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THE USES AND MISUSES OF OPF IN CONGESTION
MANAGEMENTpresentation by
George Gross
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Seminar “Electric Utilities Restructuring”
Institut d’Electricité Montefiore
Université de Liège
December 8, 1999© Copyright George Gross, 1999
OUTLINE
Review of OPF applications in the vertically integrated
utility environment
Review of congestion management in the two paradigms of
unbundled market structures
Pool based
Bilateral Trading
OPF application to competitive markets
Role of the central decision making authority and impacts
on generators
THE BASIC OPF PROBLEM
Nature: optimization of the static power systems for a fixed
point in time
Objective: optimization of a specified metric (e.g. loss
minimization, production cost minimization, ATC maximization)
Constraints: all physical, operational and policy limitations for
the generation and delivery of electricity in a bulk power
system
Decision: optimal policy for selected objective and associated
sensitivity information with direct economic interpretation
OPF PROBLEM CHARACTERISTICS
Nonlinear model of the static power system
Representation of constraints
Representation of contingencies
Incorporation of relevant economic information
Central decision making authority determines optimal
policy
OPF PROBLEM FORMULATION
u = vector of m control variables
x = vector of n state variables
f : m x n is the objective function
g : m x n n is the equality constraints function
h : m x n q is the inequality constraints function
s.t.
min
0xuh
0xug
xuf
),(
),(
),(
ECONOMIC SIGNALS IN THE OPF SOLUTION
For equality constraints the dual variables are
interpreted as the nodal real power or nodal reactive
power prices at each bus
For inequality constraints the dual variables are
interpreted as the sensitivity of the objective function
to a change in the constraint limit
MARKET STRUCTURE PARADIGMS
Pool model
Bilateral model
THE POOL MODEL
The Pool is the sole buyer and seller of electricity
The Pool uses the offers of the suppliers and the bids
of the demanders to determine the set of successful
bidders whose offers and bids are accepted
The Pool determines the “optimum” by solving a
centralized economic dispatch model taking into
account the network constraints
Seller 1
POOL
Seller M Seller i
Buyer N Buyer j Buyer 1
MWh MWh MWh
MWhMWhMWh
.$
.
. . .. . .
. . .
$
$$
$ $
.
THE POOL MODEL
Buyer NBuyer N
CONGESTION MANAGEMENT IN THE POOL MODEL
The Pool model considers explicitly the impacts of the
transmission network constraints
The Pool model assumes implicitly the commitment of
generators which are bidding to supply power
The determination of the economic optimum is done
with the explicit consideration of congestion
THE BILATERAL TRADING MODEL
Players arrange the purchase and sale transactions
among themselves
Each schedule coordinator (SC) and each power
exchange (PX) are responsible for ensuring
supply/demand balance
The independent system operator (ISO) has the role to
facilitate the undertaking of as many of the
contemplated transactions as possible subject to
ensuring that no system security and physical
constraints are violated
... ...
Load aggregator
End userESP
IGO
Scheduling Coordinator
...
Power Exchange
Ancillary Services Market
D I S T R I B U T I O N (W I R E S)D I S T R I B U T I O N (W I R E S)
GG GG GG GG GG GG GG GGGGGGGGGG
BILATERAL TRADING
Bilateral Transactions
BILATERAL TRADING CONGESTION MANAGEMENT
If all contemplated transactions can be undertaken
without causing any limit violations under postulated
contingencies, the system is judged to be capable of
accommodating these transactions and no CM is
needed
On the other hand, the presence of any violation
causes transmission congestion and steps must be
taken by the IGO to re-dispatch the system to remove
the congestion
Objective function: re-dispatch costs
Decision variables are incremental / decremental
adjustments to the generator outputs and decremental
adjustments to the loads
Constraints
transmission constraints
maximum/minimum incremental/decremental
amounts bid
OPF solution: optimal re-dispatch in generation/load
increment/decrement at participating buses
BILATERAL TRADING MODEL CONGESTION MANAGEMENT
ROLE OF OPF IN THE OLD REGIME
The OPF was originally developed for the vertically
integrated utility (VIU) structure
In the VIU, the central decision maker is the utility that
operates and controls the generation and transmission
plants and has the obligation to serve load
The OPF solution makes sense in the VIU environment
KEY DIFFERENCES IN THE ROLE OF OPF IN THE POOL MODEL
The decision maker and the players are no longer the
same entity
The cost is the price that the Pool has to pay to
competitive supply resources
The demand at each bus may be a decision variable
and as such is not fixed
The demand is expressed in the terms of willingness
to pay
The objective is maximize benefits minus costs
OPF STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS
there exists a continuum of “optimum”
solutions which results in effectively the same
cost within a specified tolerance
the choice of an optimum solution has a great
degree of arbitrariness
The “flatness” of solution
x1 x2 f(x1 ) - f(x2 ) <
OPF STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS
Different solution approaches can lead to different optima
Sensitivity of the solution to the initial point point:
different initial points can lead to solutions that are
equally “good”
Solution may be proved to be unique only if the objective
function is convex; in case of multiple minimum solutions
OPF can fail in finding the “true” solution
Solution may not exist
In VIU one may favor one generating unit or another
but all units are owned by the same entity and so it is
purely an internal problem
In competitive markets bias for or against a given
generator may result in the generator’s success or
failure
IMPLICATIONS UNDER DIFFERENT MARKET STRUCTURE
Different optima correspond to different dual variables
nodal prices may be widely different even when the
“optimal’ solutions are close
market signals may not be reliable
IMPLICATIONS
The central decision-making authority has many
degrees of freedom in specifying the OPF model
The definition of the model has a deep impact on
the optimum and on the dual variables.
The major areas under the discretion of the
central authority include:
the inclusion/exclusion of specific constraints
the definition of the set of contingency to be
applied
algorithm choice and parameters
DISCRETION OF CENTRAL AUTHORITY
DISCRETION OF CENTRAL AUTHORITY
OPFIGO
hnconstraint set
contingencyset
algorithmicdetails
feasible
dual variables
yes
no
solution
NUMERICAL RESULTS OF OPF APPLICATIONS TO POOL MODEL
The objective is to maximize benefits minus costs
the loads are assumed to have fixed benefits
each generator submits a different price offer curve
in effect, the objective is to minimize generation
costs incurred by the Pool operator
Numerical studies are used to study anomalous results
with OPF and the impacts of the discretion of the Pool
operator
ANOMALIES IN OPF RESULTS
Power flows from a node with higher nodal price to a
node with a lower nodal price
Nodal price differences between buses at ends of lines
without limit violations
IEEE 30-BUS TEST SYSTEM
1 2
3 4
86 7
5
9
15 18
14
1213
16 17
19
11
10 20
24
2321
22
26
25
27
28
2930
2.40 MW0.90 MVAR
10.60 MW1.90 MVAR
3.50 MW2.30 MVAR
11.20 MVAR17.50 MW
8.70 MW6.70 MVAR
5.80 MW2.00 MVAR
0.70 MVAR2.20 MW
22.80 MW10.90 MVAR
30.00 MVAR30.00 MW
2.40 MW1.20 MVAR
1.80 MVAR3.50 MW 5.80 MVAR
9.00 MW
3.20 MW1.60 MVAR
11.20 MW7.50 MVAR
12.70 MVAR21.70 MW
6.20 MW1.60 MVAR
8.20 MW2.50 MVAR
3.20 MW0.90 MVAR
3.40 MVAR9.50 MW1.60 MVAR
7.60 MW
EXAMPLES: OPF APPLICATION
IEEE 30-bus system
All line MVA limits are enforced
Additional 8 MVA limit on line joining buses 15 and 23
Unexpected results of OPF solution
power flows from higher to lower priced nodes
flows on lines without limit violation
OPF POWER FLOWS
congested linespower flows from lower to higher nodal pricespower flows from higher to lower nodal prices
IEEE 30-bus system with the standard line flow limits and an 8 MVA flow limit on line 15-23
1 2
3 4
86 7
5
9
15 18
14
1213
16 17
19
11
10 20
24
2321
22
26
25
27
28
2930
18=4.129
15=4.135
19=4.106
1=3.668 2=3.694
3=3.768
10=3.938
22=3.870 24=3.961
25=4.466
28=4.5426=3.770
21=3.988
4=3.786
EXAMPLE: OPF APPLICATION
Real power losses on lines are neglected
Key focus: line flows on lines without limit violations
LINE FLOWS ON LINES WITHOUT LIMIT VIOLATIONS
1 2
3 4
86 7
5
9
15 18
14
1213
16 17
19
11
10 20
24
23
2122
26
25
27
28
2930
2=3.489
3=3.541 4=3.550
10=4.501
22=3.975
21=5.046
IEEE 30-bus system with
standard line flow limits
and an 8 MVA flow limit on line 15-23; real losses neglected
congested linespower flows from lower to higher nodal pricespower flows from higher to lower nodal prices
IMPACTS OF DISCRETION OF CENTRAL AUTHORITY
Nature of discretion
consideration of line flows limits
specification of different voltage profiles
Illustration of the volatility of dual variables
impacts of nodal prices
allocation of generation levels among suppliers
EXAMPLE: LINE FLOWS LIMITS
Base case: no line limits considered
Case C1: limits of 20, 15 and 10 MVA on lines 1-2,
12-13 and 25-27, respectively
Case C2: limits of 20, 20 and 8 MVA on lines 1-3,
21-22 and 27-28 , respectively
Case C3: limits of 15, 15 and 10 MVA on lines 3-4,
12-13 and 15-23, respectively
EXAMPLE: LINE FLOW LIMITS
0.940.950.960.970.980.99
11.011.021.031.041.051.06
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718192021222324252627282930
bus
bu
s vo
ltag
e
BC C1 C2 C3
OPTIMUM AND NODAL PRICE IMPACTS
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718192021222324252627282930
bus
no
dal
pri
ces
[$/M
Wh
]
BC C1 C2 C3
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
0.45
C1 C2 C3
% c
han
ge
in o
bje
ctiv
e
GENERATION LEVEL IMPACTS
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
1
2
13
22
23
27
ge
ne
rato
r at
bu
s n
o.
generator real power [MW]
C3
C2
C1
BC
-35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55
1
2
13
22
23
27
gene
rato
r b
us
generator level variation [%]
C3
C2
C1
EXAMPLE: VOLTAGE PROFILE SPECIFICATION
No line power flow limits
Base case: 0.95 Vi 1.05 p.u. for each bus i
Case A: fixed voltage equal to 1.0 p.u. at buses 3,4 and
10, and 0.95 Vi 1.05 p.u. for all other buses
Case B: 0.98 Vi 1.02 p.u. for each bus i
Case C: 0.98 Vj 0.99 p.u. for j = 10,11,14,20 and 26,
and 0.95 Vi 1.05 p.u. for all other buses
case D: fixed voltages at 0.98 at buses 9, 19 and 21, and
0.95 Vi 1.05 p.u. for all other buses
VOLTAGE PROFILE CASES
0.940.950.960.970.980.99
11.011.021.031.041.051.06
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718192021222324252627282930
bus
bu
s vo
ltag
e
BC A B C D
OPTIMUM AND NODAL PRICE IMPACTS
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112131415161718192021222324252627282930
bus
no
da
l pri
ce
s [
$/M
W h
r]
BC A B C D
52
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
A B C D
case
% c
han
ge
in o
bje
ctiv
e
GENERATION LEVEL IMPACTS
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
1
2
13
22
23
27
ge
ne
rato
r at
bu
s n
o.
generator real power [MW]
D
C
B
A
BC
-85 -70 -55 -40 -25 -10 5 20 35 50 65 80 95 110 125
1
2
13
22
23
27
gen
erat
or
bu
s
generation level variation [%]
D
C
B
A
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The OPF tool is applicable in a central decision making
environment The discretion of the central decision making authority
in OPF applications in unbundled electricity markets has
broad economic impacts, which are especially
significant for generators The flat nature of the objective function, particularly in
the neighborhood of the optimum, implies a great
degree of arbitrariness in the choice of the optimum An improved understanding of the anomalous results
and more effective application of OPF in unbundled
markets are necessary for the OPF to gain acceptance