http://uu.diva-portal.org This is an author produced manuscript (pre-print version) of a paper. Citation for the manuscript: Hall, Jonathan “War Trauma and Intergroup Trust”

URL: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-198765

War Trauma and Intergroup Trust

Introduction War may have major adverse impacts on social institutions and norms, un-dermining the basis of trust and cooperation within society and generating a culture of fear and enmity between social groups. As a result, war is some-times perceived as “development in reverse” (Collier et al. 2003). However, other research on the long-term political and social effects of war challenges this notion. The disjuncture caused by wars and social revolutions may in certain historical instances have spurred social reform and positive institu-tional changes (Cramer 2006). This controversy is active on the micro-level as well. A growing body of literature suggests – perhaps surprisingly – that in certain contexts traumatic wartime experiences such as forced conscrip-tion or the witnessing of atrocities may result in greater post-war political, economic, and social engagement; for example, through increased involve-ment in community meetings as well as political and community organiza-tions in Sierra Leone (Bellows and Miguel 2009), community leadership in Uganda (Blattman 2009), voting in Sierra Leone and Uganda (Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blattman 2009), and economic risk-taking and altruistic be-havior towards one’s neighbors in Burundi (Voors et al. 2012). To corrobo-rate their findings, these authors point to psychological literature indicating that individuals may bounce back from life-threatening events to experience personal “posttraumatic growth” (Tedeschi and Calhoun 2004). Yet such engagement may occur largely within rather than between social groups, begging the question of whether wartime violence undermines long-term intergroup cooperation and trust.

Those examining the impact of exposure to violence on intergroup atti-tudes find more mixed results. In Israel, exposure to terrorist attacks pro-duced greater authoritarianism, ethnocentricity, and support for extreme political violence among Jews and Arabs (Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim, and Johnson 2006), as well as exclusionary attitudes towards Arab citizens of Israel (Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009) and prejudice towards those living in the Gaza strip among Jews (Besser and Neria 2009). Interestingly, exposure did lead to posttraumatic growth in Israel for some victims (Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim, and Johnson 2006); Yet, this merely increased their hostility towards outgroups (Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim, and Johnson 2006; Hobfoll et al. 2007). Exposure to missile attacks may have also encouraged Israeli political activ-

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ism (Punamaki, Qouta, and El Sarraj 1997). In Rwanda, cumulative traumat-ic exposure reduced support for nonviolent alternatives to conflict manage-ment and interdependence across ethnic lines (Pham, Weinstein, and Longman 2004). In Northern Ireland, experiences of violence boosted public support for paramilitary groups and reduced support for the decommission-ing of weapons (Hayes and McAllister 2001). In the North Caucasus of Rus-sia, victims of violence were less willing to forgive perpetrators (Bakke, O'Loughlin, and Ward 2009), while in Burundi loss of an immediate family member had the same effect (Samii 2011, 81-126). In Croatia, loss of a loved one increased ethno-nationalist attitudes, however it had no effect in Bosnia and Kosovo where war violence was more intense (Dyrstad 2012). In Macedonia, proximity to war zones did not effect support for the peace agreement (Dyrstad et al. 2011), while in Israel proximity to terrorism fatali-ties increased support for territorial concessions to Palestinians (Gould and Klor 2010). In Uganda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, group experiments in which participants could make anonymous cash donations to members of other ethnic groups did not detect ethnic bias (Habyarimana et al. 2008; Whitt 2012; Whitt and Wilson 2007).

Together, these divergent results on the micro-level point to the potential importance of the postwar context in shaping the relationship between expo-sure to violence and intergroup attitudes. Under what conditions do individ-uals respond to the traumas of war with increased intergroup animosity? Under what conditions might exposure to violence reduce intergroup ani-mosity and promote positive posttraumatic growth after war?

This paper seeks to contribute to our understanding of the social and po-litical effects of war by examining whether a comprehensive set of wartime experiences and war-related losses influence a range of conflict-related atti-tudes that arise among adversaries in response to war. However, using two surveys conducted simultaneously in 2010 I examine this relationship under different conditions: first in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina1 and second in Sweden as a settlement country. The brutal Bosnian War (1992-95) generat-ed a massive refugee crisis, displacing more than half the population. After Germany and Austria, Sweden was the third largest recipient of these refu-gees in Europe outside former Yugoslavia. Today, approximately 38 percent of Bosnia’s citizens lives beyond its borders (Valenta and Ramet 2011). A unique policy feature distinguished Sweden from other asylum countries during the 1990s: the fact that asylum seekers from Bosnia were granted permanent residency in toto in 1993. Today, 96 percent of these refugees remain settled in Sweden. This may be contrasted with the situation in Ger-many, where only 6 percent remain (Valenta and Ramet 2011). The stock of refugees living in Sweden is therefore arguably more representative than in other comparable settlement country contexts. 1 Henceforth sometimes referred to as Bosnia.

140

I examine the effects of 1) serving in a military or fighting unit, 2) being physically wounded, 3) being imprisoned or placed in a camp, 4) having lost a family member, and 5) having one’s property destroyed on respondents’ attitudes regarding the war. These include perceptions of the past and their group’s role in the war, justification of ethnic cleansing, forgiveness of per-petrators, the desirability of ethnic mixing and intermarriage, and prospects for peaceful coexistence between former adversaries.

Using regression analysis, I relate respondents’ exposure to violence and losses to their conflict-related attitudes, controlling for a rich set of individu-al background characteristics. The findings indicate that in post-war Bosnia more direct experiences of wartime violence and deeper war-related losses increased victims’ defensive coping; that is, those who were physically wounded, imprisoned or placed in a camp, or who lost a loved one in the war exhibit more conflictive attitudes. However, in Sweden the situation is very different. Exposure to violence and losses tended to be uncorrelated with respondents’ attitudes about the war. Moreover, those who suffered the gravest form of personal threat – physical violence – exhibit more peaceful attitudes and thus less defensive coping. In addition, an investigation of each subsample of victims reveals that those in Sweden hold more peaceful atti-tudes than those in Bosnia across the board.

I interpret these findings with the help of the conservation of resources model of stress (COR) and terror management theory (TMT). The basic premise of COR is that stress results from the potential or actual loss of re-sources individuals strive to retain, protect, and build (Hobfoll 1989). The size of the threat or actual loss of resources therefore determines the size of the stress response to wartime violence. At the same time, awareness of death has the potential to induce paralyzing terror (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon 1986). According to TMT, individuals turn to meaning-providing structures to cope with death anxiety. During conflict, psychologi-cal structures develop that enable groups to cope successfully with the con-flict situation. These shared beliefs involve such themes as the justness of the war effort, the need for security, deligitimization of opponents, positive self-image, patriotism, unity, and peace (Bar-Tal 1998). Those most exposed to wartime violence and losses should therefore draw most extensively upon these defensive psychological resources in order to help meet their basic needs. This appears to be the case in post-war Bosnia.

At the same time, more emphasis needs to be placed on how context shapes the coping process. The social-psychological infrastructure of the post-war context tends to reinforce reliance on conflictive beliefs for coping. I argue that migration may provide an exit from the spiral of difficult post-war socioeconomic and political conditions, setting the stage for a more pos-itive posttraumatic growth. To the extent that migration empowers victims with access to more psychological and material resources that help meet their basic psychological needs, it may reduce defensive coping and open the

141

door to greater intergroup trust. This appears to be the case in Sweden, where victims tend to be no more likely to cope defensively than non-victims and, in the case of exposure to physical violence, may rely less on conflictive beliefs for coping. However, the ability to envision a common future may depend upon the extent to which coexistence is part of everyday experience. Although respondents in Sweden express less ethnocentricity and more shared understandings of the past and the war, they are no more willing to engage across ethnic boundaries and are more pessimistic about the prospects for peaceful coexistence in Bosnia.

The paper proceeds as follows: in the next section I outline my arguments relating conflictive beliefs to wartime experiences and war-related losses under different conditions. Thereafter, the data and methods are presented and discussed. This is followed by the empirical analysis and subsequently the final discussion.

Traumatic Experiences and Perceptions of War This section explains how under threatening wartime conditions conflictive societal beliefs develop in part in order help meet basic psychological needs. Next, it describes why those experiencing the greatest traumas and losses may also rely most on defensive coping. Lastly, it uplifts the importance of context in shaping this relationship. To the extent that migration increases access to alternative material and psychological resources that help meet victims’ basic needs, it may offset the need for defensive coping.

The escalation to war entails a spiral of violent events and political ma-neuvers that spread growing fear and enmity between social groups. Polari-zation occurs as cascades of social reactions spread public support for divi-sive rather than compatible images of group identity (Kuran 1998; Somer 2001). Groups adapt to these conditions by forming new beliefs that enable their members to cope psychologically and contribute successfully to their side’s war efforts (Bar-Tal 1998). These justify the war’s aims, elevate the importance of security, praise the ingroup, delegitimize adversaries, promote the need for patriotism and unity, and preserve the distant hope of peace. As part of society’s collective effort to ensure its long-term survival, this psy-chological infrastructure becomes embodied in social institutions and norms, including the public education system, the media and everyday interactions (Bar-Tal 2007). Conflictive beliefs therefore become embedded in society’s ethos, shaping its culture, language and symbols. In the post-war context, this situation may be reinforced by poor economic conditions and the failure to address the conflict’s root causes (Mac Ginty 2006). At least on a psycho-logical level, the war may live on in the post-war politics of memory.

142

Trauma and Defensive Coping According to the conservation of resources model, individuals strive to re-tain, protect, and build resources, the potential or actual loss of which is threatening and results in psychological stress (Hobfoll 1989). Greater threats to, or actual loss of, resources therefore result in a larger stress re-sponse. On a fundamental level, exposure to violence may disrupt the psy-chological resources, or “plausibility structures”, that individuals rely upon to make sense of their world (Berger and Luckman 1966, 121). Harsh physi-cal conditions during combat, deprivation of basic needs, witnessing atroci-ties, the death of comrades, the loss of a family member, torture, rape, the destruction of homes, and related experiences of war may thus exact an enormous material and psychological toll, challenging people’s most basic assumptions (Janoff-Bulman 1992).2

Greater stress may result in greater defensive coping. According to terror management theory, the biological predisposition towards self-preservation combined with the unique human awareness of the inevitability of death creates the potential for overwhelming terror (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon 1986). However, existential terror is alleviated by reinforcing a sense of belonging to an enduring and meaningful context greater than one-self. The defense of shared beliefs reinforces one’s sense of purpose and self-esteem and assuages death anxieties that inevitably arise in the context of war. Numerous experimental studies have shown that simply making peo-ple aware of their of their own death triggers hostility towards outgroups (Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski 2000). In combination, COR and TMT suggest that those incurring greater resource losses as a result of war will also be more psychologically defensive. In the post-war context, the dual propensities of ingroup devotion and outgroup derogation should there-fore manifest themselves in victims’ perceptions of war.

The Importance of Context Previous research has not paid adequate attention to the role of context in shaping the process of defensive coping. COR theory predicts how individu-als will react to stress but does not predict which resources will be accessible to them. TMT predicts that mortality salience will promote the defense of shared beliefs, but not which beliefs will become salient in a given context. The expectation has been that resources pertaining to one cultural and histor-ical context will generalize to others. However, while the process of drawing upon available resources for coping may be universal, human beings do so

2 Indeed, According to Berger and Luckmann, “Subjective reality is thus always dependent upon specific plausibility structures, that is, the specific social base and social processes required for its maintenance. One can maintain one’s self-identification as a man of im-portance only in a milieu that confirms this identity” (Berger and Luckmann, 1967, 154-155).

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according to culturally acceptable “channels of behavior and thought” (Hobfoll 2001, 354). Moreover, resources may be altered and realigned as a result of social and historical change (Hobfoll 2002, 317). The psychological utility of conflictive beliefs developed in one context may thus dwindle un-der different political, economic and cultural conditions (Bar-Tal 2000, 72). To date little research has addressed this problem. This is, however, some-what surprising since concern for the impact of the external environment on internal coping is fundamental to resource models of stress. Accordingly, prominent theorists have called for more research to be directed at the social and cultural dimensions of the “ecology” of coping (Hobfoll 2001; 2002).

The Impact of “Exit” I argue that individuals may rely less on conflictive beliefs to cope with trauma as a result of their migration to the extent that it increases access to other resources that help meet their psychological needs. This fits with the findings of empirical research in the COR tradition which show that individ-uals with more personal and social resources are less likely to develop coun-terproductive coping mechanisms such as hostile, negative and prejudicial attitudes towards adversaries (Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim, and Johnson 2006). By empowering migrants with access to a range of resources, migration may therefore reduce reliance on conflictive beliefs for coping with the conflict crisis.

However, the effects of for example financial resource gain or cross-border social networks developed through migration may be limited if they are not accompanied by new psychological resources as well. Migration may have psychological benefits. Coping with life-threatening events entails de-veloping a set of beliefs about the causes of the crisis and one’s ability to control them as well as a positive self-image (Taylor 1983). The social-psychological infrastructure of post-war contexts tends to reinforce reliance on conflictive beliefs for coping. In this situation, social institutions and norms structure face-to-face interactions with members of one’s own and other groups, which in turn may simply serve to remind victims of their loss. On the other hand, migration may provide an exit from the spiral of difficult post-war socioeconomic and political conditions that support defensive cop-ing, instead setting the stage for a more positive posttraumatic growth.

Life in exile is certainly not without difficulty. Nevertheless, the migra-tion situation may be more resource rich than the post-war context. Experi-ences of prejudice, discrimination, and difficulties on the labor market may give rise to “acculturative stress” (Berry 2006). In response, some migrants may assimilate while others withdraw into nostalgia for the past. However, research indicates that nostalgia may be a resource rather than a liability. Experimental findings suggest that nostalgic memories reconnect the self to a meaningful and positive past, which promotes positive self-esteem

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(Wildschut et al. 2006), diminishes the effects of mortality salience (Routledge et al. 2008) and the need to invest in collective identity in re-sponse to threat (Juhl et al. 2010). Migrants who assimilate socioeconomi-cally gain greater financial stability and social status. Moreover, complex social identities may be more culturally acceptable in settlement countries than in the post-war context, since under threat individuals prefer clearer group boundaries (Roccas and Brewer 2002, 99). Research shows that iden-tity complexity increases tolerance towards outgroups by reducing the im-portance of particular intergroup comparisons for satisfying psychological needs (Brewer and Pierce 2005; Roccas and Brewer 2002). In sum, to the extent that migration provides more and different material and psychological resources to victims – resources that are not nested within the conflict situa-tion itself – it may reduce defensive coping.

Data and method I examine the impact of traumatic wartime experiences and war-related loss-es on perceptions related to war under different conditions: post-war Bosnia and Sweden as a settlement country. Using regression analysis, I relate re-spondents’ attitudes to five different measures aimed at capturing traumas and losses: serving in a military or fighting unit, being physically wounded, being imprisoned or placed in a camp, having lost a family member as a result of the war, or having property destroyed during the war. Attitudes related to the war are captured by an additive index of ten different indica-tors aimed at providing a comprehensive measure of the views of respond-ents.

Second, I examine whether those living in Sweden exhibit less defensive coping than those living in Bosnia. I conduct this analysis within each cate-gory of experience and for each individual measure of attitudes related to the war. In both parts of the analysis I control for a rich set of individual back-ground characteristics.

Sampling and Data Collection The data are the result of simultaneous surveys conducted among migrants in Sweden and the local population in Bosnia during the spring of 2010. The survey of Bosnia was undertaken by Roland Kostić of Uppsala University in cooperation with Ipsos, an established international firm, and is part of an ongoing long-term project to track societal reconciliation over time. Post-war census data is not available for Bosnia. Therefore, a stratified random sampling procedure is used to equally capture the attitudes of the three main ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) on the basis of three geograph-ical strata defined by ethnic dominance. Sampling also reflects the urban and

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non-urban distribution of each population. Oral informed consent was ob-tained before interviews, which were conducted door-to-door by experienced staff of the same ethnicity as those interviewed. The survey covers the whole of Bosnia and has a response rate of 67 percent (N=1500).3

In Sweden, census data do not include ethnicity, making stratified sam-pling on the basis of census information impossible. In my sample, three ethnic strata are defined according to Bosniak, Croat and Serb family names.4 Individuals were located by searching online public listings. Be-cause the listings are geo-referenced, the survey captures the geographical distribution of each group in Sweden. Most respondents live in the major cities of Malmö, Gothenburg, and Stockholm. Individuals to contact were selected proportionally by location (city/village). Conducting the survey by mail ensured the anonymity and informed consent of respondents. It was translated into the respondent’s native language and included 71 questions as well as a cover letter providing basic information about the project. Of the 2580 individuals contacted, 28 percent (714 individuals) responded.5

It is important to consider whether the unit non-response rate will affect the representativeness of the results. Due to steadily declining survey re-sponse rates in many countries over the past decades, a large body of re-search has emerged investigating the importance of non-response (Berinsky 2008). Numerous studies have shown that although respondents and non-respondents often differ demographically, correcting for non-response does not appear to substantially affect estimates of political attitudes. Broad re-views find that even surveys with relatively low response rates are highly representative of public opinion (Holbrook, Krosnick, and Pfent 2007).

The reason unit non-response does not necessarily result in more response error is that the factors that drive non-response may be uncorrelated with the variables of interest in the survey. In a series of experiments, the Pew Re-search Center (2012) finds that respondents are more likely to engage in political and social action than non-respondents. Yet such engagement is not correlated with political preferences, partisanship, ideology or opinions on a variety of other issues. It is therefore a reasonable assumption that the survey is representative of the conflict-related attitudes of migrants from former Yugoslavia, although it may over-represent those more likely to take action

3 The survey was conducted first in Bosnia in 2005 and again in 2010. For further methodo-logical details, see Kostić (2007). 4 A door-to-door survey in Sweden is also infeasible. There are ‘ethnic neighborhoods’ in Sweden. However, migrants from former Yugoslavia largely do not live in ethnic enclaves but instead intermixed with other members of society throughout the country. 5 Kostić and I conducted an initial pilot study to test out our survey guideline in the spring of 2008 (N=16). Then, in the fall of 2008 we conducted an initial round of data collection by mail (N=239). Finding that the procedure worked very smoothly, we then rolled out the rest of the survey during the spring of 2010 (N=475). I find no significant differences in attitudes between the two samples collected by mail and thus include data from both rounds in the analysis (N=714).

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with regard to those attitudes. However, the political and social engagement of migrants is not the subject of the current essay.

Comparing my sample for Sweden with census data provided by Statistics Sweden, demographic characteristics of the respondents do not appear to differ dramatically from those of the population of migrants from former Yugoslavia living in Sweden; however, men and those with more education are somewhat overrepresented. 6 Descriptive statistics for the two samples are presented below.

Societal Beliefs After War Addressing the conflictive societal beliefs that emerge from war is of central importance for peaceful coexistence. Developing shared understandings of the past, recognizing the past experiences of other groups, and forgiveness lay the groundwork for a common future in which social relations are char-acterized by trust, positive attitudes, and the mutual consideration of needs (Ericson 2001; Galtung 2001). Replacing beliefs embedded in an ethos of conflict with those that stem from an ethos of peace are of central im-portance (Bar-Tal 1998). These societal beliefs include perceptions of the in-group, out-groups, intergroup relations, memories of the past and the war, and understandings of peace (Bar-Tal 2000).

To measure prospects for peaceful coexistence, Hayner (2001) suggests assessing how the past is integrated and spoken about between former ene-mies, if contradictory versions of the past have been reconciled, and if rela-tionships are based on the present rather than the past. I use ten indicators to evaluate the extent to which survey respondents express attitudes embedded in a peace ethos as opposed to a conflict ethos. Answers to these questions represent attitudes on: whether ethnic cleansing is ever justified; whether one should forgive those who persecuted their compatriots; the extent to which the participation of their own group during the last war in Bosnia should be understood as purely defensive; whether their own group suffered more than others throughout history; whether their own group has a stronger culture than others in the region; whether their own group deserves to play the lead-ing role in the region; the importance they place on their own ethnic belong-ing; the ideal arrangement of multicultural society in Bosnia, including the role of ethnicity, cultural mixing and intermarriage; ethnic distances; and belief in the possibility of peaceful coexistence among Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia unsupervised by external actors. To form additive indices, each question is coded as a dummy (0-1), the cut-off point being a strict test

6 According to Statistics Sweden, 50 percent are women, the mean age is 46 years, 28 percent completed at most primary school, 49 percent at most secondary school and 21 percent up to one year or more of university studies. See the sections “befolkningsstatistik” and “utbildning och forskning” on Statistics Sweden’s website (www.scb.se).

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of more peaceful attitudes. Positive responses are then added together (0-10). Table I presents descriptive statistics for these variables.

148

Tabl

e 1.

Mea

sure

s of

Atti

tude

s To

war

ds C

onfli

ct

Surv

ey q

uest

ions

D

umm

y=1

if re

spon

dent

s an

swer

ed

Perc

ent

BiH

SE

A

re th

ere

situ

atio

ns w

here

it m

ight

be

just

ified

to fo

rce

mem

bers

of o

ther

et

hnic

gro

ups

to le

ave

thei

r hom

es?

It is

nev

er ju

stifi

ed1

0.82

0.

94

Shou

ld o

ne fo

rgiv

e th

ose

who

per

secu

ted

your

com

patri

ots?

Fo

rgiv

e, b

ut n

ever

forg

et; F

orgi

ve fo

rget

2 0.

55

0.66

M

y pe

ople

foug

ht o

nly

defe

nsiv

e w

ars

Partl

y di

sagr

ee; C

ompl

etel

y di

sagr

ee3

0.04

0.

21

My

peop

le s

uffe

red

mor

e th

an o

ther

gro

ups

in th

e re

gion

thro

ugho

ut h

isto

ry

Partl

y di

sagr

ee; C

ompl

etel

y di

sagr

ee3

0.07

0.

23

My

peop

le d

eser

ves

and

shou

ld p

lay

a le

adin

g ro

le in

the

Bal

kan

regi

on

Partl

y di

sagr

ee; C

ompl

etel

y di

sagr

ee3

0.06

0.

23

My

peop

le is

n't p

erfe

ct b

ut h

as a

stro

nger

cul

tura

l tra

ditio

n th

an o

ther

gro

ups

in th

e re

gion

Pa

rtly

disa

gree

; Com

plet

ely

disa

gree

3 0.

17

0.40

Wha

t is

your

rela

tion

to y

our o

wn

natio

nal b

elon

ging

? A

ccep

t but

don

’t th

ink

abou

t it m

uch;

Fin

d it

irrel

evan

t4 0.

43

0.67

In

Bos

nia

live

peop

le o

f diff

eren

t nat

iona

litie

s. A

ccor

ding

to y

ou, w

hich

w

ould

be

the

idea

l soc

ieta

l arr

ange

men

t?

A s

ocie

ty in

whi

ch e

thni

c be

long

ing

is ir

rele

vant

. Peo

ple

soci

aliz

e fr

eely

, and

mix

ed m

arria

ges

are

very

com

mon

5 0.

20

0.64

Dis

play

s lo

w e

thni

c di

stan

ce to

Bos

niak

s, C

roat

s, a

nd S

erbs

Sc

ore

>=10

* 0.

74

0.80

D

o yo

u th

ink

Bos

niak

s, C

roat

s, a

nd S

erbs

in B

osni

a ca

n liv

e pe

acef

ully

to

geth

er w

ithou

t int

erna

tiona

l sup

ervi

sion

, or h

as w

ar m

ade

peac

eful

coe

x-is

tenc

e im

poss

ible

?

They

can

live

pea

cefu

lly to

geth

er w

ithou

t sup

ervi

sion

6 0.

68

0.41

Addi

tive

indi

ces:

C

B Bos

nia

Con

flict

-rel

ated

bel

iefs

(sam

ple

from

Bos

nia)

M

ean:

3.7

7 St

d. D

ev.:

1.5

4 M

in: 0

M

ax: 1

0 C

B Sw

eden

Con

flict

-rel

ated

bel

iefs

(sam

ple

from

Sw

eden

) M

ean:

5.2

9 St

d. D

ev.:

1.9

8 M

in: 0

M

ax: 1

0 Sa

mpl

e si

ze:

1508

71

4 Ea

ch q

uest

ion

is c

oded

as

a du

mm

y (0

-1),

the

cut-o

ff p

oint

bei

ng a

stri

ct te

st o

f les

s co

nflic

tive

belie

fs. *

Res

pond

ents

wer

e po

sed

four

Yes

/No

ques

tions

in

rela

tion

to e

ach

grou

p: I

am w

illin

g to

acc

ept a

mem

ber o

f the

X g

roup

to: l

ive

in m

y pa

rt of

tow

n; b

e m

y co

lleag

ue a

t wor

k; b

e m

y fr

iend

; mar

ry s

omeo

ne in

m

y fa

mily

. Pos

itive

resp

onse

s w

ere

adde

d to

geth

er to

form

an

inde

x (0

-12)

.

Dum

my=

0 if:

1 Just

ified

if th

ey d

id it

to u

s; J

ustif

ied

in th

e ca

se o

f pol

itica

lly d

islo

yal p

eopl

e; J

ustif

ied

for t

he s

ake

of h

ighe

r nat

iona

l int

eres

t; Th

ere

was

no

ethn

ic c

lean

sing

. 2 Nev

er fo

rgiv

e; D

on’t

know

. 3 Partl

y A

gree

; Com

plet

ely

Agr

ee; D

on’t

Kno

w. 4 N

atio

nal b

elon

ging

is a

n im

porta

nt p

art o

f my

life.

5 Gro

ups

don'

t mix

, eac

h pr

otec

ts it

s ow

n cu

lture

, and

ther

e ar

e no

mix

ed m

arria

ges;

Gro

ups

prot

ect t

heir

own

cultu

re, b

ut th

ere

are

som

e m

ixed

mar

riage

s. 6 W

ar h

as

mad

e pe

acef

ul c

oexi

sten

ce im

poss

ible

; Don

’t kn

ow.

149

War Trauma and War-Related Losses Descriptive statistics for the five measures of war trauma and losses are pre-sented in Table II. Table III provides their breakdown by migration cohort for the sample from Sweden. War traumas and losses are distributed across all cohorts. Those that came to Sweden prior to war in Bosnia but who still participated in military or fighting units, were wounded, imprisoned or placed in a camp either returned to Bosnia during the war or reported experi-ences from the war in Croatia, which began prior to the onset of the war in Bosnia.

Table 2. Wartime Experiences and War-Related Losses

Survey questions Percent BiH SE 1. Did you participate in any military or fighting units in the wars of the for-mer Yugoslavia?

0.25 0.15

2. Were you wounded during the war? 0.08 0.08 3. Were you imprisoned or placed in a camp during the war? 0.05 0.10 4. Are any of the members of your family dead or missing as a result of the war?

0.33 0.42

5. Has your family lost property (e.g. house, land, machinery, equipment) as a consequence of war?

0.42 0.69

Sample size 1508 714

Table 3. Wartime Experiences and War-Related Losses by Migration Cohort

Came to Sweden:

Sample size

Military/ fighting unit

Physically Wounded

Imprisoned/ Placed in camp

Lost family

Lost property

Before war N=199 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.26 0.41 During war N=409 0.17 0.09 0.13 0.50 0.83 After war N=103 0.21 0.10 0.10 0.39 0.64

Individual Background Variables In the regression analysis I include six control variables in the context of Bosnia and seven in the context of Sweden. These address the demographic background and socioeconomic status of respondents.

As discussed in the theoretical section, individuals with access to greater resources are less likely to develop counterproductive coping behaviors. I argue that migration may increase access to such resources, thus decreasing the need to rely on defensive psychological resources for coping. However, migrants may differ in terms of their personal and social resources prior to migration. Moreover, labor and asylum migrants may differ in part because labor migrants are more likely to be selected for economic success. To ac-count for this, in the context of Sweden I control for belonging to pre-war, wartime, or post-war migration cohorts as well as having an urban (versus

150

rural) ground prior to migration. In addition, I control for five basic demo-graphic variables: gender, age of arrival to Sweden, education, marital sta-tus, and ethnicity. In the context of Bosnia I control for the same variables but substitute age for age of arrival and do not include migration cohort.

In the sample from Bosnia, 54.6 percent of respondents are women. The mean age is 42 years (SD=16.01). 4.45 percent did not complete primary school, 14.2 percent completed at most primary school, 66.36 percent at most secondary school and 15 percent up to one or more years of university studies. 60.61 percent are married (SD=48.89). Prior to the war, 52.78 per-cent lived in an urban settlement (SD=49.94). 33 percent identify as Bos-niaks, 32 percent as Croats, 33 percent as Serbs, and 2 percent belong to a handful of other minorities from the region.

In the sample from Sweden, 42.5 percent of respondents are women. The mean age is 44.6 years (SD=14.1). 12.2 percent completed at most primary school, 51.05 percent at most secondary school and 36.75 percent up to one year or more of university studies. 67.65 percent are married (SD=46.81). Prior to the war, 70.4 percent lived in an urban settlement (SD=45.67). 28 percent identify as Bosniaks, 27 percent as Croats, 26 percent as Serbs, 15 percent as Yugoslavs, 2 percent as Swedish and 2 percent belong to a hand-ful of other minorities from the region. Thus, while the two samples are similar in terms of age and marital status, the sample from Sweden consists of a higher proportion of men, has a higher average education level, has a more urban background, and more diverse structure of self-identification compared to the sample from Bosnia.

Results In this section I examine how war trauma and losses influence perceptions related to the war under different conditions: first in post-war Bosnia and second in Sweden as a settlement country. I argue conflictive societal beliefs are shared coping resources that develop in response to war and are embed-ded in post-war socioeconomic and political conditions. In Bosnia, those experiencing the greatest trauma and losses may thus rely most on conflic-tive beliefs to buffer mortality salience. On the other hand, those living in Sweden may have access to other material and psychological resources em-bedded in the settlement country context that offset the need for defensive coping.

Effects of Trauma on Perceptions of War: Sample from Bosnia Table IV presents the results for post-war Bosnia. The dependent variable in the regressions is the additive index CBBosnia, which provides a holistic per-spective on respondents’ attitudes related to the Bosnian War. These include

151

perceptions of the past and their group’s role in the war, justification of eth-nic cleansing, forgiveness of perpetrators, the desirability of ethnic mixing and intermarriage, and prospects for peaceful coexistence between former adversaries. This variable is regressed separately on five different measures that aim to capture war trauma and war-related losses. For each, I show es-timates with and without controls.

The findings suggest that direct exposure to violence results in greater de-fensive coping in Bosnia. Those that experienced grave personal violations during the war – physical violence, imprisonment, or placement in camps – hold more conflictive attitudes than those who did not. Although relying on different measures of defensive coping (e.g. exclusion of ethnic minorities or support for paramilitary groups), other investigations of the effects of per-sonal exposure to violence reach similar conclusions in cases such as Israel, Rwanda, North Caucasus and Northern Ireland (Bakke, O'Loughlin, and Ward 2009; Canetti-Nisim et al. 2009; Hayes and McAllister 2001; Pham, Weinstein, and Longman 2004).

152

Tabl

e 4.

Eff

ects

of W

artim

e Ex

perie

nces

and

War

-Rel

ated

Los

ses o

n A

ttitu

des T

owar

ds C

onfli

ct (S

ampl

e fr

om B

osni

a)

Figh

ting

unit

-0

.147

(0

.098

) -0

.153

(0

.132

)

Wou

nded

-0.3

67**

(0

.151

) -0

.331

**

(0.1

52)

Pris

on o

r cam

p

-0.5

83**

* (0

.207

) -0

.512

**

(0.2

08)

Fam

ily m

embe

r de

ad o

r mis

sing

-0

.258

***

(0.0

88)

-0.2

55**

* (0

.088

)

Lost

pro

perty

-0.1

11

(0.0

86)

-0.0

82

(0.0

87)

Bos

niak

-1.9

50**

(0

.763

)

-1.9

50**

* (0

.741

)

-1.9

63**

* (0

.729

)

-2.0

18**

* (0

.637

)

-1.9

60**

* (0

.722

) C

roat

1

-1.7

92**

(0

.763

)

-1.8

04**

(0

.742

)

-1.8

09**

(0

.730

)

-1.9

06**

* (0

.638

)

-1.8

03**

(0

.723

) Se

rb1

-2.1

52**

* (0

.762

)

-2.1

49**

* (0

.741

)

-2.1

63**

* (0

.729

)

-2.2

51**

* (0

.637

)

-2.1

49**

* (0

.722

) O

ther

1

-0.5

05

(0.9

45)

-0

.515

(0

.937

)

-0.5

59

(0.9

21)

-0

.474

(0

.866

)

-0.5

25

(0.9

20)

Urb

an b

ackg

roun

d2

0.4

33**

* (0

.086

)

0.4

31**

* (0

.086

)

0.4

25**

* (0

.086

)

0.4

23**

* (0

.086

)

0.4

33**

* (0

.087

) Se

cond

ary

sc

hool

3

0.0

88

(0.1

23)

0

.079

(0

.123

)

0.0

58

(0.1

22)

0

.070

(0

.122

)

0.0

58

(0.1

25)

Uni

vers

ity3

0.0

73

(0.1

68)

0

.069

(0

.168

)

0.0

48

(0.1

69)

0

.049

(0

.168

)

0.0

50

(0.1

71)

31-4

5

year

s old

4

0.0

57

(0.1

47)

0

.051

(0

.144

)

0.0

35

(0.1

44)

0

.036

(0

.144

)

0.0

38

(0.1

45)

46-6

0

year

s old

4

-0.1

04

(0.1

65)

-0

.159

(0

.158

)

-0.1

29

(0.1

57)

-0

.145

(0

.157

)

-0.1

34

(0.1

59)

60+

ye

ars o

ld4

0

.040

(0

.192

)

0.0

46

(0.1

89)

0

.025

(0

.088

)

0.0

11

(0.1

89)

0

.017

(0

.191

) Si

ngle

5

-0

.051

(0

.146

)

-0.0

35

(0.1

45)

-0

.041

(0

.145

)

-0.0

37

(0.1

45)

-0

.036

(0

.146

) D

ivor

ced5

-0.0

38

(0.2

12)

-0

.043

(0

.212

)

-0.0

48

(0.2

11)

0

.005

(0

.212

)

0.0

24

(0.2

12)

Win

dow

ed(-

er)5

-0.1

75

(0.1

51)

-0

.176

(0

.149

)

-0.1

74

(0.1

49)

-0

.127

(0

.151

)

-0.1

68

(0.1

51)

Sex

(fem

ale)

-0

.010

(0

.109

)

-0.0

34

(0.0

90)

-0

.053

(0

.089

)

-0.0

53

(0.0

89)

-0

.059

(0

.090

) R

2 0

.002

0

.038

0.

005

0.04

1 0.

005

0.0

43

0.0

06

0.0

43

0.0

01

0.0

37

Sam

ple

size

1

326

132

0 1

326

132

0 1

326

132

0 1

326

132

0 1

316

131

0 D

epen

dent

var

iabl

e is

the

addi

tive

inde

x of

con

flict

ive

belie

fs (I

Bos

nia).

Rob

ust s

tand

ard

erro

rs in

par

enth

eses

. */*

*/**

* de

note

sign

ifica

nce

at th

e 10

/5/1

per

cent

leve

ls re

spec

tivel

y. T

he m

etho

d of

est

imat

ion

is o

rdin

ary

leas

t squ

ares

. Ref

eren

ce c

ateg

orie

s: 1 Y

ugos

lav;

2 Rur

al b

ackg

roun

d; 3 Pr

imar

y sc

hool

; 4 15-3

0 ye

ars;

5M

arrie

d.

153

The majority of those wounded are ex-combatants (67 percent) and a sub-stantial proportion of those imprisoned or in camps are former prisoners of war (39 percent). This is in line with previous research indicating that Israeli POWs experienced greater posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) than non-POWs (Solomon and Dekel 2007). PTSD, in turn, has been shown to be associated with greater authoritarianism, ethnocentricity, support for political violence in Israel (Hobfoll, Canetti-Nisim, and Johnson 2006).

COR theory predicts that direct exposure to trauma will result in greater psychological distress than indirect exposure. The death or disappearance of a family member is associated with holding more conflictive attitudes about the war in Bosnia but not the destruction of one’s property. Deep personal losses therefore result in more defensive coping, which is corroborated by similar findings with regard to the effects of losing a loved one on for-giveness in Burundi and ethno-nationalism in Croatia (Dyrstad 2012; Samii 2011). In Bosnia and Kosovo, Dyrstad (Dyrstad 2012) found no relationship between loss of a loved one and ethno-nationalist attitudes. Differences be-tween these results and the present analysis may be explained by the fact that the dependent variable examined here (CBBosnia) captures ethnocentricity across a broader range of perceptions related to the war (e.g., “my people fought only defensive wars,” “my people suffered more than other groups in the region throughout history,” etc.).

In addition, it is notable that the effect sizes for variables capturing great-er traumas and losses are larger. Moreover, estimates of these variables are essentially unaffected by the introduction of the controls, which capture basic demographic and background characteristics of the respondents. This suggests that other third variables may not affect the results either. In sum, these findings are consistent with the predictions of COR and TMT as well as previous research in many other conflict-affected countries: In the post-war context, exposure to violence and losses may simply increase intergroup cohesion. Posttraumatic growth may thus go hand in hand with defensive coping, since victims draw upon shared psychological resources developed in response to conflict. These conflictive beliefs reduce anxiety about death by placing victims in a meaningful context and giving them purpose, but also contribute to the post-war politics of memory.

Effects of Trauma on Perceptions of War: Sample from Sweden Table V presents the results for Sweden as a settlement country. The de-

pendent variable in the regressions (CBSweden) measures respondents’ percep-tions of the war in the same comprehensive manner. The findings suggest that neither exposure to violence nor war-related losses result in greater de-fensive coping among victims living in Sweden. Those that experienced grave personal violations during the war – for example imprisonment or placement in camps – as well as those suffering deep personal losses – the

154

death or disappearance of a family member – hold no more conflictive atti-tudes than those not suffering such traumas and losses.

155

Tabl

e 5.

Eff

ects

of W

artim

e Ex

perie

nces

and

War

-Rel

ated

Los

ses o

n A

ttitu

des T

owar

ds C

onfli

ct (S

ampl

e fr

om S

wed

en)

Figh

ting

unit

-0

.111

(0

.252

) 0

.123

(0

.253

)

Wou

nded

0.5

35*

(0.3

18)

0.6

72**

(0

.288

)

Pris

on o

r cam

p

-0

.316

(0

.297

) -0

.181

(0

.278

)

Fam

ily m

embe

r de

ad o

r mis

sing

-0

.253

(0

.175

) -0

.011

(0

.182

)

Lost

pro

perty

-0.2

06

(0.1

82)

-0.0

51

(0.2

12)

Cam

e to

Sw

eden

dur

ing

war

5

-0

.655

***

(0.2

31)

-0

.657

***

(0.2

30)

-0

.637

***

(0.2

31)

-0

.658

***

(0.2

36)

-0

.724

***

(0.2

49)

Cam

e to

Sw

eden

afte

r w

ar5

-0

.989

***

(0.2

65)

-0

.982

***

(0.2

62)

-0

.972

***

(0.2

61)

-0

.987

***

(0.2

64)

-1

.046

***

(0.2

75)

Bos

niak

1

-1.2

85**

* (0

.246

)

-1.2

73**

* (0

.245

)

-1.2

71**

* (0

.246

)

-1.2

85**

* (0

.246

)

-1.2

56**

* (0

.252

) C

roat

1

-1.2

51**

* (0

.272

)

-1.2

67**

* (0

.271

)

-1.2

46**

* (0

.272

)

-1.2

20**

* (0

.273

)

-1.3

37**

* (0

.276

) Se

rb1

-1.4

30**

* (0

.247

)

-1.4

10**

* (0

.248

)

-1.4

43**

* (0

.248

)

-1.4

36**

* (0

.249

)

-1.4

46**

* (0

.265

) O

ther

1

-0.6

83

(0.4

17)

-0

.657

(0

.440

)

-0.6

88

(0.4

20)

-0

.687

(0

.422

)

-0.7

64

(0.4

42)

Urb

an

back

grou

nd2

0

.537

***

(0.1

88)

0

.541

***

(0.1

90)

0

.532

***

(0.1

88)

0

.538

***

(0.1

89)

0

.554

***

(0.1

90)

Seco

ndar

y

scho

ol3

-0

.186

(0

.262

)

-0.1

64

(0.2

60)

-0

.177

(0

.262

)

-0.1

92

(0.2

67)

-0

.243

(0

.267

) U

nive

rsity

3

0.5

17*

(0.2

68)

0

.510

* (0

.266

)

0.5

20*

(0.2

68)

0

.525

* (0

.272

)

0.4

17

(0.2

74)

Age

upo

n ar

rival

in

156

Swed

en4

16-

30

0.2

17

(0.2

29)

0

.170

(0

.228

)

0.2

18

(0.2

27)

0

.238

(0

.229

)

0.2

50

(0.2

29)

31-

45

0.4

05

(0.2

62)

0

.349

(0

.260

)

0.4

27*

(0.2

59)

0

.428

* (0

.259

)

0.4

64*

(0.2

66)

46-

60+

0.5

32

(0.3

80)

0

.458

(0

.373

)

0.5

34

(0.3

81)

0

.552

(0

.381

)

0.6

52

(0.4

02)

Sing

le6

0.2

98

(0.2

33)

0

.294

(0

.231

)

0.2

77

(0.2

32)

0

.282

(0

.234

)

0.2

90

(0.2

34)

Div

orce

d6

0

.144

(0

.329

)

0.1

65

(0.3

31)

0

.144

(0

.327

)

0.1

37

(0.3

27)

0

.217

(0

.341

) W

indo

wed

(-er

)6

-0.4

66

(0.4

24)

-0

.441

(0

.423

)

-0.4

84

(0.4

24)

-0

.491

(0

.424

)

-0.6

01

(0.4

42)

Sex

(fem

ale)

0

.209

(0

.164

)

0.2

22

(0.1

61)

0

.181

(0

.160

)

0.1

81

(0.1

60)

0

.212

(0

.163

) R

2 0

.001

0

.166

0

.005

0

.170

0

.002

0

.166

0

.004

0

.166

0

.002

0

.170

Sa

mpl

e si

ze

548

5

41

544

5

37

548

5

41

546

5

39

529

5

22

Dep

ende

nt v

aria

ble

is t

he a

dditi

ve i

ndex

of

conf

lictiv

e be

liefs

(I S

wed

en).

Rob

ust

stan

dard

err

ors

in p

aren

thes

es. *

/**/

***

deno

te s

igni

fican

ce a

t th

e 10

/5/1

per

cent

le

vels

res

pect

ivel

y. T

he m

etho

d of

est

imat

ion

is o

rdin

ary

leas

t sq

uare

s. R

efer

ence

cat

egor

ies:

1 Yug

osla

v; 2 R

ural

bac

kgro

und;

3 Prim

ary

scho

ol (

grad

e 1-

9);

4 1-15

ye

ars;

5 Cam

e af

ter w

ar; 6 M

arrie

d.

157

Moreover, those who were physically wounded appear to exhibit less defen-sive coping than those not directly exposed to physical violence. The size of this estimate is much larger than those for other war-related experiences; meanwhile, introducing controls further increases its size and statistical sig-nificance. Investigating the composition of the sample of these victims re-veals that ex-combatants make up a larger proportion of those wounded in Sweden (75 percent) in comparison to Bosnia (67 percent). However, con-trolling for participation in military or fighting units also increases the size and statistical significance of the estimated effect of being wounded (not shown). Differences in the combatant/non-combatant composition of victims of physical violence thus cannot account for the observed difference between the two contexts.

These differences point to the fundamental importance of context in shap-ing the impact of traumas and losses on shared societal beliefs after war. Under the conditions of settlement in Sweden, exposure to violence and losses during the war does not appear to increase defensive coping. In fact, the victims of physical violence may have responded to their deeper traumas with less animosity towards their adversaries; that is, a more positive post-traumatic growth.

Which resources enable victims to cope more positively with trauma in Sweden? Clearly migration improved living standards. In addition, potential psychological resources include the development of greater identity com-plexity and nostalgia. One third of respondents identify as Bosniaks, Croats or Serbs while at the same time expressing an emotional attachment to either Du Gamla, Du Fria, the Swedish national anthem, or Hej Slaveni, the Yugo-slav national anthem.7 Both a more complex identity and nostalgia for Yugo-slavia – a modernizing and multiethnic state – may reduce the salience of intergroup comparisons related to homeland conflict.

Turning to the controls, those who identify themselves as Bosniaks, Cro-ats or Serbs hold significantly less peaceful attitudes than Yugoslavs. This is true in Bosnia as well. However, 15 percent of respondents in Sweden iden-tify as Yugoslavs, while in Bosnia the corresponding number is less than 1 percent. Yugoslavs thus hold appear to hold less conflictive beliefs, which again suggests that those in Sweden may rely more upon nostalgia as a psy-chological resource.

Those who came during the war or through family reunification after the war hold more conflictive attitudes than those who arrived during the Yugo-slav gastarbeiter migration to Europe during the 1950s and 1960s. This may reflect their greater exposure to ethnic mobilization and war and thus to the conflictive ethos developed in response to the conflict. The effect size of migration cohort also increases with proximity to the conflict.

7 Not shown but available from the author.

158

The findings for Sweden as a settlement country stand in stark contrast to those for post-war Bosnia, but also for many other conflict-affected countries examined in the previous literature. For those who live in Sweden “exit” may have provided access to more resources – both material and psychologi-cal – that are embedded in the migration context and which help offset the need for defensive psychological resources.

Effects of Migration by Category of Trauma and Loss In this section I examine whether respondents living in Sweden exhibit

more peaceful attitudes than those living in Bosnia. Moreover, I assess this relationship within each category of trauma and loss and for each of the ten measures of conflict-related attitudes. The relationship is first shown as a bivariate regression and second with control variables added. The independ-ent variable in this analysis is thus whether or not the respondent belongs to the sample from Sweden. For example, beginning at the top left-hand corner of the table the question being asked is: Among ex-combatants, are those living in Sweden less willing to justify ethnic cleansing than those living in Bosnia?

159

Tabl

e 6.

Eff

ects

of M

igra

tion

to S

wed

en o

n C

onfli

ct-R

elat

ed A

ttitu

des b

y W

artim

e Ex

perie

nces

and

War

-Rel

ated

Los

ses

Sa

mpl

es

M

embe

r of m

ilita

ry o

r fig

htin

g un

it in

the

war

Ph

ysic

ally

wou

nded

du

ring

the

war

Im

pris

oned

or p

lace

d in

a

cam

p in

the

war

Fa

mily

mem

ber d

ied/

di

sapp

eare

d du

e to

war

Lo

st p

rope

rty d

urin

g th

e w

ar

Out

com

es

Biv

aria

te

Con

trols

B

ivar

iate

C

ontro

ls

Biv

aria

te

Con

trols

B

ivar

iate

C

ontro

ls

Biv

aria

te

Con

trols

Et

hnic

cle

ansi

ng

0.1

09**

* 0

.080

**

0.2

08**

* 0.

130*

* 0

.229

***

0.1

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161

With the partial exception of the sample of ex-prisoners, belonging to the sample from Sweden appears to have a largely consistent, positive, and sta-tistically significant effect on eight of the ten indicators, implying a reduc-tion of conflictive beliefs. Respondents living in Sweden express more sup-port for the statement that ethnic cleansing is never justified; more willing-ness to forgive those who persecuted their compatriots; less support for the view that their group’s role in the war was purely defensive; greater acknowledgement of past suffering of other groups; more positive views of the cultural traditions of other groups in the region; less support for the belief that the respondent’s group deserves and should take the leading role in the Balkan region; less emphasis on their own ethnic belonging; and more sup-port for the view that ethnicity should be irrelevant in Bosnia, and that ethnic mixing and intermarriage among Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs should occur uninhibited.

These questions aim to capture the respondents’ level of ethnocentricity with regard to their perceptions of the past and the war as well as intergroup relations. The findings provide strong support for my theoretical claim: by providing new resources for coping, migration may help meet migrants’ basic psychological needs, thereby reducing the need to rely on the defensive psychological resources conflictive beliefs provide.

However, living in Sweden is not associated with a reduction of ethnic distances. Those in Sweden are thus no more willing than those in Bosnia to accept members of other ethnic groups as neighbors, colleagues, friends, and family members. In addition, those living in Sweden are less optimistic re-garding the belief that Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs can live together peace-fully in Bosnia without international supervision. In combination with more shared understandings of the past and reduced ethnocentricity, however, pessimism regarding the possibility of coexistence among former adversaries in Bosnia probably does not reflect more defensive coping. Respondents living in Sweden are asked to reveal their attitudes about the capacity of the local population in Bosnia, not about themselves, and on this count they remain more uncertain.

Conclusion New research suggests that traumatic experiences such as forced conscrip-tion and the witnessing of atrocities result in greater engagement in post-war contexts, which authors attribute in part to posttraumatic growth after war. Yet such engagement may occur largely within rather than between social groups. Research on exposure to violence and intergroup attitudes finds more mixed results. In many post-war contexts trauma increased intolerance towards out-groups, while in others it had no effect. This raises important questions. Under what conditions do individuals respond to the traumas of

162

war with increased animosity? Under what conditions might exposure to violence reduce animosity and promote positive posttraumatic growth after war?

Using simultaneous surveys, I examined the effects of a comprehensive set of traumas and losses on a range of perceptions related to war under dif-ferent conditions: post-war Bosnia and Sweden as a settlement country. In Bosnia direct experiences of wartime violence and deep war-related losses increased intergroup animosity. However, in Sweden exposure to violence and losses tended to be uncorrelated with respondents’ attitudes about the war. Moreover, those who suffered the gravest form of personal threat – physical violence – exhibit less animosity. Within each category of trauma and loss, compared to respondents in Bosnia those in Sweden display more shared understandings of the past and less ethnocentricity, but are no more willing to engage across ethnic boundaries. They also express more pessi-mism regarding intergroup cooperation in Bosnia.

The analysis contributes to an ongoing debate by uplifting the importance of context in shaping the impact of trauma and loss on intergroup attitudes. Higher standards of living and social welfare in Sweden may reduce victims’ vulnerability, which COR theory predicts should result in less stress. Less stress in turn should result in less defensive coping. Meanwhile, migration entails escaping the social-psychological infrastructure that sustains beliefs developed in response to war. Victims in Sweden may therefore develop greater identity complexity and rely more on Yugo-nostalgia as a psycholog-ical resource. To the extent that migration provides more and different mate-rial and psychological resources to victims – resources that are not nested within the conflict situation itself – it may reduce defensive coping and ena-ble moving on from the traumas of the past. However, whether victims em-brace a common future may depend upon the extent to which intergroup cooperation is part of lived experience. In the context of post-Bosnia – where economic growth is jobless, poverty and unemployment are high, and the war lives on in the politics of collective memory – trauma may result in in-tergroup animosity, even though victims grudgingly accept coexistence with adversaries as a result of their everyday experience after war. Cooperation may thus not hold the key to reducing intergroup hostility, but rather the resources that offset the need for defensive coping.

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