There's no "L" in Ambush

8/9/2019 There's no "L" in Ambush

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THERE'S NO "L" IN AMBUSH

9 Joshua therefore sent them out; and they went to lie in ambush, and

stayed between Bethel and Ai, on the west side of Ai; but Joshua lodged thatnight among the people.

10 Then Joshua rose up early in the morning and mustered the people, andwent up, he and the elders of Israel, before the people to Ai.

11 And all the people of war who were with him went up and drew near;

and they came before the city and camped on the north side of Ai. Now avalley lay between them and Ai.

12 So he took about five thousand men and set them in ambush between

Bethel and Ai, on the west side of the city.13 And when they had set the people, all the army that was on the north of

the city, and its rear guard on the west of the city, Joshua went that nightinto the midst of the valley.

14 Now it happened, when the kind of Ai saw it, that the men of the city

hurried and rose early and went out against Israel to battle, he and all his

people, at an appointed place before the plain. But he did not know thatthere was an ambush against behind the city.

15 And Joshua and all Israel made as if they were beaten before them and

fled by the way of the wilderness.16 So all the people who were in Ai were called together to pursue them.

And they pursued Joshua and were drawn away from the city.17 There was not a man left in Ai or Bethel who did not go out after Israel.

So they left the city open and pursued Israel.

18 Then the Lord said to Joshua, Stretch out the spear that is in your handtoward Ai, for I will give it into your hand. And Joshua stretched out the

spear that was in his hand toward the city.

19 So those in ambush arose quickly out of their place; they ran as soon ashe had stretched out his hand, and they entered the city and took it, and

hurried to set the city on fire.

20 And when the men of Ai looked behind them, they saw, and behold, the

smoke of the city ascended to heaven. So they had no power to flee this wayor that way, and the people who had fled to the wilderness turned back on

the pursuers.21 Now when Joshua and all Israel saw that the ambush had taken the city

and that the smoke of the city ascended, they turned back and struck downthe men of Ai.

22 Then the others came out of the city against them; so they were caught in
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the midst of Israel, some on this side and some on that side. And they struck

them down, so that they let none of them remain or escape."

Joshua and the Israelites burn the City of Ai. Or the Obamas leaving

Washington.

It's hard for me to tell from the picture.

From this we can see that the ambush is hardly a new tactic. However, it has

remained a quite viable tactic ever since, even in this age of high-tech

modern weaponry, simply because it works and, properly executed, works

very well. The standard, by-the-book L-shaped near ambush has been done

to death; it can be found in just about any military manual, all infantry

manuals, and you even occasionally see it diagrammed on restaurant

placemats. So well take a look at some of the less common methods used

by insurgents and other non-Western military forces.

First, however, here are a few tips applicable to just about any ambush

situation from Colonel Frank Herbert, a no-nonsense professional warrior on

the order of David Hackworth.

A. Surprise-getting into position in secrecy. This means, generally, no
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digging in, no movement at site, no eating there, no smoking, no hair oil

smell on troops, silence, etc.

B. All around security at site-emplaced in such a way that their firepower

can also be utilized during the ambush covering the entire target zone

C. Insure that your troops are spread out enough to be able to provide fire

over the entire target.

D. Shock action -opening fire must be as heavy as possible (automatic), and

the entire target must come under fire at initial burst.

E. Take time to do the job correctly - you have time, the enemy doesn't react

any quicker than we do; no follow up unit is about to come racing in to any

place where another unit has just been creamed, so no need to race off.

F. Rally on the objective site-assault element rallies on the target, search,

finish the job, etc. Organize for withdrawal, issue a short order, then move

out-organized and under control, ready to fight again -picking up security

elements as you pull out.

The Canadian Army has a complete manual devoted entirely to ambush and

counter-ambush. They list these real-life lessons learned of mistakes to

avoid while making an ambush.

a. Disclosure of the ambush by the noise made by cocking weapons and

moving safety catches or change levers. Check your weapons, practise men

in silent handling and ensure that all weapons are ready to fire.

b. A tendency to shoot high at the face of the enemy. This can be corrected

by conducting night range practices utilising night vision devices and fixing

bayonets when possible.

c. Disclosure of the ambush position by footprints made by the ambush party

moving into position and by the movement of individuals at the crucial time

when the enemy is approaching.

d. A lack of fire control as commanders were unable to stop the firing and

start the immediate follow-up.

e. Commanders were badly sited with consequent lack of control.

f. A lack of all-round observation resulting in enemy arriving in the area of

an ambush unannounced.g. Misfires and stoppages through failure to clean, inspect, and test weapons

and magazines.

h. A lack of a clearly defined drill for opening fire.

i. A tendency for all to select and fire at the same targets.

j. Fire opened prematurely.


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I also thought it worth of note that in the counter-insurgency manuals used

by British, Gurkha and former Commonwealth forces in Malaya, as well as

the Rhodesian ATOPs manual all stressed marksmanship. In fact, from the

British ATOM manual, the #1 principle for successful ambush was stated as:

Good shooting from all positions: kneeling, sitting, standing, lying and

from behind cover.

This makes a lot of sense to me. No matter how well-sited the ambush

positions, at the moment of that first burst of fire the enemy is going to hit

the dirt and there are going to be dead spaces that direct fire will not reach.

At that point, with the enemy down out of line-of-sight, just pouring in fire

is going to go harmlessly right over them. Insurgents in particular try to flee

an ambush, rather than assault. Thus, if you change your position you

change your vantage point, especially going from prone to kneeling or

standing, and have more clear shots at the targets you would not otherwisesee or be able to hit.

Now, for the last of the quotes from the manuals, the following ambush tenet

comes from thePartisan Leaders Guide, a small manual developed by theOSS for the French Maquis operating in German-occupied France. I

particularly like it because it is a no-frills KISS guide that gives a good basic

how-to overview without all the bullshit and fancy words.

French Resistance WWII

1. Planning.

(a) Find out by what roads small detachments and patrols of the enemy are
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accustomed to move. Select on one of these roads a locality which offers a

good opportunity for ambushing.

2. Locality. The following points should be looked for in selecting the

locality for the ambush.

(a) A line of retreat must be available which will give all the men a safe and

sure way of escape. A thick wood, broken and rocky country, etc., give the

best cover.

(b) Firing positions are required which enable fire to be opened at point-

blank range. When there is no chance of prior discovery by the enemy, it

may sometimes be of advantage to improve the position by building a stone

or sandbag parapet. This should not be done, however, unless it can be

concealed from aircraft.

(c) The locality should provide at least two fire positions and it is often

better if these are on opposite sides of the road.(d) It is best if the fire position enables the approaching enemy to be in view

for three or four hundred yards. By this means it can be discovered in time if

the enemy is in greater strength than expected; in such case the enemy

should be allowed to pass without being attacked.

3. Information.

Then get the following information:--

(a) Do the detachments move on foot, mounted, or in motor vehicles?

(b) What is the average strength of these detachments? How are they armed?

How many vehicles?

(c) Do they use armoured cars and light tanks to patrol the roads?

(d) At what times do they pass the place you have chosen?

(e) Do they move in one block, or do they put men out in front and behind to

guard against surprise? How do these men move, and how far from the main

body?

(f) How will they try to summon assistance if attacked? Where is the nearest

place such assistance can come from?

(g) If the detachment is carrying supplies, are those supplies of a type which

can be easily destroyed by you, or be of use to you?(h) What sort of troops are they, active or reserve, elderly, young, or what?

Is there an officer with them? Can he be picked out and shot by the first

volley? Can the N.C.O.s be picked out as well?

4. Action.

(a) The men must get into position without any chance of discovery. If there


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is any doubt, the position must be occupied by night.

(b) Sentries must be posted to give warning of the enemys approach. They

must be in sight of the firing position. It is not necessary to use guerillas for

all sentry posts; a woman or child can sometimes be employed with

advantage as they need not be in hiding.

(c) A simple system of signaling by sentries must be arranged. This can be

the removal of a hat, doing up a shoelace or any natural action of that nature.

(d) If the enemy detachment is preceded by scouts, or a scouting vehicle,

these should be allowed to pass on and not be fired at. Sometimes, however,

it may be advantageous to place one or two guerillas further on from the

firing position to shoot these scouts. They must never be fired on, however,

before the main attack begins; the guerilla leader must make certain this is

known and understood.

(e) The leader must give the signal to open fire. This can either be pre-

arranged or given at the moment. Fire must be rapid fire, so as to have animmediate overwhelming effect.

(f) Two or three of the best shots must be detailed to shoot any officers or

N.C.O.s. If these cannot be recognized by their uniform, they can be

discovered by noting who is shouting orders, etc.

(g) If the enemy appears to be destroyed, and it is intended to destroy or loot

any cars or lorries, men for this task must be detailed beforehand. The rest

must remain ready to open fire in case enemy are concealed in the lorries, or

reinforcements arrive.

(h) The leader must give the signal to retire, and this signal must be

unmistakable.

To judge the correct moment to break off the action is the leaders most

difficult task. If the opening volleys of fire have not disorganized the enemy,

it will probably be better to retire immediately, and be content with the

damage done. If, however, the enemy detachment is completely destroyed,

the opportunity should always be taken to seize all rifles, ammunitions, etc.,

and destroy or loot all other material. All papers and documents found

should be taken away for examination. The dead must be searched for

anything that may be useful.

(i) Remember that soldiers will always face the direction from which theyare being fired at. It is usually best therefore to divide the party into two

groups, on different sides of the road, of which only one group should fire

first. The enemy will then face towards this group and start to attack and

fire. The other group must then shoot the enemy in the back.

(j) Sentries must remain in position until the leader gives the signal to retire.

(k) Retirement when begun should be as rapid and dispersed as possible, ie.,


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the party must break up, and collect again as the leader may have ordered.

Make full use of the time until the enemy hears of the attack to get right

away from the scene.

(l) All wounded guerillas must be carried away if possible. It may be useful

to have a few horses hidden at a short distance to carry wounded.

CHECHAN INSURGENT AMBUSHES

It's hard to tell which makes for the worst ambush sites; the cities or the

mountains of Chechnya.

Fighting the Russians in Chechnya, the jihadists have taken the age-oldambush and added some new twists. Im no big fan of Muslim extremists

but one can sometimes learn even more from your enemies than you can

your allies. Not only the restricted streets and abundant cover and

concealment in the big cities such as Grozny aided the jihadists, but the

surrounding mountains and forests also provided plenty of good ambush

sites.

As always, the most likely spots for ambushes are bridges, confined areas,

hidden turns in a road, slopes and crests of hills, large forests, mountain

passes, and gorges. The Chechens also use the age-old axiom of choosing a

place which assures concealment of the ambushs and the ambushers

location and guarantees the element of surprise, effective fire from weapons

and munitions, and the opportunity for rapid withdrawal.

The insurgents intend ambushes either to impede or to destroy (or capture)
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the enemy. The type of ambush chosen depends on the combat situation, the

correlation of forces, and the terrain. If the purpose is to delay the

movement of forces and assets, to alter their direction, or to force apremature deployment into combat positions, then the insurgents can use a

significantly smaller force than they would need for ambushes to destroy or

capture the enemy. While only a few insurgents can detain a company-sizeor smaller unit for several hours, destroying the unit requires a militant

force of comparable size. Depending on the location, the tactical formation,

and the method of action, ambushes might be what are called meeting,parallel, or circular.

The meeting ambush.

The meeting ambush is usually stationary and set up on the federal forces

route of movement. The insurgents goal is to pin units down or to destroy

advance units. Insurgents often use the meeting ambush on small units andthe transport assets that follow behind them independently. The guerrillas

set up the ambush site well in advance, prepare reserve and false positions,and select withdrawal routes. They often use the meeting ambush in

combination with a simultaneous feint on some other objective to cause

reserve forces to move toward that objective.

The parallel ambush.

Insurgents use the parallel ambush along a convoys axis of advance. Theparallel ambushs objectives are the convoys security force,

reconnaissance elements, rear columns, and sometimes the main force. The

main body of insurgents disperses along one or both sides of the movementroute.

The circular ambush.

The most difficult ambush to prepare and execute is the circular ambush.

Anticipating the movement of enemy forces and assets, insurgent groupsposition themselves along the perimeter of a preselected area. The first

group opens fire on a convoys flank, initiating the battle, and then

withdraws, drawing the convoys attention toward it. The other groups actin a similar manner, forcing federal forces to repel attacks from several

directions or to advance in various directions. In some circumstances, the

ambushed force loses control of the situation, including losing its commandand control. If that happens, the force is doomed.

Depending on the mission, forces of 10 to 20 insurgents carry out ambushes,


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although sometimes ambush forces might exceed 100. They position

themselves along several lines. The size of the ambushing detachment varies

depending on the goal and the forces available. The detachment mightinclude a fire or strike group; a diversionary group; a group that impedes

the maneuver or withdrawal of federal forces (pins them down); a reserve

group; and a group that observes, handles communications, and informs. Ifthe detachment has heavy weapons, the detachment will also have a

transport group.

The primary force is the fire or strike group that kills soldiers and destroys

equipment. Positioned near the zone of the planned actions, the primary

force includes riflemen, a group for capturing prisoners and weapons, anddemolitions specialists.

The diversionary group takes a position some distance away from theambush kill zone. The diversionary groups mission is to draw retaliatory

fire from the security force (and sometimes the main force) and to supportthe strike groups surprise actions. The diversionary group is the first to act.

The signal to begin might be a mine explosion or a demolition charge.

Positioned along the same axis as the strike group, the diversionary groupfires on approaching federal forces from a greater distance and then

withdraws. As members of the attacked federal force pursue the

diversionary group, they open themselves to a flank attack.

Occupying positions along the presumed axes of the federal forces

movement, usually along the only possible axes, the group that impedes themaneuver and withdrawal of the federal force lays out land mines and other

obstacles along these axes. If necessary, the reserve group reinforces the

strike group or the blocking group. The reserve groups mission is tosupport the main forces exit from the battle. The group monitors the

situation and covers the detachments flanks and rear.

The group that observes, communicates, and informs does not participate in

the battle; its concern is reconnaissance, determining when federal forceswill move out from their encampment area and in what direction. The

insurgents in this group listen in on conversations over non-secure radio

nets, follow the convoys, and report on their movement to the detachmentsmain force. Personnel in this group can operate without weapons. They

land like birds on the convoys tail and later pass by as though they were

just random travelers. The transport group hides out along the detachments


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planned lines of withdrawal and stands ready to evacuate the detachment

and any prisoners or weapons taken.

In a typical ambush, the insurgents usually allow federal scouts and security

elements moving ahead of the convoy to pass by. Using a remotely

controlled blast mine, the insurgents knock out the main forces forwardvehicles and then concentrate fire on command vehicles and the center of

the convoy.

American doctrine writers are absolutely horrified by the very thought of the

chance of fratricide from having ambush forces on both sides of a target,

what with volume over accuracy being the name of the shooting game. With

all those bullets flying back and forth, the possibility of fratricide is indeed

real. However, if basically untrained Maquis and Chechen rebels can pull off

a circular ambush, if the VC, Mujahideen, and Taliban can do the same,theres no reason a true team of good men with crack marksmanship could

not do so as well.

During the early phases of the Korean Conflict when UN forces restricted

their offensive warfare to the low ground and valleys, the Communist forces

used an inverted-V formation in conjunction with a mobile force. TheHachi

Shiki tactic involved the more mobile CCF light infantry forces withdrawingto the rugged high ground, and then permitting road-bound United Nations

troops to enter the V, at which time a superior numerical force encircled the

attacking column and closed the V.

As one North Korean POW stated: Our troops make strategic

withdrawals when the enemy (UN) attacks; our troops then attack from the

flanks and encircle the enemy with superior numerical strength. In mostcases the enemy (UN) had no additional forces on their own flanks to assist

them

Enemy groups occupied the forward slopes of ridges paralleling low ground

and placed fire on the United Nations columns. An attempt was made todestroy the first and last vehicle of a column to canalize and halt movement

on the narrow roads. A sizeable enemy force deployed to the rear to prevent

retreat of friendly units and the arrival of UN reinforcements.

Once an ambushed has been fragmented and/or surrounded, this tactic has

supposedly been tried, according to H John Poole. Rather than sending an


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assault crashing in on the surrounded force, going full tilt with guns blazing,

the ambushers move in on their bellies, with camouflage and stealth, taking

only an occasional well-aimed shot to pick off an unwary defender,

especially when theyre looking the other way, slowly shrinking the noose

about the surrounded unit.

The Viet Cong had absolutely no compunction about possible fratricide due

to their tactic of ambushing from prepared dug-in bunkers. In fact, if they

were to get a friendly unit to deploy too far forward or if they were able to

maneuver behind, they had no problem with shooting into the enemy from

all points of the compass, rather like the old joke about the Polish firing

squad. It was their fighting positions which enabled them to do this in

relative safety. Heres what the Marine Corps learned about these positions

and tactics.

The enemy permits the friendly force to penetrate his position, seals the

opening, and destroys the force trapped inside.

+ Bunkers are constructed from locally available materials.

+Positions are interconnecting and mutually supporting.+ Firing apertures are small, located close to the ground, and extremely

hard to see.

+ Fire lanes are cleared of brush and growth up to 18 inches high and aredifficult to detect.

+ In some areas, particularly in I CTZ, the fortifications are directional in

nature.+ Camouflage is exceptional; in most instances, bunkers cannot be detected

until the unit is fired upon.

+ Bunkers are built with a very low silhouette that blends into the naturalgrowth of the area.

+ Trench lines are constructed in depth; tunnels connect these trench linesand provide safe and easy access to the numerous bunkers and

fortifications.

+ With the connecting tunnels and trenches, the enemy can move his forcesand bring pressure to bear in any location.

+ Bypassed bunkers may be reoccupied, if not destroyed by the attacking

unit.+ NVA units will outflank the attacking force, probe and find the weak point,

and attack the flanks and rear of the unit.


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Even without the protection of their well-concealed stout bunkers, the NVA

and VC still conducted U-shaped ambushes, very similar to the V-shaped

ambush of the Chinese in Korea. During Operation Buffalo, 2 July 1968, B

Co, 1st Bn, 9th Marines, moving up a sunken road known as Route 561 near

The Marketplace was taken under desultory rifle fire from about 100 yards

to their left. In the standard counter-ambush drill, the Marines assaulted.

When they did so, formerly silent machine guns opened up a devastating

fire. When the Marines sought cover, another NVA force on the right side of

the road opened fire, shooting them in the backs. From the front, more

machine guns and mortars laid down full enfilade fire along the entire

column. Then, the riflemen of the NVA force on the left began to work

towards the Marine survivors, not in an assault but creeping forward in ones

and twos, well camouflaged as clumps of grass. Still another NVA force

then moved around the rear, closing the U and cutting off the company from

all sides. Meanwhile, the stealthily advancing NVA troops from the leftbegan crossing the road, segmenting the Marine company into smaller, more

vulnerable pieces. From the beginning, officers, NCOs, and RTOs had been

deliberately targeted. Nearby A Company attempted to come to B

Companys aid, and was also hit by booby traps, snipers, small arms fire and

mortars until it too was pinned down. By the end of the day, it had become

the single worst day for the Marines in the entire Vietnam War. The two

companies combined lost 84 KIA, 190 WIA, and 9 MIA.

The Taliban in Afghanistan, despite being pretty poor shots who mainly

spray-n-pray with AKs on full auto, have no worries about firing on

Coalition troops from multiple sides; even from all the way around if they

can work their way behind to cut the escape route. Then again, I dont think

those yahoos worry too much about fratricide; if theyre not killing us

infidels, theyre killing each other. An example of their willingness to

conduct parallel or U-shaped ambushes follows.

Ambush from both flanks in open field

"At about 5:30 pm, the squad of Marines and Afghan police pushed south

towards the river; the additional squad maintained a cordon to the north of

the village. The Marines crossed a series of irrigation ditches and enteredan open field.

The insurgents waited in ambush, hiding behind a series of thick mud wallson each side of the squads approach. As the patrol passed by, eight or nine


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insurgents on the western side of the field opened fire with PK machineguns

and RPGs. They hit the Marines right flank with a heavy volume of

accurate fire from less than 75 meters away.

Half the squad managed to take cover behind a low wall in the open field;

the rest were pinned down in the open. Two of the Marines in the openattempted to flank the insurgents position but were stopped by a volley of

RPGs. One of the Marines was wounded, forcing both to fall back.

The squads joint tactical air controller was killed early in the ambush.

Several other Marines were wounded; one later died.

Once the squad was pinned down and facing west, about ten insurgents

opened fire on the Marines rear. This second enemy position was behind a

thick mud wall in a tree line to the east. The police returned fire on thisposition, while the Marines remained focused on the enemy to the west

When it was apparent that the Marines were pinned down and air support

was not immediately forthcoming, additional enemy fighters flocked to the

ambush site. They arrived in several trucks from Waryah village on theother side of the river and attempted to flank the Marines from the south.

The fighting went on for another two hours until dusk. When darkness fell,around 7:30 pm, the enemy fire trailed off; the insurgents broke contact and

withdrew."

In March 1981, a Soviet motorized rifle company, with only two hours to

prepare and having to deploy after dark, ambushed a Mujahideen supply

convoy. The commander was criticized by a Western expert for setting

himself up for fratricide by having troops on both sides of the road. If there

is high ground on both sides of the road, there is much less danger of

fratricide, but in this case the troops on one side were on the high ground

and the ones on the other side low ground, making perhaps the most

dangerous situation for taking friendly fire that there is.

I noted this statement from the Russian CO, however: I placed forces to

block the entrance and exit to the ambush site and concentrated the bulk ofmy force in the center of the ambush site. All-around observation was

maintained on the site entrance and exit while my troops dug in and fortified

their firing positions and then camouflaged them.


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Dug-in troops, if the positions are properly prepared, are much more

protected from aimed flat trajectory fire, let alone stray bullets.

The results of our ambush were 26 enemy killed and 20 captured. Eight of

the captives were wounded. We destroyed five trucks loaded withammunition and food. I lost one soldier KIA and five WIA.

If its stupid, but it works, its not stupid.

There were many petrol tankers in these convoys. They were easy to seton fire, and just firing at them would do the job. Once you set them on

fire, it would demoralize the entire column as everyone could see the

smoke.

Ambush Psy Ops fromMujahideen Commander Toryalai Hemat

In another air assault action by the Soviets against the Mujahideen, an

airborne company was cut off from the rest of its battalion and fought a day-

long battle, running almost entirely out of ammunition. A Western military

expert noted:

This is partially due to the Soviet philosophy that small arms fire

suppresses enemy fire and eventually may kill the enemy. The West wants tokill enemy with small arms fire and uses crew-served weapons to suppress

enemy fire. The standard Soviet assault rifles selector switch goes from safe

to semiautomatic to full automatic. The West sees semiautomatic as the
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norm. Perhaps the Soviets needed to devote more time to rifle

marksmanship for a guerilla war. It saves on ammunition and consumption.

In the mountains, a bolt-action rifle with range and accuracy is frequently ofmore use than a rapid firing assault rifle (though not in an ambush).

I agree totally with the authors assessment, except for the part about the

Western soldiers crack marksmanship versus the Soviets spray-and-pray. I

certainly never saw much marksmanship, nor training in nor emphasis on

nor improvements to, in my time. Basic Rifle Marksmanship in boot camp,

and that was it for the next 13 years, unless I did it myself. Maybe things

have changed these days, maybe not.

Case in Point: 3 September 2006. A task force consisting of a company of

U.S. Special Forces and the Afghan government commandos they were

training moved up Sperwan Ghar. A group of insurgents on the topwatched the soldiers approaching. When the task force got to within a few

hundred meters of the hilltop, the insurgents opened fire from three sideswith RPGs and small arms. The commandos fought for 20 minutes, until

they nearly ran out of ammunition. They then broke contact and moved back

towards the southern edge of the valley to await resupply by helicopter.

It is hard to chastise a Soviet airborne company for running out of

ammunition during a day-long engagement when these elite troops ran out in

20 minutes. Giving them the benefit of the doubt in that they carried the

"official" basic load of 210 rounds of ammunition (as in Vietnam, the figure

I hear bandied about the most is actually around 600 rounds), that amounts

to about ten rounds per minute, or one shot every six seconds. If we consider

the 600 round figure, thats thirty rounds per minute, or a shot every two

seconds. So much for the Wests vaunted semi-auto precision

marksmanship. Sounds like spray-and-pray to me. The most enlightening

fact is that for God only knows how many thousands of rounds expended, it

appears that no one on either side was hit. Since the Taliban boys were firing

from dug-in positions on three sides of targets in the open, it is apparent that

the new generations marksmanship is absolutely abysmal, lucky for us.

Like most Eastern forces, the Japanese in WWII had no problem with firing

from 360-degrees into an enemy formation.

"At any time the Japanese may ambush an attacking force. On one occasion

the enemy had taken up a position in the small paddy field, marked X in


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Figure 2. The only trail leading to the nearby river ran directly through the

paddy field. The Japanese position was exceptionally important, for it

controlled the only ford in that general area. (Neither the Japanese nor theBritish had bridge-building equipment available.)

The British planned a two-platoon attack. One platoon was to make aholding attack in front of point D, and the other platoon was to break

through between B and C, as indicated by the arrow.

The attack was launched as planned'. But the Japanese, anticipating the

time and direction of the attack, withdrew in front of it as the attackingtroops went in. Encountering no opposition, the attacking platoon burst into

the clearing, and headed for the opposite side to engage the Japanese at D.When the British soldiers were well into the clearing, enemy machine guns

situated in trees at A, B, C, and D opened up and caught the attackers in a

deadly cross fire. Only 14 men escaped. The other 16, including the platooncommander, were killed.

In another ambush, the Japanese solved the problem of possible fratricide in

a U-shaped ambush by using a different weaponthe blade.

"A British company was pursuing a Japanese force along a trail, moving in
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the direction indicated by the arrow in Figure 1. The company had an

advance guard for its own protection.

Between X and Y the trail ran comparatively straight for about 150 yards. It

followed an old stream bed, which formed a clearing about 60 feet wide.

The advance guard examined the edges of the clearing for signs of aJapanese ambush, and, finding none, notified the main body and moved

forward.

What the advance guard failed to discover was that the Japanese had built

platforms in the trees at X and Y, and had placed two light machine guns ineach tree. The platforms had been concealed with great care, and were

barely visible from the ground. The advance guard failed to reconnoiter the

various minor game trails which led away from the clearing, and which

converged at points A and B, where the Japanese had posted ambushparties.

As soon as the advance guard had passed point Y, the Japanese parties at A

and B quickly moved in, and stationed them selves along the edges of the

clearing. As the head of the main body reached Y, the tail was approachingX. At this moment, the four Japanese machine guns opened fire. Taken by
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surprise, the British troops immediately headed for the cover of the jungle,

but here they were met by the Japanese ambush party, armed with knives.

Many of the British suffered severe slashes on the arms and shoulders. Thetotal casualties numbered about 40 percent of the company, and included

the company commander. In the confusion which followed, the Japanese

succeeded in escaping."

If youre still too leery of fratricide in ambush, which is an inherently

dangerous endeavor anyway, or if youre operating in a small group,

probably the most neglected but the best of the standard ambush techniques

is the far ambush. I think this tactic is sadly neglected, in part, due to the

knowledge of most modern armies that their troops are, for the most part,

piss-poor rifle shots. Some of the smaller professional armies still stress

shoot to kill rather than lay down a heavy volume of fire, but the big

boys with all the money and toys and the arty/air dont. The far ambush isexactly what Fred of Appleseed fame recommends and talks about in his

Ambushing the UN story.

A far ambush is defined by the army as one outside of hand grenade range,

which supposes 30-35 meters. The far ambush is almost always used strictly

just for inflicting casualties and damage upon the enemy, thus doing away

with the need for an assault party. The far ambush takes the fullest

advantage of accurate, long-range fire from .30-caliber battle rifles. At 300

meters plus, dug-in and concealed prone shooters are in relatively little

danger from assault rifle fire from most troops. Beyond 400, and weapons

such as the M203 grenade launcher are taken out of play as well. Only

designated marksmen and light machineguns/SAWs still pose any kind of

threat. Five hundred yards could be considered an ideal range for a far

ambush, with good weapons and troops.

In addition to being protected by the very range of the fire, the far ambush

also allows you plenty of time to prepare, cammie up, find cover, measure

ranges, set sights, etc. That includes being able to dig and camouflage

fighting positions that will protect you from what fire you do receive. In onefar ambush in Afghanistan, it was found that the Taliban fired a PKM

7.62x54R machine gun through an 8-inch hole in a thick mud wall at 600

meters range. Thus, the gun was not only very difficult to spot, it was even

harder to hit. While clever in their siting, luckily the Talibans accuracy

wasnt good enough to do much damage.


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A well executed far ambush. Ranges would be longer than they appear

here. The ambush team is well concealed and firing from cover. Steep

bluffs, a bridge and a creek restrict the enemy's ability to maneuver.

Obstacles such as the deep-banked creek bed and wire fence, as well as

distance itself, protect the ambush team from counter-attack.

The far ambush also allows a small light infantry group to ambush a muchlarger force in relative safety when compared to a near ambush. We were

always taught that in a near ambush, you could only tackle a unit one third to

at best one-half the size of your own, which is pretty darn limiting for a

squad-sized element. It also gives the ambushers a wide-angle, big-picture

view of the area and the enemy. If the enemy group is just too big, the far

ambushers have a much better chance to just hunker down, remain

undetected and let the enemy pass. Regardless of the outcome, the far

ambush gives the ambushers the greatest amount of time and the most

choices for a safe egress when it comes time to un-ass the AO. The farambushs biggest weakness is if the OPFOR has artillery and air on call at a

moments notice. But, as Afghanistan showed, arty and air cant be

everywhere at once.

It was the far ambush that won the Mujahideen a formidable reputation as

expert marksmen during the Soviet-Afghan War. Before that war, rifles,
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ammunition and game to shoot were all hard to come by, and the hill people

learned to make every shot count. Additionally, most were armed with

powerful, accurate, lone-range weapons such as the old British Lee-Enfield

or Chinese knock-offs of the 98 Mauser.

Fortunately for our troops, the new generation of Afghan insurgent fighter

was born and raised with the AK47, a weapon with an intermediate

cartridge, less accuracy than the bolt guns, and full-auto capability. And

everyone knows how macho it is to point the weapon in the enemys

general direction and rip off a full magazine on rock-and-roll.

So, for a small group of good men with good rifles, the far ambush offers the

best bet against superior of conventional forces. If these men have developed

a cool head under fire, the other ambush tactics involving fire from multiple

directions are certainly viable options as well, especially when consideringthat poorly-trained and armed insurgents can use those tactics successfully.

Always think outside the box. Just as there's more than one way to skin a

cat, there's more to ambushing than just the L-shaped near ambush.

http://benandbawbsblog.blogspot.com/2010/07/theres-no-l-in-ambush.html

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There's no "L" in Ambush