Theodicy 4 6th Graders

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Theodicy for 6th Graders

Or, Why God does what he does.

R. J. Dullaart

4/25/2013



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Table of Contents

OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................... 2

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 3

1. THINKING ABOUT GOD ............................................................................................................ 5

2. COMMON GROUND ................................................................................................................ 7

3. THE SOMETHING GOD ............................................................................................................. 9

4. GREATNESS ............................................................................................................................ 11

5. EQUALITY ............................................................................................................................... 14

6. GOODNESS ............................................................................................................................. 17

7. THE PROBLEM OF POWER ..................................................................................................... 20

8. THE PROBLEM OF CREATION ................................................................................................. 22

9. RELATIONSHIP ....................................................................................................................... 24

10. CREATION ........................................................................................................................... 27

11. DECISION ............................................................................................................................ 29

12. SEPARATION ....................................................................................................................... 31

13. CHEMISTRY ......................................................................................................................... 33

14. THE WORLD ........................................................................................................................ 36

15. SUFFERING ......................................................................................................................... 39

16. THE FALL ............................................................................................................................. 41

17. THE GARDEN ...................................................................................................................... 43

18. REVELATION ....................................................................................................................... 46

19. BALANCE ............................................................................................................................ 49

20. ELECTION ............................................................................................................................ 51

21. HUMILITY ........................................................................................................................... 53

22. PRINCIPLES OF ELECTION ................................................................................................... 55

23. MERCY ................................................................................................................................ 59

24. REUNION ............................................................................................................................ 62



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OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT (FROM THE 2ND ESSAY ONWARDS)

2. There is something that is eternal about the cosmos and this something is not the physical

universe.

3. If God exists, God is identical to the eternal something about the cosmos.

4. The something God has roughly the same non-moral attributes as God traditionally has.5. Equality is the principle underlying all of God’s actions.

6. According to the principle of equality, God’s greatness means God’s goodness.

7. Infinite actions are not challenging for an infinite God; God might have to look for other

ways to express his greatness.

8. Free creatures or ‘little gods’ are the only things worth creating.

9. God would express the truths about the relationship between creature and creator in

creation.

10. Some form of separation is needed for freedom to be given a chance.

11. The free decisions God could require of us would be God-related decisions.

12. The separation will require a separation from the knowledge of God, it will continue for

some time and it will end.

13. For God to be faithful to his non-moral attributes God would have to distance himself

from inequality; distance causes further inequality, which causes further distance, etc.

14. To allow free God-related decisions the world must be almost entirely natural.

15. Suffering provides a powerful basis for a universal moral baseline, seeing as God cannot

tell us himself.

16. The only honest/representative separation would result in weak, dependent creatures –

dependent on God especially regarding their God-related choices.

17. This separation can only occur

18. This separation would have to occur all at the same time, via representatives, in a semi-

separated state.19. God would only reveal himself in ways that do not violate human decisions.

20. The world might be designed so as to preserve the balance necessary for free choice.

21. People are powerless when it comes to the most crucial God-related decisions so God

must choose (on the basis of other free decisions).

22. According to equality, humility is the cardinal virtue; humility preserves the role of God’s

decision and human agency in God’s choice, while retaining the truths about the

relationship between creature and creator.

23. God might choose according to other principles that are based on his greatness rather

than any human virtue; election allows for free choice to be most free and most widely

applied.24. Mercy is required to tolerate inequality; only God can provide mercy, on earth, as a man.



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INTRODUCTION

I was hoping to put off the matter of an introduction. I thought it would be tedious since I was

thinking of releasing this in blog format and since the first essay was something of an informal

introduction. But I thought I owed it to anyone that I delivered this to for comment to explain

something about the motivation and significance of the argument.

On the one hand, I have always wanted to write a book for children – something involving the

children that I teach; the problem is that I am not much good with making up stories. But I have

always thought deeply about God and so I thought a book about God might be more within my

range. So I set about to write the simplest book I could about God.

On the other hand, as I have said, I always thought deeply about God and about all the most

difficult questions of faith. I have tried to get to the bottom of every issue that concerned me.

And I am never content with any explanation until I see how it fits into a cohesive whole (Ilooked always for the explanation of the explanation of the explanation). So, essentially, I was

never very content, until, perhaps, recently.

I did not succeed in writing something for children. But I still hold fondly to this notion and hope

that some of my children might one day read it and that it would give them some structure to

their thinking about God. I hope it retains some simplicity and informality of the original intent.

As for the significance of the argument – it has long been possible to get some argument for the

existence of God (and a basic outline of God’s non-moral nature) from reason alone. But the

jump from there to a good God and a God that would behave in a certain way has, historically,been something of a bridge too far.

I never thought of it as such, but all my thinking about God started to become something of a

system, a system that perhaps could bridge this gap; a way to get something of an outline of

the crucial points of religion, mostly from reason, with a few facts from science and life thrown

in.

There are three things that I have done that have helped me to bridge this divide.

First, I have used the simplest facts about life and science so secure my rational conclusions.

Facts such as ‘there is something eternal about the universe’, ‘people only have one life as far

as we know’, ‘people die’ – simple facts. So I have not used pure reason but a combination of

simple logical conclusions and simple facts.

Second, I have made certain assumptions. They are assumptions with some backing and appeal

but they are still assumptions. My attitude has been to take a leaf from the scientific playbook,



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where an assumption (theory) is not judged only in isolation but according to what it can do;

according to its predictive value.

Third, where my assumptions lead me to a dead end, I used the assumptions to create

problems. Problems are the lifeblood of the intellect. A problem is problematic because it has a

narrow set of solutions. A problem is a hallway with a hundred doors but only one of them can

open. So at certain points in the argument I have proceeded by the use of problems.

The argument operates on a number of levels. On the Christian side, it is an argument for and

explanation of Christian theology. It is an attempt to solve certain theological difficulties with a

deeper understanding of the issues. It is a framework from which I hope to tackle other

theological problems.

On the non-Christian side, it is corrective against the non-religious and anti-religious who reject

God according to arguments that rely on sloppy thinking. In a way, it is a challenge to allreligions, to see if reason is not on the side of one religion only and to see if they could similarly

derive their core beliefs from reason alone.

As a Christian, this argument costs nothing. I have nothing invested in it. I do not believe

everything I have written and I don’t expect you to either. In fact, I urge you not to believe it. It

is a useful counterpoint to thinking about God; it might give you interesting insights into why

God does what he does; it might help you to see how things fit together, but it is not meant to

be true.

And if this argument in any way helps you to make sense of why God does what he does, thenremember that God must have far better reasons than any of the reasons that you will find in

here.



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1. THINKING ABOUT GOD

Everyone thinks about God. Religious people think about God. Spiritual people think about God.

Even people who do not believe in God think about God. They think about what God should do

but doesn't; about what God does do but shouldn't. They think about the idea of God, if only to

reject it. Everyone thinks about God.

Thinking about God is natural. It is part of being human to wonder if some greater personality

created us and everything around us. We were born to fathers and mothers – we give birth to

children – it is quite understandable that people would consider the possibility that humanity

itself came from some great Father or Mother – though it might not be true. We create (and I’m

not just talking about children, this time) so perhaps we were created. We think, so perhaps

some greater intelligence thought us up.

This is an idea, I would think, that would occur to any creature that attained any reasonablelevel of intelligence and self-awareness. So it is not just that we were Sunday-schooled into

thinking about God. God is an idea that occurs quite naturally; it suggests itself. And because it

is an idea that is so natural and so fundamental to our understanding of ourselves and our place

in the world, it is an idea we cannot ignore for long. So it is an idea that we must all embrace or

dismiss or put on the shelf for a time, but we must all confront it eventually.

So God is something that we all think about and we must. But not everyone thinks about God

the same. People have different ideas about God and these ideas come from different ways of

thinking. There are two broad ways of thinking about God. First, we can think about the sort of

God we would like to believe in and look for a religion (or invent one) that suits our

preferences. Thus, people find that they have a desire for spiritual fulfilment and they search

for a religion that they think suits them. Second, we can set our preferences aside and use

reason and facts about the world to get to some idea about what God must be like.

This, simply put, is a choice between putting theory first and putting facts first (speaking about

the facts of reason and science). And if we can learn anything from science, we know that we

must work from fact to theory and not twist the facts to suit any pet theory. This is perhaps the

core insight that makes the scientific worldview possible. But this insight is not limited just to

science; it is a way to minimize bias and let the facts speak for themselves. So any attempt atknowledge should work in this way, even when it comes to religious knowledge. At any rate, we

owe it to ourselves to see how this powerful insight might change our thinking when it comes

to religious matters.

Of course, science and religion are usually seen as quite separate. People mostly take this to

mean that while science requires a strict method, there are no rules when it comes to knowing



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about God. Religion is sacred; no one should interfere with someone else’s religion. People

should be unrestrained in their spiritual search. I am not, here, trying to interfere with religious

freedom; if anyone wants to continue seeking religious knowledge without any restrictions then

that is their choice. But even these people might be interested to see where a few basic facts

and a little logic might lead. The facts-first approach did not hold back our knowledge of thephysical world; we should at least explore its implications for the spiritual landscape.

It might surprise you to know that even people who do not believe in God could do with a little

more method. Interestingly, the non-theist or a-theist is just as prone to thinking wildly about

God as the religious fanatic. The difference is that the religious person thinks that they have

some direct, personal connection to spiritual knowledge while the non-theist thinks so little of

religion in general that they (understandably) do not give much consideration to their thoughts

about God. It is perhaps the atheists disdain for religion that makes them so especially

vulnerable to thinking carelessly about God.

But even the non-theist cannot dismiss thinking about God so lightly. After all, the average non-

theist has considered opinions about what God must be like, if he exists. Almost every

argument against God contains some assumption about what God would be like if he existed:

‘God wouldn’t make the world like that’; ‘God wouldn’t make religion this way’; ‘God wouldn’t

allow people to suffer’; ‘God wouldn’t make people like this and punish them for it'; Like it or

not, all these statements express considered opinions about the very nature and character of

God. It would, then, be extremely important not only for the theist but, also, for the non-theist

to check their thinking about God – even their atheism depends on it.



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2. COMMON GROUND

So what are the facts of a ‘facts first’ approach to religion? By facts, here, I mean only the

simplest facts from reason and science; facts that everyone could agree on, no matter what

they believe about the world or religion. There are many facts we might consider, but I want to

start with a fact that will be an appropriate place to start – because it is always appropriate to

start at the beginning – and because it will start us out on a firm footing. The fact I have in mind

is simply this: something in the cosmos (a term meaning more than just the observable

universe) has always existed; something about the cosmos is eternal.

There really seems no other way to make sense of our being here. And it doesn’t matter what

your beliefs about science or religion are, you will probably have no problem accepting this fact

– that something must have existed forever, whatever it may be. The only alternative is to say

that nothing in the universe existed forever, meaning that there was a time (before the first

thing) that nothing at all existed – no vacuum, no God, no laws, no energy, not even emptyspace – and that somehow something popped into being out of nonbeing.

Now, it is true that scientists sometimes say that the universe came into being from nothing,

but it usually turns out that they mean something like: the universe popped into being out of a

quantum vacuum that is very close to nothing or from forces that on balance seem to be

nothing or that whatever came before is very different to our notion of an ‘existing something’.

And I do not take issue with these arguments, here. I will even accept the somewhat forced use

of the word ‘nothing’ and will accept that the something that has always existed is this ‘barely

existing nothing’. Still, something about the cosmos has always existed.

And I think that it is probably fair to say that this something is not the physical universe. The

consensus of hard science on this question points towards the universe (including space and

time) having a definite beginning in the past, before which there was no physical universe. Of

course, there are speculative new theories proposed every day, but, right now, until such a time

as new evidence is discovered (or the evidence is radically reinterpreted) we can be as certain

of this fact as we can be of any fact in science. So, according to science, the ‘something’ that

has always existed is probably not the physical universe but something else (even if it is only a

‘barely existing nothing’.).

There are, also, arguments to this effect from philosophy and mathematics.

First, it seems that true infinites are not the sort of things that exist in nature. Calculations using

infinites yield wildly divergent answers. Infinity minus a finite number is infinity. Infinity minus

infinity is zero. Infinity minus all the odd numbers (half the numbers in the set) is still infinity.

Because of this, it seems that the infinite is just an idea; not something that exists in nature. At



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least, infinity is not a collection of finite things put together (like the universe) but rather

something that has no finite parts (so that we avoid the strange results of taking finite numbers

from it or taking away all the odd numbers from it).

Second, it seems plain that our material universe is not the sort of thing that can last forever.

Material things grow old and fall apart; the universe is no different. The universe will eventually

die – stars will burn out, the universe will cool and all life will most probably end. If the universe

had existed an eternity ago, then the universe would probably already be cold and dead. So it

stands to reason that the universe began to exist a limited time ago; and it is not itself eternal.

(It might be part of some continuous cycle, although the oscillating universe model does not

enjoy wide support these days.) So it seems relatively certain that something in the cosmos has

always existed and this something is not the physical universe.

(Not even the multiverse hypothesis can avoid these conclusions. First, there is well-established

scientific proof, which proves with certainty that even the multiverse would have to have abeginning a finite time ago. Second – even if we grant that the multiverse is infinite – it seems

unlikely that the innumerably many universes in a multiverse are actually the thing that is

infinite about the multiverse. These universes might have existed eternally, because there

cause existed eternally, but it seems unlikely that the universe would have existed at all without

their cause. Even in the multiverse, universes begin and end. So even if the multiverse is

eternal, it is probably not the physical universes within a multiverse that make the multiverse

eternal. So there is something in the multiverse that is itself eternal and this something is not

the physical universe.)

CORE PROPOSITIONS: There is something that is eternal about the cosmos and this

something is not the physical universe.



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3. THE SOMETHING GOD

This eternally existing thing might be an immaterial mind or a blind physical thing. (You might

have an opinion about which is more likely.) But, it seems clear, that if there is a God, that this

God must be identical to the first cause – by which I mean the eternally existing thing that has

somehow given rise to everything else; or, minimally, the eternal thing that has provided the

necessary conditions for everything else to begin to exist. Any other scenario – where God is not

the first cause – is going to be far more unlikely than the idea that God is the first cause.

For, if God exists but God is not the first cause, then we know two things: first, that the first

cause somehow gave rise to God; second, that the first cause somehow gave rise to a physical

universe as well. (Or the first cause might give rise to a God that created a universe or the first

cause gave rise to a universe that gave rise to a God.)

Now, it seems incredibly improbable that anything at all should exist, no matter what caused it – it would be astonishing that a first cause gave rise to a supernatural God; it would be

wondrous that a first cause allowed a natural universe to exist. But it is certainly vastly more

improbable that a first cause would give rise to a natural universe and a God! I don’t think

anyone would be tempted to believe that a first cause would give rise to a God and a universe.

But if anyone were tempted, the idea of a first cause giving rise to a universe and a God would

only increase our estimation that the universe had been designed by a greater mind. (After all, a

supreme being (God) is more unlikely to have arisen from natural processes than a universe; a

universe and a God arising together are even more unlikely still.) This leads us again to the

conclusion that God is identical to the first cause.

It seems, then, that we can conclude with relative certainty, that if there is a God, that God is

identical to the first cause. Now, at this point, I have said a lot about God without actually

saying what I mean by the term. This is because I do not want to make any assumptions about

God. There is, also, a sense in which the word ‘God’ only applies to an infinitely great deity and

a being without superiors. But we will not rely on these preconceptions – we will see over the

course of the argument if there is anything else that we can say about what God is like. And

that is precisely what we are about to do.

So what we have here is something of a marriage of God and a single element of science (thesomething that has always existed); I imagine that if a scientifically-minded person was to take

science seriously, and the idea of God seriously, this is the sort of union they would come to. It

is a notable fact, however, that the non-religious person almost always thinks of God in entirely

religious terms (which they find incredible) and almost never thinks about the God they would

actually believe in, if they believed. Thus, the non-religious person rejects what they see as a

weak version of God, while not even considering the version of God they would be more likely



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to believe in, given their scientific inclinations. (It is generally not advised to reject the weakest

version of an argument; one of the reasons being that the strongest version might still be true.)

So I think the non-religious person owes it to themselves to consider, not just the religious view

of God, but a view of God that is freed from all the baggage of religion – a God that is the result

of combining God and that eternal something about the universe. The religious person also

owes it to themself to set aside their dogmas and to consider this more neutral God, so that

they can see if this God backs their religion or not. So there is a challenge, here, for the religious

and the non-religious: for the religious it is to think about a God that is a result of a marriage of

science and reason – a God that might not resemble their own; for the non-religious person, it

is to think about God at all.

(I cannot promise that this God will always fit in neatly with all the scientific dogmas of our day,

any more than I can promise it will not contradict some religious views – because it

undoubtedly will. Certainly, if we assume the existence of God, we simultaneously reject theidea that the natural world is all that exists and we allow that God might intervene in the

physical world – though we would need some compelling reason to think that he would. So,

although we started from a marriage of one part of the natural world to God, this was just a

starting point; from here on out we see what reason can tell us about this strange not-quite-

scientific but not-quite-religious God.)

CORE PROPOSITIONS: If God exists, God is identical to the eternal something about the

cosmos.



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4. GREATNESS

So, if God exists, we know that this God must be the same as this eternal something. It follows,

then, that God will share the qualities of this eternal thing. Thus, we can look at the eternal

something – the thing that caused or just allowed everything else – and see what God must be

like, if he exists. This would not be the God of religion or of spiritual imagination but rather it

would be the God that might exist in this universe (or in some sense above and beyond it) given

what we know about the cosmos, particularly the eternal something about the cosmos (even if

we know very little about it).

What, then, can we tell about this eternal something in the universe?

First, most obviously, this eternal something is, well, eternal . This is the only way to make sense

of anything existing. Something about the universe must be eternal and this is it. It follows,

then, that if God exists, and if God and the eternal thing are one in the same, then God must beeternal.

Second, this eternal thing is immaterial . If we go by the consensus of science on the issue it

would seem that the universe had a beginning. This means, of course, that what came before

the universe is in some sense quite different to the universe, otherwise we could not say that

the universe began as a separate, distinct thing. (If the universe was the same as what came

before, we would not say it began, we would just say it had always been there.) So, if the

universe began, then the thing that came before it must be quite different to it.

But there is more to it than that. The things around us – the physical things; the material things – they grow old, they degrade and they fall apart. An eternal thing is not likely to be made of

this sort of stuff. What is more, as we have seen, infinite things cannot be made up of finite

things. So it seems that we have an eternal thing that is very different to the stuff around us,

something that doesn’t grow old, and something that is not made of finite parts. This stuff is so

different to the material that we know that we might call it 'immaterial'. So God, if he exists,

would be in some sense immaterial.

Third, this eternal thing is transcendent . Although it seems incomprehensible to us, science tells

us that space and time itself were created at the moment of the big bang. But an experience of space and time is hardwired into our brain so that we cannot think about a ‘situation’ (I wanted

to say a place and time) where space and time did not exist. We literally cannot get the idea of

space and time out of our heads. So it means very little to us to say that there is a setting where

time and space do not exist. But science tells us there is such a timeless and spaceless reality

and we might call this reality 'transcendent' in the sense that it transcends space and time. If

God exists, then, and God is the same as the eternal something, it follows that God transcends



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time and space. (This might mean something like to say that God is eternal and omnipresent, or

those words might just be the interpretations of minds that cannot help but see things in terms

of space and time.)

Forth, this eternal something is potent. Look around you. Everything that you see somehow

originated from the eternal something about the cosmos. That’s a whole lot of space, time,

energy and matter (dark or otherwise). Now, for the eternal something to give rise to

something on this scale (though the scale is somewhat subjective) would make it, in some

sense, quite powerful. I’m not sure it matters how it came about – whether by some sort of

cause or by providing the right conditions (another sort of cause) – the fact remains that the

eternal something gave rise to a universe, and that is nothing to be scoffed at. So the eternal

something is in some sense powerful – a power which might be far greater than the power

required for making a universe – and God, if he exists, would have an identical power.

(Of course, if we factor in the multiverse hypothesis it would only strengthen this conclusion.On some versions of the theory there are a near infinite number of universes, which would

make for near infinite power.)

Last, this eternal thing is intelligent. Of course, at this point we haven’t yet considered that the

eternal something might include a mind of sorts. But, for the sake of argument, we have

assumed God’s existence and we argued that God and the eternal something are the same

thing. So if we think of God as the eternal something – and there is really no other way – then

we would have some reason to think that God is considerably intelligent. There are two broad

evidences of the intelligence of God. One, the presence of intelligent creatures would suggest abeing of probably far greater intelligence than the minds he created. Two, the complexity and

organization of life and the universe, including the fine-tuning of the universe would suggest a

creator of considerable intelligence (Assuming, that he did not do these things by accident,

which I think is a reasonable assumption). We cannot say precisely how intelligent this being

might be, but it would have to be far beyond our own intelligence. (Given the multiverse, we

might think more or less of this intelligence depending on the nature of the other universes.)

So, if God and the eternal something are the very same thing, then this something God is a

being that is eternal, immaterial, transcendent, powerful and intelligent. Of course, the first

thing anyone is likely to notice about this description is that it is rather close to what certain

religious traditions have said about God all along. And we might interpret this fact in one of two

ways. First, we might think that the fact that religion got it right all along is because they were

plugged into some genuine source of religious knowledge. Second, we might think that religions

got it all along because they had some rational intuition about God or the cosmos – a vague



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apprehension of the sorts of arguments we have just discussed – and so they incorporated this

idea into their religion. Either alternative is possible.

But I would like to go a step further and to say that God, if he exists, and if he is the same as the

eternal something, is not just very big and intelligent – I would like to make the leap to infinite

power and intelligence. Because it seems to me that the first something cannot be a halfway

sort of thing. We are looking for something, here, that plugs the gap at the beginning of

everything. A terminator to the infinite regress of what caused the universe, and what caused

that, etc. There seems no other way to think of this eternal something than as extreme. If we

turn the tables, we might consider how absurd it would be for this first thing to be not quite

eternal and not quite transcendent and only reasonably powerful and intelligent – it just seems

absurd for this eternal thing to have shortcomings.

But you do not have to accept this argument. The majority of the argument to come does not

depend on infinite attributes and so I will not insist on it. But I would like you to have somesense of the mind-boggling extremity of a being that is the same as the eternal something

about the cosmos and – even though the argument does not depend on it – I will sometimes

lapse into talking about God as infinite. It would not be too contrary to the argument to just

assume God’s infinity either. We did not want to assume anything about God because we

wanted the facts to speak for themselves. But now that we are so close to a traditional view of

God, perhaps it would not be too much to proceed with the notion of a God that is infinite in

every sense. (That, and it is tedious to continually have to say ‘near infinite’ and it is

comfortable to be able to say ‘all-powerful’ and ‘all-knowing’, etc.)

CORE PROPOSITION: The something God has roughly the same non-moral attributes as God

traditionally has.



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5. EQUALITY

So we have painted in broad strokes – broad strokes were needed – the nature of a God that is

the same as the eternal thing in the cosmos. Now, one takeaway point for the religious and

non-religious person is that if God exists, and God is the same as the eternal thing about the

universe, then their can really be no wishing that God is one way or another, any more than

wishing that the eternal something about the cosmos were different. If God exists, he is what

he is; his personality (we have, after all, noted that God would be intelligent) might be flexible,

but his non-moral nature is surely fixed (at least, wishful thinking would not be the thing to

change it). It seems utterly useless, then, to think – as many do, on all sides – that God is a

blank canvas, subject to the whims of our imagination. We must do some serious thinking

about God if we wish to get anywhere.

Of course, it is not guaranteed that God’s personality would be flexible. If God’s character is in

any way influenced by his non-moral nature – as seems likely – then it stands to reason that hispersonality might be equally fixed on some points or on all points. There are, in fact, three basic

ways to think of God’s actions (actions being how personality is expressed and judged). Either

God’s actions are due to choice, obligation or necessity. That is, either God chooses freely what

to do or God is obligated to do the things he does (and he chooses to do his duty) or God has no

choice, he simply has to do something. And if we do think that God ’s nature completely

controls his personality and actions, then we might be looking more at a case of necessity.

I will leave it up to you to decide whether God’s actions are the result of choice, obligation or

necessity – surely, some combination is possible – but we are, here, considering a principle that

might underlie God’s actions, that might help us predict what God would or wouldn’t do; a

principle that will guide our discussion for some time to come.

Now, this must be a very special principle if it is going to be worth seeing out. It must be a

standout principle that naturally suggests itself as the only principle worth considering. The

value of it must be undeniable. (Now, again, truth is not the most important thing; it must be a

principle that is worthwhile considering, whether true or not.) And I need everyone – the

religious, non-religious and everyone else – to agree that this principle is a suitable, neutral

starting point.

There is only one principle – to my mind – that fits the bill and I think that you will agree that it

is the only suitable starting point for thinking about how God would act. We might call it the

principle of equality , which, broadly, says that God must act equally to all things – to himself, to

us, to everything. We might say that God this means that God acts reasonably, rationally, rightly

or fittingly, which is all the same thing. And, by acting ‘equally’ to things I mean, amongst other



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things, that God must not misrepresent himself or us. This principle is sublimely simple, yet it

underlies all areas of human knowledge, and it is the only assumption worth starting out with.

Here are some reasons that equality is the only principle worth thinking about.

First, consider how this principle underlies all areas of human knowledge. All math and scienceare merely about spotting as many equalities as possible. Reason is about seeing what

conclusion follows from certain facts; put differently, it is about what premises equal a certain

conclusion. Truth is merely a matter of saying what is equal to reality and what is not. Justice is

about making sure that people get equal punishments, compensations and opportunities.

Morality is about ensuring that people act equally towards each other. So we are in good

company when considering equality; no other principle could have the same credentials.

Second, equality is axiomatic. There is a reason that equality gets around so much; it is a basic

principle of human thought and it cannot be doubted. Equality makes all thinking possible. Todoubt equality; to doubt that one plus one really equals two, is completely absurd and

unthinkable. So we could not pick a surer footing on which to start our discussion of God’s

actions.

Third, equality is content-less. Equality itself is nothing – it is the equal sign in the equation, the

only content lies on either side of it. It takes its content from any outside thing (God, people,

animals, things). In this way, it is different to any other principle we might choose. Any other

principle has content – an opinion, a leaning, a goal. Take any principle that might guide God’s

actions, ‘God acts to make people happy’ or ‘God only looks out for himself’. But there are

hundreds of such principles and if you choose one you must say why you chose it above all the

others. And there will always be someone who disagrees with your choice because they prefer

another explanation.

But equality sidesteps all this; equality gets all its data from outside things, it has no opinions,

priorities or desired outcomes. So, first, it is not in competition with any other theories because

it contains no added content (so it is not open to being called arbitrary). Second, it is the

simplest, most basic theory imaginable and so a fitting place to begin (you would have to see

where it leads even if you did not start with it). Third, because it lacks content it is remarkably

free from any bias. (The only bias comes in when we start using it.) So, again, equalitycommends itself – for so many reasons – as the only principle worth considering for our

discussion.

Forth, it is predictable. Because equality lacks content – and gets all its content from outside – it

is probably the fullest sense in which something may be called predictable. The object itself

(whatever we feed into the equation) is precisely what we will get out. It doesn’t matter what



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we put in, we get out what is equal to it. This is not the same for any other principle. Take the

principle that ‘God acts so as to maximise his own happiness’. Now, it is not sure what this

principle would mean from situation to situation (or even in general). So we would have

problems with applying such a principle to every new situation, and every new situation would

require an argument to settle how God would proceed. What is more, this principle would nottell us how swift or harsh or generous God would be in achieving his end. So it would tell us

nothing about the size or quality of God’s action. But equality might tell us exactly what God

would do and how he would do it with regard to each and every new object or action, in the

way that a mirror easily reflects new things. So equality is the only principle that has any hope

of being practically useful (in the sense that it will allow us to predict God’s actions without

resulting in endless discussions). So, again, equality stands out as the only principle worth

proceeding with.

So we have an excellent principle to proceed with, one which promises to yield a fruitful

discussion: it is sublimely simple, unquestionably important, incredibly powerful and

remarkably unbiased. It is, also, the only principle that we could think of moving forward with,

practically speaking. Even if you favour another explanation, there is no doubt that this is a

principle worth pursuing and we really do owe it to ourselves to see where it will lead.

CORE PROPOSITION: Equality is the principle underlying all of God’s actions.



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6. GOODNESS

So we know that God, if he exists, must be eternal, transcendent, powerful and intelligent. And

we now, also, have a rule that promises to tell us what God is like and what God will do – the

principle of equality, which seemed a worthy principle. But we do not yet know quite what to

do with the principle and we cannot be over-enthusiastic about it until we see how it is applied.

Equality, we said, is about treating things like they really are. For starters, God must be honest

about himself wherever possible and must not misrepresent himself. God must be honest

about people wherever possible and not misrepresent them. God must be honest about the

relationship between himself and people and wherever possible God must not misrepresent

this relationship. In fact, God must represent everything equally, as it really is, and not make

anything out to be more or less than it really is.

(This is just one part of the principle of equality; the part that has to do with how God treatsthings. There is, also, the part about how people should treat God and how people should treat

each other. The principle of equality would have something to say about these things as well.

We could look at equality as the basis for a moral system or just a rule of behaviour; either

option is acceptable for the argument to come.)

Now, on the face of things, we have not said anything too difficult to believe. All that this really

adds up to is saying something like, ‘God must act his attributes’ or ‘God must act how he really

is’ or – to make it even simpler – ‘God must be himself’. There is nothing particularly

objectionable about that. Indeed, it seems self-evident that God would act like himself. It seems

only natural that God’s non-moral nature – his eternality, transcendence, power and

intelligence – would influence his personality and behaviour. It seems only natural that God

would express his non-moral nature fully and, with that, God would not make himself out to be

different than he really was.

After all, as people we know that a person’s non-moral nature – their genes and the

environment they grow up in – greatly influence who they will be and how they will act. It

might be exactly the same for God. In fact, it might be much worse. For, although we have not

had a lot of time to find ourselves – so we act unevenly in any case – God has had an eternity to

come to terms with who he is and it seems likely that over this time God would have a moresettled character and pattern of behaviour. Moreover, there is no way to tell how infinite (or

near-infinite) non-moral attributes would cause God’s moral nature to be fixed.

Of course, a free being can act however it wants. People can act unpredictably, so perhaps God

could also act out of sorts. But the point, I think, is that it takes more effort to go against your

(eternal and near-infinite) nature than to go with it. So, also, it takes more to believe that God



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would act unlike himself – unlike his eternality, power, intelligence, etc. And, although we

might allow that someone would change a small part of their personality, it is more unlikely

that anyone would change everything about themselves – especially a God with such a

pronounced non-moral nature. So it is clearly more reasonable to think that God would act in

line with his non-moral nature than to think that he would not – particularly because God is aneternal, near-infinite being.

And I don’t think a lot of people realise this when they say that God would act this way or that.

Yes, it is conceivable that God could act unpredictably, but it is difficult to see how God could

overcome the drive of his non-moral nature. But there is something else people do not realise

about God, and that is that for God to act in line with his nature is the same as to say ‘God is

good’. I mean that for God to behave in line with his non -moral attributes is all that is needed

to make God perfectly good. In other words, God’s moral attributes flow from his non-moral

attributes if we only assume that God would represent himself as he is.

You see, what people do not realise is that all wrongdoing is ultimately a sign of weakness. A

being that can create anything does not need to get jealous and steal something. A being that

does not make mistakes does not have to cheat to get what it wants or lie to cover it up. Such a

being does not need to get angry and frustrated – perhaps even violent – when things don’t go

his way, because a wise being would never find itself in that situation and a powerful being

could easily make everything go his way. Being big and powerful and without limits takes away

half the reason to do anything bad. So, to avoid all these things, an infinitely powerful and wise

being just has to act powerful and wise.

And not only does this mean that God would find wrongdoing quite uninteresting; it also means

that God would have certain virtues. For, to be equal to oneself at all times (assuming your

nature does not change) is the same as being perfectly consistent or constant or the same as

having integrity. To be equal about everything is the same as being perfectly honest and

truthful. Moreover, if such a being were to say or promise something, they would never go back

on their word – and they would not have the need to. We could call this reliability or

faithfulness. So we have a perfectly even-handed God, just from saying that God would act

equally to all things.

Now, this answers at least two common mistakes in thinking about God. First, some people

think, ‘even if God exists, who is to say he is good?’ Second, people think, ‘but God could just as

easily be evil as good’ But as you can see, God is good just because he is great and he acts like

it. It is not like good and evil are on a level for God: the first requires God to be himself, the

second requires God to forget what he is and to act against his nature. And it is not just

intellectual for God; God’s attributes are likely to influence his behaviour, like a human’s genes



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influence their actions. It would take quite a lot to explain how God’s attributes would result in

a moral nature that was completely out of sync with his attributes. So anyone who thinks these

things is automatically on the back foot.

Shifting focus, now, back to the principle of equality, we have assumed that God would never

allow any inequality whatsoever. That is the assumption we have made as it allowed the

argument to proceed and seemed the only worthwhile assumption to make. But there might

come a time when God desired to allow some inequality for some reason. Such an inequality

might be permitted providing that there was no way around it, that allowing the inequality

achieved some greater good that could not be got otherwise, that the inequality was no greater

than it needed to be, that the inequality would be balanced eventually and that it is perfectly

and completely balanced when the time comes. Under these conditions we might just allow

some inequality to enter our equation, but only if it cannot be avoided.

Core propositions: According to the principle of equality, God’s greatness means God’sgoodness.



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7. THE PROBLEM OF POWER

There is another implication of the rule of equality that I would like to briefly pursue, here.

Equality suggests that God must be honest about himself. But would it be enough for God to

just exist timelessly without lifting a finger and without any other being even knowing he

existed? Now, in one sense, this would be perfectly honest – God would simply be being

himself and not misrepresenting himself. But, in another sense, God is not being himself – not

fully – in the sense that God is not expressing his nature in action.

Then again, perhaps God – at rest – is equally glorious to God in action. Still, it is perhaps similar

to the question of the tree falling in the forest. If God exists timelessly alone – without being

seen or heard from by another soul – is that enough? Perhaps, then, observers of some sort are

essential for a full, active expression of glory. Perhaps it is a case of good, better, best: God on

his own and at rest would be perfectly good, God in full tilt would be better, God at full tilt with

observers would be best. Perhaps, then, we are all here for the fullest, most equal expression of God possible.

But there is a paradox and a puzzle in all of this. God has infinite or near-infinite power and

intelligence. That means the power to produce an infinite numbers of burning suns and the

intelligence to generate an infinitely complex and detailed multiverse. But for the being of

infinite power, a mere infinite expression of power or wisdom might, paradoxically, not be a full

expression of his greatness. Yes, it would certainly be incomprehensibly great to us but for God

it would be humdrum. An infinitely powerful, infinitely intelligent fireworks display, for

instance, would on some level be the most mundane expression of infinite glory, because these

attributes are being expressed in the most uncreative and straightforward of ways.

The question, I suppose, is how God might express both his intelligence and his power in a way

that was not quite so straightforward; in a way that was more interesting and challenging for

God. Perhaps God might opt for a scenario where he was up against obstacles that posed a very

real challenge to himself. For surely expressing infinite glory is good, but expressing infinite

glory while overcoming (possibly infinite) obstacles would be better. And perhaps, it would be

best for God to overcome (possibly infinite) obstacles without having to resort to infinite power

and intelligence – some sort of voluntary handicap scenario.

Now this whole subject might seem speculative; we started on an uncertain premise, and we

finished with an uncertain solution. And so I will not speculate on the subject any further. But

there is a very real problem here, no matter how we started or how we finished. It is a very real

problem for God to find a fuller expression of his greatness than the easy and predictable

flexing of infinite muscles. It would be spectacular to be sure, but not for God. And as for the

solution, we might not know exactly what God might do, but it is a certainty that in order for



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God to express his greatness in a way that better suited his intelligence he might have to do

some pretty radical and unexpected things. And we will leave it there for now.

Core propositions: Infinite actions are not challenging for an infinite God; God might have to

look for other ways to express his greatness.



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8. THE PROBLEM OF CREATION

We haven’t yet arrived at the conclusion that God would create anything. But we are here, and

we live in a physical universe, so it seems plausible that if God does exist, and God is the same

as the eternal something, then God did create us. It would certainly be a remarkable

coincidence if God exists, did not create us, and yet we developed as intelligent beings that

could ask such questions about God. It seems far more likely that, if God exists, he created us

deliberately as intelligent creatures that could think about God.

But – even if we do not know that God would create – we can still ask the question, ‘what

would God create, if he were to create anything?’ And it is not such a simple question as you

might expect; in fact, it is quite problematic. And people who think about God sometimes pose

this as a problem for God and religion: ‘a perfect being lacks nothing, so a perfect being

wouldn’t create,’ and, ‘if a being created something, it would show that they lacked something

and they aren’t perfect.’

Now, this problem is easily solvable. Creation only implies imperfection if the creation issues

from some deficiency on the part of the creator. If God were to create, say, for pure enjoyment;

this would not show any serious lack. Admittedly, it would show some unfulfilled desire, but

not a desire that issued from any flaw in the creators nature. Now, for the purpose of our

argument we can allow this sort of ‘lack’; which only implies that God has desires. (After all, the

argument has no interest in proving that God is perfect . That is something that a religiously-

motivated argument would do; we are just following the non-religious argument.) And why

shouldn’t God have desires? It would seem odd to accuse an all-powerful, all-wise being of

imperfection for wanting to express his attributes.

But there is another problem, here, that someone thinking about God might ask – ‘What would

be worthwhile for God to create?’ And this question is slightly more difficult to answer. And the

problem, roughly, is that an all-powerful, all-wise God (or something close) would have a

problem finding anything to do that was remotely challenging or interesting. And the reason for

this is that for such a God even the most intricate and delicate and complicated and immense

projects would be as simple as ‘1+1’ is to a human – there is just no challenge in it for an infinite

God. Such a project might be utterly fantastic to us, but it would hardly be inspirational for God.

This is perhaps the riddle of how God can get something that he does not already have. For, in

one sense, there is really nothing to any project of creation – no matter how splendorous or

sophisticated – that God did not foresee in every detail. The act of creating it does not add

anything to God that he did not have perfectly in mind beforehand. And, upon creating this

project, God does not gain any resources that he did not already have within himself. So



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nothing God does actually fits the description, ‘creation,’ in the sense of making something new

– except, that is, for one thing.

So it is a very good question to ask and there is only one answer to it. The motivation for God’s

creation cannot come from intricacy or delicacy or immensity; it must come from a radically

different sort of project. You see, the only thing that would be worthwhile creating – the only

thing that has a value quite apart from its nature – is God himself. The only thing worth creating

for God, then, would be more Gods. The only thing worth creating for is the thing that can

create. Little Gods, perhaps, capable of intelligent thought and self-determination – that is the

only thing that could interest God (and not because the creatures are unpredictable or

complicated either, but because persons are valuable just for being persons.)

This is the answer to the riddle, ‘How can a God who lacks nothing, gain something?’ or 'How

can the God who has everything create something new?' God creates another creator. The act

of creating this being might not be difficult or significant, but at that moment something newenters existence; something significant, something that had not existed for an eternity. Another

‘god’, whose actions God does not directly choose or cause. At that moment, something, well,

not-God enters existence, to choose its own path, its own direction. These beings might be as

significant as God is significant – perhaps not on the same scale – depending on how God

created them, but in some scaled down sense. So if God himself is in some way worthwhile,

then souls would be worthwhile in the same way.

We have already shown that for God to desire to act is only a slight – hardly with mentioning –

form of weakness – certainly it is not on a par with some flaw in God’s non -moral attributes.But maybe there is someone who thinks that this is still a sign of imperfection – that God felt

the desire to create little gods, as though God were lonely. Perhaps, then, it would help to think

of it another way. Yes, God did desire to create on some level. But perhaps God did not create

for himself but for those he created. Perhaps it was not because he desired beings to study or

prod, but to give these creatures an experience of the greatest thing imaginable – himself . The

desire that leads to this action would not imply any real lack, but merely a desire to share his

greatness – not anything to do with weakness – with created things.

Core propositions: Free creatures or ‘little gods’ are the only things worth creating.



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9. RELATIONSHIP

We are now getting to the part of the argument that has to do – not just with God – but with

any possible interactions that God might have with any possible, ‘little gods’. Now, above all

else, according to the principle of equality, any interaction between God and man must be

honest, representing all parties precisely as they truly are – God would have to make sure of it.

And God would have to so order things that the truths of who God is and who the creature is

would be kept intact. And there are a few basic truths about the relationship between God and

man that God would preserve (as a matter of choice, obligation or necessity).

First, it is a relationship of infinite inequality . No matter how well God makes us, we will always

be finite and God will always be infinite. And I shouldn’t have to point out that the difference

between something finite and infinite is an infinite difference. If God is bound to act in a way

that is proportionate to man; that is, if God is bound to act equally to man, then this infinite

difference might be reflected in God’s actions. (This is not to say that God would completelydisregard people – if God creates something, it would not do for him to disregard it. That would

not be an equal action either; it would not be equal to his purpose and the act of his making the

thing.)

Second, it is a relationship of complete dependence. God is the only being that just exists on his

own; everything else depends on God for its existence. That means that the relationship

between creature and creator is crucially important for the creature. If God were to withdraw

whatever influence sustains his creation – even slightly – there would be some effect, and that

effect would plausibly not be healthy or comfortable for the creature. And, again, if God is

going to act equally towards this relationship, he would make sure that the true nature of the

relationship is not neglected. This might sound something like a threat that God would ‘keep

people in their place’, but for now we will call it keeping people honest , and we must mention

this as it is in keeping with the principle of equality that is the foundation of this investigation.

Third, it is a relationship of infinite consequence. An infinite God has everything to offer. It is in

God’s power to create a paradise for people or a hell. But more than that – there is the

possibility that an infinitely great God would himself be something desirable. Of course, the

experience of God himself could also be terrifying and painful, like experiencing a sun. Or

perhaps the pleasure or pain of experiencing God depends on the makeup of the creature? So

we cannot say that the experience of God will be good or bad. (The experience of God would

probably not be something in-between. God is nothing in-between; God by his very nature is

extreme. And any interaction – if it is honest – must reflect this fact, and God would have to

work things out so that any experience with him reflected this fact, unless God had some



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overriding purpose in putting off this extreme encounter.) So the relationship between God and

man is one of potentially infinite consequence – as infinite as God is infinite.

Forth, whether pleasurable or painful, it stands to reason that an encounter with God would be

life-changing to say the least. It might tear us apart or fill us to overflowing, but we would not

walk away from it unchanged – if we could walk away from it. I think, at the very least, an

encounter with God would completely overpower our will. We might think of this as being left

speechless or in awe – a slack-jawed wonder that I do not think would ever fade away. God

might give us a will that could withstand the effect of God’s greatness – that ought to make us

less like wide-eyed zombies but that would not be the end of the life-changing effects of

experiencing God. (It would not be in keeping with the principle of equality for God to make

himself any less impressive than he really is, especially given the infinite inequality between

God and his creation.) And whatever the effect of experiencing God would be, it stands to

reason that it would be as powerful as God is powerful.

Fifth, it is a relationship governed by equality. Everything about this relationship: how each

must treat the other, the terms of friendship or enmity – if either of these things are a

possibility – everything that matters would be governed by the principle of equality. This is not

to say that there is no room for choice or initiative. It is also not to say that God is just a blind

physical force like gravity that must behave in a certain way, but for our purposes we assume

that he will – whether he must or because he chooses to. But whether or not these things are

the result of necessity or the result of choice, they are not a result of arbitrary decisions; they

are not a result of decisions that happen in a vacuum. These are decisions that are guided by

the principle that underlies fairness and justice; the principle that is fairness and justice itself.And these things would be important, because God is important and because the relationship

between God and man is so important.

Now, I must just take a moment to address a very common idea about God held by the anti-

religious. The anti-religious person is repulsed by, and rebels against, the idea of a God that

rules over things absolutely, that ‘bosses people around’, that makes people utterly dependent

on himself (the word, ‘dictator’ often pops up). About this sort of thing, notice, first, that this is

not any kind of argument but just a pejorative interpretation of the facts – it is mere spin.

Second, if God exists, facts such as the infinite inequality between creature and creator and the

infinite dependence of creature on creator would be indisputable realities and a God that

ordered things in keeping with these truths would be nothing other than accurate and truthful

and (though we might not like fairness in this case) fair. Third, liking something is irrelevant to

its truth; the real question should be, 'Do the facts call for it?' – And in this case they certainly

do. It used to be the specialisation of religious people to reject thinks on the basis of feelings; it

seems the anti-religious have been feeling left out.



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Core propositions: God would express the truths about the relationship between creature

and creator in creation.



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10. CREATION

We have not established with certainty that God would create, though this seems a possible

outcome of the principle of equality – that God would actively express himself, even to

observers. (By ‘creation’ I mean something like ‘the arrangement and purpose of the world and

its free creatures’.) Still, let us consider what God might create if he were inclined to create. We

have already noted that the only thing that makes creation worthwhile – for an infinite or near-

infinite being – is free creatures with the power for self-determination. Further than that, we

can be assured that God would order creation so that it would preserve certain truths about

the relationship between creature and creator.

Of course, there might be many ways to preserve these truths and to incorporate freedom into

the world and its workings. Even so, there are certain basic choices, regarding a creation that

we can examine in the light of the principles we have outlined in the course of the argument.

The first and most basic scheme of creation (because it posits only God and free creatures and

nothing in-between) is that people would be put straight into the immediate experience of

God. No lengthy prologue or preamble; just creatures, born into God’s presence. And let’s

assume that this is a pleasurable experience of God’s presence, although it might just as equally

be terrible, like landing on the surface of a star. But immediately, in this scenario, we hit upon a

serious conflict – a conflict we have already gestured at. For it seems that creatures cannot be

significantly free in the undiluted presence of God. Such creatures could hardly make up their

minds freely about God and how to behave around him – which are the most important choices

that could possibly be made.

We noted previously that the non-religious person is apt to call God a dictator. That is an

unfortunate but inevitable side-effect of being a supreme being that is (necessarily) in control

of everything. But if you think God is dictatorial now, just imagine being thrust – without any

consultation – straight into the centre of God’s awesome power and, there, forever compelled

to worship God – you could scarcely do otherwise – without ever being able to freely choose.

Perhaps the creature’s will is sapped, perhaps their will is absorbed into God’s, and perhaps

they just pretend – trying to keep their actions (and even their thoughts) in order. The same

group that calls God a dictator imagines that if God exists he will put them straight into some

sort of paradise – with God’s existence clear to all – without thinking that God would, then, be a

far worse dictator than to begin with (and the creature no longer free to say anything about it).

That would truly be the act of a dictator.

And, of course, there are problems from God’s perspective, also. First, if creatures are put

directly into God’s presence, God could not be assured that these creatures would want to be

in his presence if they had the choice. Thus, God would forever be in the presence of beings



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that perhaps wouldn’t even want to be there – and an intelligent being might be acutely aware

of who would have wanted to be in his presence (in different circumstances) and who not. This

would surely not be an equal action – to put people into his presence who would not even have

wanted to be there. And assuming that God actually has some interest in relationship with his

creatures or care for their feelings (both speculative propositions) then this would matter toGod.

Third, putting creatures straight into God is not equal to God’s intelligence and power and

greatness overall. Creating a few people, thrusting them indiscriminately into God, wowing

them forever – it all seems far too easy and unintelligent. This is certainly related to ‘the

problem of power’; the problem of finding a way of expressing intelligence and power that goes

beyond the all-to-easy display of these attributes. And this scenario does not solve the

problem; it is just an uncreative display of power with a hint of injustice thrown in.

But if the problem is people who would not have chosen God given the chance, then there is aneasy solution; God could only create those who would have chosen him otherwise and simply

not create those who would not have chosen him. So God would only have those who would

have freely chosen him in his presence. But this doesn’t work either. First, because it

misunderstands the operation of freedom: there is no guarantee that the creature who would

have chosen God otherwise would not still resent being put straight into God if they were not

really given the chance to choose God. So the creature without the chance to choose God freely

otherwise might not freely choose God in God’s presence. Second, (even if we ignore the last

problem) there seems something amiss in God just creating the good eggs. This seems an

underhanded way of robbing creatures of the opportunity to make the most important choices.And if freedom really is the whole reason for creation then this just wouldn’t fit.

So if an immediate union is completely out of the question, then some sort of separation is the

only alternative – a separation either in terms of God withdrawing his presence from people or

God removing people to some intermediate setting. But the precise degree and character of

this separation is still to be determined.

Core propositions: God’s direct presence and creaturely freedom are incompatible.



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11. DECISION

In the previous sections we established two important principles: one, that human beings were

made to be free and to exercise freedom but, two, that being put directly into God’s presence

would ultimately undermine this freedom in some crucial respect. An initial union was

conclusively ruled out and, by that very fact, an initial separation of some sort was proved. But

even more sure than the argument are the facts that we see all around us. We know from

experience that we are not in the direct presence of God (or if we are we certainly don’t know

it.) So separation from God is a given.

But there is an unanswered question about all this, which was suggested before and which we

cannot put off any longer. We know that free choice is central to creation. What is the role of

choice in all this? What decision (or decisions) did God give us freedom for?

The first thing I think we can tell about this choice is that it is a God-related choice. There aretwo points that are relevant to our discussion. First, we had to be separated from God in order

to make this choice. It isn’t certain to what degree God’s undiluted presence would overwhelm

our souls, but there is one choice that we could not make in God’s undiluted presence: we

could not doubt the existence and the greatness of God. This would strongly influence a

person's ability to make up their mind about God – apart from the dizzying effects of God's

greatness – and would heavily influence how they behave around him.

Now, this is something of a paradox for an infinitely powerful being: God might not be a cosmic

bully but there would be no doubt that he has a great big stick (infinitely powerful as he is). It

doesn’t matter that God would never use it, but the mere fact of the infinite power of God – to

create and destroy life – is ominous in a way. There is no way to get around it: being infinitely

powerful has its drawbacks; God’s infinite power is always in some sense th reatening, even

when we have every assurance that it is not. And this fact would always influence what people

thought about God and how they acted around him.

Second, I think it is just self-evident that it would be a God-related choice. Surely making one ’s

mind up about God is the most important choice that a creature could make. Surely God would

want people to have freely chosen to be in his presence, before having this choice taken away

from them by glory; God would surely not want people in his presence that would haverejected him if they had had the choice. Surely people would not want to be put into God’s

presence without being consulted about it, only to live without being able to freely make the

most important choices and with the infinite power of God always cutting off their options. (Of

course, God could take way these feelings; but this would also be to take away freedom, which

is an automatic non-starter.) So it seems to me that it suits the interests of God and his



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creatures for there to be separation before there is any sort of union; for there to be

independence before the creature is effectively overpowered by God.

(If we were to follow the principle of equality to form a set of moral standards for how people

should act towards God, this might be what God has in mind in terms of the God-related

decisions we must make. Such standards might include, thinking and speaking rightly about

God, thinking and speaking rightly about any of the truths that hold in the relationship between

creature and creator and obeying God’s instructions of he provided any.)

Core propositions: The free decisions God could require of us would be God-related decisions.



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12. SEPARATION

It seems sure that some separation is required in order for creatures to make God-related

choices. But the precise character of this separation remains unknown. Still, there are certain

things that we can be sure about regarding separation. (Some of these things might seem

obvious at first but bear with me.)

First, this separation is a separation from the full knowledge of God’s existence. There are two

parts to the ‘full knowledge of God’s existence.’ Most obviously, there is the knowledge that

God exists. This knowledge could be a strong conviction or an undeniable, empirically provable

certainty. But that is not enough: the full knowledge of God requires that we know who and

what God is; that we have an apprehension (as much as we can) of the greatness of God. Now,

if we were to have both the full knowledge that God exists and of who God is , then we might as

well not have been separated in the first place – for having the full knowledge of God must be

something like standing in front of God himself. But, really, either of these parts of the fullknowledge of God would undermine a balanced freedom and meaningful separation. (There

might be some room for the knowledge of God within the separated state, but this knowledge

could not be full in either sense.)

Second, this separation will end only when it ends. The separation might end, but until that

time the separation will remain. The separation might be partial – God might not remove his

presence or influence completely – but it will be a separation to some degree. This presence or

influence might shift or change. If the presence and influence were to increase gradually or

suddenly, then at some point the balance would shift towards union rather than separation. So

even if we are talking about degrees of separation, there is a beginning to separation (on

balance) and that relative separation will only end when it ends. This is the obvious point, which

is often overlooked.

Third, this separation is bound to end sometime (for the individual). Either the separation will

end or it will continue forever. Now, there are reasons to think that this separation will not

continue forever.

One, we have already sketched a scenario were creatures are removed from God’s presence so

that they can make God-related choices before being united with God by choice. This seems tobe the most natural interpretation of separation. We cannot be put straight into God’s

presence so we are separated first. After separation, creatures can freely choose to be united

with the creator or not. At some point the separation ends and a union is possible that avoids

all the problems of an initial union. But this was by no means certain; it is just what the facts (of

separation and choice) seem to suggest.



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Two, an endless separation would be purposeless. On the one hand, if the separation is

intended for our enjoyment, it might continue forever. However, we might just as easily enjoy

ourselves in some paradise where God’s existence was clearly known and seen or even in God’s

direct presence, if we could withstand it. So an endless separation for the pleasure of the

creature would be pointless. (Although a transition from a pleasurable separation to apleasurable union might be plausible.) On the other hand, if the separation was just one of

endless indifference, then it would most definitely be pointless. Then there is the idea that the

separation might be vindictive – that God might just separate his creatures to watch them

squirm – which would not be intelligent or creative or serve any real purpose other than God’s

entertainment, which is doubtful in any case.

So it seems more likely that the separation will end. But apart from all this, it is certain that the

separation will end, because we know that every person dies. If this life is a separation from

God; then we know separation ends just as life ends and we do not know what comes

afterwards. So we know from the way that the world works that the separation is not indefinite

for the individual. Of course, it is not certain what will happen after we die, but we are certain

that we will die. (A second separation or a reincarnation is unlikely; this would make God seem

as though he could not do it the first time or the first however-many times. And this would not

be equal to God.) So all we really know for certain is that we have one life to live and, as far as

we can tell, there are no second chances.

Core propositions: The separation will require a separation from the knowledge of God, it will

continue for some time and it will end.



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13. CHEMISTRY

To this point we have only considered that God acts equally to all things but we have not yet

considered how God might react towards inequalities (and by ‘inequalities’ we can only mean

moral inequalities; not errors in math). Before creation God is on his own, with no inequalities

to worry about except those that he creates. But after creating ‘little gods’ the inevitability of

inequality enters the system – little Gods are not always going to choose the equal thing. They

are not going to treat each other equally; they are not going to treat God equally. And at that

point God must choose what (if anything) he will do about it.

And there is at least the possibility that God would want to distance himself (I do not mean this

in a literal sense) from any and all inequalities. We chose the principle of equality, partly,

because it was in line with God’s intelligence and power; equality is what you would expect

from a God that expresses his intelligence by always getting things spot on. And inequality,

then, would make God seem less than he really is. So, in order for God to maintain his statureas a faultlessly equal God – a God that never acts unequally – God might want to distance

himself from inequality in some sense.

If God were just to allow inequality to continue indefinitely, then God would seem guilty by

association. And God does not simply allow things; he creates and likely sustains things. So God

would be guilty of aiding and abetting, also. God would condemn inequality outwardly, but

allow it to continue inwardly, without intervention. We would rightly say this was somewhat

hypocritical of God. It would be like saying you are perfectly good while still allowing others to

commit abuses. So it seems that, to be regarded as equal – and to be truly equal without

exception – would require God not only to do the equal thing, but it would require God to

distance himself from the inequality of others.

On the one hand, distance wouldn’t seem to be enough. (Running away surely wouldn’t make

God seem less hypocritical.) God would have to do more than just distance himself. But this is

forgetting that distance itself is something serious if we are speaking about the creator

distancing himself from the creation – the very thing that the creator likely sustains at every

moment. For God to distance himself from the creation might have harmful effects, ending,

ultimately, in complete non-existence.

So we have, here, an interesting situation. In the full presence of God it is difficult to act

unequally. So it stands to reason that the further we are from God the easier it would be to act

unequally. Perhaps it is even the case (as creaturely dependence would suggest) that the

further we are apart from God, the more difficult it is to act rightly and the more we end up

acting wrongly. It would be naive to think that the more we were distanced from our creator;

that we would still remain morally neutral; no more inclined towards inequality than equality. If



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God were to faithfully show the creatures dependence on himself, then the further from him

they got the more powerless they would become to act equally and to resist inequality. So

there is something of a relationship between distance from God and acting equally: the further

from God we are, the more we are unable to do the right thing.

(Here is another way to think about it: as we will say at many times in this investigation,

freedom is a fragile thing; all too often people are just sucked in by the thing that has the most

gravity. When people are close to God they might orbit God but as they get far enough away

from God, they begin to orbit things, people, themselves -- the most attractive things they can

find. And people could not help but to be sucked in by these things; they are unbounded

comets hurtling through space, waiting to be taken in by something great. And this is perhaps

the essence of inequality: when people swap the infinitely great God for created things. (Which

is not to say that people will lose all their freedom; most notably, they will still have the

freedom to be honest about their predicament.))

And there is something cyclical about this. Acting unequally causes distancing or separation

(some separation was, in any case, required). Further distancing or separation causes further

unequal actions. And the process repeats, ad infinitum. And the Latin, here, is not just for show;

the situation might soon become infinite; sooner than we might think. It all depends on how far

and how fast God distances himself from sin. And there would be nothing out of place if God

were to distance himself from sin infinitely (if God is infinite) – showing himself to be infinitely

concerned with equality and against inequality in the strongest possible terms.

An infinite reaction to sin might be justified according to the rule of equality if God wasinfinitely great. If God was infinite in knowledge and power, then God might be justified in

showing himself to be infinitely against inequality. If God is infinitely intelligent and powerful,

then God would be infinitely equal -- infinitely inclined towards equality; infinitely set against

inequality. And if God is infinitely great then there cannot be a sense in which God has

overreacted or that God has gone a step to far in asserting his disapproval of inequality. If God

distances himself from inequality in a finite sense, we cannot say he has gone too far. If God

distances himself in an infinite sense, then he has distanced himself truthfully. If God decides to

punish people in addition, we cannot say he has Gone too far, because infinity plus infinity is

still infinity.

In any case, if God is infinitely serious about inequality, then there ought to be no avenue of

action against inequality that God did not take. In that sense, it would be quite strange to find

that God did not punish inequality -- if that were so, then perhaps God was not infinitely against

inequality after all. So if God really wants to distance himself from wrongdoing in the strongest



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possible terms then we cannot rule out the possibility of God punishing inequality. Distance is

one way for God to show that he is against wrongdoing; punishment is a far stronger way.

But is an infinite reaction to inequality really equal ? Surely there is no sense in which a person's

inequality is infinite? People are finite; their actions are finite in time and space. There are two

points to note, here. First, we have not said that God's reaction to sin must be infinite; but just

that if God is infinitely intelligent and powerful, and takes this infinitely seriously, and so is

infinitely against inequality -- then an infinite reaction to sin is in some sense equal to God . So

you will have to consider the merits of that argument; but the investigation as a whole does not

depend on it; a finite reaction is acceptable.

Second, there is a sense in which God is the only quantity that we need to measure anything

against. People ultimately have no value apart from what they were given by God. So God is

ultimately the source of all human value. Another way of putting this is that God is the only

thing that has value at all on its own; everything else gets its value from God, and, so, in thatsense, God is the only thing that we need to compare inequalities to, to see how serious they

really are. And if we are speaking about an action which is aimed at God's greatness – such as a

lie about God – and we compare the lie to God himself, then the inequality is clearly an

infinitely great inequality, which God would take infinitely seriously. Again, this point is not

critical to the investigation, but the bottom line, I think, is that we should not be terribly

surprised when the eternal something about the universe turns out to be extreme.

Core propositions: For God to be faithful to his non-moral attributes God would have to

distance himself from inequality; distance causes further inequality, which causes further

distance, etc.



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14. THE WORLD

So separation is necessary and we have some a sketch of the basic character of this separation

– that it is a separation from the knowledge of God, that it will continue for some time and that

it must end finally – but, of course, that is not all that is required for such a separation. For one

thing, there needs to be a stage for this separation to be played out. People cannot just be put

into nothingness. Some intermediary setting is required: a world where the drama will unfold.

So what can we say about this world? What would this world be like? Now, we know that for

this world to be a place where people can make the most important choices (God-related

choices included) then this world cannot give this fact away directly. We have already noted

that there is a space for the knowledge of God or for evidence of God’s existence, but this

evidence cannot be so glaring that God’s existence is undeniable. There would have to be

enough ambiguity to allow people to deny God’s existence. This we may call the ‘grey area’ –

the area where we are not sure how much or in what way God can reveal himself. I will notspeculate about this grey area; rather, for now we will focus on the black and white.

Now, clearly this world could not be obviously supernatural. I am not sure how we would be

able to tell how something is supernatural (It is possible that even if we were born into a

supernatural world we would think it quite natural and perhaps come up with many natural

explanations for it) but even if it was supernatural, it could not be obviously supernatural. A

supernatural world could not be allowed insofar as it undeniably revealed God’s existence.

And a supernatural world would undeniably reveal God’s existence. If we really could find no

natural explanations for things (not for a lack of trying); then we might have no option but to

conclude that the world was the result of a supernatural cause. We could fight it as much as we

wanted, but in the end the lack of any and all natural explanations would leave us with no

choice but to accept the only explanation we had – that the world was the result of a

supernatural force. So a wholly supernatural world just wouldn’t do. And so a natural world is

required.

Here are some of the things that the world might need.

First, the world would need matter. The world and everything in it would need stuff; naturalbuilding-blocks for everything that was needed in the world. This is a no-brainer: for a natural

world to exist would require natural building blocks.

Second, the world would need natural laws. Well, here, I mean more that there could not be

randomly changing laws. This would not only be unliveable, but it would also defy naturalistic



37

explanation (assuming that the laws were randomly changing and not changing according to

some deeper law.)

Third, the world would need cause and effect. Without cause and effect the world might as well

be supernatural. In that case, every cause might randomly produce (or not produce, or produce

after a delay) a new magic-like effect. Without cause and effect people could also not

investigate and discover naturalistic explanations – which would defeat the whole point of

having a naturalistically explainable world.

Forth, the world would need a top-down and bottom-up complexity or order. Everything in this

world, from galaxies to atoms, needs to have explanations. There can be nothing that people

investigate that yields a certain, naturalistic dead-end – not an undeniable dead-end anyway.

Everything would have to be explainable and investigable.

Fifth, (which is really the same as the previous point) these explanations would have to gobackwards in time (for some time), in such a way that they did not just stop at some point,

before which there were no naturalistic explanations – leaving only an undeniable supernatural

explanation as the only alternative. (Of course, if the universe did have a beginning then

naturalistic explanations might hit a wall but having all naturalistic explanations terminate in a

single point is more acceptable than their stopping midway.)

Sixth, this explanation would have to be unified. Nothing would be worse than a patchwork of

clearly unrelated natural explanations without any hope of unification. This would also leave an

undeniable supernatural explanation, which God would have to avoid. So the world would need

to allow the hope (if not the reality) of a grand unifying theory.

Seventh, this explanation would have to be balanced. Freedom is a tenuous thing. All too often,

people choose simply what holds the most attraction (this is perhaps a truism). It follows, then,

that even if the world has a naturalistic basis, that it must allow a balance of explanations in

order to allow meaningful, God-related choices.

(And there is one more thing that would be of special benefit to a creator of free creatures. The

natural world would, in some sense, be independent of God. Yes, God would be required to

design it and to keep it running, but if God operated the world according to fixed laws – largelywithout supernatural intervention – then there is a sense in which God is not directly

responsible for everything that happens (Of course, there is another sense in which God is

always ultimately responsible).

Particularly, I have in mind how the DNA of two people is combined to make a new person. If

this process is governed by natural processes, then God cannot be accused of simply making



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people good or bad and then rewarding or punishing them for it. The game would appear to be

rigged. What DNA provides is a continual source of new, free people, which God does not force

to be one way or another. The process would be fair, because it is governed by indifferent

natural laws.)

These are some of the things that a freedom permitting world would require. Even so, this only

represents one side of the coin. It would not seem fair for God to leave us stranded without any

knowledge of God, yet expecting us to make choices that are somehow God related. Even

within such a world, there is room for the knowledge of God (within limits).

Core propositions: The world cannot contain the full knowledge of God. The world must

appear natural.



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15. SUFFERING

Would the First-Cause God allow suffering in this naturalistic world? Now, practically speaking,

since life is some sort of test, to be followed by some sort of consequences (to be considered)

then there must be a right and a less right way to behave, practically speaking. Morally

speaking, since we must act in a way that is equal to God and to his creatures, there is a more

and less equal action; this means there is a more and less right action, morally speaking. So

there are things that are essentially right and wrong to do.

Given that the world is created for freedom, we can conclude that a wrong action would

certainly be anything that undermined freedom – murder or slavery or oppression being

obvious examples. (These actions would be wrong actions in terms of their violating the

equality that must exist between people and in terms that it is unequal to God’s purpose and

perhaps, also, his instructions.) Even so, if the world is created for freedom, then God would

have to allow the possibility of people doing the very things that would rob other people of their freedom.

However, given that we are separated from God and God is somewhat hidden, then it follows

that there would be nothing much to tell us what is right and wrong – again, not in such an

obvious way as to make God’s existence undeniable. So whatever clues to right and wrong

behaviour would have to occupy the grey area, where evidence of God may be strong but not

compelling. We must also remember that the world, to preserve human choice and God’s

hiddenness, must have a naturalistic basis; so whatever is left to tell us what is right and wrong

would also have to have some basis in nature.

So there is a two-fold problem: how can God secure our freedom (even freedom to do wrong)

and, also, tell us what is right and wrong, without revealing himself and violating the separation

in either case? Suffering is one answer to this question.

First, suffering helps to preserve freedom. If the creatures and objects in this world are both

natural and if there is cause and effect in the world, then it follows that creatures would be able

to interact causally with the objects in the world and vice versa. Further, if people and things

can interact causally it follows that both could be harmed in the process. If we could break a

rock apart, then a stone could break us apart. (If we found that we could take things apart, butnothing could harm us in turn, we would have to conclude that something supernatural was at

work.) So it follows that creatures must have natural parts and natural workings – just like

everything else – and that these things could be causally affected. Suffering, then, mainly helps

us to avoid any harmful interactions with nature, so that we will not do anything that will

ultimately limit our freedom.



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Second, suffering tells us what is right and wrong. We all experience emotional and physical

suffering and know it is terrible. We know that how we feel when we are wronged is how

others feel when we wrong them. So suffering is a strong, intuitive basis for a universal morality

and empathy. In fact, it is probably the only thing that a non-religious person is likely to respect

as a reason to behave morally. To the non-religious person, often, inflicting pain is the onlywrong action, and everything else is acceptable. So suffering is the foundation of a moral

system that everyone can and must respect.

Third, suffering tells us just how right and wrong something is. Suffering does not just give us an

intellectual knowledge of right and wrong; it tells us how wrong something is and that some

things are more terrible than others – and that many things are unthinkably terrible. Suffering

would essentially be useless if it did not have degrees of intensity. If suffering was not serious

and painful, then the wrong actions that caused suffering would not be seen as serious either.

So suffering shows us that some things are really, really wrong – in a way we can’t get around.

So suffering is not only necessary, but the possibility of quite serious suffering is, also, required.

I do not know of any way (other than suffering) to solve the problem of telling people what is

right and wrong, without revealing God and undermining the balance required for meaningful

freedom to exist. Any other system that does the same job is not likely to be any less painful; or

if it is any less painful, it will probably not be able to do the same job.

Regrettably, however, in a natural world, where things interact causally, things can always go

wrong. People have accidents, people make mistakes. Things fall, roll, cut, collide. This is a

consequence of living in a physical world, where physical things interact causally. And in a worldof top-down and bottom-up complexity – there needs to be life on all levels from the higher

animals to the amoeba (else there is a clear suggestion of supernatural origins). And it would

not do to think that people would be exempt from these organisms (for it would suggest the

same thing). So people could be affected by the big and the small equally.

Now, on this subject there is never any shortage of people who will give their suggestions on

how God could have made the world better than he did: God could have made people stronger

or the pain less; God could have made everything less dangerous. There really is no shortage of

suggestions. But, inevitably, these suggestions end up violating some important principle: either

they leave some powerful supernatural suggestion, or, they would create a world where people

wouldn’t feel that some things are really wrong. (And inevitably these suggestions seem to

make the world more cartoon-like.)

Core propositions: Suffering provides a powerful basis for a universal moral baseline, seeing

as God cannot tell us himself.



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16. THE FALL

Separation is not without its effects. Seeing that God is the condition for the creature’s

continued existence, separation from God is likely to damage the creature. We have, also,

looked at the possibility that distance resulted in wrongdoing and further wrongdoing resulted

in further distance, and so on, forever. Let us look at the same issue from a different

perspective; from the perspective not of a God wanting to distance himself from wrongdoing,

but simply from the perspective of a God who acted honestly.

Now, in one sense it is impossible to be separated from God completely. God is everywhere.

God created everything and God, in all likelihood, sustains everything at every moment. So

when we are speaking about a separation, we are not speaking about a spatial separation – or a

full separation in every respect – but some other sort of separation. After all, a full separation

would result in our non-existence, which is not the point of the separation at all; indeed, such a

separation would be quite pointless.

Further, we have already mentioned that this separation would be a separation from the

knowledge of God – at least there could be no undeniable evidence of supernatural action.

Some quiet, inner assurance might do, but nothing that would force people to believe when

they would not otherwise have wanted to believe. So separation from the full, undeniable

evidence of God is certainly one essential aspect of this separation.

But there is much more to say about this separation from the principle of equality. God is

bound to represent things as they truly are. Following from this, it would seem that if people

would be apart from God, then God would represent who people are apart from him as

faithfully as possible. Meaning that God would not give people any unfair advantage or make

them seem more capable than they really are. Just as God must act consistently to his own

attributes; he must also fairly represent our attributes. Of course, this cannot be an exact

representation; if people were completely cut off they would not even exist. But it would be a

representation of people that are people apart from God, while still existing as people.

So God must separate people, but in such a way that they remained, well, people. And these

people would, at the bare minimum, require some power to act physically. For, in order for life

to offer a balance of options with regards to God-related choices, there must be the option tohave some sort of existence without God. People must be able to reject God and not disappear

in a puff of smoke or suddenly fall down like a sack of potatoes. So there is really only one area

where God can faithfully represent the powerlessness of people and their complete and utter

dependence on him and that is in the moral sphere; particularly in the area of God-related

choices. If God is going to accurately represent who people are apart from God, he could only

make them powerless with regards to certain moral actions.



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God could still not make it such that all nonbelievers were completely wicked and all believers

(who satisfied whatever conditions God required of them) were perfectly angelic. It could not

be anything so obvious. God would have to make it more ambiguous than this; such that a

person could outwardly do something right while inwardly they lacked something important

which disqualified their action. Or God might allow people to make all manner of moral choicesexcept the most crucial God-related choices, where they would have to rely on God somehow

for the power to make these choices. Or God might give all people some power to act morally,

but make people more or less powerless to change their lives in some crucial respect. God

might use some of these methods or all of them to represent the truth about the relationship

between creature and creator.

This might all sound terrible but, notice, first, it is also truthful. People are completely

dependent on God and they are nothing without him. Second, this might also be

compassionate; if God makes people dependent on him they might be more open to accepting

God. The worst thing that God could do is make people without any need of him, while still

expecting them to think of him and make God-related choices. So, given that God must work

within certain parameters, a clear dependence on God would be something to be thankful for --

a clue as to our divine origins.

Core propositions: The only honest/representative separation would result in weak,

dependent creatures – dependent on God especially regarding their God-related choices.



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17. THE GARDEN

Separation is inevitable and it is in some way harmful. Imagine you were to undergo such an

ordeal: one moment you are in the presence of God. You are whole and healthy. You feel his

power and influence everywhere you go, everything is easy and you lack nothing whatsoever.

You see God as he is; you enjoy his presence and his power – the greatest show anywhere; the

greatest possible experience; the greatest possible relationship, if you are fortunate enough to

have some personal relationship with God.

All of a sudden you are flung from his presence, cut off, stranded, cast away. Perhaps you did

something wrong and God expelled you from his presence; perhaps it was unprovoked. All the

power is gone; your strength to do the right thing is gone. You find yourself twisted, broken,

damaged, hurting; everything is hard. And instead of the greatest show anywhere, you have

only a dull, difficult existence, struggling every day just to survive.

It is not something that you would soon forget. You would think that you would remember your

ordeal no matter what and you would do anything you possibly could to get back into God’s

good graces; you would not rest until you were reunited with God, which is precisely the

problem. You see, this upsets the balance that is required for free decisions; it robs people of

the ability to make up their minds about the most important questions. Separation is inevitable

but this separation cannot violate our opportunity to freely make God-related choices – this

was the whole purpose of the separation to begin with.

Now, we can think of this separation happening in a number of ways.

First, the separation could be as a result of human wrongdoing or divine decision or both. If it is

a result of a person doing the wrong thing and not God’s decision, then this would seem to

suggest that the wrongdoing had escaped God’s attention; this would not be in keeping with a

being of infinite intelligence, and so we cannot entertain this option, owing to the law of

equality. If, on the other hand, it were the result of divine decision that would not imply any

oversight on God’s part, but it could be seen as unfair (unequal) for God to suddenly cast

someone out of his presence for no apparent reason. Perhaps, then, what we are left with is

some combination of both: God knows that he must separate people but he waits for an action

from his creatures that will get things started.

Second, we can think of this separation (by divine decision and human action) happening

individually (one at a time) or collectively (all at once). Now, there is nothing wrong with God

doing it individually, per se. Each person could have their own private separation. But what

would be the point of this? The individual would not know that they had been separated; and is

there really any point in doing the same thing over and over for each person, when the person



44

will have no direct knowledge of their experience? So this seems unnecessary and perhaps not

a fitting show of divine intelligence. It might be more in keeping with divine intelligence for this

separation to happen collectively or all at once – though people would still not have direct

knowledge of the traumatic separation.

But how does one separate all people at once – according to divine decision and human action

– without each person doing something wrong all at the same time? It seems impossible that

everyone would freely do something wrong all at the same time. And, how, if people come into

existence at different times, could they be altogether to do this thing all at once? Is there any

solution to this problem?

Now, we have perhaps stacked the deck here (although someone would have to make an

argument for this conclusion) but we are left with only one elegant solution to these problems:

God could appoint a representative or representatives for the entire human race. It would be

up to these people to be the brave pioneers in relationship with God, but unfortunately,according to the divine plan, they would do something that warranted the inevitable

separation, and as the representatives of all humankind, all people after that point would be

separated as a result, from that time onwards. This would avoid the inelegant and impossible

situation of separating people one by one and it would allow for both divine decision and

human agency.

Precisely how these representatives would come to sin is something of a problem. For, if they

were directly in God’s presence, it would be very hard to get the idea to do the wrong thing;

God’s presence would influence them heavily in the other direction. So either we are looking atsome sort of boost of human ability or some stunting of God’s power (none of which seems

honest or equal) or we are looking at some partially separated state, where the representatives

are not quite joined to God, but not quite separated either; where they have the knowledge of

God, but, also, some opportunity to choose the wrong thing.

(This, of course, is very similar to the religious origin story. This is why I am aware that I might

be accused of stacking the decks in favour of one particular story. If anyone wants to make this

argument, I would like to hear it. Their best bet, I would guess, would be to show that I have

not followed the principle of equality or that I have applied it unevenly, to suit my own ends.

Rejecting the principle itself is probably not the best alternative, since the importance of the

principle cannot be doubted. So the only error might be that it has been wrongly applied. The

principle is not a guarantee of truth, but it is something that you want to work for you and not

against you. It is a principle that you ought to have high regard for; and you ought to mind its

conclusions.)



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And there is one last observation we should make, although I hope by now that this is obvious.

First, that it doesn’t matter particularly how it happened but more that it had to happen. We

cannot blame our representatives for falling because any person, in the same position, would

have done the same thing – if anything, it just would have taken longer or shorter. This

separation – and all the details of the separation that we have discussed – were more or lessinevitable from the moment that God set out to create people who would make free, God-

related decisions – the most important decisions they could ever make. Second, there is no

point mourning that it did happen; there was no way around it and people would have to be

separated, no matter what. So if we want to ask questions about anything, we ought to ask,

how will we get back?

Core propositions: This separation would have to occur all at the same time, via

representatives, in a semi-separated state.



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18. REVELATION

In this essay, I want to look at some of the ways that God might reveal himself to mankind that

would not violate the creature’s freedom to make God-related choices; that is, the sort of

evidence that could be strong, but not forceful. This is all assuming that God wants to reveal

himself to us, despite the unavoidable separation. In short, we are speaking about revelation.

Some of the methods of knowing God are drawn from existing religious traditions and their

relevance is discussed within the present system.

First, each person might be given private, inborn knowledge of God. This might be an inner

feeling that God exists. Still, this knowledge would be nothing that a person could not ignore or

explain away, given a strong desire or reason to do so. Science is now discovering that humans

are hardwired to see purpose in things, and, so, to see intelligence behind things (only

intelligent beings are purposeful). So, it seems that science does suggest some vague sort of

natural inclination towards belief in an intelligence that is behind the universe.

Second, each person might be given a direct, private communication from God. The difference

being that, here, God speaks directly to people rather than giving everyone a default belief in

himself. Now, a communication received in the mind is always questionable, even if it is true.

Even so, a loud or audible voice, would probably tip the scales unfairly in favour of God, so we

might have to favour the softer variety of direct communication.

Third, each person might be given a moral sense; a conscience. Although the conscience might

not directly suggest that God exists, arguments have been made from the truth of objective

moral values, to the existence of God. As such, conscience might be an indirect witness to God ’s

existence. This would certainly be a gentle enough pointer towards God and would not violate

any of our principles.

Forth, we might be born with an unfulfilled desire that only God could fill. This is especially

fitting if we see life as a time where we must freely rediscover and reconnect with God. Then

God might put a desire in us for the thing that he wants us to seek out and to find. This is not a

general, inborn knowledge of God, but a consciousness of the absence of God or, at least, of

something being missing.

Fifth, God might handicap us in some relevant way. This might not be a nice suggestion, but

another way to incline us towards seeking God or being open to God, is to give us some moral

handicap that only God can help us overcome. I say, ‘moral handicap’ because this is a handicap

we have already discussed; that according to the principle of equality people would have to rely

on God for everything, especially for God-related choices.



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Sixth, God might give us a feeling of God when we admire his creation. That is, when we look at

a sunset, jagged mountain cliffs, rainforests, endless rivers, lakes, oceans, the stars and galaxies,

we might receive a feeling that it had been created by a God. The reason I bring up this point is

because it seems a part of people’s experience. And this is not an overpowering sense that ‘God

did it’ but a gentle enough pointer in that direction, which does not violate our principles.

Seventh, God might leave evidence, but not evidence that is so powerful that it is coercive. We

have something like this – an example of something like this – in nature. Nature has a strong

appearance of design – this is widely admitted even by people who do not think it is designed.

Yet this design can be explained through other means, and so the evidence is not coercive.

Another sort of evidence that God might leave behind is the absence of evidence; that is, a gap

that cannot be explained by any naturalistic explanation; a gap were God himself intervened.

Now, at this point, someone is likely to bring up the dreaded ‘God of the gaps’ defeater. But if

God exists, and if God does intervene, then it follows that there would be gaps here and there.

And, importantly, there are two sorts of gaps: gaps like the unexplored portion of a map and

gaps like a hole in the ground. No one should rush to try to fill in the map with imaginative

theories, but a hole will always be a hole. The point is that sometimes science discovers gaps or

'holes' of the second sort; and the more science finds out about these holes, the more certain

we become that these are holes of the second sort; holes that are not closed by science but

exposed by it.

Eighth, it is possible that god would reveal himself more directly through a prophet or a book.

We might always doubt that the person or book was genuine, no matter what confirmations

accompanied it and so this would be an acceptable means of revelation. However, not all books

and prophets are the same and we would have to research the claims of each book individually.

This might seem an exhausting task, but there would surely be some sources which seemed

more credible than others. Afterwards, we might find that one or more sources of revelation

have strong, but not coercive, evidence.

Ninth, lastly, God might come down to earth himself – in human form. Now, this is an

interesting idea drawn from various religious traditions – the idea is sometimes known as

‘incarnation’. This incarnation would only be acceptable (according to our principles) if it wasnot too obviously godlike and alien. A being with six eyes and angel wings, for example,

wouldn’t cut it. The being could have some strong (but not compelling) evidences of deity, but

it would have to appear in human form. This, of all forms of revelation is certainly the most

intriguing.



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So these are some of the ways that God might reveal himself to his creatures without violating

our principles or forcing anyone to believe anything. Now, there are two general notes to take

from these points: First, together, these sources of revelation could present a strong cumulative

case for God, if we give them a chance. Perhaps even a compelling case, if we accept all these

sources of revelation as genuine. Second, there is nothing preventing God from revealinghimself to people who have already made the right choices – those people that have already

passed whatever test is set out for them. To these people God might reveal himself in other

ways or more strongly in the same ways. Third, there is no way to know what means of

revelation God might use; these would be a matter of divine decision, not any compulsion. The

most that we could do is look at the world around us and decide for ourselves if any of these

sources are genuine.

Core propositions: God would only reveal himself in ways that do not violate human decision.



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19. BALANCE

In the last essay we discussed the ways in which God might provide evidence for his existence.

Before that we discussed that the world would have to be almost entirely natural. This

immediately suggests that there is a balance between natural and supernatural explanations

for the world. However, it is interesting to consider – not the evidence for one side or the other

– but that there might be evidence of balance between the two. Perhaps there is no evidence

one way or the other, and so we should look for another sort of evidence; evidence that the

world is primed for choice.

I wonder if it is something peculiar to people – that they are able to find evidence for whatever

they want to believe – or whether the world is really designed to offer alternatives. Take a few

examples from science.

First, science can take us remarkably to the beginning of creation, and moments before but itcannot – at this moment – take us any further. But the beginning of the universe plays into the

hands of the religious, who say that God (which is separate to the universe) created the

universe. The God-sized gap at the beginning of time is as powerful a fact as everything that

happened since.

Second, science tells us that all life evolved, but it cannot tell us how it all got started; how the

first self-replicating cell got going. So science takes us to yet another beginning but it cannot

take us all the way, leaving the possibility of a supernatural beginning in this area tantalisingly

open. Given the truly staggering odds of this happening by chance; this gap is enough to offset

the naturalistic explanation of what follows.

Third, science tells us that we are made with DNA and that DNA contains a symbolic language

(some form of) which is required for even the simplest self-replicating cell. This is among the

most powerful prima facie evidences of a divine mind that we could possibly hope to find. DNA

would balance out any evidence for any equally strong naturalistic explanation.

Forth, science tells us that the universe is fine-tuned for life, and yet at the same time we see

very little life anywhere else in the universe. The universe is fine-tuned for us, yet we are stuck

on a small planet in an apparently unremarkable part of space. The universe is fine-tuned yet if it were not, we wouldn’t be here to know that it was. These points counterbalance neatly,

allowing for us to choose either side.

And these are just some of the more striking cases from science; we might mention more cases

besides this. Philosophy also seems to permit people to hold opposite views quite convincingly.

A person offers a powerful argument for determinism, but the experience of freedom offers a



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powerful rebuff. A person might offer a powerful argument for materialism, but our mental life

seems to offer a different conclusion. One person points out the problem of evil; another says

evil proves God. One says morality proves God; another says religion brings nothing but

devastation. One says God created the world; another asks, ‘Who created God?’

Perhaps I have been too selective in my examples; perhaps I have stated then too crudely, or

perhaps there really is a peculiar, thought-provoking balance to life. And perhaps we should

stop getting bogged down in the details, step back, and take a look at the bigger, more

symmetrical picture.

(This is not to say, however, that this balance will ultimately bear out, that it will not shift or

that one side will not one day be vindicated. In fact, it might come out -- I see no way around it

-- that the arguments for one side were completely empty and quite ridiculous in retrospect,

while the other side was quite obviously true all along. But all this would, perhaps, only come

with the benefit of hindsight.)

Core propositions: The world might be designed so as to preserve the balance necessary for

free choice.



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20. ELECTION

In case you have forgotten, people are still in a tight spot. God has decided to separate people

and to separate them honestly. This can only mean that God must leave people powerless in

the most important of ways; with regards to the most important God-related choices. Yet, even

if this was inevitable, it still leaves us with a serious problem. People were created for freedom

but they do not have the power to freely make the most important choices. Freedom was the

whole reason for creation, and yet, following the evidence, there is no role for freedom where

it matters most. This is the most crucial freedom imaginable and it is the only place where an

equal God can reasonably express the undeniable truth that people are completely dependent

on him.

And it is not the case that God could just make people a little stronger – that would be an

unequal action. People do not truly have any strength of their own; people only have the

strength that God gives them – that is a simple fact, no matter how you look at it. We havefollowed the law of equality this far we must see where it leads.

Is there any solution to this problem?

There is only one solution that I can see. In it, God must show himself to be totally sufficient,

while people are totally dependent on him. So God must make people essentially powerless to

make the most important choices, while leaving them free to choose with respect to everything

else. God uses the data of people’s choices – with respect to everything else – in order to make

an informed, even-handed decision about who he will give the power to, to make the necessary

God-related decisions. Those who are empowered by God go on to make the right choices;

those that are not empowered, do not – or, at least, they might try to, but their efforts would

be lacking in some significant sense.

In this scenario, we have God as the only source of power needed for success with regard to

God-related choices. And we have people that are powerless with regard to God-related

choices. Yet, on the basis of people’s free decisions (not including the God-related decisions)

God chooses who will be empowered to go on and make the most important choices. In short,

people go about their business and God chooses according to some equitable criterion.

(God chooses. This might sound undesirable, but if you think about it there is nothing

altogether strange about it. According to many religious traditions God chooses, in any case.

Normally, we think of this choice happening after death, in some form of judgement. Here, we

have moved the choice to some point during a person's life. And if there is no reason to be put

off by a final judgement; then there is no real reason that we should be put off by God choosing



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during our lifetime. The only issue is how God chooses and whether it is a fair method of

choosing.)

But there is still something missing in this scenario and it all depends on the choices that God

will use to make up his mind about people. This decision could not be a directly God-related

decision or else it would not be used by us; people must be wholly dependent on God for God-

related decisions. Yet, at the same time, it must be something that people cannot take credit

for. If God makes his choice because of some virtue that certain people have, then it would

seem that, in some sense, God really does not have the initiative and that people are subtly

calling the shots (without even knowing it). So we need some free action that can thread these

two needles. There is one virtue that can solve these problems; a virtue that fits, rather snugly,

into our system.

Core propositions: People are powerless when it comes to the most crucial God-related

decisions so God must choose (on the basis of other free decisions).



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21. HUMILITY

There is one cardinal virtue (and corresponding vice) according to the rule of equality, and it

holds the key to everything. Humility. Humility is not an action; it is an attitude. Humility means

knowing yourself, knowing your limits, knowing how you compare, and, above all, being honest

(equal) about all these things. In short, humility is about knowing where you fit in – in terms of

stature – relative to everything else.

Now, with regards to God and people, there is only one possible view to take. God is the only

necessary being; God is transcendent, intelligent and powerful. People are made by God; they

are infinitely less intelligent and powerful. And, when comparing an infinite being and a finite

being, we can only arrive at the opinion that the one is infinitely significant and the other

relatively insignificant by comparison (speaking purely in terms of their attributes) and this

should inform our view of ourselves in relation to God.

Obviously, then, the first thing that people can do, before actually doing anything, is to have the

right attitude. And there seems no attitude that is more in keeping with equality than to view

ourselves and God with the right perspective. And this is the very essence of what we

understand by the word ‘humility’; knowing ourselves, knowing God and knowing the

difference between the two. So this seems the first and purest moral duty with regards to God

(according to the principle of equality).

Pride, of course, is the opposite of humility. It is possible to have a healthy sense of pride, such

as when we say someone takes pride in their work. But there is clearly an unhealthy sense of

the word, also. Pride is the opposite of humility. Instead of thinking of oneself with due

perspective, one develops an inflated sense of self-worth. So a person might think of

themselves as superior and they might minimise their faults and weaknesses. With regards to

God, pride means to think little of God, to think that you are God’s equal or that you know

better than God. It is easy to see that this is the worst thing you could possibly do when you are

morally obligated, first, to treat God equally.

The most significant thing about true humility is that it immune to pride. This is not to say that

someone with humility cannot later feel pride; but just that when someone has a moment of

true humility, they cannot at the same time feel pride. But more than that, you cannot takepride in being humble, after the fact – it is self-defeating to do so. It is self-contradictory, for

example, to be proud about being humble; to think yourself really quite grand for thinking of

yourself as humbly as you do.

This is the only virtue of this sort; any other virtue is not immune to pride. One can boast in

generosity, in self-control, in diligence, in industry – you can feel pride about any other virtue,



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except humility. And there is no immediate reason to think that a person cannot be generous

and suffer from pride at the same time – there is no immediate reason to think these things are

at cross purposes. But pride and humility clearly work to undermine each other.

Think about that – it is impossible to boast about humility. Humility is the one virtue you can’t

blow your trumpet about – it is impossible. Try it. Start your sentence, “I am so humble that…”

It is a difficult sentence to finish. I would go so far as to say that humility is something that you

can’t even admit, let alone boast about. It is clearly absurd to say, “I am the humblest!” But

there is something uncomfortable about even saying, “I am humble.” To even say – to even

think – that you are humble goes against the very spirit of humility. This certainly is an elusive

virtue; you cannot even acknowledge it!

That is why humility is the perfect solution to our problem. If God empowers people on the

basis of humility; then it is not on the basis of their actions at all, but on the basis of an attitude.

But is not just any attitude; it is an attitude that contains the truth about man’s condition inrelation to God. So it is not that God is choosing people on the basis of their virtue, but on the

basis of their having recognised their position in relation to God in some sense. In addition, it is

a virtue that people cannot take any credit for. So it is not that God recognises something good

within people that he must acknowledge, but that God recognises some sense of himself in

people; something that people cannot boast about. If God chooses man, rather than man

choosing God, then it seems likely that humility would be the key to God’s choice.

(Even if God does not choose and people choose instead, humility would still play a crucial role.

First, humility is essential for all moral progress. You must admit your problems before you cansolve them. Second, humility is essential for progress in knowledge. Without humility, thinking

rationally is all but impossible. This goes for progress in all areas of human knowledge. Third,

obviously a person with an over-inflated sense of self-worth would have trouble seeing that

they were in trouble and needed divine help.)

Core propositions: According to equality, humility is the cardinal virtue; humility preserves

the role of God’s decision and human agency in God’s choice, while retaining the truths about

the relationship between creature and creator.



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22. PRINCIPLES OF ELECTION

Humility is a crucial part of the puzzle but it by no means the whole story – humility is the part

of the puzzle that shows how divine choice and human choice somehow fit together. God

chooses people; people choose to be open to the truth. In the end, it is not so much about

people or their virtues, perhaps, as it is about God seeing an opening; a way that he can draw

near to people without compelling them or overriding their decisions. In that sense, humility is

a person lowering their defences against God; allowing the possibility that something greater

might be at work in the world.

But the crucial point is that God chooses and that his choice has nothing to do with the

greatness of people (quite the opposite) or with their moral strength. Rather, humility is a

virtue that is impossible to attribute to people, because humility is really more recognition of

some greatness outside of people. But humility is not the only thing that might inform God’s

choice. There are a number of other factors that might be suitable candidates for God’s choic e – all of which have more to do with God’s greatness rather than human virtues.

First, God chooses according to weakness. Here, we are speaking not about the recognition of

human weakness in relation to God (which is humility) but the reality of weakness relative to

other people. In this group we might mention the physically or mentally weak, the poor, the

downtrodden, the lame, the outcasts and more. (Of course, this group would be more

predisposed towards humility.) Choosing from among this group might serve more than one

purpose. First, it would directly refute the idea that God cares about the things humans are

impressed with. Second, it seems appropriate that an all-wise God would give this group some

slight advantage with regards to the hereafter, since some would have a difficult time here and

now.

Second, God chooses according to interest and desire. God might choose those who had a

genuine interest and desire in him combined, perhaps, with openness towards him. This would

not be for God to choose people according to any virtue, but simply according to their

recognition of himself. In this case, God might be rewarding the power of the idea of God to

attract people, without any violations of free choice.

Third, there is something about greatness that does not fit into any one box. God might reservethe right – every now and again – to colour outside of the lines; to not act according to any rule

but to show that he is somehow beyond them. After all, God’s greatness is the thing behind the

foregoing rules, so it cannot be boxed in by them. The idea of God choosing the strong is

perhaps one such choice. God might sometimes choose the strong (in whatever sense of the

word) to show that his power was greater than any human strength. Another exceptional

choice might be for God to choose someone particularly wicked, to show his greatness in



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transforming their lives. Or God might choose someone exclusively to show people that his

choice had nothing to do with human merit – a deathbed conversion might do the job or (as

contrary it is to our preferences) a death-row conversion might also be on the cards. So too,

though God usually works in a subtle way (which does not violate free choice) God might

(exceptionally) overwhelm people with an experience of himself. All this would be acceptable, if God’s greatness is the overriding concern in God’s choice.

In all the points we have mentioned, God’s greatness is the overriding concern; God did not

choose any virtue or action within people. In the case of God choosing the humble and those

with an interest or desire in him, we might be tempted to think that God chose these people

because of some pre-existing good within them, but it might equally be said that God chose

them because of the something 'God' within them – some dim recognition of the greatness of

God, which is arguably the thing that drew them. So it might be that the idea of God would

have to get the credit for their humility and interest.

But, of course, as people we have some concerns about this (as people that feel themselves

helplessly subject to the whims of an all-powerful God would have). First, we might ask

whether all this is really fair. Is it fair for God to look past us like this and to choose only

according to himself?

About this, notice, one, that choosing people according to their virtues would not be

particularly fair either; virtues are just as much a product of genetics and environment as

anything else – so we could hardly take credit for these things. We might think that we had

tried harder than anyone else to be good, but we couldn’t know that we have. So for people tobe chosen according to being born a certain way, to certain circumstances, would appear to be

something of an automatic entry into God by birth. No one can say that is fair. And, of course, it

would be dishonest – it would make is seem that people have moral power that they do not

have in reality.

Two, notice that if we base God’s choice on humility, for example, then this is something that

everyone can do regardless of their moral record. Even a person born with genuine moral

defects would not be disqualified from being chosen by God. So to choose on the basis of

something like humility is really fairer than to choose on the basis of moral strength within

people (which, in any case, might be fantasy). Freedom is a fragile thing; people are pulled

every which way in their lives and actions, but how we feel about where we are is something

that always seems within our power. So to base God’s choice on something like humility (rather

than outward action) is the only way that freedom can play an active role in everyone – no

matter the strength of their moral character. So this is really a way to secure the role of

freedom, which was a crucial assumption all along.



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(This is a point worth dwelling on. God’s election might seem, on the face of it, to ignore free

choice. But it might actually be the case, paradoxically, that free choice necessitates election.

We have said many times that free will is a fragile thing. Perhaps the only place that all people

are most free and that all people are equally free is in their thoughts. In their lives and actions,

people are pushed around by things outside of their control – but people can be freer in theirthoughts than in their actions. But if coming to faith somehow involves actions – reading a

book, going to a place of worship, etc. – then it follow that free choice would not operate

equally freely in all people with regards to these actions. Some people would have an unfair

advantage if they had a greater power to turn their desires into actions (and everyone is

different on this account). And even if it were possible for these people to choose God; this

would not be fair to everybody. So perhaps the most free and fair option to everyone is for God

to choose people on the basis of something within their mental life, rather than on the basis of

some action. So to respect the role of freedom (when it is at its freest) it is perhaps necessary

for God to choose people. Election, then, as strange as it might seem, is the best way to respect

free choice.)

Three, we might not like it, but there is really not much we can say about God choosing

according to his own greatness. After all, it is a logically inescapable fact that God is the only

being with any inherent worth and God has it in infinite abundance. We might not like it but

God’s greatness is really the only factor worth considering with regards to anything. It is the

only worthy consideration and it is infinitely worthy -- even relative to any other valid

consideration. (From our perspective we have many other things that we consider, but these

are as the concerns of ants to the concerns of people.) So there is nothing more appropriate

than for God’s greatness to be the focus of his choice.

Second, as people we might ask whether God really chooses us at all. Does God even see

people for who they are, or does God just choose himself? On the one hand, it seems that God

doesn’t care about those he chooses, and, on the other hand, it seems that God is t oo self-

involved to care. In response to this, notice, one, that whether God chooses on the basis of

personality alone or on the basis of his nature alone, we encounter problems on either side. If

God merely chooses on the basis of personality, then his choice is arbitrary. If God chooses only

on the basis of himself, then his choice is blind. So the best we could hope for is something in-

between. But we have not, in the course of the essay, argued that God chooses only based onhimself or only based on people – we have, in fact, been arguing for something in-between all

along. God chooses people on the basis of him seeing something about himself within people;

God chooses himself in people.

This is not simply to say God chooses himself. Humility might not be something that people can

take credit for but it is something that belongs to people, which is found within people. So it is



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with people that have a genuine interest in and openness to God; their interest might be a

response to God’s greatness but it is still something within people. The human will is not

irrelevant in these examples; it is just not the only thing at play.

And there is something about these God-reflecting virtues which reveal who people really are.

Humility is about seeing yourself as you truly are. So perhaps it is that humble people are the

only people that can really be seen (even if it is not a pretty sight) when all the false self-

importance has been stripped away and just the truth is left. Perhaps then God sees and

chooses only those who can be seen. And there is something, well, right about people who are

in some way in harmony with the great truths of God; those that in some way resonate with the

truth about God (even if they do not know it). Such people are not obscured by God’s

greatness, but illuminated by it; it is perhaps the greatness of God which sets these people

apart – that highlights them – so that they can be seen.

So it is simply not the case that God choosing people according to his own greatness would leadto his overlooking people – it might be quite the opposite. So it is not necessary that God would

ignore people or that God is self-absorbed. There is, oddly enough, nothing contradictory about

people being seen by God and about God seeing something reflective of himself in people.

Core propositions: God might choose according to other principles that are based on his

greatness rather than any human virtue; election allows for free choice to be most free and

most widely applied.



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23. MERCY

There have been times in our investigation where we have permitted some small inequalities.

When we say, for example, that God can give people the power to act physically (while people

really have no such power apart from God) we are allowing inequality to enter our system

(though it is perhaps not a moral inequality). And when we say that God would not immediately

punish inequality (seeing as this would violate free choice) then we are allowing God to tolerate

some inequality. And there must be some explanation for this; we cannot so lightly accept an

action that undermines the principle of our investigation. We allowed inequality, in essence,

because we had no other choice, and we allowed no more than was necessary. Even so, we

could not allow this inequality without the possibility that these debits could be balanced

somehow. In short, we might call it ‘mercy’; something that allows, for some time, the

possibility of inequality, where it cannot be avoided.

And, with regards to people: people must be allowed to act unequally to God and to eachother. But God must distance himself from inequality. God can have nothing to do with

inequality – this was more or less the assumption of the entire argument. So inequality caused

separation and separation caused inequality and so on, which only caused the gap between

God and people to widen. That is how God and people would have to remain, if it were not for

some form of mercy. And for God to separate people without the possibility of a later union

(we have already discounted the possibility of an endless separation) would seem pointless and

unintelligent in the extreme. So the only possible outcome to creation must be union, which

requires some mercy.

There are certain facts that we can uncover about this mercy.

First, God must be ultimately responsible for mercy. This mercy must either be provided by God

or by man (we will not speculate about any intermediaries). There are many reasons to think

that this mercy could not be gained by man.

One, in our system man is powerless with regard to the most important God-related choices.

(This was the only area where God could show that people are entirely dependent on him.) If

people were to gain their own mercy, this would make people seem self-sufficient and

independent apart from God, which is just not a reality. Indeed, to give people the ability tocreate mercy would be a complete reversal of all the truths that hold for the relationship

between God and man. We have argued that the area of God-related choices is the only area

where God can express the truths that hold about the relationship between God and man. In

this area God is all-sufficient and people are all-dependent – not the other way around. But

giving people the power in this crucial area would be to reverse the truth about God and people

in the only area that it could be expressed.



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Two, (on the other side of the same coin) God would be the only rightful provider of mercy.

God is the creator and provider of everything. People must depend on God for the most

important things and not the other way around. The role of creating and providing mercy could

only be provided by God. God is the only being whose action would be sure to cover any and all

inequalities; God is the only being with the knowledge, power and authority necessary to dothe job. God is going to play the lead in this act; in fact, it’s pretty much going to be a one -man

show.

Three, even if people were allowed to gain mercy there is no guarantee that they could do so. If

a person has accumulated a sizeable collection of inequalities – and so a sizable separation –

there is no telling whether they could offset this with whatever action they had to perform to

gain mercy. And, even if they were terribly observant with their sacrifices or good works or

penance, there would always be something doubtful about the error-prone methods of human

beings. So this mercy, even if possible, would not provide any sense of security (which,

admittedly, is not an important part of our system, but it may be a practically relevant

consideration).

The only thing left to decide is how it is going to be done and the options are limited in this

regard.

First, God could provide mercy in heaven or on earth. Assuming that God’s purpose was for

people to accept his offer of mercy, it would be quite pointless for God to do it in secret. And if

God did it in heaven it would have to remain secret – at least, God could not show anyone what

he had done (though he might perhaps tell them). Even so there is no real reason for it tohappen in a place where no-one would ever witness it. Also, it would be more advantageous to

stage the action on earth – if it was not obviously supernatural; that is, if it had some

naturalistic basis – where it could be seen. If we take it that God actually wants people to know

about it – and there is nothing equal about assuming that God would do it to provide mercy for

all people and then hide it from them – then it stands to reason that God would do it according

to the most public and believable manner available to him, which would require an earthly

setting. So it stands to reason that God would perform the action on earth.

Second, God could perform the action once and for all time, or repeatedly, as much as was

required. Now, if God were to do it multiple times it might seem that God did not do it properly

the first time or that God did not anticipate having to do it a second time – neither of these

alternatives reflects particularly well on God. If God were to act equally to his attributes, then

he would do it once and for all and not over and again.

Third, God could come as God or a man. We have already established that the thing must be

accomplished by God himself, and that it would happen on earth rather than in heaven. So God



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could do it in his full greatness or as a man. The first option would clearly violate freedom of

choice. But the second option is acceptable. In fact, there is something neat about this with

regards to the investigation as a whole. First, we have already noted that incarnation would be

an acceptable means for God to reveal himself. Second, this might go some way to solving the

‘problem of power’, which stated that it is perhaps too easy for God to demonstrate infinitepower, but that God might opt for some sort of handicap. Third, of course, there is some great

balancing effect to God leaving heaven and coming to earth; nothing would seem to better

offset whatever imbalances were allowed in creation than this.

I will not speculate as to what action God might perform; it seems that I am close enough to a

particular religious tradition that I do not have to speculate. IT may be that some thought on

this topic will yield greater insight but the action does not particularly matter for our purposes.

The simple fact is that mercy is required, and if it is somehow accessible, then God is the only

one that could make it available, on earth, as a man. The purpose of this investigation was, in

some sense to provide an outline of some of the fundamental points in religion, and not that

we have a way back to God we have done that. The only thing that might be left is to consider

that nature of the afterlife, but we will leave that for another time.

Core propositions: Mercy is required to tolerate inequality; only God can provide mercy, on

earth, as a man.



24. REUNION

Another question might be to ask how we might access this mercy. The good news, I think,

about God doing all the work, is that people wouldn’t have to do anything. In fact, if God is

serious about doing it himself, then people wouldn’t be allowed to do anything. And, according

to what we have said, people wouldn’t have the power to do anything – it would all be up to

God.

And there is no doubt that people could not access this mercy without humility. Proud people

want to do everything themselves; they feel they do not need any help from God. Some go as

far as to say that even if God did exist, and offered them mercy, they would refuse it out of

principle. It would be hard for people to accept that they didn’t have to work at it; that they

couldn’t contribute to it as some sort of joint effort.

Now, we have posited that God would have to empower us to accept this offer of mercy andwe will hold to this principle. The problem is you might not even know that God is at work in

you already or not. So that is really something you would have to decide – whether God is at

work in you or not. Certainly humility and desire are precursors to God empowering you to

accept him. And if you feel these things then it seems that God would be drawing you already

and that God would be drawn to you.

But if everything we have said about God is true, it would do no good to try to get to God

through a book such as this – this is just a signpost pointing the way. If God is about equality,

then he is about getting things right. And if he is about getting things right, then it will matter a

great deal to God where and how we come to him. More precisely, if we want to get to God, we

must go to the source, whatever that may be (and I think we have really left only one option).

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