THE W AR AND ITS CAUSES

B Y

G. P. GOOCH, M.A.

“ TOUT COMPRENDRE, C’EST TOUT PARDONNER."

PRICE ONE PENNY.

TH IR D E D IT IO N .

THE TRAN SVAAL COMMITTEE, ERMIN’S MANSIONS, WESTMINSTER, S.W.

1900

WK968.048

201,773

THE TRANSVAAL COMMITTEE,

TO PROTEST AGAINST WAR W ITH THE TRANSVAAL.

This Committee has been formed for the purpose of spreading* accurate information, by means of Lectures, Meetings, the- circulation of Literature, &c., on the matters at issue between the two Governments, and to show that there is no question affecting the honour or interests of the Empire which calls for War.

The Committee will be glad to send Literature, or to arrange for Lectures, and they desire the adhesion and sub­scriptions of those who favour its objects.

Chairman—PASSMORE EDWARDS. Treasurer—Dr . G. B. CLARK, M.P. Hon, Secretary— P. W. CLAYDEN.

Office :— St. Ermin’s Mansions,

W estminster, S .W .

PREFACE.

Though the dogs of war have slipped their 'leash, it is as neces sary as ever— perhaps more necessary— to call attention to certain facts and certain considerations which must be taken into account in forming- a judgment of the struggle. History has always judged and will continue to judge the merits of a controversy that ends in Avar not only nor chiefly by its final stage but by the general conduct of the dispute.

While these pages were passing through the Press, Mr. Cham­berlain has from his place in Parliament attempted to defend his conduct of the negotiations with the Government of the South African Republic. The most important feature of his speech was his declaration that the despatch of August 28 was intended as a qualified acceptance of the proposals of the Transvaal Government contained in their despatch of August 19. The terrible significance of this statement lies in the fact that the Transvaal Government, in common with the entire English Press (the Standard described the reply as “ an explicit negative,” September 2), treated the reply as a refusal; and further, in no subsequent despatch was the slightest attempt made by Mr. Chamberlain to explain to the Transvaal Government that, in regarding his reply as a refusal,, they had been labouring under a misconception.

What more crushing impeachment of Mr. Chamberlain’s diplomacy is possible than the fact that, although the two Governments had actually armTed at an agreement as regards “ at least nine-tenths ” of the controversy, and that the remaining tenth was “ a matter of form,” the Transvaal Government and the English nation were left in ignorance of the fact until nine days after the commencement of hostilities ?

A sinister light was also thrown on the conduct of Mr. Cham berlain in claiming to exercise suzerainty by virtue of the super­seded Convention of 1881, when Lord Salisbury stated in the House o f Lords that, in order to get the word suzerainty out of the Con­vention of 1884, “ Mr. Kruger made considerable territorial and other sacrifices.”

T H E W A R A N D I T S C A U S E S

In the middle of the 17th century the Cape of Good Hope was occupied by the Dutch East Indian Company as a resting-place on the long voyage from Holland to the East. During the years that followed the settlers spread over a large part of what is now Cape Colony. At the end of the century they were joined by several hundred Huguenots, who had fled from France on the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and quickly blended with the Dutch.

On the outbreak of the Great War France invaded Holland, expelled the House of Orange, and dragged the country at the

. wheels of her chariot for 20 years. Profiting by the excuse fur­nished by this alliance, if alliance it can be called, England seized Dutch colonies all over the world, and at the Peace of Vienna retained the Cape of Good Hope. Henceforward the Dutch were treated as a subject race, and deprived of all share in the Govern­ment. u It is not a pleasant admission for an Englishman to make,” writes Theal, the author of the standard History of South Africa, “ but it is the truth, that it would be difficult to find in any part of the world a people with so much cause to be discontented as the old inhabitants of Cape Colony.” One generation of our rule was sufficient, and the Boers (farmers) resolved to withdraw beyond the boundaries of British influence.*

With the Great Trek of 1836 (in which Paul Kruger, then a little boy of eleven, took part), the modern history of the Dutch in South Africa begins. The emigrants won a foothold in what are now the Orange Free Slate, the Transvaal, and Natal. From'the latter, after four years’ occupation, they were expelled by British

# Sir Benjamin Durban, Governor of tlie Cape, declared the movement owing to insecurity of life and property, inadequate compensation for the loss of the slaves and despair of obtaining recompense for the ruinous losses by the Kaffirs. (Despatch of July 29, 1837.) The compensation for the abolition of slavery awarded to the Dutch was three millions. O f this they only received one-sixth.

6 THE ANNEXATION OF THE TRANSVAAL IN 1877.

troops. In 1848, the British Government proclaimed its authority over the Orange Fiee State, and defeated the settlers at Boomplats. The South African Republic and the Orange Free State were finally recognised as independent in 1852 and 1854 respectively by Earl Grey.

'For some years the Republics were unmolested; but when diamonds were discovered about 1870 in the western part of the Orange Free State, the territory was declared by England to belong to a Griqua Chief who had ceded his claim to the English. The Dutch yielded under protest before superior forces, the land was taken, and Kimberley founded. “ From that day,” wrote Mr. Froude, in

Oceana,” “ no Boer has been able to trust English promises.”*In 1877, Sir Theophilus Shepstone was sent to Pretoria by Lord

Beaconsfield’s Government, and choosing a moment when the Volksraad was not in Session, declared the South African Republic annexed to the British Crown. For this step, from which the confusion of the last 20 years has resulted, certain excuses were given. In the first place it was declared that the Boers were at the mercy of Sekukuni, a Basuto chief in the North- East. What had really happened, however, was as follows. In the previous year, a border quarrel had arisen from the molestation of Boer wood-cutters. An expedition was sent against the Basutos, who were strongly entrenched, and, after some severe contests, withdrew from the country for the winter. Early next year, Sekukuni sued for peace, paid a fine and was forced to accept a limitation of his territory. When Shepstone arrived, there­fore, instead of finding the Boers at the mercy of Sekukuni, he was greeted by a supplication from Sekukuni to protect him from the Boers. (Aylward’s Transvaal of To-day, 1878.)

It was also said that the Zulus were threatening the very existence of the Republic. On this it is only necessary to remark that in the terrible struggles following the Great Trek, the Boers, though at that time far fewer in numbers, not only drove the Zulus back but deposed their king Dingaan and set uphis brother Panda; that for the 34 years preceding the annexation amicable relations had been maintained; and that the difficult question of boundaries had been settled by the construction of beacons, in each of which the Zulu Commissioners had laid the first stone.

* Shortly after, a British Commission reported that Waterboer had never possessed any rights to the land. President Brand therefore came to England to obtain redress, but failed, and accepted £90 ,000 as a solatium.

7

In the third place, it was asserted that the South African Republic was bankrupt. Of cash, it is perfectly true, there was and had always been but little ; but while the farms were so plentifully stocked with flocks and herds, it was ridiculous to talk of the bank­ruptcy of the country. Many of the burghers, too, refused to pay taxes on account of their want of confidence in the President for the time being, who had lost the faith which was to them so supremely real. How little truth there was in the assertion was proved by the fact that, immediately after the annexation, the Boers raised £1,000 for the purpose of sending a deputation to England to protest against it. The presidential election was at hand, and Burgers would have been replaced by a President in whom the people had confidence and to whom they would pay taxes.

A final excuse was made at the time and has recently been repeated by Mr. Fitzpatrick. It was said that a number of the burghers petitioned in favour of annexation. But Mr. Fitzpatrick ■carefully omits to state that the petitions were signed not by the Butch to whom the country belonged by conquest and treaty but by English settlers.

The excuses, then, were one and all devoid of foundation. The Republic was not in danger of annihilation by Basutos or Zulus; it was not bankrupt; it did not petition for annexation. Indeed, the more closely that we examine the circumstances, the more clear does it become that the annexation was a piece of conduct as inde­fensible as was ever perpetrated by a large State against a small one. Twenty-five years earlier, England had set her seal on the Sand River Convention, the first article of which ran as follows :— “ No encroachment shall be made by the English Govern­ment on the territory north of the Yaal River.” She now showed what value she attached to her solemnly plighted word. Troops were massed on the frontier, and Shepstone informed the Executive that, if he returned to Natal, it would be to make room for “ the men of the sword.”*

What the burghers thought of it when the news found its way into the farmhouses was soon shown in an unmistakable manner. Paul Kruger, who at this moment comes forward as the leader of the Nationalist party, was at once sent to England to ask the Govern­ment to allow a plebiscite, that is, an opportunity to express their

* Bishop Colenso wrote, “ W e took possession like a party of filibusters, partly by trickery, partly by bullying.” — Cox’s Colenso, I I . 4S9.

PRETEXTS FOR THE ANNEXATION’. \

8 ENGLISII RULE AND BOER OPINION.

wishes in relation to the government of their country. The request was refused, and, in the following year, Kruger and Joubert returned to England with a signed memorial from the burghers, protesting’ against the annexation of the country without their knowledge. When this mission also failed, the Boers demanded an interview with Sir Bartle Frere, the High Commissioner. Sir Bartle listened to their complaints, which he promised to transmit to the Home Government , but informed them that he could give them no hope that their request would be complied with (Martiueau’s “ Bartle Frere,”' vol. 2). In the last weeks of 1879, a meeting representing the entire population of the Transvaal was held, at which it was determined to restore the old Government. As, however, a change of Ministry seemed imminent in England, it was resolved to postpone the decisive step. Meanwhile a paper was founded! for the furtherance of the cause of independence, which, however, was quickly suppressed. It must be remembered, also, that not one of the articles of the constitution promised by Sir Theophilus Shepstone had been carried cut.

The corruption of our rule, again, as revealed in the corres­pondence between Lord Welby, the present Chairman of the County Council, on behalf of the Treasury and the Colonial Secretary, inspires nothing but contempt. Said Lord Welby, “ Sir Theophilus Shepstonc’s account is of a most unsatisfactory character; vouchers and details are produced for about one-third only of the payments, and the small portion that is capable of thorough examination, contains evidence that the unvouched residue includes several duplicate charges. . . . He has disregarded the elementary rules which ordinarily govern men in their dealings with money other than their own.” Mr. Leonard Courtney, then Secretary to the Treasury, drily wrote, “ My Lords of the Treasury feel sure that the Secretary of State will not wish to charge the Consolidated Fund with the cost of Sir Theophilus Shepstone’s hat, Mr. H. C. Shepstone’s hair brushes, Mr. Finney’s cricket bat, or Mr. Thirsk’s fishing-rod.”

In 1880, Mr. Gladstone succeeded Lord Beaconsfield as .Prime- Minister. He had denounced the annexation as “ insane,” and the- Boers naturally supposed that on his accession to power it would be reversed. Mr. Gladstone was, however, informed that the taxes were being regularly paid, and that so many Englishmen had settled in the Transvaal since the annexation that to restore it to the Boers would lead to civil war Accepting these statements

THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. 9

without adequate investigation, Mr. Gladstone’s Cabinet declared that it could not comply with the wishes of the Boers. This deplorable pronouncement removed their last hopes. A farmer refused to pay taxes, and the Government seized his carts and oxen. A meeting of burghers was held, the restoration of the old Government was announced, and a Triumvirate was appointed con­sisting of Kruger, Joubert, and Pretorius. The British troops were repulsed by Joubert in an attack on Laing’s Nek, and Sir George Colley, hurrying up from Natal, was defeated and killed at Majuba Hill.

Popular ignorance has swollen Majuba Hill into a battle of almost legendary proportions. As a matter of fact, 92 English were killed and one Boer. Popular ignorance will also have it, that,, on the arrival of the news, Mr. Gladstone’s Cabinet capitulated in a moment of panic, and restored the independence of the Transvaal.. What took place was precisely the reverse. Sir Evelyn Wood hastily collected 12,000 men ; an army, be it said, not only far better- equipped, but more numerous than the Boer force. Before giving battle, Sir Evelyn telegraphed home that, humanly speaking, he had, the Boers at his mercy. The unanimity of the Boers in rebelling against the foreign yoke had come as a surprise to Mr. Gladstone,, and informal negotiations had been entered on directly the first, blood had been shed. The advance on Majuba Hill was undertaken on Sir George Colley’s sole responsibility, and it is difficult to understand on what grounds we can acquit him of the desire to snatch the laurels of victory before he could be superseded by his superior officer Sir Evelyn Wood. Mr. Gladstone’s Cabinet, there­fore, decided that as its object was not the shedding of the maximum quantity of blood, but the attainment of a settlement, the informal negotiation should not be interrupted by Colley’s fool-hardy exploit.

A Royal Commission was appointed, and the Convention of Pretoria was drawn up. England was declared the suzerain power, and retained the “ direction ” of the foreign policy of the Transvaal State, as it. was now called, and the right to move troops through the country. A Resident was appointed with power to interfere in certain specified internal affairs. So far from obtaining peace and independence at the point of the sword, Mr. Kruger, in pre­senting the treaty to the Volksraad, declared that though not what he could have wished, he had signed it because better terms were unobtainable. Though the Boers say, and say truly, that they

a 3

10 THE CONVENTIONS OF 1881 AND 1884.

beat us at Majuba Hill, they entertain no illusion as to the fact that their Government was restored not by their arms, but by the will of Mr. Gladstone’s Cabinet. Mr. Gladstone’s mistake was not in restoring’ the Transvaal in 1881, but in not restoring' it in 1880. It should also be remembered that his Cabinet included Mr. Chamber- lain and the Duke of Devonshire, and that the policy of retrocession was strongly approved by Lord Randolph Churchill on his visit to South Africa a few years later.* (“ Men, Mines, and Animals in South Africa.” )

Towards the end of 1883 Mr. Kruger and two other deputies were sent to England to discuss the conclusion of a new Conven­tion. The delegates were received by Lord Derby, the Colonial Minister, who, after occupying the position of Foreign Minister in the early years of Lord Beaconsfield’s Cabinet, rebelled against the provocative policy it pursued, and accepted office in Mr. Gladstone’s Ministry. A new Convention was drawn up. The title of the South African Republic and the control of foreign relations were restored, England reserving the right to veto within six months .any treaty concluded by the Republic with a foreign Power, except with the Orange Free State, on notifying that such a treaty 'Conflicted with interests of Great Britain (Art. 4). The second important change was the omission of all reference to suzerainty. Mr. Chamberlain, indeed, has asserted that the preamble of the -Convention of 1881 was tacitly retained in 1884 ; but, as Sir Edward Clarke has said, “ I do not see how anyone, carefully examining the history and documents of the case, can come to this conclusion.” If we turn to the Blue-book, we find that Lord Derby, in preparing the treaty, took a copy of the Convention of 1881, and wrote in his own hand at the top, “ Passages enclosed with a black line are to be omitted.” Looking down the page (the facsimile is given in the Blue-book, C. 9507), we And a line drawn round the whole preamble and round the only other two references to suzerainty. In the second place, the new Convention is furnished with a new' preamble. Has a Convention with two preambles ever been heard of, any more than of a man with two heads ? In the third place,

* M r. Balfour professes to have discovered, in a recent speech of Lord Kimberley, that the settlement of 1881 was dictated by fear. W h at Lord Kimberley said was, that if we had attempted to continue to rule the country against the will of its inhabitants, we should have had the whole Dutch population of South Africa against us. To guard against this was statesman­ship, not “ pure funk.”

T1IK DISCOVERY OF GOLD. 11

on the clay on which Lord Derby signed the new Convention, he telegraphed to South Africa, “ I have to-day granted to the South African Republic the same complete internal independence as is possessed by the Orange Free State.” In the fourth place, in explaining the Treaty in the House of Lords, Lord Derby used the following words:—“ W e have abstained from using the word suzerainty because it was not capable of legal definition, and be­cause it seemed a word which was likely to lead to misconception and misunderstanding.” It has been contended, however, that if the preamble of 1881 is cancelled, the independence of the Transvaal goes along with it, for there alone is it explicitly men­tioned. This attitude overlooks the fact that the existence of the Transvaal State is implied in the first words of the new preamble ; that this same preamble gives this State a new name, the South African Republic; and that if the Republic was not a State with a Government of its own, no Convention could be formed with it. From the conclusion of the Convention until October, 1897, the word suzerainty was not once used, nor the Convention of 1881 once appealed to, in the long series of despatches between the Colonial Office and South Africa.

In 1886 gold was discovered on the Witwatersrand, and Johannesburg sprang up as if by magic. To those who believe that President Kruger has been animated throughout life by fanatical hostility to the British race it may be a surprise to learn that from the influx of gold seekers in 1886 until the appearance of Mr. Rhodes on the scene in 1890 the relations of Johannesburg' and Pretoria were of a friendly character. The Gold Laws were recognised as the most favourable in the world. A Sanitary Com­mittee was instituted, elected by householders, of which the first chairman was an Englishman. When a crash resulting from over- speculation came in 1889, and Johannesburg was on the verge of starvation, the President offered premiums to those who should first reach the city with stores. Early in 1890 a second Volksraad was created, in which foreigners could sit and for which they could vote two years after their arrival. For these and other matters the President was repeatedly thanked by the mining community.

In 1890 Mr. Rhodes, wjio had amalgamated the Kimberley Diamond Mines in 1888, and to whom Lord Salisbury’s Government had in 1889 made the inexcusable concession of an immense area in the Hinterlands of South Africa, became Prime Minister of Cape Colony. But for the Transvaal, South Africa presented no very

a 4

12 PALL KRUGER AND CECIL RHODES.

formidable obstacle to the realisation of his schemes. From this time the history of South Africa, in large measure, resolves itself into a duel between two remarkable personalities and the principles they represent.

Scarcely had Mr. Kruger created the second Raad for the benefit of the immigrants than the High Commissioner’s agent arrived in Pretoria as the emissary of Mr. Rhodes. In a strain wholly different from that hitherto pursued in negotiations between English and Dutch, Lord Loch demanded the surrender of the right of expansion northwards guaranteed to the Transvaal by the Conven­tion of 1884. Were this right surrendered the Chartered Company would be able to pursue its aim unmolested of obtaining all terri­tory north of the Limpopo and west of Portuguese territory. Lord Loch also demanded that the Transvaal should enter the Customs Union, believing that if it did, Natal, which had hitherto stoutly refused to become a member, would be unable to maintain its opposition. Unless these demands were at once complied with,, the consent of the .British Government to occupy Swaziland, a small territory on the eastern border of the Transvaal, was to be withdrawn, and Swaziland was to be occupied by a British force. The Pretoria Government was indignant at this treatment, and a serious crisis was only averted by Mr. Hofmeyr. The question of the Customs Union was omitted, and the Convention signed.

The next important contest took place in 1894. The Johannes­burg traffic being a very profitable affair, Mr. Rhodes did his best to secure a monopoly for the railways of Cape Colony. The Cape however, is over 1,000 miles from the Rand, while to Delagoa Bay and through Natal are scarcely more than a third of the distance. In the early part of 1894 Mr. Kruger resolved on the extension of these lines. Mr. Rhodes thereupon demanded the “ pooling ” of al! receipts from the Johannesburg traffic, 50 per cent, to go to Cape- Colony. The demand that the long route should be guaranteed the same as the two shorter routes jointly was naturally rejected.

Mr. Rhodes refused to accept his rebuff, and later in the year it was rumoured that the Chartered Company was endeavouring to- obtain Delagoa Bay. The inner workings of the episode are not yet known, but at any rate, Germany, which possessed interests in the railway, sent a couple of men-of-war to Delagoa Bay, and persuaded the English Government to maintain the’stafas quo.

During the same year took place what Mr. Chamberlain has- lately described as a breach of the Convention. About 100 British

THE RAID. 13

subjects were “ commandeered” for service against a native chief. The right of the Government to call out all residents exists in Cape Colony. The authorities at Pretoria were fully within their legal rights. By Article 15 of the Convention of 1881, only those who had established their domicile in 1877-81 were exempted from com­pulsory military service. Nearly all who were commandeered joined the expedition and were compensated. A few objected. Lord Loch proceeded to Pretoria, and exemption was granted to all British residents.

In 1895 arose the question of the ‘‘ Drifts.” The proposed pooling of the receipts being refused, Mr. Rhodes reduced the rates on the Cape Colony portion of the line to Johannesburg, in order to undersell the rival routes. The Transvaal thereupon raised the rates over its own portion of the line to a level that kept the through rate at the old price. Mr. Rhodes now determined to avoid the Transvaal Railway altogether, and to unload the trucks at the Vaal River, whence goods were to be conveyed by ox-wagons across the river to Johannesburg. The Transvaal Government retaliated by closing the drifts or fords to traffic. Mr. Rhodes’ Attornej^-General asserted that this constituted a breach of the London Convention by distinguishing between colonial goods and over-sea goods, but declared later that he had changed his opinion. Mr. Rhodes now telegraphed home that the Government of Cape Colony would share the expense of a war with the Transvaal, adding in a subsequent telegram that he hoped his previous com­munication would be regarded as confidential. A threatening note was sent to Pretoria, and Mr. Kruger withdrew his proclamation, and promised that he would make no alterations in the rates with­out consulting the British Government.

A few days later, Mr. Lionel Phillips, as Chairman of the Johannesburg Chamber of Mines, delivered a speech, hinting at a coup. It was clear that the threads of a far-reaching conspiracy were being woven between Johannesburg, Rhodesia, and Cape Town. Mr. Kruger was urged to take steps to guard against the storm that was brewing, but replied that the tortoise must put its head out before it could be chopped off. The head was thrust forth, as all the world knows, when, on the last day of 1895, Dr. Jameson crossed the Transvaal frontier from Rhodesia, and chopped off, when Dr. Jameson was forced by Commander Cronje to surrender near , Krugersdorp.

In opposition to the opinion of most of his advisers and of the

u MI?, chamberlaix’s principles in 1896.

vast majority of the burghers, President Kruger determined that Jameson and his fellows should not be tried in the Transvaal, where he could not save their lives, but should be sent to England. For this step he was warmly thanked by the English Government and! to some extent vindicated in the eyes of his burghers by the sentences and the plain speaking meted out to the conspirators by the Lord Chief Justice. The President was convinced that the shedding of blood, even when authorised by the laws of the country, would do nothing but harm, and when four of the Reform Leaders, by whom the plot had been engineered, were sentenced to- death, he pardoned them.

During the months that followed the Raid, Mr. Chamberlain, in> a series of speeches in the House of Commons and elsewhere, clearly explained the principles which he conceived England’s policy in South Africa should be based. These utterances, it is needless to say, were made by Mr. Chamberlain with full knowledge of the Outlanders’ complaints.

Mr. Chamberlain’s first principle we may state as, Keep in with the Dutch. “ W e are constantly reminded of the fact that our Dutch fellow citizens are In a majority in South Africa, and I may say for myself as for my predecessors, that we are prepared to go as far as Dutch sentiment will support us. It is a very serious thing if we are asked to go to war in opposition to the Dutch senti­ment.” (Feb. 14th, 1896.) His second principle may be sum­marised as, No bloodshed. “ The rights of our action under the Convention [note the singular] are limited to the offering of friendly counsel, in the rejection of which, if it is not accepted, we must be quite willing to acquiesce.” (Feb. 13th, 1896.) “ The question isif President Kruger will consider that our proposals will endanger the security of the Transvaal Government. If he does, he will be perfectly justified in rejecting them.” In reply to the attack on» these moderate sentiments by Sir Ashmead Bartlett, Mr. Chamber- lain used the following words : “ What would be the policy of the hon. member for Sheffield as Colonial Secretary? We know what it would be. He would send, in the first place, an ultimatum to President Kruger, that unless the reforms he was specifying were granted by a particular date, the British Government would inter­fere by force. Then I suppose he would come here and ask for a. vote of £10,000,000 or £20,000,000, and would send an army of 10,000 men at the very least, to force President Kruger to grant reforms in the State, in regard to which not only this Government,

THE SOUTH AFRICA COMMITTEE. 15

but successive Secretaries of State have pledged themselves re- I peatedly that they have nothing to do with its internal affairs. | That is the policy of the lion, gentleman. That is not my policy.” (April 12th, 1896.)

With these sentiments the advocates of peace at this juncture unreservedly associate themselves. It is contended, however, that owing to the change of circumstances, the principles laid down in 1896 as the necessary basis of sound policy in South Africa have become inapplicable in 1899. To the examination of this plea we now turn.

The man in the street imagines that the suspicion felt by the Boers towards England is due to the Raid, and to the Raid alone. No mistake could be greater. It is perfectly true that the Raid left behind an ineradicable distrust of Mr. Rhodes and of a certain section of the Oudanders, and determined the Transvaal Govern­ment to clothe itself with defensive armour. But at the time there was no sign that the English Government had been in any way mixed up in the affair, and there was no expectation that any opposition would be offered to probing the affair to the bottom. The South Africa Committee, therefore, and the proceedings in Parliament that followed, came as a rude shock to the Dutch popu­lation of South Africa. In the first place, the telegrams that were produced left no doubt as to the nature and purpose of the Raid. On Dec. 30th, 1895, Mr. Rhodes had wired to Miss Flora Shaw,“ The crux is I will win, and South Africa will belong to England.” But other developments were still more sensational. On Dec. 17th, 1895, Flora Shaw, who paid frequent visits to the Colonial Office, telegraphed to Mr. Rhodes, u Chamberlain sound in case of inter­ference of European Powers, but have special reason to believe wishes you must do it immediately.” It will be admitted that this was suspicious ; what effect could the incident of the Hawksley telegrams have save that of strengthening those suspicions? Mr. Jackson, Chairman of the Committee, ordered their production ; Mr. Hawksley refused to produce them, and they were not pro­duced. If they were of no importance, as it was asserted, why were they demanded ? If they were important, why were they not produced? This deliberate suppression of evidence was bad enough, but there was worse. The Committee reported as follows:—“ Whatever justification there might have been for action on the part of the people in Johannesburg, there was none for a person in Mr. Rhodes’ position in subsidising, organising,

16 THE REVIVAL OF T1JE CLAIM TO SUZERAINTY.

and stimulating an armed insurrection. Such a policy once entered on involved Mi*. Rhodes in gross breaches of duty to those to whom he owed allegiance. He deceived the High Commissioner, representing the Imperial Government; con­cealed his views from his colleagues in the ministry and from the Board of the South African Company, and led his subordinates to believe that his plans were approved by his superiors.” A few days, however, after this tremendous sentence had been delivered, Mr. Chamberlain rose in the House of Commons and declared that “ there existed nothing which affected Mr. Rhodes’ personal character as a man of honour.” (Annual Register, 1897.) All the officers who took part in the Raid have been replaced in their positions in the Army. Mr. Rhodes remains a Privy Councillor. Not a farthing has been paid in compensation for the Raid, either to the orphaned families of those who took part in repulsing it, or

» to the State. It is these facts, still more than the Raid, that are I responsible for the suspicion with which England, and in particular I Mr. Chamberlain, were henceforth regarded by the Dutch population | of South Africa.

Not many weeks after the termination of the above incidents, Mr. Chamberlain committed, in Sir Edward Clarke’s words, a breach of national faith. The suzerainty had been deliberately laid to rest by Lord Derby in 1884, and had slept an unbroken sleep for 13 years. In the long series of dispatches which had passed between England and South Africa during that time, no reference was made to it nor to the Convention of 1881, in which it had been contained. In October, 1897, however, Mr. Chamberlain informed the astonished Government at Pretoria, that “ Her Majesty still maintained the preamble of 1881.” * That this was only the first step of a new departure was quickly shown by the order sent to England’s ambassadors on the Continent not to recognise Dr. Leyds, the Plenipotentiary of the Transvaal in Europe, and by ceasing to recognise Mr. Montague White, the Agent of the Transvaal in London.

In the early months of the present year, a Petition, professedly signed by 21,000 Outlanders, was sent to the English Govern­ment. The immediate occasion was declared to be the death of Edgar. Mr. Chamberlain replied that the British Government would not turn a deaf ear to the complaints of British subjects.

* M r. Chamberlain characteristically refused to submit liis claim to arbitration.

T1IE BLOEMFONTEIN CONFERENCE. 17

The Transvaal crisis began with the refusal of Mr. Kruger to accept Sir Alfred Milner’s demand, put forward at Bloemfontein, for a five years’ franchise. It seemed to be regarded in many quarters as a proof of peculiar wickedness that the Boers were unwilling to revolutionise their old polity. Old-fashioned and unprogressive as their civilisation was, it was their own, and they were profoundly attached to it. By the efforts of the Orange Free State and the Dutch Ministers of Cape Colony, however, Mr. Kruger was induced to grant the franchise after seven years. To this Mr. Chamberlain replied by suggesting a Joint Commission into the nature of the concession. At this point, however, relying on an assertion which he understood Mr. Conyngham Greene to have made, that his proposals would be acceptable to the English Government, Mr. Kruger, obviously acting at the instance of the Executive of the Orange Free State, drew up his dispatch of Aug. 19th offering more than Sir Alfred Milner had demanded. A five years’ franchise, with a vote for the President and Commander-in-chief, and eight seats for the gold industry were to be conceded, with a guarantee that the representation should never fall below one-quarter. In return no further mention was to be made of the suzerainty (thus returning to the practice of 1884-97), the present interference in the internal affairs of the Republic was not to be regarded as constituting a precedent,* and outstanding disagreements were to be submitted to arbitration. These conditions were declared inadmissible by Mr. Chamberlain.

From the Conference of Bloemfontein until the middle of August negotiations had been slow, but on the whole satisfactory. By the aid of the natural mediators, the Dutch of the Free State and Cape Colony, the Transvaal had been brought to successive reductions of the franchise. However unreasonable Mr. Kruger’s refusal at Bloemfontein to cast the Transvaal polity into the melting pot; however exasperating his disinclination to assist in an inquiry into the effects of a seven years’ franchise, he had now offered terms more favourable than those he had refused some weeks before. Mr. Chamberlain did not quarrel with the terms, but with the conditions. These conditions seemed reasonable, not only, as was natural, to the inhabitants of the Republics, but to the Dutch throughout Cape Colony, and Mr. Chamberlain’s refusal to

* A subsequent dispatch of August 21, explicitly stated that the acceptance of this condition did not affect our right of intervention either under the

•Convention of 1884 or under International Law.

A. 5

18 THE CAUSES OF THE ULTIMATUM.

accept them effected a sudden transformation. Till now our demands had been supported not only by the good-will, but to some degree by the active influence of our Dutch fellow-subjects. But it seemed perfectly clear to them that if Mr. Chamberlain refused these conditions he must have an ulterior motive for his action, and that motive the deprival of the Transvaal of its inde­pendence. The Free State now ranged itself on the side of the Transvaal, and encouraged it to resist further demands. The quid pro quo being rejected, Mr. Kruger withdrew his offer of the five years’ franchise. As, however, the offer had been made after an express declaration of Sir Alfred Milner, that “ such a course would not be regarded as a refusal” of the invitation to a Joint Inquiry into the seven years’ franchise law, the Transvaal now accepted it. Despite the express promise to keep the offer open, Mr. Chamberlain replied that “ the Government cannot now consent to go back to this proposal ” (September 8).

The rejection of both the Transvaal offers brought war within sight. The final franchise demands put forward by the Cabinet on September 4, in themselves moderate, were forwarded in a dis­patch which reasserted the existence of the Convention of 1881, and found the Boers in the resentful mood into which they had been thrown by the rejection of their offer of August 19. By a decision unnecessary, blind, suicidal if you will, but not unnatural,, it was resolved to reject them. The Duke of Devonshire’s assur­ances that no intention existed of attacking internal independence were inadequate to restore confidence while the patron of Mr. Rhodes held sway in the Colonial Office and the despatch of troops went unceasingly forward.

The subsequent history is too recent to need recapitulation. The English Government declared that it had closed the door to further proposals on the franchise, and that it would at once pro­ceed to formulate its terms for a final settlement. Day after day passed, and the proposals did not appear. Then the Army Corps was mobilised, the Reserves were called out, and Parliament was summoned. Much as we may blame the Ultimatum, it can excite no surprise. What people believing, whether rightly or wrongly, that their independence was being attacked, would quietly await the arrival of overwhelming forces ?

The pretexts for the war are the redress of the Outlanders grievances and the vindication of British supremacy. Let us take' the grievances first.

FIRST PRETEXT FOR W A R : THE OUTLANDERS’ GRIEVANCES. 19

It is constantly said that the Outlanders are subject to taxes from which the Boer is free. If it were so, it would, of course, constitute a breach of the Convention. But it has never been pointed out to what tax or taxes this distinction applies, for the very good reason that no such tax exists.* It is also said that the Outlanders are overtaxed. But when we talk of overtaxing, we imply that we possess some standard by which we measure. What is that standard ? If it is the standard of the countries of Europe or of America, the residents of the Transvaal have cause to con­gratulate themselves. The population of Johannesburg largely consisting of men engaged in the gold mining industry, the gold laws are of the utmost practical importance. The taxation of the gold machinery is 50 per cent, lower than in Cape Colony. The royalty on the value of the output is only a trifle over one-half per cent., the lowest in the world. In Rhodesia, it is 50 per cent., i.e.r nearly 100 times as large, and in Canaria 10 per cent. It may be added that the miners at Klondike petitioned for the introduction of the Transvaal gold-laws. There is no income-lax. Mr. Leonard, solicitor to the chief mine-owners, admitted before the South African Committee that he was making 10,000/. a year, and that his direct taxes including his license for a solicitor amounted to 100/. a year. In England his income-tax alone would have been over 300/. By far the greatest part of the revenue is derived from the tariff, which is 33 per cent, lower than that of Cape Colony. The Boer only pays less because he buys less.

Before passing from taxation, we must look at the dynamite monopoly, in relation to which the most remarkable misapprehen­sions are prevalent. Like all monopolies the dynamite is sold above the market value. In 1894, however, Mr. Lionel Phillips had recom­mended the formation of a dynamite monopoly in which the mining companies should be shareholders and the price of a case stand at 905,, a sum greater than that of which they were so loudly com­plaining, till a 10 per cent, dividend had been paid for three years. Those who denounce the dynamite company should remember also that if the monopoly was abolished and the royalty raised to the Canadian and still more to the Rhodesian standard, the mining industry would pay vastly more than it does at present. It may b e 1

* The W a r Tax Law levies a tax on real property owned by persons living ■outside the Republic or on Companies, the members of which are not liable to be commandeered. W ithout the Law, a Boer farmer would be liable to be commandeered while the absentee foreigner would neither fight nor pay.

20 CORRUPTION— FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND MEETING.

added that the price is now about 12*. a case lower than at the time of the Raid.

The Netherlands Railway is another grievance, and it may be admitted that its charges, like those of all railways in South Africa, are high. There was not enough money in the State to make the line, and a Dutch company undertook the risk in return for the monopoly. Coal, however, is delivered at the mines at the average cost of 155. per ton, the price which the Cape Government pays on its railways.

Mr. Chamberlain has said that the Outlanders “ are not even allowed municipal rights, and cannot control the drainage of their own city.” This statement is the very reverse of the truth. From the foundation of Johannesburg a Sanitary Council existed, chosen by householders, of which the first chairman was an Englishman. Soon after the Raid the city was provided with a Municipal Council.

Another charge which has been much employed to work up feel­ing against the Transvaal is the alleged corruption of its officials. The salaries are in some cases excessive, though the remuneration of the President £7,000) ought to seem moderate to a nation which pays the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland £20,000 a year. Presi­dent Kruger may not possess a nice sense of personal honour, and it may readily be conceded that, like many others, he is none the better for a long spell of power. But not one of our states­men has a cleaner record than General Joubert, Mr. Reitz, or Mr. Smuts, the State Attorney. And what is the record of some of those who condemn the Pretoria oligarchy as corrupt ? Was it not corruption when Mr. Rhodes spent £250,000 in Johannesburg in fomenting an insurrection? (Evidence of Colonel Frank Rhodes before the South Africa Committee.)

It is frequently asserted that the Outlanders are muzzled, and are unable to express their views. On the contrary, nothing can be more untrue. Whatever the disabilities under which they labour, they are at least allowed to the full the privilege of com­plaining of them. Violent anti-Dutch papers like the Star re­mained unmolested for years, though openly working for the over­throw of the Government of the country. Our tolerance in England is never put to such a proof; but there is many an Indian editor who longs for the permission to attack the English administration by tongue and pen that is accorded to the residents of the Rand. In no country on the Continent, except France, is such untrammelled freedom to grumble to be found.

JUSTICE— PERSONAL SAFETY. 21

The Press Law empowers the Executive to prohibit publications considered by the President dangerous to morals or order. In the only two cases, however, iu which the Act has been applied, the High Court set aside the order of the Government. The Aliens Expulsion Law, passed in consequence of the Paid, has only been put into operation to expel the alleged murderer of a capitalist.

The Alien Immigration Law was directed not against English­men but against paupers, and did not affect those who possessed a passport from their Government or who could show that they had means of subsistence. Though curiously similar to the scheme proposed for England by Lord Salisbury, the law was repealed on representation that it was inconvenient.

W e are told also that the Kotze incident has made it impossible to obtain justice. Let us examine the assertion. Till 1897. it had been held by every judge, including Kotze, that resolutions and laws passed by the Volksraad were of equal validity. He now informed the President that he should no longer recognise the validity of legislation by resolution; this, of course, threw doubt on the legality of much of the legislation of the country. The Test Act was therefore passed by the Volksraad to require the Courts to recognise legislation by resolution as they had always done before. Kotze refused, and was dismissed. It was not President Kruger who set the Constitution at defiance, but the Chief Justice.

Another common assertion is that life and property are unsafe ; indeed the popular conception seems to be that our fellow-country­men in Johannesburg go about in fear of their lives. When we demand proof of this remarkable assertion we are referred to the Edgar case. Granting for a-moment that the story of the case as narrated by Mr. Chamberlain’s supporters is correct, does it not appear strange that only one case should be brought forward in a period extending' over so many years ? Is not the stress laid on it a proof that it is not an ordinary but a unique occurrence ? To parallel Johannesburg, with its many-nationed throng, we must look to the cities in the south and the west of the United States. But who takes any notice when the police of New Orleans or San Francisco shoot a man engaged in a scrimmage? On the other hand, there is no evidence to prove Mr. Chamberlain’s narrative is correct. According to the evidence of Jones, the policeman, Edgar, on being' presumably insulted by an Englishman in the street knocked him down and retreated to his house close by. Jones, who was not far off, seeing the scuffle and hearing a bystander cry

22 CONTEMPT AND MISUNDERSTANDING.

“ he has killed him,” followed him into his house and strove to arrest Edgar who resisted with an iron-shod stick. Jones, in fear of his life, fired and killed Edgar, who lies side by side in the cemetery with the Englishman whom he had struck.

W e often hear, too, that the Boers despise the Outlanders. In fairness to the Boers, let us remember that the most prominent of the Outlanders inspire precisely the same feelings in men of our own race. Here is the impression made on Mr. Julian Ralph, Special Correspondent of the Daily M ail: —

“ It is disgusting to turn into any one of the Cape Town Hotels to find yourself surrounded by the rich refugees from Johannesburg, and to hear them cry like children as they tell you what they will lose if the British do not hurry up and take the Transvaal before the Boers destroy Johannesburg. They actually cry in their plates at dinner, and half strangle themselves by sobbing as they drink their whiske}7 at bed-time. The grand hotels are all full of these merchants and millionaires, faring on the fat of the land, idle, loafing, all and every day, and discussing what per cent, of their losses the British Government will pay when they put in their claims at the end of the war. It is enough to make a statue ill to hear and see them and move among them.”

On the other hand, is not the contempt reciprocated ? How many Englishmen were there in Johannesburg who did not regard the Boers as an inferior race ? Representatives of different types of civilisation never fully understand each other. The ordinary tourist, such as Canon Knox Little, rushes through South Africa in six weeks, visits Cape Town, Kimberley, and Johannesburg, sees nothing but English newspapers, frequents English clubs, meets few, if any, Dutchmen, cannot understand their language, and returns home and writes a book. The residents in Johannesburg, again, know nothing of the farmers of whom the country is chiefly composed. President Kruger and his subordinates do not constitute the nation. Against the reports of tourists and newspaper correspondents we may quote one or two testimonials from men whose names com­mand very different respect. Our great Pro-consul, Sir George Grey, whose connection began in 1854, declared in 189G, after

, a career of unique experience: “ I have lived among many 1 nations and in many countries, and I may say this with truth—I j know no people richer in public or private virtues.” {The Ilumani- , tartan, April, 1896.) Sir Bartle Frere wrote in a Despatch in 1879 : “ The leaders are, with few exceptions, men who deserve respect

TREATMENT OF THE NATIVES.

and regard for many valuable and amiable qualities” (Martineau’s. Bartle Frere, Yol. 2.) The leader of the pioneer expedition to Rhodesia, Mr. Selous, testifies to their unfailing kindness and hospitality, and declares that they possess all the qualities required to build up a great nation. (“ Travel and Adventure in South-East Africa.” ) But perhaps the most valuable testimonials to the qualities of the Boers are to be found in the character o f Mr. Schreiner’s Dutch supporters, and in the Government of the Orange Free State, which not even the most unscrupulous have dared to condemn.

W e now arrive at a grievance which, though rarely openly avowed, accounts for much of the hostility of the rich Johannes* burg mine-owners to Pretoria. The Government limits the employ­ment of natives, with the result that the mine-owners are compelled to employ a larger proportion of white labour, wThich demands and obtains high wages. This is the explanation of the suggestion put forward by Mr. Chamberlain in the despatch of February, 1896,. dated on the day of Mr. Rhodes’ visit to the Colonial Office, that the Johannesburg district should be cut off from the Transvaal, to* which it should owe only quasi-allegiance. The Boer Government once gone, nothing prevents the increase of native labour, and the- consequent increase of profits.

In connection with the foregoing there is another point at which, though not a matter concerning the Outlanders, we must glance. Among the charges used to inflame English opinion against the Boers is their treatment of the native races. Nobody asserts that the relation of the Dutch to the natives has been satisfactory; but not a shadow of evidence is forthcoming to* prove that their conduct is worse than ours.* This was the- judgment of Sir George Grey, and it is the judgment of Mr* Selous, one of the few men who know the Boer in his home* Indeed, Saul Solomon, perhaps the staunchest political friend the Kaffirs have had, and Bishop Colenso, who, alone o f Englishmen, earned the complete confidence of the Zulus, always- declared that the view of Boer cruelty was unfounded. On tho other hand, in our new colony of Rhodesia, there is something very nearly approaching the revival of slavery. In the report which Sir Richard Martin was sent out by Mr. Chamberlain to* make, occurs the following passage :— “ Compulsory labour does,

* W here in Boer annals do we find an episode blacker than our treatment of- Langalibalele ? See Cox’s Life of Colenso, I I ., 313 -87.

2̂

24 EDUCATION AND LANGUAGE.

undoubtedly exist in ^Matabeleland, if not in Mashonaland. The native commissioners in the first place endeavour to obtain labour through the Indunas, but failing* in this they procure it by force.” (Report printed as Appendix to Proceedings of S. A. Committee.)

The opponents of military intervention do not base their opposition on the contention that no grievances exist, but on the ground that the grievances complained of are not worth a w ar; being in part chimerical, and in part exaggerated. To the latter class belongs the non-recognition of the English language. Two wrongs do not make a right, but in fairness to the Boers, it should be remembered that for 10 years after the introduction of responsible Government into Cape Colony in 1872, the Dutch language was forbidden in the Assembly and in all public offices, and that during the annexation of 1877-81, it was systematically tabooed. That a language is the chief sj^mbol of nationality to a small community in a distant land hardly needs to be pointed out ; and when the independence of that community has more than once been placed in jeopardy, its jealous adherence to its tongue cannot excite surprise. Except in the Yolksraads, however, English is widely used. In connection with education, it is little known that under a law of 1896 there are five schools in the gold­fields where English is the medium of education. In the lower standards no Dutch book is used, and in the higher the maximum government capitation grant is made where five hours per week are devoted to Dutch. In no other country does the education of foreigners receive so much assistance from the Government. If the study of Dutch appears a hardship, it should be remembered that all members of the public service in Cape Colony are compelled to be proficient in both languages. Remember, too, that all languages except Magyar are forbidden in Hungary, that Polish is forbidden in Poland, German in the Baltic Provinces, and Danish in Schleswig- Holstein.

The second point to which we referred is that of the franchise. The early history of the subject is, of course, out of date, since the reduction of the period of naturalisation from 14 to 7 years; but as the exclusion of the Outlanders from political rights has bulked so largely in the indictment agaiust the Transvaal, we must ask ourselves how the matter stood. In the first place, it is clear on reading the Convention of 1884 that no reference, explicit or implicit, is made to the concession of political rights. Article 14 runs as follows: “ All persons conforming themselves

THE FRANCHISE, 25

to the laws of the Republic can enter, travel or reside there, hire or possess houses, &c., carry on commerce, and not be subject to any taxes other than those imposed on citizens of the Republic.” If political rights had been intended, it seems un­likely that they would have been omitted, while matters of pre­sumably minor importance were inserted. That successive changes, were made iu the franchise laws without protest from the British Government conclusively proves that the Convention was not con­sidered to have any relation with the matter. In the second place it must be remembered that the Boers entertained a very natural aver­sion to have their polity turned upside down by the intrusion of men representing a state of civilisation, which, whether better or worse* was utterly different from their own. In the third place early immigrants came solely to dig for gold, with the determination to return home directly they had made their money. That it was the opportunity to make money rather than the franchise which the Outlanders desired is proved by the remarkable letter of Mr. Lionel’ Phillips to his friend and colleague, Mr. Beit, dated June 16, 1894.“ I may say here that, as you of course know, I had no desire for political rights, and believe, as a whole, that the community is not' ambitious in this respect.” (App. to the Cape Colony Report of the Select Com. on the Jameson Raid, A. 2913, 5/96.) After the first years, it is true, some arrived who were desirous of making the Transvaal their homes. But before they reached any large number the friction between the Transvaal and Mr. Rhodes, which has been sketched above, had beguuand increased the disinclination to extend the franchise to his countrymen. And, further, it must be remem­bered that though the Outlanders have clamoured for the franchise, they have been unwilling to accept the conditions on which it is granted, not only in the Transvaal but in other countries. An oath of allegiance is demanded in every country, and the wording of the oath in the Transvaal was copied from that in use in the United States. In all countries where universal military service exists, the naturalised alien takes his share in the military duties of his new home. As Mr. Hofmeyr said some years ago, “ I must frankly say that I cannot see why men expect to be made voting citizens in any country without transferring their full allegiance to it. There must be no more trying to sit on two stools.” Disfranchisement* we must in the last place remember, exists in countries where re­presentation is nominally (o be found. In Prussia, for instance* where the Socialists are numerically the strongest party, they are-

prevented from securing the return of a single member, owing to franchise laws framed for the special purpose of excluding them. In the German Empire, again, though the constitution of 1871 •divides the country into constituencies of 100,000, and orders that redistribution shall keep pace with the growth or decline of popu­lation, no such redistribution has ever taken place. In this way many county members are returned by 50,000, and many town members by 250,000, As the former are nearly all Ministerial, and the latter nearly all Opposition, a redistribution, demanded alike by law and justice, is refused by the Government, whose majority would be jeopardised. The German artisan is an Outlander. Is Pretoria more unjust than Berlin ?

This rapid review has been attempted in no sense with a desire to explain away the grievances of which we have heard so much. To exaggerate them, however, is no whit less blameworthy than to deny their existence. IIow many of those who have swallowed day by day the messages from the South African correspondents o f our Ministerial Press have fulfilled the elementary duty of taking the trouble to discover how much is true, and how much is false ?

Nobody maintains that the Government of the Transvaal is •■satisfactory. Its shortcomings are deprecated by none more’ strongly than by the Progressive Boers. But nothing has ever been adduced, either by Mr. Fitzpatrick or anybody else, to show that anything exists which constitutes a serious obstacle to the attainment to wealth and well-being by the immigrant population.

The second pretext is that we have to suppress an Africander con­spiracy. The first argument that is brought forward in justification of this assertion is the military equipment of the Transvaal. If it could be shown that the Transvaal had piled up huge armaments before its independence had been threatened, it might have been fairly said that they had an offensive not a defensive object. We possess, however, precise evidence that the armaments of the Transvaal date from the Paid. In the first place, the war budget which stood at £19,000 in 1893 and £28,000 in 1894, rose to £80,000 in 1895, when a revolution was being organised, and leaped to £495,000 in 1896, as a consequence of the Raid. In the second place, we possess the report of Major White, who was sent by Mr. Rhodes in the autumn of 1895 to investigate the military resources of the Transvaal, that he found about a dozen guns, none of them fit for much work.” (Cape Report on the Raid.) Further we find

2 3 SECOND PRETEXT FOR AVAR : AN AFRICANDER CONSPIRACY.

THE ARMAMENTS OF THE TRANSVAAL. 27

that General Joubert was taken to task for allowing the defences j o f the State to be so inadequate, and we have the authority of Captaiu 1 Younghusband, who was sent out as Special Commissioner of the Times soon after the Raid, that the Transvaal was “ nearly caught napping.,, That iufamous piece of brigandage convinced the South African Republic that, without defensive armour, its life as a separate •! State was not worth many months’ purchase. The Transvaal Government acted as every wise householder acts when his premises have been broken into and the burglar remains at large.

No conspiracy to overturn British rule, supposing such an idea to have been entertained by the Transvaal, could have had the smallest prospect of success unless the Dutch throughout South Africa were partners to it. It is, therefore, of vital importance to determine whether the conduct of the Free State and Cape Colony affords any such presumption. Taking first the case of the Free State, we may point out that its national revenue has never exceeded £500,000, a large part of which has been spent on public works in Bloemfontein and elsewhere, that it has never purchased guns, and that its capital is virtually unfortified. In the second place, the friendliness of the State towards Great Britain, despite the theft of the Kimberley diamond fields, has been unvarying and indeed pro­verbial. A couple of illustrations will suffice. President Brand received a knighthood, the first time such a distinction had ever been conferred on a man who was neither an Englishman nor a subject of the Queen. When Mr. Reitz, again, the State Secretary f o f the Transvaal, was elected President of the Free State, he refused to accept the post until it had been offered to his intimate friend, Sir George Grey. Further, the Free State possesses a Government founded on equal rights for all white men, and which even the most unscrupulous have never ventured to disparage. True, the Free State concluded a defensive alliance with the Transvaal when the ndependence of the latter had been treacherously assailed, but that

this step had not deflected the policy of the country from its traditional course was shown by the entrance of the State immediately afterwards into the South African Customs Union. Finally, the exertions of President Steyn and Mr. Fischer to obtain concessions from Mr. Kruger during the critical period of the negotiations are too recent to need more than a reference. It was only when the proposals of August 19 were rejected, and the English Government withdrew its invitation to the Commissioner on the seven years’ franchise law, which Sir Alfred Milner had expressly held open,

28 THE FREE STATE AND CAFE COLONY.

that the Free State became convinced that Mr. Chamberlain was playing for war, and threw in its lot with the Sister Republic. Who will say that President Steyn and his burghers were wrong in doubting that with the anuexation of the Transvaal the independence of the Free State would be secure? As the President remarked, “ if a valuable goldfield were discovered in the Free State, how long do you suppose we should keep our independence ? ”

The record of Cape Colony is equally free from reproach. If a conspiracy against British rule existed, it must have dated either from before or after the Raid. But if before, Mr. Rhodes must have been in it, for Mr. Rhodes was returned to power in 1890 by Dutch votes and kept in power by Dutch votes until the Raid. It must date, therefore, from a period subsequent to the Raid. What, then, are the notable events in the history of Cape Colony during the last 3 years? In the first place, a Ministry was returned to power by Dutch votes of which only one man of pure

i Dutch blood is a member. This Ministry offered unanimously and spontaneously— and unconditionally, £30,000 a year towards the expenses of the Imperial Navy. But, it may be said what of the Bond? The Bond is not a huge secret society for the overthrow of British rule, but an association with a comparatively small number of members, some of whom are Englishmen. Its founder and leader, Mr. Hofmeyr, has distinguished himself beyond all other colonial subjects of the Queen in his endeavours to draw the parts of the Empire closer together. To him we owe the suggestion of the Colonial Conference of 1887; to him we owe the proposal of an Imperial Zollverein; from him came the project of an All-British Cable.

Deeds like these are more eloquent than words; but words arc not wanting. Sir Alfred Milner in seeking for evidence of disloyalty can only adduce two obscure provincial newspapers. Mr. Chamber- lain declared in 1896 that there were “ tens of thousands of Dutch­men in Cape Colony just as loyal to the throne and the British connections as our French Canadian fellow-subjects.” (April 22.) On May 18 of the past year, Mr. Goschen cordially acknowledged the contribution of the Schreiner Ministry towards the Navy, arid suggested to the representatives of other Colonies that “ they should imitate the patriotic action of Cape Colony.” Still later, on July 24, Sir David Tennant, Speaker for 22 years of the Cape Parliament and now Agent-General in London, declared that the Bond was “ thoroughly loyal at heart,” and that the cables

ALTERNATIVES TO WAR.

antagonistic to this view were “ sent for party purposes and financial objects. True, the policy of coercion on which the Govern­ment have entered inspire universal grief and indignation and subject the loyalty of the Dutch subjects of the Queen to a strain which we can but faintly realise. It remains true, however, that, in Mr. Bryce’s words, “ such irritation as there is to-day is due to the methods of British policy during the last few months.”

What, however, more than anything else was making a race struggle in South Africa unnecessary is not a matter of politics at alL From the Ministerial Press we might gather that the two populations live side by side without mixing. Nothing could be less true. The Chief Justices of the two Republics, President Steyn, and Mr. Fischer, to name no others, are married to English wives. If the Dutch were the “ dogs” that Mr. Swinburne has lately dubbed them on the strength of unconfirmed reports, what are our English brothers and sisters doing ? Would they freely link their lives with the cruel and ignorant monsters who are paraded before our eyes in the columns of the Yellow Press?*

It has been asked, what alternatives to war were possible? One alternative was to wait till President Kruger, an old man of 75, should die. In the Transvaal, as in all other places, there were two- parties, the Conservative and Liberal. In the presidential election before the Raid, Joubert polled scarcely fewer votes than the successful candidate, and a progressive majority was lately returned to the Yolksraad. If Mr. Chamberlain did not care to accept the conditions offered with the proposal of the five years’ franchise, why could he not have accepted > the seven years’ franchise as an instalment ? Who is there who would venture to assert that a new President and a Colonial Secretary with a better record than Mr. Chamberlain (and for these in the ordinary course of things there could not be long to wait) would not be able to effect a settlement ?

If, however, we were unable to wait, a second alternative pre­sented itself. Might not the nation whose representative proposed the Court of Arbitration at the Hague Conference, have set the example of making' use of it ? The Times declares that arbitration

* The good qualities of the Boers are at last beginning to bo recognised. Lieutenant Kinalian’s letter from Pretoria (Daily News, December 28) is typical of many. “ A ll that you read about the Boers in England is absolutely false.” In reference to the white flag neither side is free from reproach. According to- otir own correspondents, Colonel Bullock’s party fired on 3 Boers who came to them with a white flag, at the Tugela, killing 2.

2d

30 VICTORY CANNOT BRING SETTLEMENT

is inadmissible where the “ honour or interests ” of a country are at stake. If this is indeed so, the Court will not be overburdened with work. When the Venezuela dispute arose, the Times argued as hotly against arbitration as it does to-day, and declared that we could not “ surrender our rights to the hazards of arbitration.” Despite the Times, arbitration has taken place, resulting in a verdict highly favourable to England. If, however, false pride prevented us from accepting foreign arbitration, what was there to prevent the appointment of arbitrators drawn from the ranks of the con­tending parties ? Would it not have been better, assuming that Mr. Chamberlain was sincerely desirous of peace, to appoint such a body of men after the Bloemfontein Conference, instead of rousing the passions of both parties by the publication of Sir Alfred Milner’s communication of May 4, and by the dispatch of troops during negotiations ? So far from a display of force tending to secure the acceptance of our proposals, its effect was to transform the discussion from one of franchise to one of nationality.

We have heard much of Mr. Chamberlain’s long-suffering patience. Before he had been four months in the Colonial Office, he was discussing with Mr. Rhodes the invasion of the Transvaal on the question of the drifts. Within a week of the Raid, he tele­graphed to Sir Hercules Robinson, “ I am considering, in concert with my colleagues, the propriety of immediately sending a large force, including cavalry and artillery, to the Cape, to provide for all eventualities ” (January 7), but was dissuaded by Sir Hercules Robinson. When President Kruger refused to fall in with his pro­posal (February 4) to make Johannesburg independent of the Pretoria Government, and declared that the condition of South Africa rendered it impossible for him to accept Mr. Chamberlain’s invitation to visit London, Mr. Chamberlain sent a communication possessing almost the character or significance of an Ultimatum, which drew strong protests from the Ministers of Natal and the Members of the Cape Legislature. (C. 8063 and 8423.)

The Boers will yield to overwhelming numbers. Our armies will make a solitude , and our statesmen will call it peace. But of the future it is, of course, impossible to speak with certainty. Mr. Chamberlain’s opinion, however, is well known. “ A war in South Africa would be one of the most serious wars that could possibly be waged. It would be in the nature of ia civil war; it would be a long war, a bitter war, and a costly war, and it would leave behind it the embers of a strife which I

TIIE DUTCH MAJORITY.

believe generations would hardly be long enough to extinguish.” (May 8, 1896.)

The first part of the prophecy has come terribly true; and there seems unfortunately no reason to believe that the second will be less accurately fulfilled. To those who declare that the relations could not be worse than before the war, we reply that intermarriage was frequent, that intimate friendships were very general, that the races mixed in the schools, in the legislatures, in society. Mr. Balfour has declared his conviction that the Boers will soon learn to regard as a “ blessing ” the war in which their fathers and brothers and husbands were slain, and by which the independ­ence which they prize next to life itself was wrenched from them. He relies on the merits of our prospective administration to obliterate the torturing memories of the war; bub it is surely a very superficial view of the dynamics of human nature to imagine that the elemental passions of the vanquished, the love of family and of nationality, can be conjured away by the insertion of some new wheels in the political machine. The remedy is tragically incommensurate with the disease.

But there is another matter to consider. W e are fighting, we learn, for equal rights for all white men and for British supremacy throughout South Africa. But how are these ideals related to each other ? The answer turns on the vital question as to the relative numbers of the rival races. Good government is only one of the reasons why the French Canadians acquiesce in our rule ; the other is that they constitute but a small fraction of the Dominion. The Dutch are to-day in a considerable majority throughout South Africa.* Will they remain so ? There is a widespread impression that the English will enter South Africa in vast numbers and rapidly out-number the Dutch. They may indeed enter the country; but what will they do there ? The Transvaal laws have hitherto secured employment for ten thousand English miners; but when the limitation imposed on the use of native labour is removed, does anyone imagine that the mine-owners will employ white labour on the Witwatersrand any more than they do now at Kimberley and in Rhodesia ? In the next place, is it likely that our emigrants will turn farmers ? They have never done so yet, and technical equip­ment and capital are even more essential in South Africa than in England, owing to the sterility of the soil, cattle-plague, horse .diseases, and the like. Being excluded, then, from the mines. by

31

# About 4 to 3.

32 EQUAL RIGHTS VERSUS SUPREMACY.

the competition of black labour, and from the land by the want of aptitude for a farmer’s life, the English will remain, as hitherto, the professional and the shop-keeping classes, for whom the demand is everywhere limited. Nobody who knows the condition of Rhodesia would describe it as the safety-valve of the British steam-engine* Its land is held by syndicates and its mines are worked by Kaffirs. The South African Dutch, on the other hand, are not a dying’ nation, but one of the most prolific races in the world, and families of a dozen or more are common. As a Natal newspaper frankly declares ( Times, Dec. 9), “ nothing short of extermination” will alter the Dutch majority. The mines, again, cannot last for ever. It is con­sidered bjr experts that, in a generation or two, they will be either exhausted or will be too deep to make it profitable to work them. And what would Kimberley and Johannesburg be without their mines?

And now what of equal rights and British supremacy ? It is obvious that, if the Dutch remain in the majority and hold together, both very probable assumptions, a deadlock may occur at any moment, the gravity of which would be greater in the Federation to which we are instructed to look forward. There is no halting- place between the complete self-government of Canada, in which the representative of the Crown is a social, not a political personage, and administration from Downing Street. So clear is this that the Natal journals are already discussing schemes for depriving the Dutch of their majority. ( Times, Dec. 9.)

The champions of equal rights, however, are careful to point out that these luxuries are neither for to-day nor for to-morrow. The Dutch republics are to make the acquaintance of British rule as 'Crown Colonies, and are to be coerced into “ loyalty” by an army of occupation. How large that army is to be is a matter of dispute. Sir Gordon Sprigg puts it at thirty thousand men; in any case, judging by our total failure to implant the love of British rule in Boer bosoms during the annexation of the Transvaal, the mainten­ance of British supremacy in South Africa will probably demand the presence of a very considerable force. How long the period will extend before the Boers are deemed sufficiently loyal to be entrusted with 61 equal rights ” remains to be seen.

In short, one of the most tragic aspects of this war is that the numerical superiority of the Dutch seems to preclude the possibility of a settlement. The government of the more numerous race as a Crown Colon}’ will satisfy neither them nor ourselves; and when equal political rights are granted, there is nothing to prevent the

THE PEACE PAR IT. 33

election of a Dutch majority, and nothing to prevent that majority kicking against the English connection. If they do, we must choose between British supremacy and equal rights; and if we choose the former we shall be undertaking a task too great even for the giant strength of our Empire, namely, that of ruling the majority of the white population of South Africa in opposition to their will.

A few words are necessary in reply to the charge that the Peace Party have caused the war. In the first place, let it be clearly understood that, so far from counselling President Kruger to resist, they strenuously urged him to accept the English proposals of September 4, despite the rejection of his own offers of August 19, and that, at the eleventh hour, they wired the Duke of Devon­shire's speech, adding that his assurances could be implicitly accepted. If it be said, however, that it was useless to press the acceptance of reforms while at the same time declaring that they would not support the demand by arms, and that their conduct led the Boers to believe that no force would be used, the reply is that it has been throughout made perfectly clear to Mr. Kruger, not only by his own Consul-General, Mr. Montague White, but by his personal friends in England, and by the Peace Party, that, though there was a very deep and wide-spread indignation at Mr. Cham­berlain’s policy, this could not hinder the despatch of a single soldier. Are we not to raise our voices against a policy that leads inevitably to war, against the commission of what we think to be a blunder and a crime, before it is too late ? The New Diplomacy brings us war, and the New Fatalism declares it inevitable. W e have protested, and shall continue to protest, against both the one and the other. Bright, Cobden, and their scanty following of friends did their utmost to prevent the Crimean War, and after incurring precisely the same reproaches as are levelled at us to-day, find their justification at last in the universal con­demnation with which that war is regarded. Who knows but that we may have to wait a shorter time for a no less complete vindication ?* It is often said, “ I am an Englishman, not a

# Those who console themselves for the unanimous hostility of the Continent by attributing its attitude to jealousy would do well to explain why our conduct meets with as severe animadversions from Italy and Switzerland as from Trance, Germany, Austria, and Russia. In regard to the United States, it must be remembered that all our newspaper correspondents who inform us that America approves our action write from the same place, New Y o rk ; and even in New York, the City Council, with 1 dissentient, adopted a resolution in favour of the Boers, December 26. A similar resolution was passed by the Common Council of Boston unanimously. W ere they all Irish ?

u THE TRIBUNAL OF HISTORY.

Dutchman,'nor an Armenian, nOr a Cretan ; and I am going to stand, by my country.” Is it not precisely this attitude from which war- springs? Were it not for the presence of a certain number of men; in every nation who endeavour to put themselves in the position of the. other party and to understand its point of view, wars would b e ; far more frequent than they are. The South African war is a war of ignorance; and the least of us cannot escape the responsibility before history of doing or leaving undone what in us lay to dispel it in ourselves and others.

APPENDIX.

The following passages are from the “ Times ” report of two debates in the House of Commons :—

On October 19th, speaking on M r. Stanhope’s amendment to the Address, S i b E d w a b d C l a r k e referred to the Boers’ offer of the five years’ franchise, and said:—

“ The extraordinary incident that has marked the proceedings of this evening has been the statement of the Colonial Secretary that the answer to that proposal might have been taken as an acceptance. I should like to know, was that answer intended as an acceptance ? ”

M r . C h a m b e r l a in : A t that time we thought the proposal of the Transvaal extremely promising. W e intended to send a most conciliatory answer, accept­ing, as far as it was humanly possible for us to do so, their proposal, and, as the only point of difference was the internal intervention, I thought myself it would be accepted.

S i r E . C l a r k e : Then I take it that it was intended to be an acceptance. Now, M r. Speaker, if that were so— if, in fact, the Colonial Secretary intended to accept the proposals of the Transvaal, then undoubtedly this amendment ia proved up to the hilt.

M r . C h a m b e r l a i n , again intervening later on, said :—“ The hon. member harps upon the word ‘ acceptance.’ H e must remember

he asked me the question whether we intended to accept. I myself should have thought that the Boers would have taken it as an acceptance. B ut I suppose it may be properly described as a qualified acceptance. W e did not accept everything, but we accepted at least nine-tenths of the whole.”

S i r E . C l a r k e : “ Really, this becomes more and more sad. I t is dreadful to think of a country of this kind entering upon a war, a crime against civilisa­tion, when this sort of thing has been going on. W h y , in the very next sentence [ i.e., of the Despatch of September 8£7/.] the right hon. gentleman says: ‘ It is on this ground that H er Majesty’s Government have been com­pelled to regard the last proposal of the Government of the South African [Republic as unacceptable in the form in which it has been presented.’ ”

M r. C h a m b e r l a in : In the form.Sir E . C l a r k e : Is it a matter of form ?M r. C h a m b e r l a in : Yes.Referring to these statements in a later debate on October 25th,M r. C o u r t n e y said : “ The next point is the rights of the Outlanders, and

here we have got a five years’ Franchise promised; at first, seven years, and then five years, subject to conditions, to which my right hon. friend sent an answer intended to be received as an acceptance.” (An hon. member dissented.) “ M y right hon. friend is quite equal to denying my statement if it is wrong.”

M r. Ch a m b e r l a in : “ Oh, well then, I do deny it. I did not think it worth while to interrupt m y right hon. friend, because he knows I have said oter and over again a ‘ qualified ’ acceptance, and he always omits the adjective.”

M r. C o u r t n e y : Y ou said nine-tenths. Is the one-tenth worth war ? Tell us what the one-tenth is ?

M r. C h a m b e r l a i n : I do not think it was worth war.M r. C o u r t n e y : Tell us what the one-tenth is.M r. C h a m b e r l a i n : W h y did not President Kruger give way ?M r. C o u r t n e y : Because he did not understand the despatch : it was never

explained to him. Are we going to fight for the tenth point ? As to that, M r. Speaker, history, I think’, will judge.

[M r. Chamberlain did not intervene further in the course of M r. Courtney’s speech.]