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Thomas Cook Procedures Thomas Cook Changes ALT update, changes and situation with regard to the A319 & A321 Airworthiness Directives System Review – Airbus Inert Gas System Fuel Airworthiness Limitations Section Changes A320 Maintenance Related MOR review from SDD Database 1

Thomas Cook Procedures ALT update, changes and …cbt.altitudeglobal.aero/Files/Airbus A320 Q2 2012.pdf · The Thomas Cook Autoland Maintenance Procedures Manual has been amended

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Thomas Cook Procedures Thomas Cook Changes ALT update, changes and situation with regard to the A319 & A321 Airworthiness Directives System Review – Airbus Inert Gas System Fuel Airworthiness Limitations Section Changes A320 Maintenance Related MOR review from SDD Database

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For clear and precise instructions on how Thomas Cook (‘TCW’) require their Technical Logs to be completed, refer to the following:

Log on to Thomas Cook portal using the following login/username details: Log in: TCABSTA Username: 4477 HTTPS://Portal.tcab.be

Once logged in the path is as follows: Documents/Maintenance Control/Manuals: TCW CAME Issue 2, Rev 4. Part 1, Paragraph 1.1 Technical Log Utilisation TCW Outstation Manual Issue 3 Rev 3. Page 11, Technical Logbook

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Thomas Cook are to operate an A319 (IAE V2500) from this Summer. The aircraft details are as follows: ◦ Registration: OO-TCS // Airbus A319-132 // 2 x V2524-A5 // MSN 2362

The Thomas Cook Autoland Maintenance Procedures Manual has been amended

to take account of the A319 addition to the Thomas Cook fleet. It is now at Issue 2, Revision 2.

The Thomas Cook RVSM Maintenance Requirements Manual has been amended to take account of the A319 addition to the Thomas Cook Fleet. It is now at Issue 2, Revision 3. OO-TCS has been added to the RVSM “without operational restrictions” list in this manual. This indicates that the aircraft meets the minimum modification standard specified for this type of operation by the manufacturer.

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ALT MOE and associated EASA Form 3 (Approval Certificate) do not incorporate the A319 aircraft type. An amendment to the MOE has been submitted and an application has been made for amendment of the approval certificate. Until the A319 is added to staff authorisation documents and the EASA Form 3 has been issued to include the A319, ALT staff may not certify work on the A319.

Note that the application to the UK CAA included the A321. Where training shows A321 / A319 differences, the type can be added to staff authorisations by submission of an application only. No further demonstration of experience is required due to the aircraft familial similarities to the A320.

The current SGHA (Contract) between ALT and Thomas Cook is being amended to include ad-hoc support for the A319.

No engineering bulletins / memos have been issued relevant to the A320 family

for this period.

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AD No. Description

2011-0155R1 Airworthiness Limitations Section Part 5 (ALS Part 5)

2011-0160R1 Escape Slide Raft Modification

2012-0008 Airworthiness Limitations Section Part 1 (ALS Part 1)

2012-0012 Flap Interconnecting Strut

2012-0032 MLG Support Rib 5

2009-11-02 (R) CFM56 HPC Spool 4-9

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This AD mandates the requirements of the Fuel Airworthiness Limitations (ALI & CDCCL). The revision in this case is a correction. As shown at the bottom of the text below.

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This AD is to clarify that post the effective date of the AD, non-modified slide raft assemblies may not be installed on aircraft where previous modification action removed them.

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This AD supersedes a previous AD and adds some additional A320 family models to the effectivity. The safe life (Part 1) section gives a life to certain components installed on the A320 family aircraft.

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A new AD issued to detect a potentially unsafe combination of target / sensor serial numbers.

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This AD supersedes an AD issued to detect corrosion of the MLG support Rib 5. The AD issued incorporates aircraft that had been modified at production and were thought not to be affected by the identified problem. In service problems show that the condition existed on these aircraft hence the incorporation.

Continued on next page...

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This AD is revised to correct part / serial number information.

Airbus Inert Gas System (ATA 47) ◦ Can be factory installed or SB retrofit ◦ Acronyms FTIS (Fuel Tank Inerting System) IGGS (Inert Gas Generating System) NEA (Nitrogen Enriched Air) OEA (Oxygen Enriched Air) DFSOV (Dual Flow Shut Off Valve) D-ULPA (Double-Ultra Low Particle Filter) ASM (Air Separation Module)

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5 additional repetitive tasks ◦ All of the additional tasks are applicable to an

aircraft installed with the IGGS. ◦ The applicable task is dependant on mod state and

includes: Op Check of the DFSOV , Dual Flapper Valves & leak

check of the NEA line. 4000FH shop visit for the ASM

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Fuel Airworthiness Limitations (FAL)

1 Component Life Limit has been applied ◦ Air Separation Module is now an LLP limited to

27000FH

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3 Additional CDCCLs have been issued Fuel Tank Volume & Ventilation Flow Rate

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3 Additional CDCCLs have been issued FINCH painting the Dual Flapper Check Valve

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3 Additional CDCCLs have been issued FINCH painting the Dual Flapper Check Valve

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3 Additional CDCCLs have been issued Decal Installation to warn of a hazardous condition

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3 Additional CDCCLs have been issued Decal Installation to warn of a hazardous condition

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Caution: ◦ The CDCCL is the presence of the decal. The tasks

for panel removal / installation require the decal to be checked for presence.

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Caution: ◦ The CDCCL is the presence of the decal. The tasks

for panel removal / installation require the decal to be checked for presence.

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The following are maintenance related extracts from the UK CAA MOR database related to the A320 family.

The information is protected by the UK CAA and the monthly digests are now strictly controlled by them. It is respectfully requested that with this in mind, the content of the following slides is not copied or distributed in any way.

Of note is that the number of de-icing related issues (mainly deficiencies in the way aircraft have been de-iced) were well into double figures. Due to the similarity of the reports we have not copied them all into the following slides.

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