ThisThinkChinaAnalysisiswrittenbyWenXiang,iCourts,FacultyofLaw,UniversityofCopenhagen.

Thisanalysisisachapterinthebook:InterpretationofthePrecautionaryPrinciplebytheCourts:National,ComparativeandInternationalAnalysis,Sep2019.Editor(s):CasperWichmannandKristinaWulffHansen.Disclaimer:TheviewsandopinionsexpressedinthisThinkChinapublicationarethoseoftheauthor(s)andnotnecessarilythoseofThinkChina.CopyrightofthispublicationisheldbyThinkChina.Youmaynotcopy,reproduce,republishorcirculateinanywaythecontentfromthispublicationwithoutacknowledgementofThinkChinaasthesource,exceptforyourownpersonalandnon-commercialuse.AnyotheruserequiresthepriorwrittenpermissionofThinkChinaortheauthor(s).©ThinkChinaandtheauthor(s)2020

Frontpagepicture:flickr.com

ThinkChina,UniversityofCopenhagenKarenBlixensVej42300CopenhagenSMail:cw@thinkchina.dkWeb:www.thinkchina.dk

1

ThinkChinaAnalysis2020

PrecautionaryPrincipleandRegulationofGMOsinChinaWenXiang:iCourts,FacultyofLaw,UniversityofCopenhagen.

Thepotential uncertaintiesofbiotechnologyarea strong counterbalance to the researchandapplicationofgeneticallymodifiedorganisms(GMOs)inChina.Ithasshiftedfromaratherpro-GMOattitudetoamorecautiousapproachsinceitsadoptionoftheBiosafetyProtocolandsev-eralnationalagriculturalregulationsintheearly21stcentury.Wen Xiang explores the concept of precautionary principle at the international level and itsapplicationonregulatingGMOs inChina.TheprecautionaryprinciplehasbeenseenasacoreelementinregulationofGMOs,asreflectedinCartagenaProtocolonBiosafetyandEUlegisla-tions.ItalsoplaysanimportantroleinChina’sregulatoryframeworkonGMOs,eventhoughtheinterpretationandimplementationof itremainunclear.A lackof independenceofriskassess-mentandtransparencyinriskmanagement,aswellaslackingeffectivenessofliabilityregimeinChina,largelyimpedetheexerciseofprecautionaryprincipleintheregulationofGMOs.This analysiswillmainly focus on three aspects, including scientific quality in the risk assess-ment,transparencyintheriskmanagementandeffectivenessoftheenvironmentalliabilitysys-tem.

Keywords:China,GMOs,precautionaryprinciple,BiosafetyProtocol,biotechnology,regulations

2

Precautionary Principle andRegulationofGMOsinChinaBy Wen Xiang, iCourts, Faculty of Law,UniversityofCopenhagen.IntroductionFor the Chinese government, food securityhasrankedoneofthetopmajorconcernsforseveral decades due to the hugepopulationaswell as the limited cultivated landwithinthecountry.Anurgentcallforimprovingag-ricultural productivity has been made. Itseems that the emergence and fast devel-opment of biotechnology is right in time tosolvethefoodshortagecrisis.iButthepoten-tialuncertaintiesofbiotechnologybecameastrong counterbalance to the research andapplicationofgeneticallymodifiedorganisms(GMOs)inChina,especiallyunderthecurrentsituation,where problems like the relativelyweaklegalframeworkofgovernance,insuffi-cientpoliticaltransparency,andtheabsenceof broad participation of the general publicwidelyexist.Theprecautionaryprinciplehasbeenseenasa core element in regulation of GMOs, asreflected in CartagenaProtocol onBiosafety(Biosafety Protocol) and EU legislations. ItalsoplaysanimportantroleinChina’sregula-toryframeworkonGMOs,eveniftheprecau-tionary principle has not been explicitlystated in specific rules addressing GMOs.However, the implementation and interpre-tation of the precautionary principle remainunclear in several aspects. This analysis willexplore the concept of precautionary princi-ple at international level and its application

ontheregulatingGMOsinChina.Itwillmain-ly focusonthreeaspects, includingscientificquality in the risk assessment, transparencyintheriskmanagementandeffectivenessoftheenvironmentalliabilitysystem.Precautionary principle in the InternationalcontextThe importance of the precautionary ap-proachistoensurethattherewillbeanade-quate action in case of possible seriousthreats on the conservation and sustainableuseofbiologicaldiversityattheinternationallevel.ii The wide application of the precau-tionary approach indicates thatwhere thereare threats of serious damage, cost-benefitmeasures shall be taken to prevent thosepossible adverse effects related to activitiesofapplicationofbiotechnology,eventhoughthere is no full scientific certainty of suchdamage.iiiPrecautionary approach also applies in theWTOAgreement on theApplication of Sani-tary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPSAgreement).AlthoughtheSPSclaimsascien-tific-basedapproach,andrefers to ‘availablescientific evidence’ explicitly when conduct-ing the risk assessment, the precautionaryapproachplaysasignificantrole,especiallyinthe cases where there are indications ofharm butwhere relevant scientific evidenceisinsufficient.ivUndersuchconditions,Mem-ber‘mayprovisionallyadoptsanitaryorphy-tosanitarymeasuresonthebasisofavailablepertinent information, including that fromthe relevant international organizations aswell as from sanitary or phytosanitarymeasuresappliedbyothermembers’.Undersuch situations, Members ‘shall seek to

3

obtain the additional information necessaryfor amore objective assessment of risk andreviewthesanitaryorphytosanitarymeasureaccordingly within a reasonable period oftime’.vThisarticleprovesthatacertainroomfor the interpretation of the precautionaryprincipleisavailableinimplementingtheSPSAgreement. However, the previous jurispru-dence reflects the contradictory attitudefromthedisputesettlementbody.IntheEC-Hormones dispute (Hormones Case WTO),both the Panel and theAppellate Body (AB)stated that ‘the precautionary principle hasnotbeenwrittenintotheSPSAgreementasaground for justifying SPS measures that areotherwise inconsistent with the obligationsofmemberssetoutinparticularprovisionsofthatAgreement’.viThejurisprudencedoesnotprovidesufficientdiscretionforthemembercountriesintermsof the interpretation of the precautionaryprincipleincarryingoutriskassessment.Asaconsequence, questions such as how to de-termine the legitimacy of measures whenthereisnosufficientscientificevidence,whatarethecriteriaforthepertinentoravailableinformation, andhow todetermine the rea-sonableness of the time period remain con-troversial. The controversy has been fullyreflectedby theEC-BiotechDispute.viiIn thiscase,theUSrequestedthePaneltolookintothe measures adopted by the EU, which intheir view caused unnecessary delay in theapproval and marketing of biotech prod-ucts.viiiThe Panel in the EC-Biotech DisputeinterpretedtherelevantSPSAgreementpro-visionsandruledinfavoroftheUS.

However, the ruling’s general implication tothe interpretation of the precautionary ap-proach is limited, because, firstly, the AB ofthe Japan-Measures Affecting AgriculturalProductshadalreadystatedthatindetermin-ing the reasonable period of time, it shouldbe ‘established on a case-by-case basis anddepends on the specific circumstances ofeach case, including the difficulty of obtain-ing the additional information necessary forthereviewandthecharacteristicsofthepro-visional SPS measure’ix; and secondly, giventhespecificityoftheGMOs,whosepotentialrisksmaynotbepossibletoreverseoncetheproduct is released into the environment,xthe precautionary principle is strongly re-quired by other international instruments.xiInaddition,developingcountries’interestsinthe GMO case should also be considered,providedthatalargenumberofmanydevel-opingcountriesmayhavenotyetestablisheda regulatory framework for GMOs by early2000.China’s implementation of internationalobligationsatnationallevelChina has been a contracting party to boththe Biosafety Protocol and theWTO, and itadopted several legislations implementingtheseinternationaltreatiesatdomesticlevel.ThemostrelevantonesareRegulationontheSafety Administration of Agricultural Genet-icallyModifiedOrganismsissuedbytheStateCouncil, followed by three implementingmeasures,whichareMeasuresontheSafetyEvaluationAdministrationofAgriculturalGe-netically Modified Organisms, Measures onAdministration of the Import Safety of Agri-culturalGeneticallyModifiedOrganisms,andMeasures on Administration of Labeling of

4

Agricultural GeneticallyModifiedOrganisms.Asmentioned before, none of these legisla-tionsexplicitly referred to theprecautionaryprincipleinthetexts.However,Chinaindeedtook a precautious attitude towards envi-ronmentalreleaseofGMOs,aswillbeelabo-ratedinthefollowingsections.National regulatory framework of GMOs inChinaAs one of the leading countries in develop-ment of biotechnology, China’s biosafetyframework in terms of how to address thepros and cons of biotechnology has a pro-found influence on both the internationalmarketprospectsofGMOsand the relevanttechnology development.xiiThe National Bi-osafety FrameworkofChinawas adopted in1999asapilotprojectoftheUnitedNationsEnvironment Programme (UNEP). xiii TheFramework involved participation of severalgovernmentalorgans,suchastheMinistryofAgriculture (MOA), the Ministry of Science,theMinistryofEducation,theStateForestryAdministration, theChineseAcademyof Sci-ences, the State Drug Administration, etc.Based on international biosafety regulatorytrends and the biotechnology developmentstageofChina,theFrameworkproposedthelegalandpolicysystemsforbiosafetyregula-tion, as well as the technical standards andthecapacityoffuturedevelopment.Chinaneedsaholistic legalframeworkinor-der tobuildamoreregulatedbiotechnologysystem, including the processes of research,development, the environmental release ofGMOs, commercial production, sales, con-sumption and transboundary movements.The Framework stressed the need for the

constructionofalegalsystem,andcalledfora monitoring mechanism to oversee the bi-osafety standardsofdomestic and importedGMOs to prevent their potential damage tobiodiversity, environment and publichealth.xivThe Framework adopted a precautionaryapproach to guide the development of bio-technology, under which, restricted risk as-sessment and management standards wereimposedonthewholeprocessofproduction.Actually, at the end of the 1990s, the de-factohaltofcommercializationofGMcrops,and the tightening of GMO regulations byimposing more strict application require-ments,safetyassessmentandimportcontrolwereseenasevidenceforthis‘winterofbio-technology’.As one of the early participants in the Con-ventiononBiologicalDiversityandapartytothe Cartegena Protocol on Biosafety, Chinadoes emphasize the importance of interna-tional cooperationonbiosafety issues.How-ever,thecurrentFrameworkstillneedstobeimproved,especiallyontransparencyissues.InvestmentintheresearchanddevelopmentofbiotechnologyinChinaislargelymanagedby public finance provided by governmentalministries and agencies.xv According to theFramework for the Agricultural Science andTechnology Development adopted by theState Council, it is the State’s ambition toimprove thequalityof cropsand to transfertraditional agriculture to amodernone thatisequippedwithhightechnologies.Itcanbeseenthatdevelopmentof thebiotechnologyenjoys priority in governmental policies. Inthe process of agricultural modernization,

5

there has been a consistent insufficiency inthemonitoringsystemofthebiosafetyregu-lation. Consequences like environmental un-certainties and potential public health risksarecomingtotheattentionofpolicy-makersforcing them to address the importance ofbiosafetyissuesinfurtherlegislations.ScientificqualityoftheriskassessmentTheriskassessment isconductedbytheNa-tionalAgriculturalGMOBiosafetyCommittee.Normally the risk assessment will be desig-nated by the Committee to competent au-thorities (research institutes, ministerialdepartments or university labs, etc., see Ta-ble 1). Based on the Committee’s technicalassessment results, the Agricultural GMOBiosafety Management Office prepares therecommendations to theMinistryofAgricul-ture (MOA) that is tasked with taking deci-sionsonapprovalordisapproval.The aim of the safety assessment andman-agement system is to oversee the potentialdangers or risks to humans, animals, plantsand micro-organisms caused by agriculturalGMOs. To bemore specific, Appendices I, IIandIIIoftheMeasuresontheSafetyEvalua-tionAdministrationofAgriculturalGenetical-lyModifiedOrganismsprovidefourmethodsintermsofsafetyassessment:

1) Identificationof thecharacteristicsofthe GMO recipient organisms andtheirpotentialadverseeffects;

2) Evaluation of the genetic operationsinvolvedand identificationofanypo-tential consequences to humanhealthandtheenvironment;

3) DeterminationoftheoverallsafetyoftheGMOs;

4) Applicationofmanagementstrategiesfor risks from genetic operation pro-cesses.

In addition to thesemethods, the safety as-sessmentandmanagementsystemsetupbythe Safety Assessment Regulation also in-cludemeasuresfortechnicalinspection,safe-ty monitoring and enforcement issues.Accordingly, several institutions have beennominated by theMinistry of Agriculture inthe Bio-technology Testing Organization in2002, with different testing responsibilities(SeeTable1).One criticism is that the Committee, by itscomposition,islikelytopaylessattentiontothe potential risks to the environment andhuman health.xviIn addition, conflicts of in-terests exist in the assessment process aswell. Accordingly, some of the Committeemembers who have participated in the as-sessmentmaypersonallyhavean interest incommercializing such product, or the Com-mitteemembers’personalconnectionscouldinfluence the assessment result. The secondconcern is relevant to dependence andtransparencyofwholeprocess, since the listof members of the committee, and the de-tailsofriskassessmenthaveonlybeenmadepublicly accessible after several NGOs andthe media consistently criticized the proce-dure.xviiThirdly, lack of scientific independ-ence may also affect the quality of riskassessment and exercise of precautionaryprinciple.

6

No Institution High-levelAuthority ScopeofDetection

1 InstituteofPlantProtection,ChineseAcademyofAgriculturalSciences

ChineseAcademyofAgriculturalSciences

GMmaize,Soybeanenvironmentalsafetyassessment

2 OilCropResearchInstitute,ChineseAcademyofAgriculturalSciences

ChineseAcademyofAgriculturalSciences

GMoilseedrapeenvironmentalsafetyassessment

3 NanjingAgriculturalUniversity MinistryofEducation GMsoybeanenvironmentalsafetyassessment

4 CottonResearchInstitute,ChineseAcademyofAgriculturalSciences

ChineseAcademyofAgriculturalSciences

BtCottonenvironmentalsafetyassessment

5 ChinaRiceResearchInstitute ChineseAcademyofAgriculturalSciences BtRiceenvironmentalsafetyassessment

6InstituteofVegetablesandFlowers,ChineseAcademyofAgricultural

Sciences

ChineseAcademyofAgriculturalSciences

GMvegetablesenvironmentalsafetyassessment

7 AcademyofAgriculturalSciences,JilinProvince

CouncilofAgriculture,JilinProvince

GMmaize,SoybeanenvironmentalsafetyassessmentandGMOproducts

testing

8 AcademyofAgriculturalSciences,ShandongProvince

AgriculturalDepartmentofShandongProvince

GMmaize,SoybeanenvironmentalsafetyassessmentandGMOproducts

testing

9 MinistryofAgriculture,TechnologyDevelopmentCenter

MinistryofAgriculture,ScienceandEducationDivision

GMplantsenvironmentalsafetyassessmentandGMOproductstesting

10BiotechnologyResearchInstitute,ChineseAcademyofAgricultural

Sciences

ChineseAcademyofAgriculturalSciences GMOproductstesting

11 AnimalandPlantQuarantineLaboratoryofAQSIQ AQSIQ GMOproductstesting

12 AcademyofAgriculturalSciences,Shanghai CouncilofAgriculture,Shanghai GMOproductstesting

13 UniversityofGuangxi AgriculturalDepartmentofGuangxiProvince GMOproductstesting

14 SouthChinaAgriculturalUniversity CouncilofAgriculture,Guangdong GMOproductstesting

15 AcademyofAgriculturalandForestry,HebeiProvince CouncilofAgriculture,Hebei GMOproductstesting

16 AcademyofAgriculturalScience,AnhuiProvince CouncilofAgriculture,Anhui GMOproductstesting

17 UniversityofZhejiang CouncilofAgriculture,Zhejiang GMOproductstesting

18 NortheastAgriculturalUniversity CouncilofAgriculture,Heilongjiang GMOproductstesting

19 UniversityofAgriculture,China AgriculturalDepartmentofBeijing

GMOfoodsafetytestingandGMOproductstesting

20InstituteofNutritionandFood

Safety,ChineseCenterforDiseaseControl

ChineseCenterforDiseaseControl GMOfoodsafetytesting

21 CenterforDiseasePrevention,Tianjin TianjinHealthBureau GMOfoodsafetytesting

Table1.AQSIQ:GeneralAdministrationofQualitySupervision,InspectionandQuarantineofthePeople'sRepublicofChina

7

One criticism is that the Committee, by itscomposition,islikelytopaylessattentiontothe potential risks to the environment andhuman health.xviiiIn addition, conflicts of in-terests exist in the assessment process aswell. Accordingly, some of the Committeemembers who have participated in the as-sessmentmaypersonallyhavean interest incommercializing such product, or the Com-mitteemembers’personalconnectionscouldinfluence the assessment result. The secondconcern is relevant to dependence andtransparencyofwholeprocess, since the listof members of the committee, and the de-tailsofriskassessmenthaveonlybeenmadepublicly accessible after several NGOs andthe media consistently criticized the proce-dure.xix Thirdly, lack of scientific independ-ence may also affect the quality of riskassessment and exercise of precautionaryprinciple, since these competent authoritiesare basically affiliated with Ministries (Uni-versities are generally public ones that arealsogovernedbyMinistryofEducation).Scientific integrityprovidesabasis forpolicymakerstomakedecisionstakingintoaccountpossible manners dealing with scientific un-certainties. The first difficulty is the politicalinfluence on the result scientific evaluation,ascanbeseenintheMilkPowderScandalinChina in 2008, xx several scientific bodiescame outwith evidence that themilk prod-ucts are not harmful to infants, which lateron proved that some of the surveys weremanipulated by some local authorities. Itwouldnotbepossibletoapplyprecautionaryprincipletoany imminentrisks ifsuchscien-tific evidence provided by the risk assess-ment is not sound. The second difficulty is

thescientific standardsarenotbestandard-ized, as can be seen in a lawsuit against afood manufacturer Nestle in Shanghai in2003, two different scientific reports pre-paredbydifferentauthoritiesturnouttobewithtotallydifferentresults.In general, three initiatives could be consid-ered to improve advance scientific integrity.An independent and unbiased risk assess-ment is needed for further decision-making. xxi Firstly, the Committee membersshould declare any conflicts of interests be-fore being selected as a member, and theCommitteemembersshouldbefromdiversesectors, including agriculture, environmentalprotection, health, etc. Secondly, guidelinesand results of risk assessment should bemade publicly accessible, and competentauthorities should provide public consulta-tions for the laypublic to comment. The re-centDecision(2015)onRevisionofMeasureson the Safety Evaluation Administration ofAgricultural Genetically Modified Organismscan be seen as a good example, since it ismade available for stakeholders to makecomments.xxiiThirdly, an independent scien-tificbodyshouldbeconsidered,similartotheEFSA in theEU, it should act independently,and it should adopt a centralized system toavoiditsdependenceonfundingprovidedbylocalauthorities.TransparencyintheriskmanagementTheMOAisresponsibleforstrengtheningthesafety evaluation administration of researchandtestingofagriculturalGMOs.Accordingly,withintheMOA,aNationalAgriculturalGMOBiosafety Committee is established, whichinitiallyconsistsof56expertsontheresearch,

8

production,processing, inspectionandquar-antine,healthandenvironmentofagricultur-al GMOs (the number of experts in theCommitteeincreasesto70lateron).xxiiiThe MOA and its subordinate departmentsconsider theapplicationofmarketing licens-esforanyorganizationorpersonthatintendsto market GMO products. In addition, theadvertisement for agricultural GMOs can bepublished, broadcasted, set andpostedonlyafterapprovalhasbeengrantedbythecom-petent agricultural administrative depart-ment. The MOA is also in charge of themanagement of import and export activitiesof agriculturalGMOs. Applicants introducingthese products into the territories of Chinamust apply toMOA and its subordinate de-partments andwait for their approvals. TheMOAhastheobligationtoissueasafetycer-tificate for agricultural GMOs, which havepassed the safety evaluation. It canbe seenthat theMOA is the leadingauthority in theholisticGMOchain, from its research to theproduction and consumption stages, otherMinistries will be presented by members intheGMOBiosafetyCommittee.xxivThe Measures on the Safety Evaluation Ad-ministrationofAgriculturalGeneticallyModi-fiedOrganismsprovidesimportantmeasuresas follows. According to different levels ofrisks, itwillaccordinglyadoptdifferentkindsofrequirementsregardingitsassessmentandapproval procedures. The most cautiousstandardswillcertainlyapplytothoseGMOswithhighestrisks:xxvFirstly,aclassifiedadministrationandevalua-tionsystemhasbeenputinplaceforabettersafety regulation. The Regulation classified

theagriculturalGMOsintoclassesI,II,IIIandIVdependingonthedegreeoftheirpotentialrisks to human beings, animals, plants, mi-croorganismsandtheenvironment.The implementing measures together withthe State Council Regulation comprised aholistic centralized regulatory framework foragriculturalGMOsinChina,whilsttheMOAisresponsible for their implementation. The2001RegulationestablishedasystemofJointMinistriesCommission for the safety admin-istration of agricultural GMOs within theState Council. xxvi The Commission gatheredofficials from departments of agriculture,science and technology, environmental pro-tection,publichealth,foreigntradeandeco-nomic cooperation, inspection andquarantine, among which, MOA is assignedthe leadingrole. TheCommission isrespon-sible for thesupervisionandcoordinationofmajor issuesintheadministrationofagricul-turalGMOs.TheApprovalProcessofGMOsinChinaItisnotedthattherecentMOApressconfer-ence indicates that a roadmap is ready forthe pipeline of GMOs in the 13th Five YearPlanofChina.Thepriorityforcommercializa-tion will be given to non-food GMO plantsfirst, followed by GM feeds or processedGMOs, and finally GMO foods (e.g. Btrice).xxviiApparently it is not clear and trans-parent for the approval process ofGMOs inChina, even if there are well-documentedregulations. Several concerns have beenraisedasfollow:Firstly, the state invests a huge amount offunding in research and development pro-cesses.xxviiiConsequently,thereispressureto

9

commercializenewcrops inorder tobenefitfromsuch investment.According to thecur-rent regulations, those GMOs with positiveriskassessmentresultswillbeissuedasafetycertificate, and then will be approved forcommercialization. However, it seems therearetwoconcernswithregardtotheregime.The first is thata socio-economicevaluationregime seems to be missing. However, be-sidesthescientificriskassessment,riskman-agement needs to take into account otherjustifiableconsideration fordecision-making.The precautionary principle provides withmanners for states tobalance theirenviron-mental and socio-economic considerationsaccordingtotheirneeds.xxixAnotheroneisabouttheunduedelayoftheapproval process of certain GM varieties,which undermines the legitimacy and effec-tivenessof risk regulation.Oneof themajorconcerns for theDecisionas reflected in theindustry associations’ comments is that itmightbelackoftransparencyforajustifiabledecision, and it might also be in violationwithChina’scommitmenttotheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO).Secondly, the involvement of farmers andconsumers intheresearchanddevelopmentprocess is under question.xxxChina has a di-verse smallholder farming system. On theone hand, it is very difficult to implement auniform biosafety regime, and on the otherhand,whetherandtowhatextentthefarm-ersare reallycapableofbenefiting fromthenew GM varieties is questionable. xxxi Deci-sion-makersareawareofthedivergingsitua-tion within China. Yet, the excessivelyconcentrated decision-making mechanism

cannot afford to balance the diversified in-terests from farmers’ different locations.Therefore, farmers are quite passive in thismechanism, and their interests cannot besufficientlyrepresented.Itismoreimportantif relevant stakeholders could be more ac-tivelyengagedintothepolicymakingprocess.EnvironmentalLiabilitysystemEnvironmentalliabilityreferstothepollutionor damage to the ecological environmentcaused by industrial and other man-madeactivities.ThenegativeeffectsofGMOshaveattractedwideattentioninChinabecauseofthe wide cultivation of GM crops in the re-cent decade.However, Chinahasnot devel-oped a comprehensive national liabilityframework to address environmental riskscausedbyGMOsatthecurrentstage.xxxiiAccording to Article 106 and Article 124 ofthe General Principles of Civil Law, environ-mental pollution, as a kind of special tort,should apply strict liability. Strict liabilitymakes one legally responsible for the dam-age caused by himor her acts regardless ofculpability.Asthereisnospecialliabilityleg-islation forGMO-relatedenvironmental tort,strict liability as a default principle shall beappliedwhentortoccurs.GMO-relatedenvironmentalliabilityisuncer-tainandunpredictabletoalargeextent.Giv-en the current legal systemof China,whereenvironmental rights are just becoming animportant concern by both the legislatorsand the general public, the strict liabilityprinciple is impractical not only because oftheinsufficiencyoflitigationdesigns,butalsoduetoweakpublicawarenessofthe

10

biosafety issue which restrict public partici-pation in environmental litigation to someextent. After all, all legal systems, expresslyor implicitly recognizeageneral rulethatnoone is ought to compensate damage that isnotcausedbyhim.xxxiiiChinaneedstodevel-op an efficient liability framework for envi-ronmental tort under its current legal,politicalandeconomicsituations.Itneedstoaddress the allocation of loss caused by po-tential GMO pollution, to hold the polluterliableandtoprovidecompensationtovictims.ThenegativeeffectsofGMOandGM-relatedproductsnormallywillnotappearinashort-timeperiod. Legislators shouldpromptlyup-date the labeling requirements based onbothscientificapproachandtheprecaution-aryapproachinordertoprotectthelaypub-lic.ConclusionChina is still struggling to find a balancebe-tween economic considerations and socialconcerns. It is noted that China has shiftedfrom a rather pro-GMO attitude to a morecautious approach since its adoption of theBiosafety Protocol and several national agri-cultural regulations in theearly21stcentury.It is imperative to find a rightway to inter-pret good regulation of GMO regulation inthefaceofconflictsofdifferentvalues,suchas food security and population pressure,ruraldevelopmentandagriculturalmoderni-zation, economic growth and environmentaldegradation,etc.Itseemsthatprecautionaryapproach is reflected in risk regulation ofGMOs inChina, even though the interpreta-tionandimplementationofitremainunclear.It calls uponmore scientific integrity in risk

assessment and broader public participationinriskregulationinChina.The term risk societywas developed fromaWestern perspective formulated by welfarestates,but theapplicationof the theorycanalsobeadjustedinanalyzingthequestionofstate legitimacy in governing environmentalrisksindevelopingcountries’contexts.IntermsofChina,whichiscategorizedasan‘authoritarian state’, it is easy to rule outformal political opposition of any kind. Thisinsufficiency in the regulation ofGMOsmaylabelChinaas a ‘developmental risk society’accordingtothewesternobservers.xxxivUnder the pressure from the internationalcommunity as well as the improvement inthe participation of the civil society, only astrictregulatorystandardofbiotechnologicalriskandbiosafetycouldkeepChinasafefrombeinglabeledasa‘developmentalrisksociety’under the current self-monitoring system.China took a precautious approach tomod-ernregulationofGMOs,however, theappli-cation of precautionary principle remainsproblematic. A ack of independence of riskassessment and transparency in risk man-agement, as well as lack of effectiveness ofliability regime in China, largely impede theexercise of precautionary principle in theregulationofGMOs.This analysis is a chapter in the bookInterpretation of the Precautionary Principleby the Courts: National, Comparative andInternationalAnalysis,Sep2019.

11

iHuang,J.etal.(2002).PlantBiotechnologyinChina,Science,295,S674-S676.iiBiosafetyProtocol,2000.iiiBiosafetyProtocol,2000.ivArticle5(2)SPS,WTO.vArticle5(7)SPS,WTO.viEuropeanCommunities-MeasuresConcerningMeatandMeatProducts(Hormones),DS26.viiEuropeanCommunities—MeasuresAffectingtheApprovalandmarketingofBiotechProducts,WT/DS291,WT/DS292,WT/DS293.viiiEuropeanCommunities—MeasuresAffectingtheApprovalandmarketingofBiotechProducts,WT/DS291,WT/DS292,WT/DS293.ixAppellateBodyReport,Japan–AgriculturalProductsII,1999.xRisksandPrecautionsofGeneticallyModifiedOrganisms,DhanPrakash,SonikaVerma,RanjanaBhatia,andB.N.Tiwary,ISRNEcologyVolume2011.xiArticle174ECTreaty,RioDeclaration.xiiAnemergingmodelforlifesciencescommercializa-tion,AshleyJStevens,NatureBiotechnology35,608–613(2017).

xiiiTheNationalBiosafetyFrameworkofChina,1999.xivTheNationalBiosafetyFrameworkofChina,1999.xvJasonKorenblit,BS,BiotechnologyInnovationsInDevelopingNations,BiotechnolHealthc.2006Feb;3(1):55–58.xviWang,X.(2004).ChallengesanddilemmasindevelopingChina’snationalbiosafetyframework,JournalofWorldTrade,38(5),S899-S913.xvii农业部颁布俩安全证书转基因“偷偷摸摸”张伟

,2009 年 12 月 23 日 08:56 来源：《中国青年报》

[ChinaYouthNewspaper,2009].xviiiWang,X.(2004).Challengesanddilemmasindevel-opingChina’snationalbiosafetyframework,JournalofWorldTrade,38(5),S899-S913.xix农业部颁布俩安全证书转基因“偷偷摸摸”张伟

,2009 年 12 月 23 日 08:56 来源：《中国青年报》

[ChinaYouthNewspaper,2009].xx国家质检总局公布对普通奶粉和其他配方奶粉三

聚氰胺专项检测情况[AQSIQpublishesmilkpowderandotherformulatestresults)](Pressre-lease)(inChinese).AdministrationofQualitySuper-vision,InspectionandQuarantine.30September2008.xxiAnneIngeborgMyhrandTerjeTraavik,GeneticallyModified(GM)Crops:PrecautionaryScienceandConflictsofinterests,JournalofAgriculturalandEnvironmentalEthics16:227–247,2003.xxiiDecision(2015)onRevisionofMeasuresontheSafetyEvaluationAdministrationofAgriculturalGeneticallyModifiedOrganisms.

12

xxiiiMao,X.(2011).OntheindustrialisationofGMriceinChina:dilemmasandwayout.JournalofNanjingAgriculturalUniversity(SocialSciencesEdition),11(9),S125-S130.xxivYang,W.(2003)‘RegulationofGeneticallyModifiedOrganismsinChina’,ReviewofEuropeanCommuni-tyandInternationalEnvironmentalLaw,vol.12(1),p108.xxvTheMeasuresontheSafetyEvaluationAdministra-tionofAgriculturalGeneticallyModifiedOrganisms,2003.xxviRegulationontheSafetyAdministrationofAgricul-turalGeneticallyModifiedOrganisms2001xxviiPressConference,2016.xxviiiKeeley,J.(2003).AbiotechdevelopmentalState?theChineseexperience.[Online].[Accessed08Feb-ruary2017]Availablefromhttp://www.ids.ac.uk/go/idspublication/a-biotech-developmental-state-the-chinese-experiencexxixArieTrouwborst,PrecautionaryRightsAndDutiesofStates,MartinusNijhoffPublishers,2006.xxxXue,D.(eds)(2009).BiosafetyandRegulationforGeneticallyModifiedOrganisms.Beijing:SciencePublication.xxxiXue,D.(eds)(2009).BiosafetyandRegulationforGeneticallyModifiedOrganisms.Beijing:SciencePublication.xxxiiWang,X.(2004).Challengesanddilemmasindevel-opingChina’snationalbiosafetyframework,JournalofWorldTrade,38(5),S899-S913.

xxxiiiSpier,J.andHaazen,O.(2000)‘ComparativeCon-clusionsonCausation’,inSpier,J.(eds.)(2000)Uni-ficationofTortLaw:Causation,PrinciplesofEuropeanTortLaw,KluwerLawInternational:TheHague.p.127.xxxivZhao,J.andHo,P.(2005)‘ADevelopmentalRiskSociety?ThePoliticsofGeneticallyModifiedOrgan-isms(GMOs)inChina’,InternationalJournalofEnvi-ronmentandSustainableDevelopment,Vol.4,No.4,p.373.