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Theories of Knowledge: An Analytic FrameworkAuthor(s): Susan HaackSource: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 83 (1982 - 1983), pp. 143-157Published by: on behalf ofWiley The Aristotelian SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4544996Accessed: 27-08-2014 01:14 UTC

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2/16

IX*-THEORIES

OF KNOWLEDGE:

AN

ANALYTIC

FRAMEWORK

by Susan Haack

Contemporary epistemology

must choose between the

solid security of the ancient foundationalist pyramid and

the risky adventure of the new coherentist raft. (Sosa')

One seems forced to choose between the picture of an

elephant

which rests on a tortoise

(What supports the

tortoise?) and the picture

of a

great Hegelian serpent of

knowledge

with

its

tail

in its

mouth

(Where

does

it

begin?).

Neither will

do. (Sellars2)

It is commonly supposed that

one

is

obliged

to

choose, in the

theory

of

knowledge,

between

two, fundamentally opposed

models:

the

foundationalist, according

to

which

the rest of our

knowledge is supported by the foundation of a relatively small

class

of

epistemically privileged beliefs, and the coherentist,

according

to

which the

various

parts

of

our

knowledge are

mutually supportive.

But it is

rarely spelled

out3

what the

characteristic

features of foundationalism and coherentism

are,

or

why they

should be

thought

to

be the only feasible

options.

My

first

object,

in

this

paper,

is

to construct

a scheme of

classificationwithin which one can locate two extreme kindsof

theory,

which

I

will

call

'Pure Foundationalism'

and

'Pure

Coherentism',

and

a whole

range

of intermediate

kinds of

theory

in between.

My

second

object

is

to

examine,

in

the

context

of this

framework,

the

arguments

which have dominated the debate

between

foundationalism

and coherentism.

This

discussion

will,

I

believe,

indicate that there are two

intermediate

types

of

theory capable

of

withstanding

the

arguments

of both

sides.

I

shall make it clear which of these I favour;but spacewill permit

me

only

to hint

at

the reasons for

my preference.

*

Meeting

of

the Aristotelian

Society

held

at 5/7 Tavistock

Place,

London

WC1,

on

Monday,

14

March,

1983 at

6.00 p.m.

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3/16

144 SUSAN

HAACK

I

Let me acknowledge,at the outset, that therewill ofcourse be an

element of arbitrariness

n

the

characterisations

I

shall

give.

But

I

hope

that

the

characterisations

given

here

will

at

any

rate serve

adequately

to

bring

into focus

the

issues

that have

been

debated

between those who call themselves

'foundationalists'

and those

who call

themselves

coherentists',

without

distorting

the

history

of

this debate

any

more than is unavoidable. The use of

the

terms 'foundationalism'

and 'coherentism' in

the

literature

has,

however, been ill-defined and shifting to such an extent that I

doubt that

any

characterisation could

square

with all of

it.

All

the theories to be characterised

in

this

section-Pure

Foundationalism,

Pure Coherentism

and the

intermediate

theories-share

the

assumptions

that we do

have

knowledge,

and that

our

having knowledge requires

(at least)

our

having

beliefs

which

are

justified

as well

as

true;

where

they

differ

is

on

how our justified beliefs

get

their

justification.

By 'Pure

Foundationalism'

I

shall

mean

any theory

according

to

which:

(PF1)

Some beliefs

are,

epistemically,

absolutely

secure

and:

(PF2)

All

beliefs

which

are

justified, but not absolutely

secure (in the sense of (PFI)) are justified wholly by the

support,

direct

or

indirect,

of

these

absolutely secure

beliefs.

I

shall

call

(PF1)-without

pejorative

intent-'Dogmatism

'4

I

have stated

Dogmatism

in

a

very general

way,

because

I

intend

it to cover not

just one,

but a

range

of

views.

All

Dogmatists

hold

that there are some

privileged

beliefs

which

enjoy immunity to

certain kinds of epistemic defect; they differ, however, with

regard

to

the kind of

epistemic

defect

they

have in

mind. For

example,

some have

in

mind

immunity

to

error

(the privileged

beliefs

are

'certain',

that

is, roughly,

it

is

impossible

that

they

should be

mistakenly held);

some,

immunity

to

unwarranted-

ness

(the

privileged

beliefs

are

'self-warranting',

hat

is, roughly,

it is

impossible

that

they

should be

unjustifiedlyheld); some,



4/16

THEORIES OF

KNOWLEDGE: AN ANALY'I'IC FRAMEWORK

145

immunity

to ignorance (the privileged

beliefs are

'self-

manifesting',

that is, roughly,

it is

impossible

that

they

should

fail to be believed when they are true); others, again, hold that

there are privileged

beliefs

which

enjoy some two,

or

even

all

three,

kinds

of

immunity.

(Here, even

in the

remarks

in

which

I

elaborate on my

original, vague

statement,

I

am,

of

course, greatly simplifying

an

extremely complex

matter;

a full account would

call for

careful

textual analysis

of what has been meant

by saying

that some

beliefs

are

'indubitable', 'incorrigible',

'directly evident',

'self-

evident', etc., etc.)5

According

to

(PF2)

the

justification

of

each

justified

but

unprivileged

belief

depends

on the

support

of

some

privileged

belief

or

beliefs:

either

directly (privileged

beliefs

justify

the

unprivileged

belief in

question)

or

indirectly (privileged

beliefs

justify unprivileged

beliefs,

. . . which

justify

the

unprivileged

belief

in

question).

The crucial

point

is that

all the

justification

of

any justified

but

unprivileged

belief

derives, strictly

linearly,

from

the

support

of

privileged

beliefs.

So

I

shall call (PF2)

the

'Strong

Thesis

of One-Directional

Justification'.

(PF1) does

not entail

(PF2);

it

could be that, though there are

absolutely

secure

beliefs, they

do not

serve

to

support the

rest of

our

knowledge.

Neither does

(PF2),

by itself, entail (PFI);6

together

with

the

assumption

that there

are

somejustified beliefs,

however,

it

does.

The negation of (PF1) is:

(NPF1)

No

beliefs

are, epistemically,

absolutely secure.

I

shall

call

(NPF1)

'Fallibilism'.

Like

'Dogmatism', 'Fallibilism'

refers

to

a

family

of

views,

rather than

to

a

single thesis.

While

each

form of Fallibilism

is

incompatible

with

the

corresponding

form

of

Dogmatism,

Fallibilism with

regard

to

one concept

of

epistemic privilege is compatible with Dogmatism with regard

to

another.

The

negation

of

(PF2) is:

(NPF2)

Not all beliefs which

are justified, but

not

absolutely secure, are justified

wholly by the support

of

absolutely

secure

beliefs.



5/16

146

SUSANHAACK

Any theory

which

accepts (or

entails)

either

of (NPF1) or

(NPF2)

is

incompatible

with

Pure

Foundationalism

(a qualifi-

cation with respectto the kind ofepistemic privilegeconcerned

is

understood here).

By

'Pure

Coherentism'

I

shall

mean

any theory according

to

which:

(NPF1) (Fallibilism)

(PC1)

No belief

is,

in and

of

itself, epistemically more

secure

than

any

other

and:

(PC2) Any

belief that

is

justified

is

justified wholly in

virtue of

its

belonging

to

some set

of beliefs which has

certain

properties

(consistency, comprehensiveness).

I will call

(PC1) 'Epistemic Egalitarianism'.

Like

'Dogmatism'

and 'Fallibilism', 'Epistemic Egalitarianism'refers to a classof

views, differing

with

respect

to

the

particular interpretation

given

to

'epistemically

secure'.

I will call

(PC2)

the 'Thesis

of Mutual

Justification'.

It is

necessary

to

stipulate

Fallibilism, separately,

as a

characteristic

thesis

of Pure

Coherentism,

because

Epistemic

Egalitarianism

s

compatible,

strictly speaking,

with

Dogmatism

as

well as

Fallibilism

(but

on the

Dogmatist assumption

that

some beliefs

are

absolutely

secure, Epistemic Egalitarianism

would

lhave

the

very peculiar consequence

that

all beliefs

are

absolutely secure). However,

Fallibilism with

respect

o

warrant-

orientedprivilege

s

actually

a

consequence

of

the Thesis of

Mutual

Justification,

since if

all

justified

beliefs

get

their

justification in

the

same

way, purely by

means

of

mutual

support, none are

privileged

with

regard

to

justification.

It is obviousthatPureCoherentism,asI havecharacterised t,

is

incompatible

with

Pure

Foundationalism.

For, first,

it is

committed

to

Fallibilism.

And,

second,

on

the

assumption

that

there are

justified beliefs, (PC2)

entails

(NPF2); indeed,

that

all

justified

beliefs

are

justified wholly by

mutual

support

entails

not just

that

not

all,

but that no

beliefs are

justified

in

the way

claimed

by (PF2).



6/16

THEORIES

OF

KNOWLEDGE:

AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK

147

In fact Pure

Coherentism,

as this

suggests,

is a

particularly

strong

rival

of

Pure

Foundationalism.

For, first,

it

rejects

both

he

characteristictheses of Pure Foundationalism.And, second, its

denial of each characteristicthesis of Pure

Foundationalism

is as

strong

a denial

as it could be: not

only

are there no beliefs

which

are

epistemically

privileged,

there

aren't even

any

beliefs

which

are at least

epistemically

better off than

others;

and

not

just

not

all, but no justified beliefsget theirjustification in

the

way

the

Pure

Foundationalist

claims.

So we can

expect

there

to be

other, intermediate kinds of

theory which are rivals both of Pure Foundationalism and of

Pure CoherentiSM.8

Among

the intermediate

theories,

I

shall

distinguish

two

categories:

those

which

retain

(PFI)

but

reject

(PF2),

and those

which

(like

Pure

Coherentism) reject

both.

(Since,

on the

assumption

that there are

justified beliefs, (PF2)

entails

(PF1),

there are

no

(non-sceptical)

theories

which

retain

(PF2)

but

reject (PF1).)

In the firstcategory fallsthe

type

of

theory

I

shall call

'Impure

Foundationalism',

and

characterise

as

holding

both:

(PF1) (Dogmatism)

and:

(IPF2) All beliefs which are justified but not absolutely

secure are justified

at least

in

part by the

support of

absolutely

secure

beliefs;

some are also

justified

in

part by

mutual relations of

support among

themselves.

Like the Pure

Foundationalist,

the

Impure

Foundationalist

requires

that

every

unprivileged

but

justified

belief derives

from

some

privileged

belief(s);

unlike the

Pure

Foundationalist,

however, he does not require that the justification for any

justified

but

unprivileged

belief

derive

exclusively rom

privileged

beliefs. For

this

reason,

I

shall

call

(IPF2)

the

'Impure Thesis of

One-Directional

Justification'

(or perhaps 'Thesis

of One-

Directional Justification with

Twiddle' would have been more

perspicuous,

if

less

elegant).

Impure Foundationalism still allows that

epistemically



7/16

148

SUSAN

HAACK

privileged beliefs play

a

specially

important

role in the

justification

of other beliefs.

But there is

another

possible type

of

position according to which, while there are epistemically

privileged

beliefs,

their

support

is not essential to the

justifica-

tion

of

other

beliefs:

(PF1) (Dogmatism)

(NPF2*)

No

beliefs

which

arejustified but

not

absolutely

secure

are

justified

even

in

part by the support of

absolutely

secure beliefs.

((NPF2*) is,

of

course, incompatible

with

(IPF2) as

well as with

the stronger (PF2).)

I

shall refer

to this as the 'Idle Epistemic Wheels' view. (I say

'view' because,

since

it is

characterisedonly negatively,

it seems

inappropriate

to call

it

a theory.)

Theories

in the second

category

(rejecting (PF1) as well as

(PF2)) deny

that there are

any

absolutely secure beliefs.But

it

is

possible to do this, to be a Fallibilist, without accepting

Epistemic Egalitarianism.

Fallibilism is

quite

compatible, also,

with

the

thesis that

some

beliefs

are

more secure

than others,

'Epistemic

Inegalitarianism';

this

is:

(NPC 1)

Some beliefs

are,

in

and of themselves,

epistemi-

cally

more

secure

than

others.

I shall

distinguish

three

types

of

Inegalitarian intermediate

theory.

One

type

sees

justification

as

essentiallyone-directional,

from

the

relatively

secure

to the

relatively insecure.

I

will referto

this

as 'Weak

Foundationalism',

and

characterise

it

as the

conjunction

ofi

(NPF1)

(Fallibilism)

(NPCI) (Epistemic Inegalitarianism)

and:

(WF2)

The

justification

of less

secure beliefs always

depends upon

the

support

of

more secure

beliefs, and not

vice-versa



8/16

THEORIESOF KNOWLEDGE:

N

ANALYTIC

FRAMEWORK

149

which

I

shall call (noting

that

(PF2) implies (WF2), but not vice-

versa)

the 'Weak Thesis of

One-Directional Justification'.

The two other types of Inegalitarian theory reject this linear

conception

of

justification,

seeing

it

as, rather,

a matter of

mutual

support.

The difference between them is that

one,

like

Pure Coherentism, requires

that

justification

be

wholly a

matter

of relations

among

beliefs, while the other, like

Foundationalist

theories,

does not. The first

type

I shall call 'Weak

Coherentism',

and characterise

as

the

conjunction of:


(NPC1) (Epistemic Inegalitarianism)

and:

(WC2) Any

belief that

is

justified

is

justified wholly

in

virtue

of

its

relations

to

other

beliefs,

the

justification of

more secure

beliefs

possibly depending upon

the

support

of

less secure

beliefs,

as

well as vice-versa

which

I

shall call

the 'Thesis

of

Weighted

MutualJustification'.

The last

type

of

theory

to

be

characterised is,

as

it

were,

intermediate

between Weak Foundationalism

and

Weak Co-

herentism,

so

I

shall call

it

'Foundherentism';


(NPC 1) (Epistemic Inegalitarianism)

and:

(FH2)

The

justification

of

more secure beliefs

may

depend upon

the

support

of less

secure

beliefs, as well as

vice-versa.

I will

refer to

(FH2)

as

'Up-and-Back-ism'. (I note that (WC2)

implies (FH2),

but not the other

way around.)

My

classification

of

types

of

epistemic theory

is

not

exhaustive,

and

it is

exclusive

only

in

a rather

restricted sense.

It is not

exhaustive,

because the

types of theory sketched all

share two

assumptions:

that

we

do have

knowledge,

and

that



9/16

150

SUSAN HAACK

knowledge

is

(at least)justified,

true belief. So

sceptical theories,

and

theories which

reject

this kind of definition

of

knowledge,

fall outside its scope.9 (Nor do I claim to have characterised

every possible type

of

theory

between

my two extremes, though

of course

I

hope

I

have

characterised

the

most

serious

options.)

The classification

s

exclusive

in this

sense: each of the types of

theory

I

have

sketched

is

incompatible

with

each of the others

with respect to any one conception of epistemic privilege, and

with respect to the same class of beliefs.

The former qualification

is

needed

because,

as

I

have

emphasised, there is more than one conception of epistemic

privilege (certainty, self-warrant, etc., etc.),

and

it

is

consistent

to subscribe to different types

of

theory

with

respect to different

conceptions

of

epistemic privilege.

The latter

qualification

is needed

because,

on the

assumption

of,

for

example,

a radical distinction between

logical

and

empirical knowledge,

it would be consistent to subscribe to

one

type

of

theory

with

regard

to the

one,

and another with

regard

to

the other.

It

might

be

useful,

in

view

of

this,

to

distinguish

between

local

and

global epistemic

theories-the latter

but not the

former

aspiring

to

apply

to all human

knowledge.

And with

this

distinction

in

hand,

it would

be

possible

to

characterise

'Contextualism ?

as

a form

of

local

foundationalism: withina

context

'form

of

life', society

or

whatever)

there are

privileged

beliefs and

justification

is

one-directional.

II

Perhaps

Pure

Foundationalism and Pure Coherentism, as I

have characterised

them,

are so

extreme

that no philosopher has

ever

seriously

held either

position.

But the

extreme theories are

nonetheless

important

to

an

understanding of the arguments

traditionally deployed in the debate between 'foundationalism'

and 'coherentism'.

(This

debate

has,

of

course, been conducted

without benefit of the scheme

of classification

I

have just offered;

so,

in

what

follows, my

use of the

terms 'foundationalism' (with a

small

'f)

and 'coherentism'

(with a small 'c') should not be

understood as

presupposing

that

scheme.)

Unless

foundationalism

is

true,

its

sympathisers sometimes



10/16

IDLE WHEELS VIEW

SCEPTICISM

(PF1) Dogmatism

NON-JUSTIFICATION

(NPF2*)

No beliefs are

DEFINITIONS

OF

justified

as

in

(PF2)

KNOWLEDGE

PURE

IMPURE FOUNDHERENTISM

W

FOUNDATIONALISM

FOUNDATIONALISM

(NPFI)

Fallibilism (N

(PF1) Dogmatism

(PFI) Dogmatism

(NPCl) Epitemic (N

Some

belief's are

absolutely

NPI

ptei(PC)Esem

Someurellef

are

absotutely

(IPF2) ImpureThesisof One- Inegalitarianism

DIrectional

_ustifica-

(FH2)

Up-and-Backism

So

(PF2) Strong,

Thesis

of

One-

hlon

. .

tha

Directional

Just~fication

All beliefs

which are

justified

beliefs

may depend

on less

(W

All

beliefs

which

arejustified

but not

absolutely

secure

are

seluebi as well as v

but

not

absolutely

secure are

Justifiedat leastin

part

by

the c

ii

bustifiewholybotorof spportofabsolutelysec

An

justified

wholly

by

support

of

support

of

absolutely

securewhlybmualspot

aboueyscr eiE eiEbsm loi atb

wh

absolutely

secure beliefs

beliefs;

some

also in

part

by

mo

mutual

support

les

WEAK

FOUNDATIONALISM

(NPFI) Fallibilism

(NPC1) EpistemicEgali-

larianism

(WF2)

Weak Thesis

of

One-

Directional

ustifica-

lion

Justification of less secure

be-

liefs

always depends

on

more

secure, not v-v.


11/16

152

SUSAN

HAACK

argue,

there

is no

way

in

which

our beliefscould

bejustified,

and

we should have

no

knowledge. Foundationalism must

be

accepted, because the only alternative is a surrender to

scepticism.

I

will call

this

the

'No

Tolerable Alternatives

Argument'.

Of course,

the

argument

depends upon

the

assumption that

scepticism

is

intolerable.

But I shall leave aside the issues raised

by

this

assumption,

to concentrate

on the claim that foundation-

alism

is the

only

alternative

to

scepticism.

The claim is that foundationalism offers

the

only possible

account of how a person'sbeliefscould bejustified. Suppose, the

argument goes,

someone believes

something

on the

basis

of

certain other

things

he

believes,

and that

he

holds these beliefs

on the

basis

of certain further beliefs,

. . .

and

so

on.

If

this

process eventually ends

with

beliefs

which

do

not

themselves

depend

on further

beliefs,

and

yet

which are themselves

secure,

the original

belief can be

justified.

But

not

otherwise;

not

if

the

process comes to an end

with

'terminal'

beliefs which are

insecure,

or if it does not come to an end at all, but

goes

round in

a

circle,

with

one belief

supported

by

others to

which,

in

turn,

it

lends

support.

Now, first, the

sort

of epistemic privilege

in

the terminal

beliefs

which is

called for

by

this

argument must, surely,

be

warrant-oriented.

he

plausible

assumption implicit

in the

argument

is

that

a person

cannot

be

justified

in

believing

something if he believes it on the basis of somethingelse he isnot

justified

in

believing.

More particularly,

second, what

the

argument requires s that

there

be terminal

beliefs which are

justifled,

but not

ustifed by the

supportof

other

beliefs.

For unless the

process

of

justification

eventually

reaches

beliefs which are not

dependent

on

further

beliefs,

it has not

come to an end.

So

what the

No

Tolerable

Alternatives

Argument

requires

is

that there be

some beliefs

which are, as I shall say, 'independently warranted'.

Some foundationalists

have,

I

think, had

in

mind

that

experiential

beliefs

have this status:

they

are

justified,

not

by

the

support

of other

beliefs,

but

by experience. Other foundationa-

lists,

of

a

less

empiricist11

tripe, have offered other candidates.

'Justified,

but not

by

the

support

of

other beliefs'

is

how I

would

make sense

of the

prima

facie

rather

puzzling claim

that



12/16

THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE: AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK

153

some

beliefs are

'self-justifying'.

It is also

a

possible

interpreta-

tion

of

the

suggestion

that

some beliefs 'do not stand in

need of

justification': they do not need justification by other beliefs,

since they

get

their

justification

elsewhere.

(I

suspect,however,

that if, at times, the

claim

that

purely

experiential beliefs do not

stand

in need

ofjustification

has

been meant more

literally

than

this,

it has been because of a confusion

between

an

experience

itself,

and a

belief

about

the

experience.)

Beliefs

which have some other kind of

epistemic

privilege,

but

are

not

independently

warranted,

may

be

epistemically

Idle

Wheels. (I do not want to enter, here, into the very complicated

considerations involved

in

the

question

of

the

logical relations

between

independent

warrant

and other

forms of

epistemic

privilege.

It will

suffice

to

point

out

that

if,

if

a

belief

is

independently

warranted,

it

follows

that

it

has some

other

type

of

epistemic

privilege,

the weaker

type

of

privilege is,

so to

speak,

implicitly required

by

the No Tolerable

Alternatives

Argument;

but

if,

if a belief

has

some other

type

of

privilege,

it

follows

that

it

is

independently

warranted,

the

stronger

type

of

epistemic

privilege

is

not

required, even

implicitly, by the No

Tolerable

Alternatives

Argument.)

The

No

Tolerable Alternatives

Argument

simply

dismisses

out

of hand the

idea that

the

process

of

justification

might 'go

round

in

a circle'.

Sympathisers

with

coherentismmight

protest

that

they propose

nothing

so

crass as

one

belief's

being justified

by the support of another, which depends on a further

belief,

. . .

which

depends

on

the

first;

he

'mutual

support' they

envisage,

to which the

foundationalist

disingenuously

refers as

'going

round

in

a

circle', is,

rather,

a

matter

of beliefs

deriving

their

justification

from

the

fact

that

they

belong

to

a

suitably

cohesive and

comprehensive

set

of

beliefs.

The

second

argument

I

want to

consider

is

an

explicit

critique

of this

proposal.

The

coherentist,

the

argument

goes, tries

to

give an

account of

justification purely in terms of the relationsamong a person's

beliefs,

with no

reference

to

anything

external,

over

and

above

the

beliefs themselves. But this

simply

cannot

be

done;

for

no

such

internal

relationswithin a

set

of

beliefs

could be

sufficientto

show them to be

justified.

There are

too

many

'coherent'

belief

sets,

and the coherentist

is

quite

unable to

discriminate

among

them.

(In

what

I

regard

as

its

most

plausible

form,

this

argument



13/16

154

SUSAN HAACK

points out,

in

particular,

that the coherentist has to allow that

a

person might bejustified

in beliefswhich are

wholly

disconnected

from his sensory experience, provided only that they cohere

internally

in an

appropriate way.)

I will call this the

'Drunken

Sailors

Argument' (justification,

in the coherentist

account,

is

like

two

drunken

sailors back

to

back-what are

they standing

on?).

This makes explicit what,

as I

suggested,

was

implicit

in

the

No Tolerable

Alternatives

Argument:

that an

acceptable theory

of

justification

must make

reference to

something beyond

a

person'sbeliefs.

Neither a Pure

nor

a Weak Coherentist

theory can allow

such

a

reference.

Foundationalist and

Foundherentist

theories, however, can

allow

it;

and those

which

spell

out the

notion of

(absolute

or

relative) epistemic privilege

in

terms of

independent warrant

do, implicitly, appeal

to

something

outside one's

beliefs.

Neither of the arguments considered here, however, shows

that an acceptable theory must admit absolutelyprivileged

beliefs.

One may,

I

take

it,

be more or

less

justified

in

believing

something.

The No Tolerable Alternatives

Argument

does not

establish

that

there must be

terminal beliefs

which

are

absolutely secure,

in the

sense of

completely justified, in-

dependently

of

the

support

of

furtherbeliefs.

Generally,

I

take it,

justification is,

so to

speak,

'diluted' as

one

passes from

supporting

beliefs

to

the beliefs

they support;

I

mean, that even

if

one

is

completely justified

in

some initial

beliefs,

one

will

usually

only

be

justified

to some extent in the

further

beliefs

one holds on

their basis.

Now,

if it

were

required

that in

order for a belief to

count as knowledge

one

should be completely justified in

holding it,

then

only epistemically privileged

beliefs

would

qualify

as

knowledge anyway,

and

the

foundationaliststructure

ofjustificationwould be simply irrelevant.If,on the otherhand,

it is

required only (as seems more plausible) that, in order for a

belief

to

count as

knowledge, one must have sufficient ustifica-

tion

for

holding it,

then

it

is

not

necessary

or the

terminal beliefs

to

be

completely justified independently

of

the support of other

beliefs;

it is

necessary only

that

they

be

justified enough to pass

on sufficient

justification

to

the rest.



14/16

THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE: AN

ANALYTIC

FRAMEWORK

155

And

it

would

be

sufficient,

to

meet the

Drunken

Sailors

Argument, to

allow

that there

are

some beliefs

which are at

least

partially justified otherwise than by the support of further

beliefs;

it is

not

necessary

that

there

be beliefs

which

are

completely justified

in this

way.

So if

these two

arguments

are

accepted,

they

leave

some

Inegalitarian

theories

(Weak

Foundationalism

and

Found-

herentism) as well

as the

Dogmatist

theories

(Pure and

Impure

Foundationalism)

in

the

field.

Let me next consider an

argument

used

by

sympathiserswith

coherentism.Foundationalism, it is sometimesargued, requires

there

to be

beliefs

which

are both

secure,

and

at the

same

time

rich

enough

in

content to

be

capable

of

supporting

the rest

of

one's

knowledge.

But no beliefs

could

be

both

secure

enough

and

rich

enough;

if

any

are

absolutely

secure,

it

can

only

be

because

they

have been so

stripped

of content

as to

take no

epistemic

risk,

and such

beliefs

would be

quite

incapable

of

serving

as

the

foundations for the rest of

one's

knowledge.

I

shall call

this

the

'Swings and Roundabouts

Argument'

(what

you gain

on

the

swings

of

security you

lose

on

the

roundabouts

of

content).

Though

it

is

vaguer

than

one

would like

as

to

exactly

what

the

relation is

between

security

and

content, still,

I

think, this

argument

has

some

plausibility

(especially,

perhaps,

in

view of

the

tendency

for

foundationalists to

restrict

the

content of

their

basic

beliefs when their

claim

to

security

is

under

threat).

The

chief point I want to make about the argumenthere is a simple

one: that

it is

the more

plausible

the

more

secure the

privileged

beliefs are

supposed

to

be,

and

the

greater

the

burden

of

the

support

of

unprivileged

beliefs

they

are

supposed

to

bear. This

means that

it is

most

persuasive

against

Pure

Foundationalism,

which

requires

its

privileged

beliefs to

be both

absolutely

secure

and

wholly responsible

for

the

justification

of

other

beliefs. It is

not

quite

so

persuasive

against

Impure

Foundationalism,

which,

though it requiresits privilegedbeliefsto be absolutelysecure,

does not

require

them to

be

quite

wholly responsible

for

the

support

of

other beliefs.

And it

need not

be

a serious

threat to

Weak

Foundationalism,

which,

not

requiring

absolute

security,

can start with

more

content in its

basic

beliefs

than

either

the

Pure or the

Impure

forms.

So,

of

the

types

of

theory

I

have

characterised,

it

looks as if



15/16

156

SUSAN

HAACK

two-Weak

Foundationalism

and

Foundherentism

(both:

with

respect

to independent

warrant)-may

be able to

survive

the

arguments of both sides in the traditional debate between

foundationalism

and

coherentism.

Of these

two

types

of

theory,

I

regard

Foundherentism

as the

more

plausible.

Central

among my

reasonsfor this

preference

is that

this

kind

of

theory

seemsto me able

to offer

a better account

of the role

of

experience

in

justification.

Like

Quine

(and

before

him, Dewey

and

Peirce),

I

conceive

of

the theoryof knowledgenaturalistically,as centrallyconcerned

with

the

ways

in which human

beings

learn about the world

by

means

of their

interactions

with

it.

And,

like

them,

I

think

of

experience

as

playing

an

important

role

in

the

justification

of a

person's

beliefs.

The

human

subjecthas experiences,

and

in the light of those

experiences

he

modifies

his beliefs.

Some of his beliefs

depend

largely

upon

experience,

some

largely upon

other beliefs of

his.

But none

depend

solely

on

experience;

for the beliefs he

already

has

affect

what beliefs

he

acquires

as

a

result

of

experience.

Weak Foundationalism,

like

Foundherentism,

is

Inegalitar-

ian,

and

so allows

that some beliefs

get more

of their

justification

than others

from

experience.

Weak Foundationa-

lism,

again

like

Foundherentism,

is

Fallibilist,

and so denies that

any

beliefs

are

completely

justified

by

experience

alone. But

while Foundherentism

can

explain

that

this

is

because even

beliefs very

close

to

experience depend

in

some small measure

upon

the

support

of

more

'theoretical'

beliefs (e.g.,

about

the

conditions

of

perception),

Weak Foundationalism

cannot;

which

is

a

reason

to

prefer

Foundherentism.This, of

course,

cuts

a

very long story very

short

indeed;

but

a

comprehensive

defense

of

Up-and-Back-ism

is

beyond

the

scope

of this

paper.12*

*

The final version ol

this

paper

was

written

up

while

I

was a

Visiting

Fellow

at the

Australian National University.

I

am

very grateful

to

Howard

Burdick for

detailed

comments on

a draft.



16/16

THEORIES OF

KNOWLEDGE: AN

ANALYTIC

FRAMEWORK

157

NOTES

'Sosa, E,

'The

Raft and the

Pyramid',

in MidwestStudies n

Philosophy, ,

ed.

French,

P. et al., Minnesota UP, p. 3.

2Sellars,

W.

'Empiricism

and the

Philosophy

of

Mind',

in

Science, erception

ndReality,

RKP, 1963, p. 170.

'But

cf.

Sosa, op. cit.,

and

Pollock, J.,

'A

Plethora

of

Epistemological Theories', in

Justification

nd

Knowledge,

d.

Pappas, G., Reidel, 1979,

93-113.

4A

usage

I

derive

from Peirce.

5Cf.

Alston, W. P., 'Varieties of Privileged Access',Americanhilosophical uarterly,,

1971, 223-41.

6Taking

the 'all'

as

in the

predicate

calculus.

'In 'Fallibilism and Necessity', Synthese, 1, 1979, 37-63,

without

benefit of this

framework,

I

used the term

'fallibilism'

to

refer to

one member of this family.

'Any

Egalitarian theory

which held that

all beliefsgot theirjustification

in

some other

way than

that

specified by (PC2)

would

be

a rival

of Pure

Foundationalism as strong as

Pure Coherentism;

but I know of no serious candidate.

'See e.g., Goldman, A.,

'A

Causal

Theory

of

Knowing',

Journal

of Philosophy,

4,

355-372.

Popper

would be another

example

of a writer who

rejects

the

justification

requirement; he is a sceptic with respect to justification, but not with respect to

knowledge.

'0See e.g., Wittgenstein, L.,

On

Certainty, lackwell, 1969;Annis, D., 'AContextualist

Theory of Epistemic Justification', American hilosophicalQuarterly, 5, 1978, 213-9.

I

would not want

this

to

suggest

that

I

regard

the

distinction

between 'empiricist'

and 'rationalist'

approaches

as

unproblematic;

it

might possibly

be

amenable

to

a

treatment roughly analogous

to the

one

I

have

employed

in

part

I

of this paper, with

approaches according

to

which

all

knowledge

derives from

experience

at one extreme

and

approaches according

to

which

all

knowledge

derives from reason at the other.

12

I

have discussed

this matter in much

more detail in two unpublished papers,

'Taking Away the given ' and

'An

Empire State Building Made Out of Toothpicks'(a

critique of C. I. Lewis's Impure Foundationalism).

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