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Does Public Contract Law meets Accounting ? A Comparative Analysis of the Judge’ Assessment of Cost Pricing in Litigation on Contract Performance (France- United States). Thierry Kirat (CNRS, IRISSO-Paris Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André Tunc, Paris 1) 1 T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Thierry Kirat (CNRS, IRISSO-Paris Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André Tunc , Paris 1)

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Does Public Contract Law meets Accounting ? A Comparative Analysis of the Judge’ Assessment of Cost Pricing in Litigation on Contract Performance (France-United States). Thierry Kirat (CNRS, IRISSO-Paris Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André Tunc , Paris 1). - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Does Public Contract Law meets Accounting ?

A Comparative Analysis of the Judge’ Assessment of Cost Pricing in Litigation on

Contract Performance (France-United States).

Thierry Kirat (CNRS, IRISSO-Paris Dauphine)

Laurent Vidal(Institut André Tunc, Paris 1)

1T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and

Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 2: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Introduction : stating the problem

• Judicial reasoning :crucial issue for sociolegal studies and comparative law.

• Literature in both fields overlooks accounting matters in judicial reasoning.

• Aim of the presentation: address this issue through a comparative empirical analysis of public contract cases before courts in France and the United States. -> How, if any, French and American judges consider the assessment of additional costs and additional fees claimed by firms contracting with a public authority. -> empirical material :administrative courts records– USA : General Services Board of Contracts Appeals; – France : Cours administratives d’Appel & Conseil d’État

T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries:

Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris,

March 16, 2011

2

Page 3: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Introduction: the matter

Litigation on Procurement contracts with the Government

• Strongly regulated contracts (Public Law Provisions)– Performance issues– Delays (due to contractor failures or Gvt decisions)

• Additional works– Legal/economic issues – Allocation of cost overruns in fixed-price contracts– Contract equilibrium– Assessment of additional costs

T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011 3

Page 4: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Summary

Part 1- Judicial styles: relative weight of legal/formal considerations vs factual/economic (including accounting) in decisions

Part 2- Computation and proof of compensatable additional costs in contracts

Conditions of costs imputability : cost pricing accounting policy

Delay-related costs : accounting methods

4T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and

Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 5: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part I – Judicial style - Decisions Analysis

Lexical statistical analysis - > insights into the language used in

courts rulings:–Lexical worlds classification–Factorial analysis

5T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and

Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 6: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 1- Judicial Styles: Lexical classes, GSBCA

T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011 6

Lexical classes (USA, %)

Performance conditions & costs;

30,63

Legal framew ork & precedents; 29,95

Price & price renegotiation; 22,57

Material events; 8,59

GSA auction bids; 8,26

Page 7: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 1- Judicial Styles: Lexical classes, Cours administratives d’appel & Conseil d’Etat

T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011 7

Lexical classes (France, %)

Legal/procedural elements; 45,42

Technical conditions of performance; 9,68

Financial conditions of the contract; 24,06

Contract oversight; 20,84

Page 8: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 1- Specific Judicial Styles

Correspondance factorial analysis exhibits :

• Correlation of words within a lexical class

• Level of remoteness between lexical classes

8T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 9: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Correlations analysis : GSBCA

T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011 9

Page 10: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Correlations analysis : CAA & CE

T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011 10

Page 11: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 1

Conclusions

- Differential weight of formalist/pragmatic considerations- Common finality : contract equilibrium (equitable

adjustment/équilibre financier du contrat)- Specific modalities and judicial reasoning

Lack of accounting issues in French rulings (including in pre-trial internal reports : Gvt Commissioner reports) :

Pervasive accounting considerations in Federal Regulation and Public Contracts Law Case-Law in the USA

11T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and

Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 12: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 2 -

Right to "equitable adjustment" and assessment of costs

USA : claims for equitable adjustment are investigated in simultaneous consideration of the contract’s legal and accounting dimensions

France : claims of cost compensation are investigated in a two-step process : 1) is the claim legally valid ? 2), if it is the case: which amount should be allocated ?

-> the American judge proceeds in a synchronous manner, judgment on the right to compensation being considered at the same time as judgment on the estimation of costs presented by the claimant.

-> The French administrative judge proceeds in a two steps reasoning : a) decide on the right to compensation b) then assess the recoverable amount.

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T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 13: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 2 - 1- Cost Pricing Methods

1- Cost Pricing Methods : Accounting policies in Federal Regulation Provisions and Case-law

Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR 31.201.3) : Reasonability, allowability, allocability of costs

Burden of proof : on the Contractors’ shoulders

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T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 14: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 2 - 1- Cost Pricing Methods

Reasonable costsA cost is reasonable “(a) (...) if, in its nature and amount, it does not exceed that which would be incurred by a prudent person in the conduct of competitive business. Reasonableness of specific costs must be examined with particular care in connection with firms or their separate divisions that may not be subject to effective competitive restraints. No presumption of reasonableness shall be attached to the incurrence of costs by a contractor. If an initial review of the facts results in a challenge of a specific cost by the contracting officer or the contracting officer’s representative, the burden of proof shall be upon the contractor to establish that such cost is reasonable. (b) What is reasonable depends upon a variety of considerations and circumstances, including— (1) Whether it is the type of cost generally recognized as ordinary and necessary for the conduct of the contractor’s business or the contract performance; (2) Generally accepted sound business practices, arm’s length bargaining, and Federal and State laws and regulations; (3) The contractor’s responsibilities to the Government, other customers, the owners of the business, employees, and the public at large; and (4) Any significant deviations from the contractor’s established practices.”

-> Use of standards-> reference to usual practices=> Necessity of interpretation of Regulation in specific cases + precedents

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T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 15: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 2 - 1- Cost Pricing Methods

Methods calculation of costs incurred (and their

eventual recovery) will be done according to • total-cost method

• modified total-cost method

• Jury-verdict method

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T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 16: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 2 - 1- Cost Pricing Methods

1. total-cost method

….used when the appellant has not established or was unable to establish an accounting analysis from the outset of the contract and was unable to determine the degree to which the costs incurred resulted from the prescribed change. Thus, the price originally stipulated is subtracted from the total cost of execution. The difference constitutes the cost of the required change. This method supposes that the costs incurred by the entrepreneur were reasonable, that the original offer was realistic and that the increase in performance costs was in no way the responsibility of the entrepreneur…. the federal government does not at all favor this quantification technique and employs it only when it is the only option, for example, in the case of a change in the contract resulting from defective specifications or various disruptions that entail losses in efficiency, reorganization of tasks, material losses, etc.

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T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 17: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 2 - 1- Cost Pricing Methods

2. Modified total-cost method (“should-have-cost method”)

• retrospective analysis of the contract• includes facts for which the entrepreneur is responsible

but excludes costs for which the government is responsible-> reassessment of the costs in a backward-cost analysis, -> more precise view on costs allowable/allocable to the

contract-> Exclusion of additional costs due to contractor’s inefficiencies

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T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 18: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 2 - 1- Cost Pricing Methods

3. Jury-verdict method

• employed when judges cannot decide between two parties’ claims with respect to the elements of proof they provide.

• Claimant must a) demonstrate the impossibility to determine a well-grounded

amount for compensation. b) Provide proof:

(1) that the modification of the contract was prejudicial in terms of costs, (2) that no other method of calculation of costs was feasible (3) that it is possible to reasonably and equitably approach the amount of costs incurred.

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T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 19: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 2 - 2. Delay-related costs

2. Delay-related costsThe problem : Overhead costs. Imputation to a contract delayed due to Gvt

decision or failureThe solution : « Eichleay formula»

[Eichleay Corp.; ASBCA, No. 5183, 60-2 BCA 2688] (1960)

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T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 20: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 2 - 2. Delay-related costs

The problem : Overhead (G&A) indirect costs. --> Changes in Case-Law since 1954.

1° Carteret Work Uniforms, ASBCA No 1647, August 20, 1954

• Incurred overhead rate – Normal overhead rate = Excess rate during delay period

• Excess rate X Total base costs during delay = Unabsorbed overhead period

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T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 21: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 2 - 2. Delay-related costs

Carteret Work Uniforms : -> contract performance required the use by

the administration’s partner of the whole factory.

-> no doubt that the G&A costs were directly due to the contract performance

-> Generous compensation scheme

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T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 22: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 2 - 2. Delay-related costs

2° Allegheny Sportswear Co., ASBCA, No 4163, March 25, 1958

• Incurred overhead rate during actual period – Normal overhead rate for projected period = Excess rate

• Excess rate X Contract base costs = Unabsorbed overhead

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T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 23: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 2 - 2. Delay-related costs

Allegheny Sportswear Co.-> if the rate of overhead cots is higher than

predicted, the difference is reconciled with the basic costs in the contract to determine the unabsorbed overhead

-> take into account actual vs predicted period

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T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 24: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 2 - 2. Delay-related costs

Limits of these accounting doctrines:-> excessivelly tolerant -> do not take sufficiently precise account of the

overhead due to a delayed or interrupted contract performance

New Rule : Eichleay Corp., ASBCA No 5183, July 29, 1960

Still in use, with minor changes (FAR, DCAA, US Court of Appeals, Court of Fed. Claims)

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T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 25: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 2 - 2. Delay-related costs

3° Eichleay basic formula :• Contract billing / Total billings for actual contract period X Total overhead incurred

during contract period = Overhead allocable to contract

• Allocable overhead / Actual days of performance = Overhead allocable to contract per

day

• Daily overhead X Number of days of delays = Unabsorbed overhead

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T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 26: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 2 - 2. Delay-related costs

Eichleay Formula :- Assessment of overhead allocable to the

contract in a normal course of performance- Assessment of a per diem overhead

allocable to the contract-> more precise assessment of overhead in

case of delay in performance

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T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 27: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 2 - 2. Delay-related costs

Eichleay : controversy between courts & Gvt/Governmental agencies :

1° Gvt (DoD) statement in Propserv, Inc. ASBCA N°20768, 1978:G&A costs are relatively stable and thus due to the entirety of the firm’s operations, and impossible to distinguish and assign to particular tasks.

ASBCA Decision : deny the DoD statement :“We find the “Eichleay” method employed by the appellant to allocate these expenses as a function of time to be particularly appropriate in cases of suspension of work where the direct costs incurred are minimal or nonexistent”

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T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 28: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 2 - 2. Delay-related costs

Eichleay : controversy between courts & Gvt/Governmental agencies :

2° DCAA : recommended that certain nondeductible costs, such as bad debts, advertising, contributions and entertainment, be excluded from the general fixed expenditures used in the calculation of the daily rate of fixed expenditures incurred by the firm.

-> recommandation enforced by DOTCAB (Department of Transportation Contract Appeals Board)

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T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 29: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 2 - 2. Delay-related costs

Eichleay : controversy between courts & Gvt/Governmental agencies :

3° GSBCA restriction in Capital Electric, Feb 17, 1983

-> « a contractor claiming recovery of underabsorbed overhead must also account for the possible benefits of direct costs deferred to later cost accounting periods that might result in a balancing overabsorption »

-> intertemporal compensation between overhead & direct costs

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T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 30: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 2 - 2. Delay-related costs

Eichleay : controversy between courts & Gvt/Governmental agencies :

Capital Electric Rule :-> overruled by the US Court of Appeals (Fed.

Cir.)-> enforced by the Court of Federal Claims for

a (short) time – then alignment with USCA Rulings

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T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 31: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 2 - 2. Delay-related costs

Eichleay : controversy between courts & Gvt/Governmental agencies :

BCA Strategies following the Capital Electric Rule overruling:

- Delayed work must on a critical path- Burden of proof on claimant’ shoulders :

proof that damage suffered are the result of disruption or delay

31

T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 32: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 2 - 2. Delay-related costs

Eichleay : controversy between courts & Gvt/Governmental agencies :

Federal appeal Courts (Ct Fed. Cl. / USCA Fed Cir.) Strategies following the Capital Electric Rule collapse : convergence on claimant demonstration

1. Unreasonable lenght of Gvt’s delay2. Gvt proximate cause of delayed performance3. Injury 4. Non concurrent delay on the part of contractor

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T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 33: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 2 - 2. Delay-related costs

Lessons (1)• Explicit BCA’s doctrines of cost accounting• Oftenlly overruled by federal courts• Compromize between BCA and Federal

courts• Law firms, lawyers, Gvt Agencies : provide

guidelines on the indirect costs issue in delayed contracts with the Gvt

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T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 34: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Part 2 - 2. Delay-related costs

Lessons (2)• French Administrative Courts : cost

accounting issue = dark side of the moon• Formalism rather than pragmatism in courts

rulings and, before all, judicial decision-taking process

• No accounting considerations in Commissioner of the Gvt

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T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011

Page 35: Thierry  Kirat (CNRS,  IRISSO-Paris  Dauphine) Laurent Vidal (Institut André  Tunc , Paris 1)

Conclusion

• Comparative litigation analysis: provide insights into judicial styles and « rationality »

• American BCA judges : former « contracting officers » trained in law, economics, and accounting

• French Judges : trained in law faculties (first-second levels administrative courts) and School of Public Administration (Conseil d’Etat)

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T. Kirat, L. Vidal –Workshop “Innovation in Network Industries: Accounting, Economic and Regulatory Implications”, Paris, March 16, 2011