Document of The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No: 36504-AR

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT(SCL-42950)

ON A

LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF US$450 MILLION

TO THE

ARGENTINE REPUBLIC

FOR A

NATIONAL HIGHWAYS REHABILITATION AND MAINTENANCE PROJECT

June 16, 2006

Finance, Private Sector and Infrastructure DepartmentArgentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay Country Management UnitLatin America and Caribbean Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective )

Currency Unit = Argentine Peso AR$3.06 = US$ 1.00US$ 0.327 = AR$ 1.00

FISCAL YEARJanuary 1 - December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMSADT - Average Daily Traffic

CAF - Andean Development Corporation (Corporación Andina de Fomento)CAI - Core Accountability Implementation Completion ReportCAS - Country Assistance StrategyCD - Country DirectorCOSTOP- Vehicle Operation Cost ProgrammCOT - Construir, Operar, TransferirCREMA - Contrato de Recuperación y Mantenimiento (Contract for

Recuperation and Maintenance)DNV - Dirección Nacional de Vialidad (National Highway Directorate)DPV - Dirección Provincial de Vialidad) (Provincial Highway Directorate)IERR - Internal Economic Rate of ReturnICR - Implementation Completion Report

IDB - Interamerican Development Bank. IRI - International Roughness IndexMTR - Mid-term ReviewNBF - Not Bank FinancedNPV - Net Present ValuePAD - Project Appraisal DocumentPCD - Project Concept DocumentSAR - Staff Appraisal ReportSISVIAL- Sistema Vial (Highway System)SOP - Secretaria de Obras Públicas(Secretariat of Public Works)TL - Team LeaderTT - Task TeamV.O.C. - Vehicle Operating Costs

Vice President: Pamela CoxCountry Director Axel van Trotsenburg

Sector Director Makhtar Diop Sector Manager

Task Team LeaderJose Luis Irigoyen Juan Gaviria

ARGENTINANATIONAL HIGHWAYS REHABILITATION AND MAINTENANCE PROJECT

CONTENTS

Page No.1. Project Data 12. Principal Performance Ratings 13. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 24. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 35. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 86. Sustainability 97. Bank and Borrower Performance 108. Lessons Learned 119. Partner Comments 1310. Additional Information 13Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 14Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 15Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 17Annex 4. Bank Inputs 18Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 19Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 20Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 21

Project ID: P052590 Project Name: AR NAT HWY REHAB&MAINTTeam Leader: Juan Gaviria TL Unit: LCSFPICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: June 23, 2006

1. Project DataName: AR NAT HWY REHAB&MAINT L/C/TF Number: SCL-42950

Country/Department: ARGENTINA Region: Latin America and the Caribbean Region

Sector/subsector: Roads and highways (97%); Central government administration (3%)Theme: Other financial and private sector development (P); Rural services and infrastructure (P)

KEY DATES Original Revised/ActualPCD: 09/15/1997 Effective: 12/15/1998

Appraisal: 11/24/1997 MTR: 03/20/2000 12/03/2001Approval: 03/17/1998 Closing: 12/31/2003 12/31/2005

Borrower/Implementing Agency: REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA/DIRECCION NACIONAL DE VIALIDAD (DNV)Other Partners:

STAFF Current At AppraisalVice President: Pamela Cox Shahid Javed BurkiCountry Director: Axel van Trotsenburg Myrna AlexanderSector Manager: Jose Luis Irigoyen Krishna ChallaTeam Leader at ICR: Juan Gaviria M. MékanICR Primary Author: Sergio Miquel

2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)

Outcome: S

Sustainability: L

Institutional Development Impact: M

Bank Performance: S

Borrower Performance: S

QAG (if available) ICRQuality at Entry: S

Project at Risk at Any Time:

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

3.1 Original Objective:The overall objective of the project was to preserve the national paved road network, and its specific objectives were to: 1) stabilize the physical condition of the non-concessioned national road network arresting further deterioration, and reducing long-run economic costs for rehabilitating and maintaining the national road network; in order to achieve financial sustainability 2) increase private sector participation in road rehabilitation and maintenance activities; and 3) adapt the role of the Dirección Nacional de Vialidad (DNV) and further strengthen its capabilities for planning, contracting and efficient supervision of rehabilitation, maintenance and concession programs.

These objectives reflected clear and realistic agreements reached between the Borrower and the Bank to continue the long-running joint efforts to rebuild and upgrade the road infrastructure, enhance public infrastructure in the provinces, and promote private sector investment in transport. They were broad to allow flexible adjustment to changing demands, well adjusted to the implementation agency’s capacity, and were in line with the Government’s macroeconomic policies supported by the Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy approved in April 1997.

3.2 Revised Objective:The above objectives remained unchanged during the project execution period.

3.3 Original Components:The project comprised four components, while the first three consisted of civil works for rehabilitation and maintenance of the non-concessioned national paved road network (about 21,700 km at time of appraisal), the fourth component consisted of technical assistance, training and equipment to strengthen DNV’s organizational capacities and to support knowledge based programs. A brief description of these four components follows.

Phase I CREMA Component.(US$544 million, or 58.6% of total project cost). Financed the further implemention of a civil works program initiated under the previous Bank Loan for the Road Sector Maintenance and Rehabilitation Sector Project (Loan 3611-AR) including the execution of a new type of performance-based road rehabilitation and maintenance contract referred to as CREMA (Contrato de Recuperación y Mantenimiento). Such contracts are performance based and require the Contractor to rehabilitate and subsequently maintain a sub-network of roads (generally between 100 and 300 km long) on a lump sum basis for a total period of five years. This component comprised execution of 61 CREMA contracts already bid and awarded under Loan 3611-AR, covering a total length of 11,818 km of the non- concessioned paved road network. The program foresaw the rehabilitation of 4,026 km during the first year of the project implementation period, as well as routine maintenance of the entire 11,818 km during the 5-year implementation period.

Phase II CREMA Component.(US$130 million or 14% of total project cost). This component provided Bank financing for the implementation of a second phase of the CREMA program expanding its coverage to an additional road length of 2,581 km. It foresaw 16 new CREMA contracts to be procured during the first year of project implementation, including rehabilitation of 1,459 km during the first two years of project implementation and routine maintenance of the entire 2,581 km during the 5-year implementation period.

Rehabilitation and Maintenance of Remaining Network Component.(US$240 million or 25.8% of total project cost). Financed entirely by local funds, at appraisal it was foreseen to carry out the improvement of

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5,106 km of the remaining non-concessioned paved network (about 7,300 km), including the rehabilitation of 2,359 km, as well as routine maintenance of the entire 5,106 km. At the time of appraisal DNV planned to execute independently from the improvement under this Component 3, a series of conservation tasks following different schemes that included: (a) transfer of operations to the Provincial Road Directorates (Dirección Provincial de VialidadDPV) under special transfer agreements called Transferencia de Funciones Operativas(TFO) for about 1,500 km; and (b) short-term quality based km-month contracts, financed until June 30, 1999, under Loan 3611-AR, for about 3,600 km. The remaining road links, totaling about 2,200 km, were to be covered under the routine maintenance program by DNV force account. This heterogeneous mix was to be streamlined, upgraded and strengthened under the project. Institutional Development Component.(US$15 million or 1.6% of total project cost). This component comprised three sub-components designed to: (a) assist in the implementation of the project by providing advisory support to DNV’s Project Coordination Unit (PCU) and purchasing state of the art laboratory equipment (total cost US$6 million); (b) strengthen DNV’s capacity, both at national and provincial levels, through a series of training programs, and support other institutional activities, including the road concession program (total cost US$4 million); and (c) support various knowledge-based programs (studies and manuals), including the modernization of the sector library (total cost US$5 million).

The design of these components incorporated the lessons learned in previous projects in Argentina’s road sector, such as the change in contracting modality from unit rate contracts to performance-based contracting to avoid cost increments through variation orders, as well initiatives to strengthening the administrative and financial capacity of the implementing agency.

3.4 Revised Components:To assist the Borrower in arresting its financial difficulties, the Bank agreed, during the project implementation period, to three changes in the disbursement percentages and to one change in the project description. The first loan amendment, dated September 23, 1999, increased disbursements for the CREMA I component from 68% to 83%; the second amendment dated January 14, 2003, created a new disbursement category to finance 75% of the component for Rehabilitation and Maintenance of the Remaining Network (financed locally before), and to increase disbursements for the CREMA II component from 50% to 75%; and the third amendment dated September 23, 2005, reallocated US$13.8 million from the financing of the Institutional Development component to the CREMA II component.

3.5 Quality at Entry:The independent Quality at Entry report for CY98 (7/19/99) evaluated this project as satisfactory. The report stressed its clear links to the Bank’s macroeconomic and sector assistance strategy for Argentina (CAS dated April 1997), the strength of the Borrower’s ownership, the adequacy of sector knowledge, and the well designed technical preparation of the project which follows on from earlier interventions. It stated that IMF supported conditionality related to budget management delayed the availability of initial counterpart funds and therefore the effectiveness and initial disbursements, but that otherwise the project was ready for implementation. However, it commented on the social and stakeholder aspects noting that the major challenge for supervision would be to ensure the institution building aspects to maintain the momentum reached during preparation.

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs

4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:The achievement of the above mentioned objectives needs to be assessed considering the combined effect of severe economic crises and subsequent political turmoil that curtailed project implementation between 1999

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and 2003 (see 5.1 and 5.2).

After recovering from the contagion effects of the Tequila financial crisis of 1994 and 1995, the Government of Argentina (GoA) was able to significantly increase road sector budgets between 1997 and 1999 (slightly above US$600 million per year), boosting the support for priority road sector investments and allowing satisfactory implementation of road improvement and maintenance programs in the country. Under these circumstances, implementation of this project started auspiciously in late 1998 with the execution of works contracted under the previous loan. However, due to the effects of the Asia crisis, in 1999 the Government was forced to apply emergency constraints on public spending and reduced significantly the US$632 million annual budget to US$436 million curtailing the development of DNV programs and producing payment arrears of about US$100 million due to contractors. Although such arrears were mostly covered by mid 2001, the political instability prevailing in the country, coupled with the onset of an overwhelming economic crisis, induced new reductions in the DNV budget to a low of about US$150 million in 2002, producing a chronic slow down of DNV activities, and accumulation of new arrears in payments to contractors, to about US$80 million. After the significant devaluation of the Argentine Peso (January 2002) and subsequently the effective macroeconomic management focused on the generation of fiscal surpluses, the country has seen a rapid recovery with fast and pro-poor growth. Such improvement in external conditions, coupled with the approval of a Price Escalation Formula acceptable to Government and the Bank for all civil works under the project (March 2003), contributed to remove implementation bottlenecks which had affected negatively the implementation of the project. The improvement of the overall economic situation allowed also the Government to raise DNV's budget back to approximately US$460 to US$500 million for the years 2004 to 2006.

Against this background, and in order to adequately assess the satisfactory achievement of the objectives set out for the project it was necessary to document the Key Performance Indicators of the project in greater detail than that obtained in DNV's periodic reporting. This investigation took into consideration data availability discussed in 7.2 and 7.6, making it necessary to adjust those indicators to allow a more accurate assessment.

During the entire project implementation period, particularly through the five difficult years, 1999-2003, DNV showed a remarkable commitment to the main project objectives of stabilizing the condition of the non-concessioned national paved road network and increasing the private sector participation in road rehabilitation and maintenance activities. It concentrated its scarce financial resources on the implementation of its road rehabilitation and maintenance programs, assigning highest priority to the CREMA contracts, thus ensuring continuous compliance with the main project objective. Achievement of this objective can be assessed through the first 3 Key Performance Indicators shown in Annex 1, outcome indicators: (a) the improvement of the average roughness indicator from the initial 3.70 in 1998 to 3.48 in 2003 (initial closing date) and 3.38 in 2005 (final closing date); (b) the decrease of the percentage of roads in poor conditions respectively from 8.0% to 5.8% and 4.2%: and (c) a significant and impressive improvement of the proportion of roads in good condition from 70% respectively to 83% and 85%. These results are rated as satisfactory.

The Government and road users recognize the CREMA as a successful program, to the extent that this program has now been adopted by DNV as the core program for asset management of all the non-concessioned roads in the country, and its expansion is supported by the new National Highway Asset Management project (Loan 7242 which became effective April 26, 2005). The CREMA approach is now starting to be adopted in some provinces under provincial road projects which are also supported by The World Bank.

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Although the project substantially achieved the physical rehabilitation and maintenance targets, DNV was less successful in maintaining the private sector participation in road rehabilitation and maintenance set out for the project after the crisis. The reduction in the proportion of works carried out by the private sector after 2002 reflects the delays in start-up of the CREMA II component during the crisis. The CREMA II contracts were awarded and started successfully their implementation in 2005 at the end of the extended project implementation period; these contracts (i.e., CREMA II) along with CREMA contracts financed under the new Loan 7242 and Government own-financed road contracts will raise the level of private sector participation above 70% in 2006. During the 2002 crisis there was a trade-off favoring the continued implementation of the CREMA I contracts that ensured the stabilization of the physical condition of a large proportion of the network at the expense of delaying the start-up of the CREMA II component. The CREMA I component started fully, as programmed in 1998. Despite an increase in payment arrears to contractors during 2002 after the onset of the economic crisis, the progress was rated as satisfactory by an independent technical audit carried out in October 2002. A long period of economic recession between 1999 and 2001 as well as the budget constraints and normal administrative difficulties associated with the major crisis affecting the country in 2002 delayed the start up of the CREMA II component, originally planed for 1999. The CREMA II started modestly in 2001, progressed very little the next 3 years and reached full implementation only in 2005, the last year of the extended project implementation period. In addition, the five year period of the CREMA I contracts started to expire in 2002 and, although they were extended for one year with Bank financing and most of them were further extended with local financing, the total length of all roads maintained by CREMA contracts under the project decreased substantially in 2005 (Note: The total length of the paved non-concessioned network, went from 21,800 km to 23.852 km in 2005, due to paving of former gravel roads and transfers of some main road sectors from provincial networks to the national network). Despite the significant efforts, the combined result - illustrated in the table for output indicators - indicates that the length of the non-concessioned network maintained under CREMA contracts stayed at around 60 % until 2001, decreased to 57% and stayed at that level for 3 years and then dropped sharply to 43% in 2005 (Note: The pavement condition surveys between 2000 to 2003 were based on a partial condition survey for 2001 that covered only 8,702 km; after project completion an updated estimate covering 19,028 km was carried out by DNV and the indicators were revised accordingly). The indicator registering participation of the private sector in road rehabilitation and maintenance activities was above 70% until 2002 and then decreased to about 54% in 2005. Although these achievements stayed below their respective targets of 70% and 90%, they can be considered satisfactory, because they demonstrate DNV´s proven capabilities in handling performance-based contracts from the planning stage to execution, despite the extreme macroeconomic challenges faced by the Government and the implementing agency.

The institutional development objective of this project, to further strengthen DNV's capabilities and to adapt its role to the changes in the structure of the highway sector in Argentina, was achieved only to a very limited extend, as analyzed in 4.5 below. Therefore, achievement of the institutional developments objectives must be rated as unsatisfactory.

4.2 Outputs by components:a. Civil works components. Compliance with the only performance indicator for civil works established at negotiations, cumulative kilometers of rehabilitation works actually achieved each year, is assessed under 1) in the output table of Annex 1. It shows that the rate of compliance with this indicator started at a quite encouraging level of 115%, decreased gradually to a minimum of 77% in 2003 and significantly increased to 92% by project completion in 2005. It is interesting to note that these outputs, although they stayed below the targets agreed at negotiations, are assessed as very positive and significant given the constraints that affected project implementation. Moreover, these reduced outputs were sufficient to improve the general condition of the network to a satisfactory level. The Bank's supervision team observed

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towards the end of 2003 (original end of the program) that the CREMA method had yielded values of roughness substantially below (about 30%) those expected by experience and determined by the HDM model considering the small thickness of overlays executed (about 3 to 4 cm). This may be a good proof of the cost-effectiveness of the CREMA system compared to conventional standards of rehabilitation and maintenance, and deserves to be studied in detail within the efforts to calibrate the HDM model for conditions in Argentina. Such a study would help to establish a more realistic cost-effect relation between type and length of road rehabilitation works and achieved improvement of road conditions and subsequent savings in vehicle operating costs.

Two additional output indicators, annual percentage of the length of the non-concessioned network maintained by CREMA contracts, and by all contracts with private sector enterprises, were analyzed by this team for the required assessment of the corresponding outcome indicators. Compliance with these indicators was already discussed in 4.1 above. The establishment of an adequate relationship between maintenance efforts and achieved improvement of road conditions should also be included in the above mentioned study.

b) Institutional development component. Only one output performance indicator for monitoring was established at negotiations, number of trainees-weeks as percentage of total derived from the Human Resources Study. A detailed basis for the periodic monitoring of this indicator was not established due to delays in the implementation of the IDB financed study and the changing positions on concept and design of the training component assumed by DNV management. Therefore, this indicator was not monitored during project implementation and was not assessed after project completion. Output of this component is discussed in 4.5 below.

4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:The economic analysis to confirm net present values (NPV) and economic rates of return (IERR) established at appraisal using the Bank’s HDM-III model, was carried out by DNV experts using the same model and is documented in a March 31, 2006 report. It evaluates a sample of 14 CREMA networks, 10 belonging to the CREMA 1 program and 4 to CREMA 2, and representing different geographic areas. The 14 networks comprise 47 road sections with different types of rehabilitation works and different traffic densities, totaling 1,138 km. Each road section was subject to a separate economic analysis.

The two policies compared in the analysis are: (a) without project:standard maintenance policy, 100% crack sealing and patching, and reconstruction when road roughness reaches >8 m/km: and (b) with project:the rehabilitation/maintenance policy actually carried out in each analyzed network. Currency used is US$. Expenses in A$ were converted at parity for the years 1990 to 2001, and at the official average annual rate of exchange (around US$1 = A$3) for the years 2002 to 2005. The analysis period is 20 years, and the discount rate is 12%. Start-up year is the actual year of initiation of works in each sample network. Vehicle operating costs are those established in DNV’s v.o.c. manual COSTOP, November 2005. Unit costs for works are those officially estimated by DNV. Economic costs are determined to be on average about 70.7% of financial costs. Traffic growth rate is the same of appraisal, 3% for all types of vehicles.

For the 14 sample networks, NPV in US$ million varies from 0.22 to 69.82, with a total NPV of US$ 210 million. IERR values vary from 13.0% to 129.4%, with an overall average of 57%. All low NPV and IERR values correspond to networks with extremely low traffic density, while high values correspond to a mix of networks with middle and high traffic density. Since these values are in the same order of magnitude as those established at appraisal, it follows that the economic rate of return of the project remains at a satisfactory level.

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In addition, DNV tabulated the results of the economic analysis to compare NPV and IERR values rendered by different types of pavement rehabilitation works (Annex 3). Reconstruction and strengthening of the asphalt concrete pavement on 157 km rendered an NPV of US$ 28.8 million and an IERR of 104.5%; strengthening of asphalt pavement on 850 km rendered respectively NPV of US$ 170.2 million and an IERR of 55.2%; slurry seals on 154 km, NPV of US$ 10.4 million and IERR of 30%; and surface treatment on 77 km, NPV of US$ 0.5 million and an IERR of 14%. These are interesting results that can lead to further investigation of the economic performance of different rehabilitation systems.

4.4 Financial rate of return:N/A

4.5 Institutional development impact:The institutional development component of this project was clearly designed to substantially strengthen and expand the considerable institution building impact achieved under the Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Sector Project (Loan 3611-AR). However, this aim could be realized only partially, due to the effects of the critical negative economic and political developments analyzed in sections 5.1 and 5.2, in addition to internal problems faced by DNV, which are described in section 5.3. As a result, start up of the ambitious training program was delayed for several years, and its content greatly reduced. Only fourteen courses were carried out on a reduced scope of subjects during the seven-year implementation period, with total participation of about 730 trainees, extremely low figures for a DNV staff of about 3.000. The originally designed staff exchanges programs with the American and the Spanish Highway Authorities were never carried out, and participation at international professional meetings was extremely limited, involving only six international professional conferences or seminars. As a whole, the scope and impact of the training program actually carried out were far smaller than originally planned and failed to satisfy many of the extensive needs of DNV personnel.

Of the initially proposed 8 studies, 7 were dropped and only one “Calibration of the HDM III Model for Argentina” was replaced by two studies on technical aspects of the HDM IV Model and on the adaptation of Argentina's Road Data Base to its requirements. These two studies were contracted by the end of 2004 directly with the University of Cordoba and were in execution by the project closing date. Award of another study on Bridge Management, which had been in preparation for some time, received the Bank’s no objection in mid 2001, but the actual award was delayed by two years due to economic crisis. Given the changes in relative prices and devaluation the proposed award required the application of a price escalation formula, but after no agreement was reached the bid process was canceled in mid 2003. Finally, the study was substantially reduced in scope and cots and awarded in May 2005 directly to the University of Cordoba. In February 2006 the University delivered Stage II of the study, containing: (a) description of the methodology to prepare bridge inventories, including already prepared inventories of 8 bridges: (b) proposed methodology for optimization of investments; (c) description of the information network system (SIGMA) in preparation; and (d) brief description of typical bridge maintenance and rehabilitation works. This report was reviewed and approved by the last Bank supervision mission in October 2005 and thereafter. The work to date is thorough, well organized and reveals a satisfactory professional and practical approach to the subject. DNV needs to complete this study and implement its recommendations as soon as possible. A fourth study on Environmental Evaluation and Management of Road Works was awarded to a single bidder and started in August 2005. It is currently being finalized by DNV. The foreseen procurement of state of the art laboratory equipment was cancelled and replaced by the acquisition of a computerized system for financial management, which is being applied to the monitoring of Loan 7242-AR.

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The support to the DNV Project Coordination Unit (PCU) was effectively given, and the performance indicator of transferring responsibilities for preparation and monitoring of the non-concessioned network to the regional districts was complied before the mid-term review. However, compliance with the other indicator on adequate training and equipping the regional authorities to assume newly assigned responsibilities has not been completely achieved; professional capacity and contract preparation and supervision procedures have not reached a homogeneous level in all districts because of shortcomings in the training programs and insufficient monitoring by headquarters.

In consideration of all the above, the institutional building impact of this project must be rated as modest.

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome

5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:Implementation and outcome of the project were substantially affected by the unexpected onset of manifold and prolonged economic and political crises that affected Argentina from 1999 to 2002 described already in detail in section 4.1.

5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:In 1999 the provincial and national elections and the subsequent change in administration compounded the effects of the economic crisis in curtailing the provision of counterpart funds in sufficient amount and slowing down decision-making across all government agencies. After a short period of relative political stability, the Government was overthrown in 2001 by popular upheavals motivated by the prevailing and enhanced critical economic condition of the country. Two following interim governments were also unable to confront these acute economic and political problems, until the election of a new Government in 2003. This political unrest is best reflected by the fact that in the 5 year period 1999 to 2003 Argentina had 5 Presidents, 7 DNV General Administrators, and the project, 5 Project Coordinators. In 2001 and 2002, decision-making was also slowed down by the failed attempts to finance the development of the road and railway subsectors through fiduciary taxation of gasoil creating a Transport Infrastructure Trust Fund (Fondo Fiduciario de Gasoil) and its main component, the new Sistema Vial (SISVIAL). Within this strategic planning the Government agreed with a Bank Project Supervision team to finance with SISVIAL funds CREMA contracts for 24 additional networks totaling 3,150 km, to be tendered November-December 2001, but the economic crisis put a brutal end to that proposal. Moreover, most ongoing CREMA contracts expired by mid 2002, inducing an additional slowdown that was overcome by extending them for one year, subsequently, in most cases, for two years. The new President elected in 2003 succeeded in settling political unrest and consolidating the strong economic recovery of the country.

5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:As already stated in 4.1 above, throughout project implementation, and particularly in the most difficult five years, DNV showed a remarkable commitment to the main project objectives, which was fundamental for a satisfactory implementation of the civil works components, despite the severe economic and political problems described above.

Achievement of the institutional objective, i.e., to further strengthen DNV’s capabilities and adapt its role to the changes in the structure of the highway sector in Argentina, was hampered by the above quoted external economic and political factors. It was also negatively affected by a consequence of the crisis which resulted in repeated in changes of DNV administrators which in turn resulted in changes in priorities and repeated modifications of the proposed programs and studies. Initially, implementation of the training programs and of several studies included in the project was to be conditioned on the conclusions and recommendations of a Human Resources Study to be carried out under an ongoing IDB loan. Because of substantial delays in the implementation of this study, its recommendations became available only late in

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the year 2000. Implementation of the institutional development component of the Bank loan started by mid 2001 with the participation of DNV personnel at a workshop and a course on the HDM4 (respectively in Chile and in Spain), the preparation of a training program, definition of new studies and activities to replace the original ones (which had become obsolete or had been overtaken by transfer of responsibilities for the administration of Road Concessions from DNV to an independent organization), and award of a Bridge Management Study that had been in preparation for some time. This updated program was approved by the Bank’s Mid-term Review mission of December 2001. However, during 2002 and 2003, implementation of this component was again curtailed by the economic problems affecting DNV activities and by the frequent changes in DNV management, except for the execution of five training courses with a total participation of 260 trainees and participation in an environmental meeting in Panama. Finally, by the end of 2004, DNV and the Bank agreed to reduce the financing of this component from the original US$15 million to US$1.8 million and transfer the balance to the civil works components.

5.4 Costs and financing:The actual total project costs did not differ substantially from the total cost estimates despite the severe economic and political crises which affected the country during most of the implementation period. The extension of the loan by two years and the Bank’s flexibility to amend the Loan allowed to minimize the impact of insufficient local financing to a mere 7% of project cost. As indicated in section 3.4, the Bank assisted the Borrower in arresting its financial deficits by increasing substantially the disbursements percentages (pari passu) for the two CREMA works components, changing the project description to allow Bank financing of the third works component, earlier financed locally, and reallocating unused loan proceeds from the Institutional Development component to the CREMA II component. As a consequence, Bank contribution to project financing increased from 48.4% to 52.3%, and the Government contribution decreased from 51.6% to 47.7%. Participation of the two CREMA components decreased from 72.6% to 68.4%, while the third component increased from 28.8% to 31.0% and the Institutional Development component decreased from 1.6% to 0.2%.

6. Sustainability

6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating:The strong recovery of Argentina´s economy since 2003 and the increasing awareness of the need to strengthen DNV’s institutional framework and streamline its administrative procedures, augur well for the sustainability of the project’s achievements, provided that efforts continue to establish a sound and permanent system of road financing, and weaknesses in DNV’s administration and procedures are corrected. Moreover it is very encouraging that the Government has adopted the CREMA program as the core methodology to manage the non-concessioned road assets in the country supported under Loan 7242 and at the provincial level under new projects supported by the Bank.

Given the limited competition that resulted in the more recent bids for CREMA in June 2005, the Bank has engaged in a dialogue with the country to develop alternative options and additional measures to improve governance and build-up the capacities of the agencies involved in procurement processes, the ultimate goal being to improve sustainability and to implement a framework that assists tracking key indicators which allow to identify factors that may jeopardize the achievement of cost-efficiency in the sector. In this respect, several actions have been agreed with GoA to increase transparency, encourage competition in the sector and enhance monitoring, including: (i) closely monitor the evolution of prices in the sector; (ii) carry out thorough reviews of the technical designs (carry out site measurements on the condition of the roads, revise the required interventions, etc) to enhance the quality and accuracy of budget estimates; (iii) monitor and assess the capacity of the construction industry to identify possible issues that may limit competition; (iv) consider alternative bidding strategies and reformulate the procurement plans to account for constraints in

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the construction industry; (v) modify aspects of the bidding documents which could increase the entry of new firms to the market and improve competition; and (vi) increase information available to the public with regards to projects procurement and implementation.

6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:Based on the lessons identified in this project and other projects in the Transport Sector, the Bank has defined with the Government a significant pipeline of new investment operations some already approved and other included in the new CAS presenetd to the Board on June 6, 2006. These operations have a special emphasis on modernizing the transport sector in the country, addressing structural weaknesses and improving the institutional framework and the governance of the sector. Along these lines, the National Highway Asset Management Project, financed under Loan 7242-AR (which became effective April 26, 2005), focuses on: (a) establishing a sound system of road financing at national and provincial level, and (b) strengthening the capabilities of DNV to carry out its functions as a modern road organization, with particular attention to sector performance and client satisfaction. Thus, the new project will ensure sustainability of the achievements of prior Bank road sector projects in the last ten years.

7. Bank and Borrower Performance

Bank7.1 Lending:Bank performance during the lending process was satisfactory. Its involvement supported effectively the government’s objectives to improve physical conditions of the non-concessioned road network and to promote private sector operations in transport. Building on the experience gained in previous operations, the Bank effectively assisted the Borrower in the preparation of all technical and economic aspects of the new project. The appraisal mission was staffed with diversified skills appropriate to the task. Project design was simple and consistent with the agency's implementation capacity. The financial package was adequately arranged, and a satisfactory implementation plan was developed. However, the Key Performance Indicators established in the PAD were quite complex and partially difficult to monitor, and were reduced and simplified at negotiations. With the benefit of hindsight, it can be stated that the appraisal and negotiations teams could not foresee the detrimental effects that two possible risk factors would have on project implementation: (a) the severe economic and politic crises that affected the country 1999-2003, and (b) the consequent instability in sector management resulting in delays of works execution, and in repeated modifications and postponements of the institutional strengthening component.

7.2 Supervision:Bank supervision performance was also satisfactory. Because of the severe economic problems that started in 1999, the project was supervised more frequently and with longer missions during the critical period 2000-2003, returning afterwards to a normal twice a year level. The progress of project implementation, or lack of it because of external or internal difficulties during the crisis, was properly reported. This close contact facilitated prompt and positive reaction of the Bank to repeated requests from the Borrower for additional financial assistance through increases in disbursement rates and a change in the project description. Bank performance was crucial for the satisfactory achievement of most project objectives. Because of the discontinuity for some years of the network condition surveys undertaken by DNV (see 7.6) some of the indicators recorded in the ISRs were reviewed and adjusted with updated data obtained after project completion, rendering lower percentages of accomplishment.

7.3 Overall Bank performance:Considering the above, overall Bank performance is rated satisfactory.

Borrower

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7.4 Preparation:As a follow up operation on previous Bank projects and due to retroactive financing of civil works contacted under the Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Sector Project (Loan 3611-AR), this project was well prepared at all levels by the Borrower and could start with extensive works execution and substantial disbursements.

7.5 Government implementation performance:Government implementation performance was satisfactory. Throughout the implementation this project was always a high priority of several administrations. Also, the multi-year characteristic inherent to the CREMA contracts committed fiscal resources in a longer term than the usual 12 month budget cycle thereby improving the availability of counterpart funds (this was a problem under the previous Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Sector project (Loan 3611-AR). Even at times of crisis, the key rehabilitation and maintenance activities of the country's main road network was ensured. This was complemented by a satisfactory performance of the implementing agency as detailed below.

7.6 Implementing Agency:The commendable DNV efforts to ensure satisfactory compliance with the project’s objectives and smooth implementation of the involved programs were thwarted, as analyzed in previous sections, by external economic and political factors, coupled with repeated changes in DNV management. These factors weakened in critical periods the project oriented purpose-ness of DNV and PCU administrators and curtailed, in particular, the satisfactory implementation of the institutional strengthening component. In addition, they caused an extreme reduction of the scope of the network condition surveys in the years 2000-2003, thus denying project monitoring personnel the possibility of developing some reliable project performance indicators. This omission could also be the consequence of the detached position that DNV took throughout the project period on the monitoring of these indicators. No information on compliance with performance indicators could be found in DNV quarterly reports, or in supervision mission Aid Memoirs. Therefore, it was necessary to obtain retroactively from DNV reliable information on annual compliance with these indicators, which had been compiled in DNV’s internal files. Finally one must note that DNV not always followed up satisfactorily all issues raised by the National Audit Office (Auditoria General de la Nacion)in its annual audit reports. Unfortunately the delay with which these reports are produced reduces the potential impact they may have on improving project administration.

7.7 Overall Borrower performance:The Overall Borrower performance was satisfactory.

8. Lessons Learned

1. Good quality project design, Borrower commitment to the project objectives, sound highway maintenance policies involving private sector participation, Bank flexibility in revising the Loan Agreement, and good support during supervision missions from the decentralized Country Management Unit are of utmost importance to carry through a complex project severely endangered by critical economic and political problems.

2. The critical financing problems experienced from 1999 to 2003 by the road sector in general, and by this project in particular, due to their dependency on annual budgetary allocations subject to sudden political decisions, show clearly the need to establish an adequate and reliable financing system. A sound and permanent system of road financing at the national and local level through a combination of direct and indirect users fees is mandatory to guarantee the consolidation and sustainability of a road infrastructure adequate to serve the needs of the national community and to support the growth of economic activity.

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3. Implementation of this project has confirmed the advantages of the CREMA performance based contract system compared to the traditional unit price (quantity measurement) type of contracting.

(a) The CREMA system of contracting fosters the contractors’ ownership of the works by transferring the responsibilities for the service quality of the roads from the Road Authority to the Contractors; thus compelling them to: (i) prepare results-oriented programming of their works and activities, (ii) exert their own quality control, (iii) implement adequate rehabilitation works the first year to ensure low maintenance costs over the remaining four years, and (iv) repair promptly any road deterioration to prevent further extension of the initial damage. This benefit of increased ownership is further reinforced by the contractors’ obligation to comply with the prescribed performance indicators, and the possibility of being penalized in case of noncompliance. The fact that the average amount of penalties has stayed at a level of 1% of contract costs demonstrates the effective development of the contractors’ ownership.

(b) The five year programming inherent to the CREMA system is also highly beneficial for the public sector. Its fixed price contracting format and the required careful planning of rehabilitation and maintenance activities over 5 years have effectively reduced the risks of cost overruns. The existence of a pre-agreed long term working program has reduced delays in project implementation, and, coupled with the quality control performed by the contractors and the simplicity and effectiveness of the monitoring system through performance indicators, have substantially reduced the government’s cost of supervising the network. In addition, the legally binding long-term payment obligation assumed by the government towards the contractors has been extremely helpful to ameliorate the detrimental effect of extended payments interruptions in the critical years 1999 to 2003.

(c) Gradual implementation of the CREMA system over the years contributed fundamentally to the substantial improvement of road conditions experienced from 1997 to 2005 by the non-concessioned network as reflected in the reduction of the percentage of roads in poor condition from 28% to 4% and the increase of roads in good conditions from 44% to 85%. These improvements have resulted in substantial savings in capital investments for network rehabilitation and maintenance and significant reductions of vehicle operating costs as determined by ex-post financial and economic analysis for the Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Sector Project (Loan 3611-AR) and confirmed by economic evaluation of this project described in 4.3.

4. The extremely thin overlays used in CREMA road rehabilitation works have rendered unexpected reductions of roughness values, exceeding those determined by the HDM model. It would be worthwhile to include a study on this matter in the efforts to calibrate the HDM model for conditions in Argentina. Such a study would help to establish a more realistic cost-effective relation between type and length of road rehabilitation works and achieved improvement of road conditions and subsequent savings in vehicle operating costs.

5. Successful implementation of a necessary institutional strengthening program requires clear and binding agreements between the Borrower and the Bank, strong ownership by the Borrower, detailed programming and consistent execution over the years. The extent to which the implementing agency internalized the "new thinking" associated to performance-based contracts rather than traditional unit price contracts is probably on of the key impacts of the project but it is hard to measure.

6. Clear and consistent definition of key performance indicators at appraisal and negotiations, early agreement between the executing agency and the Bank supervision team on the adequate form to establish and report them, and annual reporting of these indicators by the executing agency for their analysis and discussion with the Bank supervision mission, would greatly contribute to a constant and reliable monitoring of outcome and output indicators. Encourage every effort to instill political will to reflect and internalize the results orientation characteristic of the CREMA style contracts into the management units in

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charge of project implementation broadly and specifically into the DNV.

7. Shortcomings in compliance with the objective of adequate training and equipping regional authorities to assume assigned responsibilities, mentioned in the last paragraph of 4.5, and individual problems detected in isolated cases of CREMA contracts, indicate that there is still some room for further improvements to achieve an optimal CREMA contracting system, such as:

(a) Strengthening and homogenizing the capacity of regional authorities for the programming, preparation and supervision of CREMA contracts.

(b) Improving the quality of road rehabilitation design studies, and updating them before bidding if meanwhile road conditions have changed substantially due to excessive time elapsed, or occurrence of natural disasters.

(c) Simplifying and streamlining of the Bid Data Sheet (“Datos de la Licitación”) section of the bidding documents, which over time have substantially increased and complicated the paper work required for bid preparation, thus discouraging participation of prospective bidders.

(d) Continue improving the definition of accurate and relevant performance indicators for performance-based road sector contracts.

(e) Given that a CREMA contract involves a period of 5 years during which the contractor has to render an important service to the affected community and to the national economy, it could be advisable to require bidders to include their proposed work programs in their bids, the quality of which could be evaluated as an additional criteria for bid award, thus ensuring enhanced responsiveness from the bidder/contractor, higher accountability from the future contractor and, consequently, better service conditions of the roads.

9. Partner Comments

(a) Borrower/implementing agency:This comments were submitted by the Borrower in a Completion Report dated May 2006.

In order to evaluate this project objectively, several external factors should be considered highlighting the very significant crisis of 2001 which produced major institutional and economic changes.

During 2001-2003 there were numerous changes in Governments which resulted in frequent changes in DNV and project authorities.

From an economic point of view, all investments in the country were severely affected by the lack of counterpart funding. As a result without local counterparts there were significant delays in payments for works completed and certified.

The crisis was so severe that the project unit and IBRD were compelled to revise the financing parameters (lowering the counterpart funding requirements for eligible civil work components), as well as the inclusion of a new category of road rehabilitation works which were part of the original program but fully financed by Government which under the post-crisis conditions was not implementable.

Also, the significant devaluation of 2002, and the ensuing cost increases, had a major impact on the costs of contracts under implementation which were subject to the application of a cost escalation formula in order to maintain the continuity of the works financed under the program and the delay of new works until the conditions were more stable.

Given these joint efforts, the program was stabilized only in 2004 and 2005, with a total investment achieved of US$ 857.7 million against US$929 million which is considered as extremely good by Government considering all the above.

Regarding the institutional development component, the Government agrees that the achievements are not those expected, having invested only 6% of the amount foreseen at appraisal.

From a physical targets point of view, the Borrower coincides in stating that the length of roads rehabilitated and maintained before the 2001 crisis were highly satisfactory and in accordance to the targets

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of the CREMA I component, while the CREMA II was heavily affected by the crisis and the fact that most bids in 2001 did not result in contract awards (with only 3 contracts awarded and affected by serious delays). The remaining part of CREMA II was implemented through 2 contracts awarded in 2003 (year when the economic recovery really began) and 13 contracts awarded in 2004 which were under full implementation in 2005. Despite the advances in all of these contracts, all of the rehabilitation works could not be fully completed before the project closing date but their implementation is fully satisfactory.

Also among the physical outputs, the Borrower highlights also the maintenance achievements under Component 3, which started being eligible for financing since 2003 and included km-month contracts and TFO contracts executed by the affected Provinces. Under these components which are mostly maintenance the rehabilitation achievements (524 km against the original 2,359 km) is lower given their focus on maintenance and not on rehabilitation. Nevertheless, the Borrower considers that the physical outputs of this Component 3 is also satisfactory.

The above highly satisfactory achievements are due to the work of the Bank, the supervision teams, DNV and the project unit, all of whom throughout these many years put a lot of effort to sort and solve the major difficulties affecting project implementation.

(b) Cofinanciers:

(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):

10. Additional Information

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Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

Outcome/Impact IndicatorsIndicator Projected in PAD By Original Closing

Date Actual/Latest

EstimateOn completion, the average roughness of non-concessioned paved network will not exceed an IRI of 3.5,While the portion of roads in poor condition (IRI>5) will not exceed 6%

<3.5

<6%

3.48

5.36%

3.39

4.20%The proportion of that network in good condition (IRI<4) will be at least equal to 65%. >65% 82.8% 84.5%By completion, the maintenance of at least 70% of the non-concessioned paved network will be contracted under the CREMA system. >70% 57% 43%By completion, maintenance of at least 90% of this network will be contracted out. >90% 60% 54%The responsibility of preparation and monitoring of the entire non-concessioned network will be transferred to the regional districts by the mid-term review. Regional authorities will have been trained and equipped to assume newly assigned responsibilities.

The transfer was carried out before the mid-term review. However, because of shortcomings in the training programs and absence of adequate monitoring by headquarters, professional capacity, and contract preparation and supervision procedures have not reached a homogeneous level in all districts.

Year Item 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

1. Rehabilitation Program (km)

Appraisal Targets (Cumulative) 4026 5791 6035 6576 7395 7844 7844 7844 Achieved in CREMA I program (“) 4431 5193 5288 5631 5631 5631 5818 5818 Achieved in CREMA II program (“) 149 775

Financed by IDB and CAF (“) 50 50 50 96 122 Achieved in other programs (“) 201 201 201 391 391 391 524 524 Total km. rehabilitated 4632 5394 5489 6072 6072 6072 6587 7239 Percentage Achieved 115% 93% 91% 92% 82% 77% 84% 92%

Length of non-concessioned paved network (1)

21694 21697 21770 21918 21918 21687 21967 23852

2. Length of network maintained: by CREMA I 11664 11664 11310 11310 11038 10495 2300 828 by CREMA II 236 236 577 1094 2287 by CREMA Loan 7242-AR 3555 by locally financed CREMAS 543 8557 3667 Total by CREMA contracts 11664 11664 11310 11546 11274 11675 11951 10337 Percentage of network 60% 60% 59% 61% 57% 57% 56% 43% 3. Additional by private sector by km-month system 3555 3555 3555 3555 2533 805 429 By modular system 1625 1855 by C.O.T. system 609 609 609 609 609 609 609 609 Total by private sector 15828 15828 15474 15710 14416 13089 14614 12801 Percentage of network 73% 73% 71% 72% 68% 60% 67% 54%

(1) The total length of the paved non-concessioned network, which had stayed at around 21,800 km throughout the project period, experienced a sudden increase to 23.852 km in 2005, due to paving of former gravel roads and transfers of some rmain road sectors from provincial networks to the national network.

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Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Project Cost by Component Appraisal

Estimate US$ thousand

Actual/Latest Estimate (12/31/05)

US$ thousand

Percentage of Appraisal

Phase 1 CREMA 544,000 486,123 0,89 Phase 2 CREMA 130,000 105,427 0,81 Rehabilitation and Maintenance of Remaining Network

240,000 240,000 1.00

Works of Remaining Network with partial Bank Financing

0.000 26,667

Goods 1,800 0,21 Consulting Services 13,200 1,175 0,09 Total Baseline Cost 929,000 859,773 0,93

Total Project Cost 929,000 859,773 0,93 Total Financing Required 929,000 859,773 0,93

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ thousand equivalent) Procurement Method* Expenditure

Category ICB NCB Other N.B.F. 1

Total Cost

1. Works 674,000 (435,000)

240,000 (0.00)

914,000 (435,000)

2. Goods 600 (600)

900 (900)

300 (300)

1,800 (1,800)

3. Services 13,200 2 (13,200)

13,200 (13,200)

Total 674,000 (435,600)

900 (900)

13,500 (13,500)

240,000 (.0.00)

929,000 (450,000)

* Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies.1 The third component for the project will be entirely procured using the counterpart funds. DNV has indicated

that it will use the standard Bank procurement guidelines under this category.2. Inclures the operating costs for the Project Coordination Unit and also refers to training, seminars, subscription

of magazines and staff exchange programs.

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Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ thousand equivalent) Procurement Method Expenditure

Category ICG NCB Other N.B.F.

Total Cost

1. Works 591,550 (428,800)

5,533 1 (4,150)

21,133 1 (15,850)

240,000 (0.00)

858,216 (448,800)

2. Goods 19 (19)

19 (19)

3. Services 1,097 (1.097)

1,097 (1,097)

Total 591,550 (428,800)

5,533 (4,150)

22,249 (16,966)

240,000 (0.00)

859,332 (449,916)

1 In the third Loan amendment it was agreed that the Bank would finance part of the civil works for the remaining network that had been contracted under local procedures.

Project Financing by Component (in US% thousand equivalent) Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate Percentage of Appraisal Component Bank Govt. Bank Govt. Bank Govt.

Works 435,000 479,000 447,863 408,992 1,03 0,85 Goods 1,800 0 19 0 0,01 Services 13,200 0 832 0 0,06

Total 450,00 479,000 448,714 408,992 1,00 0,85

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Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits

Economic analysis of different types of rehabilitation works. Road Sections

Number Type of treatment applied Length (km) NPV

US$ M. IERR

% 6 Reconstruction and asphalt concrete

pavement strengthening 157 28,8 104,5

33 Asphalt pavement strengthening 850 170,2 55,2 6 Slurry seals 154 10,4 30,0 2 Surface treatment 77 0,5 14,9

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Annex 4. Bank Inputs

(a) Missions:Stage of Project Cycle Performance Rating No. of Persons and Specialty

(e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.)Month/Year Count Specialty

ImplementationProgress

DevelopmentObjective

Identification/PreparationJune 1997 1 EGROctober 1997 5 EGR,FinAn,EGR, PROF,EGR

Appraisal/NegotiationJune 1998 1 EGR

SupervisionDecember 1998 1 EGR S SMarch 1999 1 EGR S SNovember 1999 1 EGR S SMarch 2000 2 EGR, ASS. S SJune 2000 1 EGR S SDecember 2000 2 EGR,ECN S SJune 2001 2 ECN, EGR S SDecember 2001 2 ECN, EGR S SMarch 2002 2 ECN, EGR) S SJune 2002 3 EGR,FinAn,EGR S SDecember 2002 5 EGR,ECN,FinAn,EGR,PROCSP S SJune 2003 4 ECN,EGR,EGR,PROCSP S SOctober 2003 4 ECN,EGR,EGR,PROCSP S SMay 2004 3 ECN,EGR,EGR S SFebruary 2005 3 ECN,EGR,EGR S S

ICRMarch 2006 1 EGR

Ass = Assistant; FinAn = Financial Analyst; PROCSP = Procurement Specialist.

(b) Staff:

Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest EstimateNo. Staff weeks US$ ('000)

Identification/Preparation 14.3 107Appraisal/Negotiation 5.7 43Supervision 65.4 467ICR 5.0 39Total 90.4 656

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Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)

RatingMacro policies H SU M N NASector Policies H SU M N NAPhysical H SU M N NAFinancial H SU M N NAInstitutional Development H SU M N NAEnvironmental H SU M N NA

SocialPoverty Reduction H SU M N NAGender H SU M N NAOther (Please specify) H SU M N NA

Private sector development H SU M N NAPublic sector management H SU M N NAOther (Please specify) H SU M N NA

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Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

6.1 Bank performance Rating

Lending HS S U HUSupervision HS S U HUOverall HS S U HU

6.2 Borrower performance Rating

Preparation HS S U HUGovernment implementation performance HS S U HUImplementation agency performance HS S U HUOverall HS S U HU

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Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

Informe Final de Cierre, Prestamo 4295. Direccion Nacional de Vialidad. Mayo de 2006.lDirección Nacional de Vialidad: Ex-post Economic Evaluationsl Dirección Nacional de Vialidad: COSTOP (Vehicle Operation Cost Model)l Dirección Nacional de Vialidad: Manual de Evaluación y Gestión Ambiental de Obras Vialesl Dirección Nacional de Vialidad: Quarterly Reports - Informes Trimestrales (2001-2005)l Cámara Argentina de la Construcción: Estudio de las capacidades y problemas en la industria de la lconstrucción de infraestructura (2005). Implementation Completion Report. Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Sector Project Loan 3611. lDecember 14, 2000 Liautaud, Gerard. Maintaining Roads. Viewpoint.l Informe de Auditoria Tecnica Contratos Crema. December 31, 1998l Audit Reports (2002-2004) l Ex-post procurement Reviews (2001,2006)l Mid Term Review Reportl

Project Appraisal Document.1998l

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