The Veiled RedeemerThe Regime of Kwame Nkrumah and the United States

Jake Meador

ABSTRACT

Like his hero, W.E.B. DuBois, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana experienced a form of double consciousness, as a citizen of Africa and a politician trained in the west. This double consciousness informed his foreign policy toward the United States. It also shaped the United States attitude toward him. Over 15 years, his relationship with America shifted from bright-eyed hope to tear-stained paranoia. It is a fascinating story and essential to understanding the question of American foreign policy in Africa.

Table of Contents

Introduction—A Veiled Redeemer................................................................................................. 3The Veil in Africa.............................................................................................................................................. 3The Question of Post-colonialism.............................................................................................................. 4Unraveling Ghanaian Identity..................................................................................................................... 5The Origins of Ghana...................................................................................................................................... 7Nkrumah’s Arrival in the Gold Coast...................................................................................................... 10Nkrumah the Man......................................................................................................................................... 11

Chapter 1 - “A Shock to Us All”....................................................................................................... 15The 1951 Election......................................................................................................................................... 15First Contact, 1951........................................................................................................................................ 18Kwame Nkrumah and the Governor.......................................................................................................22

Chapter 2—“Self Government Now!”—The Independence Struggle, 1951-1957.........27The 1954 Elections....................................................................................................................................... 30Ashanti and the Final Election in 1956..................................................................................................32The Basis for American-Ghanaian Peace..............................................................................................38

Chapter 3—That Incredible Moment..........................................................................................46The Question of China.................................................................................................................................. 48Nixon’s Meeting with Nkrumah................................................................................................................50The Howard Johnson’s Incident...............................................................................................................56Minor Disputes, 1958-1960....................................................................................................................... 61The All African People’s Conference and the Question of Unity....................................................63

Chapter 4—Making Just Restitution, The Break of the Early 1960s.................................65The Radicalization of the Convention People’s Party.......................................................................65The Crisis in the Congo................................................................................................................................ 68Ghana at the United Nations...................................................................................................................... 77The Year 1960 in Summary....................................................................................................................... 81

Chapter 5 – Nothing Shocked Me So Deeply As This, 1961-1966.......................................83The Peace-keeping role of JFK.................................................................................................................. 83LBJ’s “Chain Reaction”................................................................................................................................. 84The Coup Plans Move Forward.................................................................................................................88The Veiled Redeemer in Historical Perspective.................................................................................91

Bibliography.............................................................................................................................................................. 92

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Introduction—A Veiled Redeemer

The Veil in AfricaIn his classic work, The Souls of Black Folk1, African-American scholar W.E.B. DuBois

begins by describing the “double-consciousness” of the black community in the United

States. The fissure separated their blackness and their American identity. As Americans,

they felt entitled to the full rights of citizens, yet simultaneously they experienced

marginalization and injustice as a result of their skin color. DuBois’ called this split “the

Veil.” Though the metaphor was intended principally for African-Americans, it also

captures the dilemma facing the “father of African nationalism,”2 Kwame Nkrumah.

Nkrumah was both African and thoroughly westernized, having grown up in the British-

ruled Gold Coast. He received his elementary education at a Catholic mission school,

college education at Lincoln University in the United States, and did graduate work at the

London School of Economics. Like his mentor DuBois, Nkrumah also experienced double

consciousness. As a western-educated thinker, Nkrumah believed in principles of freedom

and democracy. But like the African-American population, Nkrumah also experienced the

dark side of western values as a child of colonialism. Consequently, he was not a whole-

hearted supporter of all things western, preferring instead a system he referred to as

“scientific socialism”3 or, in its early years, “emergency measures of a totalitarian kind.”4

1 W.E.B. DuBois, The Souls of Black Folk (New York: Barnes and Noble Classics, 2003).2 David Birmingham, Kwame Nkrumah - The Father of African Nationalism (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1998).3 David Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World (London: I.B. Tauris & Co, 1988), p. 1.4 Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah (New York: Nelson, 1957), p. x.

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The story of Nkrumah is the story of a man attempting to reconcile this split identity.

Therefore, the story of Nkrumah and the United States is the story of the conflict resulting

from that attempted reconciliation.

The Question of Post-colonialism

The most immediate area of disagreement caused by the dual consciousness came in

the question of post-colonialism. What did it signify? The west believed it signified that

colonialism had achieved its purpose. March 6, 1957—the day of Ghanaian independence

—was the consummation of colonialism. The sentiment was rampant in the United States

and Great Britain, ranging from Vice President Nixon who said, “Here in Ghana we have as

good an example of a colonial policy at its best as the world can see,”5 to British Premier

Harold Macmillan who said that March 6 was “a great day” for Britain and Ghana because it

marked “the success of what we set our hands to achieve.”6 The most brazen statement

along these lines came from the pen of journalist Ann Fremantle of the New York Times

who saw Nkrumah as “a living witness to the success of the White Fathers’ work and

enduring results.”7

But to Nkrumah the ending of colonialism signaled the ending of a “struggle” and the

rise of “freedom” in Africa. In this regard, Nkrumah was less western and more in line with

the position of the Soviet Union. At the March 8, 1957 vote to accept Ghana into the United

Nations, Soviet representative Arkady A. Sobolev said the admission of Ghana represented

5 Los Angeles Times, "Nixon Aids Inuguration of New Nation, Ghana," March 7, 1957: 11.6 Thomas F. Brady, "Ghana Head Asks U.S. 'Cooperation'," New York Times, March 7, 1957: 9.7 Anne Fremantle, "On the Battleground of Faith, Their Weapon is Charity," New York Times, June 2, 1957: 243.

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the “disintegration of the obsolete colonial system.”8 Here, more than anywhere else, the

veil splitting Nkrumah’s identity as westerner and African was most clearly seen.

Unraveling Ghanaian Identity

A second difficulty is introduced when one considers the slippery question of

Ghanaian identity in the years immediately following independence. While the United

States was a known and well-understood entity by the mid 20th century, Ghana existed only

in embryo. Most of their national borders—as is the case for much of modern Africa—were

fictions. European statesmen with scant knowledge of the area drew many of the modern

day borders for African countries in 1885 at the Conference of Berlin. At the conference,

large swathes of the existing maps were marked terra incognita. The events of the

conference were summed up in these laughably tragic words from Lord Salisbury, the

Prime Minister of Britain, “We have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to

each other, only hindered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly where they

were.”9 The origins of Ghana’s national borders are an even stranger story that began to

develop in 1844. They were not finalized until the 1930s with the union of the coastal area,

the Trans-Volta region, Ashanti, and, lastly, the Northern Territories.

Given such inauspicious beginnings, it is not surprising that the great challenge

facing Nkrumah and every other aspiring Ghanaian politician was to define Ghanaian

identity. Because this was the case, it is impossible to write a straightforward foreign

policy analysis covering the years 1951-1966. Rather than seeing the relationship between

the United States and Ghana as primarily political, then, we must look at it as primarily

8 Lindesay Parrott, "U.N. Unanimous on Ghana Entry," New York Times, March 9, 1957: 1.9 Martin Meredith. The Fate of Africa. New York: Perseus Book Groups. 2005. p. 2

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relational. Prior to 1960, Nkrumah’s quest to define Ghana absorbed much of his time—

leaving little time for defining a cogent foreign policy. As a result, what little foreign policy

there was existed only with the countries Nkrumah knew personally—the United Kingdom,

the United States, and his West African neighbors. The Communist world couldn’t enter the

picture yet because Nkrumah simply lacked the time and resources necessary to begin

forming a relationship with them. Therefore, the first chapter will be scant on political

analysis and will instead adopt a holistic approach to the question of the relationship

between Nkrumah and the United States focusing largely on how the two sides saw one

another.

Further, the issue of Ghanaian identity cannot be separated from the issue of

Nkrumah’s identity. Like many other first generation African leaders, Nkrumah felt that he

was uniquely gifted to be his nation’s savior. What separated Nkrumah was that he was the

first and the most ambitious. In the mind of Nkrumah, he was Ghana. Indeed, his

autobiography published in New York on Ghana’s independence day, March 6, 1957, was

titled Ghana.10 This was the American public’s popular introduction to the man who would

create a New Africa. Interestingly, even at such an early date, one can see that Nkrumah

did not distinguish between himself and his nation. In fact, given that American readers

were wholly ignorant of Nkrumah, it would not be a stretch to say that by naming his

autobiography Ghana and releasing it on March 6, Nkrumah sought to ensure that

Americans would think that he and Ghana shared not only the same name, but the same

date of birth. Perhaps the best illustration of this comes from the caption of an official

portrait hung throughout Ghana in 1961:

10 Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah (New York: Nelson, 1957).

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To millions of people living both inside and outside the continent of Africa, Kwame Nkrumah is Africa and Africa is Kwame Nkrumah. When the question was asked: “What is going to happen in Africa?” it is to one man that everyone looks for the answer: Kwame Nkrumah. To the imperialists and colonialists his name is a curse on their lips; to the settlers his name is a warning that the good old days at the expense of the African are coming to an end; to Africans suffering under foreign domination, his name is a breath of hope and means freedom, brotherhood and racial equality; to us, his people, Kwame Nkrumah is our father, our teacher, our brother, our friend, indeed our very lives, for without him we would no doubt have existed but we would not have lived; there would have been no hope of a cure for our sick souls, no taste of glorious victory after a lifetime of suffering. What we owe is greater even than the air we breathe, for he made us as surely as he made Ghana.11

Of course, if Ghanaian identity was so fiendishly complex, it will come as no surprise

that mid twentieth century Americans were completely lost in their understanding of

Nkrumah and Ghana. Therefore, the best place to begin this study is a brief sketch of Ghana

as a nation and of Nkrumah as a person. With this firm footing, we’ll explore the early

years of the American-Ghanaian relationship.

The Origins of Ghana

It was no coincidence that Nkrumah chose to celebrate Ghana’s independence on

March 6. March 6, 1844 marked the true beginning of British colonialism in the Gold Coast.

On that day a group of seven chiefs along the coastal region—which came to be known as

the Colony—signed an agreement with British officers that made official Britain’s long-

standing commercial presence in the region.12 However, that date is only the beginning of

the evolution of the Gold Coast colony. At independence in 1957, Ghana consisted of

several very distinct regions, only one of which was the coastal region that came under

11 Meredith. p. 180.12 David Birmingham, Kwame Nkrumah - The Father of African Nationalism (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1998) p. 12.

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British control in March 1844. Also part of Ghana were the Northern Territories, a largely

rural area with a small but significant Muslim population, the Trans-Volta region in the

eastern part of the country along the border with Togo, and—most frustrating for

Nkrumah—Ashanti, the central forest region of the nation that was home to the Axim

peoples and the Ashanti empire. Each region had a unique identity and unique set of

problems. Obviously, that made governing all of them under one central government an

enormously difficult task.

The coastal region was the urban center. Historically, it was a major hub for the

slave trade, though its urban roots went back to the 15th century. Of most importance for

Nkrumah was the fact that the coast formed his political base. At the founding of the

republic in 1960, the coastal region’s population stood at close to 3 million, accounting for

nearly half of the 6.6 million total population.13 However, the coastal region also indirectly

created many problems for Nkrumah when most of their cocoa trees had to be chopped

down in the early 1950s due to a wartime outbreak of swollen shoot disease. This

devastated the coast’s economy—which depended upon the cocoa crop—and forced the

national economy to become more dependent on the cocoa crop from the Ashanti region.

The Ashanti region stretched across all of central Ghana. This region became the

country’s economic base for most of Nkrumah’s reign since it had the only healthy, stable

cocoa crop. It had come under British control in 1901 (when it was formally joined with

the coastal region and became part of the Gold Coast) after the Ashanti chief, the

Asantehene, was deposed in 1896. Unfortunately for Nkrumah, it also was a hotbed of

virulent—albeit often incompetent—opposition parties. Ashanti served as a hotbed for

13 Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana 1946-1960 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964) p. XIV.

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what Nkrumah frequently labeled “tribalism,”14 though a more appropriate term would be

Ashanti nationalism. The best that can be said of Nkrumah’s relations with the Ashantis is

that they sometimes learned to tolerate each other long enough to achieve the small

number of goals they did share. More frequently, however, Nkrumah and the opposition

party of the day—invariably with roots in Ashanti—would feud over questions of

economics and politics.

The Northern Territories did not factor as much into the national political scene due

to their largely rural population. Like Ashanti, it came under British control in 1901. Much

of the time the Northern Territories would cooperate with Ashanti in the latest opposition

scheme. Their main contribution, however, never was much more than the potential to

create more voters. While their population was roughly equal to Ashanti’s15, it was almost

entirely rural. In 1960 the population of Kumasi — the urban center of Ashanti — was

220,922. The Northern Territories’ largest city, Tamale, in comparison boasted a

population of only 57,946. This also made it only slightly larger than the third largest city

in the coastal region, Cape Coast.16 The level of education was also significantly lower in

the northern territories. In 1948 the other three regions of the colony had 233,605

children enrolled in infant junior education, which was roughly equivalent to lower-level

elementary school. The Northern Territories had only 3,421 children enrolled in

comparable schools.17 As a result, though they had the potential to be a major voting bloc,

14 Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah (New York: Nelson, 1957) p. 215.15 Austin, p. XIV.16 Ibid, p. 4.17 Ibid, p. 13-4.

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the Northern Territories never did much more than ride the coattails of various Ashanti

opposition groups.

The final region, the Volta, combined with the British Togoland holdings to form the

easternmost portion of Ghana, but its borders were not finalized until 1952. This region

was always something of a wildcard due to their enormous Ewe population. The Ewe were

the dominant group in the Trans-Volta as well as British Togoland and French Togoland. As

a result, the citizens of this region generally had more in common with their neighbors in

Togo than with their fellow Ghanaians. The Volta’s main significance for Ghana, therefore,

came from its geography. Named for the Volta River, it was the site of Nkrumah’s greatest

domestic triumph and tragedy, the Volta Dam Project, which will be discussed at length

later due to its foreign-policy significance.

Nkrumah’s Arrival in the Gold Coast

The man who sought to unite all of these regions was Kwame Nkrumah, an

American-educated member of the Nzimi tribe born in the extreme southwest corner of the

Gold Coast in 1909. In time, he would come to be known by his people as Osagyefo, a term

meaning “redeemer” in the Twi language.18 He was educated in the United States from

1935 to 45, obtaining three degrees from Lincoln University—also alma mater to Nigerian

Prime Minister Nnamdi Azikiwe and American lawyer Thurgood Marshall. He also earned a

Masters degree from the University of Pennsylvania. During his time at Lincoln, Nkrumah

was a regular on the Honor Roll and was seen as a rising star in the student body.19 He then

went to study for a brief time at the London School of Economics before becoming the

18 Basil Davidson, Black Star (London: Allen Lane, 1973). p. 119.19 The Lincolnian, "Honor Roll," October 7, 1939: 3.

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secretary for Caribbean pan-Africanist George Padmore. He played an integral role at the

Fifth Pan-African Conference in Manchester, serving as a behind-the-scenes secretary and

organizing the entire conference. It was at the Manchester Conference that Nkrumah made

his name as a first class organizer. His skills caught the eye of a fellow Ghanaian also

studying in London named Ako Adjei.20 Adjei had known Nkrumah briefly when they both

studied at Lincoln in the United States, but their relationship deepened in London. Adjei

then returned to the Gold Coast and joined a group of lawyers and businessmen in a

grassroots group called the United Gold Coast Convention. The group advocated “self-

government in the shortest possible time.”21 Unfortunately, the party lacked organization

and clarity of vision. They needed a secretary—and Adjei knew just the man for the job.

Nkrumah arrived in the Gold Coast at the end of 1947.

Nkrumah the Man

The most essential trait for understanding Nkrumah is what biographer David

Rooney describes as the “compartmentalization” of his mind. Nkrumah had a way of

completely severing all links in his mind between his personal life and his political life.

Sometimes he went so far as to separate the abstract political principles he endorsed and

the policies he actually enacted. The most jarring example of this quality cited by Rooney

was an episode when Queen Elizabeth II visited Ghana. Nkrumah, who genuinely liked the

queen, greeted her quite warmly, only to say five minutes later in her presence that, “the

20 Kwamina Panford, "Pan-Africanism, Africans in the Diaspora and the OAU," Western Journal of Black Studies 20, no. 3 (Jan. 1996): 140-150. p. 145. 21 Austin, p. 7.

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only good imperialist is a dead one.”22 This feature of his personality makes the study of

him something of a puzzle and made it even more difficult for American politicians or the

American public to understand him. American politicians never fully understood this trait

of his or how it shaped his diplomacy. However, given that Nkrumah himself seldom made

the connections between compartments, the error is somewhat understandable.

The second key to Nkrumah is understanding the substance of his political thought.

Though some have attacked his politics, describing them as “sets of rationales that he could

use to cloak the old-fashioned, garden-variety political machine in ideologically respectable

garments,”23 such glib dismissals fail to do justice to the substantial and still-significant

contributions he made in post-colonial thought. Nkrumah’s core value—a value which

American observers never fully understood or appreciated—was pan-Africanism. From his

early days in the United States where he worked with Nigerian students in the African

Students Association of America and Canada24 to his October 1965 speech in which he said,

“A United Africa is destined to be a great force in world affairs. So the battle is joined. …

We cannot disengage until the wishes and aspirations of our people have been met,”25 his

conviction that Africa must unite was unwavering.

Within that pan-African commitment, he also had strong concerns for the

industrialization of Ghana, the realization of a “scientific socialism” in her government, a

commitment to neutrality in the Cold War, and the creation of a state ready to give up its

22 David Rooney, Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World (London: I.B. Tauris & Co, 1988). p. 242.23 Henry Bretton, The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966). p. 85.24 Rooney, p. 14. 25 Kwame Nkrumah, "My Faith in a Union Government has not Changed," New African, July 2007: 10-16. p. 16.

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own rights in order to unite with other African nations. Most United States politicians and

media never grasped this element of Nkrumah. The few who did dismissed it, perhaps

with reason, as a foolish pipedream. On the whole, however, the Americans never fully

understood Nkrumah’s political philosophy. In the early years, they saw an American

educated politician trying to liberate his country from British colonialism and to modernize

his “backward” nation. In short, they saw an American—or at least as much of an American

as they could when looking at a black man. In his later years, they saw him as a far left

Marxist, an emotionally instable enemy of freedom and a threat to American interests in

Africa. Yet they never understood his pan-African convictions as central. Indeed, Henry

Bretton, an American political scientist and expert on Africa, wrote a nearly 300 page

policy analysis in 1967 that never so much as used the word “pan-Africanism.”26 Likewise,

the foreign policy documents of the time reveal that the Americans saw pan-African

meetings as a relatively insignificant phenomenon that, though tiresome, could be turned

toward their advantage. In a memorandum dated July 10, 1957 Secretary of State John

Foster Dulles wrote, “The Department believes that the holding of a conference of

independent African states is a natural development which should not be discouraged even

though it may be premature and will in all probability be turned into a forum for the

denunciation of colonialism and all its works.”27

Another key to understanding Nkrumah is that though the political compartment

dominated his mind, there was also a considerable concern and affection for individual

26 Henry Bretton, The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966).27 Circular Instruction from the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions and Counsular Offices, July 10, 1957, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, ed. John P. Glennon, Vol. XVIII (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 68.

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human beings. In her biography, Nkrumah’s mistress Genoveva Marais writes, “Kwame

Nkrumah was sensitive. A hard man could not have achieved what he did. … If he had been

hard he would probably still have been in power for his entire life.”28 Likewise, during his

rare vacations, the crew of the ship on which he sailed always reported that he was a

cheerful, charming guest, noting that “he captivated everyone by his charm and

enthusiasm.”29

These features—a compartmentalized mind, the preeminence of politics in his

identity, and his affable personality—combined to make him an enigma to the United States

for the duration of his regime. The fact that such a complex figure governed such a complex

nation only compounded the problem. With this contextual material, we can now turn our

attention to the early relationship between the United States and Kwame Nkrumah, which

began in earnest in 1951 when he was elected Head of Government Business for the Gold

Coast.

28 Genoveva Marais, Kwame Nkrumah as I Knew Him (Chichester: Janay Publishing Company, 1972). p. 16.29 Rooney, p. 87-8.

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Chapter 1 - “A Shock to Us All”When Governor General Sir Charles Arden-Clarke released Kwame Nkrumah from

prison in 1951, it seemed crazy to suggest that within six years he would become the most

widely-known leader in sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, by 1957 the Gold Coast had evolved into

Ghana with Nkrumah engineering the rapid changes. In this chapter we’ll consider the first

official contact with the west. We’ll also examine one of the main keys to his emergence as

the generally friendly face of revolutionary Africa in the west—his relationship with the

aforementioned Arden-Clarke.

The 1951 Election

In 1951 Nkrumah burst onto the scene with a surprise election victory engineered

from a Fort James prison cell. The New York Times first reported the results on February

10, “Mr. Nkrumah, a one-time divinity student in the United States and a London University

graduate, won a Parliamentary seat by an overwhelming vote.”30 The story went on to

name his top aide, one “Kamlo Gbedemah,” as the leader of the party while Nkrumah was

incarcerated. The story is noteworthy not only for being the first to cover Nkrumah, but for

its factual inaccuracies. Such inaccuracies and misunderstandings would plague the

relationship between the two powers throughout Nkrumah’s regime. The specific Times

piece had two significant inaccuracies. First, during his time in the United States, Nkrumah

was principally a philosophy student and he never studied at the University of London.

Rather, he was enrolled in the London School of Economics. Further, his top aide—and the

30 New York Times, "Gold Coast in 1st Vote; People's Party Wins 34 Out of 38 Elective Seats," New York Times, February 10, 1951: 5.

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de facto head of the party during Nkrumah’s imprisonment—was Komla Gbedemah, not

“Kamlo.” Such inauspicious beginnings were a fitting preface to the early years of

Nkrumah’s political relationship with the United States.

The elections that Nkrumah won were the result of a new constitution in the Gold

Coast, one of many that were passed during the late days of British rule. The 1951

constitution was pushed through in response to the United Gold Coast Convention’s

campaigning for self-government “in the shortest possible time.” The campaign had begun

in earnest during the aftermath of World War II after many British colonial subjects had

participated on the side of the Allies.31 Nkrumah had arrived in the Gold Coast in 1947 to

aid the UGCC in their campaign. However, when he arrived he found that the UGCC was

comprised entirely of chiefs, businessmen, and lawyers—hardly the sort of crowd a young

revolutionary like Nkrumah would approve. In his autobiography Nkrumah says that after

arriving he quickly “concluded that the sponsors of the [UGCC] were men whose political

philosophy was contrary to the political aspirations of the people of the Gold Coast.”32 Over

the next year he pursued a much more radical course within the UGCC, establishing a youth

committee as the driving force for reform. In time, the differences between the UGCC’s

executive committee and Nkrumah’s younger supporters drove the two groups apart,

leading to Nkrumah’s creation of the Convention People’s Party. Upon creating the CPP, he

immediately began a hard-line campaign calling for immediate self-government, a sharp

departure from the more moderate, bourgeois sensibility of the intelligentsia and chiefs of

the UGCC.

31 Austin, p. 11.32 Nkrumah, Autobiography. p. 62.

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Amongst the tactics included was what Nkrumah called “positive action,” which, like

future civil rights movements in the United States, relied upon boycott and non-violent

demonstrations to force change. Nkrumah described it as “constitutional and legitimate

use of non-violent methods.”33 Due to the aggression of his campaign and sporadic

violence, Nkrumah was arrested by order of the Gold Coast Governor, Charles Arden-

Clarke. He was then sentenced to three one-year terms, for inciting people to take part in

an illegal strike, coercing the government, and sedition.34 While in prison he obtained a

pencil and wrote campaign instructions on toilet paper that were smuggled out to

Gbedemah. Nkrumah’s decision to contest the election should not, however, be mistaken

for support of the 1951 constitution. In fact, he dismissed it as “bogus and fraudulent.”35

But his political realism dictated that he participate in the elections anyway. His sizable

base with the young men of the coastal areas along with Gbedemah’s capable campaigning

guaranteed an impressive victory for Nkrumah over the UGCC.

Of the 38 parliamentary seats up for grabs, Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party

won 34. In Nkrumah’s constituency of Accra (which had two seats), he won 20,780 votes.

The other seat went to Thomas Hutton-Mills, a fellow member of the CPP, who took 19,812

votes. The next closest finishers included Adjei, who gained only 1,451 votes.36 Upon

receiving the results, Arden-Clarke decided to release Nkrumah and allow him to set up a

government. As the leader of the victorious party, Nkrumah inherited the title of Head of

Government Business. The clumsy title had been created when it was expected that a

British government official would win the office, in which case the title was immaterial

33 Nkrumah, Autobiography. p. 111.34 Ibid, p. 55.35 Chicago Daily Tribune, "Constitution of Gold Coast Called Bogus," February 14, 1951: A4.36 Austin, p. 103.

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because he would simply report to Clarke. But when Nkrumah won on a platform of self-

government now, he became the de facto premier of the emerging Gold Coast government.

With the election win, Nkrumah set the Gold Coast on a path to independence. The United

States looked on from across the Atlantic, unsure of what to expect but cautiously

optimistic.

First Contact, 1951

From the beginning of Nkrumah’s regime, the United States understood that his

election—or even the possibility of his election—signaled a sea change in African politics.

Only a few weeks before his election, an American official in Accra sent a memorandum to

the Executive Director of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs

recommending that the status of the Accra office be raised to consulate general.

“Strategically, the Gold Coast is very important to the United States, both as a potential

military base and as a source of supply for strategic materials…. The Gold Coast is also

becoming more and more important as the meeting place for various national and

international borders.”37 Given the importance of the Gold Coast, the Americans observed

the election closely. When they learned that Lincoln University had awarded Nkrumah an

honorary doctorate of law after his victory, they invited Nkrumah to visit Washington while

he was in the country to receive his degree. Nkrumah, accompanied by newly-appointed

Minister of Education and Social Welfare Kojo Botsio, left Accra for London on May 30. He

37 Memorandum by the Director of the Office of African Affairs (Bourgerie) to the Executive Director of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jago). U.S. Department of State, January 23, 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States 1951, ed. John P. Glennon, Vol. V (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1989). p. 1267.

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arrived in New York on June 3 after taking a few days in London to visit his friend and

former boss George Padmore.

The Christian Science Monitor reported on Nkrumah’s visit in an article that

encapsulates many of the problems facing the relationship between the USA and Nkrumah.

The article reported on the Gold Coast’s need for American dollars to finance the ambitious

projects of Nkrumah, which included the Volta Dam. The dam would become Nkrumah’s

greatest accomplishment and his great downfall, but in 1951 that was far from apparent.

Also of note in the article was the writer’s description of Nkrumah’s beliefs:

Mr. Nkrumah himself said that his earlier threats to call an African People’s Congress had only been an answer to extreme warnings from South African Prime Minister Daniel F. Malan and had been dropped when the British Government announced its support of the principle of self-government. Any linking of his name to Communism, Mr. Nkrumah said, was “an imperialist bogy.”38

This was the first mention in the American media or foreign policy documents of

Nkrumah’s pan-African ambitions, which were fundamentally misunderstood as a

communist movement that would place Africa in lock step with the Soviet world. This

misunderstanding became symptomatic of the basic miscommunication between the

United States and Nkrumah. To the United States, self-government in Africa represented

the consummation of colonialism, signaling a new period of peace and harmonious

relations between the wedded powers of the western first world and the properly educated

Africans. Nkrumah did not share this view, though the west did not immediately realize it.

Indeed, within the Christian Science Monitor article Nkrumah said, “American-educated

natives mix around more with the masses,”39which suggested a pro-American outlook. The

38 Mary Hornaday, "African Gold Coast Seeks U.S. Dollars," Christian Science Monitor, June 9, 1951: 6.39 Ibid.

19

use of the word “natives” was significant as well, since it showed Nkrumah speaking a

language that Americans would find acceptable, even if Africans considered the term

demeaning.

For their part, the American government quickly contacted Nkrumah upon his

arrival and hosted a luncheon for him in Washington. At the luncheon Assistant Secretary

of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs George McGhee welcomed

Nkrumah, describing Nkrumah’s years as a student in the United States and expressing

hope for future American-Ghanaian relations.

During this formative period of his life in the United States he came to know us well. He came to know that faith in freedom and progress is a dominant trait in American character. Freedom and progress are as indissolubly bound to each other as air is to life. The only limitation we have put on freedom is that it be exercised in such a way as not to interfere with the freedom of others.40

One can only imagine what an avowed anti-colonial revolutionary like Nkrumah

must have thought as he heard the final sentence. McGhee also used the luncheon to serve

notice to the Kremlin that Africa would not become a Communist stronghold. It

encapsulated the American attitude toward colonialism, an attitude that in time would put

them at odds with Nkrumah’s more revolutionary conception of it. McGhee said:

The decision to go forward in the face of [many] obstacles can be attributed only to a sincerity of purpose in carrying out the long avowed objectives of British colonial policy of advancing the dependent peoples to self-government as rapidly as conditions permit. It represents an incontestable denial of the oft-repeated charges of the Kremlin that the

40 Remarks Made by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) at an Official Luncheon in Honor of the Gold Coast Leader of Government Business (Nkrumah), Washington, June 8, 1951, U.S. Department of State,Foreign Relations of the United States 1951, ed. John P. Glennon, Vol. V (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1989). p. 1271

20

British and other Western Nations are intent on keeping dependent peoples in permanent subjection.41

Nkrumah, unfazed by McGhee’s words and ever the politician, used his “American

interlude”42 for more than just asking for American funding to support his ambitious

projects and to meet American politicians. He also made a trip to Philadelphia, where he

was greeted by the mayor and given the keys of the city.43 His time at Lincoln was, for the

most part, equally promising. In his speech he said that in the Gold Coast, “We are aiming

to work under democratic principles such as exist in Britain and in the United States.”44

Yet in his account of the trip, there was a hint of Nkrumah’s leeriness of the United

States, perhaps triggered by his awareness of obvious differences on the role of colonialism

and the meaning of African self-government. In the autobiography, Nkrumah made a

revealing comment that suggests that even in these early days there was a subtext of

suspicion, lingering beneath the external niceties that characterized the trip. Upon

reaching Lincoln University, Nkrumah discovered that his suitcase was missing. The case

was never found, though it was returned to Accra weeks later, completely intact. Nkrumah

and his friends joked that “my belongings might have been taken for inspection by the

Federal Bureau of Investigation.”45 He had been stopped when he attempted to enter Accra

in 1947 due to his attendance at meetings of the British Communist Party, so Nkrumah’s

joke was not entirely groundless.

In any event, the trip was by all accounts a smashing success. Through it, Nkrumah

made connections with American leaders within months of rising to the Head of

41 Ibid, p. 1272.42 Nkrumah, Autobiography. p. 157.43 Ibid, p. 159.44 Ibid, p. 164.45 Ibid, p. 160.

21

Government Business. He also used the time to meet with many old friends and several

government officials. When it came time to leave, he sent a grateful telegram to McGhee:

Words of adequate terms are not within my reach to express my heartfelt thanks for the cordial reception accorded me during my short visit to the United States. I also want to think you for the courtesy and attention shown myself and the Honourable Kojo Botsio, Gold Coast Minister of Education and Social Welfare. The exceptional air of gesture coupled with everything that is worthy of appreciate was characteristic of your making my visit to the United States most comfortable.46

McGhee quickly wired back, saying it was a “great pleasure” to see him and that the

United States was always ready to work with Nkrumah in “every appropriate manner.”47 By

all accounts, the trip was enormously successful in forging relationships and establishing a

rapport that would allow Nkrumah to pursue his agenda for the Gold Coast with full

confidence in the United States’ help and support.

Kwame Nkrumah and the Governor

Upon his return to the Gold Coast, Nkrumah resumed his work of building a

government, developing a national identity, and obtaining self-government. Instrumental

in this task was the British governor, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke. Nkrumah was generally a

lonely man, but the friends that he did make he trusted without any doubt or question. In

time, he would develop a great dependence on them. Arden-Clarke became his first such

confidante during his time as head of the Gold Coast government. Their unlikely friendship

developed over the course of Nkrumah’s time as Prime Minister prior to independence. By

the time independence was gained, the two had become good friends, enjoying a “close,

46 Telegram sent by Nkrumah to McGhee, August 8, 1951, U.S. Department of State,Foreign Relations of the United States 1951, ed. John P. Glennon, Vol. V (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 1271.47 Ibid.

22

friendly, and not unfruitful partnership.”48 When Arden-Clarke received the dispatch from

London announcing the Gold Coast’s independence in the fall of 1956, he called Nkrumah to

Christiansborg Castle, the seat of the British presence in Accra, to hear the news. He

described the scene that followed in a letter to his wife. “After [Nkrumah] had read the text

of the dispatch he looked up and said in a rather awed voice ‘H.E. that’s nice.’… Then

[Nkrumah] goes to the House for his great moment, which in his own words is going to

‘come as a shock to all of us.’”49 The seeds of this friendship could be seen several years

before in a February 1952 conversation between Arden-Clarke and William Cole, the

American ambassador in Accra. Cole reported: “Sir Charles regarded Nkrumah as a man of

great vitality and personal charm, who, with the burdens of government, has shown a

growing sense of responsibility and understanding. … Sir Charles was mildly optimistic

toward the chances that the experiment of self-rule in the Gold Coast would continue

successful.”50 In another show of support for Nkrumah, Arden-Clarke never used the veto

powers accorded to him by the constitution that was in place from 1951 to 1957. Curious

—and skeptical—American officials quizzed him on this very point, but Arden-Clarke’s

response when asked about using the veto powers responded that, “He did not anticipate

having to [use them].”51 By all accounts, Arden-Clarke proved a sincere friend to the new

Head of Government Business and, as of March 21, 1952, Prime Minister.52 “Old racial and

48 Austin, p. 153.49 Rooney, p. 124-5.50 U.S. Consul Cole’s Meeting with Gold Coast Governor Arden-Clarke, January 31, 1952, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954, ed. John P. Glennon, Vol. XI (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 263.51 Ibid.52 The Washington Post, "Gold Coast Picks Premier," March 22, 1952: 4.

23

ideological prejudices were suppressed, and full cooperation was accorded to the new

politicians,” according to biographer David Birmingham.53

However, as was the case with the American officials he met, Nkrumah and Arden-

Clarke shared radically different ideas of what the end of British colonialism in the Gold

Coast meant. At the state opening of Parliament on March 6, Arden-Clarke addressed the

assembly. During his speech he said, “In so far as the birth of Ghana today is the natural

outcome of British Colonialism, I am proud to be a British colonialist.” To Nkrumah, such a

sentiment was unthinkable. His view of colonialism was closer to that of Wallace Johnson,

a Siera Leonean revolutionary whose opinion of colonialism was radically different and

who aptly expressed Nkrumah’s view when he said:

Personally, I believe the European has a god in whom he believes and whom he is representing in his churches all over Africa. He believes in the god whose name is spelt deceit. He believes in the god whose law is, “Ye strong, you must weaken the weak. Ye ‘civilized’ European, you must ‘civilize’ the ‘barbarous’ Africans with machine guns. Ye Christian Europeans, you must ‘Christianise’ the pagan Africans with bombs, poison gases, etc.!”54

Of course, voicing such views was what first landed Nkrumah in prison, so he

seldom expressed them as openly as Johnson. Yet his later actions show that his

convictions had not changed, even if the manner in which he expressed them had. What

made Nkrumah unique, however, amongst the post-colonial revolutionaries was not that

he held these views, but his ability to compartmentalize and his political acumen. He was

still able to maintain a very close relationship with the western world, which by all

accounts included many genuine friendships with leaders like Arden-Clarke. Indeed,

53 Birmingham, p. 40.54 Nkrumah, Autobiography. p. 22-3.

24

Nkrumah seemed to develop a dependence upon Arden-Clarke as an advisor and friend.

On September 17, 1956, the day that Nkrumah received word that the Gold Coast would

become independent within the year, he reported the following conversation with the

governor:

“Prime Minister,” the governor said, as he extended his hand to me. “This is a great day for you. It is the end of what you have struggled for.”“It is the end of what we have been struggling for, Sir Charles,” I corrected him. “You have contributed a great deal toward this; in fact, I might not have succeeded without your help and cooperation. This is a very happy day for us both!”I arranged with the Governor that I would return the following morning and collect the dispatch from him and immediately afterwards read it to the Legislative Assembly.“This has been a national struggle,” I said, “and it is only right that when the date of Independence is announced, the whole nation knows it from my lips.”The Governor nodded agreement. “Before you go, P.M., I would like to express my heartfelt congratulations on this great day,” he said, “and also my best wishes for the future of you and your colleagues and the people of Ghana. “ As he walked to the door with me he added, “And you know, P.M., that so long as I remain here in as Governor, I shall continue to do all I can to help.”“Thank you, Sir Charles,” I said. “I have always been deeply grateful for your help.”55

The nature of Nkrumah’s relationship with Arden-Clarke was important to the

question of foreign policy for two reasons. First, the portrayal above, which is reflective of

the overall tone of the Autobiography, became the first extensive portrayal to the United

States of his relationship with western leaders. This contributed to the sense of optimism

that the United States took into the early years of the Nkrumah regime. Nkrumah’s

relationship with Arden-Clarke told western leaders that he was a reasonable cool-headed

politician rapidly out-growing the revolutionary activism of his youth. Perhaps more

55 Nkrumah, Autobiography. p. 282.

25

importantly, it told the west that Nkrumah could be a malleable leader, whose opinions and

policies could be shaped by other western leaders.

Second, it reflected Nkrumah’s ability to compartmentalize. It showed that a man

with whom he could have great differences—indeed, a man who had imprisoned him—

could become a close friend and advisor. As was the case with Elizabeth II and as would be

the case with President John F. Kennedy, Nkrumah had a remarkable ability to separate his

personal feelings for people from his opinion of their politics. While this trait would

contribute to his downfall due to his inability to synthesize the compartments, it also

allowed him to rise to power in the first place. A bourgeois intellectual could not have led

the independence struggle. Indeed, lawyer J.B. Danquah and Oxford-trained sociologist

K.A. Busia both attempted to, with minimal success. Yet a typical hard-left candidate could

never have gained the British trust as Nkrumah did. But thanks to his unique ability to

separate the political and the personal, Nkrumah was able to navigate these dangerous

waters. Unfortunately, his ability to compartmentalize would not always serve him so well.

Like many other historical figures, Nkrumah’s greatest gifts and curses were one and the

same. The difficulties created by both Nkrumah’s policies and his personality would begin

to rise to the surface after his 1951 victory.

26

Chapter 2—“Self Government Now!”—The Independence Struggle, 1951-1957

Two of the most iconic scenes in Kwame Nkrumah’s remarkable life came in 1951

and 1957. In 1951 he emerged from a prison cell to lead a nation. In 1957 he celebrated

that nation’s independence, joined by a diverse group of international leaders that included

Chinese ambassadors, Russian ambassadors, the Dutchess of Kent from Britain and

American Vice President Richard Nixon. What happened between these events, however, is

vital to understanding Nkrumah as a politician. The intermittent years between his two

great triumphs consisted of dealing with one opposition party after another on the

domestic front and taking the initial steps toward developing a viable foreign policy.

During these early years as head of government, Nkrumah’s primary opposition

came from domestic foes, most of whom originated in Ashanti. The Gold Coast was not a

large enough player on the international scale to merit anything other than a mostly-benign

flagging interest from the rest of the world. However, Nkrumah’s handling of the

opposition parties during this time became a pattern for how he handled opposition post-

independence as well. Nkrumah, a passionate pan-Africanist and post-colonialist, did not

see a substantial difference between domestic opposition and international opposition. In

both cases, he saw them as agents of imperialism who undermined African unity. What

changed for Nkrumah was not the nature of the opposition, but simply its scale. So when

he became the globetrotting African revolutionary in his later years he drew on the lessons

learned from his struggles with various opposition groups in the colonial Gold Coast.

Domestically, the challenge facing Nkrumah during his time as Prime Minister of the

Gold Coast was the question of how to unite the many disparate parties and factions in the

27

larger colony. For Nkrumah, this question was central due to its ramifications for the

question of pan-Africanism. If he was unable to unite the Gold Coast, how could he ever

dream of uniting West Africa, much less the entire continent? As a result, the question of

opposition parties became an issue of both domestic and foreign policy. Understanding his

response to opposition leaders like K.A. Busia and J.B. Danquah helps explain his future

responses to leaders like American Presidents Dwight Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Lyndon

Johnson. The opposition of this period came in three phases: First, the UGCC in the 1951

elections, then the independent elections of 1954, and finally the National Liberation

Movement in the 1956 election. During the six years many noteworthy events took place

that influenced Nkrumah’s future foreign policy with the United States.

The primary point of contention between the UGCC and Nkrumah’s newly-emergent

CPP in 1951 was not necessarily a question of policy. Both parties wanted self-

government. They simply disagreed on how soon it should be obtained. The difference

was best encapsulated in the UGCC’s slogan of “self-government in the shortest time

possible,” compared to the CPP’s “self-government now.” The most noteworthy

characteristic of Nkrumah that emerged during this era was his radicalism and single-

mindedness. It’s not uncommon to see such qualities in a student leader or a political

organizer, which were Nkrumah’s previous forays into politics. But to see those qualities

preserved after election success was less common. Yet those qualities were on full display

in “self-government now!” While his advisors, notably Gbedemah, could use revolutionary

rhetoric while maintaining a more measured, comprehensive approach behind the scenes,

Nkrumah’s on-stage persona—the fiery revolutionary—and his backroom diplomatic

persona were, on matters of policy at least, the same. From the 1951 elections grew the

28

seeds of the future veneration of Nkrumah that would become a major problem in his

relations with the United States, perhaps culminating in scholar Henry Bretton’s

excoriating critique of what he called the “political machine” in Ghana. One example of the

growing adulation of Nkrumah—who never suffered from a small ego to begin with—was

the CPP’s paper, the Evening News, which published a story saying, “Chameleon

organizations shall pass away but the Political Holy Ghost, CPP, shall stay forevermore!

Long live Kwame!”56 The declaration lacked the more extreme adoration of future days, yet

the use of Christian imagery for the divine to describe Nkrumah’s movement was present,

even at this early date. The so-called “personality cult” surrounding Nkrumah would

become a major point of contention, first with the opposition parties in subsequent

elections and then with the United States in the early 1960s.

However, it is difficult to draw much more than these basic reflections from the

1951 election. The UGCC was, putting it kindly, a poorly-organized opposition party.

Arden-Clarke told an American representative that Danquah’s UGCC lacked “any

substance,” saying, “It possesses no following at present, and [I doubt] that Danquah would

ever gain the support of an appreciable number of adherents.”57 Danquah’s movement

suffered from both a lack of charismatic figures as well as a total lack of organization with

the departure of their secretary, Nkrumah. As a result, Nkrumah’s skills as a politician

were not considerably tested until after the 1951 victory.

The 1954 Elections

56 Austin, p. 12757 U.S. Consul Cole’s Meeting with Gold Coast Governor Arden-Clarke, March 26, 1952, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954, ed. John P. Glennon, Vol. XI (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 268.

29

The next major opposition arose partly under the leadership of an Oxford trained

sociologist named Kofi Busia just in time for the 1954 elections. Commonly referred to as

the “independent elections,”58 the 1954 contest presented new challenges to Nkrumah.

Though Busia was a brilliant sociologist, even publishing an extensive study on the role of

the chief in Ashanti society59, his Ghana Congress Party would not be Nkrumah’s greatest

opposition. The GCP became an organizational disaster almost immediately. Initially an

attempt to formally recognize the unofficial union of Nkrumah-opposition between the

UGCC and the chiefs, Busia’s party quickly began to attract the malcontents of Nkrumah’s

CPP as well. Ordinarily this might be a boon for an opposition party, but for the GCP it was

disastrous. The GCP was comprised largely of the moderate wing of the UGCC that had

stayed after Nkrumah left and took the revolutionaries with him. Busia also succeeded in

adding a small group of chiefs to the movement. These were largely the same people who

in 1946 had campaigned on a platform of self-government “in the shortest possible time.”

They were hardly a group of fire-breathing revolutionaries. Unfortunately for the GCP, the

CPP malcontents were not moderates frustrated by Nkrumah’s extremism, but radicals

frustrated by Nkrumah’s perceived temperance. The result was a disastrous political union

in which all of Nkrumah’s enemies joined together in a party doomed from the start. The

party was powerful enough to be a thorn in Nkrumah’s side, but never unified enough to

mount a serious threat. Further, like the UGCC before it, the GCP struggled to organize

itself. Austin writes, “The party lacked any solid base of support except where it was able

to draw strength from local interests intimately associated with individuals within the

58 Austin, p. 210.59 K.A. Busia, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti (London, 1951).

30

party.”60 Busia would have his day in the limelight, but it would not come until the 1956

elections. In 1954, the most immediate struggle for Nkrumah was a popular uprising

within his own CPP, the first of several during these formative years.

The primary struggle facing Nkrumah in 1954 was the issue of CPP identity. Again,

this becomes a small-scale picture of the larger struggle to come after independence. What

defined the Convention People’s Party? For that matter, what defined a revolutionary

African? What of African nationalism? Nkrumah, for all his talents as an organizer and

charismatic leader, faced an uphill battle in unifying a five-year-old political party centered

around uniting a nation that was still in its infancy. Additionally, the 1954 elections placed

greater power in the hands of the Africans. The new constitution allowed for 104

parliamentary seats to be determined by popular vote, rather than 38 as in the 1951

election. As a result, the CPP needed to find 66 more candidates than they had three years

before. Determining whom those candidates would be proved a monumentally difficult

task for the party. Whenever two candidates wanted to run for the same seat, they would

both appear before the CPP’s leadership to be evaluated. At the end of the evaluation “a

choice was made, an objection lodged, the decision upheld (or, what was worse, changed)

and the disappointed party member then stood as a ‘rebel’ Independent.”61 While the issue

of independent candidates affected all parties, the problem was most acute in the CPP. Due

to Nkrumah’s concern with national unity, he had no tolerance for these independent

candidates, seeing them as a threat to the party’s health and African independence. “It was

60 Austin, p. 182. 61 Ibid, p. 210.

31

vital that the Party should not be allowed to become disorganized or to be weakened by the

split that this would ultimately bring about,” he wrote in the Autobiography.62

But, in the end, Nkrumah’s calls—first frustrated and then increasingly angry—fell

on deaf ears, leading to an election with more independent candidates than affiliated in

both the Colony and Ashanti. A total of 154 of the 323 candidates nationwide were

independents.63 However, despite these odds, Nkrumah was able to overcome them and

guide the CPP to victory, using the combined forces of the well-oiled CPP machinery under

Gbedemah and the considerable personal clout that came with his name. With the victory

in 1954, the path seemed clear for independence to be granted by 1955. Unfortunately for

Nkrumah, however, a final opposition party would arise, further delaying independence.

Unlike the UGCC and GCP, this new movement had some teeth.

Ashanti and the Final Election in 1956

The epicenter of anti-CPP campaigning was the central region of Ashanti. Not only

did Busia enjoy a strong base there for his more moderate campaign, but the region also

was home to the fiercely nationalistic Ashanti people who would’ve opposed Nkrumah with

or without Busia’s leadership. The issue of nationalism colored every area of policy, but it

especially complicated the question of what model of government the Ghanaians would

adopt. Ashanti favored a federal model that would preserve much of the region’s

autonomy. Nkrumah and the governing CPP favored a centralized model that would make

Accra the hub of government and lead to the creation of a socialist welfare state. The

controversy would bubble to the surface late in 1954 after the elections were held in July of

62 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 208.63 Austin, p. 236.

32

that year. The ramifications for this debate in foreign policy were two-fold: First and most

obvious, in the highly-politicized climate of the Cold War, any leftward drifting in any area

of policy was seen by the United States as a sign of hostility and it was this controversy that

began to precipitate Nkrumah’s eventual hard left turn that would be fully realized in the

1960s. Second, and more central to understanding Nkrumah, a strong central government

was necessary for his pan-African vision to become a reality. If Ghana could not even be

united under a strong centralized form of government, then his larger pan-African dream

was impossible.

The conflict over form of government began after the 1954 elections in which the

CPP again won in a landslide in the coastal region. Once again, however, they failed to gain

a foothold in Ashanti or the Northern Territories. Though none of the candidates—much

less the foreign powers—understood each other’s views well enough to know it at the time,

Busia’s view of colonialism aligned nicely with the views of the western world. He once

gave a speech on colonialism and the west’s role in Ghana’s independence that Nixon would

call “one of the most reasoned, balanced, and objective analyses of the colonial problem I

have ever heard.”64 However, Busia was incapable of mounting a serious threat in the 1954

election since his platform did not depart sufficiently from the already-discredited UGCC.

What the 1954 election did for Busia, though, was to allow him to get a foothold in his

native Ashanti. In the aftermath of the elections when the controversy over form of

government rose to the surface, Busia’s name quickly became synonymous with the

opposition effort. As he campaigned for a more limited, federal system of government,

64 John Hughes, "New Role Symbolized," Christian Science Monitor, April 24, 1957: 3.

33

Busia foreshadowed many future concerns that the Americans would one day express in

regards to Nkrumah.

Like the Americans, the Ashantis saw Nkrumah’s broad ambitions as aspirations to a

dictatorship.65 Further, due to their historical preeminence in the region, the Ashantis felt

that they should be afforded a greater level of influence and autonomy. There was also

lingering bitterness over their long and unaided fight against the British. Former CPP

member and Ashanti representative B.F. Kusi expressed it succinctly in an assembly

speech in November 1952. He said:

If in 1900 we had the support of all sections of the country we could fought the British Empire and driven the British away and it would have been unnecessary for us today to agitate for self-government…. Another point is sentiment. All Ashantis express the sentiment that Ashanti is a nation and that fact has been accepted. We are not a region at all; we should be considered as a nation. Population alone does not make a country.66

Of course, Nkrumah saw such attitudes as no better than tribalism and therefore

(somewhat ironically) dismissed them as a vestige of the colonial mind, a trap that would

further enslave Africa to new forms of European colonialism. The result was, just as would

happen in the early 1960s with the United States, the two sides failed to fully understand

each other, which led to conflict. Further complicating this debate was the question of

colonialism’s role in Africa and the Gold Coast. The Ashantis saw themselves as a nation

and their membership in the Gold Coast as a colonial imposition. By recognizing that

imposition, Nkrumah joined in league with the colonialists in suppressing Ashanti.

Nkrumah, on the other hand, saw the factionalism and separatism of Ashanti as a hindrance

65 Rooney, p. 101.66 Austin, p. 178.

34

to African unity—and to Nkrumah, unity was the most necessary thing for resisting the

colonialists. In short, then, both sides felt that the other was aiding the colonialists.

Another factor that complicated the issue was the primacy of Ashanti in the Gold

Coast’s economy. Cocoa was the nation’s chief—and, essentially, only—export. From 1937

to 1952 the price increased ten-fold.67 However, after 1948 nearly the entire cocoa crop

was based in Ashanti. The outbreak of swollen shoot disease in 1948 had led to the cutting

out of most the coastal region’s crop. Further, the handling of the outbreak had created

mistrust between the cocoa farmers and the government. Due to a series of

misunderstandings and poor communications, the farmers had never understood the

threat posed by swollen shoot. As a result, they refused to cut down the infected trees that

endangered the entire crop. Therefore, the government sent agents to the fields to chop

down the plants, something the farmers did not understand and resented deeply. This

mistrust of government agents continued in parts of the country, further feeding the fears

of a strong centralized government, such as proposed by Nkrumah. More importantly, the

Ashanti quickly learned to use their economic dominance for leverage in other areas of

national debate. In one parliamentary debate in which Ashanti demanded more seats in

the assembly, the CPP reasoned that it was represented proportionally according to

population, leading Ashanti representative C.E. Osei to respond, echoing Kusi’s earlier

remark: “What do you mean by population? Look here, my friends, there is no Government

that can stand because it has population alone; it must have money backing it. You must be

prepared to buy our good will.”68

67 Ibid, p. 157. 68 Ibid, p. 179.

35

Essentially, the federation/centralization controversy furnished Nkrumah’s

opposition with tangible policy differences to discuss, rather than simply campaigning on a

platform of gradual change and personal dislike for Nkrumah. Further, the issue became a

galvanizing point for the many opposition parties in the Gold Coast, leading to the creation

late in 1954 of the National Liberation Movement. This group would become Nkrumah’s

final great challenge on the road to independence, forcing him to resort to new measures to

cement his position as the revolutionary leader of the Gold Coast and introducing new

approaches to government that would become common after independence was granted.

The NLM first formed in the fall of 1954, shortly after the June elections. It was led

by Busia and Bafour Osei Akoto, a wealthy cocoa farmer. Both hailed from Ashanti. What

galvanized the group and brought Akoto—a widely respected leader in Ashanti who

worked as a linguist for the chief—into the picture was Gbedemah’s proposal in August of a

new cocoa pricing structure. Busia and Akoto saw the move as another instance of

government overreach and began a vociferous protest movement. Out of this protest was

born the idea of the Gold Coast as a federal system, rather than Nkrumah’s preferred

centralized model. The federation model quickly gained steam throughout the Northern

Territories and in parts of the Trans-Volta region. The Northern Territories joined the

movement in hopes that a federal model would allow them a greater voice in the

government and more opportunities for development while the Trans-Volta region

supported it in hopes that a loose federation might allow the majority Ewe population of

the region to someday reunite with the Ewes in neighboring Togo and Dahomey (modern-

day Benin). The net result of the movement was that by the middle of 1955, political

violence was escalating, including the October 9, 1954 stabbing death of CPP dissident E.Y.

36

Baffoe in a dispute between CPP and NLM members at a house in Ashanti New Town.69 As

a result of the rising violence, the NLM was able to argue to the British that the Gold Coast

was not yet ready for independence and that another election was needed. Nkrumah

protested, saying that granting another election legitimized the violence he attributed

entirely to NLM rebels.70 However, the British granted another election, forcing Nkrumah

and the CPP to mount one final campaign before independence. As it turned out, the 1956

campaign became the most important of them all. In this election, the CPP was forced to

adopt more aggressive campaign methods in the face of their first viable opposition since

their founding seven years before.

In the field of foreign policy, the most significant development from the election was

the increased emphasis on Nkrumah as the face of the CPP and—therefore—of the Gold

Coast. After the 1954 election victory the party’s paper The Evening News published a

warning to all opposition leaders. It highlighted the increased emphasis on Nkrumah

during the intermediary years between his election and independence.

Kwame Nkrumah, Man of Destiny, Star of Africa, Hope of Millions of down-trodden Blacks, Deliverer of Ghana, Iron Boy, Great Leader of Street Boys, personable and handsome Boy from Nzima, Kwame Nkrumah has given his answers to all the twaddle and tripe and the dirty scribblers of the [opposition papers].71

Clearly, the warning went unheard by Busia and Akoto. In the days that followed,

the NLM continued to grow, even claiming an election victory to fill a parliamentary seat

after the MP died. As their influence grew, the CPP rhetoric grew. At a CPP rally,

Gbedemah assured the crowds that independence was imminent, regardless of the NLM’s

69 Austin, p. 262.70 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 249.71 Austin, p. 281-2.

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campaign success. If independence were not granted, the CPP “might be forced to declare

themselves independent.”72 Interestingly, in the same speech Gbedemah said American

support of such a radical move was certain, saying the United States would recognize the

Gold Coast as an independent sovereign state. As both parties approached the 1956

elections, tensions continued to grow, as did the odds that the NLM might pull off the upset

and defeat the CPP. However, on election day, the CPP once again claimed victory—and a

shockingly decisive one, at that. With the win the CPP continues its preeminence in the

Gold Coast political scene. More importantly, it secured independence from Britain within

a year.

The Basis for American-Ghanaian Peace

The 1954 and 1956 elections received more press in the United States than the

1951 elections. Interestingly, the American media focused many of their stories on the

method for polling. Due to the illiteracy of many Gold Coast voters, the ballots were

designed with symbols for each party. Voters received their ballot and placed it in a box

marked with the symbol they preferred. Nkrumah’s CPP used a red cockerel, while the GCP

—the opposition party du jour in 1954– featured a blue elephant on white ground. This

method confirmed Americans in their very British view that the Africans were children,

taking their first steps toward building a government. A perusal of the reports being

printed in the United States at this time shows frequent use of child-rearing or educational

language to describe the colonial process, with one writer crediting Ghana’s political

development to “enlightened British tutelage.”73 Oddly, the British view of seeing their

72 Ibid, p. 305. 73 "Ghana in Gestation," Washington Post and Times Herald, May 27, 1956: E4.

38

colonial subjects as children actually dated back to the American Revolution.74 With the

assumption of African child-likeness in place, it’s no surprise that the Americans saw

themselves as Ghana’s new tutors, picking up where the British left off.

Additionally, the American media tended to emphasize the news that confirmed the

ideas Americans already had about Africa, the so-called “dark continent.” As a result,

reports on the elections emphasized minor incidents of violence involving as few as 20

people, while burying more positive facts, like the otherwise peaceful election process in

which 4.5 million citizens visited the polls.75 As a result, the public perception of Nkrumah

in the United States continued to follow the same narrative that had existed since 1951,

when he first burst onto the scenes. Americans saw him as an American-educated,

western-oriented leader playing the role of George Washington in the Gold Coast. Like

Washington before him, Nkrumah sought to lead his people to freedom from the rule of

British colonialism. Besides the educational advantages, his visits to the United States had

been generally successful, leading many to remark on the Prime Minister’s considerable

charm. While there were reports of corruption in the government, these charges were

normally deflected away from Nkrumah and toward his ministers. Of course, even when

the aids were close to him—as in the case of Krobo Edusei, whom Nkrumah appointed

Minister Without Portfolio in 1954—the American public was not aware of the

connections. Additionally, his perceived purging of the CPP in 1953 of Communist

influence helped preserve his positive image in the United States.

74 Lawrence James, The Rise and Fall of the British Empire (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 1994), p. 99. 75 New York Times, "Gold Coast Election On," July 13, 1956: 3.

39

The United States government, meanwhile, maintained a cordial attitude toward

Nkrumah in public while keeping a more cautious eye on him in their official behind-the-

scenes work. When he first rose to prominence in 1951 he was a complete mystery to

United States officials. They knew he was American educated, which gave them great

hopes for him. Additionally, as already noted, their interviews with Arden-Clarke added to

their hope for Nkrumah and the CPP. Yet, they were leery of his revolutionary past and his

constant talk about Africa unity.

Despite fears of his “nationalist” proclivities, the Director of the Office of African

Affairs, Elmer Bourgerie, advised Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee to “accord

[Nkrumah] some form of recognition”76 during his visit to the United States to receive his

honorary doctorate at Lincoln University in June of 1951. This he did, giving Nkrumah an

official luncheon and pledging that the United States would ever be a friend to the rapidly

emerging west African state. In addition to the kind words, McGhee also presented

Nkrumah with a copy of the United States Government Organizational Manual and a copy of

a book on the American educational system to Nkrumah’s aide and fellow minister Kojo

Botsio. Following the luncheon, Nkrumah and McGhee exchanged cordial telegrams in

which Nkrumah extended his “grateful thanks for your kind reception and hospitality.”

McGhee, meanwhile assured the prime minister that the United States was “most

interested in the important developments now taking place in the Gold Coast,” and that

they were “always ready to cooperate with you and your government.”77 The United States

continued the overtures the following March when Nkrumah was officially named Prime

76 Memorandum from Bourgerie to McGhee, April 18, 1951, U.S. Department of State,Foreign Relations of the United States 1951, ed. John P. Glennon, Vol. V (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 1270.77 Ibid, p. 1270-1.

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Minister of the Gold Coast. Secretary of State Dean Acheson sent a telegram to the

American consulate to be relayed to Nkrumah that praised him for “the able manner in

which [he] carried out [his] duties as Leader of the Govt (sic) Business.” Nkrumah wrote

back, describing the “sober consciousness of increased responsibility” which he carried and

assuring the Secretary of State that, “I shall always endeavor to foster the friendly relations

which exist between our people.”78 However, these external niceties concealed the behind-

the-scenes concerns of the United States government.

Chief amongst these concerns was fear that Nkrumah would in time drift to the left

and begin a closer relationship with the Soviet Union. In an August 20, 1952 meeting with

Nkrumah, Accra Consul William Cole asked him specifically about his opinions on the Cold

War. Cole recorded his response.

Nkrumah thought the Gold Coast much too small a country to take sides in the differences between the Western democracies and the Soviet bloc. To endeavor to do so “would not be realistic.” He recognized, however, that the Gold Coast should have much to gain through technical assistance from the United States or through the employment of individual American technicians. He also regarded the American democracy and economic systems as examples for his country to emulate.79

However, one day after the interview with Cole, and four days before the interview

was entered in any official documentation, a meeting was held that reflected the American

concerns with Nkrumah and post-colonial Africa more generally. On August 21, 1952 the

Office of African Affairs held a meeting of 12 different government officials from various

departments to discuss African economic development. Several officials voiced concern

78 Message from Nkrumah for Acheson Relayed by telegram from Cole, March 27, 1952, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954, ed. John P. Glennon, Vol. XI (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 267.79 Ibid, p. 276.

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that if the United States did not provide ample aid to Africa, the continent might be “lost.”

This fear led some to suggest that a “Marshall Plan for Africa” might be necessary. It was at

this point that the first mention of the Volta dam scheme was made in official documents.

Though the scheme would become both Nkrumah’s greatest accomplishment and failure as

the Ghanaian head of state, that was not yet clear in 1952. What was clear to the Americans

was that the Gold Coast’s single-crop economy made them a prime target for a rapid

economic depression, should the cocoa crop fail or the global price drop. The Americans

feared that if this happened, it could give the Soviet Union the chance to slip in the door,

leading to further African investments and the eventual fall of the free world in Africa.

Consequently, the Americans sought a way to diversify the Gold Coast economy.

Like Nkrumah, they saw the ideal opportunity in a British scheme dating back to 1939 that

called for a dam to be built on the Volta River in the eastern region of the Gold Coast.

Nkrumah’s scheme became far grander than just a dam, calling for a smelter, massive road

system, and several docks as well. But the dam was the key and both the United States and

Nkrumah knew it. But in 1952 it was only a glint in Nkrumah’s eye and a source for

American frustration with Britain for not devoting more effort to the project, lamenting

that the British were investing in it but had “no means of checking on the actual progress”80

of the project. It was not until Komla Gbedemha’s fateful 1957 visit that the scheme would

become the chief interest in American-Ghanaian relations. During these early years, the

United States primarily concerned itself with a much more general conception of aid and

careful observation of Nkrumah for any signs of Communist tendencies.

80 Ibid, p. 25.

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The chief avenue through which a leftward turn would come, they feared, was in

Nkrumah’s work with his West African neighbors. This concern didn’t come from actual

fears of a pan-African state, something the Americans considered a wish-dream of

Nkrumah’s with no grounding in reality. “[Nkrumah’s] viewpoint is too parochial to sustain

any genuine enthusiasm for wider concepts like West Africa or Pan-Africa,” wrote Accra

Consul William E. Cole in a May 1953 airgram to the Department of State.81 Yet Cole

expressed concern that Nkrumah’s African unity work could reflect an unhealthy ambition

for power on Nkrumah’s part. Additionally, Cole feared that it could undermine

relationships with France, the dominant colonial power in West Africa. Their primary

concern with Nkrumah, then, was not so much with the potential for a pan-African union.

They saw such a union as little more than a pipe dream in the mind of Nkrumah. Indeed,

the Dakar Consul described the frequent meetings of West African revolutionaries as being

“of little practical significance.”82 Rather, the Americans were concerned with the

unforeseen consequences of Nkrumah’s campaigning for such a union. Specifically, they

were concerned with the potential anti-colonialist sentiment created by such meetings.

In the fall of 1953, however, the fears were temporarily relieved when Nkrumah

kicked out several notable CPP members for being “communists.” Recent events in British

Guiana, a neighboring colony, had led to the rise of a progressive party that planned to take

the colony in an aggressively-leftward direction. As the government moved further left,

Britain reacted by suspending the constitution, delaying the granting of independence.

Shortly after, Nkrumah suspended several members of the CPP for being “servants”—as the

81 Ibid, p. 42.82 Ibid, p. 70.

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American account puts it—of the Communist World Federation of Trade Nations.83 This

unexpected move by Nkrumah gave the United States hope that the enigmatic leader might

be moving closer to the west. Up to this point the defining paradox of America’s view of

Nkrumah was that Americans found him personally charming and trustworthy but could

not understand the anti-western stance of the Convention People’s Party. But Nkrumah’s

decision to suspend the controversial CPP members marked, in American eyes at least, a

“very significant shift.”84 These fears led American officials to confront Nkrumah with

evidence of, in the Christian Science Monitor reporter Marian Sorenson’s phrase,

“communist agitators”85 in his party. Nkrumah responded to the revelation by suspending

the two offending members and even sharing with the Americans his modifications to his

UN speech scheduled for later in the year. In fact, he went so far as to say that he regarded

Ghana as “wedded to the friendly democracies” of the world.86

The New York Times reported that “Communist infiltration of trade unions in

colonial areas is part of the Kremlin’s world wide policy,” but, the Times went on to say, “Dr.

Kwame Nkrumah has withdrawn his regime from Communist entanglements.”87 Perhaps

the clearest statement of American support of Nkrumah following these actions came from

Malvina Lindsay of the Washington Post and Times Herald who praised Nkrumah in a June,

1954 column:

83 Ibid, p. 287. 84 Ibid. 85 Marian Sorenson, "Africa's Eyes on Gold Coast," Christian Science Monitor, May 1, 1954: 4.86 Report by the Vice Consul at Accra (Fleming), October 30, 1953, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954, ed. John P. Glennon, Vol. XI (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 287.87 New York Times, "Gold Coast Trade Unions," January 9, 1954: 14.

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He has been a consistent friend of the United States and a staunch upholder of Western democratic methods. He recently announced that the Gold Coast would not permit one imperialism to be supplanted by another, that it would not accept Russian masters any more than it would British.88

At the time these developments were seen as a major boon for the American cause

in the Gold Coast, with Nkrumah finally giving a clear statement about his opinions on

communism and assuring the long-term alignment of the Gold Coast and the United States.

A relieved tone amongst Americans then characterized the final years of British rule in the

Gold Coast. Nkrumah’s reputation even grew with journalists who were once his fiercest

critics. Foremost amongst them was Elspeth Huxley, a freelance writer who lived much of

her life in eastern Africa and who was married to the cousin of Aldous Huxley and grandson

of Thomas Huxley. In her occasional feature-length stories for the New York Times she

warned readers that Africa was a “dark continent” and that giving self-government to “ex-

cannibals” was tricky business.89 Additionally, in 1953 she was leery of Nkrumah,

describing how he “flirted with communism” while in Britain and led several riots before

finally being imprisoned. Yet after his decision to remove the suspected-communists from

the CPP, Huxley praised Nkrumah’s “courage” and said that in west Africa there was “hope

—bright hope” because of leaders like Nkrumah, the realistic nationalist.90 With even

staunch conservatives like Huxley on his side, the future seemed bright for Nkrumah and

his relationship with the United States. Additionally, with his election win in 1956,

Ghanaian independence was secured. Their independence would be granted on March 6,

88 Malvina Lindsay, "US Echo in Gold Coast Election," Washington Post and Times Herald, June 7, 1954: 6.89 Elspeth Huxley, "An Area of Light in the Dark Continent," New York Times, Jan 11, 1953: SM20.90 Elspeth Huxley, "The Vast Challenge of Africa," New York Times, July 18, 1954: SM10.

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1957. Ghana and her Osagyefo had completed their first great struggle. The second was

about to begin.

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Chapter 3—That Incredible MomentIn the opening months of 1957 Ghana and her “wonder boy,” Kwame Nkrumah,

faced a full slate of challenges. Anticipation ran high for the dawning of freedom in Africa

and all eyes were on Accra. Throughout the city workers were buzzing from project to

project, preparing the many international guests who would be in attendance on March 6.

The list was impressive with representatives hailing from 70 different nations and

including Vice President Richard Nixon from the United States, the Duchess of York from

Britain, and diplomats from the Soviet Union and mainland China91. Additionally, Nkrumah

himself was working even harder than normal, routinely working 20-hour days, as he put

the finishing touches on domestic issues that needed settling. He also began to make his

first forays into foreign policy at the time. Most significant for his relation with the United

States was the publication in the United States of his autobiography, Ghana, which he

dictated to his personal secretary, the Englishwoman Erica Powell. 92 Finally, the eve of the

historic day came. Nkrumah spent the entire day handling domestic issues, making

speeches, and meeting with various international leaders.

Then, at midnight on March 6, 1957 Nkrumah reached the zenith of his political

career as Ghana celebrated her independence. Nkrumah and his officials knew that Africa

would never be the same. Reporter John Hughes described the scene in a front-page story

for the Christian Science Monitor.

For hours the crowds had seethed excitedly outside Parliament. Inside as the hands of the clock drew near midnight, Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah tied up the final business of the Gold Coast in a speech to his legislators.

91 Chicago Daily Tribune, "Ghana never to be neutral, Nixon is told," March 5, 1957: B12.92 Erica Powell, Private secretary (female)/Gold Coast (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966).

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At the moment of midnight the clamor of hooters and sirens blended with a great roar from the mob. In a rush and a flurry Dr. Nkrumah was whisked bobbing on the shoulders of his supporters to a platform among his people. On his head was his old white cap embroidered with the initials P.G. for “prison graduate,” commemorating his sentence by the British for sedition.Then came that incredible moment when, with face glistening with tears and sweat under the photographers floodlamps, weeping quietly with emotion, he called for the national anthem of the new nation whose freedom was at last fulfilled.93

Then Nkrumah spoke, flanked by his faithful ministers Botsio and Gbedemah,

announcing the liberation of Ghana and of Africa, saying, “At long last, the struggle has

ended!”94

Unfortunately, Nkrumah’s assessment turned out to be rather sanguine. A more

accurate assessment would have been that one struggle was ending and another—far more

daunting than its predecessor—was about to begin. In the years leading up to 1960

Nkrumah’s stable relationship with the United States continued for the most part, initially

buoyed by the successful meeting with Nixon at State House. But the seeds of future

conflict were planted, most notably in the relationship between Gbedemah and the

Americans. The major developments of the period included Nkrumah’s increased work for

a united Africa and the American response to his work, the beginnings of the American-

Ghanaian collaboration on the Volta dam scheme, and the rise of the Civil Rights Movement

in the United States in response to Jim Crow segregation, which caused Nkrumah and many

others to look on the Americans in a much less favorable light. All these events were

building to the climactic year of 1960 in which the relationship would be further strained,

93 John Hughes, "Africans Cheer Ghana Freedom," Christian Science Monitor, March 6, 1957: 1.94 Kwame Nkrumah, The Birth of Ghana, March 6, 1957, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PBwV7W0UeGM&feature=related (accessed February 16, 2010).

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giving way to the antagonistic relationship of the 1960s. The first point of controversy

during this period actually preceded the independence celebration. In fact, it was about the

independence celebration and specifically who would be invited.

The Question of China

In the early months of 1957 the United States was still many years away from

granting diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China. Additionally, they

viewed the Chinese with almost as much suspicion as the Russians. So when the Americans

received word that both the Russians and the Chinese would be present at the

independence celebrations, they were not pleased. The news first came to Washington

early in 1957. An unhappy State Department wired instructions to the Consulate General

in Accra upon receiving word that “through the efforts of Kojo Botsio”95 the Soviets would

be invited to the March celebrations. Nkrumah avoided all blame in the memo as the

invitation was attributed to Botsio, his Minister of State. The State Department cited a

previous telegram sent to President William Tubman of Liberia warning him of the

consequences for establishing any relationship with the Soviets and suggested a similar

warning needed to be relayed to the Ghanaian government.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between African states and the Soviet Union constitutes a Soviet device for communist penetration of the continent of Africa. Once a Soviet mission is established in an African state it becomes only a matter of time before Russian blandishments and enticements of economic aid and technical assistance are likely to be accepted.96

95 Instructions from the Department of State to the Consulate General at Accra. February 20, 1956, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-1957, ed. John P. Glennon, Vol. XI (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 363.96 Ibid.

49

The issue surfaced again when the question of China was raised. Whom would

Nkrumah invite to the celebration, the mainland Chinese under Mao Zedong or the

nationalists from Taiwan under Chiang Kai-shek? In the end, an invitation was extended to

Mao’s China, further raising American ire. However, when the Americans confronted

Nkrumah about the decision, he quickly responded by saying the British invited the

Communist Chinese. The question then became an issue of contention between Britain and

the United States. Further complicating the issue was the fact that the dispute happened

mere months after the much larger conflict between the two sides over Nasser’s

nationalizing of the Suez Canal. The core issue in Ghana in February of 1957 was the same

as in Egypt in the fall of 1956 during the Aswan dam incident: The question of granting

diplomatic recognition to China. Britain’s view was that while they did not desire China to

get a foothold in Africa, they saw inviting them to the celebration as a separate issue. In the

case of Ghana, the United State conceded the point and Mao’s China was invited to the

celebration. However, the Americans were pleased to note that Nasser’s Egypt would not

be in attendance. Nkrumah indicated that he did have plans to send a letter to Egypt after

the celebration “expressing regret” that they could not be invited, but that was a concession

the Americans were willing to grant.97 With these final diplomatic questions ironed out, the

way was clear for the Americans to participate in Ghana’s independence celebration. In a

major victory for Nkrumah, President Eisenhower decided to send Vice President Richard

Nixon and his wife, Pat, to Accra for the celebrations. Nixon would then follow his brief

stay in Ghana with a tour of West Africa before returning home to report on his time in

Africa.

97 Ibid, p. 368.

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Nixon’s Meeting with Nkrumah

When they met at the State House on March 4, Nixon presented Nkrumah with

facsimiles of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and a

joint resolution of Congress on the independence of Ghana. Additionally, he promised the

subsequent delivery of a 2,000 volume technical library to be given to Ghana as a gift from

the United States government.98 Nixon played the consummate diplomat throughout the

trip, despite treatment he likely would have regarded as undiplomatic. When he arrived at

the airport, he was surprised to find that Nkrumah himself did not come to receive him.

Nkrumah’s absence was explained by the fact that the only foreign guests that would be

received by the Ghanaian head of state were other heads of state.99 However, the other

government ministers, led by Komla Gbedemah, incorrectly referred to as “Kimla” in

American reports, did receive him. Though it seemed a meeting of little consequence at the

time, Gbedemah’s contact with Nixon became more significant in coming years, eventually

leading to Gbedemah’s demotion in the government and subsequent flight from Ghana. The

loss of Gbedemah would prove devastating to the internal structures of his government.

But on March 4, 1957 Gbedemah was simply a finance minister receiving an important

foreign representative and escorting him to his posh suite at the “ultra-modern”

Ambassador Hotel. Much to Nixon’s chagrin, his suite on the second floor was only one

below the Chinese ambassador and two below the Soviet.100 Yet this didn’t seem to faze

Nixon publicly, who received a warm welcome from the Ghanaians. If contemporary

98 Thomas F. Brady, "Ghana Head Asks U.S. 'Cooperation'," New York Times, March 7, 1957: 9.99 Drew Pearson, "British Ask if Ike Will Meet Queen," Washington Post and Times Herald, March 21, 1957: B15.100 Washington Post and Times Herald, "Gold Coast Cabinet Waits While Nixon Greets Crowds at Accra Airport," March 4, 1957: A1.

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American accounts can be trusted, “Neither the Russian nor the Chinese received the warm,

friendly welcome accorded the Nixons. Nixon even got a warmer welcome than the

Duchess of Kent.”101

The meeting between Nixon and Nkrumah occurred shortly after Nixon’s arrival on

March 4, a day earlier than most of Nkrumah’s meeting with foreign leaders. Indeed, Nixon

was the first foreign leader whom Nkrumah spoke with, even preceding the British

diplomat. The meeting began informally with Nkrumah inquiring of Nixon about President

Eisenhower’s health and Nixon asking Nkrumah about “the current problems which Ghana

faces.” Nkrumah, in an example of his compartmentalized mind rising to the surface,

commented on his tiredness and his frequent desire to quit politics, rather than addressing

policy issues, saying he sometimes wished to “throw it all over.”102 The conversation then

turned to more political matters as Nkrumah spoke of his economic goals for the soon-to-

be independent nation.

Nkrumah cited Ghana’s one-crop economy as a major cause for concern, explaining

that until Ghana was economically self-sustaining, it could not be politically liberated.

Interestingly, this idea anticipated Nkrumah’s later work and particularly his book Neo-

Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism, a work published in 1965 that finally shattered

his relationship with the United States. Yet at this time the idea was well received by

Nixon. Indeed, the United States had been aware for some time that Ghana was vulnerable

due to its single-crop economy. Nixon responded to the concern by pointing out that the

need to diversify an economy was quite common in developing nations, citing Cuba and San

101 Ibid.102 Memorandum of a Conversation between Nixon and Nkrumah, Accra, March 4, 1957, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, ed. John P. Glennon, Vol. XVIII (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 375.

52

Salvador as two examples of developing nations with similar struggles. Further, Nixon

suggested that the United States had dealt with the same problem in its infancy, noting

“180 years ago when we obtained our independence, we had about half the population of

Ghana and were also primarily an agricultural nation.”103 This mention of the United States

caught Nkrumah’s attention, leading him to speak “with pleasure” of his ten years as a

student in Pennsylvania. Yet even this anecdote reveals a key difference that remained

implicit in all American-Ghanaian relations. Nkrumah spoke rhapsodically of the United

States because “in his mind’s eye he could see a United States of Africa, he could see Africa

becoming a viable unit, becoming a world power.”104 Yet for Nixon and the Americans,

Nkrumah’s love affair with the United States was seen as validation of American ideals of

freedom and free-market principles. After general discussion on diversifying the Ghanaian

economy, the conversation turned toward the very specific question of the Volta River

scheme.

As already noted, the scheme was not Nkrumah’s idea originally, but dated back to

the pre-World War II years when the British hoped to find a source of cheap aluminum to

help address their growing financial woes. Nkrumah had learned of the British scheme,

likely from Charles Arden-Clarke, and expanded upon it. For Nkrumah, the scheme became

Ghana’s gateway to modernity. Nkrumah’s grand scheme called for a dam to provide cheap

electricity for the entire nation, making it more self-sufficient in energy use. Additionally,

he would fund the dam by negotiating a contract with an outside group on the condition

that it would be given access to the extensive bauxite reserves on the banks of the Volta. To

get to the bauxite, the funding group would need to build an aluminum plant, which would

103 Ibid, p. 376.104 Kwame Kwateng, quoted in Pandora's Box: Black Power, directed by Adam Curtis, 1992.

53

be powered by the dam and could then be used to create jobs for Ghanaians in the Trans-

Volta. The fact that the British were desperate for aluminum in the early 1950s only

increased Nkrumah’s desire to begin the project.

But this would become far more than a simple development scheme for Nkrumah: It

became the basis for all his plans of development for Ghana. Ghanaian historian Al Haji

Futa explained his passion for the project. “This was the one source from which he could

get the power he needed.”105 When Nkrumah raised the issue with Nixon, Americans were

already well aware of the scheme. American media began reporting on the scheme as early

as July 1953 while fears about Nkrumah’s potential communism were still high.106

American government officials also began to discuss the project at a relatively early date,

including the previously mentioned August 1952 meeting in which fears about Nkrumah

and the Soviets were first voiced. After his removal of the alleged communists in 1953 the

Americans began to pay more careful attention to the project, beginning to see it more as a

tool for developing an ally rather than a potential opportunity for the Soviets to exploit. In

fact, the Gold Coast had even approached the United States about funding in 1953, leading

the Americans to send Nkrumah a letter explaining that they had no need for the ample

bauxite reserves along the Volta’s banks, but that they would certainly keep an eye on the

project.107 Nixon repeated this line to Nkrumah, advising him to first approach the British

or Canadians for aid in financing the ambitious project. This was where the matter of the

Volta River scheme would rest for the next seven months, until Gbedemah’s infamous

105 Pandora's Box: Black Power, directed by Adam Curtis, 1992.106 Chicago Daily Tribune, "Warns African Aluminum Plan Faces a Delay," July 5, 1953: 15.107 Memorandum Prepared by Douglas B. Smith of Investment and Economic Development Staff, March 5, 1953, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954, ed. John P. Glennon, Vol. XI (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 279.

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October 1957 visit to the country. Yet for the moment, Nixon and Nkrumah left the matter

open.

Finally, their discussion turned to the question of foreign policy. Nixon asked

Nkrumah if it would be accurate to say Ghana would pursue a “nationalist” approach to

foreign policy. Nixon explained that the Americans found the “neutralist” term, which had

been used earlier, unhelpful. Secretary of State Dulles had dismissed such a policy as a sign

of “the strong irrational nationalist tendency.”108 Nixon then defined a nationalist policy as

being the policy of nations “determined to secure and defend their independence.”109 The

distinction was important, Nixon argued, because “The United States had shown by words

and actions its devotion to the principle of independence.”110 Here arose the main source of

implicit disagreement between the nations in 1957.

To Nkrumah, to be “nationalist” was to fight for the neutrality of Ghana on grounds

that the Cold War was no concern of the new nation, which was too weak to play a role

anyway. Additionally, Nkrumah’s foreign policy can best be described as “equal-

opportunity,” meaning he would look for help wherever he could find it. However, to Nixon

any nation claiming to be nationalistic was by definition on the American side of the Cold

War because nationalists defended their freedom and Americans were ever on the side of

freedom. This distinction had been in place since Nkrumah’s visit to the United States in

108 Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 114.109 Memorandum of Conversation between Nixon and Nkrumah, March 4, 1957, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, ed. John P. Glennon, Vol. XVIII (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 377.110 Ibid.

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1951 when Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee gave him an honorary luncheon

and said “faith in freedom is a dominant trait in the American character.”111

Yet at this point the differing ideas of nationalism remained unspoken—and most

likely unnoticed. Nkrumah quickly agreed that Nixon had accurately represented Ghana’s

policy. He further explained that, “Ghana’s policy will be one of non-involvement and non-

alignment in the East-West struggle. But, Ghana can never be neutral.”112 To Nixon, this

statement represented ample proof that Ghana was, for the time, a friend to the United

States and he happily reported Nkrumah’s declaration that “Ghana can never be neutral” to

the American media. In the subsequent media coverage that followed, Ghana was

wholeheartedly embraced as a member of the pro-American coalition in the Cold War

effort. Nixon exacerbated the problem by saying, “Speaking for myself, I believe this is very

significant because this could indicate the trend which will be followed in other African

countries as they acquire their independence.”113 American optimism was further

buttressed by Ghana’s acceptance into the British Commonwealth. This further reflected

what was perceived to be a pro-western outlook but was actually simple pragmatism on

Nkrumah’s part.

Upon Nixon’s departure, the published government records are silent on the issue of

Ghana for seven months, only to return with a vengeance when Gbedemah arrived in the

United States seven months later. The only major development was Nixon’s presentation

111 Remarks made by McGhee at Honorary Luncheon for Nkrumah, June 8, 1951, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1951, ed. John P. Glennon, Vol. V (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 1271.112 Memorandum of a Conversation between Nixon and Nkrumah, March 4, 1957, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, ed. John P. Glennon, Vol. XVIII (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 378.113 John Scali, "Ghana No 'Neutral" Premier Tells Nixon," Washington Post and Times Herald, March 5, 1957: A1.

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of a report to Eisenhower highlighting his observations from his time in Africa. Nixon’s

foremost concern at the time was his fear of American segregation damaging diplomatic

relations with Africa. “We cannot talk equality to the peoples of Arica and Asia and practice

inequality in the United States,” wrote Nixon.114

The Howard Johnson Incident

Gbedemah came to the United States in October of 1957, less than a month after the

Little Rock Nine incident in Arkansas, to attend an International Monetary Fund meeting

and to help lead the Ghanaian UN delegation. During his stay, he also had plans to speak at

several universities on the Volta scheme, trying to get the word out to young American

engineers about the plans and possibly gain additional funding for the project. The British

had recently informed Nkrumah that they would not be able to finance the project, leaving

it delayed indefinitely until a new source of funding could be found. At this point a strange

series of events would cause the two main issues of contention between the nations to

merge. On October 8, 1957 the issue of American racism and the Volta dam became

connected due to events that took place at a Delaware Howard Johnson’s roadside diner.

Gbedemah tells the story.

I was invited to Midland State College to give a talk on the newly-independent Ghana and as I was driving there from New York I felt like having a drink of orange juice at a roadside restaurant, Howard Johnson’s restaurant in Delaware. My secretary who was a black American told me, “Minister, I think this is one of the states where they are very sticky about color.” I said, “what?” I asked for two glasses of orange juice, the girl looked at us and said, “No sir, you can’t.” I said, “what?” Then she turned away and went in and told the manager to come speak with us. So the manager came and said, “Gentlemen, I’m sorry. Because of your color, you cannot drink in here.” I said to him, “Look, there are people here who are

114 Richard Nixon, "Text of Vice President Nixon's Report to the President," New York Times, April 7, 1957: 46.

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lower social status than I am but they can drink and I can’t? OK, you can keep the orange juice and the change, but you have not heard the last of this. Next morning it was world news all over the world.115

Upon the breaking of the story, the United States government responded promptly,

with Gbedemah being invited to breakfast at the White House with President Eisenhower

and Vice President Nixon. It was the second meal that Gbedemah shared with Nixon. They

had met seven months earlier when Gbedemah hosted the Nixons as well as Russian

Minister of State Farms Ivan Benediktov at his home in Accra. Of course, Gbedemah also

led the welcome delegation that received Nixon at the Accra airport. Once again, American

journalists proved incapable of properly spelling Gbedemah’s name, incorrectly naming

Komla Agbeli Gbedemah as “Kimla Agbell Gbedemah.”116 It was at the breakfast that

Gbedemah continued to develop a rapport with the United States, forming the basis for his

future fall out with Nkrumah. Both Eisenhower and Nixon were apologetic to Gbedemah,

as the Howard Johnson’s incident represented the fulfilling of Nixon’s worst fears from his

report to Eisenhower only six months before. In the report Nixon had warned that

Americans could not speak of freedom to Africans when they practiced segregation

domestically. The Gbedemah incident, then, was something of a doomsday scenario for

American foreign policy in Africa. Not only was a Ghanaian made more aware of American

racism, but one of the most important Ghanaians was made aware in the most personal

way imaginable. It would not be an overstatement to say the government was apoplectic.

On the evening of October 9, John Foster Dulles sent a telegram to the Accra embassy

reporting the incident. “At Department’s request Howard Johnson trying since last night

115 Komla Gbedemah interview, Pandora's Box: Black Power, directed by Adam Curtis, 1992.116 Thomas F. Brady, "Ghana will shun neutral policy," New York Times, March 3, 1957: 5.

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communicate with Minister and express personal regrets. Company preparing press

statement saying Johnson apologizing to Minister and declaring segregation not policy of

company.” Dulles went on to request that the Accra embassy pass on “regrets [of] U.S.

Government over incident.”117 Yet the Howard Johnson incident was not all that was

discussed at the White House breakfast.

Eisenhower also asked Gbedemah about what had brought him to the United States

in the first place. Gbedemah then began telling him about the latest developments in the

Volta scheme and how Ghana had just received word that the British would be unable to

fund the project. Gbedemah explained to the president that the project was on “cold

storage”118 until Ghana found a new source of funding. At this point Eisenhower asked him

if he had spoken with the State Department. Gbedemah said he had not. Eisenhower then

looked at Nixon and said, “Dick, will you take care of that?” With that, the United States

assumed a significantly greater degree of involvement in the project, becoming the primary

source of funding for it.

Meanwhile back in Accra, Nkrumah was nearly as upset over the incident as the

Americans, but not for the reasons one might expect. A telegram sent to the State

Department in response to Dulles’ rushed note shared Nkrumah’s surprising reaction to

the news:

Prime Minister was much annoyed with Gbedemah for creating fuss over incident. Prime Minister said he himself understood these things; that same thing had happened to member of his staff at Prime Ministers’ conference in London but he thought little of it and ordered nothing said; that some day “everything will be all right in US and England” and

117 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Ghana, October 9, 1957, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, ed. John P. Glennon, Vol. XVIII (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 379.118 Pandora's Box: Black Power, directed by Adam Curtis, 1992.

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meanwhile Africans had to be understanding; that if he had experienced same incident as Gbedemah he would have kept quiet, which Gbedemah should have done.Prime Minister made guarded but nevertheless uncomplimentary reference to Sutherland (Gbedemah’s African-American secretary) and said Sutherland should have known better than to let Gvedemah stop at restaurant in question. He speculated on possibility that somebody had maneuvered Gbedemah into provocative situation, adding that “Gbedemah is just the kind that can be maneuvered.In my presence today Prime Minister gave orders to Minister of Information to kill any further publicity over radio or through any other media controlled by [government.] Also in my presence he telephoned editor of party organ Evening News and gave same order. He then telephoned Daily Graphic, asked for “cooperation” and received assurance Graphic will atrophy story.He asked me to inform my government that “this incident will not have the slightest effect on the happy relations between our two countries.”119

Though Nkrumah’s response might seem surprising given his radical politics and

staunch anti-colonial convictions, his words were not completely groundless. When he was

a student in the United States he experienced a nearly identical situation. He entered a

roadside diner in the south to get a glass of water and, like Gbedemah, was turned away

due to his color. While he was exasperated and angered by such treatment, “I said nothing

but merely bowed my head and walked out in as dignified a manner as I knew how.”120

Perhaps what is more interesting in the telegraph is the American response to Nkrumah’s

quick move to control the press—a move decidedly out of step with American values. The

American ambassador Wilson Flake never commented on the point. Instead, he glossed

over it as if it were simply an ordinary event of no real importance.

Yet there is another point worth contemplating in the incident and its aftermath. As

noted by Consul Flake, “Prime Minister may be somewhat jealous of Gbedemah’s White

119 Ibid, p. 380-1.120 Nkrumah, Autobiography, p. 43.

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House visit.”121 Those concerned with the more personal aspects of Nkrumah’s life have

noted his deep-seated need for the approval of others and his lack of close friends.122

Surprising as it may seem, Nkrumah was not especially close to either Botsio or Gbedemah,

despite their long-term political relationship and Gbedemah’s special service to the CPP

during Nkrumah’s imprisonment leading up to the 1951 election. Though they flanked him

as he gave his independence speech, he did not count either of them as particularly close

friends. His advisors and confidantes at this time were Arden-Clarke, his former employer

in London George Padmore, and his secretary Erica Powell. So Nkrumah’s displeasure with

Gbedemah and his harsh words about him are not as surprising as they might at first seem.

Additionally, they help explain how he could dismiss both of them as he turned more

radical during the period from 1959 to 1961. Finally, there was something especially

galling to Nkrumah about Gbedemah, who had never been in the United States before,

receiving an invitation to the White House. Nkrumah, who had studied in the United States

for ten years and visited multiple times since, had never met the president. The best

Nkrumah had managed was the 1951 luncheon in Washington where Assistant Secretary of

State George McGhee had spoken.

The net results of this simple stop at a Dover Howard Johnson’s were three-fold.

First, it represented the next step in obtaining American funding for the Volta project.

Second, it brought the issue of American racism to the forefront of the Cold War. From that

October day onward, the Soviets had a dependable counter argument whenever the

121 Telegram from the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, ed. John P. Glennon, Vol. XVIII (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 380.122 Genoveva Marais, Kwame Nkrumah as I Knew Him (Chichester: Janay Publishing Company, 1972).

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Americans portrayed themselves as friends of freedom. Finally, the incident became the

first crack in the foundation of the CPP’s three-headed leadership team of Nkrumah,

Gbedemah, and Botsio. Though their charismatic leader invariably dwarfed Gbedemah and

Botsio, the two lesser-known men were essential to the success of the CPP. Gbedemah

served as the financial guru, possessing an understanding of the complexities of

international politics and finance that was completely absent in Nkrumah and Botsio.

Additionally, his skills as a political organizer were on par with Nkrumah’s, as evidenced by

his ability to campaign successfully for an imprisoned candidate in 1951. Botsio also

brought unique gifts to the table. His revolving titles—everything from Minister of State to

Minister of Education—reflected his more multi-faceted abilities. While Nkrumah may

have garnered the headlines, Gbedemah and Botsio were also integral to the CPP’s success.

The Howard Johnson incident created the first cracks in their partnership and,

consequently, eventually contributed to Nkrumah’s downfall.

Minor Disputes, 1958-1960

The first notable disagreement between the United States and Ghana, however,

would not occur until 1958. Predictably, it centered around the Volta River scheme. After

Gbedemah’s visit in October of 1957, the State Department began to be involved in

assisting Ghana’s search for the funding. However, there were still no plans for direct

government loans from the United States nor had there been a change in the American

decision to refrain from buying any of the Ghanaian bauxite for the making of aluminum.

With this backdrop, Nkrumah came to the United States in July of 1958 to visit the White

House.

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When Nkrumah arrived, however, he first had to deal with reports—largely based

on Busia’s politicking—that he was turning Ghana into a dictatorship. The reports were

first strengthened in late 1957 when he deported a Daily Graphic reporter.123 Though the

United States made no comment when Nkrumah silenced the Ghanaian press’ publishing of

the Gbedemah incident in the United States, his move to silence the Daily Graphic elicited a

much stronger response. It is perhaps unsurprising then that a London-based group that

also owned the Daily Mirror was the principal owner of the Daily Graphic.124 Busia called

the move proof that Ghana was moving toward “the familiar pattern for the establishment

of dictatorships.”125 But by the end of September, two months after the story first broke,

Nkrumah backtracked and dropped the charges.126 However, Busia’s warning still

resonated with an American audience. Further, American reservations about Nkrumah

were bolstered when one of his ministers, Aaron Ofori Atta said to a political rally that the

Soviet Union was “not as bad as Britain has made us to understand.”127 At the time

Americans considered it a cause for concern, but the fact that it was only a minister that

made the remarks helped keep the heat off Nkrumah. As a result, the two incidents were

slight tremors, but the relationship was still sound when Nkrumah arrived in the United

States in July 1958.

It was on this first post-independence visit that the seeds for future conflict between

the United States and Ghana began to germinate. Predictably, reports of Nkrumah’s arrival

123 Chicago Daily Tribune, "Exiled from Ghana," August 2, 1957: 10.124 John Hughes, "Ghana Ouster of Newsman Rouses Africa," Christian Science Monitor, August 5, 1957: 4.125 Ibid.126 Richard P. Hunt, "Ghana Drops Suit Naming Reporter," New York Times, September 25, 1957: 11.127 Reuters, "Ghana Aide Says Russia 'Not So Bad'," The Washington Post and Times Herald, September 21, 1957: A6.

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were filled with inaccuracies, with the most egregious being a Washington Post and Times

Herald story that described Ethiopia as part of west Africa, reported Nkrumah’s age to be

49—he was 48—and said his name was pronounced “Nee-kroo’mah.”128 When Nkrumah

arrived he was received at the airport by Vice President Nixon rather than President

Eisenhower in a move that could be explained by Nixon’s previous relationship with

Nkrumah. Or perhaps it represented American political gamesmanship in which the United

States responded to Nkrumah’s reception of Nixon in March 1957 when he failed to receive

Nixon at the Accra airport.129 Nkrumah met with President Eisenhower and was honored

with a luncheon. Among the luncheon’s attendees was Senator Lyndon Johnson of Texas,

who was getting his first glimpse of the man who would become a perpetual headache to

him in the opening years of his presidency.130 During his time in the United States,

Nkrumah and Eisenhower were able to make some progress on the question of Volta

funding, but there was no guarantee of funding at that time. The lack of certainty became a

source of frustration for Nkrumah with the Eisenhower administration.

The All African People’s Conference and the Question of Unity

The other significant development of the period, though its importance to the

relationship with America is mostly incidental, is Nkrumah’s immediate pan-African

activism. In December 1958 he hosted the All African People’s Conference in Accra, an

event that signified the high-water mark of Nkrumah’s pan-African goals. In 1958 Ghana

128 Ernest Gorey, "Show Boy Sobriquet At Home," Washington Post and Times Herald, July 23, 1958: B3.129 Chicago Daily Tribune, "Ghana Premier Ike Guest at Luncheon; Coming to Chicago," July 24, 1958: B9.130 Washington Post and Times Herald, "Ike Host to Ghana Visitor," July 24, 1958: D1.

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was still the leader of liberated Africa and Nkrumah was her “black star.” So when a major

conference of African revolutionaries was called in Accra, African leaders came in droves.

The attendees included future Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta (who had also attended the

Fifth Pan-African Conference in Manchester), future Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda

and, most importantly, future Congolese Premier Patrice Lumumba. It was the relationship

between Nkrumah and Lumumba that would prove vital to the future disintegration of

American-Ghanaian relations. However, the United States looked on apathetically,

continuing to see the conferences as an unfortunate necessity given the state of Africa at

the time. So as Ghana closed the 1950s its relationship with the United States was one of

cautious, uneasy peace with hopes for a mutually beneficial trade arrangement. However,

with the dawning of the 1960s, two new struggles came into play for the two nations. The

first would be the increased radicalization of the Convention People’s Party. The second

was the crisis in the Congo. Though the relationship seemed quite strong in the late 1950s,

it would prove too fragile to survive these new complications.

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Chapter 4—Making Just Restitution, The Break of the Early 1960s

As a new decade dawned in Ghana, plans for the next phase of development were

rapidly underway in Ghana. The nation would become a republic on July 1, 1960. Though it

initially appeared that this move could fracture relations with Britain and the

Commonwealth, the British eventually agreed to recognize the change and the way ahead

seemed clear. But beneath the surface of the political change was simmering a growing

radicalism in the CPP that would turn Nkrumah east toward the Communist world and

would eventually lead to his overthrow in a 1966 military coup that was possibly

supported by the CIA. Additionally, in January of 1960 powder kegs were being stockpiled

in the Belgian colony of the Congo, waiting only for the spark that would ignite a fire that

would consume Africa.

The Radicalization of the Convention People’s Party

Beginning in 1959 and continuing into the 1960s, the CPP took a hard leftward turn.

The old guard of Gbedemah—whom American documents at this time incorrectly identify

as “Adedemah”131—and Botsio was on the way out. A new wave of radicals led by a young

former opposition party member named Tawia Adamafio was on the rise. But

understanding the radicalization of the CPP is a project that requires further explanation.

At the CPP’s birth in 1949 it was not a truly radical party in all ways. Its insistence

on immediate self-government was certainly radical as was its militant anti-colonialism.

131 Telegram from the Embassy in Cameroun to the Department of State, November 13, 1960, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States of America 1958-1960, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar, Vol. XIV (Washington : United States Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 241.

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Yet in other matters the CPP was a mixture of influences, not dissimilar to the modern

African National Congress of South Africa. At its head was the steady leadership of their

three luminaries, Kwame Nkrumah, Komla Agbeli Gbedemah, and Kojo Botsio (like

Nkrumah and Gbedemah, Botsio’s name also fell prey to the American media, with one

story calling him “Kodio Botsio”132). The talents of the three leaders complemented each

other well, making for a powerful political machine. It is no coincidence that Nkrumah’s

greatest triumphs—the 1951 election win, the follow-up wins in 1954 and 1956, the

gaining of independence in 1957, and the All African People’s Conference in 1958—all

came while he was teamed with Gbedemah and Botsio. Gbedemah brought financial talents

to the table that the other two lacked, especially Nkrumah. Likewise Botsio brought a jack-

of-all-trades sensibility that allowed him to work a number of different jobs in the

government. As the architect of their early foreign policy, Botsio insured that Ghana could

truly live up to the non-aligned label. However, by the late 1950s the partnership of the

three leaders was disintegrating.

The problems began in October of 1957 with Gbedemah’s Washington visit.

Nkrumah’s response indicated strong jealousy of Gbedemah receiving the accolades.

Nkrumah’s jealousies of his financial minister did not disappear quickly. In July 1958 when

he visited the United States he brought with him Botsio and another minister, Kofi Baako.

Gbedemah was left in Ghana.133 Then in late 1959 Nkrumah’s friend and foreign affairs

advisor George Padmore died in Ghana. This left a void in the foreign affairs branch of

Ghana’s government, a void filled by the newly-created independent Bureau of African

Affairs. Among the appointees to this group was Adamafio, a former Union Party member

132 New York Times, "Ghana Cabinet Changed," May 8, 1958: 8.133 New York Times, "Nkrumah Leaves Ghana," July 19, 1958: 7.

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who had been made General Secretary of the CPP—a position strikingly similar to

Nkrumah’s initial appointment to the UGCC—in June of that year. From the start, Adamafio

saw himself as a reformer in the CPP. In his book By Nkrumah’s Side he describes the CPP

prior to his arrival.

I knew their intrigues and jealousies, the vicious whispering campaigns and the rumor mongering, the deliberate name-smearing and wicked mud slinging, the character assassination, the interminable inner party struggle, the incompetence and greed, the bribery and corruption.134

Following Padmore’s death only two months after his appointment to the position of

Secretary, Adamafio quickly assumed Padmore’s role as friend and adviser to the Prime

Minister. He also began to gather around him a group of similarly-minded leftists who

encouraged Nkrumah in his anti-colonialism while also pushing him in increasingly radical

directions on other issues, namely Cold War foreign policy and domestic economics. But

unlike Arden-Clarke and Padmore, Adamafio used his trust with Nkrumah principally to

advance himself. Reports of Adamafio’s corruption are legion135. As a result, Gbedemah

and Botsio began to feel the pinch in 1959. Additionally, Nkrumah had passed the

Preventive Detention Act in 1958 as a measure to keep the peace in Ghana, but under

Adamafio’s rule it began to be applied in increasingly political ways. The change caused the

old guard to fear potential imprisonment if they spoke out too strongly against Adamafio

and his growing circle of far left friends. This was the domestic context in which issues of

Cold War alignment and the question of the Congo were addressed. It is unsurprising, then,

that the answers proposed to these questions were less than palatable to American

interests.

134 Rooney, p.170.135 Ibid.

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The Crisis in the Congo

Nkrumah’s involvement with the Congo began in earnest with the All African

People’s Conference of December 1958. While he was aware of the issues before and had a

kind of vague support for certain leaders, it was his meeting with Patrice Lumumba at the

December conference that solidified his interest in the Congo. Nkrumah was impressed

with Lumumba, becoming a staunch supporter two years before he became the first

Congolese Prime Minister. However, to understand Ghana’s involvement in the Congo, we

must first understand the larger conflict and the various forces that were involved.

Since the late 19th century it had been well understood that Congo was the jewel of

the African continent for its potential to make its owner exorbitantly wealthy. In 1878 King

Leopold II of Belgium hired Henry Stanley, the American journalist of “Dr. Livingstone, I

presume?” fame to guide an expedition across central Africa and lay claim to as much as

possible for Leopold’s personal domain. The exploration and claims of an area nearly 1

million square miles helped spark the Scramble for Africa, which culminated in the 1885

Berlin Conference.136 By 1960 Belgium had joined the ranks of other European colonial

powers in feeling pressure to give up its colonies. An independence day was set for June

30, 1960. At the celebration the Belgian king addressed the crowd. The recently elected

Premier Lumumba, who was only 35 years old at the time, sat by listening. The speech

sparked a controversy all too familiar to students of Africa at this time. Like many other

western leaders, the Belgian king saw the independence of Congo as a sign of “mission

accomplished” for the Belgian colonizers. He used the opportunity to address the recently

elected heads of state, Lumumba and President Joseph Kasavubu, saying “It is now up to

136 Meredith, p. 95.

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you, gentlemen, to show that you are worthy of our confidence…. The independence of the

Congo constitutes the culmination of the work conceived by King Leopold II, undertaken by

him with a tenacious courage and continued with perseverance with Belgium.”137 It is

unsurprising that Lumumba, an anti-colonialist of the same mind as Nkrumah, was furious.

In his speech that followed the Belgian king’s, he fearlessly attacked the Belgian claims,

doing what Nkrumah himself refused to do when Arden-Clarke expressed similar

sentiments three years before.

We have known sarcasm and insults, endured blows morning, noon, and night, because we were ‘niggers’ …. We have seen our lands despoiled under the terms of what was supposedly the law of the land but which only recognized the right of the strongest. We have seen that the law was quite different for a white than for a black: accommodating for the former, cruel and inhuman for the latter. We have seen the terrible suffering of those banished to remote regions because of their political opinions or religious beliefs; exiled within their own country, their fate was truly worse than death itself …. And finally, who can forget the volleys of gunfire in which so many of our brothers perished, the cells where the authorities threw those who would not submit to a rule where justice meant oppression and exploitation.138

From this day onward, Lumumba was branded a dangerous extremist by the Belgian

authorities. The United States, meanwhile, looked on fearfully as a leader they believed to

be more radical than Nkrumah rose to power. Most alarming of all, this rise came in a

nation whose wealth far exceeded that of the comparatively-miniscule Ghana. Yet for all

their fears, American knowledge of the Congo was alarmingly lacking and severely

distorted by American racial attitudes. Upon being informed by Secretary of State Dulles

that the Congo situation was complex due to the presence of roughly 80 political parties,

President Eisenhower responded by saying that he was surprised there were 80 people in

137 Ibid, p. 93.138 Ibid, p. 94.

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the Congo that could read.139 Interestingly, the parallels between Lumumba and Nkrumah

are multiple, a fact not lost on either Nkrumah or the Americans. To begin, both men

experienced a meteoric rise to fame, largely on the strength of their considerable rhetorical

gifts and charisma. In fact, Lumumba was even more radical and flamboyant than

Nkrumah. Nkrumah talked like a radical in both public and private, but could be enough of

a pragmatist to forge relationships with western leaders. Lumumba was wholly incapable

of such friendships. He verbally assailed multiple Belgian leaders, most notably telling the

king at the independence celebrations “we are no longer your monkeys.”140 Additionally,

both men shared militant anti-colonial convictions that pushed both of them toward a

neutralist, or as Nixon would have it, “nationalist” foreign policy. In addition to their many

similarities, it was known that Lumumba was receiving financial support from Accra and

had been in attendance at Nkrumah’s December 1958 All Africa People’s Conference. For

all these reasons, the Americans saw many similarities between the two leaders.141

The chief difference, however, between Nkrumah’s situation in Ghana and

Lumumba’s Congo was that the Belgians made no effort to bring in western-style

development to the Congo. Due to the lack of white settlers and the overall goals of British

colonial policy, Ghana had a well-established African bourgeoisie class by the 1920s. Congo

still lacked such a class in the late 1950s. At independence, Ghana had ample financial

139 Memorandum of conversation between John Foster Dulles and Eisenhower at NSC Meeting, May 5, 1960, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States of America 1958-1960, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar, Vol. XIV (Washington : United States Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 274.140 Meredith, p. 102.141 Memorandum of the Conversation between the Ambassador in Belgium (Burden) and Patrice Lumumba, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States of America 1958-1960, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar, Vol. XIV (Washington : United States Government Printing Office, 1992).p. 264.

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reserves due to the booming cocoa prices around the world. Congo, on the other hand,

began with empty coffers. As a result, the situation was far more precarious at

independence in 1960 for the Congo than it had been three years before for Ghana. Many

in the American government felt that Congo would not be ready for independence for at

least 25 years.142 The additional complicating factor was the would-be independent state,

Katanga. Katanga was vital to the Congo’s economic stability due to its immense mineral

wealth. However, the region threatened to secede from the Congo under the leadership of

Moise Tshombe should independence be granted. Lumumba strongly opposed the move

for reasons strikingly similar to Nkrumah’s opposition to Ashanti’s proposed secession—

Africa needed strong centralized governments to combat colonialism. Like Nkrumah,

Lumumba preferred a centralized form of government to a federal model.143 Additionally,

Tshombe, the son of a wealthy merchant, favored breaking from the Congo so that Katanga

could continue a profitable trade relationship with Belgium, a move that further angered

the increasingly radical Lumumba. As a result, the independent Congo soon to emerge on

July 1, 1960 was a frail union led by a divided government and an inexperienced 35-year-

old premier.

It took no time at all for problems to begin rocking the Congo. Shortly after

independence, the underpaid military went on “a rampage”144 throughout the country,

rioting and attacking European citizens. It did not help matters that the military was still

under Belgian control. Lumumba immediately charged the Belgians with inciting rebellion

142 Memorandum of Conversation at NSC Meeting, November 5, 1959, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States of America 1958-1960, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar, Vol. XIV (Washington : United States Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 258. 143 Ibid, p. 280.144 Meredith, p. 102.

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in the military. Meanwhile, Tshombe took advantage of the confusion and declared

Katanga an independent state and began to resume trade relations with Belgium.

Lumumba responded by demanding UN support, which he received. He then pressed the

matter by demanding the expulsion of all Belgian troops from the country, a step the UN

was not prepared to endorse. Lumumba responded to their slowness by saying that if the

UN didn’t take care of the situation, he would call in the Soviet Union to do it for them. The

United States was, predictably, furious. Descriptions of Lumumba from contemporary

American accounts range from “psychotic” to “Castro or worse.”145

From Ghana, Nkrumah looked on, trying to find ways to support Lumumba. Though

he had been characterized by a pragmatic realism up to this point, the situation in the

Congo and the threats against his protégé pushed him in new directions. In a letter written

to Lumumba—which was later published in the west—Nkrumah wrote “the only

imperialist I trust is a dead one.”146 Throughout the summer, Nkrumah campaigned for an

African-only UN coalition and the banishment of Belgian troops from the Congo.

Additionally, he sent Ghanaian troops to aid the UN coalition in the region. The situation

continued to simmer throughout the summer until the meeting of the United Nations slated

for the end of September.

Nkrumah arrived in the United States on his 51st birthday, September 21, 1960. The

next day he called on President Eisenhower. Their discussion centered around two issues.

The first was the Volta Scheme, a drama we will pick up later. Then they discussed the

“crisis in the Congo.” The discussion began with Eisenhower asking Nkrumah for his views

145 Ibid, p. 104. 146 W. Scott Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-1966 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969) p. 140.

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on the matter. Nkrumah stated that the matter had to be dealt with by the UN basis. If the

UN failed, “small nations are finished,” according to Nkrumah.147 Eisenhower assured the

Ghanaian president that the United States hoped to work through the United Nations. In

fact, he went so far as to praise Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold for “great patience, a

virtue which I do not have in abundance.”148 Ike tried to strike a conversational note with

Nkrumah as he continued with a brief anecdote from earlier in the day when he had

entered the UN to give his speech to the assembly. “The crowds shouted, ‘Give ‘em hell, Ike,

give ‘em hell,” but what do we gain by giving them hell, I asked? Rather each country is

really dependent on every other.”149 Nkrumah warmed considerably to the president after

hearing these comments and began speaking candidly about Eisenhower’s UN speech given

earlier in the day. But at that point, the interview was cut short, though the two presidents

walked to the elevator together to pose for photos. The pictures ran in newspapers

nationwide and show the two heads of state happily shaking hands as both smiled for the

cameras. Though none knew it at the time, it was the end of an era in American-Ghanaian

relations. The next day Nkrumah would give a speech to the UN that left the Americans

“confused.” The souring of American-Ghanaian relations was about to begin.

On September 23rd Nkrumah took his turn at the UN, delivering a characteristically

fiery speech that ran for an hour and fifteen minutes. In it he attacked the European

colonialists and Belgium in particular.

147 Memorandum of Conversation between Eisenhower and Nkrumah, September 22, 1960, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States of America 1958-1960, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar, Vol. XIV (Washington : United States Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 662.148 Ibid.149 Ibid.

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For years and years, Africa has been the foot-stool of colonialism and imperialism, exploitation and degradation. From the North to the South, from the East to the West, her sons languished in the chains of slavery and humiliation, and Africa’s exploiters and self-appointed controllers of her destiny strode across our land with incredible inhumanity—without mercy, without shame, and without honor. But those days are gone, and gone forever.150

The speech went on to recommend the same solutions proposed by Lumumba.

Specifically, Nkrumah urged that the UN force be comprised entirely of Africans and that

Belgium be required to leave the Congo immediately. The speech did not play well with

American listeners. The next day Eisenhower sought a meeting with Nkrumah to express

the American “surprise over the contents of his speech.”151However, a meeting between the

two presidents never occurred. Instead, the Ghanaian representative to the UN, a capable

diplomat named Alexander Quaison-Sackey, and the Assistant Secretary of State for African

Affairs Joseph C. Satterthwaite exchanged notes. In his note to Quasion-Sackey,

Satterthwaite noted that though Nkrumah failed to attend President Eisenhower’s speech

he had sat through every minute of Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s 2 hour and 20

minute address. Additionally, Satterthwaite noted that Nkrumah’s comments on the Congo

were particularly unhelpful.

I pointed out that it was difficult to find a word in the speech showing any understanding of the position of the West in the East-West conflict. Moreover, in Nkrumah’s discussion of the Congo no mention was made of the unilateral intervention of the Soviet Union outside United Nations channels involving the arrival of several hundred Soviet technicians.

150 Official Records of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Fifteenth Session, Vol. 1 (New York, 1960), p. 61.151 Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Satterthwaite) and the Ghanaian Representative at the United Nations (Quaison-Sackey), September 24, 1960, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States of America 1958-1960, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar, Vol. XIV (Washington : United States Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 664.

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Certainly, therefore, the content of the Nkrumah and Khrushchev speeches and the display attached to the reception by the eastern bloc delegates of the Nkrumah speech gave us every reason to believe there had been collusion between the two.152

However, though the United States was frustrated by Nkrumah’s speech at the UN,

Secretary of State Herter instructed the Ghanaian embassy to maintain the friendly

relationship with Nkrumah and continue moving forward with the Volta Scheme. The

relationship would continue in this way—with each side maintaining a superficial

friendliness that belied their increased suspicions of each other—until Nkrumah’s next

visit to the United States in March 1961.

When Nkrumah returned, his new entourage reflected his shift to the left. Rather

than Botsio and Gbedemah, Aaron Ofori Atta, who in 1957 had said the Soviet Union was

“not so bad,” and the young radical Adamafio joined Nkrumah. Perhaps even more

importantly, events in the Congo had caused a major change in the relationship. Lumumba

had been arrested and beaten to death the previous January. Supposedly the Congolese

themselves had arrested and beaten him, but Nkrumah suspected both the Belgians and the

Americans of involvement in his death.153 As it turned out, his fears were justified. In her

book The Congo Cables, The Cold War in Africa, historian Madeleine Kalb writes that, “the

order to assassinate Lumumba was given by President Dwight D. Eisenhower at a National

Security Council Meeting on 18 August 1960 in Washington.”154 Additionally, Nkrumah had

begun to suspect Gbedemah of conspiring against him with the CIA—another fear that was

later proven true.155 For all these reasons, the Nkrumah that visited the United States in

152 Ibid.153 Rooney, p. 212.154 Madeleine Kalb, The Congo Cables, the Cold War in Africa (New York: Macmillan, 1982), p. 50.155 Rooney, p. 176.

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March 1961 was a far different figure from the one who had stood outside the elevator,

clasping hands with Eisenhower only six months before.

However, when Nkrumah met with the newly-elected President Kennedy, this fear

manifested itself in an unexpectedly deferential, rambling approach that left the Americans

both confused and confident about their ability to influence Nkrumah moving forward.

With Adamafio at his side, Nkrumah pled with the United States to comply with his wishes

for all western diplomats to leave the Congo. “Why not give it a try?” he asked. “Let them

get out for just a month and see if it doesn’t make a difference.” Fittingly, Atamafio

responded to the president’s request by muttering, “three months,” under his breath.156

When President Kennedy tried to turn the conversation toward the Volta scheme, Nkrumah

said he would prefer not to talk about it at that time. He then asked Kennedy to end the

American habit of confusing nationalism for Communism. Finally, Nkrumah concluded the

meeting by informing Kennedy that aid from the Soviet Union came considerably quicker

and with fewer strings when compared to western aid. Kennedy disputed Nkrumah’s

claim, stating that the Americans provided ample aid in a timely fashion.157 On the whole,

then, the conversation was far and away the least successful of Nkrumah’s many

discussions with American heads of state. The meeting also reflected his heightened levels

of paranoia partly caused by the events in the Congo and likely also caused by the absence

of Gbedemah and Botsio, both of whom served as stabilizing influences on him during the

early years of his government.

156 Memorandum of Conversation between Kennedy and Nkrumah, March 8, 1961, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States of America 1961-1963, ed. Harriet Dashiel Schwar. Vol. XX (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 95. 157 Ibid, p. 98.

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Though the Crisis in the Congo would continue for several years, Nkrumah’s role

would subside considerably after the death of Lumumba. With Lumumba gone, Nkrumah

no longer had any allies in the Congolese government. Additionally, his pan-African

ambitions had the unexpected result of alienating many West African leaders. As a result,

Nkrumah became an increasingly-irrelevant figure in African policy. More important to our

study, the death of Lumumba confirmed Nkrumah in his increased fear of the United States.

Meanwhile, Nkrumah’s response to the situation in the Congo raised many concerns

amongst American leaders, causing them to wonder if Nkrumah wasn’t a shrewder version

of the radical Congolese premier. By early 1961, the only major tie that still existed

between the two nations was the Volta scheme. But the Congo crisis was not the only point

of friction between the United States and Ghana that rose to the surface in 1960.

Ghana at the United Nations

In addition to the trouble created by Nkrumah’s apparent Soviet sympathies and the

dispute over the Congo, the issue of Africa and the Cold War finally bubbled to the surface

in 1960. While the issue had been addressed extensively in Nixon’s March 1957 meeting

with Nkrumah, the question of “nationalism” left the debate unsettled. Additionally, French

nuclear testing in the Sahara had infuriated Nkrumah and made him aware of the problem

of disarmament.158 As a result, Nkrumah desired more than Africa being kept out of the

Cold War. He also became alarmed with the stockpiling of nuclear weapons and became

convinced that a meeting between President Eisenhower and Soviet leader Nikita

Khruschev was needed to prevent a nuclear holocaust. His fears were exacerbated by the

fallout following the Soviets shooting down American pilot Gary Powers’ U2 spy plane,

158Thompson, p. 98.

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which led to the abortion of a proposed conference between Eisenhower and Khrushchev.

Nkrumah was not alone in his fears. Indonesian President Sukarno, Egyptian President

Gamal Abdel Nasser, Indian Premier Jawaharlal Nehru, and Yugoslav leader Tito shared

Nkrumah’s concern. The five non-aligned leaders drafted a resolution that they hoped

would address the situation. The resolution called for improved relations between the two

Cold War powers and suggested that, “The President of the United States of America and

the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics renew

their contacts interrupted recently, so that their declared willingness to find solutions of

the outstanding problems by negotiations may be progressively implemented.”159

The resolution met with stiff resistance from the western powers. Australian Prime

Minister Robert Menzies proposed an amendment calling for a four-nation summit that

would include both Cold War powers as well as Great Britain and France. In a speech that

continues the western attitude of seeing African independence as colonialism

consummated, Menzies argued for British and French inclusion in the summit by raising

concerns about creeping Communism.

It is a very well known Communist technique, quite visible in many countries and most clearly visible in my own, to seek to describe the drama of the world’s problems in terms in which the two antagonists are the United States and the Soviet Union, with all the rest of us presumably as insignificant onlookers -- and if not insignificant, at least, presumably, indifferent. This is in reality a dangerous fallacy. I do not for one moment accuse the sponsors of the draft resolution of intending to give currency to that fallacy. But I do venture to say to them, with unfeigned respect, that in this sadly troubled world the real conflict of ideas, and perhaps of even more than ideas is between the authoritarian doctrines and practices of Communism and those other systems of government to which most of us subscribe, in which free men whether freed yesterday or any years ago,

159 Official Records of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Fifteenth Session, Vol. 1 (New York, 1960), p. 421.

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practice or hope to govern themselves in an atmosphere of individual freedom.Is the United Kingdom, a nation with such a magnificent contribution in our own time to freedom and self-government, to be omitted from summit talks? Is France, whose place in the history—indeed, the revolutionary history—of individual liberty is clear, to be omitted?160

Menzies’ words express several western ideas that Nkrumah found objectionable

and which reflect the widening gap between Ghana and the west. First, Nkrumah would

have found the notion that Britain contributed to “freedom and self-government” insulting.

Earlier in the year he had written the letter to Lumumba in which he said “The only

colonialist or imperialist I trust is a dead one.”161 Further, Nkrumah’s disdain for France had

never been greater. He saw it as the greatest threat in West Africa to his pan-African

ambitions. He took special offense to de Gaulle’s decision to test nuclear weapons in the

Sahara in July 1959, an action which led him to attempt to freeze all French assets in

Ghana.162 Undaunted by Nkrumah’s decision, the French tested another bomb two months

later. The failure of the freeze to deter French testing did little to help Gbedemah’s cause,

who in mid 1959 was experiencing his final days as Nkrumah’s Minister of Finance. Yet

Nkrumah’s objection to Menzies’ speech was not limited to his words regarding France and

Britain.

Most problematic was Menzies’ attempt to join Nixon in implicitly identifying Ghana

with the western world by speaking of “freed men freed yesterday.” Menzies’ words

suggest that all post-colonial states were by definition on the side of the first world.

Nkrumah, who was the first to speak after Menzies concluded, pushed back against the

160 Ibid, p. 422.161 Thompson, p. 140.162 Ibid, p. 99.

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statement saying that, “Whether we like it or not the key to war and peace is in the hands of

the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics. The world wants peace. Africa wants peace. Asia wants peace. And I

presume Europe and America want peace.”163 To Nkrumah the world was not divided along

ideological lines, but geographic. While such an understanding is consistent with

Nkrumah’s policy, it did not play well in the western world. When the vote was called on

the Australian amendment, the proposal was defeated by a vote of 45 against, five in favor,

and 43 abstentions. The only five in favor of the amendment were Australia, Canada,

France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Ghana was one of the 45 to reject the

amendment. The Soviet Union and larger Eastern Bloc, meanwhile, abstained from voting.

Yet even with the amendment defeated, the original question of the resolution as drafted

by the five non-aligned powers remained unresolved.

Once the amendment vote was concluded, the Argentine representative requested

that the words “the President of” and “the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of” be

removed, so that the resolution called for a meeting between “the United States and the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.”164 Prime Minister Nehru immediately lambasted the

proposal.

I do not understand what [the amended statement] means. I was not aware, and I believe that this Assembly was not aware of the formal, diplomatic official contacts of the United States of America and the Soviet Union having been interrupted. Therefore, this statement has no meaning at all. In fact, it would put the Assembly in the rather absurd position of making in a formal resolution a statement which is wholly incorrect. I

163 Official Records of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Fifteenth Session, Vol. 1 (New York, 1960), p. 423.164 Ibid, p. 459.

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submit that an amendment which reduces a draft resolution, or a part of it, to absurdity is not in order and certainly cannot be accepted.165

After Nehru finished speaking, a vote was called with 37 in favor of the proposal

with nearly all the support coming from the western hemisphere, 36 against, and 22

abstaining. After a further point of order, another vote was called, this one having 41 in

favor, 37 against, and 17 abstentions. Though the amendment did not garner the necessary

two-thirds support to pass, it did prove that the assembly was divided on the question.

After a brief debate, a third vote was called. The results were still divided, with 43 for, 37

against, and 15 abstentions. At this point a recess was announced to allow Nkrumah,

Nehru, Nasser, Tito, and Sukarno to discuss the future of their proposal. Upon returning,

Nehru once again rose to speak, saying that the five leaders had decided to withdraw the

resolution because they could no longer support it if such changes would be included.

Though the proposal was withdrawn, it reflects the widening gap between the United

States and Ghana in the year 1960.

The Year 1960 in Summary

1960 completely changed the relationship between Ghana and the United States.

Due to the American support of Belgium in the Congo, Nkrumah came to see America as a

colonial power, an idea he would never have considered in previous years. As if returning

the favor, the United States began to see Nkrumah as an instable, closet Communist who

presented the Soviet Union with a golden opportunity to become more involved in Africa.

Additionally, the Gary Powers incident and the subsequent fallout at the UN led to further

165 Ibid, p. 461.

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conflict between the two nations. As they moved into 1961, both powers were uncertain of

the future. However, while the Americans were preparing to enter the era of Camelot and

the Kennedys, Nkrumah was becoming increasingly radical and paranoid. As the two

nations moved into 1961, their two paths continued to diverge.

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Chapter 5 – Nothing Shocked Me So Deeply As This, 1961-1966

The Peace-keeping role of JFK

By 1961 the situation in Ghana was bleak. Nkrumah’s most capable lieutenant,

Gbedemah, was first demoted to Minister of Health. Shortly after the demotion, Gbedemah

fled the country in the spring over fears that he would soon be imprisoned under the

Preventive Detention Act.166 Additionally, plans for the Volta scheme continued to drag.

Although President Kennedy had agreed in principal to provide aid, it was not immediately

clear how quickly the aid would be arriving or how much of it there would be. Further,

many of Nkrumah’s domestic programs were failing. Finally, his many African neighbors

increasingly came to see Nkrumah’s pan-African aspirations as a new form of colonialism,

leading to his becoming more and more isolated in Accra. Finally, his relations with the

Soviets continued to improve under the watchful eye of Russian ambassador Georgi

Rodionov. Interestingly though, the official printed records of the United States

government are largely silent on the years from late 1961 through the end of the Kennedy

administration. The relationship existed in a state of tension, with all the external realities

pulling the two nations apart but Nkrumah’s strong affection for Kennedy, whom he saw as

a peacemaker and a friend, holding it together. Additionally, Kennedy showed a continued

willingness to work on the Volta scheme, which further strengthened Nkrumah’s faith in

the United States. Finally, after two years of uncertainty and tension, Kennedy reached a

decision on the Volta scheme. On November 19, 1963 Kennedy made the final decision to

move forward with it despite his misgivings. But, as Rooney explains, Kennedy’s

166 Rooney, p. 176.

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assassination three days later destroyed that fragile peace and proved the final nail in the

coffin in American-Ghanaian relations:

The assassination of Kennedy on 22 November caused Nkrumah deep personal grief and changed overnight the attitude of the US administration towards Ghana. Kennedy, with his sensitive and concerned attitude, was replaced by Lyndon B. Johnson. His attitude may be summed up by a quotation from Averill Harriman, who was asked to keep the new President informed about Ghana. Johnson rang and said, ‘Tell me, Av, what’s the goddamn name of that place?”Two weeks after Kennedy’s assassination, Barbara Ward visited Nkrumah in Accra. On his desk he had a photograph of the Kennedy family, which Jacqueline Kennedy had given him. With tears in his eyes he said “I have written to her, and I have prayed for them both. Nothing shocked me so deeply as this.” He had always felt that if there were misunderstandings between Ghana and the United States, they would be resolved if only he could get through to Kennedy, whom he saw as his friend, the friend of Africa. After the violent deaths of Lumumba and Kennedy, to both of whom he was emotionally attached, he became convinced that he would be the next victim.167

LBJ’s “Chain Reaction”

Less than two months after Kennedy’s assassination, the conspicuous 18 month

silence of the American official records on Nkrumah was broken by a January 3, 1964

memorandum from William Brubeck of the National Security Council to Johnson’s Special

Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy.168 From the beginning, the

Johnson administration struggled in its handling of Nkrumah. Brubeck’s note explained the

situation for the United States as essentially a lose-lose. If they offered the support

promised by Kennedy, they supported a man they considered a dangerous radical. But if

167 Rooney, p. 230-1.168 Memorandum from William H. Brubreck of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), January 3, 1964, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States of America 1964-1968, ed. Nina Davis Howland, Vol. XXIV (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 411.

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they pulled out, the United States reputation was harmed and the door would be opened

for Soviet aid. Brubeck likened the Volta situation to the Aswan Dam fiasco of July 1956 in

Egypt. Given the fact that the Volta scheme had little to no repercussions on larger

economic questions beyond Ghana, the comparison is a leap, to say the least. Yet from the

beginning, Johnson’s administration was marked by a mistrust of Nkrumah and an inability

to understand—and at times manipulate— him as Kennedy did. The problems only

increased as time progressed.

In addition to his strained relationship with the west, Nkrumah was increasingly

unpopular at home. Assassination attempts had been made in 1962, which led Nkrumah to

imprison Adamafio and recall Botsio, and again in 1964. As a result, he became

increasingly withdrawn, confining himself for long periods of time to Flagstaff House in

Accra. This combined with the failure of his domestic policies to make him politically

vulnerable, a fact not lost on the Johnson administration. In a February 11, 1964

memorandum sent from the CIA to Secretary of State Dean Rusk the possibility of a military

coup was first raised. Rusk asked if General Jason Ankrah was prepared to take over

leadership of the country. CIA Director John McCone said that Ankrah was “well respected

in Ghana, but not inclined to accept responsibility.” Rusk responded by asking McCone to

“explore the prospect fully” and report back to him.169 Interestingly, it is not entirely clear

how strong the communication lines were between various members of the United States

government at this time. In a note from the same day, the Director of the Office of West

African Affairs, William Trimble, wrote to the Assistant Secretary of State for African

Affairs, G. Mennen Williams, indicating that Nkrumah was “convinced that through the CIA

169 Memorandum of Conversation between McCone and Rusk, Feb. 11, 1964, ibid, p. 412.

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we are seeking to engineer his downfall.” From Rusk’s correspondence with McCone it is

clear that Nkrumah’s fears were precisely right, but it is not clear if Trimble or Williams

knew of the plans at this point. As a result, Trimble advised Williams that the United States

should do everything in their power to stay in Ghana in order to protect America’s

reputation abroad and keep the Soviets out. However, Trimble conceded that adequate

American pressure could be used to “induce a chain reaction eventually leading to

Nkrumah’s downfall.” However, it seems that in February of 1964 Trimble preferred that

the United States would continue to work with Nkrumah.170

Certain Americans continued to discuss Nkrumah’s overthrow during a February 12

meeting with a number of British representatives, including Prime Minister Sir Alec

Douglas-Home, and a number of high ranking American officials, including President

Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, Averill Harriman, and Bundy. Harriman opened the

meeting by expressing fears over Nkrumah’s erratic behavior and tendency to “blame the

United States for all his troubles.”171 Douglas-Home shared Harriman’s fears, but cautioned

that if the United States withdrew its aid, the Russians would immediately step in to

provide aid for the Volta dam. Indicative of the confused fears of both nations, Douglas-

Home first said the “Aswan” dam before correcting himself. Both the British and the

Americans agreed that things were going downhill rapidly in Ghana, but that the best

course at the moment was to continue to give aid to the Volta project but decline all other

requests. A later meeting with Edgar Kaiser, who was heading up the American aluminum

company hoping to work with Nkrumah on the Volta scheme, strengthened their resolve in

170 Memorandum from the Director of the Office of West African Affairs (Trimble) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Williams), Feburary 11, 1964, ibid, p. 414.171 Memorandum of a Conversation between Sir Alec Douglas-Home and Johnson, February 12, 1964, ibid, p. 417.

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this direction. Kaiser assured the Americans that the scheme was still, despite Nkrumah’s

unpredictable behavior, “economically sound.”172 With Kaiser’s support, the United States

decided to continue the relationship and, for the moment, forego plans to support a

military coup.

Perhaps sensing his vulnerability, Nkrumah sent a letter to President Johnson at this

time to address whatever concerns Johnson might have about his regime while still

maintaining his anti-colonialist position. “It is my primary ambition to secure and maintain

the economic independence of Ghana in such a manner as to forestall the danger of the

growth of those social antagonisms which can result from the unequal distribution of

economic power among our people,” wrote Nkrumah. Interestingly, however, he then

invoked one of the standard American foreign policy devices in the next paragraph, saying,

“Within the framework of this position there is an open door for foreign investment in

Ghana.”173 Less than a week after sending the letter, Nkrumah met with American

ambassador William Mahoney in Accra to discuss the situation. The conversation followed

the same predictable give-and-take of recent exchanges between the two powers.

Mahoney attempted to address Nkrumah’s fears of American attempts to overthrow him.

“I repeated that there had been no conceivable activity on our part to subvert or overthrow

him.”174 It is unlikely that Nkrumah found Mahoney’s words reassuring, but it did allow

him to raise the issue of the CIA in a formal discussion with an American representative.

The meeting encouraged Mahoney, who said, “Nkrumah was as friendly as I have ever seen

him. He seemed extremely anxious to please. It was evident from conversation that he

172 Conversation between Kaiser and Nkrumah, February 26, 1964, ibid, p. 424. 173 Letter from President Nkrumah to President Johnson, February 26, 1964, ibid, p. 427. 174 Ibid, p. 430.

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realizes some eating of crow necessary. He in fact did so to some extent.”175 With this

conversation, American fears of Nkrumah were allayed slightly and the funding for the

Volta scheme moved forward. In April, Harriman gave an optimistic address on the

situation in Ghana, expressing hopes that the situation may yet be salvaged thanks to the

Volta scheme, the work of the Kaiser Corporation, and the independence of the Ghanaian

university system. After Harriman’s address, the official record is again silent for 11

months, before picking up in March of 1965.

The Coup Plans Move Forward

Where it picks up is with a conversation between CIA Director McCone, Ambassador

Mahoney and an unidentified Deputy Chief of the CIA African division whose name has not

been declassified, but who could be Accra-based agent Howard Bayne or John Stockwell, a

CIA officer who would later give an interview to filmmaker Adam Curtis discussing the

CIA’s involvement in Ghana. In any event, the first item of business on the agenda was a

planned coup involving the Ghanaian police and military under the leadership of General

Ankrah. Mahoney—who had repeatedly lied to Nkrumah about the CIA’s involvement in

Accra—said that he did not think it was the right time to support a coup, but that he

suspected Nkrumah would be out of power within a year. Economic matters were then

discussed, with all three men agreeing that it was best to continue the current policy of

supporting the dam, but nothing else. One month later Mahoney met with Nkrumah. The

meeting further convinced him that Nkrumah was losing his grip on reality, making a coup

seem more palatable.

175 Telegram from Mahoney to the Department of State, March 2, 1964, ibid. p. 431.

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On April 2 Mahoney met Nkrumah to confront him about the hostile, anti-American

rhetoric in Nkrumah’s recent speeches. Nkrumah had leveled charges of racism and

fascism at the United States, two points of acute sensitivity for the Americans at this time.

“I said I would never have believed that man of his sophistication and refinement would

use language like that against my country.”176 At this point Nkrumah, who had been holding

his head in his hands, looked up at Mahoney. Mahoney could see that he was in tears.

Mahoney described what happened next.

With difficulty he said I could not understand ordeal he had been through during last month. Recalled that there had been seven attempts on his life. I said I appreciated strain, but this no reason make hostile speech against country trying help. …In apparent effort say something nice about US, Nkrumah said, “You know you have great country—the only one that can lead world to peace.” When I commented that one would not guess this from what he said, he replied, “But it is what I believe. You can work with Russians.”177

Mahoney saw Nkrumah’s reaction to the confrontation as a ploy to gain sympathy

rather than a sign of genuine contrition. From that day forward, Mahoney was convinced

that Nkrumah was instable and that a change would be necessary. It also perhaps

explains Mahoney’s willingness to continue to mislead Nkrumah. While he constantly

reassured Nkrumah that the United States had no plans to overthrow him, he continued to

meet with CIA agents to discuss a coup. Mahoney’s position was validated when Nkrumah’s

book Neo-Colonialism was released late in 1965, laden with attacks on the United States. A

November circular telegram from the Department of State to all African embassies sternly

condemned the book, noting the “unprecedented nature such an attack by Head of State of

176 Telegram from Mahoney to the Department of State, April 2, 1965, ibid, p. 445.177 Ibid, p. 445-6.

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friendly country” and saying that that “book’s hostility and its provocative and anti-

American tone are deeply disturbing and offensive to [United States Government.]”178

Three months later, Nkrumah and the Americans would celebrate, despite their

disagreements, the completion of the Volta scheme. A New York Times article described the

celebration and reported that Nkrumah praised the Americans for their help in the

completion of the project.179 Unfortunately for Nkrumah, it was a classic example of too

little, too late. One month after the dam’s completion Nkrumah was overthrown in the

long-anticipated military coup led by General Ankrah on February 24, 1966.

It remains unclear who instigated the coup. Nkrumah’s domestic policies were

sufficiently unpopular and the economic climate of Ghana was sufficiently bleak to explain

a domestic-based coup. Additionally, Nkrumah had indicated he would consider sending

the military to South Rhodesia to address the recent usurping of Zimbabwe’s white

population against the black population. The military, remembering the failed Congo

incursion, hated the plan. For all these reasons, the coup could be domestically based.

Indeed, the American media favored that explanation at the time. An article that appeared

on the front page of the New York Times cited Nkrumah’s transformation of Ghana into a

“dictatorship” and his significant trade relations with the eastern bloc as reasons for the

military’s actions.180 However, given the frequent references to a planned coup in the

foreign policy documents, it is also possible that the United States instigated the coup.

Former CIA agent John Stockwell told Adam Curtis that the United States sparked the coup:

178 Circular Telegram from the Department of State to Embassies in Africa, November 23, 1965, ibid, p. 451.179 New York Times, "Nkrumah dedicating dam, applauds US for aid," January 24, 1966: 12.180 New York Times, "Nkrumah is reported out after Ghana army coup," February 24, 1966: 1.

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Howard Bain, who was the CIA station chief in Accra, engineered the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah. Now, obviously you can look at it different ways. A Ghanaian might say, ‘I thought we did it.’ Inside the CIA, though, it was quite clear. Howard Bain got a double promotion and the Intelligence Star for having overthrown Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana. The magic of it, what made it so exciting to the CIA was that Howard Bain had had enough imagination and drive to run the operation without ever documenting what he was doing and to sweep along his bosses in such a way – they knew what he was doing, tacitly they approved, but there wasn’t one shred of paper that he generated that would nail the CIA hierarchy as being responsible.181

Additionally, Stockwell’s interview explains the lack of paperwork that could

conclusively prove the CIA’s involvement in the coup. As a result, it is impossible to prove

definitively that the United States was the principal power involved in the overthrow of

Kwame Nkrumah, but it is certainly possible that they were.

The Veiled Redeemer in Historical Perspective

To sum up, then, we must return to DuBois’ notion of the veil. There is no doubt

that Kwame Nkrumah was a man of immense talent. A political visionary, charismatic

speaker, and shrewd politician, it is hard to imagine anyone else accomplishing so much in

the early years of African independence. Yet Nkrumah, like his mentor, DuBois, would fall

prey to the 20th century problem of the color line and double consciousness. In many ways,

Nkrumah was a product of the west, and even of the United States. He opened his

autobiography by quoting Walt Whitman, the greatest of all American poets.182 Moreover,

he received his education in the United States. He spoke of an “open door” in Ghana. He

moved Ghana to a republican form of government, a significant departure from the typical

181 Pandora's Box: Black Power, directed by Adam Curtis, 1992.182 Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah (New York: Nelson, 1957), p. vi.

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pattern of British colonies that moved him closer to the United States. Further, his most

lasting accomplishment, the Volta dam, was achieved with American aid.

And yet due to his Africanness, he could never fully endorse the west or become part

of it himself. As an African, he railed against the forces of colonialism wherever he saw

them. When his friend Patrice Lumumba was killed, he abandoned his pragmatism and

took it upon himself to fill the void left by Lumumba as a militant, out-spoken critic of

European colonialism. As a result, his relationship with the United States was permanently

strained. Further, his African identity compelled him to keep diplomacy with the

Communist world a possibility so that the Africa he loved would not be captive to any

foreign interest, even if that interest came from the United States, a country that he, in at

least one of his many compartments, dearly loved. Simply stated, Nkrumah the man was

born in Africa but Nkrumah the politician was born in the United States. It is this double

consciousness that is his legacy and his tragedy.

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