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THIRD DIVISION
ELPIDIO P. TIONG,Complainant,
- versus - ATTY. GEORGE M. FLORENDO,Respondent.
A.C. No. 4428 Present: VELASCO, JR., Chairperson,PERALTA,ABAD,MENDOZA, andPERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. Promulgated:December 12, 2011
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D E C I S I O N
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed
by Elpidio P. Tiong against Atty. George M. Florendo for gross immorality
and grave misconduct.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Complainant Elpidio P. Tiong, an American Citizen, and his wife, Ma. Elena
T. Tiong, are real estate lessors in Baguio City. They are likewise engaged
in the assembly and repair of motor vehicles in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan.
In 1991, they engaged the services of respondent Atty. George
M. Florendo not only as legal counsel but also as administrator of their
businesses whenever complainant would leave for the United States of
America (USA).
Sometime in 1993, complainant began to suspect that respondent and his
wife were having an illicit affair. His suspicion was confirmed in the
afternoon of May 13, 1995 when, in their residence, he chanced upon a
telephone conversation between the two. Listening through the extension
phone, he heard respondent utter the words "I love you, I'll call you later".
1
When confronted, his wife initially denied any amorous involvement with
respondent but eventually broke down and confessed to their love affair
that began in 1993. Respondent likewise admitted the relationship.
Subsequently, at a meeting initiated by respondent and held at
the Salibao Restaurant in Burnham Park, Baguio City, respondent and
complainant's wife, Ma.Elena, confessed anew to their illicit affair before
their respective spouses.
On May 15, 1995, the parties met again at the Mandarin Restaurant in
Baguio City and, in the presence of a Notary Public, Atty. Liberato Tadeo,
respondent and Ma. Elena executed and signed an affidavit2 attesting to
their illicit relationship and seeking their respective spouses' forgiveness,
as follows:
"WE, GEORGE M. FLORENDO, a resident of Baguio City and of legal age and MA. ELENA T. TIONG, likewise a resident of Baguio City, of legal age, depose and state:
We committed adultery against our spouses from May 1993 to May 13, 1995 and we hereby ask forgiveness and assure our spouses that this thing will never happen again with us or any other person. We assure that we will no longer see each other nor have any communication directly or indirectly. We shall comply with our duties as husband and wife to our spouses and assure that there will be no violence against them. That any behaviour unbecoming a husband or wife henceforth shall give rise to legal action against us; We shall never violate this assurance;
We, the offended spouses Elizabeth F. Florendo and Elpidio Tiong forgive our spouses and assure them that we will not institute any criminal or legal action against them because we have forgiven them. If they violate this agreement we will institute legal action.
This document consists of four (4) typewritten copies and each party has been furnished a copy and this document shall have no validity unless signed by all the parties.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have set out hands this 15th day of May 1995 at Baguio City, Philippines.
(SIGNED) (SIGNED)
GEORGE M. FLORENDO ELPIDIO TIONG
(SIGNED) (SIGNED)
MA. ELENA T. TIONG ELIZABETH F. FLORENDO"
Notwithstanding, complainant instituted the present suit for disbarment on
May 23, 1995 charging respondent of gross immorality and grave
misconduct. In his Answer3, respondent admitted the material allegations
of the complaint but interposed the defense of pardon.
2
In the Resolution4 dated September 20, 1995, the Court resolved to refer
the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and
decision.
Finding merit in the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),
through Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga, submitted its Report and
Recommendation5 dated September 21, 2007 for the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for one (1) year, which was adopted
and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution6 dated
October 19, 2007. Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration7 therefrom was
denied in the Resolution8 dated June 26, 2011.
Hence, the instant petition on the sole issue – whether the pardon
extended by complainant in the Affidavit dated May 15, 1995 is sufficient
to warrant the dismissal of the present disbarment case against
respondent for gross immoral conduct.
After due consideration, the Court resolves to adopt the findings and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD except as to the penalty imposed.
The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide,
thus:
"CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
xxxx
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession."
3
It has been consistently held by the Court that possession of good moral
character is not only a condition for admission to the Bar but is a
continuing requirement to maintain one's good standing in the legal
profession. It is the bounden duty of law practitioners to observe the
highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the
Bar.9 Consequently, any errant behaviour on the part of a lawyer, be it in
his public or private activities, which tends to show him deficient in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant his
suspension or disbarment.
In this case, respondent admitted his illicit relationship with a married
woman not his wife, and worse, that of his client. Contrary to respondent's
claim, their consortium cannot be classified as a mere "moment of
indiscretion"10 considering that it lasted for two (2) years and was only
aborted when complainant overheard their amorous phone conversation
on March 13, 1995.
Respondent's act of having an affair with his client's wife manifested his
disrespect for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow
of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low regard for the
ethics of his profession.11 Likewise, he violated the trust and confidence
reposed on him by complainant which in itself is prohibited under Canon
1712 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Undeniably, therefore, his
illicit relationship with Ma. Elena amounts to a disgraceful and grossly
immoral conduct warranting disciplinary action from the Court.13 Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that an attorney may be
disbarred or suspended from his office by the Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office, grossly immoral
conduct, among others.
Respondent, however, maintains that he cannot be sanctioned for his
questioned conduct because he and Ma. Elena had already been pardoned
by their respective spouses in the May 15, 1995 Affidavit14.
The Court disagrees.
It bears to stress that a case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and
not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case but is intended
to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in
order to protect the public and the courts. It is not an investigation into the
4
acts of respondent as a husband but on his conduct as an officer of the
Court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.15 Hence, the
Affidavit dated March 15, 1995, which is akin to an affidavit of desistance,
cannot have the effect of abating the instant proceedings.16
However, considering the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that a
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months, instead
of one (1) year as recommended by the IBP-CBD, is adequate sanction for
the grossly immoral conduct of respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GEORGE M. FLORENDO is hereby
found GUILTY of Gross Immorality and is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for SIX (6) MONTHSeffective upon notice hereof, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent
as a member of the Philippine Bar and furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme CourtBaguio City
EN BANCLORENZO D. BRENNISEN,
Complainant,
- versus - ATTY. RAMON U. CONTAWI,
Respondent.
A.C. No. 7481 Present: CORONA, C.J.,CARPIO,VELASCO, JR.LEONARDO-DE CASTRO.BRION,PERALTA,BERSAMIN,DEL CASTILLO,ABAD,VILLARAMA, JR.PEREZ,MENDOZA,SERENO,REYES, andPERLAS-BERNABE, JJ Promulgated: April 24, 2012
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint[1] for disbarment
filed by complainant Lorenzo D. Brennisen against respondent Atty. Ramon
5
U. Contawi for deceit and gross misconduct in violation of his lawyer's
oath.
The Facts
Complainant is the registered owner of a parcel of land located in
San Dionisio, Parañaque City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 21176[2] of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal. Being a
resident of the United States of America (USA), he entrusted the
administration of the subject property to respondent, together with the
corresponding owner's duplicate title.
Unbeknownst to complainant, however, respondent, through
a spurious Special Power of Attorney (SPA)[3] dated February 22, 1989,
mortgaged and subsequently sold the subject property to one Roberto Ho
(“Ho”), as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale[4] dated November 15,
2001. As a result, TCT No. 21176 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No.
150814[5] issued in favor of Ho.
Thus, on April 16, 2007, complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint against respondent for having violated his oath as a lawyer,
causing him damage and prejudice.
In his counter-affidavit,[6] respondent denied any formal lawyer-client
relationship between him and the complainant, claiming to have merely
extended his services for free. He also denied receiving money from the
complainant for the purpose of paying the real estate taxes on the
property. Further, he averred that it was his former office assistants, a
certain Boy Roque (“Roque”) and one Danilo Diaz (“Diaz”), who offered the
subject property to Ho as collateral for a loan. Nevertheless, respondent
admitted to having confirmed the spurious SPA in his favor already
annotated at the back of TCT No. 21176 upon the prodding of Roque and
Diaz, and because he was also in need of money at that time. Hence, he
signed the real estate mortgage and received his proportionate share
of P130,000.00 from the proceeds of the loan, which he asserted to have
fully settled.
Finally, respondent denied signing the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of Ho and insisted that it was a forgery. Nonetheless, he sought
complainant's forgiveness and promised to repay the value of the subject
property.
In the Resolution[7] dated July 16, 2008, the Court resolved to refer
the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.
The Action and Recommendation of the IBP
6
During the mandatory conference held on October 21, 2008, the
parties stipulated on the following matters:
1. That complainant is the owner of a property covered by TCT No. 21176 (45228) of the Register of Deeds of Parañaque;
2. Respondent was in possession of the Owner's Duplicate Certificate of the property of the complainant;
3. The property of the complainant was mortgaged to a certain Roberto Ho;
4. The title to the property of complainant was cancelled in year 2000 and a new one, TCT No. 150814 was issued in favor of Mr. Roberto Ho;
5. The Special Power of Attorney dated 24 February 1989 in favor of Atty. Ramon U. Contawi is spurious and was not signed by complainant Lorenzo D. Brennisen;
6. That respondent received Php100,000.00 of the mortgage loan secured by the mortgagee on the aforementioned property of complainant;
7. That respondent did not inform the complainant about the unauthorized mortgage and sale of his property;
8. That respondent has a loan obligation to Mr. Roberto Ho;
9. That respondent has not yet filed any case against the person whom he claims to have falsified his signature;
10. That respondent did not notify the complainant that the owner's copy of TCT No. 21176 was stolen and was taken out from his office.[8]
In its Report[9] dated July 10, 2009, the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD), through Commissioner Eduardo V. De Mesa, found
that respondent had undeniably mortgaged and sold the property of his
client without the latter's knowledge or consent, facilitated by the use of a
falsified SPA. Hence, in addition to his possible criminal liability for
falsification, the IBP-CBD deduced that respondent violated various
provisions of the Canons of Professional Responsibility and accordingly
recommended that he be disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys.
On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
the report of Commissioner De Mesa through Resolution No. XIX-2011-
248[10] as follows:
“RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex 'A' and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding Respondent guilty of falsification; making or using falsified documents; and for benefiting from the proceed[s] of his dishonest acts, Atty. Ramon U. Contawi is hereby DISBARRED.”
The Issue
7
The sole issue before the Court is whether respondent violated his
lawyer's oath when he mortgaged and sold complainant's property, which
was entrusted to him, without the latter's consent.
The Court's Ruling
After a punctilious examination of the records, the Court concurs
with the findings and recommendation of Commissioner De Mesa and the
IBP Board of Governors that respondent acted with deceit when, through
the use of a falsified document, he effected the unauthorized mortgage
and sale of his client's property for his personal benefit.
Indisputably, respondent disposed of complainant's property without
his knowledge or consent, and partook of the proceeds of the sale for his
own benefit. His contention that he merely accommodated the request of
his then financially-incapacitated office assistants to confirm the spurious
SPA is flimsy and implausible, as he was fully aware that complainant's
signature reflected thereon was forged. As aptly opined by Commissioner
De Mesa, the fraudulent transactions involving the subject property were
effected using the owner's duplicate title, which was in respondent's
safekeeping and custody during complainant's absence.
Consequently, Commissioner De Mesa and the IBP Board of
Governors correctly recommended his disbarment for violations of the
pertinent provisions of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Canon 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Canon 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Canon 16 – A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client which may come into his possession. Canon 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from client. Canon 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
In Sabayle v. Tandayag,[11] the Court disbarred one of the respondent
lawyers and ordered his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys on the
grounds of serious dishonesty and professional misconduct. The
respondent lawyer knowingly participated in a false and simulated
transaction not only by notarizing a spurious Deed of Sale, but also – and
even worse – sharing in the profits of the specious transaction by acquiring
half of the property subject of the Deed of Sale.
In Flores v. Chua,[12] the Court disbarred the respondent lawyer for
having deliberately made false representations that the vendor appeared
personally before him when he notarized a forged deed of sale. He was
found guilty of grave misconduct.
8
In this case, respondent's established acts exhibited his unfitness
and plain inability to discharge the bounden duties of a member of the
legal profession. He failed to prove himself worthy of the privilege to
practice law and to live up to the exacting standards demanded of the
members of the bar. It bears to stress that “[t]he practice of law is a
privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency
and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to
administrative liability.”[13]
Moreover, respondent's argument that there was no formal lawyer-
client relationship between him and complainant will not serve to mitigate
his liability. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is
committed in a lawyer's private or professional capacity, for a lawyer may
not divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another.[14]
With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court thus finds the penalty of
disbarment proper in this case, as recommended by Commissioner De
Mesa and the IBP Board of Governors. Section 27, Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court provides:
“SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Courtfor any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, xxx or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice xxx” (emphasis supplied)
The Court notes that in administrative proceedings, only substantial
evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required.[15] Having
carefully scrutinized the records of this case, the Court therefore finds that
the standard of substantial evidence has been more than satisfied.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. RAMON U. CONTAWI, having clearly
violated his lawyer's oath and the Canons of Professional Responsibility
through his unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct, is DISBARRED and
his name ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance. Let a copy of this Decision be
attached to respondent's personal record as attorney.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 6490 July 9, 2013(Formerly CBD Case No. 03-1054)
9
LILIA TABANG AND CONCEPCION TABANG, Complainants, vs.ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
PER CURIAM:
This case involves a complaint for disbarment directly filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) charging respondent Atty. Glenn Gacott of engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).1
Complainants alleged that sometime in 1984 and 1985, complainant Lilia Tabang sought the advice of Judge Eustaquio Gacott, respondent Atty. Glenn Gacott’s father. Lilia Tabang intended to purchase a total of thirty (30) hectares of agricultural land located in Barangay Bacungan, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, which consisted of several parcels belonging to different owners. Judge Gacott noted that under the government’s agrarian reform program, Tabang was prohibited from acquiring vast tracts of agricultural land as she already owned other parcels. Thus, Judge Gacott advised her to put the titles of the parcels under the names of fictitious persons.2
Eventually, Lilia Tabang was able to purchase seven parcels and obtained the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) under the names of fictitious persons, as follows:
1. TCT No. 12475 – Amelia Andes;
2. TCT No. 12476 – Wilfredo Ondoy;
3. TCT No. 12790 – Agnes Camilla;
4. TCT No. 12791 – Leonor Petronio;
5. TCT No. 12792 – Wilfredo Gomez;
6. TCT No. 12793 – Elizabeth Dungan; and
7. TCT No. 12794 – Andes Estoy.3
Later, complainants Lilia and Concepcion Tabang decided to sell the seven parcels as they were in need of funds for their medication and other
expenses. Claiming that he would help complainants by offering the parcels to prospective buyers, respondent Glenn Gacott borrowed from Lilia Tabang the TCTs covering the parcels.4
About a year after respondent borrowed the titles and after he failed to negotiate any sale, complainants confronted respondent. Respondent then told the complainants that he had lost all seven titles.5
On the pretext of offering a remedy to complainants, respondent advised them to file petitions in court for re-issuance of titles. Pretending to be the "authorized agent-representative" of the fictitious owners of the seven parcels, Lilia Tabang filed petitions for re-issuance of titles.6
In the course of the proceedings, the public prosecutor noticed similarities in the signatures of the supposed owners that were affixed on the Special Powers of Attorney (SPA) purportedly executed in favor of Lilia Tabang. The public prosecutor, acting on his observation, asked the court to have the supposed owners summoned.7
Seeking to avoid embarrassment, Lilia Tabang had the petitions voluntarily dismissed without prejudice to their being re-filed.8
Subsequently, Lilia Tabang filed a new set of petitions. This time, she changed the fictitious owners’ signatures in the hope of making them look more varied.9
Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had filed a new set of petitions, respondent executed several documents that included revocations of SPAs and various affidavits of recovery purportedly signed by the parcels’ (fictitious) owners. Respondent then caused the annotation of these documents on the TCTs of the seven parcels.10
Also, respondent caused the publication of notices where he represented himself as the owner of the parcels and announced that these were for sale.11 Later, respondent succeeded in selling the seven parcels. He received a total of ?3,773,675.00 from the proceeds of the sales.12
Alleging that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit, complainants filed their complaint directly with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on February 3, 2003. The case was docketed as Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Case No. 03-1054.
In his defense, respondent alleged that the owners of the seven parcels were not fictitious and that they had voluntarily sold the seven parcels. He added that Lilia Tabang had been merely the broker for the seven parcels
10
and that she had unsuccessfully demanded a "balato" of twenty percent (20%) from the proceeds of the sale of the seven parcels. He alleged that after she had been refused to be given a "balato," Lilia Tabang had threatened to defame him and seek his disbarment.13
In her Report and Recommendation dated March 4, 2004,14 IBP Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro found respondent guilty of gross misconduct for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. She recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.
In a Resolution dated April 16, 2004,15 the IBP Board of Governors adopted the report of Commissioner Navarro. However, the IBP Board of Governors increased the penalty to disbarment. Thereafter, the case was referred to the Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
In a Resolution dated September 29, 2004,16 the Supreme Court remanded the case to the IBP. The Court noted that majority of the pieces of evidence presented by complainants were mere photocopies and affidavits and that the persons who supposedly executed such documents were neither presented nor subpoenaed. Thus, there could not have been adequate basis for sustaining the imposition of a penalty as grave as disbarment.
The case was then assigned to Investigating Commissioner Dennis B. Funa. Hearings were conducted on March 22, 2005; October 7, 2005; July 18, 2006; August 29, 2006; November 7, 2006; February 23, 2007; and July 25, 2007.17
The complainants presented several witnesses. One was Dieter Heinze, President of the Swiss American Lending Corporation.18 Heinze testified that in April 2001, a friend introduced him to respondent who, in turn, introduced himself as the owner of seven (7) parcels in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. They agreed on the purchase of a lot priced at P900,000.00. His company, however, paid only P668,000.00. Heinze noted that his company withheld payment upon his realization that Lilia Tabang had caused the annotation of an adverse claim and upon respondent’s failure to produce Leonor Petronio, the alleged lot owner.
Another of complainants’ witnesses was Atty. Agerico Paras.19 He testified that Heinze introduced him to respondent who, in turn, introduced himself as the owner of seven (7) parcels in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. They agreed on the purchase of a lot priced at P2,300,000.00. He paid for the said parcel in two (2) installments. Upon learning that Lilia Tabang had caused the annotation of an adverse claim, he wrote to respondent asking him to either work on the cancellation of the claim or to reimburse him. He
added that respondent was unable to produce Amelia Andes, the ostensible owner of the parcel he had purchased.
Teodoro Gallinero, another buyer of one of the seven parcels, also testified for complainants.20 He testified that in February 2001, he was introduced to respondent who claimed that several parcels with a total area of thirty (30) hectares were owned by his mother. Gallinero agreed to purchase a parcel for the price of P2,000,000.00 which he paid in cash and in kind (L-300 van).
Complainant Lilia Tabang also testified on the matters stated in the Complaint.21
On July 25, 2007, Commissioner Funa required the complainants to submit their Position Paper. Respondent filed his Motion for Reconsideration and the Inhibition of Commissioner Funa who, respondent claimed, deprived him of the chance to cross-examine complainants’ witnesses, and was "bent on prejudicing"22 him.
Commissioner Funa then inhibited himself. Following this, the case was reassigned to Investigating Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco.
In the meantime, with the Supreme Court En Banc’s approval of the IBP-CBD’s Rules of Procedure, it was deemed proper for an Investigating Commissioner to submit his/her Report and Recommendation based on matters discussed during the mandatory conferences, on the parties’ Position Papers (and supporting documents), and on the results of clarificatory questioning (if such questioning was found to be necessary). As such, respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied, and he was required to file his Position Paper.23
On July 30, 2009, respondent filed his Position Paper.24 Subsequently, the case was deemed submitted for Commissioner Limpingco’s Report and Recommendation.
In his Position Paper, respondent noted that he filed criminal complaints against Lilia Tabang on account of Tabang’s statement that she had fabricated the identities of the owners of the seven (7) parcels. He claimed that since 1996, he had relied on the Torrens Titles of the seven (7) owners who were introduced to him by Lilia Tabang. He asserted that Lilia Tabang could not have been the owner of the seven (7) parcels since the SPAs executed by the parcels’ owners clearly made her a mere agent and him a sub-agent. He also assailed the authenticity of the public announcements (where he supposedly offered the seven 7 parcels for sale) and Memorandum of Agreement. He surmised that the signatures on such
11
documents appearing above the name "Glenn C. Gacott" had been mere forgeries and crude duplications of his own signature.
In his Report and Recommendation dated August 23, 2010,25 Commissioner Limpingco found respondent liable for gross violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR. He likewise noted that respondent was absent in most of the hearings without justifiable reason, in violation of Rule 12.04 of the CPR.26 He recommended that respondent be disbarred and his name, stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
On October 8, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution27 adopting the Report of Investigating Commissioner Limpingco.
On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration.28
Respondent then filed his Notice of Appeal with the IBP on August 8, 2011.
On August 17, 2011, respondent filed before the Supreme Court his Urgent Motion for Extension of Time (to file Petition for Review/Appeal). On September 20, 2011, the Court granted respondent’s Motion and gave him an extension of thirty (30) days to file his Appeal. The Supreme Court warned respondent that no further extension will be given. Despite this, respondent filed two (2) more Motions for Extension – the first on September 29, 2011 and the second on November 3, 2011 – both of which were denied by the Court.
Despite the Court’s denials of his Motions for Extension, respondent filed on December 14, 2011 a Motion to Admit Petition for Review/Appeal (with attached Petition/Appeal). This Motion was denied by the Court on April 17, 2012.
For resolution is the issue of whether or not respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, thus warranting his disbarment.
After a careful examination of the records, the Court concurs with and adopts the findings and recommendation of Commissioner Limpingco and the IBP Board of Governors. It is clear that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR when he executed the revocations of SPAs and affidavits of recovery and in arrogating for himself the ownership of the seven (7) subject parcels.
While it may be true that complainant Lilia Tabang herself engaged in illicit activities, the complainant’s own complicity does not negate, or even
mitigate, the repugnancy of respondent’s offense. Quite the contrary, his offense is made even graver. He is a lawyer who is held to the highest standards of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. Perverting what is expected of him, he deliberately and cunningly took advantage of his knowledge and skill of the law to prejudice and torment other individuals. Not only did he countenance illicit action, he instigated it. Not only did he acquiesce to injustice, he orchestrated it. Thus, We impose upon respondent the supreme penalty of disbarment.
Under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court (Rules), a lawyer may be disbarred for any of the following grounds:
deceit;
malpractice;
gross misconduct in office;
grossly immoral conduct;
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
violation of the lawyer's oath;
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority to do so.
It is established in Jurisprudence that disbarment is proper when lawyers commit gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in usurping the property rights of other persons. By way of examples:
In Brennisen v. Contawi:29 Respondent Atty. Ramon U. Contawi was disbarred for having used a spurious SPA to mortgage and sell property entrusted to him for administration.
In Sabayle v. Tandayag:30 One of the respondents, Atty. Carmelito B. Gabor, was disbarred for having acknowledged a Deed of Sale in the absence of the purported vendors and for taking advantage of his position as Assistant Clerk of Court by purchasing one-half (1/2) of the land covered by said Deed of Sale knowing that the deed was fictitious.
12
In Daroy v. Legaspi:31 The Court disbarred respondent Atty. Ramon Legaspi for having converted to his personal use the funds that he received for his clients.
Nevertheless, recourse to disbarment must be done with utmost caution. As this Court noted in Moran v. Moron:32
Disbarment should never be imposed unless it is evidently clear that the lawyer, by his serious misconduct, should no longer remain a member of the bar. Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, only for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe – such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine – would accomplish the end desired.33
Moreover, considering the gravity of disbarment, it has been established that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify its imposition.34
As explained in Aba v. De Guzman,35 "[p]reponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto."36
Per Rule 133, Section 1 of the Rules, a court may consider the following in determining preponderance of evidence:
All the facts and circumstances of the case;
The witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony;
The witnesses’ interest or want of interest and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and
The number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.
In this case, complainants have shown by a preponderance of evidence that respondent committed gross misconduct, dishonesty, and deceit in violation of Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
Specifically, complainants have shown not only through Lilia Tabang’s testimony but more so through the testimonies of Dieter Heinze, Atty. Agerico Paras, and Teodoro Gallinero that:
respondent misrepresented himself as the owner of or having the right to dispose of the subject parcels;
respondent actively sought to sell or otherwise dispose of the subject parcels;
respondent perfected the sales and received the proceeds of the sales – whether in cash or in kind – of the subject parcels;
such sales were without the consent or authorization of complainants; and
respondent never remitted the proceeds of the sales to complainants.
More importantly, complainants’ witnesses showed that when respondent had been confronted with Lilia Tabang’s adverse claims and asked to substantiate the identities of the supposed owners of the subject parcels, he had failed to produce such persons or even show an iota of proof of their existence. In this regard, the testimonies of Dieter Heinze, Atty. Agerico Paras, and Teodoro Gallinero are particularly significant in so far as they have been made despite the fact that their interest as buyers is contrary to that of complainants’ interest as adverse claimants.
In contrast, respondent failed to present evidence to rebut complainant's allegations.
Respondent’s defense centered on his insistence that the owners of the seven parcels were not fictitious and that they had voluntarily sold the seven parcels. Respondent also evaded the allegations against him by flinging counter-allegations. For instance, he alleged that Lilia Tabang had unsuccessfully demanded a "balato" from the proceeds of the sale of the subject parcels and that after she had been refused, she threatened to defame respondent and seek his disbarment. In support of this allegation, he pointed out that he had filed criminal complaints against Lilia Tabang. He also surmised that the signatures on the subject documents appearing above the name "Glenn C. Gacott" were mere forgeries and crude duplications of his signature.
Per Rule 131, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,37 the burden of proof is vested upon the party who alleges the truth of his claim or defense or any fact in issue. Thus, in Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Office of the Court Administrator v. Gutierrez38 where a party resorts to
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bare denials and allegations and fails to submit evidence in support of his defense, the determination that he committed the violation is sustained.
It was incumbent upon respondent to prove his allegation that the supposed owners of the seven parcels are real persons. Quite the contrary, he failed to produce the slightest proof of their identities and existence, much less produce their actual persons. As to his allegations regarding Lilia Tabang’s supposed extortion and threat and the forgery or crude duplication of his signature, they remain just that – allegations. Respondent failed to aver facts and circumstances which support these claims.
At best, respondent merely draws conclusions from the documents which form the very basis of complainants’ own allegations and which are actually being assailed by complainants as inaccurate, unreliable, and fraudulent. Respondent makes much of how Lilia Tabang could not have been the owner of the seven (7) parcels since her name does not appear on the parcels’ TCTs39 and how he merely respected the title and ownership of the ostensible owners.40 Similarly, he makes much of how Lilia Tabang was named as a mere agent in the SPAs.41However, respondent loses sight of the fact that it is precisely the accuracy of what the TCTs and SPAs indicate and the deception they engender that are the crux of the present controversy. In urging this Court to sustain him, respondent would have us rely on the very documents assailed as fraudulent.
Apart from these, all that respondent can come up with are generic, sweeping, and self-serving allegations of (1) how he could not have obtained the TCTs from Tabang as "it is a standing policy of his law office not to accept Torrens title [sic] unless it is related to a court case"42 and because "[he] does not borrow any Torrens title from anybody and for whatever purpose;"43 (2) how complainants could not have confronted him to demand the return of the TCTs and how he could not have told them that he lost the TCTs because "[a]s a lawyer, [he] always respects and recognizes the right of an owner to keep in his custody or possession any of his properties of value;"44 and (3) how he could not have met and talked with Lilia Tabang for the engagement of his services only to refuse Lilia Tabang because legal practice constituted his livelihood, and there was no reason for him to refuse an occasion to earn income.45
Rather than responding squarely to complainants’ allegations, respondent merely embarks on conjectures and ascribes motives to complainants. He accuses Lilia Tabang of demanding a "balato" of twenty percent (20%) from the proceeds of the sale of the seven parcels, and of threatening to defame him and to seek his disbarment after she had been refused.1âwphi1 This evasive posturing notwithstanding, what is clear is that respondent failed to adduce even the slightest proof to substantiate
these claims. From all indications, Lilia Tabang had sufficient basis to file the present Complaint and seek sanctions against respondent.
Given the glaring disparity between the evidence adduced by complainants and the sheer lack of evidence adduced by respondent, this Court is led to no other reasonable conclusion than that respondent committed the acts of which he is accused and that he acted in a manner that is unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
This Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued with public interest and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State – the administration of justice – as an officer of the court."46 Accordingly, "[l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing."47
Respondent has fallen dismally and disturbingly short of the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required of him. Quite the contrary, he employed his knowledge and skill of the law as well as took advantage of the credulity of petitioners to secure undue gains for himself and to inflict serious damage on others. He did so over the course of several years in a sustained and unrelenting fashion and outdid his previous wrongdoing with even greater, more detestable offenses. He has hardly shown any remorse. From how he has conducted himself in these proceedings, he is all but averse to rectifying his ways and assuaging complainants’ plight. Respondent even foisted upon the IBP and this Court his duplicity by repeatedly absenting himself from the IBP’s hearings without justifiable reasons. He also vexed this Court to admit his Appeal despite his own failure to comply with the much extended period given to him, thus inviting the Court to be a party in delaying complainants’ cause. For all his perversity, respondent deserves none of this Court’s clemency.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT, having clearly violated the Canons of Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct, is DISBARRED and his name ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let copies of this Decision be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's personal record as attorney.
SO ORDERED.
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Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.Brion, J., on leave.
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