFebruary 1986 effort, showing not only the personal but also tactical continuitybetween the anti-Marcos military rebellion and the RAM effort to topple Aquino.44The two coup attempts caused not just political chaos but severe economic harm aswell. A sturdy post-Marcos economic recovery was slowed by the first and stoppedby the second major RAM rebellion. The Philippines missed a major wave ofJapanese capital investment n Southeast Asia because of the anti-Marcos unrest in1985 and a second wave in 1987 due to coup attempts as well as the kidnapping ofa Japanese businessman.45

Aquino released Communist prisoners upon assuming office as a repayment of apolitical debt after years of "united front" activity with the radical left againstMarcos. She also opened negotiations with the Communists in late 1986 despitebitter opposition from the military. Nonetheless, Communist-led guerrilla attacksresumed wo weeks after Aquino took power. According to the party's official line,her regime represented no basic change from Marcos's, and after the break-off ofnegotiations in early 1987 it became clear that the insurgents had no intention ofending their armed opposition.46 Unlike in Spain, where a negotiated transition odemocracy allowed the inclusion of Communists into the political system inexchange for pledges of loyalty, Communists and moderate politicians who hadbeen allies in the anti-Marcos struggle were now competitors for power after hisoverthrow. The Communists, who had initially been the major group in theanti-Marcos struggle, felt cheated by "people power" and redoubled theircountryside-based insurgency at a time when Aquino's hold on office seemedtenuous.

Similar to Portugal after the coup against Caetano, conservatives in the militaryand radicals in the Communist party preyed on each other's extremist tactics inorder to undermine he electorally oriented center.47 Marcos's rule had worsenedproblems of social injustice: andlessness had grown while workers' real wages had

declined. Seizing on these issues, the radical Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas(KMP, Philippine Peasant Movement) launched land seizures that angered locallandlords and military commanders.48 A KMP march on the presidential palace topress for agrarian reform in January 1987 was fired on by government soldiers(later criticized by a presidential commission), killing over a dozen demonstra-tors.49 The labor union closest to the Communists, the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU,May First Movement), organized a series of strikes under the more liberal laborlaws established in Aquino's first year in power. Several RAM leaders were laterarrested n connection with the killing of KMU leader Rolando Olalia in November1986. RAM even used the massive left demonstration rotesting Olalia's murder asthe fitting moment to back a "loyalist" coup attempt also timed to block

188



Mark R. Thompson

government-Communist eace negotiations.50 Later RAM tried to take advantageof the polarization caused by the KMU supported welgang bayan (national strike)in August 1987 by launching its own first major coup attempt. The radical left, inturn, refused to take sides during the military uprising, which it dismissed as acontest between reactionaries.

How the Aquino Government Survived

The chief failure of the Aquino government, the lack of socioeconomic reform, isrelated to its major success, the restoration of key democratic institutions able to

survive several violent challenges. The 1991 coup against Haitian presidentJean-Bertrand Aristide showed the danger of trying to undertake oo much reformin the midst of political instability following an overthrow transition.51 Aquino'sgreat popularity would probably not have been enough to save her government fshe had been opposed by a united military backed by the economic oligarchy. Hergovernment needed enough allies among soldiers, businessmen, and landlords tofend off repeated power-grabs by military rebels. The compromises Aquino madeadversely affected the quality of the democracy being restored n the Philippines,but it gave her the breathing space needed to seek democratic consolidation slowlythrough electoral means.

When the mortal danger posed by the Enrile-RAM faction became clear to theAquino government n mid 1986, it began to reverse its critical stance towards themilitary hierarchy developed during the anti-Marcos struggle. While Ramos washappy to be promoted to chief of staff of the armed forces by Aquino, he wasantagonized by her release of Communist prisoners, rejection of his counterinsur-gency plan, investigations of human rights violations by the armed forces, and cutsin the defense budget. The distinction commonly made between "professional"and "politicized" soldiers overlooks Ramos's own (recently fulfilled) politicalambitions, but it nevertheless distinguishes between those who defend the "military

as institution" and those who plot to establish a military government. Aquinoyielded to Ramos's demands ust in time, increasing he defense budget in October1986 only a month before a RAM-supported "loyalist" coup attempt nearly closedmilitary ranks against her.52 After negotiations with the Communists were brokenoff in early 1987, Ramos's proposal to launch an offensive against the insurgentswas implemented. Aquino's political courtship of Ramos also undercut theeffectiveness of the presidential commission on human rights: two years after"people power," Amnesty International eported hat not a single military or policeofficer had been convicted of an offense committed during or after the Marcosyears.53 In the aftermath of the November 1986 and August 1987 coup attempts,Aquino dismissed several cabinet members considered "leftist" by the military.

189




Ramos, then defense minister, was Aquino's key ally in the highly unstable periodbetween 1987 and 1990. Her endorsement of his (successful) presidential bid in1992 was a final act of gratitude.54

Calls for sweeping social change were lacking in Aquino's presidential campaignagainst Marcos. She concentrated her attacks nstead on his personal corruption andthe need for political democracy. While Aquino and her inner circle showed littleinterest in land redistribution during her first year in office, the shooting ofdemonstrators protesting for such change in front of the presidential palace inJanuary 1987 led to a debate in the government. In May 1987 the cabinet actioncommittee issued a draft proposal of what would have been a major reform effort.55But the plan aroused fierce opposition among conservative members of the

administration nd landowners (including Aquino's brother, Jose Cojuangco, Jr.).Enrile allied himself with militant landlords, who were issuing threats andestablishing so-called private armies.56 Aquino issued a watered down proclama-tion on reform in mid 1987, which was further diluted by congress in a bill passeda year later. She had been strongly influenced by her executive secretary, JokerArroyo, who opposed reform in part because he was himself a landowner butlargely because he believed "that strong action on reform would create too manyenemies among the powerful in society."57 One expert has argued that the Aquinoadministration eared that "a more radical reform programme could have drivenlandowners o support he coup plotters."58

Under authoritarian ule, state-granted monopolies had come to dominate manyindustries, a number of bankrupt "crony" firms had been taken over by thegovernment, and the domestic market had been heavily protected from foreigngoods. After Aquino's ascension to power, conditions seemed ideal to break up themonopolies, privatize "nonperforming overnment assets," and open the countryto international competition. But it did not take long for resistance to developagainst the reforms. Privatization was slowed by managers appointed by the regimeto state firms, who began to enjoy the advantages of public ownership.59 The saleof government-owned businesses was also slowed by protracted awsuits and weak

institutional mplementation. While the dismantling of monopolies established byMarcos was generally popular, trade liberalization endangered the inefficientimport substitution industries of independent and "crony" businessmen alike.60Not wanting to alienate the powerful industrial elite, Aquino allowed economicreform to be repeatedly delayed.61 This lack of social and economic reform by theAquino government was consistent with pre-martial-law patterns: and reform andeconomic liberalization were thwarted by the oligarchy's resistance. Aquino andher advisors apparently easoned that large landowners and domestic industrialistshad again to be placated if political democracy was to be successfully restored.

Although Aquino had committed herself to removing U.S. military bases in thePhilippines at one point during the anti-Marcos truggle, once in office she assured

190



Mark R. Thompson

the American government hat the current reaty would be honored and negotiationsopened for a new one. Had Aquino called for the immediate removal of the bases,opposition to her regime within the American government (which mounted duringher administration's alks with the Communists) might have reached the boilingpoint.62 Her "open options" strategy on the military nstallations and the break-offof talks with the Communists insured solid U.S. support during a period ofunstable democracy. After verbal backing for the government during earlier coupattempts, the U.S. government directly intervened in the midst of the December1989 putsch (American ets flew over Manila, grounding rebel planes) and proveddecisive in the survival of the government. By the time the Philippine senaterejected the base renewal treaty in 1991 against Aquino's by then openly probase

stance, she no longer needed U.S. support to stay in power.63 In fact, it could beargued hat the American military withdrawal aided democratic consolidation n thePhilippines by removing a highly charged issue from the political agenda.

By delaying a decision on the U.S. bases, compromising with military hierarchy,and yielding to elite pressures on socioeconomic reforms, Aquino won enoughinternational nd domestic support o withstand he military challenge of the rebelsoldiers. Her political survival fell short of democratic consolidation, however,until results at the ballot box replaced the rule of the gun.

A Risk-Prone Consolidation

In an overthrow ransition, the new administration s not formed by winners of fairelections after negotiations with the outgoing dictatorship but by the loose coalitionof forces that toppled the ancien regime. Not only does a provisional governmentlack a legal basis, it often enjoys no democratic egitimacy as it usually comes topower through the bullet and not the ballot.64 When rulers continue to displayrevolutionary redentials ong after the fall of the dictator, democracy is doomed.The claim is made that the people have spoken and therefore elections are

unnecessary as in Cuba under Castro) or can be postponed (as in Nicaragua underthe Sandinistas). In Portugal, democratization was achieved only after theacceptance of the voters' will by most of the political elite superseded therevolutionary role claimed by some elements in the military and the Communistparty.

The Philippines was an unusual overthrow transition because revolutionary andelectoral legitimacy went hand in hand. Aquino was (accurately) perceived as thereal victor of a fraudulent presidential election, and the "people power" uprisingwas seen as carrying out this expression of popular will. Nonetheless, Aquino'sofficial justification for her rule was based on revolutionary claims derived fromthe popular nsurrection gainst Marcos, not from the election he had held. But her

191




commitment to the restoration of electoral institutions finally prevailed as herpopularity forced even her disloyal opponents into the electoral arena and eachround of balloting peeled off another ayer of the antisystem opposition. After themilitary rebels were finally defeated and the Communist insurgency weakened,elections remained the only political game in town.

That public acceptance of Aquino during her first year in power was greater eventhan the outpouring of support she received during the election campaign againstMarcos is shown by the fact that the number of Filipinos who expressed support orher in late 1986 (87 percent) was higher than her estimated vote count in theFebruary 1986 presidential elections.65 Seventy-six percent of the twenty-twomillion voters (with a turnout of nearly 90 percent of those registered) approved he

new constitution on February 2, 1987. Aquino and her foes agreed that theconstitutional referendum was a vote on her presidency. While her slogan was"Yes to Cory! Yes to Democracy! Yes to the Constitution!," her opponents'rallying cry was "No to Cory! No to Communism! No to the Constitution!"66 heconstitution's ratification put an end to open attacks on her democratic egitimacy.Even Enrile felt compelled to proclaim: "We accept the will of the people."67

With Aquino's right to rule no longer questioned, Enrile, Laurel, and the Marcos"loyalists" returned o the electoral arena. Activists close to the Communist party,wishing to take advantage of the "democratic space" created by Aquino andfearing political isolation if they again opted for boycott, formed the Alliance forNew Politics, the first leftist political party to participate n elections since 1946.Pro-Aquino candidates swept the May 1987 legislative polls. Of the twenty-foursenators elected at large nationally, twenty-two of her hand-picked andidates won.(Enrile was one of the two opposition winners, finishing twenty-fourth.) The Lakasng Bansa alliance and several other parties closely identified with heradministration took 149 seats, or nearly three-fourths of the house ofrepresentatives, with most of the rest going to her rightist opponents in thepro-Marcos KBL and the pro-Enrile Grand Alliance for Democracy (see Table 1).

Although the commitment of Enrile, Laurel, the Marcos "loyalists," and the

Communists to democratic means proved to be temporary, heir election battleswith Aquino showed they could not match her level of voter support. Aftercriticizing her provisional government's "dictatorial" actions, they were badlydefeated when they confronted her on democratic errain. When coup making andguerrilla insurgency resumed, there could no longer be any doubt about who wasthe democrat and who the would-be dictators.

Elections not only exposed disloyal opposition as a minority position; they alsoled to the gradual reduction of its ranks. Disputes over patronage distribution hadbeen at the heart of much of the political controversy during Aquino's first year inpower. The abolition of parliament and the replacement of local officials created asizable and powerful group of disgruntled politicians. Congressional elections in

192



Mark R. Thompson

Table 1 Results of the May 1987 Congressional Elections by Political Affiliation and Party

Political Affiliation Party Seats Won

Pro-Aquino Lakas ng Bansa 53PDP-LABAN 37UNlDO 26Liberal Party 19Regional Parties 9Independent 5

Total 149

Rightist Opposition Independent 17Nacionalista arty 12KBL 10Regional Parties 5GAD 3

Total 47

Leftist Opposition ANP 2

Key: PDP-LABAN Partido ng Demokratikong ilipino-Lakas g Bayan), UNIDO (UnitedNationalist Democratic Organization), BL (Kilusang Bagong Lipunan), GAD (Grand Alliancefor Democracy), ANP (Alliance or New Politics).Note: Only 95 of the winning congressional andidates egistered nder one party abel. 83

were registered nder more than one and 22 were ndependent. But candidates enerally chosethe party hey were closest to as their irst party abel on the ballot which s therefore used toidentify party affiliation. The party affiliation f two candidates were not classified by the sourceused for this table.Source: Adapted rom Institute or Popular Democracy, Political Clans and Electoral Politics(Manila: IPD, 1987).

1987 and particularly ocal elections in 1988 allowed many pro-Marcos politicianswho had been thrown out of power to get back in through elections. Aquino'senemies had some chance to win office on their own (the rightest opposition won

nearly a fourth of congressional seats, as shown in Table 1), but there were alsogood prospects for reconciling with the ruling camp. In 1987, twenty-four ormerlypro-Marcos politicians won legislative seats in parties allied with the administra-tion.68 In the January 1988 local elections, Aquino went so far as to endorse manyof the governors and mayors she had replaced upon taking power, including someunsavory "warlords."69 arty switching or "turncoatism," a prominent eature ofthe weakly institutionalized parties of pre-martial-law olitics, returned n full forcein the post-Marcos period.

The revival of old style electoral politics in the Philippines was demonstrated bya report which classified over 80 percent of congressmen elected in 1987 asbelonging to "traditional clans."70 Elections, never inexpensive or peaceful in

193




postwar Philippine history, remained expensive, blood-stained affairs underAquino, though less than during the Marcos period.7' While one study claims thatsome of the "flawed electoral arrangements" f the Marcos period were employedby Aquino's camp, the military remained largely neutral, and fraud, when itoccurred, was carried out at lower levels of government.72 Electoral protestsreceived little media attention or public support. The Alliance for New Politicsfaced substantial ntimidation n the 1987 election, but it was probably not the chiefreason for its overwhelming defeat. Left politicians, lacking experience, poorlyfunded, and often badly organized, received only half-hearted support from theCommunist party, which remained committed to armed struggle.73 Electionsreturned to the pre-marital-law pattern of localized violence and decentralized

cheating, sure signs of intense competition among so-called traditional politicians.The May 1992 elections were a highpoint of elite consensus on participation.Almost all major pro- and anti-Aquino political factions participated in theelections at one level or another (nearly all elected offices in the country,presidential, congressional, and local, were on the ballot). By deciding not to run,Aquino surrendered he many advantages of incumbency. Although she usedgovernment resources to help her presidential candidate, Ramos, two othercandidates were also identified with her administration: house speaker RamonMitra, a long-time ally, and senate president Jovito Salonga, who supportedAquino in 1986 but distanced himself from her administration ater. Aquino'sbitterest rivals were also well-represented: Vice President Laurel (who had openlysupported he 1989 coup), Marcos crony Eduardo Cojuangco (who had reportedlyhelped finance it), and Imelda Marcos (who, along with her husband, was behindseveral "loyalist" putsch attempts). (Enrile, the greatest coup-maker of all, won aseat in the lower house of congress). The list of major presidential candidates wasrounded off by political newcomer Miriam Defensor-Santiago see Table 2).

The multiparty system developed in the post-Marcos era greatly split the vote.Ramos received less than a quarter of the ballots cast. This fragmentation was oneof the most notable differences from the pre-martial-law olitical system, although

its importance hould not be exaggerated.74 The inefficient electoral apparatus wasoverloaded by the number of contested offices and candidates vying for them,delaying the official results until a month after the balloting. Despite the slow votecount and tight finish, Ramos faced no major disloyal opposition upon assumingthe presidency. Though his party was in the minority in both houses, free flowingpatronage helped elect a pro-Ramos speaker of the house, Jose de Venecia, Jr.Ramos also struck deals with the president of the senate, Edgardo Angara, whoheaded a rival political party, although recently conflicts between the two havemounted.75 Traditional political accommodation was revived.76

Elite consensus around elections was formed at a time when armed opposition tothe regime declined sharply. Muslim secessionists, already substantially weakened

194



Mark R. Thompson

Table 2 Results of the 1992 Philippine Presidential Election and the Success of EachCandidate's Party in the Congressional Elections

Candidate Vote Senate HousePercentage Seats Seats

Fidel V. Ramos, Lakas-NUCD 23.58 2 44Miriam Defensor-Santiago 19.72 - -Eduardo Cojuangco, NPC 18.17 5 36Ramon Mitra, LDP 14.64 16 87Imelda Marcos, KBL 10.32 - 4Jovito Salonga, LP-PDP 10.16 1 8Salvador Laurel, NP 3.40 - 4

Key: Lakas-NUCD Lakas-National nion of Democrats), NPC (Nationalist eople's Coalition),LDP (Laban ng Demokratikong ilipino), KBL (Kilusang Bagong Lipunan), LP-PDP (LiberalParty-Partido g Demokratikong ilpino), NP (Nacionalista arty).Source: Eckhard Hofer, "Wahlen n den Philippinen m 11. Mai 1992, KASAislandsInfonnrmation, (1992).!, p. 13-22.

by the time Marcos fell, posed no major military threat even though negotiationswith the government in 1986-1987 collapsed; they were later revived withIndonesia serving as mediator.77 While Communist guerrillas could still harassgovernment troops in the country's periphery at the end of Aquino's presidency,they lost considerable erritorial ontrol, and their armed strength declined from anestimated 25,800 fighters in 1988 to 13,500 in 1992.78 A major threat n the early1980s, the Communists became merely a military nuisance. Improved governmenttactics (particularly he redeployment of crack government troops used to protectMarcos during the last years of his presidency) and arrests of several topCommunist leaders due to improved intelligence contributed to the contraction.The Communist eadership wounded itself through hardline actics, bloody purges,and splits between exile leaders and Philippine-based commanders. While theinternational ecline of Communism hurt the movement, the fall of Marcos and the

reestablishment f democracy were also crucial variables. Historian Alfred McCoyargues that the Communists' "gains were the product of a short-term protest againsta particular egime, Marcos," and not the result of structural actors in Philippinesociety.79

While the Communist hreat gradually aded, dissidents within the military wereswiftly defeated after the failed December 1989 coup. A series of arrests thinnedthe rebel leadership, while the coup's ferocity undercut support n the military foranother such fratricidal undertaking. Too weak to attack Aquino directly in Manila,oppositionists in the military staged one more minor rebellion in Mindanao inOctober 1990 that quickly collapsed.80 After Ramos's victory in the presidentialelection, the remaining rebels agreed to surrender n exchange for amnesty.8l

195




Armed threats declined, and elite consensus began to form in the Philippines,ironically at a time when Corazon Aquino's popularity ell after a sharp drop in theregime's performance beginning in 1987-1988. Although she continued to enjoy aplurality of public support, opinion polls showed mounting public dissatisfactionwith government corruption and the decline of public safety from 1987 to 1991.82Most important, however, the economy performed poorly, reversing the steadygrowth and low inflation during the early Aquino period. While GNP grew bynearly 5 percent annually between 1986 and 1988, it slowed to just over 2 percentin 1990, then declined by almost 1 percent in 1991.83 Inflation surged from lessthan 1 percent in 1986 to over 6 percent in 1988 to 18.7 percent in 1991.84 Thus,poverty, as measured n absolute and self-rated terms, stayed at high levels during

the Aquino years; a plurality of respondents said that the quality of their livesdeteriorated during the Aquino administration.85However, Aquino's legitimacy was based less on government performance or

personal popularity than on the reestablishment of democratic institutions. Acrowd of over 100,000 demonstrated against those who would "destroy ourdemocracy" after the December 1989 coup attempt.86 The importance ofdemocracy was demonstrated by an opinion poll that showed that Filipinos wereopposed to her seeking a second presidential term, which many legal expertsbelieved unconstitutional, by a two to one margin.87 Persons and institutionswhich behaved democratically, notably Aquino and congress, enjoyed publicsupport, while disloyal oppositionists, like Laurel, Imelda Marcos, GregorioHonasan (the RAM leader), and Jose Maria Sison (head of the Communist party)received consistently negative ratings.88 Ramos's initial popularity ratings afterassuming the presidency were almost as high as Aquino's during her first year inpower. Rigoberto Tiglao argues that democracy has "taken root in thePhilippines . . . despite a perception among many Filipinos that the quality oftheir lives has deteriorated." High satisfaction ratings are best explained not bythe actual performance of congress or the president but by "the democratic ethosthey represent."89

Precisely this gap between efficacy and legitimacy makes democracy in thePhilippines risk-prone n the future even if it is stable at present. Poor performanceprovides opportunities for nondemocratic political entrepreneurs. None of thecurrent actors on the political stage in the Philippines seems capable of mobilizingdiscontent at the moment. But the Philippines has the geographical "bad luck" ofbeing in the region with the world's highest growth rates, where development isoften valued above democracy.90 The speech of former Singapore prime ministerLee Kuan Yew to Manila businessmen in December 1992, which many observersinterpreted s a veiled call for a more authoritarian olitical order n the Philippinesmodeled on its economically successful Southeast Asian neighbors, won thesupport of 70 percent of Filipino businessmen polled at the conference.9'

196



Mark R. Thompson

Conclusion

In comparative perspective, the Philippines stands out in a number of respects.The "Spanish model" of authoritarian-initiated ransition, so influential in LatinAmerica and eastern Europe, was ignored by Marcos and his family-basedregime. Democracy offers little to personalistic rulers who have no interests thatcan be protected outside of office. Rather, the Philippine experience was mostsimilar to countries where a revolution or a coup led to the replacement of oneform of authoritarianism y another. The Phillipines owed its entry into the clubof new democracies to the victory of "moderate" politicians over armedopponents in the race to bring Marcos down. The transition in the Philippines

was "backwards" when compared with most recent cases. Instead of presidentialelections coming near the end of an institutionalized process of regimetransformation, the "revolutionary" aftermath of the February 1986 electionrepresented only a (shaky) beginning of democratization n the Philippines. Theoutcome of "people power" did not settle the question of the type of governmentand regime that would dominate the post-Marcos era. A political "state ofnature" prevailed until 1990: military rebels did not just protect institutionalprerogatives but sought political power, and Communist guerrillas did not laydown arms but continued revolutionary struggle. Aquino only narrowly escapedbeing toppled, like Aristide in Haiti, by compromising with "professionals" inthe military, foregoing social reform, and placating the U.S. Democraticconsolidation was achieved as armed threats declined and elite consensusemerged around elections.

The analysis of the Philippine's democratic transition and recent consolidationshould be distinguished rom the problems of democracy. A free press, competitiveelections, and power exercised by elected politicians are clear improvements overthe Marcos dictatorship. But continuing human rights violations by the Philippinemilitary are undoubtedly the worst aspect of the country's current politicalsystem.92 Unfortunately, such crimes committed by an otherwise democratic

government in the context of a civil conflict are not exceptional. Another majorfailing of Philippine democracy is its coexistence with a highly oligarchic socialstructure. A democratic political system does not ensure greater equality in society,or "socialization" in Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter's terms.93Substantial and and other kinds of socioeconomic reform, however necessary theymay be, have been rejected by an elected congress. Although public opinion pollsreveal only limited popular concern about social inequality, widespread injusticecould lead to a resurgence of rebellion and insurgency, as has happenedperiodically throughout his century, particularly f political polarization within theelite reemerges.94 At present, however, government corruption nd weak economicgrowth rank highest among citizen complaints.95 n short, the Philippines meets the

197




minimal criteria generally used to define democracy without achieving what mostobservers would consider good government.

A key to stable democracy s the extent to which weak performance, particularlyin the economy, leads to system blame. Recent democratic transitions n Portugaland Spain occurred under poor economic conditions, but the people of neithercountry attributed them to democracy.96 In the Philippines, the record ofdemocratic commitment is mixed. Since the fall of Marcos, the high opinionratings given democratic politicians despite declining living standards speaks forstability. Although at the midpoint of the Ramos presidency the Philippineeconomy is improving (with a growth rate of 5.1 percent in 1994, projected at 6.5percent n 1995), it has a long way to go to match the "miracle" economies of most

of its Southeast Asian neighbors.97 n the pre-martial-law Philippines, governmentcorruption and economic problems contributed to growing elite criticism ofdemocracy.98 Political leadership has made the decisive difference between thenand now: Aquino's (and thus far Ramos's) commitment to democracy contrastswith Marcos's destruction of it. However, if the Philippines does not achievesustained development, the temptation o exploit this failure could again endangerthe country's democracy.

NOTES

An earlier version of this article was presented at the European Conference on Philippine Studies,School of Oriental and African Studies, London, April 13-15, 1994. I would like to thank James Putzel,Thomas Saalfeld, and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments.

1. There are various "counts" of how many coup attempts there were, or more specifically whatshould count as a military rebellion. I rely on the tally of a Philippine government ask force report, TheReport of the Fact-Finding Commission (pursuant to R.A. No. 6832) (Makati: Bookmark, 1990),adding to it a later putsch effort in October 1990. Greece experienced seven coup attempts after itdemocratized, Argentina five, and Spain three. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave:Democratization n the Late Twentieth Century Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), p. 233.

2. Huntington, pp. 253-254. The other countries are Brazil, India, and Peru. In discussing the

Philippines' "contextual" problems, Huntington overlooks the ethnic conflicts between Christians andMuslims and between lowlanders and mountain dwelling peoples.3. Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley, "Elite Transformations and Democratic

Regimes," in John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds., Elites and Democratic Consolidation in LatinAmerica and Southern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 5.

4. Two essays on the Philippines have been included in multicountry studies of democratization:David Wurfel, "Transition o Political Democracy n the Philippines: 1978-1988," in Diane Ethier, ed.,Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia(London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 110-136; and Karl D. Jackson, "The Philippines: The Search for aSuitable Democratic Solution, 1946-1986," in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour MartinLipset, eds., Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1989), pp.231-265.

5. The term "standpatter ictator" s drawn from Huntington. On authoritarian-initiated ransitions,

198






16. Richard J. Kessler, Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1989), p. 107.

17. Charles Guy Gillespie, Negotiating Democracy: Politicians and Generals in Uruguay(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). In a number of other cases (Brazil, Chile, Hungary,Poland, Benin, and Zambia) nstitutionalized ondemocratic egimes accepted defeat in elections andlorplebiscites. Although regular elections and referendums during the Marcos dictatorship distinguish itfrom personalistic rule in Haiti, Iran, Nicaragua, and Romania, where they were held less frequently,the Philippine ransition emained uninstitutionalized ecause Marcos routinely rigged balloting and didnot accept election results when cheating failed.

18. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in EasternEurope and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), ch. 2.

19. Marcos's planned repression s a forgotten chapter of "people power." Before the February 1986presidential lection, General Ver, in a plan dubbed "Operation Everlasting" referring o the hoped-forduration of the Marcos

dictatorship),drew

uplists of

oppositionistso be arrested and

arrangedor them

to be imprisoned on an island near Corregidor. See Bryan Johnson, The Four Days of Courage: TheUntold Story of the People Who Brought Marcos Down (New York: The Free Press, 1987), pp. 26-27;Cecillo T. Arillo, Breakaway: The Inside Story of the Four-Day Revolution n the Philippines, February22-25, 1986 (Manila: CTA Publishers, 1986), p. 8; Isabelo T. Crisostomo, Cory: Profile of a President(Quezon City: J. Kriz, 1986), p. 202; and Lucy Komisar, Corazon Aquino: The Story of a Revolution(New York: George Braziller, 1987), p. 109.20. See Richard Snyder, "Explaining Transitions rom Neopatrimonial Dictatorships," Comparative

Politics, 24 (July 1992), 379-400.21. ODonnell and Schmitter, pp. 32-33.22. On rebel strength see James Clad, "Betting on Violence,' Far Eastern Economic Review, Dec.

17, 1987, p. 35. The Philippine military grew from 54,100 troops in 1972 to 156,300 in 1980. SeeKessler, pp. 108-109. On the growth of the Communists, see Gregg R. Jones, Red Revolution: Insidethe Philippine Guerrilla Movement Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).23. See Gary Hawes, The Philippine State and the Marcos Regime: The Politics of Export (Ithaca:

Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 82, 100-101; and Gary Hawes, "Theories of Peasant Revolution: ACritique and Contribution rom the Philippines," World Politics, 42 (January 1990), 277.

24. See Mark R. Thompson, The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and DemocraticTransition n the Philippines (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), ch. 6.25. Snyder, pp. 379-383.26. On the development of military opposition, see The Final Fact Finding Report; Johnson, pp.

36-44; and Sandra Burton, Impossible Dream: The Marcoses, the Aquinos, and the UnfinishedRevolution (New York: Warner Books, 1989), ch. 12. Two interesting "inside" accounts are Col.

Hector M. Tarrazon, After Edsa . . ., vol. 1 (Manila: Hector Tarrazona, 1989); and Arillo.27. One of the puzzles of "people power" was why General Ramos "spontaneously" ccepted Enrile'sinvitation o join the RAM rebels in a Quezon City military camp after the discovery of the putsch plan.In an interview with the author in Quezon City on August 1, 1989, RAM advisor and close Ramosconfidant Gen. Jose Almonte spoke of Ramos's knowledge and support of the rebel group's activities.

28. Barry Rubin, Modern Dictators (New York: New American Library, 1987), p. 79.29. This term is drawn from Ruby Paredes, ed., Philippine Colonial Democracy (Quezon City:

Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1989).30. See Carl Lande, Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippines Politics (New

Haven: Southeast Asian Studies, Yale University, 1965).31. Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America's Empire n the Philippines New York: Random House,

1989), p. 360.32. For a helpful summary, see David A. Rosenberg, "Introduction: Creating a 'New Society,' " in

200



Mark R. Thompson

Rosenberg, ed. See Thomas C. Nowak and Kay A. Snyder, "Clientelist Politics in the Philippines,"American Political Science Review, 68 (September 1974), 1147-1170, on the flaws of Philippine

clientelism as responsible for the collapse of democracy.33. Thompson, The Anti-Marcos Struggle, ch. 2.34. Shirley Christian, Nicaragua: Revolution n the Family (New York: Vantage, 1986), pp. 54-58.35. An exception is Arthur Alan Shantz, "Political Parties: The Changing Foundations of Philippine

Democracy" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1972), p. 98.36. Nearly fifty years of colonialism led to a transplanatation f much of U.S. political culture in the

Philippines. While one side of Filipino politics was modeled on reformism, another mirrored ts corruptfeatures. As Philippine senator Claro M. Recto remarked n 1951: "We seem to find our models, whichwe have already surpassed, in those American political machines, with their Tweeds, Hagues,Pendergasts, and Huey Longs. ..." Quoted in Teodoro M. Locsin, "Judgment Day," Philippines FreePress, Nov. 10, 1951, p. 3. Two years later Recto was involved in Magsaysay's campaign, whichresembled American urban reform.37. Harvey A. Averch, John E. Koehler, and Frank H. Denton, The Matrix of Policy in the

Philippines (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 36, showed that the most importantcriteria in casting votes was "honesty of a candidate," which ranked substantially above "help givenyour area."

38. See Mark R. Thompson, "Cory and 'the Guy': Reformist Politics in the Philippines," UFSIReports, 16 (Indianapolis: Universities Field Service International, 1988-1989).

39. Raul P. de Guzman and Luzviminda G. Tancangco, An Assessment of the 1986 SpecialPresidential Elections: A Study of Political Change through People Power, Vols. 1-2 (Manila:University of the Philippines, College of Public Administration, 1986).40. Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy

(New York: Times Books, 1987), pp. 355-440. Despite Bonner's critical tone, his account makes clear

that "people power" was a success from the vantage point of U.S. policymakers.41. President Corazon C. Aquino, Proclamation No. 3, "Declaring a National Policy to Implement

Reforms Mandated by the People Protecting Their Basic Rights" (Manila: March 25, 1986), reprintedin Javate-de Dios, et al., eds., pp. 764-765.42. Putsches were attempted n July 1986, shortly after Aquino's appointment of commissioners to

write a new constitution; n November 1986, to preempt government negotiations with the Communistsand to reconvene the abolished parliament; n January 1987, to stop the constitutional referendum; nApril 1987, to preempt congressional elections a month later; and in July 1987, to pave the way forMarcos's return o the Philippines before local elections at the beginning of the following year.43. This claim explains why Enrile blocked the filming of a television film, "A Dangerous Life,"

about "people power" in Manila, forcing the moviemakers to go to Sri Lanka to finish production.

Rodney Tasker, "History by Docu-drama," Far Eastern Economic Review, Feb. 16, 1989, pp. 38-39.44. The Final Report of the Fact-Finding Commission, pp. 475-492. The October 1990 coup attemptin Mindanao was also linked to RAM. John McBeth, "Suspect Loyalties," Far Eastern EconomicReview, Oct. 25, 1990, pp. 15-16.45. Rigoberto Tiglao, "Seeing the Light: After Years of Instability an Era of Growth Beckons," Far

Eastern Economic Review, Sept. 3, 1992, pp. 33, 35.46. Gareth Porter, "The Politics of Counterinsurgency n the Philippines: Military and Political

Options," Philippine Studies Occasional Paper, 9 (Honolulu: Center for Philippine Studies, Centers forAsian and Pacific Studies, University of Hawaii, 1987), pp. 42-9.47. Kenneth Maxwell, "Regime Overthrow and the Prospects or Democratic Transition n Portugal,"

in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions romAuthoritarian Rule: Southern Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp.109-137. Of course, a major difference between Portugal and the Philippines was that in Portugal he

201




Communists cooperated with the radical wing of the military, whereas in the latter he armed forces andguerrilla rebels remained enemies (largely due to the bloody insurgency). Only after the failure of the

December 1989 coup did a RAM-linked group, the Young Officers Union (YOU), proclaim sympathywith several ideas close to the Communist program, particularly opposition to U.S. bases, largelybecause of the role of U.S. jets in the Aquino regime's victory over the military dissidents.48. According to the KMP, 50,000 hectares of abandoned, sequestered, and idle lands were seized by

landless farmers n 1986-1987. Landlord and government bitterness about these seizures was evident inagrarian reform legislation which disqualified all farmers who had illegally occupied land. See JamesPutzel, A Captive Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform n the Philippines (London: Catholic Institutefor International Relations, 1992), p. 250, n. 8; and "Farmers Hit Disqualification Bid," Manila Times,July 10, 1987, p. 2.

49. Office of the President, Report of the Citizens' Mendiola Commission, February 27, 1987,reprinted n Javate-de Dios, et al., eds., pp. 789-793. It is still unclear what exactly happened at

Mendiola, but there was obviously little effort at moderation on the part of either the military or thepeasant marchers. The consequences of the massacre were one-sided, however, in terms of casualties aswell as legal consequences. While the commanding military officers were merely reprimanded, KMPleader Jaime Tadeo was charged with sedition and later imprisoned on an ostensibly unrelated charge.50. For former National Bureau of Investigation director Antonio Carpio's sworn testimony on the

RAM link to the Olalia killing, see The Final Report of the Fact-Finding Commission, p. 151. Also see"Enrile Ex-aides Held for Murder," Philippine News, Mar. 2-8, 1988, pp. 1-2; and " 'Gringo' AlsoHeld in Olalia Case," Philippine News, Mar. 9-15, 1988, pp. 1, 15.

51. Aquino and Aristide hardly could have been more different n terms of their social background andpolitical views: the former was a leading member of the Philippine "oligarchy" with a generallyconservative socioeconomic outlook; the latter was a provincial priest who promised major socialchange. But both took power in a volatile political environment where even the possibility of substantialreform strengthened disloyal opposition to the government.

52. The Final Report of the Fact-Finding Commission, pp. 146-158.53. Cited in John Andrews. "The Philippines: A Question of Faith," The Economist, May 7, 1988,

p. 12.54. Rigoberto Tiglao, "Payment in Full: Aquino Backs Ramos as Candidate for President," Far

Eastern Economic Review, Feb. 6, 1992, pp. 11-13.55. On the Aquino government's nitially hesitant stance on land reform, see Putzel, ch. 6; and on the

cabinet debate and the May 1987 draft, ch. 7. Also see James Clad, "Rhetoric and Reality," FarEastern Economic Review, Mar. 5, 1987, pp. 32-34.56. Putzel, pp. 228-234; Jose Galang, "Resistance o Reform," Far Eastern Economic Review, June

25, 1987, p. 31.57. Putzel, p. 248.58. Rigoberto Tiglao, "Window Dressing," Far Eastern Economic Review, Sept. 5, 1991, p. 20.59. Haggard, "The Political Economy of the Debt Crisis," p. 255; Stephan Haggard, "The

Philippines: Picking Up after Marcos," in Raymond Vernon, ed., The Promise of Privatization NewYork: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988), pp. 91-121.60. Haggard, "The Political Economy of the Debt Crisis," pp. 245-255.61. See Rigoberto Tiglao, "Failure to Meet the Need for Change," Far Eastern Economic Review,

June 13, 1991, pp. 40-41. A March 1992 World Bank report argued that this failed liberalization eft"deep underlying nefficiencies" in the structure of the economy, which was one of the chief causes ofthe country's poor overall economic performance during Aquino's presidency. Quoted in Alfredo P.Hernandez, "Fight against Poverty as Failure-World Bank," Philippine Daily Globe, Mar. 30, 1992,p. 21.

202



Mark R. Thompson

62. Jones, pp. 166-167, reports that, while Aquino was negotiating with the Communists, the CIAprepared a contingency plan to support a coup against her.

63. American-Philippine elations cooled after the Philippine senate refused to ratify the bases treaty,but the pain of military withdrawal was eased somewhat by the end of the cold war and the eruption ofMount Pinatubo, which rendered one of the two major American installations unusable. In the formerSubic naval base, a joint venture with the Taiwan government for a 300 ha. industrial park for lightmanufacturing s being set up to attract oreign investment o help offset the heavy financial losses afterthe American withdrawal.64. See Yossi Shain and Juan Linz, eds., Betwveen States: Interim Governments in Democratic

Transitions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Mark R. Thompson, "Democracy afterSultanism: The Troubled Transition n the Philippines," in H. E. Chehabi and Alfred Stepan, Politics,Society, and Democracy: Comparative Studies (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 333-336.65. Mahar Mangahas, "People's Evaluation he Bottom Line," The Manila Chronicle, June 29, 1992,

p. 4.66. James Clad, "Cory's Constitutional Gamble," Far Eastern Economic Review, Jan. 29, 1987,

p. 21.67. James Clad, "Vote for Stability," Far Eastern Economic Review, Feb. 12, 1987, p. 10.68. Eric U. Gutierrez, Ildefonso C. Torrente, and Noli G. Narca, All in the Family: A Study of Elites

and Power Relations in the Philippines (Quezon City: Institute or Popular Democracy, 1992), p. 25. Inaddition, two relatives of prominent (ex-) pro-Marcos politicians were elected in alliance with theAquino administration.

69. Matt Miller, "Philippine Local Vote Greases the Wheels for 1992 Presidential Race," The AsianWall Street Journal Weekly, Jan. 25, 1988, p. 23.70. Gutierrez et al., p. 25.71. Only forty-eight election related killings were reported in the 1987 congressional elections,

compared to 348 in 1984. Raul P. De Guzman and Luzviminda G. Tancangco, An Assessment of theMay 1984 Batasang Pambansa Elections: A Summary of Findings (Manila: University of thePhilippines, Public School of Administration, 1985); James Clad, "On Cory's Coat-tail," Far EasternEconomic Review, May 21, 1987, pp. 12-13.

72. Luzviminda G. Tancangco, The Anatomy of Electoral Fraud: Concrete Bases for ElectoralReforms (Manila: Matrix, 1992). For a critical review see Armando Doronila, "Matter of Fact, NotMotive," The Manila Chronicle, Mar. 14, 1991, pp. 1, 9.

73. ANP senatorial candidate and former NPA leader Bernarbe Buscayno claimed that the "nationaldemocrats' " full potential was not mobilized in support of the candidates or democratic politics and thatpatronage, of which the left was short, proved crucial during the campaign. Olle Tornquist,

"Communists and Democracy in the Philippines," paper presented at the European Conference onPhilippine Studies 1991, Amsterdam, April 22-25, 1991.74. Philippine politics has always been highly factionalized, and third parties have been common.

Primarily he electoral law penalized all but the Nacionalistas and Liberals by preventing other partiesfrom overseeing the vote counting, an essential safeguard n Philippine politics, and kept other partiesfrom becoming well-established. In the post-Marcos Philippines, by contrast, all parties can participatein poll-watching. See Masataka Kimura, "Philippine Political Parties and the Party System inTransition: Leaders, Factions and Blocs," Pilipinas, 18 (Spring 1992), 43-65. Elections weed outweaker factions, which may lead to a gradual reduction in the number of significant parties. Forexample, the Marcos "loyalist" (Kilusang Bagong Lipunan) and the pro-Laurel Nacionalista) partieslost political importance between 1987 and 1992.75: The senate is (and was before martial aw) the major stumbling block for Philippine presidents.

Elected nationwide, senators can not be as easily satisfied by pork-barrel rojects as constituent-bound

203




congressmen. In addition, senators "share" the national electorate with the president and many (if nota majority) of the current wenty-four senators have presidential ambitions.

76. For the May 1995 congressional elections, many former opposition politicians, including evenformer senator and now representative Enrile, are trying to jump on Ramos's bandwagon, as the rulingLiberal Democratic Party s expected to sweep the elections. Rodney Taskeer, "All Aboard: OppositionPoliticians Flock to the Ramos Bandwagon," Far Eastern Economic Review, Feb. 16, 1995, pp. 18-19.

77. 'The Tortuous Trek for Peace," The Philippine Star, Sept. 7, 1994, p. 7. While the governmentnegotiates with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), it continues to fight breakaway Muslimgroups, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf group, whose campaignof murder and kidnapping ed to a small-scale war in June 1994.

78. Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia Yearbook 1993 (Hong Kong: Review Publishing Co., 1992),p. 192.79. Alfred McCoy, "After the Yellow Revolution: Filipino Elite Factions and the Struggle for

Power," in Peter Krinks, ed., The Philippines under Aquino (Canberra: Australian Studies Network,1987), p. 32.80. McBeth, pp. 15-16.81. Joaquin G. Bernas, S. J., "Reading the Pact with the Rightist Rebels," The Manila Chronicle,

Dec. 29, 1992, p. 5. Among the new democracies, it is highly unusual to have a former general as theelected leader of the country. However, whereas in Latin America democratization involved aninstitutionalized ransition from a military regime, in the Philippines it followed the overthrow of acivilian, and General Ramos's rise to power was directly related to the popularity his "professional"faction in the armed forces gained by defeating several military coups.82. Aquino's net approval rating (those satisfied minus those dissatisfied) in the Social Weather

Survey declined from 71 percent in October 1986, to 35 percent in October 1987, to 29 percent inSeptember 1989, and 7 percent n April 1992. Mahar Mangahas, "Scanning the Social Environment,"The Manila Chronicle, Nov. 25, 1991, p. 4.83. Computed rom Robert S. Dohner, "Aquino and the Economy: An Assessment of the First Three

Years," Pilipinas, 11 (Fall 1988), 26; Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia Yearbook 1992 (Hong Kong:Review Publications, 1991), pp. 6-7; and Asia Yearbook 1993, pp. 6-7.84. Dohner, p. 26; Asia Yearbook 1993, pp. 6-7.85. Mahar Mangahas, "War vs. Poverty Flying Blind," The Manila Chronicle, June 22, 1992, p. 4;

Redempto Anda, "Survey Shows Life Harder under Aquino," The Manila Chronicle, Sept. 30, 1992,pp. 1, 6.86. Associated Press, "Crowds Cheer Cory," The News-Times Danbury, Connecticut), Dec. 9, 1989,

pp. 1, 20.87. Mahar Mangahas, "Who Wants a Cory Reelection?," The New Chronicle, Oct. 28, 1991, p. 4.

The 1987 constitution establishes a six year presidential erm without reelection, but it was unclearwhether this provision applied to Aquino, who assumed office before the constitution was approved.88. Mahar Mangahas, "Veritably, a Honeymoon," The Manila Chronicle, Oct. 7, 1992, pp. 27, 36;

Mahar Mangahas, "Surveys on the Peace Process," The Manila Chronicle, Apr. 19, 1993, p. 5; Mahar,Mangahas, "Imelda Not Yet Forgiven," The Manila Chronicle, Nov. 1, 1991, p. 4.89. Tiglao, "Poorer but Free," Far Eastern Economic Review, Sept. 5, 1991, p. 18.90. See Mark R. Thompson, "The Limits of Democratisation n ASEAN," Third World Quarterly, 14

(1993), 469-484.91. Alex Magno, "A Signal of Great Despair," The Manila Chronicle, Dec. 5, 1992.92. Some commentators argue that the protection of civil liberties is slowly improving, in large part

because of the decline of the Communist nsurgency. See Conrado de Quiros, "Human Rights Day,"Philippine Daily Inquirer, Dec. 11, 1993, p. 5.93. O'Donnell and Schmitter, Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, pp. 11-14.

204



Mark R. Thompson

94. The Sakdalistas n the 1930s, the Huks in the 1940s and early 1950s, the Moro National LiberationFront in the 1970s, and the NPA beginning in the late 1960s all emerged during periods of intense

contestation between leading political factions and parties. Anti-Marcos politicians had close ties to boththe Muslim and Communist rebels.95. Pollution and criminality are also major concerns, but the Communist rebellion and military coups

have diminished substantially. D. Villadolid, "Church Survey Shows Ecology, Graft, Weak EconomyConcern Filipinos Most," Veritas, July 16, 1990.

96. Linz and Stepan, chs. 6, 7.97. Tasker, "All Aboard," p. 18. In addition, Ramos has implemented everal key economic reforms,

including privatization of several government-owned corporations, new taxes (for a chronicallyunderfunded tate), and infrastructure rojects (particularly or much needed additional electric powergeneration).

98. The initial legitimacy of Marcos's authoritarianism was based on its promise of greatertechnocratic

efficiency.It is unclear whether its failure discredited

dictatorshipor only the Marcos

regime. As one prominent Philippine economist/businessman told me in a discussion aboutauthoritarianism mong the newly industrialized ountries of Southeast Asia: "It's not dictatorship hat'sthe problem, it's that we had the wrong dictator."

205

Documents

ThompsonMR - Off the Endangered List Philippine Democratization in Comparative Perspective