Third party roles played by Turkish managers in subordinates' conflicts

JOURNAL OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR, VOL. IS. 453466 (1994)

Third party roles played by Turkish managers in subordinates’ conflicts

M. KAMIL KOZAN AND SELIM S. ILTER Department of Management, St. John Fisher College. Rochester. Nen York 14618. 1‘. S. A

This study investigated the third party roles of Turkish managers and how these roleb were related to the conflict management styles used by their subordinates. Questionnaire data werecollected from 295 Turkish managers in seven firms. Mediation and facilitalion were found to be the third party roles reported more frequently than autocratic intervention and laissez-/aire. Subordinates reported increased use of collaboration and compromise toward the other party when their managers, in a third party role, were seen as using more mediation and facilitation. Competitive behavior increased when thc third party was seen as autocratic. The paper discussed the relationship of these findings to cultural characteristics such as uncertainty avoidance and collectivism.

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Introduction

Conflict management has grown into a major subfield of organizational behavior. Most o f the emphasis in the literature has been on the styles of handling conflicts by the disputing parties. Recently, however, the third party role of managers in subordinates’conflicts has received increasing attention. The rich literature on third party roles in other areas such as labor relations, community mediation, and international conflict has found a vast area of application in management.

Currently, there seems to be a need in the field to extend these trends to the study of conflict management in other cultures. Empirical studies of conflict in organizations in non-Western cultures have been scant (Kiggundu, Jorgensen and Hafsi, 1983). Recent contributions which compare conflict management across cultures have again emphasized differences in styles used by the conflicting parties (Ting-Toomey et al.. 1991). Third party roles may be a particularly promising topic of study in cultures where confrontational methods are less common. Cultural characteristics such as high collectivism and high uncertainty avoidance (Hofstede. 1984) may be predictors of an aversion to confrontation and, therefore, functionality of third party roles in handling disputes.

The present study investigated the third party roles of managers in Turkish organizations. Turkish culture embodies characteristics which are conducive to effective third party involvement in conflict (Dereli, 1968; Starr, 1978). Research in Turkish organizations (Kozan, 1989) has shown the limitations of managers in directly handling their differences. This study sought to describe the third party roles played by Turkish managers, and to explore how these roles were related to the styles used by the conflicting parties. A significant role for third parties in this culture may have implications for other cultures having a similar profile in uncertainty avoidance and collectivism.

CCC 0894-3796/94/050453-14 0 1994 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

454 M. K. KOZAN AND S. S. ILTER

The cultural context Turkey is in transition into becoming a mature industrialized society. Analogous to its geographi- cal location, Turkish culture carries the signs of a duality created by the superimposition of Western institutions upon traditional values. The country is run by a parliamentary democracy, and it has secular legal and educational systems. Its firms have shown a continuing interest in adopting modern management practices. Younger managers are heavily recruited from among graduates of very popular business (and engineering) schools, the best of which have instruction in English and follow state-of-the-art curricula. Emphasis on internal management training has also increased, as Turkish industrial firms and banks successfully opened up to the global markets during the eighties.

On the other hand, values relating to authority and conflict, which have their roots in early socialization, have been relatively slow to change. Turkish culture is distinguished by ‘centralized decision making, highly personalized, strong leaders, and little delegation’ (Ronen, 1986). Hof- stede’s (1 984) data from IBM subsidiary employees have placed Turkey thirty-fifth among 50 countries in power distance. The power distance index reflects a lack of participative style on the part of managers, a low preference for participative managers by the employees, and fears on the part of subordinates in expressing disagreements with superiors. However, this autocratic style is not accompanied by cool, distant relations. It is not uncommon for the firm or any part of it to be likened to a family, with the manager seen as a father figure. As Kagitcibasi (1970) has noted, the father’s authority in the family is not questioned, but it is exercised within the context of warm relations. Similarly, in his research on preferred leadership styles, Ilter (1983), points out a leaning towards a benevolent autocratic style of leadership.

In Turkish organizations, the hierarchy is the main mechanism of control and coordination. Less emphasis is placed on the various lateral and informal means of coordination. For example, Lauter (1 968) reported that cliques are seen as essentially harmful; the recognition of such groups as sources to be influenced towards accomplishment of organizational objectives was an alien idea to these managers.

These tendencies spring from a basically negative attitude towards conflict in general; open conflict is seen as harmful and something to be avoided. Turks have difficulty in aggressively defending their interests on a face-to-face basis without jeopardizing the relationship. As Dereli (1968) points out, when openly confronted, conflict may take extreme forms.

The difficulty with confronting differences is related to the high degree of uncertainty avoidance in the Turkish culture. According to Hofstede (1984), in cultures high in uncertainty avoidance, individuals are less tolerant of ambiguity and change and avoid dissent and risk taking. A stronger need is felt for consensus, and deviant persons and ideas are not easily tolerated. These cultures develop norms that contain aggression by avoidance of conflict and competition.

An earlier survey of conflict handling styles of managers in Turkey showed the prevalence of either avoidance or an authoritarian response when in conflict with an adversary (Kozan, 1989, in press). Managers were more dominating towards subordinates and more accommodating towards superiors. Conflicts with peers were mostly avoided. Managers in the U.S., who are also accommodative towards their superiors, have been found to use more problem solving with subordinates and to be more compromising with peers (Rahim, 1986). In comparison, Turkish managers seemed to rely more on their authority in resolving their conflicts with subordinates. When no clear-cut authority relation existed, no effective conflict resolution method seemed to emerge.

The relative absence of problem solving in superior-subordinate conflict and of compromise in conflict .imong peers suggest a useful role for third parties. Intermediaries may help employees

TURKISH MANAGERS IN SUBORDINATES’ CONFLICTS 455

deal with differences which otherwise would be avoided and driven underground, causing con- tinual problems. Third parties may also provide an avenue for timid subordinates to express their opinions and objections concerning superior’s actions. In a culture where direct confrontation is shunned, more third party capacity in organizations may be needed for a healthy conflict resolution process.

Third party intervention is indeed a natural outcome of a variety of conflicts in Turkish society. For example, in the family, conflict between authoritarian fathers and sons is almost always managed through the mediating efforts of the mother. It is also common for the older and respected members to play the peacemaker role in conflicts among members of the extended family. Starr (1978, p. 136) has described how in the Turkish village disputants negotiate through representatives who ‘. . . lend their weight to one side or the other (but one side only), although, of course, they usually are not as partial and short-sighted about a situation as the principal they represent. Thus, by their presence they tend to inject a certain amount of “good sense” into the process and sometimes enter into hard negotiation as well’. These practices fit well within a culture which has a concern for face-saving; the presence of third parties dampens escalation and enables disputants to make concessions without appearing weak.

In labor-management conflict, the government plays a significant third party role. The Labor Union Law, and the Collective Bargaining, Strikes and Lock-outs Act stipulate that mediation is required before a strike can be legal. If the collective bargaining process fails to bring agreement within 60 days, a mediator is automatically assigned by the Ministry of Labor. The law calls for arbitration, either by mutual consent of the parties or if the government decides to postpone strikes and lock-outs for ‘public health’ or ‘security’ reasons and no agreement is reached within 60 days. Arbitration is exclusively carried out by a special council dominated by government appointees. According to Danis (1989), the state is indeed a regular party to industrial relations conflicts in Turkey. The legal arrangements for this purpose may, in part, be a reflection of the difficulty of achieving a peaceful conflict resolution process between labor and management without third party help.

The role of third parties in various facets of Turkish culture find their expression in organizational life as well. During several years of participation in Turkish organizations, the authors have witnessed the manager to be the prime intermediary in handling intra-organizational conflicts. Most Turkish firms do not have institutionalized mediation or arbitration methods. The appeals committees and administrative courts that exist in the government and state-owned enterprises have no equivalent in private firms. Neither do these firms have less formal third party functions such as the ombudsman. However, the cultural aversion to direct confrontation calls for some third party function to fill in this void. While any organizational member may play such a role, the hierarchic nature of these organizations makes the immediate superior of the conflicting parties the most natural candidate for serving third party functions. The present study was limited in its scope to the third party roles played by the immediate superiors.

Managers as third parties

Managers playing third party roles in subordinates’ conflicts is a universal phenomena. The literature on third party behavior developed in the West may, therefore, serve as a useful starting point for studying other cultures, as well. This would provide for a degree of comparability of findings across cultures, particularly when differences between cultures pertain to the degree some roles are emphasized more than others. More care has to be shown, however, for those roles which may assume a unique meaning in a specific culture.


Models of third party roles played by managers have incorporated extensions of third party roles in legal settings to organizational life (Sheppard, 1983), laboratory studies that simulate managerial intervention (Karambayya and Brett, 1989), and direct observations of ombudsmen (Kolb, 1986). Sheppard identified four roles, namely, inquisitorial, adjucative, mediational, and motivational, the first three of which derive from Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) work involving legal settings. In the adjucative role, resembling judges in U.S. courts, the third party has control over the final decision, but the disputants have control over the process, i.e. the presen- tation and interpretation of evidence. In the inquisitorial roles, the third party has process control as well as decision control. In the mediational role, the disputants have decision control, and whilc they may also have the final say on process, the mediator significantly influences process, loo. In Sheppard’s fourth role, that of the motivator, the manager uses rewards or threats in order to induce the disputants towards a resolution.

In a factor analytical study using a simulation exercise, Karambayya and Brett (1989) con- firmed Sheppard’s roles with the exception of the adjucative. They further identified an additional role which they called the procedural marshall. A third party in this role would give information on the dispute handling procedures to be followed, enforce these procedures, and prevent the parties from interrupting each other.

Kolb ( 1986) identified three third party roles based on observations of ombudsmen in organizations. The first of these, the adviser, acts as a counselor, ‘arranging matters for, and “cooling out” the people involved’ (p. 216). The second type of ombudsman takes the investigator’s role, trying to uncover the facts and bring them out into the open. The adviser role of Kolb is similar to the mediator role of Sheppard, and the investigator’s role to that of the adjucative role. Kolb’s third role, the restructurer, is unique, and it is particularly relevant for managers in third party roles. A restructurer changes organizational structure, that is, the assignment of duties, the reporting relationships, and so on, in order to facilitate resolution of disputes.

Some of these roles identified in the Western literature are familiar aspects of conflict management in the Turkish culture. The inquisitorial role describes the function of the higher arbitration council in labor-management conflicts and that of judges in the Turkish legal system, which is adopted from the continental European code-law system. Mediation is commonly used, as Starr (1978) has observed, in the informal handling of disputes, and is preferred to litigation because ii provides for a more comprehensive treatment of differences than the formal and strict methods of courts of law.

The authors have observed widespread use of mediation, inquisition and restructuring by managers. as well. As Putnam (1994) argues, managers treat conflict as a problem to be solved, and act as orchestrators, negotiators and referees in the process. The desire for harmony in the Turkish culture, which is the driving force behind the widespread use of third party intervention, would be an even stronger force in the organizational setting.

One would, therefore, expect mediation, which is deeply embedded in the culture as a main peacekeeping tool, to be used extensively by managers, too. The inquisitorial role would also be common, especially as an authoritarian response to impasses. Restructuring would have a high appeal to the Turkish manager who would perceive it as a shrewd method of containing conflicts. Its applicability may be limited, however, to those instances where organizational rearrangements are relevant and feasible.

While these third party roles are more readily apparent to observers of Turkish organizations, others, such as the adjucative or procedural marshall, may also be relevant for a comprehensive study of intervention behavior. To achieve comparability with findings in the West, the whole variety of third party roles identified in the literature were included in the study. However, because these conclusions are anchored in the Western culture, some cautionary remarks are


incorporated into the discussion section on the unique meaning of some third party roles in the Turkish setting.

In addition to the roles discussed above, our study included another third party role which will be labeled as laissez-faire. This describes the familiar behavior of a manager who would not get involved in the dispute and leave the disputants on their own. In the legal setting, or even in the case of the ombudsman, the laissez-faire role is highly unlikely once the third party is involved in a dispute. However, Pinkley et ul.’s (1993) research has found ‘active involvement versus avoidance of subordinates’ conflict’ as one of the critical dimensions of managerial third party behavior. A manager’s decision not to get involved in subordinates’ conflicts may imply that the conflict does not call for intervention or that it can also be avoided by the disputants. In cultures where disputants are inclined to bring in third parties to a dispute, the laissez-faire role may particularly suggest a degree of selectivity which signals the disputants for the containment of the conflict.

The study also addressed the question of how the style of conflict management used by a disputant was influenced by the third party role played by a superior. Research evidence suggests that conflict management styles would be influenced from the behavior of significant third parties. Thomas (1976) reports that supervisory emphasis on cooperation tends to be accompanied by more collaborative and accommodative interdepartmental behavior by subordinates. He further points out that frequent arbitration by third parties tend to actually promote some degree of competition. Karambayya and Brett’s (1989) research has shown that compromise solutions were most likely to occur when a third party used a mediational role and least likely to occur when a third party used a motivational role which involved rewards and threats.

The literature on conflict management identifies five styles: avoiding, accommodation, compromise, competition, and problem solving (Blake and Mouton, 1964, Thomas, 1976; Rahim, 1983). As pointed out earlier, confrontation and compromise behaviors do not get displayed as naturally in the relatively authoritarian Turkish culture as they do in the West. Hence, mediational third party roles may be particularly instrumental in securing collaborative and compromising behaviors from a disputant party. On the other hand, a disputant may adopt a win-lose attitude and become more competitive when the third party is perceived as using the inquisitorial, the adjucative, and the motivational roles.

In a culture where power distance is relatively high, the authority position of the other party to conflict may further complicate the picture. Styles of conflict management have been shown to be influenced from whether the other party is a superior, a peer, or a subordinate in Turkey (Kozan, 1989) as in the U.S. (Rahim, 1986). Hence, position power of the other party was introduced as an intervening variable in order to see whether the third party role played by a manager changed when the conflict was between superiors and subordinates as opposed to between peers, and whether the position of the other party to conflict affected the relationship of the style used to third party roles.

Sample Data were personally collected by the second author from the managerial personnel of seven firms. This group included a durable goods manufacturer, an electric motors manufacturer, a pharmaceutical company, a cleaning goods and cooking oil company, an electronics manufacturer, a national bank, and a multi-product conglomerate with diverse operations in whites, auto manufacturing, steel, and food processing. With the exception of the last two, these firms

458 M. K. KOZAN AND S . S. ILTER

had their operations in Istanbul, the commercial and industrial center of the country. The multi-product company had most of its operations in Istanbul and the bank, with branches in all pro\ inces, had its headquarters in the same city.

In each of the firms studied, two members of top management were interviewed prior to the distribution of questionnaires. In addition to obtaining a listing of the managerial personnel, these interviews were aimed at finding out about any formal or institutionalized form of appeals system or third party functions in their organizations. Questionnaires were distributed to all managers of the first five firms. In the case of the bank and the conglomerate, the respondents were managers attending company-wide training sessions, which were systematically carried out at training facilities in Istanbul. In both companies, all managers in training in Istanbul were included in the sample. All respondents filled out the questionnaires during regular work hours.

A total of 295 usable responses were obtained, after a return rate that was slightly over 90 per cent. This managerial sample was 86 per cent male. Average age was 37, and average tenure was 10 years. Sixty-seven per cent of the managers had college degrees. Of these, 49 per cent had majored in engineering, and 36 per cent in business administration. Sixty-six per cent of the managers came from the supervisory level, 32 per cent from middle management, and only 2 per cent from top management.

Measurcs Conflict management styles were measured by a Turkish translation of the 28-item Rahim Organizational Conflict Inventories I1 (ROCI-11). The instrument has been reported to have satisfactory test-retest and internal consistency reliabilities (Rahim, 1983). The five-style model has been shown to have factorial validity in non-Western cultures (Van Vliert and Kabanoff, 1990; Ting-Toomey et ul., 1991; Rahim and Blum, in press). The reliability of translation into Turkish was checked by means of retranslation into English by two bilingual colleagues.

ROCI-I1 has parallel versions for conflict with superiors, subordinates or peers, and a respondent randomly received only one of these versions. Consequently, the position power of the other party was indicated by the version filled out by the respondent.

The third party roles were measured by a 32-item questionnaire (the items appear in abbre- viated form in Table 1). Twenty-one of these items were taken from Karambayya and Brett’s ( 1989) measures of the inquisitional, adjucative, mediational, and motivational roles. Reliability was again checked by retranslation into English. Five additional items were written to measure Kolb’s (1 986) restructuring role, and six other items were created by the authors for the luissez- fuire role.

The instructions asked the respondents to describe the third party behavior displayed by their immediate supervisor, if the ROCI-I1 version they received asked about conflicts with peers or subordinates. If the ROCI-I1 version asked about conflict styles used towards a supervisor, then the respondent was asked to describe the third party role played by the superior once removed. ROCI-I1 instructs respondents to describe their conflict styles in general rather than in relation to a specific conflict episode. Similarly, the respondents were asked to rate the typical third party behavior of their supervisors, and the items were worded accordingly.

Results No appeals systems or ombudsman roles existed in the seven firms studied. Formally, the personnel managers were ‘responsible’ for the handling of disputes with the exception of those involving


higher management. In practice, however, the personnel manager’s role was confined to disciplin- ary action pertaining to non-managerial personnel. Line managers were the main group of actors that could play a third party role in conflicts among managers working under them.

A factor analysis was conducted in order to identify the types of third party roles played by these managers. An eight-factor solution was obtained using the maximum likelihood method and a minimum eigen value of one. The chi-square goodness-of-fit value was 223.63 (df = 268, p = 0.01 1). The varimax rotated factor matrix is shown in Table 1. As a rule, an item was included in the factor on which it had the highest loading.

Table I . Factor analysis results Factor’

Item 1 2 3 4 5

Enforces procedural rules Incorporates disputants’ ideas Predicts possible outcomes Describes negotiation procedures Proposes own ideas Keeps parties together Allows questionslrebuttals Ignores problem Bypasses those in conflict Threatens disputants Makes final decision Puts pressure on one or the other Imposes own ideas Gives job to people who can work together Assigns work to those who get along Rearranges duties/responsibilities to create cooperative climate Changes division of work to bring together compatible people Arranges wok to minimize contact between disputants Does not assign job to those who create conflict Leaves disputants alone Only intervenes when requested Abstains from involvement Remains a spectator Lets disputants work it out Listen to disputants’ views Questions disputants Asks for proposals Offers disputants incentives Shuttles back and forth Does not allow interruptions Offers own ideas Works senaratelv with each

70 04 07 -12 07 - 63 -29 18 -05 23 60 -20 21 -21 09

51 -35 17 - 1 1 15 50 -19 06 -03 09 fl -36 09 -16 22

-53 23 - 1 1 38 -17 - 1 1 67 19 00 -06 -16 56 -01 14 -18 -10 49 10 01 -08

04 41 02 11 -14 -17 38 06 02 01

03 01 76 08 15 I5 01 68 04 -03 34 -11 57 - 1 1 06

01 24 -03 01 03 37 W - -06 03

-35 02 -04 - 68 -16 -02 -01 04 59 05 -31 17 06 53 -25 -39 16 -05 44 -27

14 -06 02 35 05 38 -32 09 -18 3 35 -05 14 -07 55 41 -36 21 -21 52

-04 27 13 08 -01 01 -04 09 -06 05 30 05 21 -21 15 28 -10 09 -24 07 20 -16 11 -05 09

-

- 52 22 13 06 20 - -

- -

- -

- -

- -

- 18 17 56 00 07

-

- -

- -

* 1 - mediation; 2 - autocratic; 3 - restructuring; 4 - laissez faire; 5 - facilitation.

The table includes the five factors that had several items with high loadings. Two of the remaining three factors not included in Table 1 had a single high-loading item, and one had several low-loading items. The restructuring, laissez-faire, and mediating roles emerged as expected. The mediation factor, however, also incorporated the items written for the procedural marshall role. Furthermore, an item which was originally written for the laissez-faire role loaded (negatively) on the mediation factor. A fourth factor, which may be labeled as autocrafic interven-

460 M. K. KOZAN AND S . S. ILTER

tion, incorporated subsets of items originally written for the inquisitorial and motivational roles and ;in item written for the restructuring role. A common aspect of all these items incorporated into the fourth factor was the third party’s determination to impose his or her solution on the disputants. Finally, a fifth factor emerged as a less active version of mediation. This factor, which will be labeled as facilitation, included items such as asking questions, listening to parties’ views, and soliciting proposals from them.

The factor analysis results were used to construct scales for the five third party roles identified. The internal consistency coefficients (alpha) for these scales, and their means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations are given in Table 2. The mediation and the facilitation scales have a high positive correlation. Both of these scales had moderately high, negative correlations with the autocratic intervention and luissez-fuire scales.

Table 2. Mean frequencies, standard deviations, intercorrelations, and internal consistencies (alpha) of third party roles (N = 288)

Third party role Third part) role Mediation Restructuring Laissez-faire Autocratic intervention Facilitation Mediation Restructurt ng Laissez-faire Autocratic

Facilitatior i Meant Standard deviation Internal consistency

intervent ion

- 0.30* -0.40* -0.34* 0.69* - -0.05 0.18* 0.24*

- 0.21* -0.38*

- - O M * -

3.74 3.00 2.53 2.59 3.16 0.54 0.67 0.61 0.64 0.69 0.83 0.76 0.72 0.64 0.81

* p < 0.01. t On a 5-point scale with 1 = lowest and 5 = highest.

The third party roles used most frequently by these managers were mediation and facilitation. Laissez-faire and autocratic intervention were used the least. A profile analysis was carried out to test whether the position of the other party to conflict, i.e. superior, subordinate or peer, affected the frequencies of third party roles reported above. The results showed no effect of position [F‘Wilk’s) = 1.07, n.s.1.

The relation of respondents’ conflict management styles to the third party role played by their supervisors was investigated by canonical correlation. Additional canonical correlations were also run for subgroups of respondents who were reporting on conflicts with subordinates, with peers, or with supervisors. Table 3 shows the number of significant canonical functions (with a = 0.05) and the structural correlations obtained.

The overall analysis yielded two significant canonical functions [F(Wilk’s) = 2.64, p < 0.001]. The first function indicates that avoiding increased when the third party was perceived to be using more restructuring. The second function indicates that collaboration and compromise increased when the third party roles of mediation and facilitation increased. On the other hand, collaboration and compromise decreased when the third party used more of a laissez-faire role.

For the subsample that reported on conflicts with peers, only one significant canonical function was obtained [F = 1.59, p < 0.051. The correlations show that the competitive style was used more when the superior used more autocratic intervention.

For the subsample reporting on conflicts with subordinates, the only significant canonical function obtained [F = 1.56, p < 0.051 indicated that avoiding, and to a lesser extent accommodation, increased as the disputants’ superior used more of a restructuring role.

TURKISH MANAGERS IN SUBORDINATES' CONFLICTS 461

Table 3. Canonical correlations for conflict management styles and third party roles

Conflict Conflict Conflict

(n = 283) peers subordinates superiors Variables Funcl Func2 (n = 98) (n = 95) (n = 90)

Conflict styles Collaboration 0.15 -0.72 0. I9 -0.14 0.01 Competition 0.62 0.15 0.86 -0.61 -0.83 Compromise 0.60 -0.59 0.33 -0.50 -0.45 Accommodation 0.63 -0.21 -0.33 -0.74 -0.44 Avoiding 0.74 0.39 0. I6 -0.87 -0.54

Mediation 0.28 -0.84 -0.35 -0.55 0.15 Restructuring 0.82 0.01 -0.06 -0.82 -0.57 Laissez Faire 0.28 0.70 0.49 -0.21 -0.36 Autocratic Intervention 0.49 0.17 0.67 0.05 -0.61 Facilitation 0.25 -0.63 0.06 -0.14 -0.17

All subjects with with with

Third party roles

Functional correlation 0.36 0.23 0.42 0.44 0.52 Eigen value 0.15 0.06 0.21 0.24 0.37 Variance of styles

explained (%) 34 22 21 39 27

Finally, when the other party to a conflict was a superior, again a single significant function was obtained [F= 1.86, p < 0.011. In these cases, a disputant became more competitive as the third party (i.e. the superior once removed) was seen as using more autocratic intervention or more restructuring. Furthermore, a disputant tended to avoid a superior somewhat more when the third party used more restructuring.

A number of patterns emerge when results in these subsamples are compared with the overall results. First, the increase in avoiding when a third party used restructuring holds mostly for hierarchical conflicts, i.e. when the other party was either a subordinate or a superior. Second, competition increased under an autocratic third party when the conflict was with a peer or a superior, but not when conflict was with subordinates. Finally, the increase in collaboration and compromise with third party mediation, which was an expected finding, holds for the whole sample. In the subsamples, this relation did not appear to be strong enough to yield a second significant canonical function.

Discussion

The factor analysis results suggest that the third party roles identified in the Western literature are found in varying degrees among Turkish managers. These managers use restructuring, for example, as do their Western counterparts. Mediation, as will be explained shortly, may have a different meaning in this managerial culture. Finally, roles such as adjucative, procedural marshall and motivation were not distinguishable third party roles for Turkish managers.

This last group of roles are primarily adopted from the legal setting. It is uncertain at this point whether they have limited applicability in the Turkish setting or in managerial dispute resolution in general. Kolb (1986) has argued that several differences exist between the legal and managerial settings, and third party models based on one may not be directly transferable

462 M. K . KOZAN AND S. S. ILTER

to the othcr. Pinkley et al. (1993) found that manages did not distinguish process control from outcome control, a distinction on which such roles as adjucative and motivation are based.

The nature of managerial settings rather than culture may have played the greater role in the merger of the inquisitorial and motivational roles in this research. A recent research note by Karambayya, Brett and Lytle (1992) indicates a similar merger of these two roles to yield a single ‘autocratic’ factor. Unlike the legal setting, a manager who chooses to arbitrate a settlement is burdened by its enforcement as well. Managers naturally use various motivational devices in order to secure acceptance of arbitrated decisions, and Turkish managers are no exception. Additional studies of managers in the West, as well as other cultures, will aid a better deliiieation of the effects of culture from forces that are unique to the managerial setting.

Mediation, on the other hand, appears to carry a different meaning for the Turkish managers than their Western counterparts. A closer analysis of the mediation role items reveals some differences from Karambayya and Brett’s (1989) study. Three of their mediation items formed a separate factor, facilitation. On the other hand, two of their procedural marshal1 items loaded on the mediation factor. Some additional items loading on the mediation factor are not found in Karamhayya and Brett, i.e. ‘keeps parties together’, ‘proposes hidher own ideas’, ‘predicts possible oiitcomes’. Turkish managers seem to differentiate between a more active mediational role and a rather detached facilitative role.

Facilitation resembles Pruitt’s (198 1) passive approaches to mediation, where the mediator’s presence eases tension and encourages people to be on their best behavior. In the mediational role, Turkish managers seem to be using their position power not only to manage the process, but also to press for a resolution. Mediation may get quite intrusive, as evidenced by the inclusion, in the mediation factor, of items loading on other factors in Karambayya and Brett, such as ‘predicts possible outcomes’ and ‘proposes own ideas’.

Although mediation may get heavy handed at times in the West, too, an intrusive mediational style is the main method of dispute resolution in some non-Western societies. Patai (1983) describes how mediators in Arab societies elicit concessions from a disputant for the sake of a beloved relative of hidher or by referring to hidher forgiving nature. Wall (1990) describes how Chinese community mediators try to find out who is right and put emotional pressure on the disputants for a ‘just resolution’. A predictor of this style of mediation may be the individualismxollectivism dimension of culture (Hofstede, 1984). Turkish culture, like the Arab and Chinese, is relatively low in individualism. Wall suggests that in more collectivist cultures people are viewed less as individuals than as members of a group, and disputes are treated as a group problem rather than just between two individuals.

A clear sign of the functionality of this style of mediation, as well as that of facilitation, in the present study was their positive influence on the more direct handling of conflicts by the disputants. Mediation and facilitation were positively correlated to collaborative and compromising styles of conflict management by the disputing parties. On the other hand, when left alone, i.e. when the third party played a laissez-faire role, the disputants used significantly less collaboration and compromise. A mediating or facilitating manager plays a crucial role in this culture because face-to-face defense of interests do not get displayed as naturally by the conflicting parties as in the West. Furthermore, parties find it easier to make concessions without losing face to an intermediary than when directly facing their adversaries.

Mediation and facilitation may be functional in other collectivist cultures which also place a premium on face-saving. Rahim and Blum (in press) state that: ‘Whereas organizational members from individualistic cultures may select distributive dimension (i.e. competition-accommodation) to resolve their interpersonal conflict, organizational members from collectivist cultures may select .ind use integrative dimension (i.e. collaboration-avoiding) for managing this conflict’.


Yet, due to face-saving concerns, impasses are more common than collaboration in many collectivist cultures. Since the collaborative/problem solving style does not always get naturally displayed, mediation and facilitation may provide the tool that is needed to fulfil the integrative potential inherent in a collectivist culture.

Restructuring was also instrumental in Turkish organizations, but in a different way than mediation; it helped managers avoid direct confrontation. The restructuring of responsibilities and reporting relationships seem to effectively remove the conditions that lead to conflict. The preference shown for restructuring by the Turkish managers may therefore be explained by their concern for harmony and avoidance of tension in the workplace.

Closer analysis, however, reveals a further role for restructuring. Subordinates who were in conflict with a superior became more competitive when the superior once removed resorted to restructuring. The immediate superiors of these subordinates, in turn, were more avoiding or accommodative toward them. In other words, restructuring by the superior once removed softened the immediate superior’s stance towards an assertive subordinate. This suggests that restructuring can sometimes be used by higher-ups to back up a lower level employee against hisher immediate superior in a subtle way, without embarrassing or undermining the authority of the latter.

Managers participating in this research also displayed a tendency to make less use of autocratic intervention than mediation, facilitation, and restructuring. This is an interesting phenomenon for Turkish organizations which are known for their authoritarian climate. Turkish managers have been found to use a competitive, forcing style when in direct conflict with another manager, especially a subordinate (Kozan, 1989). Yet, in a third party role, they generally avoided autocratic intervention.

A possible explanation of this is the use of autocratic intervention only when other methods are seen as inappropriate or have already failed. This tendency of managers has a parallel in the legal setting, too. Merry (1990) has shown how plaintiffs turn to the courts reluctantly as a last resort when all else seems to have failed. In the case of Turkish managers, the more intrusive nature of mediation, and its ability to induce compromise and collaboration, may also have enabled managers to reserve autocratic intervention for crucial situations. Autocratic intervention may still be a potent means of resolving impasses, however, even though it is used sparingly.

Another explanation for the infrequent use of autocratic means may be found in the meaning of authority in the managerial culture. To the Turkish manager, authority is a personal matter, and the maintenance of undisputed authority is of topmost priority. When in conflict with a subordinate, a manager feels a personal need to defend his or her authority with an urge that may go beyond the need to maintain authority for organizational goal achievement. How- ever, in a third party role, a manager can afford to stay neutral and mediate. Such behavior will not threaten his or her authority; to the contrary, the manager will gain stature as a peacemaker.

The present study has a number of limitations, requiring some caution in the interpretation of its findings. A major limitation stems from its dependence on reports of behavior by the respondents. The findings, however, are actually compatible with the authors’ firsthand experience with third party roles in the Turkish society and in organizational life. Furthermore, the data on third party behavior in the survey was not based on self-reports of managers who played the third party role, but reports of a disputant. This minimizes social desirability bias because superior’s behavior rather than one’s own is being rated. The procedure may have inflated, however, the relationship found between conflict styles and third party roles because of common source variance; that is, the same respondent rating hidher own conflict


style and the third party’s behavior. Furthermore, descriptions of third party’s behavior is exclusively based on one of the disputants, rather than all involved. Consequently, inter-rater reliability could not be ascertained. Further study using systematic, in-depth observation may overcome some of these concerns, and help understand the process of third party intervention as well. Observational methods may also overcome some of the bias which may occur in translat- ing questionnaire items.

The study was also limited to third party behavior of the immediate superior of the disputing parties. A question that needs exploration is how widespread and functional are third party roles played by other actors. A related question is whether and when representatives are used by disputants, along the lines Starr (1978) has observed in conflict management in the Turkish village. It will be recalled that these representatives are not typical ‘impartial’ third parties, but rather act on behalf of the party they represent.

Finally, the nature of the sample may limit the generalizability of the findings. The respondents were well-educated, and relatively young managers working in medium to large private companies with headquarters in Istanbul. Many were fluent in a Western language and have been exposed to Western management concepts through their education in Turkish or, in the case of some, foreign universities, and management training seminars conducted by their companies. Although the sample characteristics are typical of managers in the corporate private sector, the findings may not be descriptive of all aspects of Turkish work life, most notably government agencies, government owned firms, and smaller organizations outside of large metropolitan areas.

The findings of this survey, although in need of further in-depth study and more broadly-based samples, provides us with a useful, albeit preliminary, description of third party managerial behavior in Turkish corporations. The best general description of their behavior is perhaps a striving for harmony in the workplace. Restructuring is used to reduce the possibility of open conflict among subordinates. When conflicts arose, they chose to mediate or facilitate more than autocratically intervene or display a laissez-faire attitude. Mediational efforts, which are more intrusive than in the West, enable the disputants to collaborate or compromise with more ease, a pronounced need in conflicts in this society. All in all, the peacemaking style of intervention used by these managers is well suited to a culture which dislikes adversarial competition and direct, aggressive defense of interests.

Western managers doing business with Turkish firms may benefit from a knowledge of the role of third parties in this culture. A third party who is well-versed in the language and ways of bothcultures, as well as in mediation skills, may greatly facilitate the creation of acollaborative and compromising climate in handling cross-cultural conflicts.

Foreign subsidiaries as well as domestic firms should be encouraged to institutionalize third party mediation within their organizations. It will be recalled that personnel managers, responsible for dispute resolution but in a strictly staff position, could play a limited role in this regard. Experimentation with the ombudsman role, which is an alien concept in Turkish firms, may be worthwhile. But can the ombudsman play an effective role in these organizations, or would they be relegated to the inconsequential third party role of the personnel managers? The most viable course of action here may be the formal recognition of third party roles of line managers. This can be done by including third party roles of managers in subordinates’ disputes as part of their jobhole definitions. Training of managers may also incorporate third party functions, particularly mediation. Managerial training material in use, which are adopted from the Western literature and practice, do not contain or stress the type of mediational role that seems to work for the Turkish manager.

The present findings on Turkish managers further suggest that third party roles may also


be a promising area of research in the comparative management field. Third parties play an important role in conflict management in cultures where confrontational tactics are shunned. As pointed out earlier, Patai (1983) has described how conflict management in the Arabic culture is mainly carried out through mediators. Similarly, Wall and his colleagues described the role of mediators in community conflict resolution in China (Wall, 1990) and South Korea (Kim, Wall, Sohn and Kim, 1992). The uncertainty avoidance and individualism-collectivism dimensions of culture (Hofstede, 1984) may serve as predictors of the importance of third party roles in a culture. A theoretical framework for managers in a third party role has started to emerge in the Western management literature. Comparative studies may benefit from inclusion of third party roles along with styles of the conflict management in studying organizational conflict in non-western cultures.

A second area of research on third party roles is crosscultural conflict, where the disputants are from different Cultures. Borisoff and Victor (1989) have described how differences in language, place, thought processing, and non-verbal behavior may complicate the process of handling crosscultural conflicts. It may be worthwhile to study the roles third parties may have to play in that process. Of particular interest here may be those situations where the cultures differ in their reliance on third parties in place of direct confrontation.

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Third party roles played by Turkish managers in subordinates' conflicts