THE UNFCCC FACES CHALLENGES OF LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVENESS · politically impossible, at least for the firstyears of the post–2012 era in the climate regime. Thisreal - ity has

A CLIMATE OF CONSENSUS

Antto Vihma FIIA BRIEFING PAPER 75 • March 2011

75

THE UNFCCC FACES CHALLENGES

OF LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVENESS

• TheCancúnclimatemeetingadoptedapackageofdecisionstonumerousstandingovations.However,itdidsoagainstloudandformalprotestsfromBolivia,stretchingtheconceptof“consensus”morethaneverbeforewithintheUNclimateregime.

• TheCancúnmeeting also brought to everyone’s attention the inconvenient truth that decision-making in theUNFCCC exists ina legalvacuum.TheConferenceof thePartieshasneveragreeditsRulesofProcedure,andhasduringits17-yearhistoryoperatedwithdraftRulesofProcedurewithoutvotingrules,underageneralagreementthatdecisionsaretakenby“consensus”.

• In the light of the dramatic events in the recent Copenhagen andCancúnmeetings, aswell asthedauntingprospectsofachievingaratifiablelegalinstrumentforpost-2012,itisclearthattherelationshipbetweenconsentandauthorityhasbecometooflimsytoprovideanunproblematicbasisoflegitimacyfortheUNFCCC’sdecision-making.

• The2000sledtotheerosionofUNFCCC’slegitimacyasadecision-makingarena,especiallyinthesubjectiveviewsofNortherngovernmentsaswellasconsiderablepartsoftheexpertcommunityandthepublicingeneral.ThistrendledtoanoutburstofUNscepticismaftertheCopenhagenmeeting,declaringtheUNclimateregimetobea“multilateralzombie”.

• WhiletheCancúnmeetinghasbeencriticisedwithargumentsbasedonprocessandlegitimacy,fromabroaderperspectiveitseemslikelythatachievingdecisionswithsomesubstanceisactuallytheprimaryneedinsecuringthelegitimacyoftheUNprocess.

• HadtheCancúnagreementbeennegotiatedoutsidetheUN,itwouldverylikelyhavebeenweakeronseveralfronts.Also,itisimportanttokeepthelongertermoptionforalegallybindingtreatyopen;theonlyinstitutionalpossibilityforthislieswithintheUNFCCC.

A CLIMATE OF CONSENSUS

Antto Vihma

Researcher

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs

FIIA Briefing Paper 75

March 2011

THE UNFCCC FACES CHALLENGES OF LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVENESS

The Global Security research programme


THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 3

TheCancún climatemeeting adopted a package ofdecisions on mitigation, adaptation, finance andtechnologytonumerousstandingovations.However,itdidsoagainstloudandformalprotestsfromBolivia.At the close of the Cancúnmeeting, Bolivia stoodconspicuouslyisolated,butmadeveryexplicitobjec-tionstoadoptingthedecisionswithunforeseenper-sistence.TheMexicanpresidencygavelledthroughthedecisionsandclarifiedthat“the consensus rule does not mean unanimity, far less does it mean the possibility of one delegation exercising a right of veto after years of hard work and huge sacrifices by many others […] I cannot disregard the position and wish of 193 other parties, hence the decision has been duly adopted”.

Afterwards,Boliviaanditsnon-governmentalsup-porters dubbed the Cancúnmeeting a betrayal ofthedemocraticprinciplesandcorevaluesoftheUN,namelytheruleofconsensus,whichis“sacrosanct”.Themeetinghasbeenaccusedofsettingaside“openandparticipatorymethodsnormalintheUN”,andithasbeenclaimedthatseniornegotiators’workwas“overtaken”byministerial-levelguidance.1Whatarethebroaderimplicationsofgavellingoverobjectionsinordertomakeprogressinclimatepolitics?DoesitdamageorrevitalizethelegitimacyoftheUNclimateregime?

Majormultilateralenvironmentalagreementssuchas theUN climate regime are expressed in legally

1 MartinKhor(2010).ComplexImplicationsoftheCancunCli-

mate Conference.Economic & Political Weekly, 25December

2010.

binding treaty formas “conventions” and“proto-cols”tothoseconventions.Theyincludeprovisionsforsignature,ratification,accession,approval,andwithdrawal recognizedby international treaty lawandcustomarylawasawayofformalizingconsentto be bound.TheUnitedNations FrameworkCon-ventiononClimateChangewassignedinRio(1992)andenteredintoforcein1994,anditisimplementedby its yearly Conference of Parties (COP) as itssupremedecision-makingbody(Article7,UNFCCC).TheKyotoProtocolwassignedin1997andenteredintoforcein2005,containingspecificlegallybind-ingcommitmentsfordevelopedcountrypartiesforitsfirst commitmentperiod2008–2012.Currently,however, a legally binding protocol seems to bepolitically impossible,at least for thefirstyearsofthepost–2012era in theclimate regime.This real-ityhasfocusedincreasinginterestandattentiononthepossibilitiesandlimitationsofCOPdecisionsinimplementingtheframeworkconventionandshap-ingglobalclimatepolitics.

ThequestionofwhetherCOPdecisionsarebindingunderinternationallawhasbeenwidelydebatedbylegalscholars,andthepositionofthemajorityisthattheylackalegally-bindingcharacter.JuttaBrunnéeelaboratesthat“[COP] decisions do contain terms that make conduct mandatory, and make access to certain benefits contingent upon compliance with some of these mandatory terms. Yet, they do not appear to be binding in a formal sense”.2How-

2 JuttaBrunnée(2002).COPingwithConsent:Law-Makingun-

derMultilateralEnvironmentalAgreements.Leiden Journal of In-

ternational Law21,note4.

The definition of “consensus” took the spotlight in the final hours of the Cancún climate meeting. Photo: UN Climate Talks / Flickr.com.


ingtheCancúnmeeting,ExecutiveSecretaryChris-tianaFigueres,UNSecretaryGeneralBanKi-moon,aswell as host country President Felipe CalderónallunderscoredthatthemeetingwasaboutsavingtheUNclimateregime,withsevereimplicationsformultilateralismasawhole.TheMexicanpresidencyuseddiplomacyatthehighestleveltowardsareluc-tantVenezuela, andhigh-profiled IndianministerJairamRameshworkedaroundtheclocktoachieveNorth/Southcompromisesoncrunchissues.WhileAirForceOnedidnot landontheCancúnairstrip,andtheglobalmedialimelightwaslessbrightthaninCopenhagen,theclimatenegotiationsappearedtobealiveandwell.

No consensus on consensus

Declaredmany timesevenbefore theCopenhagenmeetinganditsaftermath,thekeyargumentchal-lenging the UNFCCC’s legitimacy has been thatconsensualdecision-makingamong193countriesisnotpossible(withsuchacomplicatedandpoliticallychargedissue),andthatasmallerandmoreflexiblegroupsuchastheG20isrequiredforthejob.Thesecatchphrasesenterexpertandpublicconsciousnessalikeviathemassmedia.ThelegitimacydebateisarelevantbackdroptothefinaleventsoftheCancúnmeeting, where the concept of consensus cameunder the spotlight inaheatedexchangebetweenBoliviaandtheCOPPresidentfromMexico.

TheCancúnclimatemeetingalsobroughttoevery-one’sattentiontheinconvenienttruththatdecision-makingintheCOPsoftheUNFCCCexistsinalegalvacuum.The Conference of the Parties has neveragreeditsRulesofProcedure,astheiradoptionwasblockedbySaudiArabiaatthelastIntergovernmen-talNegotiatingCommitteemeetingin1991beforethefirstConferenceofParties.TheRulesofProcedureincluderule42,withseveraloptionsforvoting.TheCOP has during its 17-year history operatedwithdraftRulesofProcedure(FCCC/CP/1996/2)withoutthe voting rules, under a general agreement thatdecisionsaretakenby“consensus”.

Tofurthercomplicatethepicture,thereisnocrys-tal clear definition of consensus.Themainstreamopinionofinternationallawyerswouldhaveitthatconsensus is denoted by the Chair’s perceptionthatthereisnostatedobjection.Thishasbeenthepracticeinmostglobalnegotiationforaandcanbe

ever,itisseeminglydifficulttogeneraliseaboutthelegally-bindingnatureofCOPdecisions,asdifferenttreatiesempowertheirrespectiveCOPstodifferentdegrees.Whilenotunarguablylegallybinding,itisincreasingly likely thatCOPdecisions taken in theclimateregimehaverathersignificantimplicationsfor stateparties and thenon-state actors in thesestates alike.The authority and scope ofCOP deci-sionsfromCancúnisasubjectofconsiderablepoliti-cal controversywithin someUNFCCC parties, andassociatedwith thiscontroversyaredifferentcon-ceptionsofcountryidentities,ofsovereignty,andofconditionsforeffectiveandlegitimategovernance.

From Copenhagen to Cancún

After the emotional and unprecedentedly chaoticCopenhagen climate meeting in December 2009there was a plethora of sceptical writing on theUnited Nations-based climate regime. Many ana-lysts of international relations—on both sides oftheAtlanticaswellasintheSouth—concludedthat“political capital” had left the building, and thattheUNFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC) now “smells like failure”.3 Several EUleadersaswellas theEUCommissionwerevisiblyfrustrated and questioned theUN process, some-thingthattheEUasastrongsupporterofmultilat-eralismhasbeenkeentoavoidinthepast.AlthoughtheCopenhagenmeetingwasthesceneofarathercomplex geopolitical game, several observers sawjustwhattheywantedtosee;theendofmultilateral-ismand/ortheirrelevanceofEuropeinworldaffairs.

TheCancúnclimatemeetingin2010wasadifferentstory altogether.Themeetinghad rather low sub-stantiveexpectations,afarbettermanagednegotia-tionsprocess,andquicklyindicatedthatmanyofthesweeping post-Copenhagen judgements had beenoversimplifications. A decent amount of politicalcapitalwasdefinitelystillinvestedinthetalks.Dur-

3 Evenmanyprominentenvironmentalistswereparty to the

UNscepticism,seeforexampleGeorgeMonbiot(2010).The Short,

Happy Life of Climate Change Enlightenment,TheGuardian,21

October2010;somemorepopulistcriticsgladlytooktheopportu-

nitytodenounceinternationalclimateregulationasawhole,dec-

laringthat“the UNFCCC/Kyoto model of climate policy cannot

continue because it crashed in 2009”,seeThe Hartwell Paper,22

April2010.


referred toaspartof international customary law.However, it certainlyhasbeen thepractice in theUNFCCC (aswell as in some other environmentaltreaties)thatdecisionshavebeengavelledthrougha limited amount of opposition, notably in Kyoto(1997),whereSaudiArabia’sobjectionswereheardbut not taken into account. According to climatenegotiationsfolklore,theUNFCCCwasitselfadoptedin Rio (1992) despite objections by some OPECcountries.4Inothercases,whentheoppositionhasbeenperceivedbytheChairasstrongenough,thedecisiontextshaveonlybeen“noted”asinGeneva(1996)andCopenhagen(2009).

Overall, inadequateattentionhasbeenpaid to thebroaderquestionof the legitimacyof thedecision-making process in climate negotiations in eitheracademicorpolicyliterature.Naturally,legitimacyasajustificatoryrelationhastraditionallybeenmostrelevantbetweenthecitizensandtheirnationstate.The dominant source of international legitimacyhas been seen as emanating indirectly from thestate level, expressedby theexplicit agreementofanation’sownlegitimateauthorities.Theauthorityof treatiessuchastheUNFCCCcanbeseenasself-imposed,restingfirmlyontheconsentoftheverystatestowhichitapplies.Theoriesoflegitimacyinthe social sciences revolve around the possibili-tiesandproblemsofdomination,theimpositionofone’swillonanother–thelegitimacyofconsensualobligationssuchascontractshasnotbeenregardedasinteresting.However,inthelightofthedramatic

4 KatiKulovesi(2010).Different views on consensus: legality of

the Cancun Agreements?PointCarbon,23December2010.

events in the Copenhagen and Cancún meetings,as well as the daunting prospects of achieving aratifiableprotocol forpost-2012, it is evident thattherelationshipbetweenconsentandauthorityhasbecometooflimsytoprovideanunproblematicbasisoflegitimacyfortheclimatenegotiations.

Effectiveness and legitimacy intertwined

When the legitimacy of international decision-makingisnotindirectlyderivedfromtheconsensualagreementof legitimatenations,andsomelevelofauthority is exercised in its decision-making onmemberstatesandnon-stateactors,analternativebasisforlegitimacyisneeded.Thiscanbeapproachedbygroupingthecomponentsthatprovidethelegiti-macyforinternationaldecision-makingintosource-based (the source of the authority is consideredlegitimate,suchasexpertiseorscience),procedural(theauthorityemerges from fairprocedures), andsubstantive(leadstosuccessfuloutcomes).5

ThelegitimacyoftheUNFCCChassofarbeenmainlybuiltonthefirsttwopillars.Generally,thesource-based legitimacy in global climate governance isderived from climate science.While the scientificevidence for climate changehas beenperiodicallyquestionedinsome(mainlypolitical,notscientific)forums in different domestic contexts, this hashardly affected the functioning of theUN process

5 DanielBodansky(1999).TheLegitimacyofInternationalGo-

vernance: A Coming Challenge for International Environment

Law?The American Journal of International Law93,596–624.

Mr Pablo Solon, Bolivian permanent representative to

the United Nations, defended the Bolivian positions in

Cancún. Photo: UN Climate Talks / Flickr.com.


directly. However, climate science only providesimperativesforthetendencythatthereisaneedtoreduce greenhouse gas emissions, butnotbyhowmuch,assciencedoesnotdefine“dangerous”.Italsostayssilentonthepoliticalquestionsofhowandbywhom.Theproceduralsourceoflegitimacyinglobalnegotiationsisabout“fairplay”.Theusualquestionsarenaturallyhowmanygovernmentsareallowedatthetableandhowequalthetermswillbe.Thepro-cedural source includes formal legitimacy,mean-ingthattheagreementisbasedonaformallyvalidmultilateralprocesswithinthesystemandtraditionof international law.Theprocedural sourcediffersquite starkly from the definitions of a legitimateprocessofnormdevelopment indomesticpolitics,where legitimacy ispredominantly linkedtosomenotion of democracy.There is also a lively debateon democracy in global governance—on currentdemocracydeficitsandhowtheycouldbereduced,themeaningofdemocracyattheinternationallevel,andwhattypeofdemocracyispossibleordesirable.Thiscomplexdiscussion,however,remainslargelyinacademiccircles.

The third source of international legitimacy issubstantive: the actual impact of the norms. Sev-eral theorists have emphasized the substantive or“outputdimension”of legitimacy inglobalgovern-ancebecauseof the lackofdemocraticmeansandaccountabilitybetweenthosewhogovernandthosewhoaregoverned.Theargumentisthat input-ori-entedargumentscouldnevercarrythefullburdenoflegitimizingtheexerciseofgoverningpower,buttheyarealwayscomplementedbyoutput-orientedarguments.Ultimately,theoutputlegitimacyofthenormsdependsonsocialjudgmentsabout“accept-

ableperformance”,whichmayormaynotcoincidewithobjectivefactors.

This elaboration ondifferent components of inter-national legitimacy confirms howmutually inter-dependenteffectivenessand legitimacyare. In thetraditionalview, legitimacy iscrucial inachievingstate compliance and thus effectiveness—legiti-macy iswherethe lawacquires its“force” innon-hierarchicalsystemssuchasglobalnegotiations.Butequally important,effectiveness isacomponentoflegitimacy; as the lack of acceptable performance(substantivedecisions) undermines the legitimacyof the norm in the long term.This argument hasbeenwidelynotedinsociology,butseeminglyhasnotbeeninternalizedbytheanalystsofinternationalregimes.

The UNFCCC’s great challenge

Themajor challenge for the legitimacy of theUN-basedclimateregimehasbeenthelackofsubstan-tivedecisions,inotherwordsitslackofeffectiveness.The 2000s led to the erosionof its legitimacy as adecision-makingarena,especiallyinthesubjectiveviews of Northern governments, but also amongsomeof themostvulnerable in theSouth, aswellasconsiderablepartsoftheexpertcommunityandthepublicingeneral.ThistrendledtoanoutburstofUN scepticism intheaftermathof theCopenha-genmeeting,withdeclarationsthattheUNclimateregimeisa“multilateralzombie”.

Second,forsomeconsiderabletimetherehasbeenaneedtoclarifyandformalizethedecision-making

Ms Patricia Espinosa, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of

Mexico, championed the Cancún compromise and became

one of the most popular COP presidents in UNFCCC’s

history. Photo: Marco Castro / United Nations.


rulesoftheCOP,theprimaryshaperofthepost-2010climategovernance,viaasystematicsearchforpos-siblesolutionstothevotingquestion(rule42).Inthelightofthesechallenges,theCancúnmeetinganditsfinalplenarywerepotentiallyusefuldevelopments.CancúnshowedthewiderpublicthattheUNFCCCisnotcompletelyparalyzed,and inspiteof“consen-sus” in the decision-making, one (small) countrydoes not have veto rights. Itmay, hopefully, alsohave provided some stimulus for governments toworkonthedecision-makingproceduresoftheCOPwith renewedurgency. So far, PapuaNewGuineahasbeenoutonalimbinraisingtheissueofvoting,receivingstonewallresponsesfromthelikesofChinaandIndia.

WhiletheCancúnresultshavebeencriticisedwitharguments basedonprocess and legitimacy, fromabroaderperspectiveitseemslikelythatachievingdecisionswith some substance is actually the pri-maryneedinsecuringthelegitimacyoftheUNpro-cess.Bolivia’sdiplomaticpridemightbewounded,butthatwillsoonbecomejustanotherunfortunatefootnote to the history of climate diplomacy. Abreachofprocessrulescanhardlybedescribedaspositivefromthelegalpointofview,buttheriskofproceduralissuesunderminingtheUNFCCC’slegiti-macyseemsrelativelysmallcomparedtothethreatofitserosionvialackofresults.

Climatechangeisnowadayspartofabroaderinter-nationalpolicyagendaandtheUNFCCCisnolongerthe only platform for global climate governance—andtheCOPplenarywillhavetobecarefulnottobeseenasincapableoftakingdecisions.Furthermore,theUNprocess is likelytohavetosealdealsmadeelsewhere,tosomeextent.EvenSecretaryGeneralBanKi-moonhashinted in thisdirection, empha-sizingthe“necessityofcooperationbetweentheUNandG20”inissueareaslikedevelopmentandclimatechange.6However,equallyimportantisthefactthattheUN climate regimecontinues toplaya central

6 UN chief stresses necessity of cooperation between UN, G20,

Xinhua,11October2010.

roleinglobalclimatepolitics.TheUNFCCCprocessgivesbothavoiceandacertainleveragetothemostvulnerable countries, in rather stark contrast totheG8/G20groupsortheMajorEconomiesForum,wheremostofthesecountriesarenoteveninvitedtoparticipatepassively.Also,theroleofcivilsocietyismarginalinthesead hocgroupmeetings.HadtheCancúnagreementbeennegotiatedoutsidetheUN,it would very likely have beenweaker on severalfronts, and less emphasiswouldhavebeenplacedonadaptation.Furthermore,itiscrucialtokeepthelongertermoptionforalegallybindingtreatyopen;theonlyinstitutionalpossibilityforthislieswithintheUNFCCC.

The emission reduction figures that key countrieshavepledgedfor2020remainclearlyinadequatetoachieveasafelevelofgreenhousegasconcentrationsintheatmosphere.Thisinconvenienttruthcanonlybe addressed in the long term,with concentratedandpainstakinglyslowdiplomaticefforts,ultimatelybuildingabroad-based,moretransparentandbetterfinancedclimateregimewithintheUN.

Antto Vihma


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THE UNFCCC FACES CHALLENGES OF LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVENESS · politically impossible, at least for the firstyears of the post–2012 era in the climate regime. Thisreal - ity has