CHAPTERONE

The Wrong of Abortion

Patrick Lee and Robert P. George

Much of the public debate about abortion concerns the question whether deliberatefeticide ought to be unlawful, at least in most circumstances. We will lay that ques­tion aside here in order to focus fIrst on the question: is the choice to have, to perform,or to help procure an abortion morally wrong?

We shall argue that the choice of abortion is objectively immoral. By "objectively"we indicate that we are discussing the choice itself, not the (subjective) guilt or inno­cence of someone who carries out the choice: someone may act from an erroneousconscience, and if he is not at fault for his error, then he remains subjectively inno­cent, even if his choice is objectively wrongful.

The fIrst important question to consider is: what is killed in an abortion? It isobvious that some living entity is killed in an abortion. And no one doubts that themoral status of the entity killed is a central (though not the only) question in theabortion debate. We shall approach the issue step by step, fIrSt setting forth some(though not all) of the evidence that demonstrates that what is killed in abortion - ahuman embryo - is indeed a human being, then examining the ethical signifIcanceof that point.

Human Embryos and Fetuses are Complete (thoughImmature) Human Beings

It will be useful to begin by considering some of the facts of sexual reproduction. Thestandard embryology texts indicate that in the case of ordinary sexual reproductionthe life of an individual human being begins with complete fertilization, which yieldsa genetically and functionally distinct organism, possessing the resources and activedisposition for internally directed development toward human maturity. 1 In normalconception, a sex cell of the father, a sperm, unites with a sex cell of the mother, an

ovum. Within the chromosomes of these sex cells are the DNA molecules which con­

stitute the information that guides the development of the new individual broughtinto being when the sperm and ovum fuse. When fertilization occurs, the 23 chro­mosomes of the sperm unite with the 23 chromosomes of the ovum. At the end ofthis process there is produced an entirely new and distinct organism, originally asingle cell. This organism, the human embryo, begins to grow by the normal processof cell division - it divides into 2 cells, then 4, 8, 16, and so on (the divisions are not

simultaneous, so there is a 3-cell stage, and so on). This embryo gradually developsall of the organs and organ systems necessary for the full functioning of a maturehuman being. His or her development (sex is determined from the beginning) is veryrapid in the fIrSt few weeks. For example, as early as eight or ten weeks of gestation,the fetus has a fully formed, beating heart, a complete brain (although not all of itssynaptic connections are complete - nor will they be until sometime after the childis born), a recognizably human form, and the fetus feels pain, cries, and even suckshis or her thumb.

There are three important points we wish to make about this human embryo. First,it is from the start distinct from any cell of the mother or of the father. This is clearbecause it is growing in its own distinct direction. Its growth is internally directed toits own survival and maturation. Second, the embryo is human: it has the geneticmakeup characteristic of human beings. Third, and most importantly, the embryo isa complete or whole organism, though immature. The human embryo, from concep­tion onward, is fully programmed actively to develop himself or herself to the maturestage of a human being, and, unless prevented by disease or violence, will actually do

so, despite possibly significant variation in environment (in the mother's womb). Noneof the changes that occur to the embryo after fertilization, for as long as he or shesurvives, generates a new direction of growth. Rather, all of the changes (for example,those involvirtg nutrition and environment) either facilitate or retard the internallydirected growth of this persisting individual.

Sometimes it is objected that if we say human embryos are human beings, on thegrounds that they have the potential to become mature humans, the same will haveto be said of sperm and ova. This objection is untenable. The human embryo is rad­ically unlike the sperm and ova, the sex cells. The sex cells are manifestly not whole

or complete organisms. They are not only genetically but also functionally identifi­able as parts of the male or female potential parents. They clearly are destined eitherto combine with an ovum or sperm or die. Even when they succeed in causing fer­tilization, they do not survive; rather, their genetic material enters into the composi­tion of a distinct, new organism.

Nor are human embryos comparable to somatic cells (such as skin cells or musclecells), though some have tried to argue that they are. Like sex cells, a somatic cell isfunctionally only a part of a larger organism. The human embryo, by contrast, pos­sesses from the beginning the internal resources and active disposition to develophimself or herself to full maturity; all he or she needs is a suitable environment andnutrition. The direction of his or her growth is not extrinsically determined, but theembryo is internally directing his or her growth toward full maturity.

So, a human embryo (or fetus) is not something distinct from a human being; heor she is not an individual of any non-human or intermediate species. Rather, an

G Patrick Lee and Robert P. George

l

embryo (and fetus) is a human being at a certain (early) stage of development - theembryonic (or fetal) stage. In abortion, what is killed is a human being, a whole livingmember of the species homo sapiens, the same kind of entity as you or I, only at anearlier stage of development.

No-Person Arguments: The Dualist Version

.Defenders of abortion may adopt different strategies to respond to these points. Most

will grant that human embryos or fetuses are human beings. However, they then dis­tinguish "human being" from "person" and claim that embryonic human beings arenot (yet) persons. They hold that while it is wrong to kill persons, it is not alwayswrong to kill human beings who are not persons.

Sometimes it is argued that human beings in the embryonic stage are not personsbecause embryonic human beings do not exercise higher mental capacities or func­tions. Certain defenders of abortion (and infanticide) have argued that in order to be

a person, an entity must be self-aware (Singer, 1993; Tooley, 1983; Warren, 1984).They then claim that, because human embryos and fetuses (and infants) have not yetdeveloped self-awareness, they are not persons.

These defenders of abortion raise the question: Where does one draw the linebetween those who are subjects of rights and those that are not? A long tradition

says that the line should be drawn at persons. But what is a person, if not an entitythat has self-awareness, rationality, etc.?

This argument is based on a false premise. It implicitly identifIes the human personwith a consciousness which inhabits (or is somehow associated with) and uses a body;

the truth, however, is that we human persons are particular kinds of physical organ­isms. The argument here under review grants that the human organism comes to beat conception, but claims nevertheless that you or I, the human person, comes to beonly much later, say, when self-awareness develops. But if this human organism cameto be at one time, but 1came to be at a later time, it follows that I am one thing andthis human organism with which 1am associated is another thing.

But this is false. We are not consciousnesses that possess or inhabit bodies. Rather,we are living bodily entities. We can see this by examining the kinds of action thatwe perform. If a living thing performs bodily actions, then it is a physical organism.Now, those who wish to deny that we are physical organisms think of themselves,what each of them refers to as "1," as the subject of self-conscious acts of conceptual

thought and willing (what many philosophers, ourselves included, would say are non­physical acts). But one can show that this "I" is identical to the subject of physical,bodily actions, and so is a living, bodily being (an organism). Sensation is a bodilyaction. The act of seeing, for example, is an act that an animal performs with his eye­balls and his optic nerve, just as the act of walking is an act that he performs withhis legs. But it is clear in the case of human individuals that it must be the sameentity, the same single subject of actions, that performs the act of sensing and thatperforms the act of understanding. When I know, for example, that "That is a tree,"it is by my understanding, or a self-conscious intellectual act, that I apprehend whatis meant by "tree," apprehending what it is (at least in a general way). But the subject

The Wrong of Abortion

of that proposition, what I refer to by the word 'That," is apprehended by sensationor perception. Clearly, it must be the same thing - the same I - which apprehends thepredicate and the subject of a unitary judgment.

So, it is the same substantial entity, the same agent, which understands and whichsenses or perceives. And so what all agree is referred to by the word "I" (namely, thesubject of conscious, intellectual acts) is identical with the physical organism whichis the subject of bodily actions such as sensing or perceiving. Hence the entity that Iam, and the entity that you are - what you and I refer to by the personal pronouns

. "you" and "I" - is in each case a human, physical organism (but also with nonphys­ical capacities). Therefore, since you and I are essentially physical organisms, we cameto be when these physical organisms came to be. But, as shown above, the humanorganism comes to be at conception.2 Thus you and I came to be at conception; weonce were embryos, then fetuses, then infants, just as we were once toddlers, pre­adolescent children, adolescents, and young adults.

So, how should we use the word "person"? Are human embryos persons or not?People may stipulate different meanings for the word "person," but we think it is clearthat what we normally mean by the word "person" is that substantial entity that isreferred to by personal pronouns - "I," "you," "she," etc. It follows, we submit, thata person is a distinct subject with the natural capacity to reason and make free choices.That subject, in the case of human beings, is identical with the human organism, andtherefore that subject comes to be when the human organism comes to be, even thoughit will take him or her months and even years to actualize the natural capacities toreason and make free choices, natural capacities which are already present (albeit inradical, i.e. root, form) from the beginning. So it makes no sense to say that the humanorganism came to be at one point but the person - you or I - came to be at somelater point, To have destroyed the human organism that you are or I am even at anearly stage of our lives would have been to have killed you or me.

No-Person Arguments: The Evaluative Version

Let us now consider a different argument by which some defenders of abortion seekto deny that human beings in the embryonic and fetal stages are "persons" and, assuch, ought not to be killed. Unlike the argument criticized in the previous section,this argument grants that the being who is you or I came to be at conception, butcontends that you and I became valuable and bearers of rights only much later, when,for example, we developed the proximate, or· immediately exercisable, capacity forself-consciousness. Inasmuch as those who advance this argument concede that youand I once were human embryos, they do not identify the self or the person with anon-physical phenomenon, such as consciousness. They claim, however, that being aperson is an accidental attribute. It is an accidental attribute in the way that someone'sbeing a musician or basketball player is an accidental attribute. Just as you come tobe at one time, but become a musician or basketball player only much later, so, theysay, you and I came to be when the physical organisms we are came to be, but webecame persons (beings with a certain type of special value and bearers of basic rights)only at some time later (Dworkin, 1993; Thomson, 1995). Those defenders of abor-

Patrick Lee and Robert P. George

tion whose view we discussed in the previous section disagree with the pro-life posi­tion on an ontological issue, that is, on what kind of entity the human embryo orfetus is. Those who advance the argument now under review, by contrast, disagreewith the pro-life position on an evaluative question.

Judith Thomson argued for this position by comparing the right to life with the

right to vote: "If children are allowed to develop normally they will have a right tovote; that does not show that they now have a right to vote" (1995). According to

this position, it is true that we once were embryos and fetuses, but in the embryonicand fetal stages of our lives we were not yet valuable in the special way that would

qualify us as having a right to life. We acquired that special kind of value and theright to life that comes with it at some point after we came into existence.

We can begin to see the error in this view by considering Thomson's comparisonof the right to life with the right to vote. Thomson fails to advert to the fact thatsome rights vary with respect to place, circumstances, maturity, ability, and otherfactors, while other rights do not. We recognize that one's right to life does not

vary with place, as does one's right to vote. One may have the right to vote inSwitzerland, but not in Mexico. Moreover, some rights and entitlements accrue toindividuals only at certain times, or in certain places or situations, and others do not.But to have the right to life is to have moral status at all; to have the right to life,in other words, is to be the sort of entity that can have rights or entitlements to beginwith. And so it is to be expected that this right would differ in some fundamental

ways from other rights, such as a right to vote.In particular, it is reasonable to suppose (and we give reasons for this in the next

few paragraphs) that having moral status at all, as opposed to having a right toperform a specifiC action in a specifIC situation, follows from an entity's being thetype of thing (or substantial entity) it is. And so, just as one's right to life does notcome and go with one's location or situation, so it does not accrue to someone invirtue of an acquired (i.e., accidental) property, capacity, skill, or disposition. Rather,this right belongs to a human being at all times that he or she exists, not just duringcertain stages of his or her existence, or in certain circumstances, or in virtue of addi­tional, accidental attributes.

Our position is that we human beings have the special kind of value that makesus subjects of rights in virtue of what we are, not in virtue of some attribute that weacquire some time after we have come to be. Obviously, defenders of abortion cannotmaintain that the accidental attribute required to have the special kind of value we

ascribe to "persons" (additional to being a human individual) is an actual behavior.They of course do not wish to exclude from personhood people who are asleep or inreversible comas. So, the additional attribute will have to be a capacity or potential­ity of some sort.3 Thus, they will have to concede that sleeping or reversibly coma­tose human beings will be persons because they have the potentiality or capacity forhigher mental functions.

But human embryos and fetuses also possess, albeit in radical form, a capacity orpotentiality for such mental functions; human beings possess this radical capacity invirtue of the kind of entity they are, and possess it by coming into being as that kindof entity (viz., a being with a rational nature). Human embryos and fetuses cannot ofcourse immediately exercise these capacities. Still, they are related to these capacities

The Wrong of Abortion

differently from, say, how a canine or feline embryo is. They are the kind of being ­a natural kind, members of a biological species - which, if not prevented by extrin­sic causes, in due course develops by active self-development to the point at whichcapacities initially possessed in root form become immediately exercisable. (Of course,the capacities in question become immediately exercisable only some months or yearsafter the child's birth.) Each human being comes into existence possessing the inter­nal resources and active disposition to develop the immediately exercisable capacityfor higher mental functions. Only the adverse effects on them of other causes willprevent this development.

So, we must distinguish two sorts of capacity or potentiality for higher mental func­tions that a substantial entity might possess: fust, an immediately (or nearly immedi­ately) exercisable capacity to engage in higher mental functions; second, a basic,natural capacity to develop oneself to the point where one does perform such actions.But on what basis can one require the fust sort of potentiality - as do proponents ofthe position under review in this section - which is an accidental attribute, and notjust the second? There are three decisive reasons against supposing that the first sortof potentiality is required to qualify an entity as a bearer of the right to life.

First, the developing human being does not reach a level of maturity at which heor she performs a type of mental act that other animals do not perform - even animalssuch as dogs and cats - until at least several months after birth. A six-week old babylacks the immediately (or nearly immediately) exercisable capacity to perform char­acteristically human mental functions. So, if full moral respect were due only to thosewho possess a nearly immediately exercisable capacity for characteristically humanmental functions, it would follow that six-week old infants do not deserve full moral

respect. If abortion were morally acceptable on the grounds that the human embryoor fetus lacks such a capacity for characteristically human mental functions, then onewould be logically committed to the view that, subject to parental approval, humaninfants could be disposed of as well.

Second, the difference between these two types of capacity is merely a differencebetween stages along a continuum. The proximate or nearly immediately exercisablecapacity for mental functions is only the development of an underlying potentialitythat the human being possesses simply by virtue of the kind of entity it is. The capac­ities for reasoning, deliberating, and making choices are gradually developed, orbrought towards maturation, through gestation, childhood, adolescence, and so on.But the difference between a being that deserves full moral respect and a being thatdoes not (and can therefore legitimately be disposed of as a means of benefIting others)cannot consist only in the fact that, while both have some feature, one has more ofit than the other. A mere quantitative difference (having more or less of the samefeature, such as the development of a basic natural capacity) cannot by itself be a jus­tifIcatory basis for treating different entities in radically different ways. Between theovum and the approaching thousands of sperm, on the one hand, and the embryonichuman being, on the other hand, there is a clear difference in kind. But between theembryonic human being and that same human being at any later stage of its matu­ration, there is only a difference in degree.

Note that there is a fundamental difference (as we showed above) between thegametes (the sperm and the ovum), on the one hand, and the human embryo and

Patrick Lee and Robert P. George

fetus, on the other. When a human being comes to be, a substantial entity that isidentical with the entity that will later reason, make free choices, and so on, beginsto exist. So, those who propose an accidental characteristic as qualifying an entity asa bearer of the right to life (or as a "person" or being with "moral worth") are ignor­

ing a radical difference among groups of beings, and instead fastening onto a merequantitative difference as the basis for treating different groups in radically differentways. In other words, there are beings a, b, c, d, e, etc. And between a's and b's onthe one hand and c's, d's and e's on the other hand, there is a fundamental differ­

ence, a difference in kind not just in degree. But proponents of the position that being

a person is an accidental characteristic ignore that difference and pick out a mere dif­ference in degree between, say, d's and e's, and make that the basis for radically dif­ferent types of treatment. That violates the most basic canons of justice.

Third, being a whole human being (whether immature or not) is an either/or matter- a thing either is or is not a whole human being. But the acquired qualities thatcould be proposed as criteria for personhood come in varying and continuous degrees:there is an infmite number of degrees of the development of the basic natural capac­ities for self-consciousness, intelligence, or rationality. So, if human beings wereworthy of full moral respect (as subjects of rights) only because of such qualities, andnot in virtue of the kind of being they are, then, since such qualities come in varyingdegrees, no account could be given of why basic rights are not possessed by humanbeings in varying degrees. The proposition that all human beings are created equalwould be relegated to the status of a superstition. For example, if developed self-con­sciousness bestowed rights, then, since some people are more self-conscious thanothers (that is, have developed that capacity to a greater extent than others), somepeople would be greater in dignity than others, and the rights of the superiors wouldtrump those of the inferiors where the interests of the superiors could be advancedat the cost of the inferiors. This conclusion would follow no matter which of the

acquired qualities generally proposed as qualifying some human beings (or humanbeings at some stages) for full respect were selected. Clearly, developed self-con­sciousness, or desires, or so on, are arbitrarily selected degrees of development ofcapacities that all human beings possess in (at least) radical form from the cominginto existence of the human being until his or her death. So, it cannot be the casethat some human beings and not others possess the special kind of value that qual­ifies an entity as having a basic right to life, by virtue of a certain degree of devel­opment. Rather, human beings possess that kind of value, and therefore that right, invirtue of what (Le., the kind of being) they are; and all human beings - not just some,and certainly not just those who have advanced sufficiently along the developmen­tal path as to be able immediately (or almost immediately) to exercise their capaci­ties for characteristically human mental functions - possess that kind of value andthat right.4

Since human beings are valuable in the way that qualifies them as having a rightto life in virtue of what they are, it follows that they have that right, whatever itentails, from the point at which they come into being - and that point (as shown inour fust section) is at conception.

In sum, human beings are valuable (as subjects of rights) in virtue of what theyare. But what they are are human physical organisms. Human physical organisms

The Wrong of Abortion

- --- -------

come to be at conception. Therefore, what is intrinsically valuable (as a subject ofrights) comes to be at conception.

The Argument that Abortion is Justified asNon-intentional Killing

Some "pro-choice" philosophers have attempted to justify abortion by denying thatall abortions are intentional killing. They have granted (at least for the sake of argu­ment) that an unborn human being has a right to life but have then argued that thisright does not entail that the child in utero is morally entitled to the use of the mother'sbody for life support. In effect, their argument is that, at least in many cases, abor­tion is not a case of intentionally killing the child, but a choice not to provide thechild with assistance, that is, a choice to expel (or "evict") the child from the womb,despite the likelihood or certainty that expulsion (or "eviction") will result in his orher death (Little, 1999; McDonagh, 1996; Thomson, 1971).

Various analogies have been proposed by people making this argument. Themother's gestating a child has been compared to allowing someone the use of one'skidneys or even to donating an organ. We are not required (morally or as a matterof law) to allow someone to use our kidneys, or to donate organs to others, evenwhen they would die without this assistance (and we could survive in good healthdespite rendering it). Analogously, the argument continues, a woman is not morallyrequired to allow the fetus the use of her body. We shall call this "the bodily rightsargument. "

It may be objected that a woman has a special responsibility to the child she is car­rying, whereas in the cases of withholding assistance to which abortion is comparedthere is no such special responsibility. Proponents of the bodily rights argument havereplied, however, that the mother has not voluntarily assumed responsibility for thechild, or a personal relationship with the child, and we have strong responsibilities toothers only if we have voluntarily assumed such responsibilities (Thomson, 1971) orhave consented to a personal relationship which generates such responsibilities (Little,1999). True, the mother may have voluntarily performed an act which she knew mayresult in a child's conception, but that is distinct from consenting to gestate the childif a child is conceived. And so (according to this position) it is not until the womanconsents to pregnancy, or perhaps not until the parents consent to care for the childby taking the baby home from the hospital or birthing center, that the full duties ofparenthood accrue to the mother (and perhaps the father).

In reply to this argument we wish to make several points. We grant that in somefew cases abortion is not intentional killing, but a choice to expel the child, the child'sdeath being an unintended, albeit foreseen and (rightly or wrongly) accepted, sideeffect. However, these constitute a small minority of abortions. In the vast majorityof cases, the death of the child in utero is precisely the object of the abortion. In mostcases the end sought is to avoid being a parent; but abortion brings that about onlyby bringing it about that the child dies. Indeed, the attempted abortion would be con­sidered by the woman requesting it and the abortionist performing it to have beenunsuccessful if the child survives. In most cases abortion is intentional killing. Thus,

Patrick Lee and Robert P. George

even if the bodily rights argument succeeded, it would justify only a small percent­

age of abortions.Still, in some few cases abortion is chosen as a means precisely toward ending the

condition of pregnancy, and the woman requesting the termination of her pregnancywould not object if somehow the child survived. A pregnant woman may have lessor more serious reasons for seeking the termination of this condition, but if that is

her objective, then the child's death resulting from his or her expulsion will be a sideeffect, rather than the means chosen. For example, an actress may wish not to be

pregnant because the pregnancy will change her fIgure during a time in which she isfIlming scenes in which having a slender appearance is important; or a woman maydread the discomforts, pains, and diffIculties involved in pregnancy. (Of course, inmany abortions there may be mixed motives: the parties making the choice may intendboth ending the condition of pregnancy and the death of the child.)

Nevertheless, while it is true that in some cases abortion is not intentional killing,

it remains misleading to describe it simply as choosing not to provide bodily lifesupport. Rather, it is actively expelling the human embryo or fetus from the womb.There is a signifIcant moral difference between not doing something that would assistsomeone, and doing something that causes someone harm, even if that harm is anunintended (but foreseen) side effect. It is more diffIcult morally to justify the latterthan it is the former. Abortion is the act of extracting the unborn human being fromthe womb - an extraction that usually rips him or her to pieces or does him or herviolence in some other way.

It is true that in some cases causing death as a side effect is morally permissible.For example, in some cases it is morally right to use force to stop a potentially lethalattack on one's family or country, even if one foresees that the force used will alsoresult in the assailant's death. Similarly, there are instances in which it is permissibleto perform an act that one knows or believes will, as a side effect, cause the death ofa child in utero. For example, if a pregnant woman is discovered to have a cancerousuterus, and this is a proximate danger to the mother's life, it can be morally right toremove the cancerous uterus with the baby in it, even if the child will die as a result.A similar situation can occur in ectopic pregnancies. But in such cases, not only is thechild's death a side effect, but the mother's life is in proximate danger. It is worthnoting also that in these cases what is done (the means) is the correction of a pathol­ogy (such as a cancerous uterus, or a ruptured uterine tube). Thus, in such cases, notonly the child's death, but also the ending of the pregnancy, are side effects. So, suchacts are what traditional casuistry referred to as indirect or non-intentional, abortions.

But it is also clear that not every case of causing death as a side effect is morallyright. For example, if a man's daughter has a serious respiratory disease and the fatheris told that his continued smoking in her presence will cause her death, it would obvi­ously be immoral for him to continue the smoking. Similarly, if a man works for asteel company in a city with signifIcant levels of air pollution, and his child has aserious respiratory problem making the air pollution a danger to her life, certainly heshould move to another city. He should move, we would say, even if that meant hehad to resign a prestigious position or make a signifIcant career change.

In both examples, (a) the parent has a special responsibility to his child, but (b)the act that would cause the child's death would avoid a harm to the parent but cause

The Wrong of Abortion

a signifIcantly worse harm to his child. And so, although the harm done would be aside effect, in both cases the act that caused the death would be an unjust act, andmorally wrongful as such. The special responsibility of parents to their childrenrequires that they at least refrain from performing acts that cause terrible harms totheir children in order to avoid signifIcantly lesser harms to themselves.

But (a) and (b) also obtain in intentional abortions (that is, those in which theremoval of the child is directly sought, rather than the correction of a life-threaten­ing pathology) even though they are not, strictly speaking, intentional killing. First,the mother has a special responsibility to her child, in virtue of being her biologicalmother (as does the father in virtue of his paternal relationship). The parental rela­tionship itself - not just the voluntary acceptance of that relationship - gives rise toa special responsibility to a child.

Proponents of the bodily rights argument deny this point. Many claim that onehas full parental responsibilities only if one has voluntarily assumed them. And sothe child, on this view, has a right to care from his or her mother (including gesta­tion) only if the mother has accepted her pregnancy, or perhaps only if the mother(and/or the father?) has in some way voluntarily begun a deep personal relationshipwith the child (Little, 1999).

But suppose a mother takes her baby home after giving birth, but the only reasonshe did not get an abortion was that she could not afford one. Or suppose she livesin a society where abortion is not available (perhaps very few physicians are willingto do the grisly deed). She and her husband take the child home only becausethey had no alternative. Moreover, suppose that in their society people are not waitingin line to adopt a newborn baby. And so the baby is several days old before anythingcan be done. If they abandon the baby and the baby is found, she will simplybe returned to them. In such a case the parents have not voluntarily assumed respon­sibility; nor have they consented to a personal relationship with the child. But itwould surely be wrong for these parents to abandon their baby in the woods (perhapsthe only feasible way of ensuring she is not returned), even though the baby'sdeath would be only a side effect. Clearly, we recognize that parents do have aresponsibility to make sacrifIces for their children, even if they have not voluntaryassumed such responsibilities, or given their consent to the personal relationship withthe child.

The bodily rights argument implicitly supposes that we have a primordial right toconstruct a life simply as we please, and that others have claims on us only very min­imally or through our (at least tacit) consent to a certain sort of relationship withthem. On the contrary, we are by nature members of communities. Our moral good­ness or character consists to a large extent (though not solely) in contributing to thecommunities of which we are members. We ought to act for our genuine good orflourishing (we take that as a basic ethical principle), but our flourishing involvesbeing in communion with others. And communion with others of itself - even if we

fmd ourselves united with others because of a physical or social relationship whichprecedes our consent - entails duties or responsibilities. Moreover, the contributionwe are morally required to make to others will likely bring each of us some discom­fort and pain. This is not to say that we should simply ignore our own good, for thesake of others. Rather, since what (and who) I am is in part constituted by various

~ Patrick Lee and Robert P. George

relationships with others, not all of which are initiated by my will, my genuine goodincludes the contributions I make to the relationships in which I participate. Thus, thelife we constitute by our free choices should be in large part a life of mutual reci­

procity with others.For example, I may wish to cultivate my talent to write and so I may want to spend

hours each day reading and writing. Or I may wish to develop my athletic abilitiesand so I may want to spend hours every day on the baseball fIeld. But if I am a fatherof minor children, and have an adequate paying job working (say) in a coal mine,then my clear duty is to keep that job. Similarly, if one's girlfriend fmds she is preg­nant and one is the father, then one might also be morally required to continue one'swork in the mine (or mill, factory, warehouse, etc.).

In other words, I have a duty to do something with my life that contributes to the

good of the human community, but that general duty becomes specifIed by my par­ticular situation. It becomes specifIed by the connection or closeness to me of thosewho are in need. We acquire special responsibilities toward people, not only by con­

senting to contracts or relationships with them, but also by having various types ofunion with them. So, we have special responsibilities to those people with whom weare closely united. For example, we have special responsibilities to our parents, andbrothers and sisters, even though we did not choose them.

The physical unity or continuity of children to their parents is unique. The childis brought into being out of the bodily unity and bodies of the mother and the father.The mother and the father are in a certain sense prolonged or continued in their off­

spring. So, there is a natural unity of the mother with her child, and a natural unityof the father with his child. Since we have special responsibilities to those with whomwe are closely united, it follows that we in fact do have a special responsibility toour children anterior to our having voluntarily assumed such responsibility or con­sented to the relationship.5

The second point is this: in the types of case we are considering, the harm caused(death) is much worse than the harms avoided (the diffIculties in pregnancy). Preg­

nancy can involve severe impositions, but it is not nearly as bad as death - which istotal and irreversible. One needn't make light of the burdens of pregnancy to acknowl­edge that the harm that is death is in a different category altogether.

The burdens of pregnancy include physical diffIculties and the pain of labor, andcan include signifIcant fmancial costs, psychological burdens, and interference withautonomy and the pursuit of other important goals (McDonagh, 1996: ch. 5). Thesecosts are not inconsiderable. Partly for that reason, we owe our mothers gratitude forcarrying and giving birth to us. However, where pregnancy does not place a woman'slife in jeopardy or threaten grave and lasting damage to her physical health, the harmdone to other goods is not total. Moreover, most of the harms involved in pregnancyare not irreversible: pregnancy is a nine-month task - if the woman and man are notin a good position to raise the child, adoption is a possibility. So the diffIculties ofpregnancy, considered together, are in a different and lesser category than death.Death is not just worse in degree than the diffIculties involved in pregnancy; it isworse in kind.

It has been argued, however, that pregnancy can involve a unique type of burden.It has been argued that the intimacy involved in pregnancy is such that if the woman

The Wrong of Abortion

must remain pregnant without her consent then there is inflicted on her a unique andserious harm. Just as sex with consent can be a desired experience but sex withoutconsent is a violation of bodily integrity, so (the argument continues) pregnancyinvolves such a close physical intertwinement with the fetus that not to allow abor­tion is analogous to rape - it involves an enforced intimacy (Boonin, 2003: 84; Little,1999: 300-3).

However, this argument is based on a false analogy. Where the pregnancy isunwanted, the baby's "occupying" the mother's womb may involve a harm; but thechild is committing no injustice against her. The baby is not forcing himself or herselfon the woman, but is simply growing and developing in a way quite natural to himor her. The baby is not performing any action that could in any way be construed asaimed at violating the mother.6

It is true that the fulfIllment of the duty of a mother to her child (during gesta­

tion) is unique and in many cases does involve a great sacrifICe. The argument wehave presented, however, is that being a mother does generate a special responsibil­ity, and that the sacrifIce morally required of the mother is less burdensome than theharm that would be done to the child by expelling the child, causing his or her death,to escape that responsibility. Our argument equally entails responsibilities for thefather of the child. His duty does not involve as direct a bodily relationship with thechild as the mother's, but it may be equally or even more burdensome. In certain cir­cumstances, his obligation to care for the child (and the child's mother), and espe­cially his obligation to provide fmancial support, may severely limit his freedom andeven require months or, indeed, years, of extremely burdensome physical labor. His­torically, many men have rightly seen that their basic responsibility to their family(and country) has entailed risking, and in many cases, losing, their lives. Differentpeople in different circumstances, with different talents, will have different responsi­bilities. It is no argument against any of these responsibilities to point out theirdistinctness.

So, the burden of carrying the baby, for all its distinctness, is signifICantly lessthan the harm the baby would suffer by being killed; the mother and father have aspecial responsibility to the child; it follows that intentional abortion (even in the fewcases where the baby's death is an unintended but foreseen side effect) is unjust andtherefore objectively immoral.

Notes

See, for example: Carlson (1994: chs. 2-4); Gilbert (2003: 183-220,363-90); Larson (2001:chs. 1-2); Moore and Persaud (2003: chs. 1-6); Muller (1997: chs. 1-2); O'Rahilly andMueller (2000: chs. 3-4).

2 For a discussion of the issues raised by twinning and cloning, see George and Lobo (2002).3 Some defenders of abortion have seen the damaging implications of this point for their posi­

tion (Stretton, 2004), and have struggled to fmd a way around it. There are two leadingproposals. The fIrst is to suggest a mean between a capacity and an actual behavior, suchas a disposition. But a disposition is just the development or specifIcation of a capacity andso raises the unanswerable question of why just that much development, and not more or

Patrick Lee and Robert P. George

less, should be required. The second proposal is to assert that the historical fact of someonehaving exercised a capacity (say, for conceptual thought) confers on her a right to life evenif she does not now have the immediately exercisable capacity. But suppose we have babySusan who has developed a brain and gained sufficient experience to the point that just nowshe has the immediately exercisable capacity for conceptual thought, but she has not yetexercised it. Why should she be in a wholly different category than say, baby Mary, who is

just like Susan except she did actually have a conceptual thought? Neither proposal can bearthe moral weight assigned to it. Both offer criteria that are wholly arbitrary.

4 In arguing against an article by Lee, Dean Stretton claims that the basic natural capacityof rationality also comes in degrees, and that therefore the argument we are presenting

against the position that moral worth is based on having some accidental characteristicwould apply to our position also (Stretton, 2004). But this is to miss the important dis­tinction between having a basic natural capacity (of which there are no degrees, since oneeither has it or one doesn't), and the development of that capacity (of which there are infi­nite degrees).

5 David Boonin claims, in reply to this argument - in an earlier and less developed form,

presented by Lee (1996: 122) - that it is not clear that it is impermissible for a woman todestroy what is a part of, or a continuation of, herself. He then says that to the extent theunborn human being is united to her in that way, "it would if anything seem that her actis easier to justify than if this claim were not true" (2003: 230). But Boonin fails to graspthe point of the argument (perhaps understandably since it was not expressed very clearlyin the earlier work he is discussing). The unity of the child to the mother is the basis forthis child being related to the woman in a different way from how other children are. Weought to pursue our own good and the good of others with whom we are united in various

ways. If that is so, then the closer someone is united to us, the deeper and more extensiveour responsibility to the person will be.

6 In some sense being bodily "occupied" when one does not wish to be is a harm; however,just as the child does not (as explained in the text), neither does the state inflict this harmon the woman, in circumstances in which the state prohibits abortion. By prohibiting abor­tion the state would only prevent the woman from performing an act (forcibly detachingthe child from her) that would unjustly kill this developing child, who is an innocentparty.

References

Boonin, David (2003). A Defense of Abortion. New York: Cambridge University Press.Carlson, Bruce (1994). Human Embryology and Developmental Biology. St. Louis, MO:

Mosby.Dworkin, Ronald (1993). Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and

Individual Freedom. New York: Random House.

Feinberg, Joel (ed.) (1984). The Problem of Abortion, 2nd edn. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth,1984.

George, Robert (2001). "We should not kill human embryos - for any reason." In The Clash of

Orthodoxies: Law, Religion, and Morality in Crisis (pp. 317-23). Wilmington, DL: ISI Books.George, Robert and Lobo, Gomez (2002). "Personal statement." In The President's Council on

Bioethics (2002, pp. 294-306).Gilbert, Scott (2003). Developmental Biology, 7th edn. Sunderland, MA: Sinnauer Associates.Larson, William J. (2001). Human Embryology, 3rd edn. New York: Churchill Livingstone.

The Wrong of Abortion

Lee, Patrick (1996). Abortion and Unborn Human Life. Washington, DC: Catholic University ofAmerica Press.

Little, Margaret Olivia (1999). "Abortion, intimacy, and the duty to gestate." Ethical Theory and

Moral Practice, 2: 295-312.McDonagh, Eileen (1996). Breaking the Abortion Deadlock: From Choice to Consent. New York:

Oxford University Press, 1996.Moore, Keith, and Persaud, 1. V. N. (2003). The Developing Human, Clinically Oriented

Embryology, 7th edn. New York: W. B. Saunders.Muller, Werner A. (1997). Developmental Biology. New York: Springer Verlag.O'Rahilly, Ronan, and Mueller, Fabiola (2000). Human Embryology and Teratology, 3rd edn. New

York: John Wiley a Sons.The President's Council on Bioethics (2002). Human Cloning and Human Dignity: the Report

oj the President's Council on Bioethics. New York: Public Affairs.Singer, Peter (1993). Practical Ethics, 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Stretton, Dean (2004). "Essential properties and the right to life: a response to Lee." Bioethics,

18/3: 264-82.

Thomson, Judith Jarvis (1971). "A defense of abortion." Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1: 47-66;reprinted, among other places, in Feinberg (1984, pp. 173-87).

Thomson, Judith Jarvis (1995). "Abortion." Boston Review. Available at (www.bostonreview.mit.edu/BR20.3/thomson.html).

Tooley, Michael (1983). Abortion and InJanticide. New York: Oxford University Press.Warren, Mary Ann (1984). "On the moral and legal status of abortion." In Feinberg (1984,

pp. 102-19).

Further reading

Bailey, Ronald, Lee, Patrick, and George, Robert P. (2001). "Are stem cells babies?" reasonon­

line. Available at (http://reason.com/rb/rb080601.shtml).Beckwith, Francis (1993). Politically Correct Death: Answering the Arguments Jor Abortion

Rights. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker.

Beckwith, Francis (2000). Abortion and the Sanctity oj Human Life. Joplin, MO: College Press.Chappell, 1. D. J. (1998). Understanding Human Goods: A Theory oj Ethics. Edinburgh:Edinburgh University Press.

Finnis, John (1999). "Abortion and health care ethics." In Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer (eds.),Bioethics: An Anthology (pp. 13-20). London: Blackwell.

Finnis, John (2001). "Abortion and cloning: some new evasions." Available at(http://lifeissues.net/writers/fm/ fm_O1aborcloneevasions.html).

Grisez, Germain (1990). "When do people begin?" Proceedings oj the American CatholicPhilosophical Quarterly, 63: 27-47.

Lee, Patrick (2004). "The pro-life argument from substantial identity: a defense." Bioethics, 18/3:249-63.

Marquis, Don (1989). "Why abortion is immoraL" Journal oj Philosophy, 86: 183-202.Oderberg, David (2000) Applied Ethics: A Non-Consequentialist Approach. New York: Oxford

University Press.Pavlischek, Keith (1993). "Abortion logic and paternal responsibilities: one more look at Judith

Thomson's 'Defense of abortion'." Public Affairs Quarterly, 7: 341-61.

Schwarz, Stephen (1990). The Moral Question oj Abortion. Chicago: Loyola University Press.Stone, Jim (1987). "Why potentiality matters." Journal oj Social Philosophy, 26: 815-30.Stretton, Dean (2000). "The argument from intrinsic value: a critique," Bioethics, 14: 228-39.

Patrick Lee and Robert P. George

CONTEMPORARYDEBATES IN

APPLIED ETHICS

Edited by

Andrew I. Cohen andChristopher Heath Wellman

• A Blackwell'-II Publishing