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The European Commission’sscience and knowledge serviceJoint Research Centre
European Reference Network for critical infrastructure protection
Thematic Group on Chemical and Biological Risks to Drinking Water
Rui Teixeira, Municipality of Barreiro, Portugal
This work has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programmeunder grant agreement No 775989. The contents of this article do not reflect the official opinion of the European Union. Responsibility for the information and views expressed therein lies entirely with the speaker.
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Trento
Tomas Bata Bristol
Kassel
IACIE
Thessa-loniki
Gdansk
Luzern
Patras
ACI
EDP
Finavia
ECAC
Raja
Operators
RATPEON
Alli-ander
PSE
IATA
Shell
GDF Suez
Industry
L3EOS
S:can
IconalABB
Mutix
Elster
EDP Smiths
Vituki
IBMCyber Security Center
AsterAPCO
VCE
Siemens
Rapiscan
Honeywell Morpho
ENER
MOVECNCT
EU Inst.
ENISAJRC
GROW
HOME
ENEA LNEC
BAM
Fraun-hofer
CEATNO
DSTLAEA
RobertKoch
EcoindCETAQUA
ICRA
STUK
VTTThales ENCS
CERN
INRIA
NPL
Research Facilities
Academia
Romania
CzechDenmark
Portugal
Netherlands
Cyprus
Spain
Germany
GreeceHungary
Sweden
UK
Belgium
France
Switzer-lands
Austria
Finland
PolandMemb. states
ETSICEN/CEN.
ISO
NIST
https://erncip-project.jrc.ec.europa.eu/
What is ERNCIP?
A JRC-facilitated network of security related expertsvolunteering to address issues of pre-standardisationat EU-level towards fostering the development of innovative and competitive security solutions
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• Chemical/Biological(CB) Risks to Drinking Water• Detection of Indoor Airborne CB agents
Chemical & Biological Detection
• Detection of explosives and weapons at secure locations• Protection of structures
Weapons & Explosives Detection
• Radiological/Nuclear threats to critical infrastructure
Radiological & Nuclear Threat Detection
• Extended Virtual Fencing (video and biometric technologies)
Physical Security
• IACS components Cybersecurity Certification Framework
Cybersecurity
Thematic Groups 2017-2019
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© P
hilip
p H
ohen
blum
TG CB Risks in Drinking Water – Who we are...active since April 2012
Environment Agency Austria (coordination)
University de Lorraine - Nancy (FR)Fraunhofer-IOSB (DE)
Robert Koch Institute (DE)Water Research Centre plc (UK)
Lyonnaise des Eaux (FR)Aguas do Algarve (PT)
Aigües de Barcelona (ES)Jerusalem Waters (IL)
Barreiro Water (PT) S::CAN (AT, ES)
ADASA Sistemas (ES)
voluntary participation - membership agreementseveral members on hold
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Chemical and Biological Risks to Drinking WaterA response to deliberate chemical and/or biological contamination of drinking water.
Guidance: Water Security Plan in drinking water supply for water utility operators
Environment Water Utility Network Consumer Waste
SAFETY: Monitoring as requested by legislation, weak measure to identify quickly changing compositions or contamination with hazards not being monitoredSECURITY• Online monitoring (Event Detection, Early Warning, Limitation of non compliance with
legal frameworks, DWD etc.) • Rapid response analytical screening (targeted/non targeted laboratory analysis)• Physical and cyber protection: Out of scope of TG Water considerations
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Water Security Plan 2017-2019
Guidance on requirements for production of a water security plan in drinking
water supply
Rapid detection & identification labmethodologies
Practical guidelines on the requirements of a continuous
online water-quality monitoring system in
drinking-water-supply systems
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Water Security Plan
Water Security
Plan
Context Purpose Scope
Design
Implemen-tationRevision
Disclosure
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Continuous online water-quality monitoring system
Hydraulic model and geographic information system application
Sensor-placement optimization software
The sensors
Event-detection system
Water quality contamination dissemination look-ahead simulation
Event-management system
Sensor-placement optimization software
Hydraulic model and geographic information system application
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Continuous On Line Water Quality Monitoring System
Event Management System
Event Detection System
Contamination Dissemination Model
Physical Security
Customers complaints
Sensors
Hydraulic Model GIS mapping of the water network
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Rapid detection & identification lab methodologies
Hydraulic model and geographic information system application
Sensor-placement optimization software
Rapid detection & identification Lab methodologies – Chemistry
Rapid detection & identification Lab methodologies – Microbiology
Quality control - Intercomparison tests for unknown contamination events
Rapid detection Lab methodologies - Toxicology
Contamination scenarios to be considered
Future work: Lab response to emergency (with connection to the other reports)
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Water Security Plan - Lifecycle
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Water Security Plan design
General characterization of a water supply system
Threat identification
Responsibilities allocation and team constitution (internal team and external entities)
Risk assessment
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Water Security Plan Implementation
Phase I –Planning andPreparation
• Risk assessment• Security and system design vulnerabilities• Characterization and evaluation of the threats• Definition of scenarios• Indicators for detection of suspicious activity• Preparedness for rehabilitation• Alternative water supplies and redundancy• Emergency response plan• Identification of roles• Awareness-raising, training and exercices
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Water Security Plan Implementation
Phase II –Protection – Event
detection and confirmation
• Event detection• Record of anomalous occurrences• Online water quality and operational
monitoring• Consumer complaints, public health and
surveillance by authorities• Sampling and laboratory analysis for
confirmation
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Water Security Plan Implementation
Phase III -Response - Event
management
• Communication• Response measures
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Water Security Plan Implementation
Phase IV -Remediation and recovery - Return
to normality
• Recovery plan• Remediation and recovery actions• Identification of roles• Return to normality
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ObservationsIntentional threats to water systems are the main focus
A water security plan needs:• a risk assessment approach specific to water security• different approach to remediation and recovery• inclusion of technical issues: online monitoring, lab tests and
methods, etc. • involvement of all stakeholders: customers, public health
authorities, water managers, policy makers etc.• link to other plans (emergency, WSP, etc.)• link to daily operations
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Challenges• Security is a sensitive topic to discuss within water utilities or
between them and national authorities• Security awareness is needed for water utilities and their staff• Information may not be available or sharable• Terminology is not agreed or understood in a uniform manner• Standards for water security are missing
• Planning is one step, implementing is key• Implementation cannot take place solely on the effort of the utility,
it needs involvement and an active role of the policy makers and authorities
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Next steps…Finalise guidance reports
Exchange with stakeholders• Operators, authorities,
manufacturers, policy makers• EurEau• DG-Home, DG-ENV, DG-SANTE• NATO
ERNCIP Workshop is being planned for Autumn 2019
© Philipp Hohenblum
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Stay in touch
This work has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 775989. The contents of this article do not reflect the official opinion of the European Union. Responsibility for the information and views expressed therein lies entirely with the speaker.
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