Trusting in Force:

Russia’s Responses to the Hostage Crises from 1995-2004

Luke Engstrand

Abstract:

In 1994 and again in 1999, Russia decided to invade Chechnya in response to growing unrest in the region, using overwhelming military force. Between 1995 and 2004, Chechen forces undertook four major civilian hostage attacks in response, with the hope it would force Russia to negotiate on Chechnya’s desired independence. However, Russia decided to negotiate less and less with the Chechens, and in 2004 at Beslan used only full-scale military force, leading to severe hostage casualties. This study seeks to explain what caused Russia to more regularly invoke violence as a solution to these crises. I test three theories: the first focusing on the domestic audience of Russia and its role in helping shape a leader’s decision-making process, the second targeting the President’s belief in success and perception of the Chechens, and the third focusing on how Russia perceives the motives behind the Chechen assaults on its civilian population. This thesis finds that the perceived intentions of the aggressor most significantly helped shape the state’s response, with a growing perception in Russia that the Chechens were trying to destroy the country leading the government to increasingly use force.

Introduction

On an October night in 2002, the musical “Nord-Ost” was in full swing at the Moscow

Theater, performing in front of an audience of over 900 people. Unbeknownst to them, a group

of highly trained Chechen terrorists who had planned and trained for months in advance

infiltrated and seized the theater, taking the audience hostage1. This was the third hostage crisis

of its kind, and the government responded quickly. Police and Alpha units of the Spetsnaz, the

Russian Special Forces, surrounded the building, setting up a perimeter2. In the following days

the Chechens released the children, pregnant women, and non-Russian individuals in the hostage

group3. Russia, while not sending official representatives, allowed for prominent individuals,

including journalist Anna Politkovskaya and pediatrician Leonid Roshal, to enter and negotiate.

These negotiations led to the administration of necessary supplies such as water and food as well

as the release of several hostages4. Additionally, the Russians allowed for a staged protest to

occur nearby against the war in Chechnya, which led to more adolescent hostages being

released5.

While Russia eventually used a nighttime raid to end the crisis, the outcome of the

negotiations was invaluable. Hostages were freed for little to nothing in return, while the

negotiators were able to bring vital supplies to the remaining hostages and gather information on

the situation inside the theater.

In this context, the Beslan hostage crisis that occurred just two years later is a perplexing

event. Similar to the previous crisis at the Moscow Theater, the Chechen terrorists took hostage a

school packed with children, parents, and teachers in Beslan6. The Russian military cordoned off

the school from the public, deciding to not allow anyone through to negotiate besides former

Ingushetia President Ruslan Aushev7. Additionally, they failed to publicly announce any of the

demands being made. Instead, they denied that the terrorists had demanded anything, when in

fact the terrorists had hand-written notes delivered to the authorities outlining their goals in

taking the school hostage8.

With numerous, serious fortifications set by the terrorists in and around the school, the

decision for military force instead of negotiations seems to be an illogical and ruinous one,

evidenced by the catastrophic number of casualties (334) that occurred during the process9.

While negotiations might not have put an end to the crisis, experience from similar previous

incidents in Russia suggested that there was significant utility in engaging with the terrorists,

even if through indirect channels.

The decision on whether or not to negotiate with terrorists is one that has and will

continue to plague states and leaders who must decide how best to protect their citizens from

harm. How do states respond to terrorist acts by autonomous groups? In this case, what factors

influenced Russia’s decisions to negotiate or use force against the hostage-taking autonomous

Chechens during the multiple hostage crises from 1995 to 2004. I argue that the Russian public

and government increasingly believed that the Chechens were attempting to subvert Russia with

these attacks, rather than to bring their cause of independence to the public eye, and due to this

believed negotiations were only aiding the destruction of their country.

Dependent Variable: State response to Hostage crisis

My dependent variable is the state's response to a hostage crisis. This is operationalized

as a category variable: The state decides to negotiate completely, it negotiates but then attacks, or

it decides to only use military force. Negotiation is defined as “a process of combining

conflicting positions into a common position under a decision rule of unanimity.”10 Usually

negotiations are undertaken by a trained crisis/hostage negotiator, however during this time

period the use of official Russian negotiators only occurred when Prime Minister Viktor

Chernomyrdin negotiated the release of hostages at the Budyonnovsk hospital in 199511.

Thereafter, Russia relied on prominent figures that negotiated the release of prisoners as well as

introduced necessary supplies and general demands12. The terrorists often request these

figureheads, but they also came of their own accord13. Because they are allowed to pass the

barriers created by the Russian military, I argue that they are informally recognized as

negotiators. Therefore any negotiations carried out by prominent figures with the hostage takers

will be considered negotiations. Successful negotiations will be codified as the release of

hostages due to a negotiator securing their freedom. Regarding the military and government

responses to hostage incidents, the forces that set up a perimeter and engage in hostage rescue

missions are made up of Russia’s Internal Troops, Special Forces from the Federal Security

Service, and Ministry of Internal Affairs police14. A strategic attack will thus be defined by the

use of deadly force against the hostage-takers in an attempt to rescue the hostages by any or all

of these aforementioned forces.

I code the decision made by Russia during the Beslan crisis in 2004 as an overwhelming

attack because of the suppression of media on releasing the demands as well as the exclusion of

prominent individuals who desired to mediate with the Chechens. Furthermore, the Russian

government’s full frontal assault on the third day by FSB, Internal army troops, and local police

represent the full array of forces identified as participants in previous raids against hostage takers

in Russia.

Theoretical Framework

Domestic Audience Costs

This approach focuses on the interaction between two states, in which a leader must

decide on a course of action. In these interactions, threats or escalation of the crisis by a leader

are taken as credible, yet these actions have no binding will behind them (Smith 1998). This

framework argues that these actions are taken seriously because of a domestic audience within

the country, most notably in democracies, that will punish a leader for not following through on

their statements and backing down (Fearon, 1994). This occurs through the voicing of their

opinions, often at the polls. Scholars, in trying to understand why the domestic population would

dislike these hollow commitments, especially if it avoids war, point to the desire to remove

incompetent leaders from office.

Due to the only clear indication of incompetence in foreign policy residing in the actions

and performance of a leader, the public views the act of reneging on a commitment as a sign of

inefficacy (Smith, 1998). Other scholars, however, argue that this isn’t necessarily true. They

suggest that some citizens don’t pay close attention to foreign policy, while others focus on the

end result of the interaction rather than the developments of the situation (Brody, 1994). More

recently, certain scholars have sought to identify and explain audience costs with a more relaxed

understanding of the way in which a domestic audience rates the performance of their leader

(Clare, 2007).

Fearon (1994) writes the seminal work on audience costs, setting the groundwork for this

whole theoretical framework to grow. He argues that in an international crisis, both sides possess

incentives to misrepresent their true willingness to fight in order to achieve a better deal.

Domestic audiences are thus a powerful tool for signaling true intentions, because an escalation

of a crisis by a leader that is followed by backing down incurs reprisals from their domestic

population due to the “loss of face” or honor. He suggests that democracies, with their protection

of free speech, have higher audience costs than an autocracy, where a leader might control the

media or not pay attention to the public at all. As an addendum, his theory states that as a crisis

progress, each side will incur audience costs due to the nature of having a significant unresolved

conflict in the spotlight.

H1: If a state with high audience costs decides to escalate a crisis with another actor, then it is

more unlikely that it will negotiate.

Within the aforementioned time period, Russia is defined as a democracy, with its first

major democratic elections taking place after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, four years

before the first crisis occurred. Polity scores denote Russia as a 4-6 from 1995-2004, which

signifies that its regime type is around open anocracy to democracy15. While the Chechen leaders

are a significant actor that can make decisions in a crisis, they cannot incur true audience costs

because of their autonomy in using military actions, and are not included in this research. This

paper uses Russian public opinion polls, opinion papers written by newspapers within Russia,

and stances on the crises taken in the Duma to ascertain the level of audience costs incurred from

the handling of the crisis. If this hypothesis is correct, then backing down after attacking will be

met with poor reviews of the policy makers, whereas attacking without backing down afterwards

should be met with better reviews. However, regardless of the final decision, while the crises

develop the Russian government incurs audience costs from the public reaction to the situation.

Leadership Perceptions

Scholars in this research field focus on the individual level of analysis, studying the

personality and individual beliefs of leaders to explain foreign policy decisions. Within this

literature, there exists the concept of operational code, which investigates how leaders from

various political cultures and structures make political calculations (George, 1969). This lens of

examining political elites is enhanced and refined by the creation of a Leites-George paradigm,

which includes the assumptions and premises the leader hold while making decisions (Walker,

1990). This paradigm suggests that the characteristics structure (propensities, beliefs, personality

traits) constrains the decision-maker’s goals and help shape their analysis of potential

alternatives. Thus, this person's choices are selected within the confines of what these principles

dictate (Walker, 1990).

One of the difficulties with operational code is pointing out the independent influence a

leader’s beliefs hold in shaping how exactly a state handles a challenge (Saunders, 2009).

Scholars attempt to remedy this by exploring the history of the leader pre-political power as well

as throughout their terms in order to create a more convincing causal chain (Saunders, 2009 &

Renshon 2008).

Stoessinger uses this operational code in conjunction with the theoretical framework of

misperception in order to identify why nations decide to engage in war (Stoessinger, 2008 &

Levy, 1983). He argues that a leader's’ beliefs, as well as their perceptions of their adversary’s

power and capabilities, drives them to war with the misperception of a quick, decisive victory

(Stoessinger, 2008).

H2: If a leader views his adversaries negatively and is overconfident in their potential success,

then they are more likely to choose force.

In seeking to explain a policy decision of force by Russia, the focus of Stoessinger’s

variables necessitate an investigation of the Russian presidents between 1995 and 2004. This is

accomplished by examining the Russian president's personal beliefs regarding the Chechen

resistance as well as their perception on the likelihood of victory during the various conflicts

with the Chechens. For both beliefs and perception, the best findings come from the careful

investigation of statements, public speeches, and interviews made by a president during and after

the crisis. Regarding the president's personal beliefs, statements should provide rhetoric

signifying a belief that the motivation behind the resistance exhibits evil and malicious

tendencies. Evidence of the president’s overconfidence shall come from assertions made

regarding the crises that show that the leader perceives the Russian military as superior and

argues that it can easily overpower the Chechens to quickly solve the hostage crisis.

Correspondent Inference Theory

In Psychology, the theoretical framework of attribution seeks to explain how individuals

attach meaning to the behavior of others as well as their own behavior. This framework attempts

to make sense of the social world by arguing that it is important to understand how an individual

uses information to arrive at a causal explanation for an event (Heider, 1958). In attributing

behavior, individuals tend towards separate explanations for their behavior versus others

behavior. The interpretation of others actions is often internally attributed, with examples being

personality traits, feelings, and abilities. With regards to our own behavior, the explanation is

often externally attributed, such as factoring in the environment or luck (Heider, 1958). Certain

logical models developed from this distinction between internal and external attribution seek to

explain how humans should interpret behavior, based on the observation of situations in which

context provides the individual more information (Kelley 1967). Other theories within this

framework seek to specifically explain the action of internal attribution, arguing that humans

tend to rely on certain sources of information more heavily in judging actions we deem as

intentional (Jones and Davis, 1965).

Abrahms uses this concept of internal attribution in order to explain why terrorism often

doesn’t work for terrorist groups trying to achieve their stated political goals (Abrahms, 2008:

141). His central argument notes that the correspondent inference theory, created by Jones and

Davis, suggests that individuals often assume a similarity between the effective outcome and the

objectives of an actor engaging in some sort of consequential behavior (Abrahms, 2008: Ibid).

H3: If a state interprets the results of a terrorist attack to be representative of the aggressor’s

motives, then the state is less likely to pursue negotiations.

In order to explain the increasing use of force, an examination of the Russian

government’s correspondence level on terrorist actions is necessary. This level of

correspondence signifies what the perceived link between terrorist actions and their intentions is

within the decision-making organs of Russian government. In investigating the level of

correspondence in Russia, the most useful indications come from official responses by the

current Russian president and other government representatives on the crises caused by the

Chechen militants. Another significant source of information resides in the public statements

cataloged in news reports on the attacks, as these individuals are often directly related to those

involved in the crises. This information should be examined for three key factors. First, whether

the country is fixated on the short-term outcomes of the terrorist acts, rather than the policy

demands. Second, does the country infer that the terrorist group pursues maximalist objectives,

defined as demands over ideology changes within the target state (Abrahms 2008: 136). Lastly,

whether the country’s infers from the actions taken by the terrorist group that it desires to destroy

its society, values, or both. Rhetoric that includes two or three of these factors will be classified

as high correspondence, and should reflect a low number of negotiations by Russia. Rhetoric

with one or none of the three variables is low correspondence, and should lead to more incidents

of Russia negotiating with the Chechen hostage takers.

Case Study

With inestimable losses incurred by the Russian government’s responses to barricaded

hostages crises, it is important to illuminate why governments decide to negotiate or use force in

civilian hostage situations. In this section I investigate what lead to Russia’s decreasing use of

negotiations over time as a solution to these crises, using three independent variables: domestic

audience costs, leadership perceptions, and correspondent inference. I will test the validity of the

hypotheses connected to these independent variables over a time span of nine years, split into the

presidential terms of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin.

Period 1: Olive Branch and the Sword, 1995-1999

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Former Soviet Air Force General

Dzhokhar Dudayev forcibly takes control of Chechnya, declaring independence and suppressing

with increasing force the Soviet supported opposition movement that rallied against him. Boris

Yeltsin, trying to piece together a collapsing federation, invades Grozny in December of 1994, in

order to restore constitutional order16. The December invasion, an ill-prepared offensive which

involved indiscriminate bombing by the Russian Military in response to heavy resistance, results

in thousands of civilian deaths and the displacement of many more17. The failures within the

Chechen system and Dudayev’s criminal regime are quickly eclipsed by this use of

overwhelming force. Ironically, the invasion caused Dudayev, initially viewed poorly as a leader

by the Chechen population, to become a figurehead for Chechen resistance18. Poorly conducted

Russian assaults, such as the slaughter of the village of Samashki by inebriated Russian Interior

Ministry troops in 1995, ignites the smoldering anger of the Chechen people and empowers

many to fight for self-preservation with guerilla warfare19.

Fearon (H1) asserts that domestic audiences play a role in how a state handles a crisis

because of the increased scrutiny on the state’s actions. A state with high audience costs risks

incurring domestic backlash if it escalates and then backs down on an issue. Though the

Russian’s violent campaign against Chechen rebels dealt serious blows to the Chechen morale,

their continued escalation proved unsustainable. As the Russians, who possessed superior

weaponry, slowly pushed the Chechen fighters into the mountains, Chechen battalion

commander Shamil Basayev responded on June 14 of 1995 by capturing a crowded hospital in

Budyonnovsk, a city northwest of the Chechen capital of Grozny. Justifying his actions based on

the recent destruction in Samashki, the estimated 100 rebels took over 1,000 hostages,

demanding the cessation of hostilities and the removal of Russian troops from Chechnya. After

multiple days of unsuccessful negotiations, Russian forces stormed the hospital but were

repelled, with many hostages killed and even more wounded20. This led to Russian Prime

Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin negotiating the release of the hostages, as well as agreeing to a

ceasefire that the Chechen resistance needed to recover from the heavy fighting21.

Following Fearon’s (H1) predictions, the Russian people, especially those who had

relatives in the hospital or were hostages themselves, were extremely frustrated with Yeltsin. In

Nova Scotia during the attack, Yeltsin was bombarded by complaints on his lack of a direct role

in handling the response to the crisis and for allowing an attack upon the hospital that led to

casualties before eventually negotiating22. Further supporting Fearon’s hypothesis of audience

costs, the Russian Duma shortly after passes a vote of no confidence for the administration on

the incident, a huge blow to Yeltsin politically, which lead to the ousting of top military

leadership23. However, others disagreed with the negativity for negotiating, with one article

stating, “Chernomyrdin did the only right thing . . . To suggest, as some in the State Duma and

the military now are, that it would have been better to sacrifice 1,000 hostages and save Russia's

honor is barbaric.”24 Overall, the extremely negative public reaction to the Russian government’s

handling of the crisis provides significant support for Fearon (H1), although there exist pockets

of resistance to this sentiment.

On January 9th of 1996, the Chechen rebels struck a Russian air force base in Kizlyar in

the neighboring region of Dagestan. After destroying multiple parked helicopters and killing an

estimated 33 servicemen, the 200 man Chechen force moved into the city, taking an estimated

2000 hostages from the city hospital and posting them in nearby buildings25. The rebels

demanded the withdrawal of all Russian troops from Chechnya in exchange for the hostages, but

eventually negotiated with local Dagestan officials to release many of the hostages in exchange

for unimpeded return to Chechnya26. As collateral against reprisal, the rebel convoy took 100-

160 hostages as they escaped towards the Chechen border. However, with mere miles before the

border, Russian paratroopers and attack helicopters ambushed the convoy, forcing the Chechens

to hide in the nearby village of Pervomayskoye27. The rebels compelled the villagers and

hostages to dig trenches in preparation for the inevitable assault by the Russian military28.

Stoessinger (H2) posits that the personalities and beliefs of leaders, notably a negative

view of the enemy and a strong belief in the likelihood of their own success directly affect their

choice to engage in conflict. Assessing the crisis, Federal Security Service leader Alexander

Mikhailov said, “My personal opinion is that they should not be allowed to go free. They are

bandits and they should be annihilated.”29 This statement suggests a strong hatred towards the

Chechen resistance in the upper echelon of the government. Further support for Stoessinger (H2)

can be found in the hatred and bravado from Yeltsin’s public announcements on the crisis while

at the funeral for a former French president, where he stated the need “to punish the bandits” and

that 38 snipers were posted nearby waiting to do so30. These official statements, which show a

strong negative view of the Chechen resistance and confidence in the ability to punish them

militarily, fit both criteria put forth by Stoessinger (H2) in explaining why these leaders choose

to use force.

The meagerly supplied Russian force, which included Interior troops and the respected

Alpha unit of the FSB, held the Chechens in the village with ill-fated battles to recover the

hostages. The next day Mikhailov announces, “we believe the hostages are dead. And now we

will destroy the bandits."31 Soon after his statement, the military begins firing enormously

destructive Grad missiles into the village in an attempt to eliminate the Chechens. Interestingly, a

contradicting statement by the Interior Ministry Troops of Russia appears soon after that there

were up to 90 hostages alive, suggesting that the two organizations did not coordinate or

communicate effectively32. Russian President Boris Yeltsin, once again expressing his loathing

of the Chechen militants, supported the rocketing, stating “mad dogs must be shot down.”33

These acrimonious statements provide further weight for Stoessinger’s argument of a causal link

between the leadership’s beliefs and the decision to use force.

Stoessinger (H2) holds that leaders who are overconfident in their success are more likely

to choose conflict. With the Chechen war continuing to plague Yeltsin in his quest for a second

term, he announces talks with rebel leader Dudayev. However, shortly after this Dudayev was

assassinated by laser-guided missiles from Russian aircraft which were tracking his cellphone.

Vice-President Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev replaces Dudayev and meets with Yeltsin soon after,

which leads to an agreement on a ceasefire and exchange of prisoners on May 27th34. Yeltsin

soon after campaigns in Chechnya, proclaiming to the amassed troops “You have won. We have

defeated the rebellious Dudayev regime.”35 As Stoessinger would predict, this strong belief in the

success of the Russian offensive led to the decision to renew major bombing runs of Chechen

forces instead of following the ceasefire in earnest. This assured victory proves to be a false

promise however, as the Chechens forces respond by besieging the Russian military in the major

cities of Grozny and Ardun. With the continued loss of ground militarily, Aleksandr Lebed, the

recently defeated presidential rival to Yeltsin and newly appointed national security chief, is sent

to negotiate a ceasefire. This momentary peace eventually leads to the 1996 Khasavyurt

Agreement, a significant step towards Chechen statehood, with guaranteed autonomy for

Chechnya as well as future presidential and parliamentary elections36.

As promised, Russia recognizes the winner of the Chechen presidential elections, Aslan

Maskhadov, and Yeltsin meets with him to sign a formal peace treaty in 1997. Aslan, a retired

colonel of the Russian military and senior Chechen military figure, finds himself entrusted with a

country devastated from constant shelling and rockets, devoid of many of its citizens, and

rampant with unemployment, militarized men, and factional warlords37. Corrupt Russian and

Chechen politicians embezzle any aid that the Russian government had guaranteed to help fix the

wreckage caused by the war38. Due to this, destroyed villages and cities are never truly rebuilt,

and a significant portion of the remaining population lives in dilapidated housing with no water,

sewage, and often no electricity. This, coupled with disease and starvation, deals a huge

psychological and physical toll on the Chechen people39.

With legitimate jobs few and far between, many Chechens turn to arms dealing, stealing,

and kidnapping to provide a source of income for themselves and their families. Kidnapping

especially becomes a booming trade in the interwar period, consistently reinforced by families’

decisions to negotiate directly with the kidnappers and pay hefty ransoms time and time again40.

Due in part to this rampant criminal activity, Chechnya transitions into a focal point for

international terrorism, with extremists traveling in to indoctrinate fighters and reap the rewards

of a lawless state41. When Islamic Chechen militants decided to invade neighboring Dagestan in

an attempt to aid the Shura of Dagestan, a group of separatist Islamic rebels, Russia is faced with

little alternative but to intervene42.

Period Two: Desire Peace? Prepare For War, 1999-2004

With former KGB colonel Vladimir Putin named Prime Minister as well as potential

presidential successor by Boris Yeltsin, few expected his term to last much longer than the failed

previous appointees. Russia’s intervention into Chechnya in 1999 marked a violation of the 1996

Khasavyurt agreement and the peace treaty of 1997, however there were powerful arguments by

officials that it was Russia’s duty to maintain order in the region43. Aiding these arguments are

multiple violent apartment bombings occurring back-to-back across Russia and Dagestan, with

blame falling on the Chechen militants. These attacks struck fear and significant anger in the

heart of the Russian public, leading to fervent support for the invasion of Chechnya44. Born out

of Russia’s 1996 failure in Chechnya under the banner of “restoring constitutional order”, the

mission statement for the Second Chechen War became a “counter-terrorist operation.”45 As

political unrest grew in the Caucasus region, Putin’s tough stance on law and order gained

popularity quickly. When Yeltsin unexpectedly resigns at the end of 1999, Putin finds himself in

an advantageous position as acting president of Russia to capture the post for good in the

following 2000 elections46.

Stoessinger (H2) posits that a leader who views the enemy negatively and is confident in

their own success will be more likely to engage in conflict. Putin, unlike Yeltsin, did not try to

avoid responsibility for air strikes on Grozny, but instead took pride in the show of military

force47. In one speech, he declared in a now iconic statement that bombings on Grozny were

directed at terrorist bases and that “This will continue, wherever terrorists may be found. . . . if

we catch them in the outhouse, we’ll wipe them out there too.”48 Putin’s aggressive, confident

claim regarding the bombings matches strongly Stoessinger prediction that certain character

traits drive a leader to choose force, which Putin takes up as a grand strategy in dealing with

Chechnya.

Abrahms (H3) postulates that a state with high correspondence of terrorism is less likely

to negotiate. Putin, in justifying the Second Chechen War, repeatedly points to the threat that the

chaos in Chechnya presents to the Russian state. During a press conference, Putin expresses his

fears that “if we don’t stop it immediately, Russia as a state in its current form would no longer

exist.”49 His claim displays a deep-set worry of the potential “dissolution of the country,”

showing a willingness to use anything at his disposal to prevent this catastrophe. As Abrahms

would predict, in continuing a reversal of the unpopular Yeltsin domestic political strategy, the

Putin administration takes a stance of non-negotiation with terrorists and refuses to recognize the

Second Chechen War as a conflict of independence50. Accompanying this grand-strategy of

force, an overwhelmingly anti-Chechen campaign begins in the mass media after the terrorists’

acts in Moscow51. This growing rift in understanding on the Chechen resistance and its goals,

with Russia taking a stance of non-negotiation, exemplifies the claims made by Abrahms that a

government which sees an opposing force as threatening the nation directly will not negotiate

with them (H3).

In similar fashion to the beginning of the First Chechen War, the people of Chechnya

initially welcomes the Russian forces, hoping for more stability than the exploitation and

brutality allowed by the Maskhadov regime. However, the often indiscriminate bombing through

air raids and artillery, chosen in part to limit Russian military deaths, quickly dashes Chechen

hopes for a better life52. As the war dragged on and the Russian military began suffering serious

casualties from fighting, the backlash on the civilian Chechen population grew harsher. Russian

troops engage in Zachistka, or “mopping up” operations, where suspected Chechen rebels

disappear and are never found again. Other Chechens are put into unofficial mass “filtration

camps” meant to weed out criminals and terrorists, but instead used to torture and demean the

Chechen people without repercussions53.

As the audience of the musical “Nord-Ost” sat in their seats on an October night in 2002,

none could guess that mere hours later they would be held hostage by a team of Chechen

separatists for days. The Chechens, with months of complicated planning, invade the theater

quickly and take control immediately. Setting up bombs and tripwires around the premises and

attaching suicide vest to the female terrorists, the Chechens announce they would blow up the

theater if the Russians attacked. Police and Alpha units of the Spetsnaz respond to the incident

by surrounding the building and setting up a perimeter, while operational headquarters are

erected in a neighboring veterans hospital. In the following days, the Chechens release the

children, pregnant women, and non-Russian individuals54.

Abrahms (H3) argues that if a state perceives terrorist intentions as directly related to the

end results of their actions, then negotiations are less likely to occur. Quickly responding to the

hostage crisis, Putin points out that these “people who have been terrorizing and destroying

Chechnya for years” were the ones who at Nord-Ost were “out to spread it farther afield.”55 The

Russian government announces shortly after that it would allow for the terrorists to make a safe

escape to a different country if all hostages were immediately released, and that Russia wouldn’t

allow for the ransoming of the individuals. While not sending official representatives, the

government allows multiple prominent individuals to enter and discuss bringing in necessary

supplies as well as releasing hostages. These non-government negotiators includes the terrorist

requested journalist Anna Politkovskaya and pediatrician Leonid Roshal, as well as politician

and popular singer Iosif Kobzon. Additionally, after phone conversations with certain hostages

by the command center, the Russians allow for a staged protest to occur against the war in

Chechnya, leading to the release of more adolescent hostages by the Chechens56. While Putin’s

statement at the beginning of the crisis suggests strong evidence for Abrahms (H3) high

correspondence argument, the resulting informal negotiations is the opposite of the predicted

outcome of focused aggression.

Early on the third day of the hostage crisis, the Russian Spetsnaz leak false information

that they would strike the theater at 5am, causing a panic inside. When the attack doesn’t occur,

the terrorists relax and let down their guard, a fatal mistake. Having snuck gas cylinders into the

club next door, the Russian forces release fentanyl, a strong anesthetic gas, into the theater

through the air duct system. The Spetsnaz teams infiltrate through multiple points: A concrete

wall separating it from the adjacent club, through the barricaded front doors of the theater, and

by breaking open steel doors leading to the orchestra pit57. While the raid successfully eliminates

the Chechens and rescues the hostages, the gas did not reach all the terrorists—suggesting that

the threat to murder all the hostages if besieged was merely a bluff to deter the military. To the

dismay of the public, the attack ends with many hostages dying due to asphyxiation caused by

the gas. This occurs because of improper body positioning of victims by rescue workers as well a

reluctance to announce the toxin in the gas by the military, leaving first responders without the

common antidote naloxone on hand to treat the victims58. However, these civilian deaths didn’t

severely hurt the public’s opinion on Putin’s handling of the crisis, giving weight to Abrahm’s

(H3) argument that higher correspondence leads to stronger support for military action.

Stoessinger (H2) postulates that a leader who possesses distorted views of his adversary

and confidently expects a brief, triumphant victory will choose to engage in conflict. Following

the hospitalization of rescued hostages, Putin makes an appearance to console them and their

families, saying later “today I talked with one of the victims at the hospital. He said: ‘I felt no

fear: there was the feeling the terrorists had no future anyway.’ And that is the truth. They have

no future. We do.”59 This statement provides strong evidence that Putin holds a powerful

negative view regarding the Chechen resistance as well as overwhelming confidence in their

doomed failure due to Russia’s military strength. As Stoessinger (H2) would predict, Putin

stands behind the decision to use force in handling the hostage crisis and would continue to rely

on it.

Fearon (H1) holds that a state with high audience costs will have more credible actions in

a crisis, and is less likely to back down after escalating due to the fear of looking incompetent.

The strong-arm actions during the Nord-Ost crisis bolsters the public's opinion of Putin, with a

polling in late November by VTsIOM finding a 6-point jump in approval ratings for Putin from

77 to 83 percent60. However, other ratings by the company show a strikingly different story, with

only 52 percent of individuals saying that they trust him and 73 percent stating that he was

failing to defeat the Chechens in the ongoing war61. The decision by the Russian government to

negotiate first and then attack matches Fearon’s (H1) speculation that not backing down would

result in better public opinion; the other ratings support Fearon’s (H1) claim that the government

would incur audience costs as a conflict progressed, regardless of the outcomes.

Additional evidence for Fearon’s (H1) argument comes from the media and Duma

reaction post-crisis, with statements comparing Nord-Ost to previous hostage crises, marking the

refusal on a majority of Chechen demands as a major victory for the Russian government62. This

general attitude towards the government’s response provides basis for Fearon’s (H1) suggestion

that a leader is better off escalating, rather than escalating and then backing down. After Nord-

Ost, interviews with officials on the crisis by The Russian State newspaper Rossiyskaya gazeta

exhibits further evidence for Fearon’s argument. These figureheads express an overwhelming

feeling that Russia thwarted the terrorists from “bringing Russia to its knees,” which directly

correlates to the perceived failure of the Government in handling the previous hostage crises63.

This misperception of intentions behind the Chechen attack also lends credence to Abrahms (H3)

postulation that high correspondence leads to a preference for force instead over negotiations in

handling terrorist attacks.

On September 1st of 2004, a group of elite Chechen terrorists move from a remote base

in the woods into the North Ossetian city of Beslan, quickly capturing its central school. In

Russia, September 1st is a celebrated first day of school, known as “knowledge day,” where

families and teachers come to commemorate the beginning of another year of learning64. Taking

an estimated 1,200 hostages, the Chechens quickly move them into the gymnasium, setting up

bombs and blocking off windows to lower visibility from the outside. With armed family

members hoping to rescue their children, the military and police set up a cordon around the

whole school65.

The Chechens demand Putin’s special advisor on Chechnya, Aslambek Aslakhanov, fly

to Beslan in order to negotiate the release of the hostages. Using an intermediary to deliver the

terrorist demands, they secure a call from the advisor, however nothing significant comes of the

talks66. A second attempt at negotiations, by Rosneft oil company president Mikhail Gutseriev,

were rebuffed by the Chechen leader Ali67. With the Russian government continuing to claim

that there are less than a third of the actual hostages held in the school, the terrorists become

more and more enraged68.

Ruslan Aushev, former President of Ingushetia, arrives on the second day of the crisis

and negotiates the release of nursing mothers and their infant children. He receives a handwritten

note to Putin pre-written by Chechen leader Shamil Basayev, which offers terms for the removal

of Russian troops and an independent Chechnya that includes: No international agreements with

any other state against Russia, no foreign military bases on Chechen soil, and Chechnya joining

the Commonwealth of Independent States69. Aushev claims he immediately sends the letter and

demands to the Kremlin, pleading for negotiations70. An impasse forms inside the school, with

the Chechens complaining that nobody will speak with them, while the government claims that

through Dr. Roshal it offers free passage to Chechnya, but is refused outright71.

With the situation looking dire, Former President of Chechnya Aslan Maskhadov agrees

to come negotiate in exchange for guaranteed safety from Russian forces, which the Russians

confirm quickly. However, before he could arrive, a set of two large explosions occurs. The

explanation for the event is controversial, as the official Russian report states the explosive went

off accidentally within the building, while politician Yury Savelyev reports that RPGs were fired

upon the building and that most of the homemade explosives did not go off72. A second

explosion hits the gymnasium roof, which catches on fire, leading it to collapse onto the

unsuspecting hostages. Hostages start to escape through holes blown open in the gymnasium

wall, as the military and the terrorists begin firing upon one another. Chaos ensues, with militia

firing on the building while the military storm the school with armored personnel carriers,

leaving 334 hostages dead when the battle concludes a full 12 hours later73.

Abrahms (H3) postulates that a state that highly correlates the destruction caused by

terrorist attacks with the underlying motives of the terrorists is less likely to negotiate. After the

attack, optimism of diminishing terrorism wanes, as the political outlook of Putin and Russian

state newspapers shifts to the growing danger of extremism. This fear permeates in its citizenry

as well, with public polls showing an overwhelming belief in the potential for future attacks74. In

speeches made after the Beslan crisis, Putin repeats numerous times that the country is under

attack, arguing that Russia must fight back against this terrorist campaign instead of giving up in

the hope that they leave them in peace75. All of these opinions paint a picture of extremely high

correspondence (H3) in Russia, and the government’s decision to use force to rescue the

hostages provides evidence on a transition away from negotiation due to a fear of the

undermining of the Russian Federation.

Analysis

In this section, each theory will be examined in order to determine its explanatory power

in answering why Russia reduced the use of negotiations in hostage crises over the two time

periods. A cumulative comparative analysis of the theories follows, leading to the elucidation of

the findings on which theory holds the most weight in explaining the research question.

Audience CostsJames Fearon posits that the threat of domestic audience costs should explain the Russian

government’s decision to negotiate with the Chechen militants more infrequently in each of the

subsequent hostage crises. This is because during a crisis, a leader has the option to escalate,

back down, or attack, with the risk of domestic costs for making a choice causing these decisions

to become more credible. Fearon argues that backing down after escalating a crisis invokes

serious audience costs due to it being a blow to the national pride and shows incompetence in the

government. Furthermore, because the public can voice their dissent over actions they disagree

with, a leader risks losing popular support if they decide to act against the public will. Across the

two time periods, there is a moderate level of support for the theory, appearing accordingly

during and directly after the crises. While there are instances where the public does shape a

leader’s decisions, often the decision for force or negotiations occurs before any audience costs

are encountered.

The actions taken during the first time period show that Fearon’s theory is useful in

understanding the susceptibility of the Russian to public opinion, but falls short of explaining

which strategy the government would eventually choose. The 1995 crisis in Budyonnovsk found

Yeltsin and the Russian military severely unprepared, leading to a final decision to negotiate

after multiple failed attacks. As Fearon predicts, the newly democratic Russia government felt

significant backlash from the public, especially from those who had been trapped in the hospital.

Yeltsin, recognizing the importance of public support and the dangers of disapproval, responded

by firing multiple members of his defense cabinet. However the second hostage crisis in Kizlyar,

where negotiations were followed by a Russian attack, polls conducted after present a highly

negative image of Boris Yeltsin. The timing suggests that the public didn’t support the hawkish

administrative decision to bombard the remaining hostages held by the Chechens, yet Yeltsin

hadn’t backed down after escalating. This brings up the question of what factors outside of

audience costs led the public to disagree with the course of actions the government had taken and

how strong Fearon’s theory is in explaining this downturn in negotiations.

Fearon postulates that domestic audiences assess how well their state’s representatives

handle a crisis, which directly influences how the government acts. As Putin rose to power and

began the Second Chechen War, his perceptive administration took the lessons from the previous

hostage crises to heart. Instead of avoiding the political turmoil involved in high-profile

incidents, Putin quickly responds to them, such as with the 2002 Moscow hostage crisis. Public

approval ratings of Putin jump 6 points after the incident, and government figures argue his

decision to not solve the crisis with negotiations a significant improvement over the

embarrassing Budyonnovsk and Kizlyar hostage crises. His approval ratings dip after Beslan,

undoubtedly due to the massive number of deaths, many of them children, in the resulting chaos

of the assault. Yet neither of these crises shows the actual decisions to use force in either crisis

being heavily influenced by the domestic audience. Instead, the government acts to limit

audience costs by learning from past mistakes on planning the operations and suppressing media

coverage of the situations.

While throughout both time periods there exists evidence directly relating to Fearon’s

major hypotheses, it doesn’t explain the explicit decision during the crises to not negotiate,

instead finding evidence only after the events. While this may suggest that each President would

learn from this and choose to negotiate less often, it doesn’t seem to be of much consequence to

the 1996 crisis nor the Russian administration’s decisions in the 2004 hostage crisis.

Leadership Personality

Stoessinger hypothesizes that certain beliefs and perceptions a state leader holds leads

them to choose conflict over negotiations. The two main variables chosen in this study to help

explain these decisions are the expectations of a quick victory and the misperception of the

enemy. Stoessinger’s theory exhibits a medium level of support across both time periods because

both Presidents of Russia exhibit a high level of distrust and hatred for the Chechen militants,

while irregularly exaggerating the possibility of easy victories in the Chechen wars. However,

while intuitively it makes sense to analyze the leader of a state to explain important decisions,

scholars must be wary of misperceiving the impetus behind these types of decisions.

Throughout the first time period, there exists strong evidence that the two main variables

of overconfidence and misperception play a role in how the government handles the hostage

situations as well as the war. An example of this are the previously mentioned statements made

by Yeltsin during the Kizlyar crisis, which exhibit a feeling of overconfidence, as well as an

extremely distorted view of the Chechens. As Stoessinger predicts, the military decides to use

overwhelming force in dealing with the dug-in Chechen forces, a disaster that didn’t manage to

stop the militants from fleeing with still living hostages. Additionally, in 1997, Yeltsin once

again overstates the Russian position by campaigning in Chechnya and telling gathered troops

that the war had been won. This was quickly proven wrong when Chechens push back Russian

forces to the point that negotiations to end the conflict occur.

Stoessinger posits that hatred for the enemy will push a leader to choose force more

often. This is evident in the decision during the Second Chechen War to use malefic “mopping

up” operations and illegally detaining Chechen civilians in order to achieve the destruction of the

Chechen resistance. However there is little evidence that this hatred carries over to the Nord-Ost

hostage crisis, and the Russian government during the event doesn’t grandstand about an

eventual victory. If Stoessinger’s theory explained the use of force in Beslan, then there should

be statements expressing the easily resolved issue and a deep distaste for the Chechens. Instead,

Putin issues a statement expressing the utter horror and depravity of the Chechens for targeting

children, with nothing else signifying why the military decided to attack. As such, while the first

time period, and parts of the second, fits the narrative under the scope of this hypothesis, it

cannot account for actions taken during the final hostage crisis. Additionally, it fails to explain in

full the differing decisions between the two presidents in handling their respective hostage crises,

instead only showing that they both held deep-seated distrust and often anger for the Chechen

insurgents and general population.

Correspondent Inference Theory

Abrahms argues that a state with high correspondence of terrorist acts is less likely to

negotiate. High correspondence denotes when a state interprets the results of an attack as

representative of the aggressor’s motives. In this case, Russia would interpret the destruction and

fear caused by an attack as the main goal of the Chechens, leading to an aversion towards

negotiating. Across the two time periods, there exists a high level of support for this hypothesis.

Because the theory bases itself in the perceptions of terrorist attacks, it provides a strong

foundation for understanding the Russian relationship with the opposing Chechen militants.

During the First Chechen War, the Chechen guerrilla fighters are pushed back into the

mountains. Two last-ditch efforts by militants to acquire some breathing room from the Russian

military lead them to capture and hold large amounts of civilian hostages. When the Russian

government responds rashly with military action in both situations, the public responds with cries

of outrage at the brutality in such a delicate situation. These reactions suggest that starting off,

the public possesses less of a reason to support outright aggression, in this case because the

Chechens were choosing to engage in hostage taking for their desire to stop the destruction of

their homeland. However, the hypothesis cannot explain clearly why the government decides to

negotiate with the Chechens during the first hostage crisis after multiple military rescue attempts.

Additionally, statements made by certain high governmental figures suggests that they view the

attacks as directed at undermining the Russian state, raising the question what separated their

opinion from the public. A potential answer to this lies in more privileged access to information

by government officials on the status of the conflict and the motivations of the Chechen

resistance, which could have led these figures to believe that the Chechens weren’t primarily

fighting for their independence.

Abrahms suggests that terrorism is often not effective because the terrorists have a

difficult time getting their message out. In the Russian public’s mind, the underlying dispute

behind the First Chechen War was one of Chechen independence, which Yeltsin alludes to in

speeches on the war. Additionally, the demands made for removal of Russian troops and

negotiations during the hostage crises accurately reflects that desire, which undoubtedly aids the

Chechens in effectively signaling their intentions. Due to a better understanding on their

underlying goal of independence, the Chechens avoid widespread high correspondence, and as

such there were more negotiations. Furthermore, this theory also explains why Yeltsin’s approval

rating ranked so low on these issues, as the public became more and more frustrated with his

decision to use force against a group whose desires weren’t alien to the public.

Putin, in his presidency, understands better the separation of perceptions between the

Russian government and its people over the Chechen issue. When the multiple apartment

bombings and the invasion of Dagestan occur in 1999, the government begins painting the

Chechens as a terrorist force, rather than a people seeking independence. Accompanying this

rhetoric, a highly negative media campaign on the Chechen people occurs, which helps

negatively shift the public’s view of the intentions behind the violence. Further hurting their

image, deteriorating conditions and increasing crime in Chechnya leads to extremism taking root

in areas of the country, resulting in lessened Russian sympathy for the Chechen cause.

Soon after, Putin introduces the Second Chechen War as a counter-terrorist operation

against the encroaching extremism. The outrage generated by the apartment bombings plus the

government’s constant shaping of the public’s perception leads to much higher correspondence

than when Yeltsin is president. During his speeches and statements after the two major hostage

crises, Putin presents rhetoric that clearly shows high correspondence, and the public

overwhelmingly agrees with it and shows support for the government’s actions. Abrahms would

therefore hypothesize that Putin retains high approval ratings despite using significant force and

avoiding serious negotiations with the Chechens due to the high correspondence prevalent

among the Russian public and government.

Comparative Analysis

Given the earlier analysis of the information gathered in the case study, it is evident that

certain theories stand out in terms of explanatory power. The most prominent theory in

explaining the changing willingness of Russia to negotiate in the hostage crises over the nine

year time period is correspondent inference theory. I argue that it presents the most robust

explanation of the Russian government’s responses to the crises, and in addition why the public

reacts the way it does.

Stoessinger’s argument concerning leadership personalities explains Yeltsin’s actions in

dealing with the hostage crises during his administration. Decisions on the use of force were

based on an inflated view of the capabilities of the Russian Special Forces in taking out the

entrenched Chechen militants and a growing hatred for the Chechens in the Russian government.

Yeltsin’s overconfidence continues past these crises until he is forced to give up the war in 1996

in order to preserve his administration. Putin’s administration, on the other hand, is more

enigmatic. It is difficult to establish solid evidence that this trait of overconfidence ever afflicts

Putin’s calculations on handling either of the two crises, or that hatred fueled the decision for

force more so than a fear of the destruction of Russia. An important part of this analysis resides

in the inherent dangers of oversimplifying such a complex series of interactions in these hostage

crises by focusing solely on the outward expressions given by leaders. This issue lessens the

general explanatory power of the theory due to the risks of incorrectly explaining why the

Russian government, which involves more than just the president in the decision of national

security matters, chooses force more often than negotiations.

Fearon’s hypothesis of domestic audience costs possesses strong explanatory power in

justifying the outcry against Yeltsin for negotiating after escalating in the first major crisis.

Additionally, the second part of the hypothesis, which focuses on the level of success in handling

the crisis, helps explain why there are low levels of public support for Yeltsin versus higher

support for Putin in using punitive measures over negotiations. However, domestic audience

costs doesn’t fully explain why the Russian government, throughout the consecutive crises,

decides to pursue military action more often than it chooses to end them with negotiations. This

blind spot in the theory significantly weakens its ability to answer the fundamental question of

this study and as such cannot be considered a key part of the final theoretical explanation.

Abrahms theory of correspondence provides the strongest framework for understanding

the Russian response to the crises, with significant evidence of higher correspondence in both of

the Presidential administrations. The Russian public, within the time period of 1995-1998,

possesses lower correspondence, and evidence of this exhibits itself in their overall negative

attitude towards the actions taken in the First Chechen War as well as the violence during the

first two hostage crises. As time goes on, a shift in the perceptions of the Chechen resistance

occurs, which Putin’s administration and the media reinforces through a barrage of venomous

statements on how these terrorist groups are attempting to destroy Russia. The hypothesis shows

that Putin did this to guarantee a more supportive public in regards to his decision for engaging

in the Second Chechen War. Finally, the lessened and often informal negotiations in both Nord-

Ost and Beslan by the Russians suggest a strong underlying belief that truly negotiating would

simply aid the Chechens in violating the sanctity of Russia.

One thing that must be noted, which isn’t explained by the theories, is the political

support for either president. Yeltsin became president during one of the most tumultuous times in

Russia’s history, with each action he took scrutinized and criticized by those who did not support

the shift to democracy. Therefore, any action that went slightly awry is an opportunity to bring

into question his ability to lead and suggest an alternative political leadership. In stark contrast to

this is Putin’s presidency, where he garners strong public support from the image he cultivates of

being a powerful leader, a so-called “protector of the nation.” Concurrently, Putin mobilizes

significant reform and improves the Russian economy tremendously, which gives him leverage

in the form of public support to make decisions that would cause other leaders significant harm

politically.

The decisions made during the hostage crises to choose force over negotiations in

rescuing the captured civilians were serious, calculated risks. I argue the rising correspondence,

seen in various media reports and in Putin’s speeches on the threat posed by the Chechen

fighters, coupled with the increasing Islamic extremist elements in Chechnya, leads to a change

in the public’s opinion on the Chechen resistance. This strengthened link in the public between

the destruction from attacks and how the public perceived the Chechens underlying goals

elucidates why Russians castigate Yeltsin but endorse the Putin administration. With a broader

base of public support due to this altered perception, the Russian government finds itself able to

more freely pursue a more hardline doctrine. This aggressive strategy starts the Second Chechen

War and influences the decisions to use overwhelming force to solve the two final crises,

explaining why a significant shift occurs in Russia’s handling of the hostage crises over the two

time periods.

Conclusions and Implications

In this section, the scope of my research expands outwards to help draw out implications

that pertain to other cases and literature. Three lessons come from the findings: Government’s

use of political violence, non-state actors seeking political goals, and the role of the media.

Finally, I argue that the Russian government and public increasingly interpret the Chechen

attacks as coming from a desire to spread terror and demoralize Russia, causing escalation of

force to sit as the most viable solution in handling the subsequent Russian hostage crises.

Political Violence

A government possesses a monopoly on the use of force, that is to say it holds the sole

right within the state to authorize, threaten, or use force (Weber 1919). Russia’s use of this force

to engage in war twice in Chechnya, both times indiscriminately and intentionally killing the

civilian population, ultimately leads to the Chechen forces bringing the conflict to the Russian

public in retaliation. Russia’s initial desire to bring stability and maintain influence in the region

backfires, significantly worsening the situation and leading to a more difficult task of protecting

itself from the unrest across from its border. This disconnect between the desire for protection

and violence signifies that the use of legitimate force should be held in reserve, with states

utilizing other means of engaging peacefully with groups that seek independence. This isn’t to

suggest that any breakaway group should get independence, as that would lead to an ever-

increasing demand for autonomy due to a disagreement or difference from the ruling party.

However, in order to preemptively avoid conflict, large, and often already autonomous groups

should be given an ear when they express their desires for independence.

This similar fear of potential loss in regional influence and instability lead Russia to

involve itself militarily in Ukraine in 2014. Russia’s heavy-handedness in the crisis nets it

international scorn, with Ukrainian troops now fighting against Russian-backed separatist forces

in Eastern Ukraine with renewed zeal. Additionally, Russia’s Western rivals now pursue stronger

relations with the newly elected Ukrainian government, giving it aid to continue battling against

the separatist movement while lacerating the Russian economy with severe economic sanctions.

All told, Russia’s overly aggressive involvement, laid out as the protection of national interests,

once again results in massive unforeseen repercussions.

NSA and Political Goals

Non-state actors combatting a larger, more powerful state often turn to violence on the

civilian population to push their political agenda. Achieving successful political change through

the use of violence requires a strong tie between the attack and a more legitimate political goal.

This study suggests that violence against civilian populations isn’t an intelligent option due to the

likelihood that the NSA will be labeled a terrorist group by the target government. This label,

and the high correspondence attached with it, inevitably leads to public-backed military

retribution by the target government and little to no support for the NSA. Instead of violence, the

garnering of political support through the spreading of their message internally and externally is

more likely to draw support and potential political change. With interconnected networks of

information spanning the globe, it’s easier now than ever to vocalize their plight and gain

recognition. However, due to increasingly rigid national systems, violence may be the only

means to achieve meaningful change in the form of autonomy. For these groups, this study

shows that attacks targeting the civilian population forces the government to respond more

harshly in order to assuage fears of further casualties. Therefore, using force only on active

combatants, such as the state’s military, will be more likely to draw attention without the fierce

condemnation of civilian targeting.

The ethnic Uyghur population of Xinjiang province represents another example of an

ethnic group that seeks the strong political goal of independence, hampered by suppression from

the powerful Chinese state. While a significant portion of the Uyghur population is peaceful,

recently a trend of Salafist extremism has seeped into their Islamic identity, mirroring the

Chechens in 1997-98. Support for this change comes in part from a growing frustration at the

Uyghur’s inability to achieve independence, and led to violent attacks on the civilian population

of China. The Chinese government uses these attacks as a cover to invoke more control and

suppression of the region, akin to the Russian-Chechen relationship even today.

Role of Media

Throughout the timeframe of this study, the consistent denial of the Russian and foreign

media from participating in key events lends the Russian government free reign in dealing with

the Chechen Wars and each of the hostage crises. Journalists that sought to investigate and report

on the wars were subject to harassment, threats, and sometimes killed, while those at the hostage

crises were cordoned off far away from the actual incidents. This suppression of the media

allowed the Russian government to shape how the public perceived the crises, with the

expanding control of the media during Putin’s term helping manipulate the public’s view on the

Chechens as terrorists rather than freedom fighters. This study suggests that in states where

media isn’t allowed the freedom to report, the likelihood of success for the NSA is lower, and the

potential corruption of the government much higher.

Once again, the struggle of the Uyghur population in China displays a clear resemblance

to the difficulties that the Chechens face, with the Chinese government arguably having a

stronger control over the media due to its political structure and significant media suppression

already established within the state. Because of this, the issue of Uyghur independence isn’t

expressed frequently enough for them to garner support for true political change, and this

coupled with the aforementioned physical suppression leads to more violence- a backfiring of

security policy mirroring Russia’s handling of the Chechen independence movement.

The Russian government’s decision to increasingly use force when faced with hostage

crises follows closely the growing belief within the country that the Chechen resistance

undertook terrorist attacks solely to cause destruction and undermine the Russian state. President

Putin, unlike Yeltsin, uses the media and government to help convince the public of this, in order

to help bolster support for his aggressive actions in Chechnya during the Second Chechen War

and during the final two hostage crises. In dealing with groups seeking independence in the

present and future, recognition should be given to the arguments of decreasing utility of force

against civilians in spreading a political cause, using caution when engaging in political violence

to maintain stability, and the increasing role of the media in informing the public's opinion.

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46 Bohlen, Celestine. "YELTSIN RESIGNS: THE OVERVIEW; Yeltsin Resigns, Naming Putin as Acting President To Run in March Election." The New York Times. January 1, 2000. Accessed March 10, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/01/world/yeltsin-resigns-overview-yeltsin-resigns-naming-putin-acting-president-run-march.html?pagewanted=all.47 (Pain, 71).48 (Pain, ibid).49 (Sakwa, 18).50 (Snetkov, Aglaya. "The Image of the Terrorist Threat in the Official Russian Press: The Moscow Theatre Crisis (2002) and the Beslan Hostage Crisis (2004)." Europe-Asia Studies 59.8 (2007): 1349-365. JSTOR. Web. 12 Mar. 2015.)51 (Gakaev, 35).52 (Gakaev, ibid).53 (Evangelista, 153-154).54 (Dolnik, Adam. 2008. Negotiating Hostage Crises with the New Terrorists. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. http://psi.praeger.com/doc.aspx?d=/books/gpg/C9748/C9748-250.xml.)55 ("Opening Remarks at a Meeting with Internal Affairs Minister Boris Gryzlov and Federal Security Service Director Nikolai Patrushev." President of Russia. Russia, 24 Nov. 2002. Web. 9 Mar. 2015.)56 (Dolnik, ibid).57 (Dolnik, ibid).58 (Dolnik, ibid).59 ("Address by the Russian President." President of Russia. Kremlin, 26 Oct. 2002. Web. 8 Mar. 2015.)60(Feifer, Gregory. "Russia: Analysts Say Putin's Sky-High Ratings Reflect Expectations, Illusions." RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. Radio Liberty, 2 Dec. 2002. Web. 2 Mar. 2015.)61 (Feifer, ibid).62 (Snetkov, 1358).63 (Snetkov, 1359).64 (Dolnik, ibid).65 (Dolnik, ibid).66 (Dolnik, ibid).67 (Dolnik, ibid).68 (Dolnik, ibid).69 (Dolnik, ibid).70 (Dolnik, ibid).71 (Dolnik, ibid).72 (Weir, Fred. "Russian Forces Faulted in Beslan School Tragedy." The Christian Science Monitor. The Christian Science Monitor, 1 Sept. 2006. Web. 10 Mar. 2015.)73 (Dolnik,ibid). 74 (Snetkov, 1360).75 ("Address by President Vladimir Putin." President of Russia. Kremlin, 9 Sept. 2004. Web. 15 Mar. 2015. <http://eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/7636>.)

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