Theory of Moments

A New Theory Peculiar to Abhidhamma A theory based on Buddhist elaboration of the famous concept of impermanence/ change (anicca), an accessory to explain anatta.

Pali Commentarial tradition accepted it to be a new theory. (VibhA: 07)

Early Buddhist doctrine of Anicca is the outcome of direct empirical observation, instead theory of moments is formulated on pure reasoning.

Continuous occurrence of change

Momentariness is the formulated theory to explain the continuous occurrence of change.

“Simile found in the Aṅguttaranikāya says: There is no moment, no instant, no particular time when the river stops flawing” (AN 4: 137).

The words used to denote change (early Buddhism)

anicca (change)

aññathatta (alteration)

khaya (waning away)

vaya (dissolution)

nirodha (cessation)

Development of the Theory of moment

The term to denote moment in the Theory of moment is ‘khaṇa (kṣaṇa). In the discourses the term occurs without a technical meaning to indicted the short period of time.

In the course of time it gradually embodied the technical meaning.

The Mahāniddesa (the canonical commentary to the Suttanipāta (and also an intermediary

Abhidhamma text) accepts the discrete moments of

life span and the moments of life.

“All that we call life, individuality, pain and pleasure are in association with one conscious event (ekacitta) which exists in short (lahuso) in the form of a moment (khaṇa)”

Even the life forms in the heavens supposed to live 84000 years do not live during two conscious moments.

_____________________________________

Jīvitaṃ attabhāvo ca, sukha-dukkhā ca kevalā

Eka citta samāyuttā, lahuso vattate khaṇo

Cullāsīti sahassāni, kappā tiṭṭhanti ye marū

Natve’va te’pi jīvanti, dvīhi cittehi samāhitā

Discussions Pertaining to the Theory (Early period)

Nature of Momentariness of mind and matter Mahāsāṅghikas believed in only the mater transforms (pariṇamati) or evolves not the mind and mental concomitants.

Vātsīputrīyas maintained some conditioned phenomena (saṅkhāras) exist for sometime whereas others perish every moment.

Āraya-sammitīyas held that matter exists for a longer period of time (kālāntaravasthāyī) whereas mind is momentary.

The Kathāvatthu reports two views regarding the duration of mind and matter and Theravada position is also given there.

One- (Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas): As all the phenomena are Conditioned, so there should not be a difference between the duration of the two. Theravādins‟ position is: If the both are in the same duration, then sence perception cannot be accounted for (Kvu: 620).

Two- (Andhakas): A Single unit of consciousness can remain for long, say for a day (Like for instance in case of jhāna). Theravāda position is no. If we accept it, then one half of the day must be reconed as the moment of origination and the other half the moment of cessation

Yamaka, the Abhidhamma canonical text in the Saṅkhāra-yamak mentions about origination moment (uppādakkhaṇa) and cessation moment (nirodhakkhaṇa) of mind.

In the Paṭṭhāna the arising of matter before mind is accepted. The two Conditions Pre-nascence (purejāta) and Post-nascence (paccājāta) are to determine this.

What canonical references can summarized as follows: The mind is momentary and the duration of matter is not equal to a single unit of mind.

However, following things cannot be

ascertained from the canonical Abhidhamma:

1) Is matter also momentary like mind and

does it exist longer than mind

momentarily?

2) Is there a static moment?

The notion of momentariness was connected to the Theory of Dhamma in the classical Buddhist period (Commentaries and Sub-commentaries) in line with the development of the Theory of Momentariness in the Theravāda Tradition.

In the Classical Abhidhamma period, Momentariness is the hub of the all Abhidhamma concepts: Sense perception, mind-body relationship, material clusters (rūpakalāpa) etc.

Some other Buddhist schools also developed the same theory.

Controversies over the nature of Characteristics of the Conditioned (Which are momentary)

The basis of Momentariness theory of the Classical Abhidhamma is centered around a Discourse that shows the characteristics of the conditioned.

“O monks, there are these three conditioned characteristics (saṅkhata-lakkhaṇāni) of the conditioned (saṅkhatassa); namely: origination (uppādo) appears, cessation appears (vayo) and change-in-continuance appears (ṭhitassa aññatattha) appears (AN I: 152).

There were disagreements among schools regarding “conditioned characteristics”

Different Disagreements Vibhajyavādins: While the Dharmas are conditioned

characteristics of conditioned Dharmas are unconditioned (asaṃkṛta). If the characteristics are conditioned and therefore week, then they cannot produce the conditioned. This is an attempt to give the conditioning characteristics universal applicability and eternal value over the conditioned.

Dharmaguptakas (A modified version of the former): Only the dissolution (vaya) or cessation (nirodha) is unconditioned. Conditioned dharmas and the courses of their origin are brought to end by the unconditioned characteristics of dissolution. This is said to be in line with early Buddhist emphasis on cessation over origin.

Sarvāstivādins: Both the conditioned and the

characteristics are conditioned. They stressed on the

“conditioned characteristics” of the Discourse.

„Conditioned characteristics‟ they interpreted as

„characteristics which are conditioned‟. They also

showed the genitive expression “of the conditioned

(saṅkhatassa)” was used to show the characteristics

are different from the conditioned.

Theravādins and Sautrāntikas had a similar

position. They interpreted “conditioned characteristics (saṅkhata-lakkhaṇāni) as to mean

specific characteristics (among other characteristics)

to identify the conditioned.

Sautrāntikas further argued that the origination is not separate from originating phenomena. Theravādins also held a similar view: There is no separate phenomena called origination different from originating event (uppādāvatthāya ca añño jāti nāma natthi). Both tradition further argued that if the origination is taken as a separate entity, then there should be other causes for their origin and there will be no end of the chain which is called infinite regression (anavatthāna/ anavaṭṭhāna). For them, characteristics are mere concepts (paññatti) so they are neither conditioned or unconditioned (saṅkhatā-sanṅkhata lakkhaṇānam pana abhāvena na vattabbā saṅkhatāti vā asṅkhatāti vā).

Theravādin’s Interpretation of Momentariness

Sarvāstivāda Tradition introduced four moments:

utpāda/ jāti (Origination)

sthiti (presence or duration)

jaratā (decay)

anitytā/ vyaya (impermanence or dissolution)

As these characteristics are recognized as

conditioned, they have other secondary

characteristics that support their origination,

origination of origination (jāti- jāti).

Sautrāntikas were in the opinion that Sarvāstivādins‟ interpretation was a futile exercise. The three characteristics in the Discourses were intended possible to observe (prañyāyate). If the Origination etc. are applied to a moment, it goes beyond observation. So, they apply the four stages of Sarvāstivādins to a series of momentary dharmas (dharma-santati).

But they apply three characteristics Origination, existence and Cessation to a momentary dharma. However, Sautrāntikas‟ existence (sthiti) and decay (jaratā) are merely metaphorical. “If a dharma is momentary, there cannot be change; if it undergoes chage, then it is not the same dharma”

Theravādins:

Theravādins accepted 3 moments of a single Unit of mind and matter. Matter is of longer duration and a unit of matter exits until 17 units of mind pass.

Both Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas had the problem to harmonize characteristics with Momentariness. They could not demarcate the moments properly.

The above passage of the AN was modified by the Theravādins (Commentary to AN) to introduce the three moments to make the concept clear. AN commentary to AN) Origination (uppāda) Genesis (jāti) = Moment of Genesis (jāti) (uppādakkhaṇa) Cessation (vaya) Dissolution (bheda)= Momentsof Dissolution (bhaṅgakkhaṇa)

Change-in-continuance (ṭhitassa-aññthatta) Decay (jarā) Moment of Duration (ṭhiti-kkhaṇa)

Thus, There are three separate moments (khaṇa):

• Moment of Origination (uppādakkhaṇa)

• Moment of duration/ presence (ṭhitikkhaṇa). It

was Decay (jarā) that was interpreted as duration.

• Moment of dissolution (bhaṅgakkhaṇa)

These three moments are separate; They do not succeed one after the other in a single unit of dharma (tividhaṃ bhinna-kālikaṃ)

Theravādins could show the moment as the briefest unit of time.

However, the moment (khaṇa) was interpreted in

two ways:

1) In general sense: Origination, existence and

dissolution of a dharma together: triads of moments

together (uppāda-ṭhiti-bhaṅga-vasena

khaṇattayaṃ).

2) Specific Sense: Time taken by a dharma either

to originate, to exist or to dissolve.

New Interpretations AN commentary to AN) Origination (uppāda) Genesis (jāti) = Moment of Genesis (jāti) (uppādakkhaṇa)

Cessation (vaya) Dissolution (bheda)= Momentsof Dissolution (bhaṅgakkhaṇa)

Change-in-continuance

(ṭhitassa-aññthatta) Decay (jarā) Moment of Duration

(ṭhiti-kkhaṇa)

Interpreting Decay as the Moment of Duration was totally a new one.

How can Decay (jarā) be the Moment of Duration (ṭhiti-kkhaṇa)?

Because at this stage it has lost its newness (navabhāva-apagama)

This stage is a collapse of newness (abhinavabhāva-hāni)

The moment that faces its dissolution (bhaṅgassa abhimukhāvatthā)

The moment that shortens the life-span of the dharma (kālaharaṇa) pushing the dharma towards cessation.

The decay is the metaphorical expression in the conventional teaching and in the Theory of moment it means the duration moment which has lost its newness.

During the moment of duration dharma does not undergo any changes. The Sinhalese translation (Sinhala Sanne) to the Visuddhimagga, in response to the phrase of Vibhṅga “at the moment of

duration, a dhamma gets fatigued by Decay

(ṭhitiyaṃ jarāya kilamanti) clearly points out that it is the metaphorical way of saying that the moment of origination has now succeeded the moment of origination.

It is just passing the moment of origination (ayaṃ

pana kevalaṃ uppaādāvatthaṃ eva apaneti). The

dhamma does not give up its own nature.

Some explanations of the Moment of Duration atthikkhaṇa (Moment of Presence)

ṭhānakkhaṇa (Moment of Standing)

vijjamānakhaṇa (Moment of Existence)

bhāva (being)

udya-vyaya-paricchinna (The moment delimited by the rise and fall)

The pause between Origination and Dissolution that ensures the overlapping of the both (udayakkhaṇe vayassa vayakkhaṇe udayassa abhāva)

The change is not Decay. Decay is what occurs within one dharma: passing origination and reaching the moment of duration. Decay is taking place in a single dharma. Change (vipariṇāma) instead is the occurring a new dharma in place of another dharma, taking place between two consecutive dharmas.

However, the decay of a single dharma is introduced as momentary decay (khaṇika-jarā). But observable decay such as wrinkling the skin is called evident decay. This is only in case of material dharmas.

Third moment: Does the third moment need causes

Vātsī-putrīyas and Āryasammitīyas: Mind ceases spontaneously whereas matter needs causes

Sarvāstivādins: Destruction does not need external causes still they are caused by characteristics of destruction.

Sautrāntikas and Dārṣṭāntikas: Cessation of bothe mental and material dharmas do not need causes

Theravādins: Dissolution does not need causes (vināsassa hi kāraṇa-rahitattā) and it takes place spontaneously (avassaṃ bhijjanti). This is similar to that of Sautrāntikas and Dārṣṭāntikas. The Buddha’s teaching is whatever is of the nature of origination is of the nature of cessation.

Some other implications of Momentariness Mental dharmas are strong at the moment of

origination and week at the moment of Duration and dissolution. Only at the moment of origination mind can generate other mental or material dharmas (janaka-sāmatthi-yoga). The material dharmas which arises at other moments are not mind-originated.

Only dharmas move (dhātūnaṃ yeva gamanaṃ). However, this meant that one dharma does not move to another location (desantara-saṅkamana); they don’t have time to move and they disappear where they arose, instead a dharma of a given series arise in adjacent locations (desantaruppati). Each cluster of matter (rūpa) is non-pervasive (abyāpāratā)

Arguments against Momentariness

When the Theory of Moments had been accepted in the mainstream Theravada philosophy, there had been doubts raised against the theory, accepting the Moment of Duration.

A Sub commentary (Abhidhammattha-vikāsinī) raises the question “Why is the Moment of Duration not mentioned in the Pāḷi (Canon)? The question suggests that the Moment of Duration does not represent Change-in-continuance (ṭhitassa-aññthatta).

Master Ānanda (Abhidhammattha-vikāsinī) rejected the application of Moment of Duration to

mind showing that the Vibhaṅga and the

Kathāvatthu do represent a Moment of duration.

He also argued that the Theory of Moment should

be applied only to a Series of Dharmas. (This

argument is totally convenient to Sautrāntika‟s

view as they showed the truly momentary dharmas

cannot have a duration and the momentariness

must be of observable nature)

The same Sub-commentary (Abhidhammattha-vikāsinī) also puts forwards an argument adduced by Master Jotipāla and Master Dhammapala to conform the Moment of Duration: As we have a Moment of origination on the basis of nascent phase and a Moment of Dissolution on the basis of cessant phase, there also should be a phase facing nascent (nirodhābhimukhāvatthā)

The sub-commentary Abhidhammattha-vikāsinī reasons out why Discourses are silent about the moment of Duration: It is the practice in the Discourse to follow a method of exposition suited to the inclination of the audience (Vineyyajjhāsayānurodhena nayadassanavasena).

Buddha’s teaching was sporadic (sappariyāya)

If the dharmas arising cease to disappear there was no need to emphasize a momentary duration which demanded subtle philosophical explanations.

In another sub-commentary, there is an argument against the denial of the Moment of Duration: If there is no Moment of Duration, then moment of Duration must be an expression for the series of momentary dharmas (santati-ṭhiti, pabandha-ṭhiti), that is, series itself is the duration. Series is not real and ultimate it is just a conceptual construct (paññatti)

Some Theravāda masters did not accept that matter is longer than mind. The impermanence is universal and it is not eligible to propose two different types manifestations for them (aniccādibhāva-sāmañña). They also revealed that in the Yamaka (in the Saṅkhāra-yamaka) it was presented that: When kāyasṅkhāra (inhalation and exhalation- physical) arises together with it arises citta-saṅkhāra (feeling and perception- mental) and when kāya-saṅkhāra ceases together with it ceases citta-saṅkhāra. So they said both are of equal duration (nāma-rūpāni samānāyukāni)

Theravada mainstream system said this is true of mind-conditioned material phenomena (citta-samuṭṭāna-rūpa). They arises at the moment of minds origination and ceases after 17 mind moments.