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People v Carpenter

BY KIMBERLEY REED THOMPSON

The diminished capacity defense allows a legally sane defendant to offerevidence of some mental abnormality

to negate the specific intent required tocommit a particular crime. There is a widedivergence of views among the statesconcerning the admissibility of evidence ofmental illness short of insanity.

Michigan recently joined those jurisdictionsthat have performed the last rites for thisdefense by holding in People v Carpenter,1that the use of any evidence of a defendant’slack of mental capacity short of legal insanityto avoid or reduce criminal responsibility bynegating specific intent is precluded.

The Untimely Death ofMichigan’s Diminished

Capacity Defense

fense under the current statutory frameworkfor the insanity defense. In Mangiapane, thedefendant sought to introduce psychiatrictestimony on the issue of his capacity toform the specific intent to commit murderin violation of MCL 750.83. The trial courtdenied the request on the ground that thedefendant did not raise the defense and givethe prosecution notice under MCL 768.20a.

The court of appeals affirmed, explain-ing that, by enacting 1975 PA 180, the leg-islature intended ‘‘to bring under one pro-cedural blanket all defenses to criminalcharges that rest upon legal insanity as de-fined in the statute,’’ and that ‘‘the defenseknown as diminished capacity comes withinth[e] codified definition of legal insanity.’’7

The court thus held that before introduc-ing evidence that the defendant—thoughnot legally insane—lacked mental capacity toform specific intent, one must fully complywith the statutory defense provisions.8

The court of appeals decision in Mangia-pane was followed by a series of decisions con-tinuing to address ‘‘diminished capacity’’ asa form of the statutory insanity defense. See,e.g., People v Denton9 and People v Anderson.10

Through this line of cases, the MichiganCourt of Appeals held that a defendant seek-ing to present a diminished capacity defensebears the burden of establishing the defensethrough a preponderance of the evidenceunder MCL 768.21(a)(3). The court contin-ually affirmed the diminished capacity de-fense and set forth procedural guidelines forits use.

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SE The Diminished

Capacity ApproachOur court of appeals introduced the di-

minished capacity defense to Michigan inPeople v Lynch.2 The defendant in Lynch wascharged with having murdered her baby bystarvation. As part of her defense, the defen-dant sought to have admitted into evidencetestimony from two psychiatrists supportingher claim that she did not possess the requisiteintent to be convicted of first-degree murder,MCL 750.316. The trial court refused toadmit the evidence on the ground that the de-fendant had never raised an insanity defenseand did not give the required statutory notice.

In reversing the defendant’s jury convic-tion, the court of appeals rejected the prose-cution’s argument that allowing evidence ofmental illness less than insanity as bearing onthe defendant’s capacity to form the intentrequired to commit a particular crime would‘‘sanction a subterfuge,’’ avoiding the stan-dards of the insanity defense enunciated bythis court in People v Durfee.3

Before the legislature’s enactment of 1975PA 180, the test for determining legal insan-ity was controlled by Durfee. Featured in the1959 movie, Anatomy of a Murder, the Dur-fee test—based in part on the M’Naughtenrule—contained two elements: ‘‘1) whetherdefendant knew what he was doing was rightor wrong; and 2) if he did, did he have thepower, the will power, to resist doing thewrongful act?’’

The Lynch court also disagreed that rec-ognizing a diminished capacity defense sepa-rate from legal insanity ‘‘would permit thedefense to in effect sneak in the insanity de-fense without labeling it as such and withoutthe necessity of complying with the noticestatute as to the insanity defense.’’4

While it acknowledged that some statesviewed mental capacity as an ‘‘all or nothingmatter and that only insanity. . . negates crim-inal intent,’’ the court of appeals concludedthat proof of diminished capacity is admissi-ble as ‘‘bearing on intent generally or at leaston those special states of the state of mind bydefinition determines the degree of offenseas here.’’5

In People v Mangiapane,6 the court of ap-peals addressed the diminished capacity de-

Ironically, the prosecutorial line of reason-ing, which the court of appeals rejected inLynch 1973 to allow the use of the dimin-ished capacity defense, was adopted by theMichigan Supreme Court in Carpenter 2001to prohibit its use.

People v CarpenterIn Carpenter, the defendant was the for-

mer boyfriend of a female complainant, Ms.Thomas, with whom he had a child. He vis-ited her home in the early morning hours,and after threats that included f iring twoshots, entered her home and assaulted Ms.Thomas and a male friend. After police weresummoned by neighbors, he staged a stand-off in Thomas’s home.

When police made contact by phone,Carpenter asked for some heart medicationthat was in his truck and an officer luredhim to a window by offering to give it tohim. When the officer tried to grab the de-fendant through the open window, he gotfree and slammed the window on the offi-cer’s finger. Carpenter eventually allowed theofficers to enter the home and was placedunder arrest.

At his bench trial, defendant presentedan unsuccessful diminished capacity de-fense. The trial court found that althoughhe had a history of organic brain damageand delusions, his actions when committingthe crimes charged were goal-oriented, indi-cating his ability to form the requisite spe-cific intent.

Carpenter was convicted of home inva-sion, felon in possession of a firearm, felonyfirearm, resisting and obstructing a police of-ficer, and felonious assault.

The court of appeals rejected the defen-dant’s argument that the trial court erred inshifting the burden to defendant to provehis claim of diminished capacity by a pre-ponderance of the evidence and affirmedhis conviction.

The Michigan Supreme Court grantedreview of the question of law regarding theproper application of MCL 768.21a, notingthat since 1975 Michigan’s insanity defensehas been governed by statute 1975 PA 180.

It further opined in order to prevail underthe affirmative defense of legal insanity, thedefendant must prove that as a result of

Fast Facts:

The diminished capacity defense

allows a defendant to offer evidence

of some mental abnormality to negate

the specific intent required to commit a particular crime.

Neither Michigan’s insanitystatute, nor its guilty but mentallyill statute, mention the use ofmental abnormality to negatespecific intent.

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mental illness or being mentally retarded asdefined in the mental health code, he/shelacks ‘‘the substantial capacity either to appre-ciate the nature and quality of the wrongful-ness of his or her conduct or the ability toconform his or her conduct to the require-ments of the law.’’11 In addition the courtfound it highly significant that ‘‘the defendanthas the burden of proving the defense of in-sanity by a preponderance of the evidence.’’12

The Supreme Court stated that although ithad several times in passing acknowledged theconcept of the diminished capacity defense‘‘[it had] never specifically authorized its usein Michigan courts.’’13

Agreeing with the defendant that there isno indication that the legislature intended tomake diminished capacity a defense, thecourt explained that the statutory scheme ofdefenses based upon mental illness or mentalretardation precludes the use of ‘‘any evi-dence’’ of lack of mental capacity short oflegal insanity to reduce criminal responsibilityby negating specific intent.

The court refuted the defendant’s argu-ment that ‘‘diminished capacity’’ is a viabledefense holding the United States SupremeCourt’s decision in Fisher v United States,14

controlling. In Fisher the refusal of the trialcourt to give an instruction in a District ofColumbia murder trial that would have per-mitted the jury ‘‘to weigh evidence of hismental deficiencies,’’ which were short oflegal insanity, in determining his capacity forpremeditation and deliberation was upheld.15

The U.S. Supreme Court noted that aradical departure, such as requiring evidenceof [diminished capacity] to be admitted incriminal trials, was more properly the subjectfor exercise of legislative power or for the dis-cretion of the courts because it would involvea fundamental change in the common lawtheory of responsibility.16

Aff irming Carpenter’s conviction, theCourt also cited Muench v Israel,17 a SeventhCircuit court of appeals case which relied onFisher to reach the decision that: ‘‘A state isnot constitutionally compelled to recognizethe doctrine of diminished capacity andhence a state may exclude expert testimonyoffered for the purpose of establishing that acriminal defendant lacked the capacity toform a specific intent.’’18

The Michigan Supreme Court added thatour legislature had addressed situations in-volving persons who are mentally ill or men-tally retarded, yet not legally insane. Thesepersons may be found ‘‘guilty but mentallyill’’ and must be sentenced in the same man-ner as any other defendant committing thesame offense and subject to psychiatric eval-uation and treatment.19

Furthermore, the majority opined thatthrough this statutory provision the legisla-ture demonstrated its policy choice that evi-dence of mental incapacity short of insanitycannot be used to avoid or reduce criminalresponsibility by negating specific intent.

Finally, the Court held that the insanitydefense as established by the legislature is thesole standard for determining criminal re-sponsibility as it relates to mental illness orretardation, as such through this framework,insanity is an ‘‘all or nothing defense.’’

The Carpenter AftermathThe Carpenter decision has laid the di-

minished capacity defense to rest in Michi-gan. This presents an insurmountable hurdlefor criminal defense counsel to overcome. Ifa defendant does not meet the statutory re-quirements for legal insanity, how can hisclaim that he suffers from a mental abnor-mality, which would negate specific intent bepresented at trial?

The dissenting justices in Carpenter pre-sent some possible arguments supporting theadmission of diminished capacity evidence.They opine that while Fisher has never beenexplicitly overruled, when interpreted bysubsequent Supreme Court cases beginningwith In re Winship20 and ending with Mar-tin v Ohio,21 an inference is created that therule of Fisher has implicitly been overruled.

They note that nearly every federal circuithas concluded that the insanity defense re-form act does not bar evidence of mental ab-normality to negate mens rea.22 In addition,they point out that neither Michigan’s in-sanity statute nor its guilty but mentally illstatute mention the use of mental abnormal-ity to negate specific intent and thus the ma-jority has engaged in erroneous statutoryinterpretation.

Citing United States v Pohlot,23 the dissentmakes the point that this clearly contrasts

with the introduction of diminished capacityevidence. A defendant claiming diminishedcapacity denies the prosecution’s prima faciecase by challenging its claim that he pos-sessed the requisite mens rea at the time ofthe crime and thus is not asserting an affir-mative defense.24

The dissenting justices conclude that ev-idence of mental abnormality or illnessshould be admissible to negate specif ic intent and thereby afford the defendant the right to present a meaningful defense,the requirement that the state prove beyonda reasonable doubt each and every elementof a charged offense, and the presumptionof innocence.

Perhaps the presentation of these signifi-cant arguments, which focus upon the basicconcepts of fairness and due process in oursystem of jurisprudence will resurrect dimin-ished capacity as a viable defense in the stateof Michigan. ♦

Kimberley Reed Thompson was appointed as theDeputy Chief Legal Counsel for the Criminal Divi-sion of the Wayne County Circuit Court in 1992.For the previous ten years she was felony trial attor-ney with LADA. She is a graduate of KentuckyState University, Howard Law School, and receivedher LLM from Wayne State Law School. She is anelected member of the Criminal Law Section.

Footnotes1. 464 Mich 223; 627 NW2d 276 (2001).2. 47 Mich App 8, 208, 208 NW2d 656 (1973).3. 62 Mich 487, 29 NW (1886).4. 47 Mich App at 20.5. Id.6. 85 Mich App 379, 271 NW2d 240 (1978).7. Id. at 394–395.8. Id. at 395–396.9. 138 Mich App 568, 360 NW2d 245 (1984).

10. 421 NW2d 200 (1988).11. MCL 786.21a(1).12. MCL 768.21a(3).13. 464 Mich at 223.14. 328 US 463, 66 S Ct 1318, 90 L Ed 1382 (1946).15. 328 US 463, at 470.16. Id. at 476.17. 715 F2d 1124, 1144–1145 (CA 7, 1983).18. Id.19. MCL 768.36(3).20. 397 US 358, 363–364, 90 S Ct 1068, 25 L Ed

2d 368 (1970).21. 480 US 228, 107 S Ct 1098, 94 L Ed 2d 267

(1987).22. 18 USC 17.23. 827 F2d 889, 900–901 (CA 3, 1987).24. See, Morse, Undiminished confusion in diminished

capacity, 75 J Crim L & Criminology 1, 6 (1984).