Document of The World Bank

Report No: 26930-NE

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT(PPFI-Q0220 IDA-30260)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 20.3 MILLION

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF NIGER

FOR THE

TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION PROJECT

February 3, 2004

TransportAfrica Region

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective August 25, 2003)

Currency Unit = FCFA 1 FCFA = US$ 0.001657

US$ 1 = FCFA 603

FISCAL YEARJanuary 1 December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMSAFD = Agence Française de Développement (French Overseas Development Agency)BEEEI = Bureau d'Evaluation Environnementale et des Etudes d'Impact

(Bureau for Environmental Impact Studies)BNC = Bureau National de Coordination (National Bureau for Coordination)CAFER = Caisse Autonome de Financement de l'Entretien Routier (Road Maintenance Fund)CNUT = Conseil Nigérien des Utilisateurs de Transport (Shippers' Council)CNEDD = Conseil National de l'Environnement pour un Développement Durable

(National Council of Environment for a Sustainable Development)DMTP = Direction du Materiel des Travaux Publics (Public Works Equipment Department)DTP = Direction des Travaux Publics (Department of Public Works)DTT = Direction de Transports Terrestres (Directorate of Land Transport)IRI = International Road Roughness IndexOCBN = Organisation Commune Benin-Niger (Joint Organization Benin-Niger)PIP = Public Investment ProgramPRIT = Project de Réhabilitation des Infrastructures de Transport

(Transport Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project)PRIU = Projet de Réhabilitation des Infrastructures Urbaines (Urban Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project)RED = Roads Economic Decision ModelSME = Small and Medium EnterprisesSNTN = Société Nationale des Transports Nigériens (National Road Transport Company)SNTV = Société Nigérienne de Transport Voyageurs

(Association of Passenger Tranport of Niger)VOC = Vehicle Operating Cost

Vice President: Callisto E. MadavoCountry Director (Acting) Diarietou Gaye

Sector Manager Sanjivi Rajasingham Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Andreas Schliessler

REPUBLIC OF NIGERTRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION PROJECT

CONTENTS

Page No.1. Project Data 12. Principal Performance Ratings 13. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 24. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 45. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 96. Sustainability 117. Bank and Borrower Performance 128. Lessons Learned 139. Partner Comments 1410. Additional Information 14Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 15Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 19Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 21Annex 4. Bank Inputs 28Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 30Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 31Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 32

Project ID: P035608 Project Name: NE TRANSP. INFRA. REHABTeam Leader: Andreas Schliessler TL Unit: AFTTRICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: February 5, 2004

1. Project DataName: NE TRANSP. INFRA. REHAB L/C/TF Number: PPFI-Q0220; IDA-30260

Country/Department: NIGER Region: Africa Regional Office

Sector/subsector: Roads and highways (99%); Central government administration (1%)

Theme: Rural services and infrastructure (P); Other urban development (P)

KEY DATES Original Revised/ActualPCD: 09/21/1994 Effective: 05/07/1998 05/12/1998

Appraisal: 06/26/1997 MTR: 11/08/2000 08/01/2001Approval: 12/18/1997 Closing: 01/31/2003 05/30/2003

Borrower/Implementing Agency: Government of Niger/Ministry of Equipment and InfrastructureOther Partners:

STAFF Current At AppraisalVice President: Callisto E. Madavo Jean-Louis SarbibCountry Director: Darietou Gaye (Acting) Theodore AhlersSector Manager: C. Sanjivi Rajasingham Maryvonnne Plessis-FraissardTeam Leader at ICR: Andreas Schliessler Jean-Noël GuillossouICR Primary Author: Robert Fishbein

2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible)

Outcome: U

Sustainability: UN

Institutional Development Impact: SU

Bank Performance: S

Borrower Performance: U

QAG (if available) ICRQuality at Entry: S

Project at Risk at Any Time: YesThe project has not been subject to QAG reviews at any time.

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

3.1 Original Objective:The development objectives stated in the Project Appraisal Document were to improve the condition of the road network and the efficiency of road maintenance execution. These objectives were straightforward and responded directly to needs, both at the time of the original project design in late 1994, and even much more so at appraisal in 1997. The long delay between identification and appraisal was caused by a military coup during the preparation process. This caused a withdrawal of most donors from Niger, including the Bank. Following the Presidential election in July 1996 and legislative elections in November 1996, project preparation re-started. Since donor support for heavier periodic maintenance activities had been largely withdrawn following the military takeover, and the road network was deteriorating. This was made worse by insufficient local funding of routine road maintenance. Hence, project design responded to the Government’s request for assistance in rehabilitating priority sections of the road network and re-establishing a credible program of road maintenance, including the maintenance funding aspect, which would also facilitate the return of additional donor resources.

3.2 Revised Objective:The development objectives were not formally revised during the project period. However, two years into execution, the PSR statement of development objectives was expanded in order to broaden the focus of the project. The following goals were stated: (i) to stabilize and improve the condition of the priority network, reducing the long-run economic costs for road maintenance and rehabilitation in order to attain sectoral financial sustainability; (ii) to restructure and strengthen institutional capacity, financial viability and operational efficiency of the agencies of the sector; (iii) to encourage private sector involvement in investment and management of the sector; and (iv) to reduce transport cost for the poor. This expansion of goals and objectives reflected the fact that the project components as presented in the SAR addressed, in reality, a much broader range of issues than the rather limited original project development objectives which were stated in the SAR. The revised objectives were nevertheless relevant, given the Government's desire to lay the groundwork for a more coherent transport sector strategy beyond road network management and maintenance.

3.3 Original Components:The project included six components:

(a) Earth Roads: Regravelling of 1,060 km of unpaved main roads.(b) Rural Roads: Definition of a strategy for rural roads, including the pilot execution of 150 km of rural roads.(c) Road Maintenance Administration and Management: Support to the implementation of the Government’s stated reform program, including (i) divestiture of public works equipment rental activities; (ii) Road Laboratory restructuring; (iii) Public Works Department restructuring; (iv) Road maintenance programming procedures; (v) Monitoring and contracting out road maintenance; (vi) Training; (vii) computerized system and procedures for management of the Road Maintenance Fund; (viii) creation of the Road Maintenance Fund; (ix) definition of a Road Maintenance Strategy; and (x) Training in environmental management.(d) Road Transport: Support to a series of studies and actions including (i) technical advisory services to implement a road safety plan; (ii) improvement of technical control of vehicles; (iii) revision of regulatory framework for protection of road assets, including axle load limitation; (iv) study of poverty-transport linkages; (v) creation of a National Observatory for Transport; (vi) feasibility study for a inland container terminal; (vii) definition of a training strategy for the transport sector; (viii) development of an investment plan for river ports; and (ix) computerization of vehicle registrations.

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(e) Environment: In addition to the road-specific environmental activities above, the project included (i) support to the National Council of Environment for Sustainable Development (CNEDD) under the Prime Minister’s Office and the Department of Environment in the Ministry of Hydraulics and Environment; (ii) preparation of legal documents to implement the 1997 law institutionalizing environmental assessments; and (iii) equipment.(f) Project Management: (i) Financial audits of the Credit and Special Accounts; (ii) Equipment; and (iii) incremental operating costs for the National Bureau of Coordination (BNC), including contractual staff.3.4 Revised Components:The project retained the original six components throughout the credit period. However, in June 2000, a portion of credit proceeds (SDR 3.0 million equivalent) were reallocated to support the Government’s retrenchment program for the Department of Public Works (DTP) and the Public Works Equipment Pool Directorate (DMTP). Funds were reallocated from the Category 1, Civil Works, to a new Category titled “Severance Payments.” Although the project design had earlier assumed that the National Budget would finance the severance portion of the restructuring plan, the SAR noted already that the lack of Government funds for this purpose was a “serious risk.” This was born out by events, especially following another coup d’état in April 1999. Although political stability was restored and donor assistance resumed in November 1999, public finances had deteriorated dramatically. Since a cornerstone of the plan to strengthen road maintenance under the Credit was the disengagement of the state, direct support was justified, in view of the urgent need to proceed with this particular reform.

3.5 Quality at Entry:Quality at entry is considered satisfactory, although marginally so. The project was clearly linked to the third core area of IDA assistance in the CAS of November 1997: “Promotion of open economic policies and regional linkages.” It was consistent with the Bank’s effort to foster a favorable business climate through support of state divestiture. By improving basic access in the country, it would also facilitate other direct programs for poverty reduction. Safeguard polices were adequately addressed in the SAR.

Although the project was based on the Government’s letter of sector policy, the SAR recognized that, since none of the reforms envisaged in the letter were yet in place, there was a major risk that consistent Government support for fundamental reforms would not materialize. Also, it was considered that there was a risk that counterpart funds, particularly to support the retrenchment program, would not be available. As noted above, both risks later turned into a reality. However, given that the Government officials in charge at the time of project preparation were fully supportive of the reforms and thought it possible to finance the retrenchment program from local budget resources, it was deemed reasonable for the preparation team to recommend accepting this risk, so as to stay engaged and lend support to the reform process, with a full understanding that the risks be reassessed later during the project.

The project design team, in their effort to be very thorough, included such a large number of actions and activities that the project design can be judged as somewhat overloaded and not selective enough. It involved numerous (over 40) studies covering a wide range of subjects, particularly in the area of Road Transport Policy. A part of the studies resulted in successful reforms and follow-on activities. For some other studies carried out, there was insufficient funding (by Government and/or donors) and insufficient human capacity to implement the recommendations made. In addition, the Road Transport Component, in spite of being very useful and successful, diverted a lot of attention without contributing to the originally-stated development objective.

During project preparation, the preparation team grafted itself to the ongoing preparation of the Urban Infrastructure Project (PRIU) and the National Bureau for Coordination (BNC), attached to the Ministry of

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Planning and eventually to the Prime Minister’s Office. It was decided that the PRIT was to be implemented together with the PRIU, under the leadership on the Government side of a single National Coordinator. Overall, the BNC operated efficiently. However, it turned out that the technical monitoring and overall management of both projects were an exceptionally challenging task. In retrospect, it was not realistic to assume that one single coordinator at the BNC could effectively coordinate and monitor the panoply of studies and activities in the transport project, in addition to the numerous activities of the urban project. This problem was only addressed after the mid-term review, when three technical specialists were hired for the BNC to support the coordinator.

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs

4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:The project’s outcome/achievement of objective is rated unsatisfactory, although only marginally so given the project's numerous positive achievements. The fundamental reason for this rating is that the overall condition of Niger’s road network is deteriorating today rather than improving, and that a reversal of this situation is presently not in sight. It is a case where, although the project can be said to have achieved almost all of its output objectives, the expected outcomes of improved road network condition and improved efficiency of road maintenance execution (the core objectives) have not been realized in a sustainable way. It can be said, however, that this outcome is primarily a result of the overall declining situation of Niger’s public finances, and not the result of a “bad” project. The general problem is that as a result of a serious decline of fiscal revenue over the past 15 years, Niger cannot afford any more to keep up its entire road network of some 9,700 km plus 5,000 km of rural roads, which was built at a time when both domestic and donor resources were much more abundant than today.

In terms of physical improvement works on the road network, the project actually exceeded original output objectives. As a temporary outcome, the level of service on some 1,400 km of unpaved roads was improved very significantly, compared to an original target of only 1,060 km. This included emergency works to save portions of the network and expand coverage by reducing service standards, following extremely heavy rains in 1998.

Regarding the improvement of road maintenance execution, the project was instrumental in introducing fundamental structural reforms which did indeed put in place the essential legal and organizational framework needed to achieve more efficient road maintenance. These accomplishments include:

The restructuring of the Public Works Directorate from a massive force account organization to a lmuch smaller and professionalized organization. This included the retrenchment of some 1.200 staff of the Ministry of Equipment (bringing about much-needed fiscal relief for the Government), and the creation of a dedicated Road Maintenance Directorate.The successful move from road maintenance by force account to contracting out those activities to lprivate firms. This has led to the creation and use of at least eight local private contractors for road maintenance works who absorbed many of the retrenched workers of the former government force account brigades, plus several local consulting firms active in the design and supervision of road works. The privatization of the Government's plant and equipment pool, by transforming it into a lprivately-owned equipment rental firm.The transformation of the Government's public works laboratory into a commercial enterprise.lThe establishment by law of the Road Maintenance Fund, based on a modern legislation following the lconcept of a second-generation road maintenance fund.

Each of these reforms involved difficult and commendable strides for the Government. Although some of

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the resulting new institutions are still in their formative stages (e.g. the privatized equipment rental firm), the overall success of the project in moving forward these reforms cannot be denied. Why is it then that the desired outcome of the project was not achieved? The answer is: the non-application of some aspects of the Road Maintenance Fund Law by the Government (Ministry of Finance), which resulted in insufficient funding for road maintenance. This aspect was outside the control of the implementing agency (Ministry of Equipment and Infrastructure) and is discussed in detail in section 5.2 of this ICR.

The project developed an innovative rural roads strategy and applied this strategy through several pilot projects. As explained in section 4.2 below, implementation delays for the pilot projects did however not allow for the practical testing of the basic underlying concepts of the new rural roads strategy. The success or not of the strategy can only be judged some two years after the completion of the pilot projects, which will be in 2005. The validation of the strategy and its formal adoption by the Government was thus not achieved.

Regarding the expanded set of actions and objectives mentioned earlier, the project was successful in assisting the Directorate of Land Transport to put in place several basic services and address some fundamental sector issues related to safety, quality and affordability. For example, the computerization of vehicle registration and driver licensing has been fully completed for Niamey and is underway for decentralized locations outside Niamey at the time of ICR preparation. Most essential elements of the Road Safety Action Plan financed under the project have been implemented. The numerous other studies financed under the project have led to various positive structural reforms and outcomes. The most notable are the successful full privatization of the National Transport Company (long-distance passenger transport by bus); the establishment of the Transport Observatory, which provides transport and trade statistics; and the liberalization of inter-city passenger and freight services, which have resulted in an average 7 percent reduction in passenger fares and 15 percent reduction in freight rates.

4.2 Outputs by components:Earth Roads: This component is rated very satisfactory. It achieved an acceptable level of service on 1,435 km of gravel roads, compared to the original target of only 1,060 km. This expansion was achieved by reducing the original specifications, which involved full regravelling (implemented on the first phase of 545 km) to a “spot improvement,” approach (implemented on some 890 km in the second phase, twice the originally planned amount). This decision demonstrates the flexible approach of the project team. It was taken following the exceptionally heavy rains of July/August 1998, when it was perceived that traffic on a major portion of the earth road network was in danger of complete disruption. A study was commissioned to formulate a program of spot improvements on 1,800 km. The study recommended a priority program in four tranches, two of which were financed by PRIT. An added advantage of the revised approach was that it provided an opportunity to build local capacity in road engineering and maintenance works, since it involved smaller, more dispersed works which would not be attractive to international firms. Minor reductions in the final output of several contracts in Phase 2 were necessary, so as to stay within the funds available in the Civil Works category (reduced due to the reallocation of the credit to support the retrenchment program and the fall in the value of the US dollar). The overall savings in the regravelling component also enabled the project to assist in additional emergency works following the 1999 rains and to bridge the gap in funding for maintenance during the transition from force account to contracting. This made it possible to finance the rehabilitation of an important bridge on National Road (RN) 6, mechanized routine maintenance on 696 km, and eight spot improvement contracts on the paved network.

Rural Roads: The rating for this component is unsatisfactory. While an innovative rural roads strategy was indeed developed, and most of the planned pilot projects were actually implemented, the main goal of validating and formally adopting a strategy for rural road development could not be achieved before the

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closing date. This is because the new strategy was supposed to be tried out through several pilot projects carried out under the project, the results of which were to be evaluated before the strategy could be formally adopted by the Government. However, the pilot projects were much delayed and barely completed at the project closing date, and some were even cancelled. It was impossible to draw any conclusions as to the results of the approach followed under those pilot projects (community-based maintenance). In addition, the pilot roads were at the end all improved to the same high standard, thus not providing a basis for comparison of the various improvement standards proposed in the draft strategy. On one of the five pilot roads, the project completed only 11 of the 17 km, causing consternation among the population. In areas where the roads were completed, there is satisfaction among the population; however, the management and finance of maintenance is only now being addressed, and it is not clear the extent to which the approach can be replicated, given the high per km cost of the initial investments. The pilot projects were recently completed and do not yet allow drawing conclusions needed to validate a rural roads strategy. Most of the problems in this component were caused by a change of the Director of Rural Roads mid-way through the project, with the new Director not fully applying the principles of the draft rural roads strategy developed under his predecessor.

Road Maintenance Administration and Management: The output rating for this component is satisfactory, although marginally so, not withstanding continued problems of resource mobilization for road maintenance. There is no doubt that the project did basically everything it set out to do under this component, and that it was instrumental in bringing about major very positive developments and capacity-building for implementing road maintenance operations.

The Government achieved (as outputs) important structural reforms, notably: (i) the full reorganization of the Public Works General Directorate, including the creation of a fully functional Road Maintenance Directorate, the establishment of a road condition database, and better capacity for planning, programming and budgeting of investments and maintenance; (ii) the elaboration of a road network maintenance strategy; (iii) the complete conversion of road maintenance activities from force account to private contractors; (iv) the transformation of the public works laboratory to a commercially-managed enterprise; (v) the privatization of the Government's Plant Pool and its transformation into an equipment rental company; (vi) the establishment by law of the Road Maintenance Fund (CAFER); and (vii) the elaboration of a Road Sector Strategy (which is however only now being finalized, 4 months after the closing date). However, the benefits of these reforms (outcome) could not fully materialize, due to resource constraints which are explained in section 5.2.

Road Transport: The output of this component is rated satisfactory. Numerous studies were completed and several key structural reforms were promoted, which are yielding improvements in transport service quality and cost. Tangible accomplishments in structural reform include:

Restructuring of the National Transport Company (SNTN) and the elimination of its previous lmonopoly on interurban and urban transport. This, combined with project-supported efforts to circumvent the “tour de role” system for interurban transport (where consumers previously had no choice between operators), has resulted in the introduction of two additional companies providing modern, reliable bus services at competitive rates; Restructuring of the National Union of Transport Users (CNUT). Although texts elaborated through lthe project are not yet adopted, studies have led to the liberalization of maritime transport (elimination of the 40/40/20 maritime cargo sharing rules) and to the abandonment of the “tour de role” system for most commercial road transport; Establishment of the National Observatory for Transport, within CNUT, which provides regular ltransport and trade statistics; Elimination of the quota system for petrol transport, which overnight reduced by 35 percent the l

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transport cost for petrol and introduced competitive higher-quality service; and Co-financing with AFD of a study for the concessioning of the Niger-Benin rail service (OCBN). lPRIT financed the costs for the first phase of the study (which is still underway), while AFD is financing the second and third phases.

Other accomplishments of this component include: (i) elaboration of a Road Safety Action Plan and implementation of initial actions, such as a data base on road accidents and several road safety campaigns; (ii) implementation of an information, education and communication program to reduce the risk of HIV/AIDS along transport corridors and among transport workers; (iii) feasibility studies and preparation of bidding documents for the creation of a “dry port” for Niamey; (iv) studies on transport and poverty, and transport and gender, which have contributed to the elaboration of the PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) and the draft rural roads strategy; (v) studies and elaboration of legal texts to reform the transport services sector; and (vi) feasibility studies and bidding documentation to develop small boat landings along the Niger River.

The criticism which can be made is that some of the studies carried out under the component were too wide ranging and ambitious, so that their results could not always be followed up through concrete action, due to lack of financial and human resources. Also, a part of the planned training activities had to be cancelled in order to stay within the project funding envelope.

Environment: This component is rated very satisfactory. The National Council of Environment for Sustainable Development (CNEDD), as well as the Bureau for Environmental Impact Studies (BEEEI), were created through this project. A total of 200 people have received training in environmental management and assessment procedures, including four staff members who underwent “training of trainers” courses in Canada. The General Directorate of Public Works has established an environmental unit, which has overseen the completion and implementation of environmental management plans for the PRIT road projects. Mitigation measures are regularly incorporated into the contract documents. A major mitigation plan was developed and implemented for the development of social infrastructure (school rooms and solar-powered water supply) in Tegueye (Tera-Yatakala Road) during Phase 1.

Project Management: The rating for this component is satisfactory. As noted earlier, the initial design assumed that one coordinator at the BNC could effectively coordinate two complex and high-risk projects. Under these conditions, the National Coordinator did as good a job as can be expected in keeping both projects moving, but was unable to establish an ongoing monitoring and evaluation system, such that indicators on sector performance in the Credit Agreement were not systematically followed up during the first half of the project. This situation was remedied at the mid-term review, with the appointment of full time technical specialists as sub-coordinators for PRIT and PRIU, and measures to establish a system for monitoring performance indicators. The BNC provided regular reports as required by the Credit Agreement, and a formal review of procurement procedures by the Bank in March 2003 showed that Bank procedures have been followed adequately.

4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:During appraisal, the economic evaluation of the project was limited to the physical investments in road works, and the same approach is used under the ICR. A comparison was made between the rates of return for investments (IRR) projected at appraisal, with the actual rates of return based on known investment costs and traffic figures at the end of the project. The results are presented in Annex 3. The investments financed under the project were for periodic maintenance / rehabilitation of existing earth roads. The economic evaluation normally covers both the initial investment for periodic maintenance / rehabilitation, plus the annual routine maintenance during the evaluation period. In this context, the life cycle of the

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investment made in periodic maintenance / rehabilitation is defined as the time until the next periodic maintenance or rehabilitation is due, and for the roads in question, the assumption is that periodic maintenance needs to be done every five years. Thus, the time period to assess the economic rate of return for the investments made in this project is five years. The ICR mission showed however that on the six roads analyzed, little or no routine maintenance was actually carried out since the rehabilitation works, and the annual routine maintenance costs were therefore zero. Calculations of net present value (NPV) and rate of return (IRR) were based on actual costs (contract values for works and supervision) and actual traffic data based on traffic counts for the five year period. Because of limitations in traffic data provided by the Ministry of Public Works Road data base, this was done for four of the six Phase I roads and two of the thirteen Phase II roads, using the Roads Economic Decision Model (RED) developed by the World Bank.

In all of the six cases, the roads were in extremely poor condition and almost impassable for part of the year before the investment. For this reason, the investment had the effect of releasing a vital constraint, leading to a relatively large increase in traffic immediately following the works, especially on those roads carrying international traffic (particularly Tera-Yatakala and Tikim-Adaré which are respectively on the Burkina Faso and Nigerian borders). It is expected however, that this traffic will level off beyond the initial period of analysis. Investment costs per kilometer ranged from US$ 5,085 to US$ 19,436, with an average of US$ 14,900 on Phase I roads and US$ 6,900 on Phase II roads which used the "spot improvement" approach. The analysis showed that all the roads had positive NPVs at a 12% discount rate, with the rates of return ranging from 45 % to 119 %. The sensitivity and switching point analysis shows that NPV would be positive even if one assumes a 25 % lower traffic level, and that traffic levels would have to be from 50 % to 80 % lower to arrive at a zero NPV. The economic analysis shows that, within the five year periodic maintenance life cycle, periodic maintenance investments on the earth roads had high rates of return, largely because initial conditions were extremely bad. However, it is clear that rates of return would be even higher if routine maintenance would have been carried out.

4.4 Financial rate of return:N/A

4.5 Institutional development impact:The project’s institutional development impact was high. It was instrumental in fundamentally changing the way in which road maintenance activities are carried out in Niger (from force account to contracting) and setting up an operational system for road maintenance planning and implementation. In the face of the Government’s serious financial constraints, the project facilitated the Government’s implementation of socially painful reforms by providing the necessary resources to implement the retrenchment of 1.200 workers for the Public Works Directorate and the privatization of the plant and equipment pool. It also facilitated the restructuring of the Public Works Laboratory to commercial operations, an important element in the transition away from force account works. The establishment of the Road Maintenance Fund was a major accomplishment, given past policies, and although it was not fully implemented as originally envisioned, its mere existence now provides a focal point for seriously addressing the road maintenance issue and a foundation for future improvements and a policy dialogue with the Bank and other donors. The combination of the institutional reforms brought about by the project, with Phase 2 of the Earth Roads component and two years of Road Maintenance Fund operations, led to the creation of a hitherto non-existent local contracting and consulting industry in the road sector, which found work and gained experience through the numerous small contracts for road maintenance and rehabilitation.

In respect of road transport, the project helped the Directorate of Land Transport (DTT) begin to address some of the root problems of the sector, which was grossly inefficient and a heavy burden on the economy. The elimination of interurban and urban transport monopolies and transport quota systems and the

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introduction of consumer choice led to almost immediate improvements in service competitiveness, quality and price. The project established a minimum capability for vehicle registrations, licensing and road safety campaigns, although a number of the planned activities remain unfunded. Regarding environmental management, the project made major inroads in main streaming environmental assessment and management, by establishing functioning agencies and training a broad range of stakeholders.

The above very significant institutional gains are however tempered by important risks of sustainability. The new institutional setup for road management and maintenance is very young and, without regular road maintenance financing, risks floundering in the future (see section 6).

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome

5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:The extraordinarily heavy rains of 1998 wrought unforeseen damage on the already deteriorating road network. This came at a time when the Government, supported by the project, was in a period of transition from force account to contracted works but had not yet put in place the Road Maintenance Fund. In order to save the road network from widespread traffic interruptions, the project downgraded its technical approach on the regravelling component so as to provide at least minimal maintenance funding on the paved network and wider coverage on unpaved network in 1999-2000.

A second major factor was the second coup d’etat in 1999 and the general economic decline of the country in the following period. GNP grew at 3.9%, 2.4%, and 10.4% respectively in 1996, 1997 and 1998. Yet following the exceptionally encouraging agricultural year in 1998, the economy slipped into a tailspin in 1999 and 2000, with GNP growth at -1.2% and -1.4%. Under these conditions, the Government was in an even poorer position than initially anticipated to cover the social costs of the retrenchment program and in meeting counterpart funding obligations. The project responded to this need, but at the price of reducing the amount of funds available for civil works.

A major factor with negative impacts on the outcome of the project was the breakdown in consensus among the donors on the basic policy and approach to assuring sustainable road maintenance financing, which in essence led to the fact that (i) road maintenance funding continues to be insufficient, and (ii) the sustainability of many of the project's achievements, and Niger's road network as a whole, is seriously threatened. At project inception and until 2001, there was a general agreement among the Bank, the EU and the IMF that the road user fee applied to the price of fuel were to be directly deposited in the Road Maintenance Fund. This principle is indeed retained in the Road Maintenance Fund Law which was adopted by Parliament in 1999. However, the Ministry of Finance revisited the application of this law and found support with the IMF and the EU, whose newly appointed representatives departed from the views shared by their predecessors. In 2003, the Minister of Finance clearly indicated that, because of the deteriorating fiscal situation, he would not accept direct collection of revenues by the Road Maintenance Fund (CAFER). This was later backed by a position paper from the EU (see Annex 7, Supporting Documents). At that time the project was about to close, and it was too late for the Bank's team to take any measures.

It can be added here that the Bank's Task Manager made numerous attempts to reconsolidate a common donor position between 2001 until the end of the project. However, diverging views between the transport sector staff and the country operations staff prevented a successful outcome.

5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:After the Road Maintenance Fund Law was passed by Parliament in November 1999, it took the

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Government more than 18 months to actually implement the RMF (CAFER) as a staffed and functioning institution. The Government then continued to delay the implementation of one particular aspect of the law, namely the direct collection mechanism of fuel levies by the CAFER. As mentioned in section 5.1 above, this was explained by "temporary liquidity problems". The Government did include in the annual budgets reasonable amounts for road maintenance, but disbursed much less than budgeted. In 2001, of the amounts programmed for road maintenance, only 35% was actually paid by the Treasury to the Road Maintenance Fund. This was supplemented by 44% direct aid from AFD, still leaving a gap of 21%. In 2002, the Treasury deposited some 54% of the user fees collected, and retained the funds which had been provided by AFD specifically for road maintenance. By July 2003, only some 22% of the programmed funds for 2003 have been deposited into the Road Maintenance Fund by the Treasury. Under these conditions, the Road Maintenance Directorate is unable to effectively plan and implement a coherent annual road maintenance program. The predictable result is the gradual deterioration of Niger’s road network. This vicious cycle of poor funding and asset deterioration is precisely the problem which the project sought to solve. The erratic nature of maintenance funding has also created a chain reaction of adverse affects on other sector actors, including the nascent local construction firms and supervision consultants, as well as their use of laboratory and equipment rental services for road maintenance contracts.

The collapsing consensus between donors during the project encouraged the Government to not fully implement the Road Maintenance Fund legislation adopted by parliament. Although the Project Management Unit (BNC) had been put under the control of the Prime Minister's office, precisely to ensure full support for the reform measures outlined in the Government's Letter of Development Policy, this was insufficient to induce the Ministry of Finance to implement the "direct collection mechanism" for the Road Maintenance Fund. Ultimately, it is this shortcoming that undermined the achievement of the overall project development objective and leads to the "unsatisfactory" rating of project outcome.

The Government had serious difficulties mobilizing counterpart funds in 1998 and part of 1999, which led to delays in execution of Phase 1 of Earth Roads. However, this problem was solved through a flexible approach, by allowing the Government to credit the taxable portion of the works contracts as its contribution.

The turnover of Government personnel had a particularly negative influence on the implementation of the Rural Roads Component, when a new Director essentially rejected the agreed approach to test various technical options, thus rendering the pilot projects of limited use for validating the strategy.

5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control:Despite the fact that the BNC was understaffed for covering two projects in the beginning, it did a good job setting up basic management and monitoring systems in conformity with Bank requirements. Once additional dedicated staff were provided after the mid-term review, oversight of the transport project improved measurably. Having said that, the BNC shares responsibility for not establishing a system of regular monitoring of project outcome indicators during the first half of the project. Because of its attachment to the Prime Minister's office, the BNC and the Management Committee was, in theory, well-placed to ensure that the Road Maintenance Fund was set up in conformity with the original Letter of Development Policy and implemented in conformity with its establishing articles. However, it was not able to play this role as envisioned, as evidenced by the eventual reversal of the original approach.

5.4 Costs and financing:Information on project costs and financing is included in the Annexes.

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6. Sustainability

6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating:The project’s sustainability rating is unlikely, because of the poor prospects for achieving sustainable and reliable road maintenance financing in the foreseeable future. A field visit in June 2003 of a sample of Phase 1 PRIT roads revealed that these roads are beginning to deteriorate due to a lack of adequate routine maintenance over the last two years. From an institutional point of view, the PRIT has created a road maintenance, management and financing organization under the Road Maintenance Directorate and the Road Maintenance Fund, as well as the emerging private sector capacity in construction and engineering. However, this capacity is bound to be under-utilized because of: the lack of a reliable and adequate financing system, as noted above. Clearly, the vicious cycle of poor maintenance funding and asset deterioration is continuing apace. The temporary solution proposed by the EU is to condition its budgetary support and funding for major rehabilitation on the Treasury’s deposits of the full programmed amounts to the Road Maintenance Fund. This "forced approach" may have some success during the years in which it is actually applied. However, given the inevitable cross-pressures and priorities faced by public finance, this has the potential to provoke repeated crisis situations with the donor, while holding hostage important periodic maintenance work on the network, thus engendering further asset deterioration and higher maintenance costs.

6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:The PRIT has laid the foundation for the development of a new “public works economy,” within which a set of public and private actors adequately play, and are held accountable for, their respective roles (finance/oversight; planning/management/supervision; and execution) in road network management and maintenance and in road transport. However, these institutions depend on a steady source of financing, both from local and donor sources. The new CAS does not include lending for a follow-on transport project, in light of constraints on future IDA lending, and because of priority given to other sectors. Although the European Union and AFD remain actively engaged in Niger's transport sector, it is however unclear if they will be able to provide adequate policy support.

7. Bank and Borrower Performance

Bank7.1 Lending:Bank lending performance was satisfactory, although marginally so. Project identification was responsive to Government priorities at the time. Bank personnel worked closely with the borrower in all aspects of preparation, including identifying key sector reforms to be pursued during the project and formulating a detailed implementation plan. The Staff Appraisal Report correctly identified the risks associated with reform and counterpart funding. However, in its effort to be responsive and very thorough, the preparation team included a relatively large number of individual and wide-ranging activities (mostly studies) into some project components. Although basically all of those studies were carried out, it was probably too optimistic to assume that the Government would be able to absorb the results of some of those studies and translate their recommendations into concrete actions and implementation measures. The declining fiscal situation and limited donor support during the life of the project made it impossible to finance certain planned investments for which studies were carried out.

7.2 Supervision:Bank supervision was satisfactory during most of the project period, with the exception of the year before the mid-term review. Given the identified risks, early Bank supervision missions carefully monitored the counterpart funding situation and proactively sought to solve key problems, particularly easing the transition to contractor-based road maintenance. From 2000 onwards, when the Road Maintenance Fund

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should have been fully functional, PSRs and mission Aide Memoires highlighted the Government’s delays in implementing some aspects of the Road Maintenance Fund law. However, the PSRs contain no information on performance indicators until 2000, and until then supervision missions did not work with the Coordination Office to set up an adequate monitoring and evaluation system, which was only addressed following the mid-term review. During a certain period before the mid-term review, implementation progress and relations between Bank staff and the Government reached a low point, due principally to: (i) long delays by Bank staff in responding to requests for non-objections which led to important implementation delays; and (ii) a tendency by Bank staff to deal directly with General Directorate of Public Works on important matters, without informing the Project Coordination Office or the Project Steering Committee. This led to a written complaint by the Prime Minister to the Bank. These supervision problems were corrected at the mid-term review (change of Task Manager), and since then, project activities progressed very well and relations between project staff at the Bank and the Government markedly improved, as demonstrated by another letter to the Bank by the Prime Minister.

7.3 Overall Bank performance:Overall, Bank performance is considered satisfactory, although marginally so. The main weaknesses were a somewhat "overloaded" project design and inadequate attention to performance indicators in the first half of project execution. Poor client relations resulted from communication problems, but these were resolved during the second half of the project and almost all project activities were successfully concluded.

Borrower7.4 Preparation:Government preparation performance was satisfactory. The BNC, Directorate of Public Works and Directorate of Land Transport were all integrally involved in the preparation and negotiations. A letter of sector policy was prepared, which addressed key sector issues and the Government met effectiveness conditions five months following the signing of the DCA.

7.5 Government implementation performance:Overall implementation performance by the Government is judged satisfactory. The Government was able to implement adequately (i) several important reforms related to road maintenance institutions and practices and road transport services, and (ii) physical road rehabilitation works. However, these accomplishments are diminished by Government’s failure to implement the financing arrangements of the Road Maintenance Fund, in conformity with its original articles, and the Government's outright rejection of these principles towards the end of the project in early 2003.

7.6 Implementing Agency:Implementation performance of the BNC is satisfactory. Although the coordination office was understaffed until just before the mid-term review, it nevertheless managed to achieve an acceptable performance in financial management and reporting. Additional staff hired after the mid-term review has helped to improve the BNC's capacity considerably. A shortcoming has been the failure to establish a complete and effective monitoring and evaluation system of sector performance, based on indicators agreed during the negotiations.

7.7 Overall Borrower performance:Overall borrower performance is, on balance, considered unsatisfactory. Although the Borrower should be given credit for general project implementation and for making major strides in changing the basic institutional landscape for road and road transport sector management, the lack of following up on an important political commitment and implementing certain aspects of the existing legislation, both concerning road maintenance financing, made it impossible to attain the main development objective of the project and assure sustainability of Niger's road network, which is among the country's largest assets.

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8. Lessons Learned

The first lesson is that if a policy change by law is required as a condition of project effectiveness, the laws which are decided under those conditions are not necessarily implemented.

The second lesson is that even if a firm and sincere political commitment by the Government exists at the time of appraisal, a change of key politicians (ministers) in the Government, and a deterioration of the macroeconomic situation may result in a non-adherence to earlier commitments.

In the same line of thought, one could say that when fundamental sector reform is at play, one should resist the temptation to address too many other issues at the same time. Since the Government's project staff seems to have been extremely busy with the plethora of studies (not only in Transport, but also in Urban development during the first half), it was not always able to devote adequate attention and resources to quality control and the absorption of recommendations made in the studies by the agencies concerned. Also, the Government's project staff did not have sufficient political weight to ensure the practical implementation of the most fundamental and difficult reform of all: putting in place a reliable system for road maintenance financing. This in spite of the fact that the legal basis for the reform was there (Road Maintenance Fund Law). This experience also suggests that it is not realistic to expect that such a new concept can be adequately established with only minimal technical assistance (such as elaboration of the texts and operations manual) and be fully functional within the span of a single investment project. Rather, a continued and intense program of technical assistance would have been needed to “iron out” the inevitable problems that arise during the formative stages of such reforms. Unfortunately, the CAS does not allow for that continuity.

Finally, even if a consensus between various donors and the Government exists concerning a planned policy change, this consensus may subsequently fall apart if the policy stance of the donors concerned evolves; the latter being triggered often by staff rotation. This problem has been observed in several recent cases in Africa and elsewhere, and has been particularly pointed out in the Niger case. Governments can easily exploit differences of opinion between donors, and are sometime caught in conflicting demands by different donors.

9. Partner Comments

(a) Borrower/implementing agency:The implementing agency and members of the PRIT Steering Committee feel that the project was a success in initiating and achieving several politically difficult reforms, which the Government could simply not have accomplished alone and without this project. There is however, a general agreement that the still unresolved issue of direct collection of user fees by the Road Maintenance Fund is at the crux of realizing the full benefit of the otherwise successful reform of road maintenance. Particular compliments were paid by the Government to the Bank's Task Manager during the second half of the project.

(b) Cofinanciers:AFD is cofinancing the study for concession of the Niger-Benin rail services. It expresses satisfaction with progress for this study, albeit with previous delays. AFD is also providing direct financial assistance to the Road Maintenance Fund and will continue to take an active interest in its management. AFD expressed its support in principle for the Second Generation Road Maintenance Fund. It is however not willing at this time to make its support contingent to the full implementation of the Road Maintenance Fund Law.

(c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector):Discussions with the private sector (SMEs and consultants) revealed that this group of economic actors

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actually and literally owes its existence to the PRIT, and that a number of initial problems associated with qualifications and contract management by the Public Works General Directorate are being ironed out.

The Government has prepared its own Implementaiton Completion Report, which is included in Annex 7.

10. Additional Information

N/A

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Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

Outcome / Impact Indicators:

Indicator/Matrix

Projected in last PSR1

Actual/Latest Estimate

Percentage of roads and quality mark > 12 at end or 2001.

Data collection underway. Paved: (T>250 veh/day) 46% Earth: (T>50 veh/day) 28% Rural: (T>25 veh/day) 37%

Index of VOC in 2001 (100 in 1997)Paved: 99; Earth 89; Rural: 94

Data collection underway. Not available

Creation of public works equipment rental company with private operators

Completed. Restructured to semi-private company; registered 9/2002.

Execution ratio of road maintenance program above 80%

Ongoing. 2001: 74% 2002: 45%

Discounted value at 12% of benefits for civil works included in project >0

100%

Output Indicators:

Indicator/Matrix

Projected in last PSR1

Actual/Latest Estimate

Creation of Road Maintenance Fund Completed Created 11/99; operational 8/2001

Restructuring of DTP Completed. Restructured and convered to DGTP 2/1999; retrenchment plan completed 5/2000.

Restructuring of the Road Laboratory Completed. Restructured to semi-private company; registered 9/2003.

State disengagement of road maintenance execution, except in unsafe areas.

Completed in all areas of the country. Completed in all areas of the country, as of 5/2000.

1 End of project

Additional Project and Sector Indicators Agreed at Negotiations:

Indicator Target Value/Date

Actual/Latest Estimate

Road Maintenance:Average overrun on cost of road maintenance contracts (CAFER)

N/A No overruns in 2001 and 2002

Average delays in contract execution (CAFER) N/A No delays in 2001 and 2002Average time of payment of the contractors (CAFER) N/A 7 to 15 days in 2001; 30 to 45 days in 2002Ratio of national enterprises contracted out (CAFER) N/A 100% in 2001; 64% in 2002 (international contract for

urban roads)Kilometers of roads actually regravelled compared to estimation

1,060 km 545 full regravelling890 spot improvementPaved network spot improvements

Works cost compared to estimation at appraisal $ 20.891 millionRoad Transport:Evolution of vehicles’ age and condition See tableAxle loads of trucks Two axle load control stations functional on Benin-Niger

corridor. One station under construction on Niamey-Dosso Road and two stations on Niamey –Burina Faso planned (EU financing). No other stations are functional.

Project Management:Average time between launching of bids and bid opening (engineering studies & works)

N/A 8 weeks

Average time between bid opening and awards N/A 13 weeksAverage time between award and signing N/A 6 weeksRatio of actual disbursements versus disbursements at appraisal

N/A

Capacity Building: Ratio of local and regional consulting firms registered on short lists and awarded contracts

N/A

Number of people trained N/A

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Sector Indicators 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002Road Maintenance CAFERAmount of road maintenance budget (billion FCFA) 5.7 5.85Resources allocated to the road maintenance (billion FCFA) 3.10 3.66 3.57 4.22 4.72 3.60Amount spent on road maintenance (milliards FCFA) 3.10 3.66 2.90 0.04 1.68 2.89Resources allocated to the road sector in the PIP 1/ 20.8 12.6 7.0Execution ratios for the budget and PIPEvolution of traffic on the roads maintained by the projectAmount and number of road maintenance contracts (billiards FCFA) awarded with national budget financing

145$ 4,2 m.

63$ 2,6 m.

Percentage of budget allocated to contracts 100% 96%Arrears on contracts financed by the Road Fund (billion FCFA) 0,462 0,313TransportEvolution of road transport tariffs See

tableRestructuring of SNTN completedRoad tolls in service between Cotonou et Parakou Two

stations Functional

OCBN’s monopoly abolished Concession study in progress

Statistics on international transport See Table

1/Strategie BCEOM (12/02), p. 49

Evolution des tarifs de transports - Voyageurs (FCFA)Axes/

Transporteurs

1997-2000 2001-20021997-2000 2001-2002

1997-2000 2001-2002 1997-2000 2001-2002 1997-2000 2001-2002 % change

Niamey-Arlit (1120 km) 21850 18575 16100 17000 16100 16100 18975 16944 -11%

Niamey-Zinder (891 km) 14850 12625 11200 11900 10400 11000 12625 11681 -7%

Niamey-Ouaga (514 km) 11500 11500 7600 8100 9550 9800 3%Moyenne 16067 14233 13650 14450 11367 11733 13717 12808 -7%

Source: SNTV, EHGM, RTM

Evolution des tarifs de transports - Marchandises (FCFA)Axes/Produits

1997-2000 2001-20021997-2000 2001-2002

1997-2000 2001-2002 1997-2000 2001-2002 1997-2000 2001-2002 1997-2000 2001-2002

% change

Togolais 36281 32000 36331 32000 36373 32000 34917 32000 67954 55000 42371 36600 -14%Ghaneen 32992 29000 33079 29000 33164 29000 30578 29000 56631 65000 37289 36200 -3%Beninois 29000 29000 29000 29000 29000Moyenne 34637 30000 34705 30000 34769 30000 32748 30000 62293 60000 39830 33933 -15%

Sources: L'Observatoire National - Revue des Statistiques 1997-2000; Revue Economique 2000-2001

EHGM RTV Transporteurs ind. Moyenne

Riz Farine Sucre Friperies Prod. Chimiques Moyenne

SNTV

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IMPORTATIONS

Importations de produits par tonne par corridor - Benin1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 % Change

Cereales 46666 45000 30000 33334 40651 53715 15%Produits alimentaires 38333 50000 45000 3334 19379 24039 -37%Textiles 21667 25834 31667 31667 24920 28549 32%Materiaux de construction 11667 10000 8334 28334 16510 22706 95%Hydrocarbures 23334 23334 40000 58333 35390 34013 46%Produits chimiques 23334 21667 28333 21667 16728 2006 -91%Autres produits 23334 33334 30000 20000 22369 27084 16%Total 188335 209169 213334 196669 175947 192112 2%

Importations de produits par tonne par corridor - Togo1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 % Change

Cereales 40000 74000 34000 28000 38649 36361 -9%Produits alimentaires 36000 46000 10000 10000 12918 18376 -49%Textiles 15000 22500 10000 10000 4832 12407 -17%Materiaux de construction 14000 54000 72000 60000 73656 73120 422%Hydrocarbures 42000 72000 88000 76000 58556 69263 65%Produits chimiques 6000 14000 4000 14000 16996 18365 206%Autres produits 14000 10000 50000 22000 40857 23478 68%Total 167000 292500 268000 220000 246464 251370 51%

Importations de produits par tonne par corridor - Ghana1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 % Change

Cereales 8334 35417 41667 33334 107431 181330 2076%Produits alimentaires 16667 200000 70833 100000 103959 107132 543%Textiles 0 0 0 0 422 1007Materiaux de construction 0 2084 8334 8334 7747 11850Hydrocarbures 0 0 0 0 35390 34013Produits chimiques 12500 12500 6250 12500 4723 6280 -50%Autres produits 0 4167 8334 8334 4451 6111Total 37501 254168 135418 162502 264123 347723 827%

Importations de produits par tonne - tous corridors1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 % Change

Cereales 95000 154417 105667 94668 186731 271406 186%Produits alimentaires 91000 296000 125833 113334 136256 149547 64%Textiles 36667 48334 41667 41667 30174 41963 14%Materiaux de construction 25667 66084 88668 96668 97913 107676 320%Hydrocarbures 65334 95334 128000 134333 129336 137289 110%Produits chimiques 41834 48167 38583 48167 38447 26651 -36%Autres produits 37334 47501 88334 50334 67677 56673 52%Total 392836 755837 616752 579171 686534 791205 101%

EXPORTATIONSExportations par tonne - tous corridors

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 % ChangeOignons 36191 49748 29289 91631 81385 125%Niebe 2791 5503 7460 28543 8532 206%Arachide 889 1340 299 1260 144 -84%Uranate 5518 2153 2960 4721 -14%Autres produits vegataux 5339 2059 5057 8848Total 50728 60803 45065 130282 0 94782 87%Animaux (tetes) 477389 809963 869284 82%Animaux (tetes): % change 1999-2002

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Parc Automobile selon les categories et l'age (Niamey, 2002)

Age/Categories Moto

Voitures Particulier

esCamionne

ttes Camions

Tracteurs

routiersRemorque

s Autocars Totaux0-6 981 968 429 43 7 8 35 2471

6-11 455 1522 498 50 59 2 42 262811-16 440 7660 1047 163 253 47 661 1027116-21 797 13748 1208 285 410 299 1157 1790421-26 743 10159 1453 609 617 615 911 15107

26 a plus 92 2654 796 406 398 727 195 5268Totaux 3508 36711 5431 1556 1744 1698 3001 53649

Source: DTTMF

Evolution des tarifs de transports - Voyageurs (FCFA)Axes/Transporteurs

1997-2000 2001-2002 1997-20002001-2002

1997-2000 2001-2002

1997-2000 2001-2002

1997-2000

2001-2002 %change

Niamey-Arlit (1120 km) 21850 18575 16100 17000 16100 16100 18975 16944 -11%Niamey-Zinder (891

km) 14850 12625 11200 11900 10400 11000 12625 11681 -7%Niamey-Ouaga (514

km) 11500 11500 7600 8100 9550 9800 3%Moyenne 16067 14233 13650 14450 11367 11733 13717 12808 -7%

Source: SNTV, EHGM, RTM

Evolution des tarifs de transports - Marchandises (FCFA)Axes/Produits

1997-2000 2001-2002 1997-20002001-2002

1997-2000 2001-2002

1997-2000 2001-2002

1997-2000

2001-2002

1997-2000 2001-2002

% change

Togolais 36281 32000 36331 32000 36373 32000 34917 32000 67954 55000 42371 36600 -14%Ghaneen 32992 29000 33079 29000 33164 29000 30578 29000 56631 65000 37289 36200 -3%Beninois 29000 29000 29000 29000 29000Moyenne 34637 30000 34705 30000 34769 30000 32748 30000 62293 60000 39830 33933 -15%

Sources: L'Observatoire National - Revue des Statistiques 1997-2000; Revue Economique 2000-2001

SNTV EHGM

Riz Farine Sucre Friperies

RTV Transporteurs ind. Moyenne

MoyenneProduits Chimiques

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Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent)AppraisalEstimate

Actual/Latest Estimate

Percentage of Appraisal

Component US$ million US$ millionEarth Road Regravelling 20.89 19.47 93Improvement of Road Administration & Management 2.81 0.79 28Rural Roads 5.61 4.07 73Land Transport Department 0.67 0.85 127Environment 0.25 0.25 100Project Management 0.27 0.07 26Railway Concessioning 0.00 3.59

Total Baseline Cost 30.50 29.09Total Project Costs 30.50 29.09

Total Financing Required 30.50 29.09Totals may not add up due to rounding.

Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)

Expenditure Category ICBProcurement

NCB Method

1

Other2 N.B.F. Total Cost

1. Works 24.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 24.70(22.20) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (22.20)

2. Goods 0.35 0.25 0.20 0.00 0.80(0.35) (0.25) (0.20) (0.00) (0.80)

3. Services 0.00 0.00 4.30 0.00 4.30Technical Assistance4. Training and Seminars

(0.00) (0.00) (4.30) (0.00) (4.30)

5. Operating Costs 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.10(0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.10)

6. PPF Refinancing 0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.60(0.60)

0.00(0.00)

0.60(0.60)

7. Severance Payments 0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

Total 25.05 0.25 5.20 0.00 30.50(22.55) (0.25) (5.20) (0.00) (28.00)

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Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent)

Expenditure Category ICBProcurement

NCB Method

1

Other2 N.B.F. Total Cost

1. Works 9.12 10.98 0.00 0.00 20.10(7.58) (8.96) (0.00) (0.00) (16.54)

2. Goods 0.59 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.67(0.59) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.67)

3. Services 0.00 0.00 5.90 0.00 5.90Technical Assistance4. Training and Seminars

(0.00) (0.00) (5.90) (0.00) (5.90)

5. Operating Costs 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.38(0.00) (0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.36)

6. PPF Refinancing 0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

0.40(0.40)

0.00(0.00)

0.40(0.40)

7. Severance Payments 0.00(0.00)

0.00(0.00)

3.05(3.05)

0.00(0.00)

3.05(3.05)

Total 9.71 10.98 9.81 0.00 30.50(8.17) (8.96) (9.79) (0.00) (26.92)

Figures in total may not add up due to rounding.1/ Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the IDA Credit. All costs include contingencies.2/ Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff

of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units.

Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent)

Component Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest EstimatePercentage of Appraisal

IDA Govt. CoF. IDA Govt. CoF. IDA Govt. CoF.Earth Road Regravelling 18.90 1.99 17.70 1.79 93.7 89.9Improvement of Road Administration & Management

2.79 0.00 0.77 0.02 27.6 0.0

Rural Roads 5.14 0.48 3.72 0.35 72.4 72.9Land Transport Department

0.66 0.01 0.84 0.01 127.3 100.0

Environment 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.00 100.0 0.0Project Management 0.26 0.01 0.05 0.00 19.2 0.0Railway Concessioning 0.00 0.00 3.59 0.00 0.0 0.0

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Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits

During appraisal, the economic evaluation of the project was limited to the physical investments in road works, and the same approach is used under the ICR. A comparison was made between the rates of return for investments (ERR) projected at appraisal, with the actual rates of return based on known investment costs and traffic figures at the end of the project. The results are presented further below.

The investments financed under the project were for periodic maintenance / rehabilitation of existing earth roads. The economic evaluation normally covers both the initial investment for periodic maintenance / rehabilitation, plus the annual routine maintenance during the evaluation period. In this context, the life cycle of the investment made in periodic maintenance / rehabilitation is defined as the time until the next periodic maintenance or rehabilitation is due, and for the roads in question, the assumption is that periodic maintenance needs to be done every five years. Thus, the time period to assess the economic rate of return for the investments made in this project is five years. The ICR mission showed however that on the 6 roads analyzed, little or no routine maintenance was actually carried out since the rehabilitation works, and the annual routine maintenance costs were therefore zero. Calculations of net present value (NPV) and economic rate of return (ERR) were based on actual costs (contract values for works and supervision) and actual traffic data based on traffic counts for the five year period.

The ex-post evaluation of economic benefits of the Earth Roads component was carried out using the Roads Economic Decision Model (RED) developed by the World Bank. The RED model is designed for low-volume roads such as the project roads in Niger. It is able to compensate for the scarcity of reliable data, normally needed for a full-fledged economic evaluation using the HDM model. Given data on the road conditions, vehicle fleet characteristics, travel speeds and vehicle operating costs, the RED model computes a series of roughness versus vehicle operating cost (VOC) relationships by interpolating polynomial functions of the above characteristics. These functions allow the estimation of VOC and roughness in the “before project” situation, by entering the known average speed of vehicles on these roads.

For the “with project” situation, the road and traffic characteristics were taken from information provided by the Ministry of Public Works Road data base. However, the information provided for some of the project roads seemed unrealistic, and it was decided to analyze only those roads for which reliable data is available. These were only for four of the six Phase 1 roads and two of the thirteen roads included in Phase 2. The economic analysis was thus carried out for the following roads:

Phase Road Length (km)Kadata-Kornaka 60Tera-Yatakala 116

Teberam-Badaguichiri 150

Phase 1

Tikim-Adaré 78Keita-RN25pk22 54Phase 2Tchadoua-Mayahi 53Total 511

In all of the 6 cases, the roads were in extremely poor condition and almost impassable for part of the year before the investment. For this reason, the investment had the effect of releasing a vital constraint, leading to a relatively large increase in traffic immediately following the works, especially on those roads carrying international traffic (particularly Tera-Yatakala and Tikim-Adaré which are respectively on the Burkina

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Faso and Nigerian borders). It is expected however, that this traffic will level off beyond the initial period of analysis. Investment costs per kilometer ranged from US$ 5,085 to US$ 19,436, with an average of US$ 14,900 on Phase I roads and US$ 6,900 on Phase II roads which used the "spot improvement" approach. The analysis showed that all the roads had positive NPVs at a 12% discount rate, with the rates of return ranging from 45 % to 119 %. The sensitivity analyses shows that NPV would be positive even if one assumes a 25 % lower traffic level, and that traffic levels would have to be from 50 % to 80 % lower to arrive at a zero NPV. The economic analysis shows that, within the five year periodic maintenance life cycle, periodic maintenance investments on the earth roads had relatively high rates of return, largely because initial conditions were extremely bad. However, even though road conditions are today still much better than before the investment, they are steadily declining due to lack of routine maintenance. It is clear that rates of return would be even higher if routine maintenance would have been carried out.

Main Assumptions

General:The basic approach taken in this analysis is that investments made on existing earth roads essentially involve periodic maintenance, and that the economic evaluation is therefore assessing the maintenance strategy on these roads. In this context, the life cycle of the investment is defined as the time until the next periodic maintenance after the investment. For the roads in question, the assumption is that periodic maintenance would occur every five years. Based on this, the time period to assess the real economic return for investments made is assumed to be five years.

Traffic estimates:Traffic counts have been carried out by the Ministry of Public Works on a sporadic basis since 1985, from which annual daily traffic levels were derived. For the six roads, all built in 1999 (Phase 1) and 2000 (Phase 2), traffic data was available for either 1997, 1998 or 1999, and 2002. This provided a means to estimate the level of traffic before and after the works. For most of these roads, the investment released a vital constraint, leading to a relatively large increase in traffic immediately following the investment, especially on those roads carrying international traffic (particularly Tera-Yatakala and Tikim-Adaré which are respectively on the Burkina Faso and Nigerian borders). It is expected however, that this traffic will level off beyond the initial period of analysis. The table below summarizes the reported and estimated daily traffic levels.

Before: End of Period:

1997/1998/1999 2003Kadata-Kornaka 74 199Tera-Yatakala 49 303Teberam-Badaguichiri 110 152Tikim-Adaré 39 276Keita-RN25pk22 98 312Tchadoua-Mayahi 51 106

Annual Average Daily Traffic (vehicles/day)

Road

Phase 2

Phase 1

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Cost Estimates:The investment costs used in the analysis were based on the actual costs of rehabilitation, including design and supervision, but excluding taxes. There was little or no annual routine maintenance on the six roads analyzed, and the annual routine maintenance costs are therefore estimated to be zero.

Road RoughnessBased on the initial road conditions, it was estimated that the international road index for road roughness (IRI) was, on the average, 15 before the works. After the works, the IRI was estimated to be 5 for Phase 1 roads (full rehabilitation) and 7 for Phase 2 roads (less complete rehabilitation and spot improvements.

Results

User impact (VOC and Time savings):Attachment 1 summarizes the results of the analysis of benefits, quantified in terms of savings in vehicle operating costs (VOC) and time for two roads – one from Phase 1 (Kadata-Kornaka road) and one from Phase 2 (Tchadoua-Mayahi road), which are typical of the results for all the roads in each phase. The weighted average road user savings (VOC + time) for all vehicle types was 37% on the Phase 1 road and 31% on the Phase 2 road. For Phase 1 roads, VOC were reduced by 40% and time was reduced by 25%, while VOC and time savings on the Phase 2 road were reduced by 34% and 25% respectively.

Project Investment CostsThe actual project cost includes the cost of design, supervision and construction. This is shown in the table below. Average cost per km were about 50% less for Phase 2 roads, which used the spot improvement method.

Road Length (km)

Investment Cost (US$)

Investment Cost/km (US$)

Kadata-Kornaka 60 764,407 12,740Tera-Yatakala 116 2,254,549 19,436

Teberam-Badaguichiri 150 2,033,173 13,554

Phase 1

Tikim-Adaré 78 993,729 12,740Keita-RN25pk22 54 466,745 8,612Phase 2Tchadoua-Mayahi 53 271,555 5,085

All roads 511 6,784,158 13,276

Net Present Value (NPV) and Internal Rate of Return (IRR):The net present value and internal rates of return were calculated for both traffic scenarios. Financial benefits and costs were converted to economic values using a conversion factor of 85%. The IRRs are rather high, ranging from 45% to 119%, with the net present value ranging from US$ 482,000 to US$ 2,4 million.

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Road NPV at 12% (US$

M)IRR

Phase 1 Kadata-Kornaka 1.109 70%Tera-Yatakala 1.966 45%

Teberam-Badaguichiri 2.400 66%Tikim-Adaré 1.057 47%

Phase 2 Keita-RN25pk22 1.558 119%Tchadoua-Mayahi 0.482 83%

Sensitivity analysis:Although the analysis was carried out using actual cost and traffic data, a sensitivity analysis was carried out, to test the impact of possible variations in actual traffic. This analysis, summarized in the table below, shows that even if observed traffic levels were 25% less, NPVs are still positive at 12% discount rate. An assessment of the switching values reveals that observed traffic levels would have to be from 50 to 80 percent lower to reach an NPV of zero. Details are provided in Attachments 2 and 3.

Base Normal Traffic -25%Road NPV at 12% (US$ M) ERR

Phase 1 Kadata-Kornaka 1.509 51%Tera-Yatakala 2.862 31%

Teberam-Badaguichiri 4.417 31%Tikim-Adaré 1.532 33%

Phase 2 Keita-RN25pk22 2.518 107%Tchadoua-Mayahi 0.806 71%

Conclusion

The economic analysis shows that, within the five year life cycle for periodic maintenance / rehabilitation on earth roads, investments for such periodic maintenance under the project had relatively high rates of return, largely because initial conditions were extremely bad. However, even though road conditions are still much better than before the investment, they are today steadily declining due to lack of routine maintenance, which means that the sustainability of the investments is at best uncertain.

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Attachment 1: Estimated Economic Savings Resulting from Road Improvement:1-Kadata-Kornaka road (Phase 1):

VOC Time Total VOC Time Total VOC Time Total VOC Time TotalCar -45% 12.99 4.31 17.3 6.28 3.21 9.49 -6.71 -1.1 -7.81 -52% -25% -45%Light bus -35% 20.27 8.34 28.61 12.77 5.8 18.57 -7.5 -2.54 -10.04 -37% -30% -35%Light truck

-39% 26.6 0 26.6 16.22 0 16.22 -10.38 0 -10.38 -39% 0% -39%

Medium truck

-43% 40.11 0 40.11 22.72 0 22.72 -17.39 0 -17.39 -43% 0% -43%

Heavy truck

-34% 35.63 0 35.63 23.37 0 23.37 -12.26 0 -12.26 -34% 0% -34%

Economic R.U.C. Savings

(%)

Financial Unit Trip Costs ($/veh-trip) (1999 dollars)

Without Project With Project Variation

2-Tchadoua-Mayahi road (Phase 2):

VOC Time Total VOC Time Total VOC Time Total VOC Time TotalCar -39% 11.56 3.84 15.4 6.44 2.95 9.38 -5.12 -0.89 -6.02 -44% -23% -39%Light bus -31% 18.04 7.42 25.46 12.14 5.38 17.52 -5.89 -2.05 -7.94 -33% -28% -31%Light truck

-32% 23.68 0 23.68 16.08 0 16.08 -7.6 0 -7.6 -32% 0% -32%

Medium truck

-36% 35.7 0 35.7 22.84 0 22.84 -12.86 0 -12.86 -36% 0% -36%

Heavy truck

-28% 31.72 0 31.72 22.77 0 22.77 -8.95 0 -8.95 -28% 0% -28%

Economic R.U.C. Savings

(%)

Financial Unit Trip Costs ($/veh-trip) (1999 dollars)

Without Project With Project Variation

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Attachment 2: Sensitivity Analysis and Switching values:

Multi-plier Factor

Net Present Value (US$ M)

IRR (%)

Equivalent Annual NetBenefits ($/km)

IRR (%)

Multi-plier Factor

Net Present Value (US$ M)

IRR (%)

Equivalent Annual NetBenefits ($/km)

IRR (%)

Base Case:1-Kadata-Kornaka 1.109 70% 4576 44% 1.109 70% 4576 44%2-Tera-Yatakala 1.966 45% 4198 34% 1.966 45% 4198 34%3-Tebaram-Badaguichiri 2.4 66% 3964 39% 2.4 66% 3964 39%4-Tikim-Adaré 1.057 47% 3355 37% 1.057 47% 3355 37%5-Keita-RN25pk22 1.558 119% 7118 67% 1.558 119% 7118 67%6-Tchadoua-Mayahi 0.482 83% 2237 48% 0.482 83% 2237 48%Sensitivity Cases :

1-Kadata-KornakaBase Normal Traffic 0.75 0.708 51% 2921 35% 1.25 1.509 87% 6231 51%Normal Traffic Growth Rate 0.75 0.87 61% 3593 39% 1.25 1.382 79% 5706 49%2-Tera-YatakalaBase Normal Traffic 0.75 1.07 31% 2285 25% 1.25 2.862 57% 6111 41%Normal Traffic Growth Rate 0.75 1.035 32% 2210 25% 1.25 3.197 59% 6826 43%

3-Tebaram-BadaguichiriBase Normal Traffic 0.75 1.968 31% 2074 22% 1.25 4417 48% 4653 29%

Normal Traffic Growth Rate 0.75 2.038 33% 2147 22% 1.25 4681 47% 4931 30%4-Tikim-AdaréBase Normal Traffic 0.75 0.581 33% 1846 28% 1.25 1532 60% 4864 45%Normal Traffic Growth Rate 0.75 0.412 29% 1309 24% 1.25 2121 68% 6734 53%5-Keita-RN25pk22Base Normal Traffic 0.75 1.069 91% 4886 55% 1.25 2.046 146% 9351 76%Normal Traffic Growth Rate 0.75 1.168 103% 5339 58% 1.25 2.058 137% 9403 77%

6-Tchadoua-MayahiBase Normal Traffic 0.75 0.304 60% 1410 38% 1.25 0.806 123% 3741 63%

Normal Traffic Growth Rate 0.75 0.403 75% 1868 44% 1.25 0.57 92% 2645 53%

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Attachment 3: Switching values:

Value Factor Change1-Kadata-KornakaBase Normal Traffic (veh/day) 74 23 0.31 -69%Normal Traffic Growth Rate % 5.30% -3.90% -0.73 -172.52-Tera-YatakalaBase Normal Traffic (veh/day) 49 22 0.45 -54.90%Normal Traffic Growth Rate % 10.10% 3.50% 0.34 -65.60%3-Tebaram-BadaguichiriBase Normal Traffic (veh/day) 110 39 0.36 -64.20%Normal Traffic Growth Rate % 1.70% -9.20% -5.36 -636.50%4-Tikim-AdaréBase Normal Traffic (veh/day) 39 17 0.44 -55.60%Normal Traffic Growth Rate % 10.80% 5% 0.46 -54.20%5-Keita-RN25pk22Base Normal Traffic (veh/day) 98 20 0.2 -79.70%Normal Traffic Growth Rate % 6.30% -6.40% -1.01 -201.40%6-Tchadoua-MayahiBase Normal Traffic (veh/day) 51 17 0.32 -67.60%Normal Traffic Growth Rate % 3.90% -4.80% -1.23 -222.70%

Base Case Value

Case that Yields Net Present Value = 0

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Annex 4. Bank Inputs

(a) Missions:Stage of Project Cycle Performance Rating No. of Persons and Specialty

(e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.)Month/Year Count Specialty

ImplementationProgress

DevelopmentObjective

Identification/Preparation10/1996, 12/1996,

5 TEAM LEADER/TRANSPORT ECONOMIST (1); TRANSPORT ECONOMIST (1); HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1); ENVIRONMENAL SPECIALIST (1); RESEARCH ASSISTANT (1)

Appraisal/Negotiation04/1997 5 TEAM LEADER/

TRANSPORT ECONOMIST (1); TRANSPORT ECONOMIST (1); HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1); ENVIRONMENAL SPECIALIST (1); RESEARCH ASSISTANT (1)

11/1997 4 TEAM LEADER/ TRANSPORT ECONOMIST (1); LEGAL SPECIALIST (1); DISBURSEMENT SPECIALIT (1); PROGRAM ASSISTANT (1)

Supervision02/18/1998 3 SNR. TRANS.

ECONOMIST (1); ROAD ENGINEER (1); FINANCIAL ANALYST (1)

S S

07/07/1998 2 SNR. TRANS. ECONOMIST (1); ROAD ENGINEER (1)

S S

04/07/1999 5 TRANSPORT ECONOMIST (1); ECONOMIST (1); SPECIALIST OF ENVIRONM (1); RURAL ROAD SPECIALIST (1); FINANCIAL ANALYST (1)

S U

06/18/1999 4 SENIOR ECONOMIST (1); OPERATION OFFICER (1); ECONOMIST (1); RURAL SPECIALIST (1)

S U

03/10/2000 6 OPERATION OFFICER (1); ECONOMIST (1); FINANCIAL ANALYST (1); SOCIAL DEVEVELOPMENT SPEC. (1); INFORMATION SPECIALIST

S S

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(1); STAFF ASSISTANT (1)05/19/2000 4 TASK TEAM LEADER (1);

TEAM MEMBER (1); URBAN TRANSP.SPECIAL. (1); HIGHWAYS ENGINEER (1)

S S

08/21/2000 3 OPERATIONAL OFFICER (1); RURAL SPECIALIST (1); RURAL TRANS. SPECIALIS (1)

S U

06/18/2001 8 TASK TEAM LEADER (1); STAFF ASSISTANT (2) SR. HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1); SR. TRANSPORT SPECIALIST (1); SENIOR TRANSPORT ECONOMIST (1); HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1); SENIOR OPERATIONS OFFICER (1)

S S

12/07/2001 6 TASK TEAM LEADER (1); STAFF ASSISTANT (2); HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1); PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST (1); FINANCE SPECIALIST (1)

03/03/2002 2 RURAL TRANSPORT SPECIALIST (1); OPERATIONAL OFFICER (1)

S S

07/16/2002 2 HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1); STAFF ASSISTANT (1)

S S

02/28/2003 7 TASK TEAM LEADER (1); STAFF ASSISTANT (2); HIGHWAY ENGINEER (1); ENGINEER/INTERN (1); PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST (1); FINANCE SPECIALIST (1)

S S

ICR06/13/2003 1 ECONOMIST (1) S U

(b) Staff:

Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest EstimateNo. Staff weeks US$ ('000)

Identification/Preparation 49.4 177.6Appraisal/Negotiation 9.5 42.0Supervision 185.9 478.0ICR 5 30.0Total 249.8 727.6

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Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)

RatingMacro policies H SU M N NASector Policies H SU M N NAPhysical H SU M N NAFinancial H SU M N NAInstitutional Development H SU M N NAEnvironmental H SU M N NA

SocialPoverty Reduction H SU M N NAGender H SU M N NAOther (Please specify) H SU M N NA

Private sector development H SU M N NAPublic sector management H SU M N NAOther (Please specify) H SU M N NA

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Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

6.1 Bank performance Rating

Lending HS S U HUSupervision HS S U HUOverall HS S U HU

6.2 Borrower performance Rating

Preparation HS S U HUGovernment implementation performance HS S U HUImplementation agency performance HS S U HUOverall HS S U HU

Ratings are explained and commented in the ICR text.

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Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

This Annex presents two supporting documents:

A: Note prepared in March 2003 by European Union (EU) office in Niamey on the Niger Road Maintenance Fund

B: Borrower's contribution to ICR (Original text as received by Government, without modifications) ----------------------------------------------

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Annex 7 - A: European Union (EU) Note on Niger Road Maintenance Fund

Note sur l’entretien routier au Niger

Mars 2003

4 Principaux éléments entravent aujourd’hui encore le bon fonctionnement de la CAFER :

1) une très grande instabilité dans ses ressources : plus de 95% sont constituées de la dotation de l’Etat (qui a toujours été versée à moins de 55% de la dotation initiale) et des recettes des péages (taux de réalisation encore plus faible).

- En ce qui concerne les ressources budgétaires, la CAFER appuyée par la Banque Mondiale préconise le remplacement de la taxe sur les produits pétroliers par une redevance d’usage routier sur les produits pétroliers qui permettrait l’affectation directe des fonds collectés sur un compte de la CAFER, sans passer par le Trésor. La Délégation de la Commission européenne n’approuve pas cette méthode, principalement parce qu’elle déroge au principe d’unité de caisse qui dans un pays comme le Niger reste primordial. En effet, la situation de trésorerie et la faiblesse des recettes budgétaires sont telles qu’il n’est pas raisonnable d’exiger du gouvernement le blocage d’une partie de ses ressources sans option de reprise en cas de problèmes macroéconomiques ou de survenue d’événements exogènes pouvant déstabiliser les équilibres.- Pour ce qui est des ressources de péage, la CAFER semble vouloir dénoncer la convention avec la CCAAIN et faire un vrai appel d’offres au secteur privé. La « faisabilité politique » de la chose n’est pas garantie. Si aucune action n’est possible dans ce sens, il faudrait envisager d’activer le dispositif dont il a été question au moment de la mise en place de la CAFER, à savoir : (i) le rapprochement mensuel des données du concessionnaires à ceux de la banque de données routières, (ii) un système de contrôles inopinés au niveau des péages, (iii) un audit technique et financier de la gestion des postes de péage.

2) L’instabilité de ses ressources rend la CAFER non-autonome et très vulnérable au « chantage politique » : pour bénéficier d’une partie de sa dotation budgétaire, la CAFER est obligée de se plier à des injonctions et à remplir des missions qui ne sont pas les siennes (ex : dépenses non prévues dans le programme, ou celles qui sont tout sauf de l’entretien).

3) L’hégémonie de la DGTP sur la CAFER : elle fait la programmation, lance les marchés, engage les montants et gère les marchés, sans réelle communication avec la CAFER. Cette déconnexion amène à engager des ressources qui n’existent pas toujours, avec pour conséquence entre autres l’accumulation des arriérés de paiement (et donc une perte de confiance des PME) et le report sur l’exercice prochain du gap de financement constaté sur l’année en cours.

4) Les textes régissant la CAFER présentent certaines lacunes et imprécisions, notamment en ce qui concerne le rôle des différentes tutelles, la nature des travaux à réaliser, la part à affecter à la voirie urbaine, les frais de fonctionnement de la CAFER, la rémunération de la DGTP.

La Banque Mondiale propose l’amendement de ces textes législatifs, pour tenter d’améliorer le

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fonctionnement de la CAFER.

Les options de la DCE sur l’entretien routier

Les interventions de la DCE sur le secteur routier sont très importantes : 35.000.000 € environ ont été mis sur le 8ème FED et 84.000.000 € sur le 9ème où le transport est un secteur prioritaire. Ces chiffres concernent les interventions sur programme indicatif national. Des financement existent également sur programme indicatif régional.

Les actions de réhabilitation et d’entretien périodique financés au Niger par l’UE visent à mettre un frein à l’évolution accélérée des dégradations du réseau routier. Pour ce faire, la Délégation doit également s’assurer (1) que le gouvernement s’acquitte de ses engagements budgétaires en matière d’entretien courant, (2) que ces allocations augmentent dans le temps.

La DCE agit alors à travers :

- l’appui budgétaireSur un programme en cours d’appui au budget de l’Etat de 20.000.000 € en 2 tranches, la mise à disposition de la CAFER de sa dotation budgétaire 2002 a été mise comme une conditionnalité au versement de la 2nde tranche.

Sur un programme triennal d’appui au budget de l’Etat de 90.000.000 € en préparation, la Commission se propose d’inclure 2 indicateurs finances publiques relatifs à l’entretien routier : le montant de la dotation budgétaire et la part réelle des fonds transférés. La libération d’un certain montant de l’appui budgétaire serait assujetti à la réalisation de ces indicateurs.

- le programme transportLe programme transport 9ème FED de 84.000.000 € est en cours de préparation et commencera probablement en 2004. Il consistera essentiellement en la réhabilitation de routes primaires classées prioritaires par l’UEMOA, en un appui au programme d’entretien périodique dans le cadre de la stratégie d’entretien réalisée en 2002, et en la construction de pistes rurales dans les zones minières ou à potentiel minier.

Des indicateurs et mesures seront certainement identifiés notamment relatifs à la CAFER, et mis en conditionnalités dans le programme, sous une forme et à des nivaux qui restent à déterminer. Le but étant la consolidation des résultats de la reforme de l’entretien routier notamment en matière de régularisation et d’augmentation des ressources de la CAFER, de renforcement du Conseil des Routes, d’une gestion technique et administrative autonome, d’une définition dans les normes d’un programme annuel pour l’entretien courant et périodique, d’un suivi régulier de l’état du réseau.

La DCE préconise également :

- la mobilisation d’une portion des ressources PPTE, après l’atteinte du point d’achèvement en 2004, pour accroître les fonds réservés à l’entretien routier et financer la stratégie du sous-secteur routier actuellement en définition par les autorités nationales. L’entretien routier s’inscrit parfaitement dans la stratégie de lutte contre la pauvreté dans ses différents aspects :

- 34 -

(1) accès aux services de base : 70% des routes en terre sont actuellement dans un état mauvais ou très mauvais. Leur entretien permettrait d’améliorer la mobilité des populations pauvres : accès aux centres de santé, aux écoles, aux autres centres sociaux. (2) recherche de croissance soutenue / développement des secteurs productifs : création d’emploi et de revenu dans le secteur du BTP et des activités connexes, réduction des coûts de transport.

Les fonds disponibles au titre de l’initiative PPTE, qui seront de l’ordre de 40 milliards FCFA par an après l’atteinte du point d’achèvement, ne pourront pas être absorbés par les secteurs aujourd’hui ciblés, à savoir la santé et éducation.

A ce niveau, une position commune et une action concertée des principaux bailleurs (IBW-FR-UE) est nécessaire pour amener le gouvernement à consacrer une partie des ressources PPTE à ce but, en plus de la dotation actuelle.

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Annex 7 - B Borrower's Contribution to ICR

REPUBLIQUE DU NIGER

CABINET DU PREMIER MINISTREBUREAU NATIONAL DE COORDINATION

PROJET DE REHABILITATION DES INFRASTRUCTURES DE TRANSPORT

Crédit 3026-NIR

RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT DE L'EMPRUNTEUR

Juillet 2003PRIT :Crédit 3026 NIR

- 36 -

RAPPORT D'ACHEVEMENT DE L'EMPRUNTEUR

SOMMAIRE

1 bilan général ………………………………………………………………………..............… 32 objectifs et composantes du projet………………………………………………..............… 3 2.1 le contexte initial ...........................…………………………………….....….................…… 3 2.2 les objectifs .............................................................................................................................. 32.3 les composantes ................................................................................................................... 33 déroulement et évènements majeurs ................................................................................ 43.1 la mise en vigueur ................................................................................................................... 43.2 la revue à mi-parcours .......................................................................................................... 43.3 le report de la date d'achèvement du projet ....................................................................... 43.4 l'exécution financière du crédit .................................................................................................. 44 exécution des composantes ……………………………………………………………..… 54.1 les travaux d'entretien routier……………………………………………………………… 5 4.1.1 la première phase des travaux …………………………………...........………………... 5 4.1.2 la deuxième phase des travaux ……………………………………………….....……... 5 4.1.3 les travaux d'urgence…………………………………………………………..………… 54.2 le projet pilote de contruction des routes rurales…………………………....…………… 54.3 les réformes institutionnelles………………………………………………………………5 4.3.1 la gestion de l'entretien routier………………………………………………………….… 5

4.3.1.1 la mise en place du Caisse Autonome pour le Financement de l'Entretien Routier 54.3.1.2 la restructuration de la Direction des Travaux Publics ……………..………… 54.3.1.3 la privatisation de la Direction du Matériel des Travaux Publics…….............. 54.3.1.4 la restructuration du Laboratoire Nationanal des Travaux Publics ……..…… 6

4.3.2 le transport routier…………...……………………………………………………………… 64.3.2.1 la restructuration du Conseil Nigérien des Utilisateurs deTransports Publics 64.3.2.2 la restructuration de la Société Nationale des Transports Nigériens …..…… 64.3.2.3 la restructuration de l'OCBN……………………………………….....…………… 6

4.3.2 4 la réforme du cadre institutionnel…………………………………........………… 7 4.3.2.5 le tour de rôle…………………………………………………………………..…… 7 4.3.2.6 la sécurité routière………………………………………..……………………….. 7 4.3.2.7 la convention Sida-Transport……………………………..………………………. 7 4.3.2.8 les appuis institutionnels………………………………………..……………….. 74.4 l'Environnement……………………………………………………….……………………… 74.5 la gestion du projet par le Gouvernement……………………………………………..…... 7

4.5.1 le Bureau National de Coordination…………………………..………………………….... 7 4.5.2 l'exécution du projet………………………………………………………………………… 8 4.5.3 les indicateurs de performance…………………………………………………………….. 85 la gestion du projet par l'ida………………………………………………………………… 85.1 le suivi par les chargés de projet……………………………………….…………………… 85.2 les non objections……………………………………….....………………………………… 85.3 les décaissements directs………………………….............………………………...……… 85.4 le compte spécial…………………………………………………..................………….…… 86 Recommandations…………………………………………………………………………… 96.1 les travaux routiers…………………………………………………………………………… 96.2 le projet pilote routes rurales…………………………………………………………..…… 96.3 le transport routier…………………………………………………………………………… 96.4 les indicateurs de performance……………………………………………………………… 96.5 le compte spécial………………………………………………....…………………………… 96.6 le programme sectoriel des transports……………………………………………………… 10

- 37 -

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1 Biian général

Le Projet de Réhabilitation des Infrastructures de Transports (PRIT), financé par le crédit N° 3026 de l'IDA, a été conçu en 1997 comme un ensemble cohérent de réformes institutionnelles, de remise à niveau d’une partie du réseau routier non revêtu et la mise en place d’une nouvelle stratégie de construction des routes rurales avec la participation des populations bénéficiaires dans le but de préparer un projet sectoriel des transports.

1437km de routes ont été entretenues pour une prévision totale de 1060km, et des travaux d’urgence ont été exécutés relatifs à des opérations d’entretien courant et à la reprise du pont situé au PK 27 sur la route Niamey-Torodi.

La plupart des réformes institutionnelles ont été mises en place.

La stratégie de construction des routes rurales n’a pas pu être mise en place, mais la participation des populations a été effective.

2 objectifs et composantes du projet2.1 le contexte initial

Le Niger est un pays enclavé dont l’économie subit des coûts de transport élevés. Ses infrastructures routières étaient mal entretenues par manque de moyens suffisants. Les travaux d’entretien étaient effectués par la régie administrative dont l’efficacité n’était pas satisfaisante malgré l’intervention d’un premier projet sectoriel (PST Cr 1706-NIR) clos le 30 juin 1993. Aussi, le rapport d’achèvement du PST 1 (PCR, Report N° 13773 du 9 décembre 1994) a recommandé l’établissement d’une politique d’entretien routier basée sur des critères économiques, de même que le rapport d’achèvement du Projet de Routes Rurales (Cr 886-NIR , clos le 30 juin 1987, Rapport N° 7739 du 28 avril 1989) a de son côté mis l’accent sur la nécessité de résoudre le problème de l’insuffisance des ressources pour l’entretien des routes rurales. Il fallait donc stabiliser le financement de l’entretien routier auparavant pris en charge par le budget de l’Etat et soumis de ce fait au déséquilibre chronique des finances publiques.

C’est dans ce contexte que le PRIT a été préparé et mis en vigueur le 12 mai 1998.

2.2 les objectifs

Les objectifs globaux du Projet de Réhabilitation des Infrastructures de Transport étaient d’améliorer l’état du réseau routier, d’augmenter l’efficacité de l’exécution de l’entretien routier et de baisser les coûts de transport. Les moyens pour atteindre ces objectifs sont développés au niveau des composantes du projet.

2.3 les composantes

Le projet comporte six composantes :• Routes en terre : Consiste à recharger 1060 km de routes en terre, en tenant compte des plans de limitation des impacts environnementaux ;• Routes rurales : Consiste à construire, dans le cadre d’un projet pilote, 150 km de routes rurales avec la participation des populations dans le but de tester la pérennisation de l’entretien ultérieur de ces infrastructures ;• Gestion et administration de l’entretien routier : Consiste à mettre en œuvre des réformes institutionnelles dans le but de privatiser l’exécution de l’entretien routier et d’en assurer son efficacité ;• Transport routier : Consiste à libéraliser le secteur, à apporter un appui pour la préparation d’un plan d’actions dans le domaine de la sécurité routière et pour le renforcement des capacités ;• Environnement : consiste à apporter un appui institutionnel à l’Administration de l’Environnement et à limiter les effets négatifs sur l’environnement dans le cadre des réhabilitations et construction de routes;• Gestion du projet : consiste à gérer le projet conformément aux indicateurs de performance correspondants ( délais de règlement, de passations de marchés ) et à commettre des audits

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3 le déroulement chronologique et les évènements majeurs3.1 la mise en vigueur

L'accord de crédit correspondant ( 3026-NIR ) pour un montant de 20 300 000 DTS) a été signé le 8 janvier 1998 et son entrée en vigueur est intervenue le 12 mai 1998.

3.2 la revue à mi-parcours

La revue à mi-parcours du projet a eu lieu du 5 au 14 juin 2001. Après avoir constaté que le projet a couvert un champ d’action très large, il a été recentré principalement sur les travaux. Les réflexions ont porté aussi sur la préparation d’un projet sectoriel des transports.

3.3 Le report de la date d’achèvement Les difficultés rencontrées dans l’exécution de la dernière tranche des travaux routiers a conduit à proroger la date de clôture du projet. Un délai de quatre mois a été accordé, reportant ainsi la date d’achèvement du 31 janvier 2003 au 30 mai 2003.

3.4 L’exécution financière du crédit

Deux réallocation de fonds ont jalonné l’exécution du crédit. La première a été effectuée pour financer les plans sociaux de la Direction du Matériel de Travaux Publics et de la Direction des travaux Publics en ponctionnant sur la catégorie Travaux. La deuxième a été faite lors de la première mission de supervision après la revue à mi-parcours pour tenir compte de l’orientation donnée au projet.

CATEGORIES ALLOCATION INITIALE 1ère REALLOCATION 2ème REALLOCATIONMontanten DTS

répartition Montanten DTSrépartitionMontant

en DTSrépartition1.TRAVAUX 14 500 000 71,4 12 190 00060,012 760

00062,8

2. FOURNITURES 650 000 3,2 650 0003,2400 0002,0

3. SERVICES CONSULTANTS 2 700 000 13,3 2 700 00013,33 820 00018,8

4. FORMATION ET SEMINAIRE 440 000 2,2 440 0002,2470 0002,3

5.CHARGE DE FONCTIONNE-MENT ADDITIONNELLES

70 000 0,3 70 0000,3

240 0001,2

6.REMBOURSEMENTDE l’AVANCE POUR LA PREPA-RATION DU PROJET

440 000 2,2 440 0002,2

300 0001,5

7.NON AFFECTE

8.PLAN SOCIAL

1 500 000

-

7,4 1 500 000

2 310 0007,4

11,40

2 310 000-

11,4GRAND TOTAL 20 300 000 100 20 300 00010020 300

000100

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L’exécution financière du projet a nécessité aussi la révision du mode de participation de l’Etat aux financements de la composante des travaux. La répartition initiale était de 10% pour le Gouvernement et 90% pour l’IDA par rapport au montant toutes taxes comprises des travaux. L’Etat ne pouvant contribuer cash pour 10% et les travaux risquant ainsi de connaître des retards, l’IDA et le Gouvernement ont convenu d’exonérer les marchés correspondants et de comptabiliser les taxes (TVA et enregistrement) comme sa participation.

4 l'exécution des composantes4.1 les travaux routiers

4.1.1 la première phase des travaux

Elle a concerné 545 km de routes en terre qui ont été entièrement rechargées. Un groupement d’entreprises nigériennes a pu figurer parmi les entreprises adjudicatrices qui étaient donc principalement étrangères. D’autres entreprises nigériennes ont bénéficié comme sous traitantes de l’exécution de certains lots. L’exécution des travaux de la première tranche s’est faite sans dépassement de délai.

4.1.2 la deuxième phase des travaux

Elle a été basée sur la réhabilitation et le traitement de points critiques. Certaines sections ont été entièrement rechargées. Elle a été scindée en deux tranches, pour tenir compte de la capacité des entreprises nationales. La première a porté sur un linéaire de 454 km et la deuxième sur 438 km. L’exécution de la première tranche s’est faite avec des dépassements de délais importants à cause du retard mis dans l’approbation des avenants. L’exécution de la deuxième tranche a connu plus de problèmes à cause du manque de matériel de travaux publics et trois des sept marchés de travaux ont dû être résiliés. Des travaux confortatifs ont pu être effectués sur les tronçons concernés pour en améliorer la praticabilité.

4.1.3 Travaux d’urgence

En dehors de ces deux phases de travaux, le projet a financé les travaux d’urgence qu’ont nécessité les dégâts causés par la forte pluviométrie de la saison 2000. Ils ont consisté en des travaux mécanisés et travaux de point temps bitume et de protection des ouvrages, ainsi que la reprise du pont du PK27 sur la route Niamey-Torodi.

4.2 Le projet pilote de construction de routes ruralesSur 150 km prévus 117 km ont été réalisés. Les populations ont effectivement participé à toutes les phases, de l’identification à la construction . Elles ont réalisé leur part ayant consisté en des travaux de débroussaillage et de plantation d’arbres. Les travaux à l’entreprise ont été achevés à l’exception du tronçon Filingué-Chical pour lequel 11 km ont pu être réalisés sur les 17 km. Pour la phase entretien, les populations ont prévu des dispositions pour pouvoir l’assurer dans des conditions satisfaisantes. Du fait du retard enregistré dans la conduite du Projet Pilote, le suivi-évaluation par un consultant indépendant, qui aurait permis de dégager une stratégie, n’a pas pu avoir lieu. L’IDA a estimé qu’il n’était objectivement pas possible de tirer des conclusions dans les délais du PRIT.

4.3 Les réformes institutionnelles

4.3.1 La gestion et l’administration de l’entretien routier

Les réformes du secteur routier ont comme axe principal la privatisation de l’exécution de l’entretien routier et l’amélioration de son exécution.

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4.3.1.1 la restructuration de la Direction des Travaux Publics (DTP)

Auparavant la Direction des Travaux Publics remplissait 3 fonctions incompatibles : elle concevait, exécutait et contrôlait les travaux d’entretien routier si bien que l’efficacité et l’économie n’étaient pas garanties dans une situation de crise financière aiguë. Il fallait donc supprimer les brigades d’entretien routier (licenciement du personnel correspondant) et confier les travaux aux entreprises. Il fallait aussi confier la surveillance de ces travaux aux bureaux de contrôle afin que l’administration des travaux publics se concentre à sa fonction de gestion et de programmation. Cependant, à cause du caractère spécifique de l’entretien courant, l’Administration des Travaux Publics en assure toujours le contrôle et la surveillance des travaux.

Cette réforme a été conduite et achevée en 2000.

4.3.1.2 la privatisation de la Direction du Matériel des Travaux Publics (DMTP)

La restructuration de la DTP a mis fin à la régie. En conséquence, l’Etat devait se désengager de la location de matériel de travaux publics. L’opération s’est déroulée en 3 phases : le licenciement du personnel qui a nécessité l’établissement d’un plan social, le parcage du matériel et la transformation de la DMTP en Société de Location de Matériel de Travaux Publics (SLMTP), et enfin la privatisation de la SLMTP. Le processus a pris beaucoup de retard. Il n’a été dénoué que le 31 décembre 2002 avec la remise officielle de la SLMTP au repreneur stratégique.

4.3.1.3 la restructuration de la Direction du Laboratoire National des Travaux Publics et du Bâtiment (DLNT/B)

Cette réforme a aussi pris beaucoup de retard. Elle est nécessaire afin de donner au LNTP/B les moyens d’offrir un service de qualité à ses clients. Elle a été conduite à terme avec la création de la SEM Laboratoire national des Travaux Publics, l’acquisition d’un matériel technique plus performant, la mise en place d’un système de gestion informatisé et la réhabilitation des locaux. Les membres du Conseil d’Administration ont été nommés et un compte bancaire a été ouvert conformément à l’autonomie de gestion. Au stade actuel, le Laboratoire s’acquitte convenablement des prestations demandées par ses clients, et est en mesure de les améliorer avec le nouveau matériel acquis.

4.3.1.4 la création de la Caisse Autonome pour le Financement de l’Entretien Routier (CAFER)

Elle est venue couronner les réformes institutionnelles dans le secteur de l’entretien routier. Pour que cette réforme ait un sens, il a fallu d’abord supprimer la régie et confier, les travaux d’entretien aux entreprises auxquelles il faut garantir les règlements dans des délais acceptables. Elle a nécessité beaucoup de sacrifices (licenciement de plus de 2000 agents de la DTP et de la DMTP) qui ont été consentis malgré tout.

C’est ainsi que la CAFER a pu être créée en 1999 et installée effectivement en février 2001 avec le lancement

des premiers appels d’offres. Malgré la suppression de la régie, l’autonomie de la CAFER n’est pas effective. Les recettes continuent de

transiter par le circuit du Trésor National. Ainsi, pour l’exercice 2002, seul un montant correspondant à 50% du budget a été versé par le Ministère des Finances dont plus de 34% allouée à la voirie urbaine.

4.3.2 le transport routier

Les réformes institutionnelles du secteur des transports routiers ont concerné surtout la suppression des mono-poles et la révision du cadre institutionnel, avec comme conséquence la restructuration des entreprises concernées.

4.3.2.1 la restructuration du Conseil Nigérien des Utilisateurs de Transport (CNUT)

Dans le cadre de la restructuration du CNUT, la clé de répartition des cargaisons selon la règle des 40/40/20 a été abandonnée. Les chargeurs ont obtenu ainsi la liberté de choisir leur transporteur maritime. L’Observatoire

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National des Transports a été créé et logé au sein du CNUT, afin d’aider à maîtriser les statistiques et les coûts de transport.

Le CNUT intervient aussi dans la facilitation de l’acheminement des marchandises nigériennes. Une représentation majoritaire des privés en son sein lui permettrait de disposer de moyens pour accomplir cette tâche et même de permettre la diversification de ses activités. Dans cette optique la révision des statuts du CNUT a été décidée.

4.3.2.2 la restructuration de la Société Nationale des Transports Nigériens (SNTN)

La restructuration de la Société Nationale des Transports Nigériens a résulté de la suppression de son monopole sur le frêt minier et le transport des hydrocarbures, dans le but de réduire les coûts de transports de ces produits stratégiques. Il fallait alors recentrer ses activités sur le transport marchandises et la séparer des activités de transport voyageurs jugées moins rentables. La Société Nigérienne de Transport Voyageurs (SNTV) et la Société de Transport Urbain de Niamey (SOTRUNI) ont été ainsi créées et sont devenues opérationnelles.

Cette restructuration a été jugée insuffisante par le Conseil d’Administration qui a décidé de la privatiser. La loi inscrivant la SNTN sur la liste des sociétés à privatiser a été votée par l’Assemblée Nationale.

4.3.2.3 la restructuration de l’OCBN

La restructuration de l’OCBN constitue l’une des principales réformes dans le domaine des activités de transport, tout en étant aussi la plus complexe de par son caractère bi-étatique. Malgré ces contraintes, cette restructuration est à présent à un stade irréversible. Elle a été acceptée par tous les partenaires (Etats et Syndicats) Elle a été précédée par l’élaboration et l’application d’un plan de rigueur pour assainir la gestion de l’entreprise. Le processus de cette restructuration, qui consiste en la mise en concession de l’OCBN, vient d’être lancé et arrivera à terme dans un délai de 18 mois. La mise en concession de l’OCBN devrait avoir un impact positif sur les coûts et les délais de transport à destination du Niger, tout en soulageant les finances publiques des 2 Etats.

4.3.2.4 la réforme du cadre institutionnel

Une étude sur le cadre institutionnel a conduit à la proposition d’un projet de loi pour sa réforme. Le nouveau cadre permettra une exploitation plus efficace des différents modes de transport et d‘aplanir la discordance ou le vide juridique des textes actuels.

4.3.2.5 le tour de rôle

Si les résultats sont plutôt encourageants dans le transport voyageurs, ils sont plus mitigés pour le transport de marchandises. Même si le tour de rôle demeure le système en cours dans les gares, des autorisations peuvent être délivrées à tout opérateur privé pour faire des services réguliers de transport voyageurs à partir des ses propres installations.Certes le transport intérieur de marchandises n’est plus soumis au tour de rôle, mais les pesanteurs persistent au niveau du transport international. Ainsi, l’OCBN a tenté de libéraliser l’affrètement des camions à Parakou mais n’a pas pu faire aboutir cette mesure. La situation est toujours le statu quo sur les autres corridors desservant le Niger.

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4.3.2.6 la sécurité routière

Un plan d’actions pour la sécurité routière a été élaboré et a connu un début d’application avec l’installation de la base des données sur les accidents. Ce plan d’actions pourrait être efficacement utiliser pour une amélioration effective de la sécurité routière au Niger.

4.3.2.7 la convention Sida-Transport

Un programme d’intervention dans le cadre de la prévention du VHI Sida a été exécuté. Non prévu au départ, ce programme a été introduit à la revue à mi-parcours pour tenir compte que les activités du secteur des transports contribuent à la propagation du Sida. L’intervention du projet a concerné notamment l’aménagement de kiosques pour la sensibilisation dans les autogares de 5 localités ainsi que la formation de leurs gestionnaires et de leurs animateurs. Des manifestations ont été aussi organisées. Ce programme a été très important, parce que servant de trait d’union avec le MAP (Multi-country Aids Program) dans le secteur des transports.

4.3.2.8 les appuis institutionnels

Ils ont concerné notamment l’informatisation des documents de transports dans le cadre de la maîtrise du parc, la formation des opérateurs du secteur et des agents de l’Administration.

4.4 l’environnement

Le but de cette composante est de vulgariser la prise en compte des impacts environnementaux dans les travaux routiers. Plusieurs sessions de formation et campagnes de sensibilisations ont été organisées. Des moyens matériels ont été mis à la disposition des structures en charge de cette composante. Une division environnementale a été créée au sein de la Direction Générale des Travaux Publics. La prise en compte des mesures de mitigation (limitation des impacts environnementaux négatifs) est devenue effective dans les travaux routiers.

4.5 la gestion du projet par le Gouvernement

4.5.1 la Coordination du projet

Le Bureau National de Coordination a été créé en 1992. La coordination de la préparation du PRIT ainsi que celle son exécution ont été assurées par le Comité de Pilotage qui regroupe les représentants de toutes les agences d’exécution. Le projet a d’abord été placé sous la tutelle du Ministère du Plan avant d’être rattachée au Cabinet du Premier Ministre. Cette dernière tutelle a été pour beaucoup dans l’aboutissement de certaines réformes.

4.5.2 l’exécution du Projet

Les actions ont été mises en œuvre par les agences d’exécution, depuis la procédure de passation de marché jusqu’à la réception des biens ou services. Les capacités de l’Administration sont ainsi directement mises à contribution à toutes les étapes de la mise en œuvre. Elles ont été renforcées par des actions de formation, qui dans le domaine routier, n’a pas pu s’étendre aux opérateurs privés afin qu’ils améliorent leurs prestations. Il faut noter que des retards, parfois importants, dans la mise en œuvre des actions, la passation des marchés ou les circuits de mise en règlement des prestations, ont été enregistrés à cause de la lenteur administrative ou la méconnaissance des procédures de l’IDA.

4.5.3 les indicateurs de performance

Quoique tardivement, leur gestion a été informatisée et pourra être capitalisée aux fins d’utilisation dans d’autres projets. Tous les indicateurs de performance ont été pris en compte dans ce système et de nouveaux indicateurs ont été aussi introduits dans cette optique. Seuls les indicateurs relatifs aux réformes institutionnelles ont été

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régulièrement suivis tout au long du projet. Le retard pris dans la mise en place du système informatisé pour le calcul des indicateurs est la raison pour laquelle le suivi n’a pas été global. Leur connaissance aurait poussé à améliorer par exemple les performances en matière de passation de marché.

5 la gestion du projet par l'IDA

5.1 le suivi par les chargés de projet

Le projet a connu 3 chargés de projets. C’est dire la fréquence des changements et leurs incidences sur le cours du projet. La stabilité observée après la revue à mi-parcours a eu un impact très positif associé au fait que le chargé de projet a beaucoup œuvré pour son achèvement dans de bonnes conditions.

5.2 Les avis de non-objection

Jusqu’à la revue à mi-parcours, le projet a beaucoup souffert de la lenteur avec laquelle les avis de non-objection sont donnés. La situation s’est nettement améliorée après le changement du chargé de projet, ce qui a permis de combler le retard enregistré sur la période précédente.

5.3 les décaissements directs

Les délais pour les décaissements directs atteignent un mois, voire même plus à l’approche de la date initiale de clôture du Crédit. Ces délais, ajoutés à celui de la mise dans le circuit de règlement, conduisent à dépasser les délais contractuels des marchés soumis aux procédures de la Banque. Les différents échanges avec l’IDA ont permis de les comprimer.

5.4 le compte spécial

Le niveau du compte spécial a été revu à la hausse au cours du projet conformément à l’Accord de Crédit. Compte tenu des retards enregistrés dans les travaux et de leur exécution simultanée, le niveau du compte spécial n’était plus adéquat. La bonne collaboration avec le Service Décaissement suivi de l’appui du Chargé de projet a permis de résoudre ce problème en acceptant de baisser le seuil des paiements directs au cas par cas. La prolongation du Crédit a permis de renflouer le compte spécial.

6 les recommandations6.1 les travaux routiers

La substitution en cours de projet de l’entretien courant au profit de l’entretien périodique (sous la dénomination réhabilitation et traitement de points critiques) a fortement ralenti le déroulement des actions, et réduit la qualité des travaux par rapport à l’indicateur de performance correspondant. A l’avenir, il serait souhaitable d’exécuter les travaux d’entretien courant sur les fonds de la CAFER, et d’orienter les fonds extérieurs vers l’entretien périodique.

Pour leur exécution, la formation de tous les acteurs du secteur est nécessaire afin d’améliorer l’efficacité du système.

6.2 Le Projet Pilote Routes Rurales

A la clôture du PRIT, la stratégie de construction de routes rurales en cours d’essai n’a pas été validée. Cette validation est pourtant nécessaire. Les projets à venir devraient prendre en compte la phase de validation de la stratégie, tout en consolidant l’expérience acquise dans le domaine de la participation des populations. Un minimum de linéaire de routes rurales devrait être prévu à cet effet.

6.3 Le transport routier

Beaucoup d’études ont été menées dans le secteur du transport routier. Il faut donc les exploiter dans les

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projets ultérieurs. Il en est ainsi de l’étude sur le port sec (pour l’amélioration de la chaîne logistique), de l’étude sur le financement des véhicules de transport ( pour le renouvellement du parc qui est indispensable ), de l’étude transport et pauvreté (dans le cadre de l’éradication de la pauvreté). Par ailleurs, pour lutter contre le développement de l’informel, il est nécessaire d’accorder une grande importance à la formation de tous les opérateurs du secteur. Une étude a été menée à cet effet dans le cadre du PRIT. Un effort particulier doit aussi être fait pour amener les opérateurs à abandonner le tour de rôle, garantie indispensable à donner pour pouvoir renouveler le parc dont la vétusté a une incidence négative sur les coûts et les délais de transport.

6.4 les indicateurs de performance

La gestion de tous les indicateurs de performance devrait se faire tout au long des projets à venir afin qu’ils puis-effectivement servir d’informations alimentant leur tableau de bord. Dans le cas d’un changement de nature des actions à mener (comme le changement des rechargements en travaux d’entretien courant), il est nécessaire d’en tenir compte au niveau des indicateurs de performance pour ne pas pénaliser le projet lors de son évaluation.

6.5 La gestion financière

Il est recommandé que le niveau du compte spécial soit adapté à l’ampleur des travaux dans l’exécution des projets ultérieurs Les délais des décaissements directs, qui ont été en moyenne d’un mois au niveau du Service Décaissement, doivent être améliorés afin de respecter les délais de règlement maximums des marchés de la Banque. Des efforts doivent être aussi faits du côté de l’Administration dans le cadre de l’atteinte de cet objectif.

6.6 Le Programme Sectoriel des Transports

Les actions menées dans le cadre du Projet de Réhabilitation des Infrastructures de Transport doivent être poursuivies et consolidées à travers l’élaboration et la mise en œuvre d’un Programme Sectoriel des Transports. Le processus a déjà été engagé avec l’étude sur la stratégie nationale des transports qui est en cours, et doit être conduit jusqu’à la mise en place du programme.

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