The Value and Meaning of Defending the Commonwealth of the Philippines.pdf

7/29/2019 The Value and Meaning of Defending the Commonwealth of the Philippines.pdf

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TheValueandMeaningofFightingforthe

PhilippinesCommonwealth

Dr.RicardoTrotaJose

Professor

AnsamLee

KAS205Student


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Acknowledgement

ToourprofessorDr.RicardoJoseforhiskindconsiderationsandtomy

lovingwifeEvelynforherunendingsupportandencouragement.


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TableofContents

I.Introduction------------------------------------------------------------------------------5

II.UnitedStatesRelationsandPoliciesinAsia---------------------------------------6

TheU.S.-China-JapanRelations----------------------------------------------------6

ThePhilippineCommonwealthandJapan---------------------------------------8

UnitedStatesandtheIssueofDefendingthePhilippines--------------------12

III.U.S.WartimePolicyandtheQuestionofPhilippineDefense--------------------13

WarPlanOrange----------------------------------------------------------------------15

TheNationalDefensePlan----------------------------------------------------------18

FlawsandCracksinthePlan-------------------------------------------------------20

IV.Conclusion----------------------------------------------------------------------------------25

VI.Bibliography-------------------------------------------------------------------------------27

VII.Photos--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------29


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TheValueandMeaningofFightingforthePhilippines

Commonwealth

Introduction

1937, was a year of uncertainty, it was a time when America was

experiencing the Great Depression, and Europe was beginning to witness the

growingstrengthoftheNaziGermany,andlaterherconquestofAustriaandPoland

in1938and1939respectively,whileinAsia,Japanwasbeginningtoshowhersign

forinsatiableconquest.NottobecontentedwithherinvasionofManchuriain1931,

she moved on to attack China, beginning with the Marco Polo Bridge incident.

Meanwhile the CommonwealthPhilippineswas still intheprocessofformingher

very owndefense force. Not to mention the cracks in the defense plan that was

found during the process of training. This was the tensive atmosphere that was

experienced then. Andwhether Japanwouldopenupanother front inSoutheast

AsiaforherconquestdependsuponJapansrelationshipwiththeSoutheastAsian

nations and or their colonizers with Japan. In the case of the Philippine

Commonwealth,itwoulddependuponUnitedStatesJapanrelationshipandtheir

capacity to hold a big stick, as well as the defensive capability of the

Commonwealthdefenseforce.


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UnitedStatesRelationsandPoliciesinAsia

TheU.S.-China-JapanRelations

To better understand the need for an immediate implementation of the

PhilippineCommonwealthsdefensiveplanfortheimpendingwar,abroaderlook

intotheUnitedStatespoliticalrelationsmostespeciallywithChinaandJapanmight

beabletogiveusanideaofthegrowingtensionsbetweenUnitedStatesandJapan.

AswellastheeventsthatmadeAmericadecidetomakea180-degreeturnfroman

isolationistnon-interventionandorneutralpolicytoamoreactivepolicy,especially

aftertheJapaneseattackonPearlHarbor.

Since the Marco Polo Incident, the continuous widespread of Japanese

bombingsonChineseciviliansandvillageshadearnedmuchindignationfromthe

UnitedStates,astheseactsalsoaffectedtheAmericannationalsinsidetheaffected

area.Ontheotherhand,accumulatedevidencesseemedtopileupagainstJapanese

authoritiesorJapanese-sponsoredagentsoftheactsviolatingnotonlytheAmerican

rights andinterests, but alsoofendangeringAmerican livesand properties.1This

wasconsideringthatJapanhadbrokentheir1911treatyandseveralothertreaties,

1RelationswithJapan,retrievedfrom

http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/WorldWar2/japan.htmonOctober7,2011at9:37pm.Cited

Source:

U.S.,DepartmentofState,Publication1983,PeaceandWar:UnitedStatesForeignPolicy,1931-

1941(Washington,D.C.,GovernmentPrintingOffice,1943),87-89.Hereinafterthissourceshallbe

knownasRelationswithJapan.

LinYu,TheChinaIncident,SundayMagazine,(April1939):171.


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promptingtheUnitedStatestoterminateherCommercialTreatywithJapan. 2And

insodoing,theUnitedStates,freeofanylegalobstacles,counteredbyimposingan

embargo on the export of arms, munitions, airplanes and aeronautic equipment

which would later extended to include essential materials necessary for the

manufacture of airplanes, as well as information on the production of aviation

materialsandother essentialmaterials.3And lateradopted the policy of informal

discouragementontheextensionofcredittoJapan.4

AstheChinaIncidentortheSino-Japanesewardraggedon,moreandmore

AmericansweresympathizingwiththeChinesecause. 5Thiswaspartlyduetothe

contributionofthefamouswriterPearlS.Buck,whoseworkonTheGoodEarth,

notonlydepictedbutalsoromanticizedthelifeofChinesepeasantry,foundherself

largeaudienceswhoasaresult,mostlyempathizedwiththeChinese.Ontheother

hand,mostAmericansbegantostereotypetheJapaneseasbrutalandtreacherous

littleyellowmen.6AndwhiletheUnitedStatesNeutralPolicy 7wasineffect,shedid

everyeffortlegallynecessarytosecretlysupporttheChinesecause,withmonetary,

2RelationswithJapan.3Ibid.YoungHumKim,EastAsiasTurbulentCentury(NewYork,NewYork:MeredithPublishing

Company,1966),100.

StanleyKarnow,InOurImage:AmericasEmpireinthePhilippines(NewYork,NewYork:RandomHouseInc.,1989),281.HereinafterthissourceshallbeknownasStanley.4RelationswithJapan.5Stanley,281.6CharlesE.Neu,TheTroubledEncounter:TheUnitedStatesandJapan,(USA:JohnWileyandSonsInc.,1975),161.7Neutrality(NotTakingSides),SomethingAboutEverythingMilitary,retrievedfromhttp://www.jcs-group.com/military/war1941vast/neutrality.htmlonOctober7,2011at10:26pm.


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materials and technical aids to the Chinese Kuomintang Government.8 Not to

mention the clandestine formationofan air forcegroupknownasCol.Chenaults

Flying Tigers, a group of American airman volunteers trained to support the

ChineseandtheAlliedcause.9

ThePhilippineCommonwealthandJapan

In thePhilippines,therewere talksof issueswhethertherewasaneedfor

thedefenseortheneutralizationofthePhilippineCommonwealth.Veteransofthe

PhilippineRevolution passed a resolution requesting the UnitedStatesto initiate

negotiationswithJapanregardingtheneutralizationofthePhilippines,andifitfails,

they are ready to defend the Philippines even without U.S. aid.10Similarly the

Sakdalista Party led by Elpidio Santos believed in the neutralization of the

Philippines,furthermoreheexpressedhisoppositionintheretentionofAmerican

basesinthePhilippines,asitwouldinvitethesuspicionofJapan.Healsodismissed

the formation and preparation of the Commonwealth Army, as it would not

guaranteethesafetyoftheCommonwealthandwouldpossiblyinviteintervention

byJapan.11Ontheotherhand,PioDuran,oneofthePro-Japanesegroupexpressed

8JohnKingFairbank,TheUnitedStatesandChina,(NewYork,NewYork:TheVikingPress,Inc.,1962),160-161.9Ibid.10LydiaN.YuJose,Philippine,American,andJapaneseRelationsasSeenThroughtheIssueofNeutralization,1900-1939,inPhilippines-JapanRelations,eds.LydiaN.YuJoseandIkehataSetsuho

(QC:AteneodeManilaUniversityPress,2003),64.HereinafterthissourceshallbeknownasLydia

Jose,Philippin-Japan.11Ibid.


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theirhopesthatthePhilippinesconcludeanalliancewithJapan,12whomPioDuran

believed had the capability to militarily aid the Philippines because of their

geographicalproximity,ascomparedwiththeU.S.

This leaves President Manuel Quezon and his allies who were in favor of

defendingtheCommonwealth.AndevenifQuezonhadhighhopeswiththemilitary

mission and the defense plan, the fact remained of the Japanese forces to be

reckoned with. In one of his visits to Japan, although cordial the relation was

betweenPresidentQuezonandtheEmperor,hecannotdoawaywiththerealization

thatJapanhadanimpressiveforce,andthatitwasnotsomethingtheycouldtrifle

with, thoughhedid expressed his belief that this forcewas not totally invincible.

ThiswasstatedinhismemoirtheGoodFight,Ireturnedtomycountryconvinced

thatmypeoplewouldhavetomakesomespecialtermswiththeJapaneseinorderto

avoidbeingattackedordominatedIwasingeneralawareoftheJapanesemilitary

strength; I never thought that shewas unbeatable from theWest.13By late 1939,

havingrealizedthathecouldnottotallydependupontheCommonwealthArmyfor

the defense, President Quezon contended himself upon depending only on the

nonguaranteedneutralization,whichwasmore likeaplea totheUnited States to

defendherfromJapaneseaggressionifitcomes.14

12Ibid.13ManuelLuisQuezon,TheGoodFight(Manila:MCPEnterprises,1946),180.HereinafterthissourceshallbeknownasQuezon.14LydiaJose,Philippine-Japan,71.


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On the other hand, General Douglas MacArthur downplayed the Japanese

threat of invasion by explaining in a military sense that those who feared the

invasion failed to understand the Japanese mind that it would be strategically

unsound for them to occupy the Philippines. 15 And if ever Japan takes the

Philippines, she would be facing two fronts that stretched from a long distance

separatedbylargebodyofocean,onefrontfromtheEastern,thatistheChineseand

theotherinthePacificregionorSoutheastAsia,thePhilippineIslandsanditsallied

neighbors.AndprotectingtheOccupiedPhilippinesbyJapanwouldinprinciplebe

in the same situation as theUnited States was at present. The excerpt that Gen.

MacArthurstatedwasthefollowing,Ithasbeenassumed,inmyopinion,erroneously,

that Japancovets theseIslandsProponentsofsuch a theory fail tofully credit the

logicoftheJapanesemind.Strategically,possessionoftheseIslandswouldintroduce

an element of extraordinary weakness in the Japanese Empire. It would split that

Empireintotwoparts,separatedbyabroadstretchofoceanandbetweenthemwould

lie its present military enemy, China. Every reason that is now advanced as to the

indefensibility of the Archipelago by the United States, because of its distance

therefrom,wouldapplyinprincipletoitsdefensebyJapan.16MacArthuralsoadded

that Japan gains no economic advantage by occupying the Philippine Islands,17

Economically,JapanwouldgainnothingbyconquestintheseIslandsthatitcouldnot

15RicardoTrotaJose,ThePhilippineArmy,1935-1942(LoyolaHeights,QuezonCity:AteneodeManilaUniversityPress,,1992),128.HereinafterthissourceshallbeknownasRicardoJose,

PhilippineArmy.16Editorials,GeneralMacArthursStatementontheDefensibilityofthePhilippinesinTheSundayMagazine(April1939):283.HereinafterthissourceshallbeknownasSundayMagazine.17RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,128.


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consummatemore advantageously andcheaply bynormal commercial and friendly

process.18

Although there was a fear of looming Japanese invasion, but it was not

withoutbasis,asthereweresuspicionsofJapaneseintelligencegatheringactivities

goingon.AsinthecaseofKaiunMaruincidentduring1934,Japanesefishingvessel

was caught illegallywithinPhilippinewaters.But insteadofcooperatingwith the

authorities, the captain and the crews threw the investigators overboard.19More

witnessescametoascertaintheseintelligence-gatheringactivitiesbytheJapanese

especially after the war broke out. Some of these Japanese informants were

plantedinthePhilippinesintheguiseofgardeners,coolies,merchants,etc.Justasin

thecaseofVicenteZamoraSeniorandhisJapanesegardener. TheJapanesegardener

washardworkingandbornwithagreenthumb.Butafterhisworkwasdone,hewould

alwaysgoandgetdrunkatFortMcKinley.Hewouldbesodrunk, thattheemployer

wouldusuallyreceivecallstohavehimpickedup.Thenoneday,hejustvanished,just

toreturnafterJapaneseinvasion,ridingacar,andwearingauniformwitharankofa

colonel.20AnotherwasfromFr.JamesNeri,S.J.ashedescribedinDavao,wheremost

ofthelandwereleasedtoJapanesecompaniesintheirproductionofabaca.Andhad

a virtual Japanese colony wherein transportation system, stores, hospitals were

managedbythem,andtheJapanesemenwouldmarrytheFilipinasandbuyplotsof

18SundayMagazine,283.19LydiaJose,Philippines-Japan,67.20TheJamesB.Reuter,S.J.Foundation,JesselynnGarciadelaCruzed.,CiviliansinWorldWarII:OneBriefShiningMoment(QuezonCity:TheJamesB.Reuter,S.J.Foundation,1994),8.Hereinafterthis

sourceshallbeknownasSJ.


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land;allthesewerepartofthepenetrationscheme.21WhileEstherS.Bellarmino

wasthecaseoftheJapaneseicecreamparlorownerwhowasalsoaphotographer

thatunceasinglytookpicturesof theirwholecommunity.22Thesewere justa few

instancesmentionedbywitnessesaboutJapaneseactivitiesthatarousedsuspicions

andfearsofimpendingJapaneseinvasion.

UnitedStatesandtheIssueofDefendingthePhilippines

IntheUnitedStates,therewasmuchdebateregardingtherecommendations

submitted by the former Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet, Admiral Arthur

Hepburn. Hepburn endorsed the idea of fortification of Guam, which General

MacArthur concurred, stating that this would have a far-reaching effect on the

defenseofthePhilippineIslands,aswellasstrengthentheUnited Statesmilitary

position in the Far East region. 23 Although Guam was being advocated for

fortification,publicopinionoptedforthePhilippineIslands.24Andwiththeissueof

NeutralityandoftheAmericaninterestsastheprimaryconcern,Congressruledin

favoroftheIsolationistsandrejectedtheproposalbeinglobbied,asthisproposal,

which was fortifying Guam and or the Philippines, would inevitably involve the

UnitedStatesinanunavoidablewar. 25Facedwithsuchatightsituation,thedefense

ofthePhilippineswoulddependentirelyupontheFilipinopeoplethemselves.

21SJ.,6-7.22Ibid.23RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,126.24RicardoJose,Philippine,Army,127.25Ibid.


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Upon receiving thenews regarding therejection of theCongress to fortify

andordefendGuamandPhilippines,GeneralDouglasMacArthurchampionedthe

Filipino cause. The following were excerpts from the statements of one of his

resolutions,NowTherefore,themembersofthisDepartmentofthePhilippines,The

AmericanLegiondoraisetheirvoicesinsolemnwarning:1.Thattherejectionofthe

GuamHarborimprovementsprojectforreasons,obvioustotheworld,wascontraryto

bestAmericantradition,andrendersourcountrybutmorevulnerabletothedangers

theCongress,byitsaction,soughttoavoid;2withdrawalofUnitedStatesfromany

political or economical front heretofore gained would but witness the start of a

decline in power, dignity, and prestige from which our country may only be

maintained by courage; 3. That the development of our domestic policy in the

dispositionofourownterritory,whereveritbesituated,issolelythebusinessofthe

UnitedStatesandshouldbynomeansbeundertheinfluence,muchlessdomination,of

foreignpressure;thatthisresolutionsubmittedtotheNationalConvention,strongly

urgingthattheprinciplesaffirmedthereinbeadoptedandadvancedasbasictruths,

fullrealizationofwhich,isessentialtotheNationalwelfare.26

U.S.WartimePolicyandtheQuestionofPhilippineDefense

InasmuchasUnitedStatespolicywasconcerned,althoughmainlyapplying

amoreIsolationistpolicy,therewasaproposalforawarlikepreparationincaseofa

RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,153.26SundayMagazine,237.


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tightdiplomaticsituation,especiallywithJapanin1913.27EvenaftertheFirstWorld

War, America had already made preparations, allegedly for the purpose of

protectingAmericaninterestsjustincastifsituationnecessitatedtheuseofforce.

Butgenerally,itwasmoreofapassivediplomacy,andmostofthetime,theirpolicy

indealingwithforeigndiplomaticproblemwereinaformofprotestandornote

andatmost,ifever,anembargo.ItwasnotuntiltheoutbreakofthePacificWarand

the sudden attack by Japanese forces on Pearl Harbor, that America took on a

hardlinestance.

InthePhilippines,asearlyas1907,therewasalreadytheso-calledJapanese

BugabooortheJapaneseinvasionscaretactics.ButaccordingtosomeFilipinosthis

was nothing more than a calculated surmise by the Americans to scare the

Filipinos.28NeverthelesstheystillhavetotackletheissueofNationalDefense.And

Filipinosdiffer intheiropinionregarding thismatter.MostFilipinoswhowere in

favor of immediate political independence downplayed the Japanese threat. And

they believed that Japan was willing to sign a treaty of good relations with the

Philippines. Furthermore they insist that the presence of American forces in the

Philippines could only entangle the country into anunwantedwarwith Japan.29

However,therewerethoselikeDavidandMiguelCornejo,bothofwhomhadbeen

27ColorPlans,SomethingAboutEverythingMilitary,retrievedfromhttp://www.jcs-group.com/military/war1941vast/1939ptoplans.htmlonOctober07,2011at

10:20pm.HereinafterthissourceshallbeknownasColorPlans.28CesarP.Pobre,HistoryoftheArmedForcesoftheFilipinoPeople,eds.MauroR.AvenaandBezalieB.Uc-Kung(QuezonCity:NewDayPublishers,2000),169.Hereinafterthissourceshallbeknownas

Pobre,PA.29Pobre,PA,170.


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NationalGuards,supportthecreationofthePhilippineArmyforthedefenseofthe

PhilippineIslands.30In1921,MiguelCornejoproposedthecreationoffiftythousand

strongmenandtwenty-fourwarships,aspartofthedefense,butitwasnottobe,for

itnevergotofftheground. 31Hisstandformilitarypreparednessmayhaveearned

himmanycriticisms.Buttheconceptofnationaldefensewouldbecomeaprimary

issuethatwouldbediscussedbytheNationalAssembly in1935,passedandlater

signedbyPresidentQuezonastheNationalDefenseAct.

WarPlanOrange

War Plan Orange was a designed military preparation in anticipation of

JapaneseaggressionagainstU.S.territories.Theplanconsistedofthreephases.First

phase, was the expected loss of lightly defended U.S. outposts east and south of

Japan. U.S. naval warships are to be concentrated near homeports and could be

deployedfromEasternPacificonshortnotice.32Secondphase,U.S.withsuperiorair

andnavalpowershalladvancetotheeast.Whileasmall-scaleattackwouldbemade

onJapaneseoccupiedterritoriesandestablishingsupplyroutesandbasesinthese

occupiedareas.Anticipatedre-occupationofthePhilippineswouldbemadewithin

two to threeyears.33And finally,ThirdPhase, U.S. forceswouldadvance towards

30Pobre,PA,171.31Ibid.32WarPlanOrange,retrievedfromhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/war-plan-orange.htmonOctober07,2011at10:00pm.HereinafterthissourceshallbeknownasWarPlan

Orange.

33Ibid.


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JapanbyacquiringislandsnearAsia,usingtheseasbasestoestablishchokepoints

toobstruct Japanese trade.Whilecontinuous air bombardmentof Japanese cities

and Industrial locationswould enableU.S. victorywithout invading the Japanese

homeland.34

War Plan Orangewas conceptualized as early as 1903, by creating a Joint

Army-NavyBoard(Joint Board),plansweremade for apreemptive strike against

JapaneseattackonU.S.territoriesinthePacificregion,ifeverithappens.Andevery

yearthisplanhadundergonereviewandchangesfromtheJointBoard,depending

ontheinternationalsituationandonmilitarynecessity. 35Andwitheverychanges

andreviewsmadeeachyear,itwasunderstoodthattheNavywastoplayavitalrole

inthewar,whereinthefinalanalysiswouldbedependentuponthesuperiorityof

theUnitedStatesNavyorU.S.seapower.36By1920s,theWarDepartmentdrewup

contingency plans for Plan Orange, theorizing the Japanese attack in the Pacific

regionforacquisitionofresourcesandterritories.37In1930-1935PlanOrangewas

againrevised,thistime,thePhilippinegarrisonwastoholdanddefendManilaBay

(lateronrevisedasholdinganddefendingtheentrancetoManilaBay)asbasesfor

theNavyuntilU.S.reinforcementarrives.38

34ibid.35Ibid.36Ibid.seealsoColorPlans.37WarPlanOrange.38WarPlanOrange.Pobre,PA,167.

SeealsoColorPlans.


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Withtheworseninginternationalsituation,PlanOrangewassupplanted,and

mostofitsbasicconceptswereincorporatedintothenewplan,whichwasknownas

the Rainbow 5. Rainbow 5 was a contingency plan in global warfare, wherein

AmericawouldbefightingGermanyandJapansimultaneouslyandattwodifferent

fronts,EuropeanforGermanyandAsiaandthePacificregionforJapan.39Thefight

againstGermanyandwinningthewarinEuropewouldbeAmericasfirstpriority,

whileconductingthedelayingtacticsagainstJapaneseinvasionanddefendingand

holdingtheManilaBayuntilreinforcementarrives.40

General Douglas MacArthur, on the other hand, lambasted Rainbow 5

together with Orange Plan as a defeatist contingency plan, as it implied the

abandonmentofthePhilippinesandevenofManilabeforethewarhadeverstarted;

as well as accepting the possibility of losing the Philippine Islands should the

reinforcements failed to arrive.41His view of theplanwasmore of an active and

positiveapproachbytransformingthePhilippinesintoavirtualstronghold.Hethen

set about for the dispatch of aircrafts, weapons and officers and men from the

United States. Andpresented a polished report onhow the Philippine Armyhad

FrankHindmanGolay,FaceofEmpire:UnitedStates-PhilippineRelations,1898-1946(LoyolaHeights:AteneoDeManilaUniversityPress,1997),405.Hereinafterthissourceshallbeknownas

FrankGolay.39Pobre,PA,275.40RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,209.Pobre,PA,275.41Pobre,PA,275.FrankGolay,405.


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beensystematicallyprogressing,andhowU.S.supportwasneededmorethanever

fortheirmoralboost.42ThroughGeneralMacArthurseffort,themilitarytopbrass

togetherwithWashingtonwereconvincedthatPhilippinescouldbedefendedgiven

enough modern weapons, professional officers and men to be sent to the

Philippines.43By thebeginningofSeptember1941,navalshipsandaircraftswere

on itsway tothe Philippines, andonNovember, tanksweredispatched, together

with these armored tanks were scheduled dispatches of munitions and all the

necessities to rearm the Philippine Army and or USAFFE forces.44And so the

fortificationofthePhilippineIslandsbegan.

TheNationalDefensePlan

With the enactment of The National Defense Act, also known as

Commonwealth Act no. 1, onDecember 21, 1935, the creation of the Philippine

Army was on theway. The Philippine Constabulary became the core unit of the

army,in spiteof the fact thattheNationalGuardwas the firstchoiceofPresident

Quezon. Which unfortunately, lamented Quezon, that the National Guard was

dissolved even before the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth. The

followingwas an excerpt from hismemoir, The firstmatter ofgreat importance

beforeuswas,ofcourse,thecreationofthePhilippineArmy.HowdeeplyIregretted

thatthePhilippineNationalGuardwhichwehadorganizedin1917-1918tohelpthe

42Ibid.43Ibid.44Ibid.


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United Statesduring thewar had beenabolished. In that,we had already had the

nucleusforanarmy.45

UndertheNationalDefenseAct,by1946,thePhilippineswouldbeacquiring

four hundred thousand troop reserves and ten thousand regular forces, with

offshore patrols and 36 torpedo boats, and Philippine Air Corp of 100 Tactical

bombers,whichwerecreatedthroughtheappropriationofsixteenmillioneachyear

from the Philippine Commonwealth budget. This was the provision for which

General Douglas MacArthur made Quezon to believe, that with just 16-M peso

budget each year, for the recruitment and training of the Philippine army and

procurement of weapons.46 And by the time the Philippines was granted her

independence, ithadalreadytrainedandpreparedenoughmenandmunitions to

defend the country, making the departure of U.S. troops from the Philippines

possible.

The importance of the need for the national defense especially after the

independenceandwithdrawalofU.S.militaryforcescanbestatedinthefollowing

excerpt, The progress ofevents in the Philippine Islands assures the establishment

thereofaCommonwealthGovernment duringthecomingcalendaryear.Oneofthe

most pressing responsibilities that will coincidentally devolve upon the new

governmentwillbetheinitiationanddevelopmentofasoundnationaldefensesystem

45Quezon,165.46Pobre,PA,180.FrankGolay,351.


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accuratelyadjustedtothestrategicsituationanddefensiveneedsoftheIslands.Itisof

themost urgent importance that this system reacha state of reasonable efficiency

beforethetimearriveswhen,underexistingconventions,theprotectionoftheUnited

States shall have been completely withdrawn. From that time onward existence of

adequatedefenseforthePhilippineswillbeapowerful influenceinpreservingpeace

inthatregion,since,evenshouldinternationaltreatiesforneutralizationoftheislands

be consummated, pronounced weakness will encourage disorders and invite

aggression. Obviously the new nations military policy, both by inclination and

compulsion,willbepurelydefensive,butitsdefensesmustcommandrespect47

FlawsandCracksinthePlan

Tobeginwith,evenbeforetheplangoesintomotion,thebudgetitself,which

was essential for the success of the trainingandmaterielprocurements. The 16-

million peso budget proposal that General MacArthur pulled was way below the

minimum estimate made by Ord and Eisenhower. The minimum estimate they

calculated would require at least 22 million pesos to produce a decent defense

force.48It was during the implementation of the defense plan that 16M pesos

annually came out short of what was actually needed. General MacArthur even

47OfficeoftheMilitaryAdviser,CommonwealthofthePhilippines,ReportonNationalDefenseinthePhilippines(Manila:BureauofPrinting,1936),14-15.48Pobre,PA,188.RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,86.


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contemplated acquiring the funds from coconut excise tax for army use,49which

unfortunately,theplanfellthroughandwasrejected.

The estimated defensebudget was just one of the flawsmentioned in the

provision.The400 thousandstrongreservedtroopstobedeliveredbytheendof

theCommonwealthperiod,whichwasaround1945,wasanotherexample.By1938,

afterathorough3-yeartraining,only69,848oftheprojected120thousandfinished

thetrainingprogram.50Thesetwotightsituationsarejustaglimpseintotheflaws

in the defense system and crack in its plan. Whether it was due to budgetary

constraintsor tounavoidable difficult situation remains tobe seen.But as far as

defense programwas concerned, efforts were made to improve and modify the

qualityoftrainingprogramaswellasdisciplineandmoraleofthetrainees.

Duringthefirsttwoyearsoftraining,problemsencounteredwereallegedly

duetobudgetaryconstraints.PerhapsMacArthuroverlookedtheuseoffacilitiesor

training grounds, when the budget was proposed and submitted to President

Quezon.ThispredicamentwaspulledoffbythenGeneralSantos,whousedevery

possiblemeanstocostcutthebudget.51GeneralSantosevenimplementedtheuseof

localproducts,suchasabacabelt,localbolo,AngTibayshoesandmostespecially

49RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,86.50BriefHistoryoftheDepartmentofNationalDefense,retrievedinhttp://www.dnd.gov.ph/DNDWEBPAGE_files/DND%20HISTORY.pdfonSeptember23,2011at

1:30am51RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,115.Note:hereceivedtheDistinguishedServiceStarforhisassistanceinsolvingimportantproblems.


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theguinithataspartofthearmyuniform 52,toaugmentshortagesinuniformsand

equipment of the trainees. Unfortunately, the cost cutting also produced other

unnecessary results. Like the quality of the guinit hat, which received much

criticismsforitspoorqualityworkmanshipandshorterlifespanascomparedwith

the U.S. made felt hat.53 Shorter training period due to cost cutting of budget

resultedinhalf-bakedtraineesandill-preparedforcombatduties.Theunfinished

constructionofbarracksandtrainingfacilities,culminatinginacongestedtraining

areathatproducedpoorqualitytraining,nottomentionthepoorfoodquality,were

afewofthementionedproblemsencounteredasaresultofcostcuttingjusttomake

endsmeet,giventhelimitedbudget.

Theacquiring of Enfieldrifles,outdated andcumbersome, usedduring the

First World War, was the only affordable if not available weapons that the

PhilippineArmycouldafford.54Whilewithin theranksof thearmy,eversince the

PhilippineConstabularybecamethenucleusunit,discriminationamongtheranks

slowlyemerged.WhereintheConstabularyofficersandmenformedacliqueoftheir

own.55Thistayo-tayonasystemnotonlyencourageswhitewashoferringofficers

but also slowly eroded the morale of the army as a whole. Another was the

appointmentofMajorGeneralBasilioValdesaschiefofstaff.Valdeswasaphysician

byprofessionwhowastotallyunfamiliarwiththemilitaryaffairs.Hissituationmay

notresultmuchasanadverseeffect.ButitdidtemporarilygiveMacArthurandhis

52RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,66,109.53Ibid.,109.54RicaardoJose,PhilippineArmy,65.55Pobre,PA,237.


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militarymission an influenceover the army, for theircompetency inrunning the

army.56

Afterhavingaman-to-manconversationwithGeneralVicenteLim,President

QuezonlearnsofthetruthregardingthePhilippineArmyanditsstatus.57Andwith

the assistance of General Lim, efforts were made to clean up themess and to

improvetheworseningconditionofthearmy.ByMay03,1939,GeneralVicenteLim

was appointed deputy chief of staff.58Thereafter, President Quezon ordered the

reorganizationoftheCentralGeneralStaff,whichcoincidentallywaslongoverdue.59

This time around, the Chief of Staff and or his Deputy would directly report to

President Quezon all activities implemented by the Central General Staff. Such

sudden move by President Quezon was allegedly due to his declining amiable

relationshipwithGeneralMacArthur,afterrealizingtheseriousnessofthesituation

inthearmythatMacArthurhadbeenkeepingfromhim. 60Followingtheadviceof

GeneralVicenteLim,gradualimplementationofchangeswasmade.In1938,courts

martialandthefirstefficiencyboardshadbeenestablished.61Andinordertoavoid

andcurbthe influenceofthetayo-tayosystemfrominfluencingthe trials andthe

56RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,115.57Pobre,PA,253.58Pobre,PA,254.RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,121.59Pobre,PA,254.RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,172-173.60RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,121.61RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,123.


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efficiencyboards,GeneralLimplacedhimselfasmemberoftheboardofappealsor

appealsboard.62

By July of 1941, words of Japanese invasion seemed imminent, as the

breakdown of negotiations between the United States and Japan intensified the

worseningtensionsbetweenthetwonations.InsanctioningJapanofitsaggressive

policy, theUnitedStates immediatelytookstepsby freezingJapaneseassets inall

U.S.territories,includingthePhilippines. 63Militarypreparationsweremadeforthe

upcoming confrontation with Japan. In Philippines, the creation of an umbrella

militarycommandwas implemented. Itwas knownas the USAFFEor the United

States Army Forces in the Far East. Under USAFFE, the PhilippineArmy and the

American forces based in the Philippines would be incorporated into a single

organization under the command of General Douglas MacArthur. 64 President

QuezonuponhearingthenewsofGeneralMacArthursappointment,setasidehis

previously ill feelings with MacArthur, and personally congratulated the newly

appointed commander. PresidentQuezon alsomade clearhis intentions that the

CommonwealthwouldfullysupportandcooperatewithGeneralMacArthur.65

PlansofabsorbingthePhilippinearmyintotheUnitedStatesarmyundera

singlecommandwereimmediatelyputintoeffect.Trainingofofficersandmen,as

wellasairforcewasunderway.Mobilizationofdivisionsscheduledforthetraining

62Ibid.63RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,191.64RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,192.65Ibid.


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ofcombinedPhilippine -U.S. army reserves for betterefficiency andcoordination

was carried out. Mobilization was achieved longer than what was generally

expected,butthetestmobilizationobtainedsatisfactoryresults.Stepsweremadeto

remedyproblemsexperiencedintransportationandcommunication.66

Conclusion

DespiteeveryeffortbythecombinedPhilippine-U.S.forcesorUSAFFEforces,

continuous Japanese invasion of the Philippine Islands went on unabated. Then

came the declarationofManila as OpenCity. Thereafter, the retreat ofGeneral

MacArthur togetherwith PresidentQuezonand a few staffas the government in

exile.Aftermonths of resisting the Japanese onslaught, Bataancapitulated to the

Japaneseforces,thenCorregidortogetherwithGeneralWainwrightssurrender,as

commander of the USAFFE. Hence, the Japanese Occupation of the Philippines

began.

USAFFEforcesmayhavefailedtodefendthePhilippineIslands;escapeesof

theDeathMarchhowevercouldhavebondedtogetherandwithfellowpatriotsand

mayhavecontinuedthefightthroughguerillawarfare.Ontheotherhand,fromthe

perspective of plan Rainbow 5, it seemed to have proceeded well as planned.

WhereinthePhilippinesattemptedtodefendherself,andtriedtodenytheenemy

the entrance to Manila Bay. While the main of the U.S. forces prioritized their

66RicardoJose,PhilippineArmy,204.


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participation of thewar inEurope, especially the D-Day. Thereafter,onlydid the

United States turned her attention upon the Pacific region, to take back her

territoriesanddealwithJapan.


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http://www.mtholyoke.eu/acad/intrel/WorldWar2/Japan.htm(accessed

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"SomethingAboutEverythingMilitary:ColorPlans.

"http://www.jcs-group.com/military/war1941vast/1939ptoplans.html

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October7,2011).

TheJamesB.Reuter,S.J.Foundation.CiviliansinWorldWarII:OneBriefShiningMoment.EditedbyJesselynnGarciaDelaCruz.QuezonCity:TheJamesB.

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"WarPlanOrange."http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/war-plan-

orange.htm(accessedOctober7,2011).

Young,HumKim.EastAsia'sTurbulentCentury.NewYork,NewYork:Meredith PublishingCompany,1966.


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Photos67

Gen.Eisenhower(center)withGen.CrawfordandGen.LeonardGerrow

Gen.DouglasMacArthurreviewsthePhilippineArmy.Gen.BasilioValdes

67*note:allpictureswereretrievedfromvariousinternetwebsitesviaYahooSearch

Engine.


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(left)Gen.VicenteLim

PhilippineCommonwealthArmedForces

(left)PhilippineArmy


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Philippinearmy

155MMgun

CorregidorMortar


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Gen.Lim(topcornerleft)

PresidentQuezonandGen.MacArthur(centerandbottomcenter)

Documents

The Value and Meaning of Defending the Commonwealth of the Philippines.pdf