The Unmoved Mover in Early Aristotle

The Unmoved Mover in Early AristotleAuthor(s): H. J. EasterlingSource: Phronesis, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1976), pp. 252-265Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4181995 .Accessed: 23/02/2015 14:13

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

BRILL is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Phronesis.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 134.76.63.66 on Mon, 23 Feb 2015 14:13:35 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=baphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/4181995?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

The Unmoved Mover in early Aristotle

H. J. EASTERLING

It is still worth discussing whether the Unmoved Mover is present in the early stages of the development of Aristotle's thought. Jaeger thought that the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover was formulated

by Aristotle at the beginning of his independent career and that it was to be seen as the successor to the Theory of Forms'. Perhaps few scholars would subscribe to this extreme version of the thesis today, but there is currently considerable support for the belief that the doctrine was an early one and that it appeared in de Philosophia2. There has been a good deal of interest in the subject recently3, but no account has been taken in recent discussions of the references to the Unmoved Mover (or to an unmoved mover) in the earlier books of the Physics, which I wish to consider here. To anticipate my conclusions, I intend to argue that the passages containing these references, which occur in Physics B and F, are later additions and that the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover did not figure in the original version of these books.

As there can be no doubt about the presence of the Unmoved Mover as a central topic in Physics (, the intention to treat the early books separately may need some justification. Though it is hard to be dogmatic about the structure of the Physics, it is perhaps safe to say that the proof of the Unmoved Mover's existence, which occupies 0), forms the culmination of the discussion of change that begins in E and

W. Jaeger, Aristotle' (Oxford, 1948), trans. R. RZobinson, p. 219. So, for example, E. Berti, La Filosolia del primo Aristotele (Padova, 1962), pp.

344-357; M. Untersteiner, Aristotele, Della Filosolia (Roma, 1963); I. During, Aristoteles (Heidelberg, 1966), pp. 185-189. 3 See especially J. P6pin, 'L'Interpr6tation du de Philosophia d'Aristote', (R.E.G. 77 (1964) 445-488); K. Gaiser, 'Das zweifache Telos bei Aristoteles' (in Naturphilosophie bei Aristoteles und Theophrast, hg. von 1. During, Heidelberg, 1969, pp. 97-113); W. P6tscher, Strukturprobleme der Aristotelischen und Theo- phrastischen Gottesvorstellunzg (Leiden, 1970); B. Effe, Studien zur Kosmologie und Theologie der A ristotelischen Schrift 'Uber die Philosophie' (Zetemata 50 (1970)); A. Graeser, 'Zu Aristoteles peri philosophias (Mus. Helv. 27 (1970) 16-27); A. Graeser, 'Aristoteles' Schrift Uber die Philosoplie und die zweifache Be- deutung der causa finalis' (Mus. Helv. 29 (1972) 44-61).

252


http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

continues in Z4. Leaving out of account the puzzling book H, one can say that EZO, whether or not they were originally written as a single unit, certainly form one now, with H awkwardly intervening, and that they are so regarded by Aristotle, who refers to them as 'a' 7tepl XLIvaew)5. Similarly ABUrA form a loose unit, also recognised as such by Aristotle under the title r 7cep't ypuaec or & (puaLxa6; this unit is clearly earlier in date than EZ?7. Thus it seems a justifiable procedure to examine ABFLA as an independent unit early in date.

The proof of the Unmoved Mover's existence appears in E), and it is natural to ask whether this was the place where Aristotle first announced it as a new doctrine, or whether he is here setting out a proof to support a doctrine already formulated and enunciated elsewhere. At first sight the latter explanation might appear correct, for there are several references to an unmoved mover in the earlier part of the Physics. I now wish to examine the passages in which these occur. There are five in all:

For convenience I will take first the three passages from the discussion of xLviwcm in F 1-3, which hang together.

1. aOX?L pd.V OUNV 'TLCLV OC&V XLVCZa4CL TO XLVQOV, Qui [L7)V XXX& 7CpCL TOuTOU

E'V 'CiXXWV eiU 8n,O'V 67r4 '/eL (gaTt yOp TL XLVOUV XOc OxLvoV). 201 a 25-27

After some preliminaries, r 1 begins by defining change as the actualisation of the potential (a 11), giving examples (a 16). Aristotle then makes the point that some things can be both actually and potentially, and thus can stand both as agent and as patient. This applies to To xLvo5v qpuaLXW, which is %Lv7qTov as well as xvv-rtsx6v (a 24), because it produces change while being changed itself. A digression (a 25-27) then remarks that there is another kind of mover (viz. unmoved), though some thinkers fail to realise this.

2. xweVcoctL 8 xatL so xLvo5v 'Oaitsp XepraxL 7stWv, TO\ aUvo4ta OV XLVT6V, XOct Oi n axwVatL' npqao ea-.Lv (V y&p I XVaCL u7rtpxel, OUTOou XxLvacta

202 a 3-5 This is merely the same point as that made at 201 a 25-27, appearing

again in the summary at the end of the chapter. Every mover, says

4 This view of 0) is perhaps an over-simplification; cf. G. A. Seeck, Nachtrage im achten Buch der Phtysik des Aristoteles (Abh. Mainz, 1965. 3). 5 e.g. deCaelo 272 a 30, 275 b 22. 6 e.g. Physics 251 a 8. 7 For a fuller discussion of these references and of the relative dating, see W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Physics (Oxford, 1936), pp. 1-19.

253



Aristotle, will itself be in motion (i) if it is potentially xLvo6v and (ii) if its previous lack of movement was 'psurax, rest (i.e. temporary absence of movement), rather than absolute negation of movement. This implies that there are movers that are not potentially xtvryov, and whose nature is incompatible with movement.

3. el)E 8' &atopLocv XoyLxrJv avyxoF.ov yxp 'ac VOu tLVOc e'VepyeLoev tou 7COL7=LXOU XOCL rou 7T-7rLXOl r6 7 v &- LoIlo, t6 ro' 7E E`th , :pYOV 8? xat

E'X /o 705 V?' 7rOcLM[a, to) 8C 7 vo C. StSEL 01V c/4Lp(G) XLV1fjG , EC RU?V I t V

rcVL; I yap Lty) eV r t CXOVaoT XOL XLVGUpLev(d, e 7 V notLGq eV t&

7COLo5vVt, Y; 7? 8 a'f7ec, ev TCO 7tCa(OVTt L es 8tL XC TOCUTar-V 7tCOaLv xav, ocucovvc, av ej . att pnv 1 ovSro, Xt8CL ?Vz xoCl XIVVV XcrL O Yap OULC)VUULO4 c E7) OOCV k oX 'a ~.L 7 V.e 'tOt)tO ' , 7' X V LvYaL e V Tcep X LVOU ~V "-tL at'ou( y &f.p

uro6 Xo6yoq &S7L XLVouvroq XaL xLvourvoou), t:5 E 7V no XtV0ov XLV CErcu,

I zZOV xLVYnaLv oU ztvyatroa. 202 a 21-31 F 3 deals with the relation between mover and moved. It motion is the

actualisation of the potential, where does this actualisation take place? Is it in the agent or in the patient? Aristotle's answer is that it is in the patient (a 13-14). But this raises a difficulty (a 21). There are really two actualisations, that of the potential agent and that of the potential patient. Do they both take place in the patient (alternative A) or is one in the agent and the other in the patient (alternative B) (a 25-27)? Aristotle examines these two possibilities in turn.

1. Take alternative B, that n teV noLLag eV 't) noto5vwn, -l 8? iaSCt,O

EVJ TC) wa7rocovwn.

This entails that there will be movement in the mover (a 29), which in turn leads to one or the other of two alternatives, either 1.1 every mover will be moved;

or 1.2 something that has movement in it will not be moved.

These are both impossible consequences and so by this reductio ad impossibile alternative B can be rejected.

2. Take alternative A, that both are in the patient (a 31). Various difficulties result from this (a 33-b 5), but these can be resolved (b 5-22).

In this argument, the section relevant to my present discussion is 1.1, which shows that Aristotle implicitly rejects as impossible the suggestion that every mover is in motion. I.e. he believes that there is such a thing as an unmoved mover.

In these passages, then, Aristotle clearly mentions or presupposes the existence of some kind of unmoved mover. And wh -lile passages 2 and 3 might be dismissed as referring merely to some unspecified kind of

254



unmoved final cause, it is nevertheless possible to say that passage 1 must refer to the Unmoved Mover, i.e. the prime mover of the universe; Aristotle promises a future discussion of the subject, which can only mean Physics E) or Met. A, so that he is clearly thinking of the Un- moved Mover here.

I now wish to ask whether these references to the Unmoved Mover are firmly anchored in their contexts, or whether they show any signs of being later additions. I assume for the purpose of this discussion that the Physics can be treated as an original basic structure to which notes were (or may have been) added later; it is possible to do this in the case of Physics r because we have a control in Met. K.

The discussion of change in F 1-3 is reproduced in Met. K 9. The version of Met. K is clearly later, because it reproduces the other version in a briefer and more concise form; e.g. it omits unnecessary examples, adopts simpler forms of words, and in general simplifies any elabora- tion. The version of Physics F is reproduced completely in Met. K, with the exception of four passages:

(i) 200 b 28-32. A note, not very relevant to the context, on relative terms. Aristotle has just pointed out that the distinction Kuvoc?rq/ evre)S?iXCL, which makes change possible, occurs in all categories. He goes on to remark in b 28-32 that while XLVYCatq thus takes place in all categories the elements involved in change, viz. the xmvyov and the xLvvLqx0v, themselves fall in the category of relation.

(ii) 201 a 19-27. A parenthetic note to point out that some things are capable of interaction and so can be both XLVOVVcM and XLwou[Lva.

(iii) 202 a 3-12. This paragraph looks at first sight like a summary re-stating the point made earlier (in 201 a 23-25) that a natural mover will always itself be in motion, but in fact it goes further than this, introducing the new point that such a mover always has an eloq which is its apxZ xxvrCam (in the sense that e.g. a builder's possession of the form of house enables him to build houses).

(iv) 202 a 21-29. This is the oinop'oa concerning the localisation of the two ZVepyetLa; it arises out of the short paragraph on the relation between mover and moved, and was discussed above in relation to passage 3.

These are the only passages of F 1-3 that are not represented, even in summary form, in the version of Met. K. Their omission may of course be pure chance, or it may be because the excerptor (whether Aristotle or another) thought that they were not essential to the summary that he was making - and it is perfectly true that they are not. On the other

255



hand, this does not seem to fit the excerptor's method; he does not systematically omit inessentials, but reproduces almost word for word a number of passages that are no more essential to the general scheme than the four that are omitted, e.g.

201 b 5-15. A summary of points made in the preceding chapter, with a detailed example to illustrate them.

201 b 16-202 a 2. Some rather disjointed and rambling remarks, mainly about other philosophers' views of change and their short- comings. In view of this it seems unlikely that the four passages were omitted merely because the excerptor was systematic and thought them in- essential; he does not seem to work in this way. A more probable explanation is that these four passages did not appear in the original version of Physics F from which he was working.

This suggestion is supported by a closer examination of passage (ii). This passage, unlike the other three, is not entirely omitted from Met. K, but is represented by a single sentence:

3U[PML"V or xcvLXtVeLa43acL S'orv I ev)Xe zerm , xcL oure npo6rspov ouo va'rpov. (1065 b 20-21) As was first pointed out by Diels8, this sentence does not at all convey the sense of the passage that it represents (201 a 19-27). This can be explained on the assumption that 201 a 19-27 as it now stands is a later amplified version of something that originally answered more closely to what we have in Met. K. There are two points that support this explanation:

1. In the recapitulation at the end of F 1 (201 b 5-15), Aristotle claims to have demonstrated, and gives a summary of, not what now stands in the text of the chapter, but what we have in Met. K. At 201 b 6-7 he uses the exact words of Met. K, although in the present version of Physics F this point has not been mentioned.

2. As Diels observed, the words that follow the suspect passage at a 27, a ' o05 8uv04LE Ovtoq, do not follow on what now precedes them. Moreover the word ivr?Xk(La, which is supplied by all editors and is necessary to make sense of the sentence, does not appear in any MS of the Physics. It is worth noting that it does not appear in the version of Met. K, and does not need to appear there since it is easily supplied from the previous sentence.

I would argue, therefore, that these four passages as they now

8 H. Diels, 'Zur Textgeschichte der Aristotelischen Physik' Abh. d. k. Akad. d. Wiss. zu Berlin, 1882, Philos.-hist. classe, Abh. I, pp. 34-35 = Kleine Schriften, Hildesheim 1969, pp. 230-1.

256



stand were absent from Aristotle's original version of Physics F. This is striking because, as will be observed, the references to an unmoved mover considered above are all contained in these suspect passages.

There are two passages to be considered in Physics B. I wish to deal first with B 7.

This chapter falls into two sections: 7.1 (198 a 14-21), which summa- rises the doctrine of the four causes, and 7.2 (198 a 21-b 9), which contains a series of rather disjointed remarks about the four causes and the physicist's interest in them. There are two odd inconsistencies between these two sections.

1. The main subject of 7.2, which constitutes the bulk of the chapter, is the relevance of the doctrine of the four causes to the physicist; Aristotle argues that the physicist must take account of all four causes, i.e. that all four must be invoked in the explanation of Ta c(SaL. As the text stands at present, 7.1 forms a link leading on from the earlier discussion of the causes to 7.2; if Aristotle intended it so, we should expect the examples of causation given in 7.1 to look forward to 7.2 and to be relevant to the physicist and his subject. But it is odd that in 7.1 Aristotle chooses mathematics, an example drawn from TOC OxMvy17m, to illustrate the concept of formal cause, and in fact appears to be saying that formal causes are restricted to the sphere of &xLvvqtx9. The use of a mathematical example is not odd in itself (a similar example was used to illustrate the formal cause when it first appeared in B 3, at 194 b 28), but it is odd that Aristotle appears to restrict formal causes to this type; more odd still is the fact that this non- physical example is used in a summary which, as the text stands, leads up to Aristotle's discussion of the physicist and his interest in the causes. This suggests that when 7.1 was written it was not designed to lead on to 7.2, but that the latter was added at a later stage.

2. The parenthesis at a 27-31 begins by mentioning unmoved movers and digresses from this to remark that they are outside the scope of physics and form the subject matter of a different science. Three sciences are then listed, which are differentiated by their subject matter, viz.

l Of course, as Ross remarks ad loc., Aristotle cannot mean to say this, because it is obvious that the formal cause is relevant to natural objects; Aristotle must be taken to mean that MxivrrTa provide a particularly clear illustration of formal causation (because the other three causes do not, in the nature of the case, operate 'v -oZq t'CxMLVoL, so that there is no danger of confusing the formal cause with any of the others).

257



(1) 7tCpt &XLVT6V,

(2) h 7rept xwovu4Lv)v ,L&v dIvpprwv &U, (3 ) 7 NeplTX X,?&pr4.

Of these three, (1) is clearly 7prIn (pL?oaocpqx and the other two are sub- divisions of physics, (2) being astronomy and (3) the study of the sublunary world.

It is worth noting that this trichotomy does not occur elsewhere in the Physics. In B 2 Aristotle discusses the sk--pe of physics. His main point is the distinction between physics and mathematics, while a note at the end of the chapter adds first philosophy as a third science (194 b 14-15). Thus B 2 may be said to recognise a trichotomy, but it is a different one from that given in B 7, viz.

(1) physics (2) mathematics (3) first philosophy.

This trichotomy appears again in Met. E (Chapter 1, esp. 1026a 18-19) and K 7 (1064 b 1-3); it also underlies the discussion of Met. F 3 (though it appears more clearly in the summarised version of F 3 that is given in K 4, (1061 b 17-33)), and it is clearly a common Aristotelian schematisation (cf. also E.N. 1142 a 17-20, de Anima 403 b 7-16)1O.

The trichotomy of Physics B 7 is not found in any of these passages; astronomy is usually included as a part of physics (cf. Physics B 194 a 7-12, Met. M 1078 a 14-20). It corresponds, however, exactly to the trichotomy given at the beginning of Met. A, where the three sciences are again differentiated by their subject matter. At 1069 a 30, Aristotle lists three sciences that study three different kinds of o'uaLx, viz.

(1) &X1V-nTO oCatX, (2) o6aloc xda5nrr xxlt OU&oq, (3) oija:c tatxxhjrh xat cx&psi.

(2) and (3) are here said to be sub-divisions of physics, but mathematics does not appear as a third science; the only mention of hcjrex'nxa here is as possible candidates for classification as MxLvThro4 ot6aUo. Thus the presuppositions that lie behind the trichotomy of sciences in Physics B 7.2 seem to be in sympathy with Met. A, and not with the earlier part of Physics B. This again suggests that B 7.2 is not part of the original version but is later in date than the rest of B"1.

10 For a fuller discussion of this subject see P. Merlan From Platonism to Neo- platonism' (The Hague, 1960), pp. 59ff.

258



Some scholars have suggested that particular sections of B 7.2 are later insertions. Thus von Arnim argued12 that the parenthesis a 27-31 is a later addition, on the grounds that (1) it intrudes unsyntactically on the preceding sentence, (2) the mention of three sciences is irrelevant, and (3) the statement here that unmoved movers are outside the province of physics is contradicted by the dictum a few lines later (a 35 - b 5) that an unmoved mover x%veZ ucptxia. These do not seem compelling arguments to support von Arnim's case'3, though of course in the text of Aristotle any irrelevant parenthesis of this kind is likely to arouse suspicion, and von Arnim may quite possibly be right about this passage. More recently Solmsen has tentatively suggested14 that in its original version 7.2 ended at the words xx' e'L 6 r[ CLM at a 32. The succeeding words xot kE TO 7rpiO'rOv xLVY)cvXV, together with what follows, "change the direction of the thought and may well have been added at a later time". Again this is a possible hypothesis, but (as Solmsen himself goes on to say) one that it is difficult to confirm.

It may be right to suspect further fragmentation of 7.2 along these lines, or it may be that the whole section (i.e. 198 a 21-b 9) should be

"1 I am assuming that Met. A is later in date than the Physics. Although many scholars take Met. A to be an early work (so most recently I. During, Aristoteles, pp. 189-190), I find it difficult to believe that it could have been written before Physics 0. It must surely be later than the Physics, if only because its theory of the Unmoved Mover represents a clear advance on that of Physics 0, and because it presupposes and refers to a number of doctrines expounded in Physics 0 (e.g. 1071 b 6-10, b 10-11, 1073 a 7, a 10; these passages are integral to the argument and can hardly be explained away as later additions). 12 H. von Arnim, 'Zu W. Jaegers Grundlegung der Entwicklungsgeschichte des Aristoteles' (Wiener Studien 46 (1928) lOff). "I Of von Arnim's points, (1) and (2) are hardly conclusive, while (3) seems to be an unreal difficulty. The statements about unmoved movers seem to be para- doxical rather than contradictory. An unmoved mover is not a TUMxh &pyn (a 36), in the sense that it is not a natural object and does not have an &pyi xIacv( kV murCo (a 37). The study of such a mover in itself is therefore not a department of CpuaLxY (a 28, oux&rL 9uputx

classed as a later insertion; if there is any force in my first argument above, it suggests the latter hypothesis. But in either event enough has been said to suggest that the section 7.2 either includes or consists of later insertions, and that the references to an unmoved mover did not appear in the original version of Physics B.

I have argued that the four passages in Physics B and Ir where Aristotle refers to an unmoved mover are later additions, and that there is no evidence for any mention of the doctrine in the original version of Physics ABFL\. This suggests that the references to it in our present version are not references forward, anticipating a doctrine that Aristotle saw as the culmination of the Physics, but notes added later, either by Aristotle himself or by an editor, after the doctrine had been expounded.

If the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover did not appear in the original version of the Physics, it seems a fortiori unlikely that it occurred in de Philosophia, which presumably represents an earlier period of Aristotle's development. But there is one important passage in Physics B 2 which seems to tell against this thesis; this is the passage at 194 a 35-36, which is cited by most editors as a fragment of de Philosophial5.

In the latter part of this chapter Aristotle is discussing the question whether the ypuamx64 should take account of both form and matter (194 a 15-16). Matter is related to form as means to end, as is shown by those

TeyvoL which make their u`Xn into something and enable us to use it for our own advantage (a 33-35); but the illustration misfires (Aristotle is rambling here,) because ,uiCv ?vexm (a 34) exemplifies not the point that he wanted to make, viz. that form is a re'),o but a different point, viz. that we, i.e. the users of manufactured goods, are also a re&?og, but in a different sense'6. He has to explain this difference - or rather he has to note that there is a difference between these two senses of re'),o and he refers the reader to de Philosophia for the explanation. This shows that de Philosophia must have explained the difference between two sorts of final cause, o'u rvexc rLIVo; and Lv[. In several other passages from the treatises where Aristotle makes this distinction he does so in order to expound the notion of an unmoved final cause; from this some scholars have inferred that the unmoved final cause referred to in de

15 Fr. 28 (Ross), fr. 30 (Walzer). "I Cf. Graeser, 'Aristoteles' Schrift Uber die Philosophie und die zweifache Bedeutung der causa finalis' (Mus. Helv. 29, (1972) 56ff).

260



Philosophia was the Unmoved Mover, i.e. the prime mover of the universe17.

This inference is clearly somewhat speculative. There are of course other sorts of unmoved final cause besides the prime mover of the universe; in Aristotle's theory of causation final cause and formal cause are only different aspects of the same thing, so that any formal cause ranks as a re'Xos and can be classed as a oiu 9vxca (more precisely a o6 9ve%X Clv6r), as Aristotle himself points out at 198 b 2-4. Thus it is by no means certain that the appearance of the term oi 9vexao nv6q in this quotation from de Philosophia entails the presence in that work of the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover. It has been pointed out that we have no knowledge of the context in which Aristotle introduced this distinction between the two meanings of oT ?vexa'8; it is true that in Met. A he uses the distinction as a means of explaining the movement of the universe"9, but we have no right to assume that he used it for the same purpose here. On other occasions when he makes this distinction, it is not always with the Unmoved Mover in mind20.

All the same it is not enough to make this negative point. There may be no direct evidence to show that the Unmoved Mover figured in de Philosophia, but we know that the dialogue contained a discussion of theology2l; this provides an obvious context for the mention of final causation, and it is difficult to see, in a reconstruction of the dialogue, any other plausible context in which the topic might naturally have

17 Cf. J. Bernays, Die Dialoge des Aristoteles (Berlin, 1863), pp. 108-110, followed by H. F. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the A cademy (Baltimore, 1944), pp. 594-595, E. Berti, op cit. pp. 355-356, and M. Untersteiner, op. cit. p. 285. For the most recent discussions, see K. Gaiser and A. Graeser, op. cit. (above, note 3). 18 Cf. Solmsen, op. cit. (above, note 14) p. 113, n. 83, and PNpin, op. cit. (above, note 3), pp. 468-469.

'"1072 b 1-3- 20 Cf. de Anima 415 b 15-21, where the quXy is said to be the o6 gvexm for the body and its organs. There are three other passages where Aristotle makes the distinction (de Anima 415 a 26-b7, Met. A 1072 b 1-3, and E.E. 1249 b 9-19). In only one of these (Met. A 1072 b 1-3) is there an explicit reference to the Unmoved Mover. The other cases show that the concepts of o5 bvexx and &xivL*rov XLvoZv are not necessarily connected in Aristotle's mind. In both these passages he speaks of god or T-6 &lov as the oT bvexa of things without any mention of his (or its) effect on the movement of the heavens, or indeed on x[V-aCl as such at all. For a full discussion of these passages, see Gaiser and Graeser op. cit., (above, note 3). 'A In frs. 16 and 26 (Ross) the dialogue is cited by name.

261



been raised. A theological context is one where it would fit most naturally and appropriately, and anyone who is reluctant to see it in a theological context is under an obligation to suggest an alternative of equal plausibility.

However, even if the context of this fragment in de Philosophia was theological, this does not necessarily mean that Aristotle had evolved the doctrine of god as the Unmoved Mover at this stage of his development. There are two distinct conceptions in Aristotle of the apyJ' of the uriiverse: (1) there is god, the supreme being of the universe, whose perfection makes him serve as a goal of aspiration, i.e. a final cause, for all other beings in the universe, and (2) there is the Unmoved Mover responsible for the movement of the heavenly bodies. These two conceptions are of course combined in one in Met. A, but this does not mean that they must have been combined in Aristotle's mind at other stages of his development, and in point of fact it hardly needs emphasising that the account in Physics 0 is in terms of (2) only.

The doctrine of the Unmoved Mover as it is developed in Phlysics 0 is based on Aristotle's analysis of xtv-caL; beginning with the thesis that the eternal movement of the universe must be explained by reference to a prime mover, which must itself be either self-moving or unmoved, he examines the nature of xLv-nat and concludes that a self- moving prime mover is impossible; from this it follows that any prime mover that we postulate must be unmoved. In this argument he is thinking on a cosmic scale (although this is not stated explicitly at the outset, and only becomes clear in the course of the argument), and the unmoved mover that emerges in the course of E) is the Unmoved Mover, i.e. the prime mover of the universe, conceived as the agency responsible for the movement of the universe and in particular for the movement of the heavens. The argument is worked out in mechanical terms, and Aristotle's conception of the Unmoved Mover still seems to be mechanical, since he assumes that a mover must be in contact with the body moved by it, and he locates the Unmoved Mover at the circumference of the universe. There is no idea of invoking final causation to explain the Unmoved Mover's mode of operation. Moreover there is no attempt in this book to link mechanical and religious ideas; there is no suggestion that the agency under discussion deserves the title &e6;.

There is thus no necessary connexion between the two ideas of (1) god as the supreme being of the universe, and (2) the celestial Un- moved Mover. Physics 0 contains (2) but not (1), and it is quite

262



possible that de Philosophia, it it dealt with tlheology, may have contained (1) but not (2). In other words, one can accept that fr. 28 must refer to god's cosmological function as a final cause without necessarily accepting that this implies a view of god as the Unmoved Mover along the lines of Met. A.

In point of fact, while (1) figures quite clearly in the fragments of de Philosophia, there is nothing in them that suggests the presence of (2). The basic evidence of the fragments, such as it is, is as follows:

Fr. 16 contains the argumenttum ex gradibus entium: god is an entity more perfect than any other existing thing, who stands at the head of a scale of being; because of his perfection he is exempt from change, since change in him could only be for the worse, and there is in any case nothing superior to him that could act upon him and cause him to change. If we can rely on fr. 17 as a genuine quotation from de Philo- sophia, Aristotle also spoke of this first principle as that which unites the world and gives it order. From the jumbled criticism of fr. 26 we can extract, as a minimum, the fact that Aristotle believed in a god who in some sense stood at the head of the universe (prae/icit mundo), but it is doubtful whether we can rely further on the details of this fragment.

The ideas contained in these three passages are strongly reminiscent of four other passages in Aristotle:

(1) de Caelo 279 a 17 ff. This passage has been claimed by some scholars as a quotation from de Philosophia.22

Whether or not this is correct, the beings outside the heaven to which Aristotle refers here (-oxe-Z, a 18) are described as changeless and enjoying the best possible kind of life. The punctuation of this much disputed passage is uncertain, and a good deal depends on it, but it looks as if the universe is said to depend in some sense on these beings (6Sbhv Z'e-trsc, a 28)23.

(2) de Caelo 292 a 22-23 and b 5-7. Here again the supreme being is said to enjoy perfection and consequently changelessness. The heavenly bodies move as they do in an attempt to attain the perfection that it exhibits.

(3) de Anima 415 a 26-b 7 conveys a similar idea. Mortal creatures cannot enjoy the true immortality of so IZov, and their life cycle is an

22 Fr. 28 (Walzer), fr. 29 (Untersteiner). 23 This is by no means certain. It is possible that the antecedent to 6Ovv is not t&xeZ or oupmv6q but mtc'v. But even if this is so, it still implics the same kind of dependence of the universe on 'cxeE, since the at 'v is the time-span of their existence.

263



attempt to come as close to this ideal as possible and to achieve the vicarious immortality that is provided by continuation of the species; in this way, living creatures are striving Eva -roU ie' xac ?oi5 &ecou

eTX(AaLV 8&VOWVOCL 7cXvT yap ?XSLVOU Opeyvrcx. Here again it is implied that Tor btLov represents an ideal state of

perfection which acts as final cause for beings in the sublunary world.

(4) E.E. 1249 b 9-19. Here again god acts as a final cause, by serving as the object of contemplation to which rpp6vwaLm is directed. The meaning of this puzzling section of E.E. is very obscure, but it is clear that god is seen as a final cause and that his function as final cause is in some way connected with his perfection (Xitd ?)ezvo0 0tV OuAV64 8ae , b 16).

In all these cases Aristotle speaks of some kind of supreme being(s) whose perfection is associated with his influence on the universe, and in passages (3) and (4) this influence is said to be the influence of final causation. It is striking that on both the occasions when he expounds this idea Aristotle introduces it by way of the distinction between the two types of final cause. It is tempting to suppose that his reason for making the distinction in de Philosophia was the same; it looks as if this distinction was associated in his mind with the idea of god as final cause.

This suggests that in de Philosophia Aristotle had formed the concept of god as final cause; thus we can place fr. 28 in a theological context with some plausibility. But there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that god was also conceived in the dialogue as the prime mover of the heavenly bodies; this conception of god springs from a different line of thought (viz. the analysis of xtv?larL coupled with an interest in astronomy), for which there is no evidence in de Philosophia.

The thesis put forward above is similar to that recently advanced by W. Potscher in his book, Strukturprobleme der Aristotelischen und Theophrastischen Gottesvorstellung24. Potscher has argued that at the period of de Philosophia Aristotle thought of god as a final cause and as a divine mind, but that this was only the starting point from which was developed the later doctrine of god as the Unmoved Mover. Met. A seems to combine the physical theory of Physics E) with the earlier final causation of de Philosophia. De Caelo B 12 is perhaps the earliest place where this combination can be seen in Aristotle's writings.

'" op. cit. (above, note 3).

264



If this thesis is correct, and if in de Philosophia Aristotle conceived of god as a final cause, this is a sufficient explanation of fr. 28, and we have no reason to read into the dialogue the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover as commonly understood. The Unroved Mover, on this thesis, was a later development. This squares with my conclusion above concerning Physics B and IF, that the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover as commonly understood was absent from these books and from the earliest period of Aristotle's thought.

Trinity College, Cambridge.

265



Article Contentsp. 252p. 253p. 254p. 255p. 256p. 257p. 258p. 259p. 260p. 261p. 262p. 263p. 264p. 265

Issue Table of ContentsPhronesis, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1976), pp. 185-276Volume InformationFront MatterSocrates on Political Disobedience: A Reply to Gary Young [pp. 185-197]A Proof from the Peri Ideon Revisited [pp. 198-218]Critical and Explanatory Notes on Some Passages Assigned to Aristotle's "Protrepticus" [pp. 219-240]Aristotle's Attempted Derivation of Temporal Order from That of Movement and Space [pp. 241-251]The Unmoved Mover in Early Aristotle [pp. 252-265]Protasis and Problema in the "Topics" [pp. 266-276]Back Matter

Documents

The Unmoved Mover in Early Aristotle