Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR2780

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (TF-91060 TF-91061 TF-91062 TF-97683)

ON A GRANT

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$10.32 MILLION

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF SUDAN

FOR A

BLUE NILE START-UP EMERGENCY PROJECT

June 13, 2013

Post Conflict and Social Development Practice Group (AFTCS) Sudan Country Department Africa Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective June 13, 2013)

Currency Unit = Sudanese Pounds 1.00 SDG = US$0.23 US$1.00 = 4.41 SDG

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAA Abyei Area Administration AF Additional Financing BNSEP Blue Nile Start-Up Emergency Project CIFA Country Integrated Fiduciary Assessment CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement DA Designated Account DIPU Abyei Department of Infrastructure and Public Utilities EA Environmental Assessment ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework FMFA Financial Management Framework Agreement FPP Final Project Proposal FRESH Focusing Resources on Effective School Health GoNU Sudan Government of National Unity GoSS Government of South Sudan ICB International Competitive Bidding IDPs Internally Displaced People IPP Initial Project Proposal JAM Joint Assessment Mission LIB Limited International Bidding LLIN Long Lasting Insecticidal Net MA Monitoring Agent MDTF Multi Donor Trust Fund MOFNE Ministry of Finance and National Economy MOU Memorandum of Understanding NCB National Competitive Bidding NCP National Congress Party NGO Non Governmental Organization NMAC National Mine Action Center OC Oversight Committee OP/BP Operational Policy / Bank Procedures PAD Project Appraisal Document PER Public Expenditure Review PCU Project Coordination Unit PFM Public Financial Management PSC Project Steering Committee QCBS Quality and Cost-Based Selection RRR Return, Reintegration, Repatriation

SOE Statement of Expenditures SPLM Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement TA Technical Assistance TT Task Team UN United Nations UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNIDO United National Industrial Development Organisation UNMIS United Nations Mission to Sudan USF Unity State Fund UXO Unexploded Ordnances

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Bella Bird

Sector Manager: Ian Bannon Project Team Leader: Yousif Elfadil

ICR Team Leader: Abderrahim Fraiji ICR Primary Author: Anthony Finn

SUDAN Blue Nile Start-up Emergency Project

CONTENTSData Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph

 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design .......................................................... 1 

1.1 Context at Appraisal ......................................................................................................... 1  1.2. Project Development Objectives and Key Indicators ....................................................... 1 

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification ................................................................................................................ 2 1.4 Main Beneficiaries ............................................................................................................ 2 1.5 Original Project Components............................................................................................ 3 1.6 Revised Components ........................................................................................................ 4 1.7 Other significant changes.................................................................................................. 4 

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .......................................................... 4 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry ............................................................. 5 2.2 Implementation ................................................................................................................. 7 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization .................. 9 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance ............................................................................. 10 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase .......................................................................... 10 

3. Assessment of Outcomes ..................................................................................................... 11 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation ................................................... 11 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives .......................................................... 12 3.3 Efficiency ........................................................................................................................ 12 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating ........................................................................ 13 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts ...................................................... 13 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops ............... 14 

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome .................................................................... 14 5. Assessment of Bank and Grantee Performance.................................................................... 15 

5.1 Bank Performance .......................................................................................................... 15 5.2 Grantee Performance ...................................................................................................... 16 

6. Lessons Learned ................................................................................................................... 17 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee/Implementing Agencies/Partners ......................... 19  Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing ..................................................................................... 20 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ............................................................................................. 21 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ............................................................................ 23 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ........................ 24 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ....................................................................................... 25 

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results .............................................................. 26 Annex 7. Summary of Grantee's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ................................... 27 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ................................... 28 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents .................................................................................. 29 

MAP  

A. Basic Information

Country: Sudan Project Name: Blue Nile Start-Up Emergency Project

Project ID: P107256 L/C/TF Number(s): TF-91060, TF-91061, TF-91062

ICR Date: 06/13/2013 ICR Type: Core ICR

Lending Instrument: ERL Grantee: GOVERNMENT OF THE BLUE NILE STATE-SUDAN

Original Total Commitment:

USD 10.32M Disbursed Amount: USD 9.82M

Revised Amount: USD 9.82M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: State Ministry of Finance and Economy, UNICEF, UNIDO Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates

Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual

Date(s)

Concept Review: Effectiveness: 01/24/2008

Appraisal: Restructuring(s): 08/30/2008 06/29/2010

Approval: 12/03/2007 Mid-term Review: 01/15/2009 01/12/2009 Closing: 06/30/2011 06/30/2012 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR

Outcomes: Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Grantee Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Grantee Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Grantee Ratings

Quality at Entry: Moderately Unsatisfactory Government: Moderately

Unsatisfactory

Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Implementing Agency/Agencies: Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Overall Grantee

Performance: Moderately Satisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators

Implementation Performance

Indicators QAG Assessments

(if any) Rating

Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

Yes Quality at Entry (QEA):

None

Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):

No Quality of Supervision (QSA):

None

DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:

Moderately Satisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes

Original Actual

Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Central government administration 22 22 Primary education 19 19 Roads and highways 25 25 Sub-national government administration 15 15 Water supply 19 19

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction 29 29 Education for all 14 14 Land administration and management 14 14 Nutrition and food security 14 14 Rural services and infrastructure 29 29 E. Bank Staff

Positions At ICR At Approval

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: Bella Bird Kenichi Ohashi Sector Manager: Ian Bannon Asif Faiz Project Team Leader: Yousif Mubarak ElFadil Asif Faiz ICR Team Leader: Abderrahim Fraiji ICR Primary Author: Anthony Finn

F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) To initiate the recovery of basic infrastructure and social services provided to the poor people in the conflict-affected area of Blue Nile State and to lay the foundations for a program addressing capacity building needs in key state ministries. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) (a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline

Value

Original Target

Values (from approval

documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

People in rural areas provided with access to “improved water sources” under the Project (171,000) - General population (71,000) - Pupils (100,000)

0 171,000 171,000

Famers adopting and trained in new technologies (200) 0 200 200

14 high priority suspected or mined areas and roads cleared or verified in about 33 communities, affecting a population of more than 54,000.

0 54,000 54,000

Capacity building in finance and economy, local government, education and public planning for 720 government employees.

0 1720 2,058

Improved disease control through: Investigative samples undertaken by the disease control center (72,000)

0 72000 350,000

Beneficiaries Direct Project Beneficiaries 0 774,000 941594 Direct Project Beneficiaries of which female 0 53% 52

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator Baseline

Value

Original Target

Values (from approval

documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Intermediate Result 1: Water Supply Improved community water points constructed or rehabilitated under the project 0 117 117

Community members trained on operation, maintenance and management of water sources 0 460 460

Intermediate Result 2: Secondary road Roads rehabilitated 0 80 107 Bridges constructed 0 18 11 Intermediate Result 3: Basic Education Schools trained to improve hygiene behavior or sanitation practices under the project 0 30 30

Improved latrines constructed under the project 0 30 64 Primary school aged children provided with pupil kits 0 145000 145000

Schools equipped with materials and/or furniture 0 122 122 Intermediate Result 4: Capacity building Administrative buildings built, rehabilitated or equipped 0 126 91

Intermediate Result 5: Supporting sustainability of fisheries sectors (Additional Financing) Fishers boats and gears improved in 16 unions and Fish processing improved in two women's associations fishers and women processors benefit

0 2,598 1,300

Improved seeds distributed in 10 villages 0 4000 0 16 Fishers union assisted with new improved boats and nets 0 50 43

Fisher unions supplied with new improved nets 0 22 22 Training of fishers 0 15 13 0ffice holders of the fishers unions (coops) trained in operating the cooperatives 0 110 60

Women groups trained in fish processing 0 4 4 Skill upgrading course for Chairpersons and secretaries 0 54 91

Skill up gradation course for Treasurers 0 29 27 Study tour for 18 fishers 0 19 19 Professional training for fisheries officers 0 12 12 Study tour for fisheries officers 0 12 12 Internal training in Co-management (11 FOs), M&E (7), Data Analysis (2) 0 20 20

Prepare Fisheries Master Plan for Blue Nile 0 1 1 Fisheries Research for BN state 0 1 1 Reorganization of the MoARF for fisheries unit strengthening 0 1 1

Establish an Ice Factory 0 1 1 Establish Fishers Service Center 0 1 1 Establish fish processing halls for women processors 0 1 1

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No. Date ISR Archived

DO IP Actual

Disbursements (USD millions)

1 06/27/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 3.94 2 12/22/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 4.21 3 05/26/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 6.38 4 12/28/2009 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 6.60 5 05/19/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 6.60 6 05/27/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.60 7 02/06/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 6.80

H. Restructuring (if any)

Component 7 (provision of long-lasting anti-malarial nets) was restructured on August 30, 2008 as a result of a proposal for the construction of a Centre for Disease Control on the basis that other agencies had already distributed anti-malarial bed-nets and there was a clear need for improving disease control in the State. Component 5 (Rural Livelihoods Component) was restructured to enhance its coverage and depth upon the approval of Additional Financing of US$3 million by the MDTF Oversight Committee (OC) on June 29, 2010.

I. Disbursement Profile

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1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. The Blue Nile Start-up Emergency Project (BNSEP) is one of the interventions flowing from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that is directed at improving basic services, consolidating peace and maintaining stability in conflict-affected areas of Sudan. These interventions focus on three conflict-affected areas in northern Sudan, namely: South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Abyei. The BNSEP was approved by the Oversight Committee (OC) for the MDTF-N on March 12, 2007. The Grant Agreement was signed on May 25, 2008 and became effective on July 14, 2008. The Project was to be implemented over a period of 23 months and close on June 30, 2011. It was later granted Additional Financing (AF), extending its closing date to June 30, 2012.

2. The project became effective three years after signing of the CPA when Sudan was embarking on a slow transition from managing conflict to pursuing pro-poor development. This transition was characterized by high needs, limited and uneven capacity, and on-going security and stabilization risks.

3. The 2005 CPA made a provision for 70% of National Development Reconstruction Funds to be targeted to the least developed states in North Sudan; this reflected the urgent recovery and development needs of these areas, as well as their pivotal role in sustained peace and security. Within this group of least developed states, the particular status of the three areas (Blue Nile, Abyei, and South Kordofan) was recognized in the CPA through specific protocols, which establish a special status under the Presidency for Abyei, and provide the Blue Nile and South Kordofan states with their own constitution and legislative bodies.

4. The first Sudan Consortium, held in Paris on March 9-10, 2006, noted that since the signing of the CPA, the three transitional areas had not received the expected resources, thus aggravating the existing political instability in the region. The quick formulation and start-up of a recovery project – including quick impact interventions – were both expected and desired.

5. When the BNSEP became effective, implementation of the CPA in all three areas was behind schedule. Internally Displaced People (IDPs) were returning to Blue Nile State and humanitarian and development agencies were scaling up activities. Opportunities for households to invest more in agriculture had increased, and there was a significant rise in food and cash income derived mainly from the benefits of increased stability and movement. However, there remained significant disparities between the three areas and the national average, and significant internal disparities between more and less war-affected areas.

1.2. Project Development Objectives and Key Indicators

6. The Project Development Objective (PDO) was: to initiate the recovery of basic infrastructure and social services provided to the poor people in the conflict-affected area of the Blue Nile State and to lay the foundations for a program addressing capacity building needs in key state Ministries in order to ensure future improvements in service delivery especially at local (decentralized) level.

7. The key performance indicators at time of approval were:

Table 1: PDO level KPIs (Original Project) PDO Indicators

Rural Livelihoods 71,000 people with access to improved water services Rural Livelihoods Targeted communities show correct and significant usage of the tools provided De-mining Reduction in accidents and mine related casualties Capacity Building Four capacity building programs are developed and agreed upon Malarial nets Long-lasting insecticidal bed-nets provided to 80 percent of rural households; training

on its use given.

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1.3 Revised PDO, Key Indicators, and Justification 8. The PDO has remained unchanged throughout the lifetime of the project. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) were originally formulated during the Project Proposal Stage and presented clustered under three sectors in alignment with the MDTF-N Three Areas Strategy. These indicators were re-articulated and reflected in project documentation, and reported on by the Monitoring Agent (MA).

9. Component 7 (provision of long-lasting anti-malarial nets) was replaced with a proposal for the construction of a Centre for Disease Control on the basis that other agencies had already distributed anti-malarial bed-nets and there was a clear need for improving disease control in the State. KPIs were revised to fit the new component.

10. KPIs were further adjusted in compliance with the mandatory Core Indicators, and subsequently to include appropriate indicators for approval of the Additional Financing (AF) to expand and deepen the rural livelihoods component (building and expanding upon the activities in the original grant, enlarging coverage, diversifying livelihoods, and maximizing development impact). This took place when the AF was proposed and was approved by the MDTF OC on June 29, 2010. It was approved by the Bank on August 25, 2010. Table 2: Revised KPIs Original KPI Change Implemented Rationale Given No original gender sensitive indicator Direct project beneficiaries (632,890) of

which are female (40%) Alignment with mandatory CORE indicator

71,000 people with access to an improved water source

People in rural areas provided with access to “Improved Water Sources” under the Project (171,000) comprised of: (i) general population (71,000) and (ii) pupils (100,000)

Alignment with mandatory CORE indicator

Target communities show correct and significant usage of the tools provided

Farmers adopting and trained in new technologies (200)

Continued as is

Reduction in accidents and mine related casualties

14 high priority suspected or mined areas and roads cleared or verified in about 33 communities affecting a population of more than 54,000

Continued as is

Four capacity building programs are developed and agreed upon

Capacity building in finance and economy, local government, education and public planning for 720 government employees

Continued

Long-lasting insecticidal bed-nets provided to 80 percent of rural households and training on its use

Improved disease control through: Investigative samples undertaken by the disease control center (72,000)

To align with revised project component

None Improved seeds distributed in 10 villages AF Livelihoods component None 16 Fisher unions assisted with the new

improved boats and nets AF Livelihoods component

None Fisher unions supplied with new improved nets

AF Livelihoods component

None Training of fishers AF Livelihood component None Office holders of the fishers cooperatives

trained in operating the cooperatives AF Livelihood component

None Women groups trained in fish processing AF Livelihood component None Skill upgrading course for chairpersons and

secretaries AF Livelihood component

None Skill upgrading course for treasurers AF Livelihood component None Study tour for 18 fishers AF Livelihood component

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

11. The main beneficiaries of the project (direct and indirect) are the general and conflict-affected population of Blue Nile State.

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1.5 Original Project Components

12. The original project components outlined in the Final Project Proposal (FPP) are:

13. Component 1: Water Supply (US$2.775 million – Implementing Agency: UNICEF). It supported the construction and rehabilitation of improved water sources throughout Blue Nile State, with the objective of increasing access to potable water on a reasonable per capita per day rate (20 liters), as well as increasing awareness on hygiene and environmental issues for 71,000 IDPs, returnees and host/receiving community members.

14. Component 2: Rural Roads Maintenance and Spot Improvements (US$3.725 million). It supported the construction of eight small one-lane bridges and 10 box culverts, as well as the clearing of 60 km and grading of 20 km of roads. It also provided capacity building as staff from the Blue Nile State Ministry of Physical Planning and Public Utilities (MPPPU) participated in all phases of the project. Purchase of some equipment was also included in the component: two trucks, six vehicles (4x4), one tanker, one excavator, and one grader. Furthermore, the MPPPU would also rehabilitate two trucks, one bulldozer (D8), one grader, and one tanker.

15. Component 3: Basic Education (US$2.780 million – Implementing Agency: UNICEF). It funded student and teacher kits, and classroom equipment for primary schools. It made basic education more accessible through the provision of a variety of interventions targeting school infrastructure and access to water, latrines, and basic hygiene. The Component also built the capacity of 1,300 teachers and established the Focusing Resources on Effective School Health (FRESH) program in 30 schools.

16. Component 4: Demining (US$1.599 million – Implementing Agency: NMAC). The National Mine Action Center (NMAC) implemented this component as part of its urgently needed work on demining suspected roads and other high priority suspected areas in Blue Nile State. Where possible, registered and accredited local mine action NGOs undertook clearance operations for mines, Unexploded Ordinances (UXO) and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW).

17. Component 5: Rural Households Livelihood Support (US$0.380 million – Implementing Agency: UNIDO). As a result of the successful implementation of the Community Livelihoods and Rural Industry Support (CLARIS) Program – Phase I (TF/SUD/03/001) in South Kordofan, UNIDO was asked to extend its CLARIS Program to Blue Nile State. The Project was implemented using the existing UNIDO CLARIS Phase I resources and staff in operations as a Project Coordinating Unit (PCU) in Dilling (South Kordofan) since 2004. The sub-office made use of support staff already available to carry out the selection and organization of target group training as required, employ existing blacksmiths for the production of hand tools, and utilize its facility for the production of the Nuba hoes and ox carts.

18. Component 6: Capacity Building for State and Local Government (US$2.310 million). It supported the Blue Nile State Government’s capacity in financial management and procurement and included: (i) institutional assessment and formulation of follow-up programs in Finance and Economy, Local Government, Education, Physical Planning and Public Utilities, and (ii) construction of basic office facilities and housing for local authorities.

19. Component 7: Anti-Malaria Bed-nets (US$0.400 million). While not included in the MDTF Three Areas Strategy, it was included in the project because of its potential high impact and quick start-up. It was to include the marketing and distribution of 65,000 long-lasting insecticidal nets (LLINs).

20. Component 8: Project Coordination Unit (US$0.640 million). This Component funded technical assistance for the coordination of the project. This included establishing a PCU within the State Ministry of Finance and Economy (MoFNE). A group of consultants with accounting, procurement and project management expertise were recruited to work together with a group of appointed young MoFNE staff to operate the PCU.

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1.6 Revised Components 21. Component 7: The Ministry later rejected the project as out of line with the priorities of the State, because LLINs were already being sourced through other channels. Instead, the Ministry requested funding for the establishment of a Centre for Disease Control (CDC), which was approved by the PCU. The construction of the Centre was financed through the MDTF, with furniture and equipment provided by the Unity State Fund (USF). The CDC opened in March 2011.

1.7 Other Significant Changes

22. Additional Financing of US$3 million was approved by the MDTF OC on June 29, 2010 and became effective on April 17, 2011 as a supplemental grant to the GoNU to enhance the coverage and depth of the Rural Livelihoods Component. Under the AF, the Rural Livelihoods Component was restructured into two sub-components. The delay in effectiveness was largely due to Bank procedures which treat AF as a new project with a different project ID and a different TF number.

23. Sub-component 1: Enhancing Coverage of Existing Rural Livelihoods Program (US$0.4 million). The AF was devoted to strengthening the existing program under the Rural Livelihoods Component and to meet the high demand which could not be met as a result of the low allocation (only US$0.38) for this component. An additional US$0.4 million was to be set aside for additional coverage of applicant beneficiaries and scaling up the packages. Activities included under this sub-component were: (i) improved seeds consultancy (US$30,190); and (ii) procurement of improved seeds (US$220,337).

24. Sub-component 2: Strengthening and Modernization of the Artisanal Fisheries for Fisherman Fishing in the Nile River (US$2.1 million). It included: (i) targeting fishers and women engaged in artisanal fisheries (US$0.4 million) to support training in better practices, supply fisher unions with improved boats and fishing nets, improve local boat/net supply by training artisans and craftsmen, fund fisher visits to better fishing areas, and provide equipment and support to market products in neighboring countries; and (ii) infrastructure for artisanal fishery and fish marketing (US$1.7 million), including support for retailing and wholesaling fish and fish products by establishing a cooling chamber, ice making factory, marketing hall and union activity center, and improvement of transportation technology.

25. Sub Component 3: Policy, Institutional and Capacity Building: (US$0.25 million). It supported provision of technical assistance (TA) for: (i) Policy and institution building, including: (a) drawing up a comprehensive plan for Blue Nile Fisheries, which was subsequently shared with State and Federal Ministries; (b) preparing a report for developing a fisheries research center and establishing research infrastructure; and (c) carrying out an institutional study of the Fisheries Department in order to develop a restructuring proposal for a research and outreach oriented departmental arrangement, and for participatory management of fisheries resources. (ii) Capacity building support was provided to strengthen the fisher unions, technically, and in relation to securing micro-credit, as well as federal fishery departments. The sub-component also sought to support the capture and dissemination among union members of best practice on fishing, fish processing and marketing.

26. Sub-Component 4: Support for the PCU (US$0.25 million), which as implementing agency was provided financing to cover costs of its operations for one additional year.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

27. The project met its PDO despite the challenges of implementation in a highly fragile and conflict-affected context. In part, the project was able to meet its PDO by: (i) aligning with wider peace-building approaches in Blue Nile State; (ii) having a strong PCU; (iii) benefiting from a relatively stable state political environment; (iv) having strong risk management measures; and (v) the Bank team providing TA and strong implementation support to the PCU.

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2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

28. Project preparation and design were responsive to the emerging policy frameworks and aligned with donor and GoNU strategy in peace-building, stabilization and recovery. The project did suffer from design weaknesses, specifically in M&E and in the preparation of project documentation. The Project also misjudged the capacity (or willingness) of the GoNU to contribute counterpart funding.

29. The project is characterized by a particularly high level of required counterpart funding that many key stakeholders in the BNSEP have argued was unrealistic. The project however was part of the MDTF-N portfolio for which this was a requirement and despite eventually discounting federal counterpart support to this project; GoNU provided nearly 60% of total MDTF-N commitments via counterpart funds. This is a rare level of co-funding in a fragile state and in effect, through counterpart funds, the MDTF-NS substantially enabled pro-poor allocations in a way and at a level that would have been unlikely without the donor partnership.

30. By design, the project was an emergency response in a highly fragile and conflict-affected environment that did not have a significant history of recent Bank engagement. The Bank re-engaged Sudan in 2004 after a gap of nearly 10 years. However, normal financial support from IDA at the time of re-engagement was (and is currently) not possible due to Sudan’s outstanding arrears accumulated since 1993 and estimated at US$600 million. In addition, the project was located in a difficult environment made all the more challenging by the risks and complexity of operating in a transitional area, under temporary joint administration, with limited capacity, infrastructure, and Bank experience in the region.

31. The strategic context to the project preparation and design comprised: (i) the 2005 CPA, which set the stage for recovery, reconstruction and development efforts to sustain and consolidate peace; (ii) the 2005 JAM, and (iii) the subsequent GoNU Five-Year Strategic Plan (2007-11). Strengths of the project design include how it has aligned with the CPA. Specifically, the project provided assistance to the implementation of the CPA by encouraging fiscal transfers to Blue Nile State. The project, as part of the MDTF-N, was leverage to secure GoNU provision of nearly 60% of total MDTF-N commitments in the form of counterpart funds (US$350 million), a very rare (as discussed further below) level of co-funding. In effect, the MDTF-N substantially enabled pro-poor allocations in a way and at a level that would have been unlikely without the donor partnership. Increased fiscal transfers to the transition states was a contributing factor in the government’s eventual decision to discontinue federal counterpart funding for MDTF emergency projects. This decision was taken on the basis that GoNU would manage the issue of government-funded Components through its budgetary process and directly with the concerned states. Based on that, MoFNE recommended that the Bank and PCU approach the State Government to fill the gap, which provided US$5.8 million for rural roads construction, taking total counterpart commitment (MoFNE, USF, and BN State) to approximately US$9.1 million, i.e., above the original co-financing commitment. 32. The project addressed the socio-economic focus in the CPA through its activities: access to basic services, reconstruction of infrastructure and the recovery of some basic economic development of conflict-affected population. It addressed the institutional development component of the CPA by providing capacity building for government institutions and key actors, including the PCU.

33. The project design was also strengthened by its alignment with the priorities of the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM). The donor-led JAM identified the development needs of Sudan and emphasized eight sectors, thematic clusters and cross-cutting issues. The project aligned itself with these needs, as well as the subsequent GoNU Strategic Plan, specifically in terms of: (i) institutional development and capacity building; (ii) productive sectors; (iii) basic social services; (iv) infrastructure; and (v) livelihood and social protection.

34. The project had design weaknesses, specifically in document preparation, including the Project Implementation Manual (PIM), which was created retrospectively in 2010 as part of the preparation of the

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AF. The Results Framework was weak, although it was later updated to include the mandatory Core Indicators. Because it was initially intended as an emergency project (with an emphasis on securing quick impacts to bolster peace building and mitigate the risk of return to conflict), it did not develop a rigorous M&E framework. In addition, the project did not have a baseline against which progress could be measured: all indicators were set at zero, which meant any project activity was unavoidably an improvement. Project KPIs were largely oriented to measuring outputs, which while they assisted project monitoring (as evidenced in the reporting of the MA), were not accurate indicators of impact. Nevertheless, these weaknesses did not significantly impact implementation or success of the project largely due to a strong PCU and flexibility by the PCU and Bank team to adapt to changing circumstances.

35. The PDO was too broadly configured to enable identification of its expected contribution to recovery and peace-building, which is largely explained by the emergency nature of the project. By no means a justification, but weak PDO formulation and project documentation are often a consequence of quick project design, preparation and implementation in unstable environments with little infrastructure or prior Bank experience, limited baseline data and prior knowledge of the political economy of the region, and emphasis on securing quick results. Moreover, Bank field presence during design and implementation was limited; its office in Khartoum was only two years old with minimal staffing.

36. As with the rest of the MDTF-N portfolio, the GoNU counterpart funding commitment was set too high and was unrealistic, particularly given the fact that Sudan was at an early stage of recovery from war, and was still in the process of preparing for the eventual secession of the South. The decision of the GoNU to discontinue counterpart funding to BNSEP (communicated on October 29, 2008) negatively affected implementation of the majority of project activities.

37. The project was responsive to the needs of the Blue Nile State Government and to conflict-affected populations in the State. Some components included consultations by implementing partners concurrent with community capacity building activities. For example, UNIDO conducted community consultations while delivering capacity building in revolving fund management and community development as part of Component 5. Stakeholder consultations also informed the design of some activities during project extension. For example, the involvement of local fishers and skilled tradesmen in the design of activities via consultation managed by the PCU. By engaging local stakeholders, the PCU managed to increase the sustainability of the project by altering the design based on these consultations. Rather than procure new fishing boats to replace old and damaged stock, the project organized local carpenters and fishers to repair old stock and replace unsalvageable materials with locally sourced timber, with the assistance of locally sourced tradespeople. Boats repaired and built were registered and plated so that they could be identified, and for the first time received appropriate upkeep and repair.

Risks and Risk Mitigation

38. The identification and management of risks was satisfactory. The project was designed with strong and realistic risk analysis and mitigation measures. Project risks were rated substantial in the FPP, with four risk categories identified, as well as issues pertaining to project complexity and implementing partners: (i) security, political stability, and political will to support the project; (ii) capacity of State Government, particularly lack of experience in program implementation, financial management and procurement; (iii) procedural and implementation risks, including: (a) transfer of counterpart funds in a timely manner; (b) procurement delays arising from customs, transport and availability of locally-sourced goods; and (c) availability of contractors capable of implementing planned activities with required quality; and (iv) fiduciary risks.

39. The risk of conflict and political instability was largely beyond the control of the project. However, measures aimed at mitigating other risks have contributed to the management of risks related to general instability, which are inherent in the external environment. These measures include designing the project as an emergency intervention with the aim of a fast disbursement of funds and achievement of results where the “quick wins” success of the project can mitigate the potential negative impact of slow

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project effectiveness on confidence and community buy-in, thus contributing towards stabilization. Similarly, the mitigation of challenges in capacity, and procedural and fiduciary risks all contributed to better implementation and thus helped the project avoid any negative impact in an unstable social and political environment. Furthermore, the implementing partners of the CPA (GoNU and Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM)), as well as the State Government committed to the project. As the project was implemented, achievement of results contributed to cementing that commitment despite serious implementation challenges due to the loss of counterpart financing.

40. Currently, security-related threats to the sustainability of project outcomes persist in Blue Nile State with increasing confrontation between Sudan’s Armed Forces (SAF) and SPLM-N in the State and the indefinite postponement of popular consultations, which, as per the CPA, were to facilitate the determination of the constitutional situation of the State. At time of writing of this ICR, confrontation between the SPLM-N is occurring in South Kordofan. The third transitional area, Abyei, is currently under the complete administration of the GoNU with the Abyei Area Administration (AAA) (power-sharing body established to govern the State) dissolved. Consequently, security-related threats to the sustainability of the project outcomes remain substantial.

41. The project utilized three implementation modalities to mitigate risks resulting from severe capacity challenges: (i) 100% MDTF-funding, implemented by UN agencies (original Components 1, 3 and 5); (ii) 100% GoNU-funding, implemented by Blue Nile State institutions (original Components 2 and 6); and Federal Government institutions (original Components 4 and 7). By diversifying implementing agencies, the project was able to start some components when others were experiencing delays. Nevertheless, there were implementation challenges with both UNIDO and UNICEF, which caused UNIDO in particular to experience significant delays in the implementation of its activities. Diversifying implementing agencies had an impact on the efficiency of the project with UN-implemented Components being the more expensive to implement compared to those implemented by the PCU. The project delegated implementation of Components 1, 3 and 5 to existing programs or work-plans of UNICEF and UNIDO. To further mitigate capacity-related risks, project design was kept simple and largely focused on works and construction, as well as having sub-components focused solely on procurement.

42. Fiduciary risks were identified as substantial and mitigation measures identified at project design including: (i) delegation of implementation to UN agencies (UNICEF and UNIDO); (ii) recruitment of fiduciary professionals in the PCU; and (iii) simple design of project activities. At project completion, it is clear that measures taken during project implementation also contributed to mitigating risks, particularly: (i) the hands-on approach of the Bank team to project management and assistance to implementing partners; and (ii) the quality of the PCU, particularly the Chair and the overall capacity of the unit.

2.2 Implementation

43. Blue Nile State faces severe constraints as a result of the conflict, lack of infrastructure and communications, weak governance and institutional capacity, its status as a transitional area, as being affected by the confrontation between SPLM-N and the SAF. Despite this highly unstable environment, the project successfully completed its activities, met most key performance indicators (original and revised), and achieved its PDO. Furthermore, after completion, results from the project have been consolidated by the PCU, which has sought Bank financing (including through the State and Peace-building Fund) and non-Bank financing to develop new programs in agriculture and apiculture. If successful, this is likely to consolidate the sustainability of some project outcomes. This is a significant achievement given the security and political instability and significant capacity challenges.

44. Implementation of restructured activities during the AF show how the project evolved from an emergency response to the needs of Blue Nile State into a project addressing longer-term issues. This is particularly the case in the restructuring of Component 7 and extension of Component 5, both of which

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responded to needs presented to the PCU and a focus on sustainability and long- term impact. An example is the 20-year master plan for the regional fisheries industry produced during project extension and shared with the State Government. This master plan built on the emergency response to rehabilitate local fisheries, by building the capacity of fisher organizations and developing a longer-term master plan for the sector in response to the likely influx of larger fishing operations due to the damming of fishery areas..

45. Project implementation faced the following challenges:

(a) Project Component Re-structuring: the original design of Component 7, the supply of anti-malarial bed-nets, was changed by the PCU in response to a request of the State Ministry of Health for support for the establishment of the Centre for Disease Control.

(b) Project Restructuring and AF: Component 5 (Rural Households Livelihood Support) was extended to increase the coverage and depth of the component over a longer time period.

(c) Counterpart Finance: arguably the most significant challenge to project implementation was the decision of GoNU to terminate counterpart funding to the BNSEP resulting in implementation delays and requiring the PCU and Bank team to obtain alternative financing to ensure implementation of the project.

(d) Activities poorly suited to the local (State) context: a consequence of UNIDO transferring already implemented activities from other transition States, such as South Kordofan, to Blue Nile State without taking into consideration local specificities and geography. Some activities were wholly unsuited to the Blue Nile State.

(e) Capacity of Implementing Partners and the PCU: UNIDO faced challenges in implementing a design adapted from another setting resulting in the delayed implementation of some activities. Challenges faced by the PCU were relatively minor, especially in FM and procurements, and they were effectively addressed through TA and strong support by the Bank team.

46. Restructuring Component 7 was a timely response to the fact that anti-malarial bed-nets were being supplied through other programs. Although the revised component (establishment of the CDC) was to be funded by MoFNE, in the event it was financed through the MDTF-N (construction) and the Unity Fund (furniture and equipment). The PCU has worked with the State Ministry to ensure the Center functions independently under the overall coordination of the Health Ministry, and that the CDC pricing structure aligns with market rates and does not negatively impact private sector health service provision.

47. Extending and restructuring Component 5 was a response to poor design and slow implementation by UNIDO. As was the case with UNICEF for Components 1 and 3, the Bank entered into direct agreement with UNIDO for the implementation of Component 5, to which the agency would apply its own procurement and disbursement rules, and manage the project expenditure component.

48. In addition to a slow approach to project implementation, further delays were caused by the replication of activities implemented in the Rural Households and Livelihood Support Component of the South Kordofan Start-Up Emergency Project and applying them in Component 5 of the BNSEP without assessing their suitability in the region. UNIDO planned to produce and supply 2000 sets of hand tools, 200 sets of animal traction tools and to deliver training in the production of hand-tools and animal traction components to 20 blacksmiths. It also planned to introduce the Nuba hoe (an agricultural tool used in South Kordofan); however, the tools are unsuited to the soil conditions in Blue Nile State. Moreover, UNIDO introduced animal traction in locations where it is not suitable, not used, and where there is no history of maintaining the animals used or the manufactured components. Ultimately, it is unclear where the responsibility lies in vetting the UNIDO design and whether the Bank team or the PCU should have identified shortcomings and sought modify the design of UNIDO’s component. The Bank team noted the

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lack of coordination between UNIDO and line Ministries and during the Mid-term Review in 2009 put in place additional monitoring of the UNIDO component to overcome design issues.

49. Shortcomings in the component were addressed through AF which: (i) enhanced the coverage of the previous Rural Livelihoods Program; (ii) strengthened and modernized the artisanal fisheries activity; and (iii) supported the provision of TA for policy and institution building (including the 20-year Fisheries Master Plan) and capacity building of fishers and fisher unions. As a result, improved fishing methods and management of stock were noted in the case of fishers, and new equipment and facilities were provided.

50. The most significant challenge to implementation of the whole project was the decision by GoNU to discontinue counterpart funding, which negatively affected the following activities and components. Table 3: Implementation delays resulting from withdrawn counterpart funding Implementation delay Measures taken to address implementation delay Component 2: Rural roads, Maintenance and Spot Improvements Duration of delay is not evident from MA reports or MTR

Bank TT, together with the Country Manager and Project Coordinator, reached an agreement with the Governor of Blue Nile State whereby in exchange for securing additional MDTF financing for the Component, the State would directly finance the construction of 85kms of rural roads under its ongoing road improvement program.

Component 4: Demining Absence of counterpart funding for this Component severely delayed its implementation; it did not start until Q4 (2009). The Component was completed by the end of Q2 (2010).

The TT and Project Coordinator were able to secure funding for this Component benefiting more than 54,000 community members from the USF.

Component 6: Capacity Building Absence of counterpart funding for this Component complicated and delayed its implementation.

The TT and Project Coordinator were able to secure funding (US$454,540) for this Component from the USF. Co-financing arrangements allowed the negative effects of the loss of counterpart funding to be successfully managed.

Component 7: Health Absence of counterpart funding for this Component complicated implementation; however, restructuring somewhat mitigated that cause of delay.

The TT and Project Coordinator were able to secure funding (US$159,090) for this Component from the USF, which was made available promptly following restructuring.

51. To address the counterpart funding issue, the Bank team and PCU recommended that: (i) the Bank team discuss with MoFNE the future of the project and try to ensure that GoNU meets its funding commitments through the MDTF-N, direct budget support, or through the Unity Fund; (ii) the PCU discuss with relevant State Ministries how their respective components can still be implemented; (iii) the Bank explore internal trust fund options to support peace and development in the State; and (iv) the State Government continue efforts to secure funding from MoFNE.

52. In the end, the shortfall in counterpart funding (US$7.52 million) was met through the contributions of the State Government and through the USF totaling US$5.8 million and US$2.2 million, respectively. The total counterpart funding disbursed for the project, from State Government, USF and GoNU, was US$9.1 million (GoNU contributed US$1,096,730).

53. In summary, the 2009 and 2011 MTRs appropriately identified the implementation challenges mentioned above, and mitigation measures to address them. In addition, the strong implementation support by the Bank team in most areas of project implementation including FM and procurement, the hiring of international procurement expertise to complement the PCU, and the close working relationship between the PCU and the Bank team all contributed to the effective identification, management and correction of implementation challenges throughout the project cycle.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

M&E Design

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54. At the design stage, it was not envisaged that the project would have a comprehensive M&E system because of its emergency nature. In the FPP, M&E is described as consisting of the preparation of quarterly Progress Reports by implementing agencies (except for reporting on Component 4, which was semi-annual), focusing on outputs, implementation progress, financial statements and results against monitoring indicators. Data would essentially rely on limited existing sources and routine data collection by the project. The project M&E framework thus concentrates more on monitoring than evaluation, with results largely output-oriented and little capacity to evaluate impact. In the final analysis, the project had good tracking of inputs and outputs in line with the original design, and later, with Core Indicators incorporated in revised frameworks.

55. The absence of a comprehensive M&E system with an evaluation component in Bank-financed emergency projects is common, and it constitutes a fundamental design flaw. In this case, an opportunity was missed to capture the good performance of the project, as well as relevant implementation lessons, including learning about direct and indirect impacts, implementation innovation and good practices. Such evaluative learning could prove highly useful for other projects in Sudan, as well as for other fragile and conflict-affected settings in and beyond the region.

M&E Implementation and Utilization

56. Monitoring arrangements and frameworks were appropriately applied to gauge implementation progress. MA reporting in particular provides a concise overview of the progress of the project toward achieving outputs, tracks implementation delays, and adequately rates project performance in FM, counterpart funding, procurement, administration, and implementation relative to performance of the MDTF-N portfolio overall.

57. The Bank team monitored project progress through close, effective on-the-ground implementation support, particularly in the early stages of the project when there were delays (e.g., delays in Component 5 implemented by UNIDO). Standard Bank reporting tools such as ISRs and MTRs contain summaries of progress toward achievement of the PDO and KPIs, as well as implementation performance and planned actions to address challenges.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

58. ISRs rate compliance with social and environmental safeguards as satisfactory for the duration of the project.1 The project recognized that GoNU had only limited capacity on safeguard policies. The Bank team and PCU focused on: (i) application of Bank Africa Regional Environmental Guidelines for CDD Projects; (ii) precautions in the Water Supply Component to assure hygiene at water-points (human and livestock) and monitoring of the drawdown of the water-table in the region; and (iii) appropriate disposal of mines. However, activities were implemented before any Environmental Management Plans (EMPs) or mitigation management plans were prepared. To close this gap, the Bank team commissioned a retrospective assessment of project environmental impacts, which reported no significant negative impacts. In preparation for extension of the project, an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) was prepared (January 2012), which included EMPs for relevant components.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

59. The project closed June 30, 2012. There are no specific plans for follow-up project activities or for monitoring the sustainability of project outcomes. The PCU and Bank team have attempted to design activities in a way that they can be sustained by the State government, or for the PCU and State authorities to seek additional financing sources to extend project activities and implement activities that

1 As per OP/BP 8.00 the project was processed under simplified procedures regarding social and environmental safeguard policies.

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were not part of the project plan but were conceived during implementation. For example, the PCU has developed two new activities on seed propagation and beekeeping which could be eligible for Bank SPF funding or sources outside the Bank. The component would construct and equip a seed propagation laboratory to develop early maturing seeds that can be harvested before the seasonal migration of pastoralists, thus removing a source of conflict (often violent) between farmers and pastoralists.

60. An important outcome of the project is the establishment of a strong and capable PCU which has taken a broader development role in the State, beyond a project implementation unit for a Bank project. As the PCU has grown in strength, effectiveness and credibility as a technically competent agency, it has taken on a more active developmental role in the State. The PCU is now able to address development needs, find innovative solutions to the State’s development challenges, prepare proposals for external funding and has forged a productive and close relationship with State authorities. PCU capacity was strengthened through support provided by the project but also, importantly, through close interaction with and direct support from the Bank team. This is an important institutional legacy of the project that is benefiting the State and its people.

61. There are no plans to regularly monitor the state infrastructure and equipment funded by the project. Longer-term sustainability of project investments will depend largely on whether these are maintained by State authorities. Many of the issues identified in the “MDTF-N Assessment of Program Sustainability” (October 23, 2011) have or are in the process of being addressed by the PCU, but comprehensive information on the state of repair of infrastructure completed during the project is unavailable. For example, while the PCU is aware that many of the water-points constructed under Components 1 and 3 are functional, it is also aware that some are not (information is not available on which ones). UNICEF (Component 1) did not uniformly create Water Users Associations that, along with the State Water Corporation and the Locality, should manage the water infrastructure and upkeep. In this scenario, it is uncertain which body is responsible for the upkeep of water infrastructure.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

Relevance of Objectives and Design

62. The Project’s objectives, design and implementation are rated satisfactory. The original PDO was relevant to:

(i) The 2005 CPA, which set the stage for recovery, reconstruction and development efforts to sustain and consolidate peace. The project supported CPA implementation by encouraging fiscal transfers to the Blue Nile State. It addressed the socio-economic focus through its activities in access to basic services, reconstruction of infrastructure (including de-mining), and the economic recovery of conflict-affected populations in the State. The project addressed the institutional development component by providing capacity building for government institutions and associations formed as part of project activities, including during AF and particularly in the fisheries sector.

(ii) The Bank-led 2005 JAM (and subsequent GoNU Strategic Plan). The project aligned with the JAM priorities in terms of: (a) institutional development and capacity building; (b) productive sectors; (c) basic social services; (d) infrastructure; and (e) livelihood and social protection.

(iii) The Bank’s country strategy (Country Re-engagement Note for the Republic of the Sudan 2003, and the ISN 2008-2009). The Note set the basis for the Bank’s re-engagement and the eventual creation of the MDTF-N. The project’s activities were fully in line with the Bank’s re-engagement and transition strategy for North Sudan, with an emphasis on strengthening public administration, rural development, infrastructure, health and education. The project was also aligned with the ISN, which focused on: (a) improving governance; (b) increasing access to basic

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services; and (c) ensuring sustainable, diversified and pro-poor growth, with primary attention to conflict-affected and marginalized areas. The ISN indicated the Bank would focus on the key provisions of the CPA as a means to ensure stabilization. Support for the three areas was a key provision of the CPA.

Relevance of Implementation

63. Project implementation was effective, especially in adapting to changing circumstances, looking for solutions when problems emerged, placing emphasis on capacity building, and to the extent possible managing to shift project focus from an immediate emergency response to consideration of longer-term issues and questions of sustainability. Effective project implementation is especially noteworthy given the very difficult setting in which the project and Bank team had to operate. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

64. Based on KPIs, the project satisfactorily achieved its PDO. As discussed earlier the KPIs do not assess impact and in some cases do not link outputs to outcomes. Nonetheless, most KPIs were either achieved early or exceeded. PDO-related KPIs called for people in rural areas to be provided with access to “improved water sources” with 71,000 general population and 100,000 pupils as target beneficiaries. The KPI was achieved by Q3 of 2010. The KPIs also called for a total of 200 farmers adopting and being trained in new technologies, which was achieved again by Q3 of 2010. PDO-related KPIs aimed at clearing or verifying 14 high-priority suspected or mined areas and roads in about 33 communities, affecting a population of 54,000; this was completed by Q3 of 2010. Another KPI aimed at delivering capacity building in finance, economy, local government, education and public planning to 720 government employees was significantly exceeded (2,058 government employees were trained by Q2 of 2011). The AF contributed to this KPI being exceeded. The PDO-level KPI relevant to the CDC was improved disease control through investigative samples undertaken by the disease control center (72,000). The performance of the CDC exceeded expectations, and by Q3 of 2011, it had processed 320,000 samples. The project therefore met all intermediate KPIs.

3.3 Efficiency

65. Project efficiency in achieving its PDO is rated satisfactory on the basis of: (i) on target disbursement during the original project and the AF despite implementation delays; (ii) very low supervision costs (with effective supervision by the Bank team; (iii) low administration costs for both the original project and AF; and (iv) the ability of the PCU and Bank team to find alternative financing when GoNU withdrew counterpart funding.

66. The project’s arrangement to utilize a PCU and two UN agencies (UNICEF and UNIDO) to implement the majority of project activities constituted an appropriate strategy to mitigate against implementation constraints. The results, however, point to the higher costs associated with UN implementation, relative to a well-functioning PCU.

67. Supervision costs for the project are among the lowest of any comparable project in the MDTF-N (Table 4) with the BNSEP costing US$56.6 thousand per year on average.

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Table 4 – Supervision costs in the MDTF-N Project CY05 CY06 CY07 CY08 CY09 CY10* CY11 CY12

** Avg.

CDF 355 153 189 139 151 357 113 175 204.0 Health 29 257 115 97 91 195 118 132 129.3 Education 68 226 130 155 73 130.4 Transport 30 196 200 312 262 225 70 100 174.4 PSCAP 92 107 217 155 158 110 110 135.6 TAF 164 166 75 57 115.5 Livestock 62 181 75 70 80 78 87 90.4 Gum Arabic 113 59 72 121 120 97.0 Micro Finance 28 84 113 72 96 103 100 85.1 S. Kordofan 42*** 75 105 70 63 0 59.2 Blue Nile 41 95 62 7 78 56.6

Abyei 50 183 97 70 100.0

68. Administration costs for the original project were also low, and the amount disbursed largely aligned with the original grant allocation (US$1,004,464.64 disbursed compared to US$1,092,000.00). Administration costs for the original grant were US$237,839.06, and AF administration costs amounted to US$268,786.20. This brought the total administration cost for the completed project to US$506,625 or 2.7% of the actual final project cost of US$18.922 million (all sources).

69. As an emergency project, BNSEP did not include economic or financial analysis for infrastructure sub-components. Similarly, no analysis of the livelihood component was conducted to gauge the impact on average household, either in the project or in the AF. KPIs do not cover the economic impact of the project. Some evidence suggests the overall economic impact is positive. CDC established under Component 7 is generating income. The ice-making factory built under AF is leased to the private sector and improved fishing practices and equipment are likely to have increased incomes in fisher communities along the Nile.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: Satisfactory

70. The Project is rated satisfactory because it was relevant in its design and implementation to the needs of Blue Nile State and to the overarching Bank and non-Bank strategic frameworks. It has satisfactorily achieved its PDOs and had satisfactory efficiency. The Bank team reacted effectively to the implementation challenges presented throughout the project cycle, and both the Bank team and PCU performed satisfactorily, particularly in the provision of TA and day-to-day guidance (Bank team) and in sourcing alternative financing when GoNU withdrew counterpart funding (PCU and Bank team). Furthermore, the project has built the State Government and PCU capacities to develop some of the activities of this emergency intervention into potential future peace-building and state-building projects.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

71. There is a wide range of likely poverty impacts, but the exact impact on the conflict-effected population of Blue Nile State is not clearly measurable due to data limitations. Beneficiaries of specific Components – for example, farmers in Component 5, fishers and local trades-people in AF activities – are likely to experience some improvement in household income. The project is likely to have generally contributed to the educational attainment of children in the State which should improve chances for better income generation opportunities. For example, basic numeracy and literacy increases access to income-generating activities such as market trading. Building the capacity of fisher cooperatives and fisher unions

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in tandem with rehabilitating the commercial infrastructure for fish processing and preservation is likely to have a longer-term impact on productivity and incomes.

72. The project has laid a foundation that may result in significant gains for both farmers and pastoralists. Should the PCU be successful in securing financing for the development of the seed propagation activity, there is likely to be additional contributions to better yields for participating farmers and significant income and social gains as a result of mitigating cyclical conflict between farmers and pastoralists. Overall, the project contributed to stabilization in the Blue Nile State and, in specific sectors, has laid the foundation for possible future gains in income generation and access to essential services in health, education and water. While exact impacts are difficult to measure, initiatives such as BNSEP have contributed to reducing marginalization, a key driver of conflict in Blue Nile State, and therefore to reducing community engagement in new conflicts. Contrary to past conflicts in the region, the renewed fighting in Blue Nile since September 2011 is politically motivated and largely confined to the Sudan Armed Forces and SPLA-N.

73. The project was not designed with a gender component, but late in the project cycle it became sensitive to basic gender considerations. It evolved to utilize some basic gender sensitive indicators which showed that 53% of project beneficiaries were women (of the 774,000 beneficiaries noted as of December 31, 2011). Women (as opposed to ‘gender’) were explicitly targeted in the AF through the capacity building of two women’s associations with 90 members working in fish processing, and thus benefited directly from the AF activities.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

74. The project specifically addressed capacity building and institutional development in economic development, local governance, education and public planning. The program of activities it delivered accounted for 94% of the Blue Nile State’s capacity building program. The methodology employed by the PCU was logical and consistent beginning with an inception workshop with Director Generals and Local Ministry staff, progressing to an externally and independently prepared technical assessment of institutional weaknesses, and finally to a fully implemented training program across Government Ministries. The capacity building program of BNSEP was co-financed with GoNU (ultimately through USF) and included a procurement-focused element that supplied 17 offices, 10 living quarters, and 76 teachers and healthcare dormitories.

75. Under the AF, the project also created the physical infrastructure of the CDC contributing to disease control in the State. However, the impact of the CDC exceeds the envisaged KPIs (all of which are quantitative and pertain to clinical investigations) and extends to bolstering the institutional capacity of the State in healthcare. The CDC developed an educational wing, which currently trains healthcare staff for work throughout the health system in the State, thus contributing to the overall capacity of the sector and not just to the health of the population.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

N/A

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

N/A

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: Substantial

76. The main risk to the development outcomes is external: the unresolved constitutional nature of Blue Nile State and the risk of violence and destabilization. Given the growing presence of SAF in Blue

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Nile State and how both Abyei and South Kordofan have become embroiled in either violent confrontations between SPLM-N and SAF or have had their joint administrations dissolved by the GoNU, there is a very real risk that the State will destabilize and that gains made with BNSEP will be lost in the future.

77. Additional risks to development outcomes come under the broad heading of the maintenance of infrastructure. As noted above, steps were taken to ensure that infrastructure provided during the project remains in a good state of repair, particularly water infrastructure to the general population and to school-users (pupils). If such monitoring provisions were in place there would still be significant difficulty accessing the area, and travel there is tightly controlled by GoNU. Consequently, there is no monitoring of the condition of water infrastructure other than through the field knowledge of the PCU, which indicates that most of the water points and hafirs are functional but that not all water management committees have been established by the implementing agency. Thus, the function of the committees (to manage the water points and payment for accessing water) is not present in all locations. Furthermore, according to the PCU an undefined number of schools have been damaged or destroyed in intermittent violence in Damazin.

78. Sustainability has been addressed in the AF activities, with focus being placed on the legacy impacts of the project through building a fisher union and transforming the seed distribution sub-component into the construction of a seed-research facility. Issues regarding the financial sustainability of the CDC are being addressed, as is the operational independence of the Centre. In spite of this, any gains made in the sustainability of project outcomes and maintenance of project outputs in a highly fragile and conflict-affected context can quickly be lost if violence recurs.

5. Assessment of Bank and Grantee Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

79. Bank performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry is rated moderately unsatisfactory due to: (i) deficiencies in the preparation of project documentation including the Project Implementation Manual (PIM); and (iii) poor M&E framework. This rating takes account of the fact that as an emergency project (with an emphasis on securing quick impacts to bolster peace building and mitigate the risk of return to conflict), BNSEP did not benefit from a longer project preparation phase. As such documentation was not prepared during the preparation phase or soon thereafter and at design it did not envisage a rigorous M&E framework that would have enabled more accurate and reliable measurement of impact. Nevertheless, these weaknesses did not significantly impact implementation or success of the project. The PIM was created retrospectively in 2010 and the output oriented KPIs employed were appropriate for this type of situation and assisted project monitoring (as evidenced in the reporting of the MA). .

80. As mentioned above, the project did have strategic relevance and the approach was consistent to managing the risks associated with implementing a project in fragile and conflict-affected environments. The Bank team engaged with key stakeholders in the restructuring of Component 7 and, through the PCU, engaged a variety of stakeholders in the design of the AF including beneficiary communities. In addition, the project became effective within a reasonable timeframe of nine months from FPP to effectiveness of GA with the State Government of Blue Nile.

(b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: Satisfactory

81. Bank supervision is rated satisfactory because: (i) there was satisfactory identification and management of fiduciary and safeguard issues, although some delay was noted in the implementation of

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the environmental risk mitigation plan; (ii) there was responsive and, at times, appropriately hands-on supervision of the project by the Bank team; (iii) the Bank provided appropriate and needed TA, including external expertise on procurement.

82. Bank supervision was responsive to the needs of the project and capacity issues of the PCU, and sought to address implementation delays including those emanating from UN implementing agencies. Bank AMs are succinct and to the point, and communications with key stakeholders including the implementing agencies and GoNU Ministries are clear. Despite the project’s implementation challenges, the Bank team maintained good working relations with GoNU and the State Government, which is critical where the Bank has been inactive for a prolonged period and relations have to be rebuilt.

83. The Bank team provided hands-on supervision to address implementation delays, including the slow start-up of UNIDO-implemented activities. Also, the team built close working relations with the PCU, especially in technical areas such as procurement and FM. As a result of this close collaboration the PCU quickly mastered Bank procedures and benefited from the support offered by the Bank team. Lastly, the Bank team was responsive to Government needs to change and restructure the project and acted expeditiously to restructure Component 7 and in designing the AF.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

84. The Bank team rigorously and closely engaged with the project and its key stakeholders during implementation and the design of the restructured Component 7 and the AF. The team identified and managed the risks associated with the project and, where needed, engaged in a hands-on manner to ensure implementation constraints were addressed which allowed the project to close as planned as possible, and achieve its PDO and KPIs. However, as was common throughout the MDTF-N portfolio, the Bank team overestimated the capacity of GoNU to deliver on its counterpart funding commitments and failed to prepare relevant project documentation on time. The impacts of the project, including important subsidiary or unintended impacts, remain unsubstantiated and links between project outputs and outcomes are largely unverified.

5.2 Grantee Performance

(a) Government Performance

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

85. The rating of the performance of GoNU is rated as unsatisfactory primarily because of its decision to renege on its pledge to provide counterpart funding in line with its original commitment of US$8.02 million (to the MDTF-N commitment of US$7.32 million). This proved to be the main implementation issue for the whole project; GoNU-implemented components such as de-mining were impaired, as were co-financed non-GoNU components. At the time of the MTR (January 2009) the Bank team was still seeking clarification from MoFNE, which was not timely in its communication, around the decision to withdraw counterpart funding. Despite this constraint, the Bank team and MoFNE (as well as other Line Ministries) have managed to maintain a good working relationship. Finances from the USF replaced much of the counterpart funding originally committed by GoNU.

86. Despite this and the early stage in conflict recovery, GoNU had created an enabling policy environment through its coordination with the JAM and production of its Strategic Plan. Fiscally, the National Government was addressing stabilization needs of the Blue Nile State through USF, which would eventually replace counterpart funding in the project. Although counterpart requirements were clearly onerous for GoNU and a solution was eventually found, the Government’s decision not to meet its commitment or to communicate this clearly to the Bank affected project implementation.

87. The State Government was clearly committed to the project and took ownership not just of project activities but, along with the PCU and Bank team addressed the counterpart deficit. Its

17

performance is rated as satisfactory. While the State Line Ministries lacked technical and physical capacity, it is clear from the outputs of Component 6 that Ministries were eager to benefit from the project in order to better serve the needs of the beneficiary population. The State Government had no direct role in FM or procurement, or indeed in M&E; however, it remained involved in the assets gained through the project (e.g., the CDC) and supported the PCU to achieve project goals. Although GoNU performance is rated as unsatisfactory this is offset by the satisfactory government performance at the state level, which justifies an overall rating of moderately unsatisfactory for the government as a whole.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

88. The project had four implementing agencies: UNICEF (Components 1 and 3), UNIDO (Component 5), GoNU (Component 4), and the PCU (all other Components and all those under the AF).

89. Despite some minor procedural issues concerning the draw-down of funds, UNICEF performed satisfactorily, implementing all activities on time and achieving all KPIs. UNIDO performed unsatisfactorily, with delayed commencement of implementation, poor project design and poor coordination with the relevant Line Ministries. Both agencies appear to have conducted adequate community consultations but the difficulties with the UNIDO Component suggests these consultations may not have been effective. Both agencies adhered to reporting progress toward achieving output-orientated KPIs, although not always on time.

90. The PCU performed well and receives a satisfactory rating. The PCU was recruited and became operational relatively quickly (there were minor delays regarding its Technical Needs Assessment) and throughout project implementation it has shown a strong commitment to its development objectives. Its capacity to engage with Bank procedures gradually improved during implementation, and despite what were largely minor errors, the PCU had good FM and procurement procedures. The PCU emphasized stakeholder consultations and has engaged all stakeholders adequately during project implementation, the design and preparation of the AF, and in meeting its M&E requirements. With support from the Bank team, the PCU has made active efforts to extend existing activities, develop new ones and prepare proposals that could mobilize additional funding. Although the ICR template requires a rating for all implementing agencies, the performance of the PCU should weigh more heavily since it is an important achievement of the project and represents institutional capacity that remains after project closure.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Grantee Performance

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

91. The overall rating for grantee performance is based on a moderately unsatisfactory rating for the performance of the Government as a whole (GoNU and State Government), a moderately satisfactory rating for the performance of implementing agents, noting that the performance of the PCU is of greater importance, and an overall project outcome rating of satisfactory. Save for counterpart funding issues, broad Government support (especially at the State and PCU levels) played a major role in the project’s satisfactory outcome.

6. Lessons Learned

92. BNSEP was designed early in the Bank’s re-engagement with Sudan and at a time when a new Bank and donor strategy on Sudan was emerging. The design and implementation of BNSEP was, to a large degree, concurrent with this development of Bank strategy. As such, BNSEP did not benefit from a more developed and structured strategic context. Furthermore, the project was implemented before the Bank’s recent analysis of its own work in FCS (which culminated in WDR 2011). Regardless, it still has important project-related and general FCS-relevant lessons to contribute.

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93. Capacity building in FCS needs to be an integral part of project design, and in extremely low capacity settings investing in a strong PCU is risky but has potentially high pay-offs. Much of the success of BNSEP has been built upon the work of the PCU. The Unit contained the correct competencies and skills for it to be successful in project implementation and in project design. Furthermore, it was perceived as independent and operated in a transparent and open manner. It also strove to develop a close working relation with the Bank team. The PCU benefited significantly from TA in procurement and FM, including that acquired through close working relations with Bank staff; the more competent the PCU became in Bank procedures, the more efficient it became in project implementation, reporting and design. For future programming, it is critical that the government, with the encouragement of the Bank where possible and appropriate, ensure that the PCU be constituted quickly but with the right combination of skills and expertise. As the experience in Abyei (also a border area where the Bank implemented an emergency project) shows, this is not always the case or something the Bank can fully control. Once the PCU is established, it can be politically difficult to change or reform and if ineffective can seriously undermine project objectives and broader capacity-building efforts. To mitigate this risk, hybrid arrangements may be appropriate, with a nascent PCU at the center of implementation arrangements but complemented by other temporary implementing agencies so the entire project is not compromised by a less-than-effective PCU. Intensive capacity efforts can still concentrate on the PCU which if effective, as in this project, can emerge with the ability to take on a broader and longer-term development role.

94. In FCS settings much TA and capacity building can be effectively provided through regular Bank supervision and by forging close relations with the PCU. TA provided by the Bank team, directly and through consultancy and international expertise (most notably in procurement), contributed to the effectiveness of the PCU and the overall effectiveness of the project. Familiarization and competence in Bank procedures and safeguards allows the PCU to fully benefit from what otherwise might be perceived as complex and sometimes painstaking procedures. The Bank should continue to formally (and informally) provide TA as early as is possible in the life of the PCU or implementing agent in order to contribute to a greater likelihood of success of any project.

95. Counterpart funding requirements need to be realistic in the context of a government emerging from a context of fragility and conflict. As outlined in the MDTF-N Country Portfolio Performance Review, BNSEP and projects in FCS in general should be designed with realistic expectations of counterpart funding. The unrealistic funding to which GoNU agreed should have been better analyzed by the Bank, and the ability of GoNU better assessed. Such high counterpart funding requirements were clearly unrealistic in Sudan’s case and the Bank could have encouraged a renegotiation with MDTF-N donors to something more fiscally viable, or if politically not feasible, at least looked in advance at other potential funding sources. As this project shows, when there is strong local ownership and commitment, there may be alternatives to centrally-sourced counterpart funding which the Bank could have assessed ex-ante and thus possibly avoided project delays which emerged when GoNU found itself in a constrained fiscal situation.

96. As in any project, but especially in an FCS setting where the Bank has been absent for a long period, it is critical that project components are well adapted to local conditions. A weakness in the BNSEP was the transfer of activities from one location (South Kordofan) to another (Blue Nile) without fully investigating their applicability to the local context. While the pressure to show early results in settings such as Blue Nile is understandable, care must be exercised when there is wholesale transfer of activities from a different setting. As a minimum, the subcomponent should build in a validation process to ensure that the imported models are relevant in the different setting, and there is a strong built-in feedback mechanism by local stakeholders that can alert implementing agencies on the need to adapt or make corrections. In the case of Blue Nile there were a number of government, producer and community structures that could have been used and consulted to validate their applicability to the local context.

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97. Although emergency projects generally do not always pay full attention to good M&E systems at the project design stage, they should not be completely ignored. Even if crude or rough some attempt should be made to establish baselines and better measures of impact. Any project monitoring should clearly link outputs to outcomes, which should be uniformly applied across monitoring executed by the Bank team, PCU, implementing agents, Grantee and the MA. Furthermore, evaluation, at least for key Components, should be based on a baseline study and a structured approach to assessing the impact on beneficiary communities. This is an area where the Bank’s M&E experts could develop better guidelines for designing basic M&E systems better and more realistically adapted to fragile and conflict-affected settings.

98. Exit strategies for emergency operations are essential but rarely articulated. Emergency projects can have a quick start-up and an equally abrupt ending without any structured formal exit strategy. In the case of BNSEP, there was no exit strategy by design; rather, the Bank team and PCU together developed the next round of project proposals based on the implementation of the AF. It would be sensible for the Bank to have a structured exit from any emergency project that: (i) retained the capacity built in the PCU (and local implementing partners where relevant) in order to be of value in the life-cycle of other projects or in relevant sectors outside those immediately addressed by the Bank; and (ii) included support for the PCU or relevant stakeholders to seek other donor or implementing agent support in building upon the outcomes of the emergency project.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Grantee/implementing agencies

(b) Cofinanciers

N/A

(c) Other partners and stakeholders

N/A

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate (USD

millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

Total Baseline Cost 14.609 18.922

Physical Contingencies 0.730

0.00 0.00

Price Contingencies 0.00

0.00 0.00Total Project Costs 15.339 18.922

Front-end fee PPF 0.00 0.00 .00Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 .00

Total Financing Required 15.339 18.922 123.4

(b) Financing

Source of Funds Type of

Cofinancing

Appraisal Estimate

(USD millions)

Actual/Latest Estimate

(USD millions)

Percentage of Appraisal

MDTF Grant 7.324 9.822 134.1

GoNU (including USF) Govt. Budget Support 8.016 3.3 41.2%

GoNU (including USF and BN State Government)

Govt. Budget Support 8.016 9.1 113.5%

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Indicator Baseline

Value

Original Target Values

(from approval

documents)

Formally Revised Target Values

Actual Value Achieved at

Completion or Target Years

Component 1: Water Supply People in rural areas provided with access to “improved water sources” under the Project (171,000) - General population (71,000) - Pupils (100,000)

0 171,000 171,000

Improved community water points constructed or rehabilitated under the project 0 117 117

Community members trained on operation, maintenance and management of water sources 0 460 460

Component 2: Rural Road Maintenance and Spot Improvements Roads rehabilitated 0 80 107Bridges constructed 0 18 11Component 3: Basic Education Schools trained to improve hygiene behavior or sanitation practices under the project 0 30 30

Improved latrines constructed under the project 0 30 64Primary school aged children provided with pupil kits 0 145000 145000Schools equipped with materials and/or furniture 0 122 122Component 4: Demining 14 high priority suspected or mined areas and roads cleared or verified in about 33 communities, affecting a population of more than 54,000.

0 54,000 54,000

Component 5: Rural Livelihood Support Famers adopting and trained in new technologies (200) 0 200 200Component 6: Capacity Building for State and Local Government Administrative buildings built, rehabilitated or equipped 0 126 91

Capacity building in finance and economy, local government, education and public planning for 720 government employees.

0 1720 2,058

Component 7: Anti-Malaria Bed-nets (restructured to improved disease control) Improved disease control through: Investigative samples undertaken by the disease control center (72,000)

0 72000 350,000

Component 8: Project Coordination Unit NA N/A N/A N/A N/A Additional Financing: Supporting sustainability of fisheries sectors Fishers boats and gears improved in 16 unions and Fish processing improved in two women's associations fishers and women processors benefit

0 2,598 1,300

Improved seeds distributed in 10 villages 0 4000 016 Fishers union assisted with new improved boats and 0 50 43

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nets Fisher unions supplied with new improved nets 0 22 22Training of fishers 0 15 130ffice holders of the fishers unions (coops)trained in operating the cooperatives 0 110 60

Women groups trained in fish processing 0 4 4Skill upgrading course for Chairpersons and secretaries 0 54 91Skill up gradation course for Treasurers 0 29 27Study tour for 18 fishers 0 19 19Professional training for fisheries officers 0 12 12Study tour for fisheries officers 0 12 12Internal training in Co-management (11 FOs), M&E (7), Data Analysis(2) 0 20 20

Prepare Fisheries Master Plan for Blue Nile 0 1 1Fisheries Research for BN state 0 1 1Reorganization of the MoARF for fisheries unit strengthening 0 1 1

Establish an Ice Factory 0 1 1Establish Fishers Service Center 0 1 1Establish fish processing halls for women processors 0 1 1

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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis N/A

24

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names Title Unit Responsibility/

Specialty Lending Yousif Elfadil Operations Officer AFTCS Task Team Leader

Supervision/ICR Abderrahim Fraiji Sr. Operations Officer AFTCS ICR TTL Richard Olowo Sr. Procurement Specialist AFTPC Procurement

Mohamed Yehia Abd el Karim Financial Management Specialist AFTFM Financial Management

Moustapha Ould El Bechir Sr. Procurement Specialist AFTPC Procurement Hiyam Fouad Gamal Abdoun S T Temporary AFMSD Team Assistant

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)

No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)

Supervision/ICR P107256 2008 0 8,8322009 28.27 106,5032010 25.61 66,9712011 8.66 30,1302012 0 12,2332013 0 -

Total: 62.54 224,668

25

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results N/A

26

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results N/A

27

Annex 7. Summary of Grantee's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR Government report was not received.

28

Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders N/A

29

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents Grant

1. MDTF-N Additional Financing for Blue Nile Start-Up Emergency Project Subsidiary Grant Agreement between the Republic of Sudan and the State of Blue Nile, Sudan

2. BNSEP Fixed Assets Register 3. MDTF-NS Grant Agreement World Bank and UNICEF 4. MDTF-NS Grant Agreement World Bank and UNIDO

Project Documents 5. Sudan MDTF-N Project Proposal Document for a Proposed Grant in the Amount of US$15.339

Million to the Blue Nile State, Sudan for the Blue Nile Start-Up Emergency Project (October 7th, 2007)

6. Sudan MDTF-N Project Paper for a Proposed MDTF-N Grant as Additional Financing in the Amount of US$3.00 Million to the Republic of Sudan for a Blue Nile Emergency Project (BNSEP) for Additional Financing (June 29th, 2010)

7. Sudan, Blue Nile Start-Up Emergency Project for Additional Financing Project Implementation Manual for Activities Supported Under Additional Financing (October, 2010)

Financial 8. MDTF-N Budgets (Various, 2010 – 2013) 9. MDTF-N Budget Allocations for CY 2013 10. MDTF Project SPN CY05-CY12 including BNSEP (original and AF) and Abyei 11. BNSEP AF Disbursements 12. BNSEP Original Project Analysis of Total Project Financing 13. BNSEP Disbursements and Cumulative Preparation and SPN Expenses 14. BNSESEP TF097683 Notification of Closure of Grant Account 15. Closure of Grant Account Blue Nile (March 2012) 16. BNSEP AF Components Costs including Project Administration

Project Monitoring (Internal and Monitoring Agent) 17. Aide Mémoire, ISM Mission Monday 30th – 31st May 2011 18. Aide Mémoire, MTR Mission Monday 12th – 15th January 2009 19. Aide Mémoire , ISM Mission May 2011 20. ISR June 2008 21. ISR December 2008 22. ISR May 2009 23. ISR December 2009 24. ISR May 2010 25. ISR January 2011 26. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q4, 2007 27. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q1, 2008 28. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q2, 2008 29. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q3, 2008 30. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q1, 2009 31. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q1, 2010 32. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q3, 2010 33. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q4, 2010 34. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q1, 2011 35. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q2, 2011 36. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q3, 2011 37. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q1, 2012 38. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q2, 2012

30

Studies and Capacity Building 39. Scheme for Operations of the Fisheries Cooperative Societies and the BN Fisheries Cooperative

Union and Role of Supporting Stakeholders (World Bank 12th July 2011) 40. Blue Nile Seed Propagation Sub-Project for the State of Blue Nile (PCU, 15th January 2012) 41. Blue Nile Project Proposal for the Beekeeping Project for Blue Nile State (PCU, 10th June 2012) 42. Blue Nile Start-Up Emergency Project Environmental and Social Management Framework

(January 2010) 43. Comprehensive Fisheries Development Plan (Fisheries Master Plan) for the Blue Nile State (June,

2012) 44. Report on the Introduction of Revised Fisheries Research Arrangements in Blue Nile State (PCU,

June 2012) 45. Ice Plant Survey (PCU, N.D.) 46. Blue Nile State Report on the Restructuring of the Fisheries Directorate in the Ministry of

Livestock Development and Fisheries (January, 2012) 47. Ice Factory at Al Damazine – Private Sector Lease Considerations and Production Costs BNSEP

(AB Financial Advisors, August, 2011) 48. BNSEP Capacity Building Training Master plan (2011) 49. Consulting for Institutional Capacity Building for State and Local Government: A Report on

Institutional Capacity Assessment for Blue Nile State Ministries of Finance and Economy, Local Governance, Education, Physical Planning and Public Utilities and Localities (March, 2009)

50. Consulting Services for Implementing Capacity Building Program in the Blue Nile State (ICQ Consultants, March 2011)

N u b i a nN u b i a n

D e s e r tD e s e r tS a h a r a D e s e r t

Nile

Nile

NileNile

White N

ile

Blue Nile

Bahr el 'Arab

Wad

i How

ar

Atbara

Wadi HalfaWadi Halfa

KostiKosti

KermaKerma

MeroweMeroweTokarTokar

KaroraKaroraAtbaraAtbara

HaiyaHaiyaEl‘AtrunEl‘Atrun

MugladMuglad

Al FulaAl Fula

En NahudEn Nahud

Ed Da‘einEd Da‘ein

AbyeiAbyei

NORTHERNNORTHERNDARFUR DARFUR

WESTERNWESTERNDARFUR DARFUR

SOUTHERNSOUTHERNDARFUR DARFUR

BLUEBLUENILE NILE

WHITEWHITENILE NILE

RIVERRIVERNILE NILE

KHARTOUM KHARTOUM

RED SEA RED SEA NORTHERN NORTHERN

NORTHERNNORTHERNKORDOFANKORDOFAN

SOUTHERN KORDOFAN SOUTHERN KORDOFAN

KASSALA KASSALA

AL QADARIFAL QADARIF

S I N N A R S I N N A R

AL JAZIRAHAL JAZIRAH

DongolaDongola

Port Sudan Port Sudan

El Obeid El Obeid

Ed Damer Ed Damer

Al FasherAl FasherGeneinaGeneina

NyalaNyala

KadugliKadugli

Ed DamazinEd Damazin

Sinnar Sinnar

RabakRabak

Wad MedaniWad Medani

Kassala Kassala

Al QadarifAl Qadarif

KHARTOUMKHARTOUM

ARAB REPUBLICARAB REPUBLICOF EGYPTOF EGYPT

SOUTH SUDANSOUTH SUDAN

CHADCHAD

LIBYALIBYA

CENTRALCENTRALAFRICANAFRICANREPUBLICREPUBLIC

ETHIOPIAETHIOPIA

ERITREAERITREA

25˚E25˚E

25˚E25˚E

Wadi Halfa

Kosti

Kerma

MeroweTokar

KaroraAtbara

HaiyaEl‘Atrun

Muglad

Al Fula

En Nahud

Ed Da‘ein

Abyei

Dongola

Port Sudan

El Obeid

Ed Damer

Al FasherGeneina

Nyala

Kadugli

Ed Damazin

Sinnar

Rabak

Wad Medani

Kassala

Al Qadarif

KHARTOUMNORTHERNDARFUR

WESTERNDARFUR

SOUTHERNDARFUR

BLUENILE

WHITENILE

RIVERNILE

KHARTOUM

RED SEA NORTHERN

NORTHERNKORDOFAN

SOUTHERN KORDOFAN

KASSALA

AL QADARIF

S I N N A R

AL JAZIRAH

ARAB REPUBLICOF EGYPT

SOUTH SUDAN

CHAD

LIBYA

CENTRALAFRICANREPUBLIC

ETHIOPIA

ERITREA

Nile

Nile

White N

ile

Blue Nile

Bahr el 'Arab

Wad

i How

ar

Atbara

Red

Sea

LakeNasser

Lake Nubia

To Aswan To

Hurghada

To Dese

To Dese

To Sarh

To Wau

To Malakal

To Abéche

N u b i a n

D e s e r tS a h a r a D e s e r t

15˚N

10˚N

20˚N

15˚N

10˚N

20˚E 30˚E 35˚E25˚E

25˚E 35˚E

SUDAN

0

0 200 Miles

200 Kilometers

IBRD 33489R1

JULY 2011

SUDANSELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS

WILAYAH (STATE) CAPITALS

NATIONAL CAPITAL

RIVERS

MAIN ROADS

RAILROADS

WILAYAH (STATE) BOUNDARIES

INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES

This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other informationshown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World BankGroup, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or anyendorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

ABYEI