The US–India Nuclear Agreement - Cambridge University Pressassets.cambridge.org/97811070/73418/frontmatter/9781107073418… · India’s nuclear status: through the agreement, India

The US–India Nuclear Agreement

Diplomacy and Domestic Politics

Dinshaw Mistry

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mistry, Dinshaw. The US–India nuclear agreement : diplomacy and domestic politics / Dinshaw Mistry. pages cmSummary: Examines the US–India nuclear deal negotiated from 2005 to 2008 and explains several puzzles related to it.Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 978-1-107-07341-8 (Hardback) 1. Nuclear nonproliferation—Government policy—India. 2. Nuclear nonproliferation—Government policy—United States. 3. India. Treaties, etc. United States, 2008 October 8. 4. United States—Foreign relations—India. 5. India—Foreign relations—United States. I. Title. jz5675.m57 2014 327.1’7470954—dc23 2014004592

isbn 978-1-107-07341-8 Hardback

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Contents

List of Figures and Tables vAbbreviations viiPreface xi1. The Argument 12. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics 93. Getting to July 2005 334. Separating India’s Nuclear Facilities 665. Persuading Congress 946. Negotiating the Section 123 Agreement 1297. India’s Domestic Politics 1518. Negotiating IAEA Safeguards 1769. Convincing Nuclear Supplier Countries 183

10. Persuading Congress, Again 20811. Reprocessing and Liability 22812. Reviewing and Extending the Argument 236Appendix: Energy, Military, and Non-proliferation Issues in the Nuclear Agreement 245References 257Index 271











List of Figures and Tables

Figure

2.1: Arrangements A1–A9 and the Win-set 12

Tables

2.1: Experts Testifying in Congressional Hearings 17 2.2: Institutional and Political Factors and the Win-set 18 2.3: US Media Positions on the Nuclear Agreement 21 2.4: Societal Coalitions for and against the Nuclear Agreement 24 2.5: Select Lobbying Activities in the US 26 3.1: US and Indian Action on Non-proliferation Issues 34 3.2: Overview of US and Indian Actions, 1998–2005 35 3.3: Alternative Arrangements for the Joint Statement 58 4.1: Alternative Arrangements for India’s Separation Plan 73 5.1: Alternative Arrangements for Congressional Legislation 103 5.2: House Votes, July 2006 107 5.3: Senate Votes, November 2006 108 6.1: Alternative Arrangements for the Section 123 Agreement 138 9.1: Alternative Arrangements for the NSG Exemption 19410.1: Alternative Arrangements on Congressional Legislation 215 A1: India’s Nuclear Power Reactors 246 A2: Projected Nuclear Share of India’s Electricity 249











Abbreviations

ABM Anti-Ballistic MissileACA Arms Control AssociationAEC Atomic Energy CommissionBARC Bhabha Atomic Research CentreBGR Barbour, Griffith, & RogersBJP Bharatiya Janata PartyCIGNL Contractors International Group on Nuclear LiabilityCII Confederation of Indian IndustryCPI Communist Party of IndiaCPI(M) Communist Party of India (Marxist)CSC Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear

DamageCTBT Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban TreatyDAE Department of Atomic EnergyDMK Dravida Munnetra KazhagamDRDO Defence Research and Development OrganisationENR Enrichment and ReprocessingEU European UnionFARA Foreign Agents Registration ActFMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty






viii Abbreviations

GDP Gross Domestic ProductGNEP Global Nuclear Energy PartnershipHFAC House Foreign Affairs CommitteeHIRC House International Relations CommitteeHR House ResolutionHTCG High Technology Cooperation GroupIAEA International Atomic Energy AgencyIDSA Institute for Defence Studies and AnalysesITER International Thermonuclear Experimental ReactorISIS Institute for Science and International SecurityISRO Indian Space Research OrganisationLWR Light Water ReactorMEA Ministry of External AffairsMPs Members of ParliamentMTCR Missile Technology Control RegimeMW MegawattNDA National Democratic AllianceNNPA Nuclear Non-Proliferation ActNNSA National Nuclear Security AdministrationNPAS Nuclear Proliferation Assessment StatementNPCIL Nuclear Power Corporation of India LimitedNPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation TreatyNRC Nuclear Regulatory CommissionNSC National Security CouncilNSG Nuclear Suppliers GroupNSSP Next Steps in Strategic PartnershipPHWR Pressurized Heavy Water ReactorsPMO Prime Minister’s OfficePNND Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and

Disarmament (PNND)PSI Proliferation Security InitiativeQFRs Questions for the RecordSCOMET Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and

TechnologySFRC Senate Foreign Relations CommitteeSP Samajwadi PartyUK United Kingdom






Abbreviations ix

UN United NationsUNPA United National Progressive AllianceUPA United Progressive AllianceUS United StatesUSIBC US–India Business CouncilUSIFC US–India Friendship CouncilUSINPAC US–India Political Action CommitteeWMD Weapons of Mass Destruction











This is a study of a very complex nuclear negotiation. The study examines how the United States and India negotiated a historic and politically

contentious civilian nuclear agreement. The agreement changed long-standing US laws and non-proliferation regime guidelines to recognize India’s nuclear status: through the agreement, India became the sixth country in the world that could retain nuclear weapons and still participate in civilian nuclear commerce. The Bush administration announced the agreement in July 2005 and completed it in late 2008.

Despite its importance, there are few comprehensive analyses of the US–India nuclear agreement. This book fills this gap in scholarship by thoroughly examining the politics of the agreement. More significantly, it draws upon the well-established framework of two-level games, that combines diplomacy with domestic politics, to explain key puzzles in the US–India nuclear dialogue. This framework explains why Washington and New Delhi could not reach a nuclear agreement in the early 2000s and why, even after they announced an agreement in 2005, they could not complete it until 2008. Such an analysis also offers lessons for US nuclear negotiations with other countries and for the broader US strategic dialogue with India.

A number of individuals and organizations assisted with this manuscript. The Woodrow Wilson Center’s fellowship program, its superb staff, its South Asia program directed by Bob Hathaway, and many friends and colleagues

Preface






xii Preface

at the Center provided a rich intellectual environment and vital research support at the early stages of this project. The American Political Science Association’s Centennial Center, the University of Cincinnati’s sabbatical program, and its Taft Research Center offered additional support. Further, a number of experts and participants in the nuclear dialogue offered their insights in research interviews and in comments on the draft manuscript: these were off the record and, without identifying them by name, I am especially grateful for their contributions. The reviewers of this manuscript also offered insightful comments. Doug Jackson at the Wilson Center provided much research support, and several political science colleagues offered helpful suggestions, including Jacques Hymans, Jacob Wilson, Ivan Ivanov, Joel Wolfe, and Rina Williams. I also acknowledge a long-standing debt to Barclay Ward, Sumit Ganguly and Stephen Cohen. They introduced me to the fields of nuclear affairs and South Asian security; they have been the best of mentors over the years; and they offered vital fellowship recommendations for and useful comments on this manuscript. Finally, I would like to thank all who assisted at Cambridge University Press with the publication of this book.






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The US–India Nuclear Agreement - Cambridge University Pressassets.cambridge.org/97811070/73418/frontmatter/9781107073418… · India’s nuclear status: through the agreement, India