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1
TheUK’sstatusintheWTOafterBrexit
LorandBartels*
23September2016
Introduction
It has become conventional wisdom that once the UK leaves the EU it will have to
renegotiatecoreaspectsofitsWTOrightsandobligations,andinparticularitsconcessions
underArticle IIof theGATT1994andArticleXXof theGATS.A leadingexponent of this
view isWTODirector-GeneralAzevêdo,who said during theBrexit referendumcampaign
that‘[theUK]willbeamemberwithnocountry-specificcommitments’.1Forsome,rather
dramatically,theUKwill,atleastdefacto,beinthepositionofacountryseekingtoaccedetotheWTOfromscratch,
2andthatitwillhavetonegotiateitstermsofmembershipwithall
otherWTOMemberswhowill holda vetoover theoutcomeof thesenegotiations.3At a
minimum,othershavesaid, theUKwill,ataminimum,havetonegotiate its shareof the
EU’scommitmentnottosubsidiseagriculturalproductionaboveacertainlevelaswellasits
share of current EU preferential tariff rate quotas for certain agricultural products.4 In
addition,doubtshavebeenexpressedastotheUK’srightstoaccessthetariffratequotas
thatotherWTOMembershavecommittedtoallocatetotheEU,5andit isgenerallytaken
for granted that the UK would have to accede as a new party to the plurilateral WTO
*FacultyofLaw,UniversityofCambridge([email protected]).IamverygratefultoTomerBroude,BillDavey,
Lothar Ehring, Larry Elliot, Alberta Fabbricotti, Michael Fogden, Tom Grant, Christian Häberli, Holger
Hestermeyer,GaryHorlick,DavidKleimann,AndrewLang,PetrosMavroidis,FedericoOrtino,DavidRoberts,
andPeterUngphakornfortheirhelp,commentsanddiscussion.Allopinionsanderrorsremainmine.
1ReportedinLarryElliot,‘WTOchiefsayspost-Brexittradetalksmuststartfromscratch’,TheGuardian,7June
2016,www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jun/07/wto-chief-brexit-trade-talks-start-scratch-eu-referendum.
2 Eg Piet Eeckhout, ‘Brexit and trade: the view over the hill’, 16 June 2016,
https://londonbrussels.wordpress.com/2016/06/16/brexit-and-trade-the-view-over-the-hill/ (‘withdrawal
from the EU is comparable to a fullWTOaccession, and accessionnegotiations caneasily take years’); Erik
Lagerlof, ‘Would theUK be able to rely upon theWTO agreement if itwere to leave the EU?’, June 2016,
https://www.matrixlaw.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Article-9-Dr-Erik-Lagerlof.pdf(‘[i]ntheeventofa
departurefromtheEU,theUKwouldaccordinglyhavetostart itsrenewedrelationshipwiththeWTOfrom
scratch’); Panos Koutrakos, ‘What does Brexit mean for the UK in WTO?’, 12 July 2016,
www.monckton.com/brexit-mean-uk-wto/ (‘[t]he application … ofWTO law on the UK following Brexit will
dependonresettingthetermsoftheBritishmembershipintheOrganisation’).
3 Eg Peter Ungphakorn, ‘Nothing simple about UK regaining WTO status post-Brexit,’ 27 June 2016,
http://www.ictsd.org/opinion/nothing-simple-about-uk-regaining-wto-status-post-brexit(‘[i]twouldonlytake
oneobjectiontoholdupthetalksbecausetheWTOoperatesbyconsensus,notvoting,onereasonwhyWTO
negotiations take so long’), Koutrakos, ibid, (‘[t]he schedules of concessions and commitments on market
access,forinstance,aswellastheUK’slistofexemptionsfromtheMFNtreatmentobligationwouldhaveto
beresetandresubmitted.TheywouldalsohavetobeacceptedbytheotherWTOparties’).
4RichardEglin, Piet Eeckhout,UncorrectedOral Evidence,Brexit: future tradebetween theUKand theEU,
Select Committee on the European Union – External Affairs and Internal Market Sub-Committees, 8
September 2016 (http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-
external-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-future-trade-between-the-uk-and-the-eu/oral/37864.pdf).
5Eglin,Eeckhout,ibid.
2
GovernmentProcurementAgreement(GPA2014),6towhichtheEU–butnottheUK–isa
party,eventhoughthisagreementcoversUKpublicbodies.
It is contended here that, in different ways, these views are mistaken. As far as the
multilateralWTOagreementsareconcerned,itisnotedthattheUK’srightsandobligations
are not, as some have thought, contingent on its status as an EUMember. In fact, it is
argued(section1)thatwhatwillchangewithBrexitarenottheUK’sunderlyingrightsand
obligations,butrathertheEU’sexerciseoftheserightsandassumptionofresponsibilityfor
theperformanceoftheseobligations.ItfollowsthattheUK’srightsandobligationsare,asa
matterof legaltheory,complete,even if, insomecases,theyarepresentlyundetermined
(section2).Furthermore,identifyingtheserightsandobligationsisnotnecessarilydifficult.
Inthefirstplace,allWTOrulesthatapplytoWTOMembersonanergaomnespartesbasisalso apply to the UK without any further complications, along with all exemptions and
exceptions (section 2(a)). Among these ordinary rights is the UK’s right to access the
country-specificEUtariffratequotasboundbyotherWTOMembersundertheGATT1994,
even though, if theUK isnota substantial supplier, itmay inpractice losemarketaccess
under thosequotas (section2(b)). It ismoreadmittedlymorecomplicated to identify the
UK’s tariff rate quota commitments, at least in a way that does not lead to the EU-27
accessingthesequotasalongwithtraditionalthirdcountrysuppliers.However,theUKcan
act unilaterally to forestall any complaints, including non-violation complaints, by setting
andallocating tariff ratequotas in termsof recent imports fromall sources, including the
EU-27,aswell as thehistoricalexpectationsofotherWTOMembersat the time that the
quotas were initially agreed (section 2(c)). As for the right to subsidise agricultural
production,itissuggestedthattheUKbeallocatedasumcalculatedbyapplyingthecurrent
ratioofUK:EUsubsidypaymentstotheEU’sscheduledrights(section2(d)).
ThearticlenextlooksattheUK’sscheduledcommitmentsinservicesunderthejointGATS
scheduleoftheEUanditsMemberStates’GATS(section3).Thisscheduleraisesnoissues
concerningtheidentificationofcommitments,assuch.TheyapplydirectlytotheUK,which
submittedaGATSscheduleunderArticleXXof theGATS.Naturally,anyEUorUK-specific
limitations on these commitments are also transposed to the UK. However, there is a
question about the validity of a territorial limitation in the schedule, according to which
commitmentsonlyapply to territory towhichtheEUtreatiesapply.Strictlyspeaking, this
wouldleavetheUKdefactowithnoschedule,aresultthatisnotimpossible,butcertainly
undesirable.However,itissuggestedthatthiswouldbeawrongresult.Instead,inlinewith
the rule of customary international law concerning ‘moving frontiers’ in cases of state
succession,itissuggestedthatthisprovisionsimplybedisregardedasinapplicablewhenUK
territorynolongerfallsundertheEUtreaties.
Thenextsectionconsiderstheproceduralmechanismsthatshouldbeusedtoestablishthe
UK’scommitments innewschedulesofcommitments (section4). Itarguesthat, following
relevant practice in similar situations under the GATT 1947, the proper procedure to be
followed is for theUK to submit anew schedule, basedon the considerations above, for
certificationasa‘change’toanexistingschedule.ObjectionstocertificationbyotherWTO
6 Eglin, ibid, Eeckhout, ibid, Michael Bowsher, ‘Procurement law after Brexit?’, 16 March 2016,
http://publicsectorblog.practicallaw.com/procurement-law-after-brexit/.
3
Members should then be limited to questions of accuracy. However, even if there are
objections, which are to be expected, this section contends that these are of no legal
consequence,ascertificationisnotrequiredforaschedule,orachangeinaschedule,tobe
legally effective. For this reason, there is no basis for the assumption, noted above, that
otherWTOMembersholdanythinglikeavetoovertheUK’slegalpositionintheWTO.
The last issue addressed in this article concerns theUK’s legal position in relation to the
GovernmentProcurementAgreement2014(section5). It isarguedthattherearerulesof
customaryinternationallawonthesuccessionofstatesfromunionswithlegalpersonality,
as well as practice under the 1947 GATT, and that according to these rules the state
succeedstoanylegalrightsandobligationscontractedbythatunionthatwereapplicableto
that state or its territory. For this reason, it is contended that the UK succeeds to the
Government ProcurementAgreement in its ownname. In addition, however, this section
notesthatotherWTOMembershaveformallyrecognizedthattheEUactsonbehalfofits
Member Stateswithin the context of this agreement, and it argues that, for this reason,
otherWTOMemberswouldmostlikelybeestoppedfromdenyingaUKclaimtosuccession.
In short, this article concludes that, in substance, the position of theUKwithin theWTO
afterBrexitcan,iftheUKwishes,bethesameasitistoday.Theremaybecertainstatistical
andpoliticaldifficultiesinsettingthelegalpositionoftheUKwithintheWTO.Buttheredo
notappeartobeanythatarelegal(section6).
1. TheUK’sstatusasanoriginalWTOMember
On1January1995theUKbecameanoriginalWTOMemberpursuanttoArticleXI:1ofthe
WTOAgreement.Thisprovisionstates:
The contracting parties to GATT 1947 as of the date of entry into force of this
Agreement,and theEuropeanCommunities,whichaccept thisAgreementand the
Multilateral Trade Agreements and for which Schedules of Concessions and
Commitments are annexed to GATT 1994 and for which Schedules of Specific
CommitmentsareannexedtoGATSshallbecomeoriginalMembersoftheWTO.
ThisappliestotheUKinastraightforwardway.TheUKwasacontractingpartytotheGATT
1947 and it ‘accepted’ the WTO Agreement and the multilateral trade agreements, in
accordancewithArticleXIV:1oftheWTOAgreement,byratificationon30December1994.7
Further, the EU annexed a schedule of concessions to the GATT 1994 ‘for’8 the UK,
9 in
7Note1 to theMarrakeshAgreementEstablishing theWorldTradeOrganization (1995)1867UNTS155, in
force1January1995;alsoWTO,StatusofWTOLegalInstruments(Geneva:WTO,2015),at41.
8Paragraph1oftheMarrakeshProtocoltotheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade1994(the‘Marrakesh
Protocol’) similarly describes its annexed schedules as ‘relating to’ WTO Members. Paragraph 1(d) of the
‘languageincorporatingGATT1947andotherinstrumentsintoGATT1994’makestheMarrakeshProtocolpart
oftheGATT1994.Foritspart,paragraph1oftheMarrakeshProtocolstatesthat‘[t]hescheduleannexedto
thisProtocolrelatingtoaMembershallbecomeaScheduletoGATT1994relatingtothatMember’.Bythese
means,ascheduleannexedtotheMarrakeshProtocolisdeemedtobeascheduleannexedtotheGATT1994,
andtherebymeetsthedescriptionsofannexedschedulesinArticleIIoftheGATT1994.
4
accordance with its practice since the UK joined the EU10 in 1974.
11 For the GATS the
situationisalittledifferent,inthattheEUanditsMemberStates,includingtheUK,jointly
submittedascheduleofspecificcommitments.12Accordingly,alloftheconditionssetoutin
ArticleXI:1havebeenmet for theUK, and theUKwill remains aWTOMemberunless it
withdraws from the WTO Agreement in accordance with Article XV of the WTO
Agreement.13
ArticleXI:1oftheWTOAgreementisanunusualprovision,althoughnotunique,14insofaras
it allows for the possibility that original WTO Members will not have autonomy in all
matterscoveredbytheWTOagreements,andwhichcontrastswithArticleXIIoftheWTO
Agreement,accordingtowhichnewlyaccedingWTOMembersmusthavefullautonomyin
thesematters. It is importantinthiscontexttonotethatautonomyisconcernedwiththe
power,underdomesticor internal law,ofagivenentitytoactonthe internationalplane.
Suchactsare,inprinciple,attributabletothatentityunderinternationallaw,althoughthere
arealsootherways inwhichactscanbeattributable toanentity (suchasadoption).But
neithertheautonomyofanentity,northequestionwhetheragivenactistobeattributed
to that entity, have anything do towith its rights and responsibilities under international
law.15Thatdependsentirelyonwhethertherulesarebindingonthatentity.
Againstthisbackground,themeaningofArticleXI:1canbebetterunderstood.Itrecognised
thattheEU(probably)anditsMemberStates(certainly)lackedfullautonomy,asamatter
9TheEEC-12scheduleattachedtotheMarrakeshProtocol,ibid,wasScheduleLXXX.ThecurrentcertifiedEU-15 Schedule CXL dates from 27 October 2012 (WT/Let/868, 30 October 2012). An EU-25 schedule was
submittedforcertificationon25April2014(G/MA/TAR/RS/357,25April2014).
10Forconvenience,thisarticleusestheterm‘EuropeanUnion’(EU),effectivebothgenerallyandintheWTO
(WT/Let/679)from1December2009,alsoforitspredecessors,theEuropeanCommunities(‘EC’)(1993-2009),
theEuropeanCoalandSteelCommunity(‘ECSC’)(1952-2002),andtheEuropeanEconomicCommunity(‘EEC’)
(1958-1992).
11TheUK’s schedule for itsmetropolitan territoryhadbeenScheduleXIX, SectionA,Parts I and II. TheEEC
withdrewtheschedulesoftheEEC-6andtheUK(andDenmarkandIreland)asof1August1974,andanew
EEC-9ScheduleLXXIIwascirculatedon6August1974.SeeGATT,ArticleXXIV:6Renegotiations–Entry into
ForceofSchedulesLXXIIandLXXIIbis,L/4067,6August1974.12EuropeanCommunitiesandtheirMemberStates–ScheduleofSpecificCommitments,GATS/SC/31,15April
1994.AnEU-25schedule(S/C/W/273,9October2006andS/C/W/273/Suppl.1,31October2006)wascertified
on18December2006(S/L/286,18December2006)butitsentryintoforcestilldependsonratificationbyall
EUMemberStates.ArticleXX:1oftheGATSstatesthat‘[e]achMembershallsetoutinaschedulethespecific
commitmentsitundertakesunderPartIIIofthisAgreement’.ThislanguageispersonaltoeachWTOMember,
andseeminglydoesnotpermitoneMembertosubmitaschedule ‘for’anotherMember,contrarytoArticle
XI:1 of theWTOAgreement.However, Article XVI:3 of theWTOAgreement states that ‘[i]n the event of a
conflictbetweenaprovisionofthisAgreementandaprovisionofanyoftheMultilateralTradeAgreements,
theprovisionofthisAgreementshallprevailtotheextentoftheconflict.’
13ItisalsopossibleforaWTOMembertobeexpelledifitrefusestoacceptcertainamendmentstotheWTO
agreementsunderArticleX:3andArticleX:5oftheWTOAgreement.
14 Article 3 of theUNCharter states that ‘[t]he originalMembers of theUnitedNations shall be the states
which … sign the present Charter and ratify it in accordance with Article 110.’ Among the 49 original UN
MemberswereBelarus,Ukraine,IndiaandthePhilippines,whichwerenotindependentstatesatthattime.15TheconceptsofattributionandresponsibilityinthiscontextaretypicallyconfusedbydiscussionsoftheEU
being ‘responsible’ for its Member States. See also Joni Heliskoski, ‘EU Declarations of Competence and
InternationalResponsibility’ inMalcolmEvansandPanosKoutrakos (eds),The InternationalResponsibilityoftheEuropeanUnion(Oxford:Hart,2013),at192-196.
5
oftheirdomesticandinternal law,tohaveschedulesofconcessionssubmitted‘for’them,
and thus tobecomeoriginalWTOMembers.16But ithasnothing todowith thequestion
whethermeasuresthatareformallyadoptedbyEUMemberStatescanbeattributedtothe
EU,andifso,whetherthisisonasharedorexclusivebasis.17Nordoesithaveanythingto
do with the question whether the EU or a given EU Member State has WTO rights or
obligations. That question can only be determined by looking at the rules, and in what
respecttheyarebindingontheEUoritsMemberStates.
In principle, when a state or an international organization conclude an agreement they
exercise rights andobligationsunder that agreement subject toany limitations setout in
thatagreement.Inthepresentcase,therearenosuchlimitations.Asjustexplained,Article
XI:1 is concerned with autonomy, not responsibility (or attribution).18 Nor is there any
suggestionanywhereintheWTOAgreement,orinanyrelevantinstruments,thattheWTO
rightsandobligationsoftheEUMemberStates,oroftheEU,areinanywaylimitedtotheir
areasofautonomy.19Indeed,thereareindicationstothecontrary.TheMarrakeshFinalAct
statesthat ‘theWTOAgreementshallbeopenforacceptanceasawhole,bysignatureor
otherwise,byallparticipantspursuanttoArticleXIVthereof,’20andArticleXVI:5oftheWTO
Agreementspecifiesthat‘[n]oreservationsmaybemadeinrespectofanyprovisionofthis
16 It was known that the EU Member States had no autonomy in the area of trade in goods, but it was
uncertainwhether theyalso lackedautonomy in theareasof servicesand intellectualproperty.On15April
1994theWTOAgreementwassignedseparatelybytheEUandtheEUMemberStates: at 16-42. On 15
November1994theEuropeanCourtofJusticedecidedthat,apartfromcross-borderservices,theEUandits
Member States possessed a shared competence forGATS and a joint competence for TRIPS:Opinion 1/94,paras98and105.On30December1994theEUanditsMemberStateseachacceptedtheWTOAgreementin
accordancewithArticleXIV:1oftheWTOAgreement:WTO,StatusofWTOLegalInstruments,aboveatn7,at16-42.Subsequenttreatychangeshavemeantthat,atpresent,exceptfortransportservices,allareascovered
by theWTO are nowwithin exclusive EU competence. SeeOpinion 1/08 (GATS) EU:C:2009:739 (GATS) andCaseC-414/11,DaiichiSankyoEU:C:2013:520(TRIPS).17Foranargument infavourofexclusiveattribution,basedonthedivisionofcompetencesbetweentheEU
and the EUMember States, see FrankHoffmeister, ‘Litigating against the EuropeanUnion and ItsMember
States—Who Responds under the ILC’s Draft Arts on International Responsibility of International
Organizations?’(2010)21EJIL723,at728and734andPieter-JanKuijperandEsaPaasivirta,‘EUInternational
ResponsibilityanditsAttribution:FromtheInsideLookingOut’inEvansandKoutrakos,aboveatn15,at60-
63. For an argument against, see Giorgio Gaja, ILC Special Rapporteur on responsibility of international
organizations,ThirdReport,UNDocA/CN.4/553,13May2005,para12and,expressingascepticalview,James
Flett, ‘TheWorldTradeOrganizationand theEuropeanUnionand itsMember States in theWTO’ inAndré
Nollkaemper and Ilias Plakokefalos (eds), The Practice of Shared Responsibility in International Law(Cambridge: CUP, 2016) at 896-97. See also WTO Panel Report, Russia – Tariff Treatment, WT/DS485/R,
circulated12August2016,para7.46,inwhichthePanelsaidthat‘theactofapplyingthedutyrates(i.e.the
levyingofdutiesatthetimeofimportation)isdirectlyattributabletoRussia’eventhoughRussiawasarguably
actingasanorganoftheEurasianEconomicUnion(EAEU)insodoing.18IwouldliketothankTomerBroudeforinsistinguponthispoint,andthedistinctionbetweenautonomyand
responsibilitymoregenerally.
19 As to whether the EU or its Member States could claim that their consent to be bound to the WTO
Agreement was invalid on the grounds that it was in manifest violation of a constitutional norm of
fundamental importance see Eva Steinberger, ‘‘TheWTO Treaty as aMixedAgreement: Problemswith the
EC’sand theECMemberStates’Membershipof theWTO’ (2006)14European Journalof International Law
837,at856-857.
20 Paragraph 4 of the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations.
6
Agreement.’Moreover,theWTOAgreementreferstothevotesoftheEUMemberStates,
without limiting these to specific areas,when it states that ‘[t]henumberof votesof the
EuropeanCommunitiesandtheirmemberStatesshallinnocaseexceedthenumberofthe
member States of the European Communities.’21 The conclusion must be that the WTO
rightsandobligationsoftheEUanditsMemberStatesarethesameasthoseofanyother
WTOMember.22
Thisconclusionhasalsobeenendorsed inWTO jurisprudence. InEC/CertainMS–Airbus,thePanel rejectedanEU request to remove fiveEUMemberStates (including theUK)as
respondent,whichwould have left the EU as the sole remaining respondent. It said that
‘[e]ach of these five is, in its own right, a Member of theWTO, with all the rights and
obligations pertaining to suchmembership, including the obligation to respond to claims
madeagainstitbyanotherWTOMember’.ThePaneladdedthat‘[w]hateverresponsibility
the EuropeanCommunities bears for the actions of itsmember States does not diminish
their rightsandobligationsasWTOMembers,but is ratheran internalmatterconcerning
the relations between the European Communities and itsmember States.’23 The point is
clear,and,itissubmitted,correct.
It is worth noting that this conclusion does not transpose to all other so-called ‘mixed
agreements’oftheEUandtheEUMemberStates.Typically,thesetreatiesseektolimitthe
obligationsoftheEUandtheEUMemberStatestotheirrespectiveareasofautonomy(or,
in EU language, ‘competence’). There are several ways by which this is sought to be
achieved.One,commoninmultilateraltreaties,isbymakinga‘declarationofcompetences’
inrelationtothevarioussubjectmatterscoveredbythetreaty.24Anotheristodefinethe
‘parties’as‘theEU,ortheMemberStates,ortheEUandtheMemberStates,inaccordance
with their respective powers’.25 A third, more recent, innovation is to permit the EU to
determinetheproperrespondent inanyarbitralproceedings.26Thereismuchthatcanbe
said about these techniques, butwhat is presently important is that, in the absenceof a
statement,effectiveininternationallaw,thatlimitstherespectiveresponsibilitiesoftheEU
and its Member States under a given treaty, they will each be fully responsible for
21Footnote2ofArticleIX:1oftheWTOAgreement.
22PietEeckhout,‘TheEUanditsMemberStatesintheWTO–IssuesofResponsibility’ inLorandBartelsand
FedericoOrtino(eds),RegionalTradeAgreementsandtheWTOLegalSystem(Oxford:OUP,2006)at451.23WTOPanelReport,ECandCertainMemberStates–LargeCivilAircraft (Airbus),WT/DS316/R,adopted1
June2011,paras7.174-7.175.
24See,eg,Heliskoski,aboveatn15.
25 There has been virtually no academic commentary on these provisions. Hoffmeister considers that they
determineresponsibilityaccordingtowhetheratreatyprovisionspecifiesthatitrelatestoanEUorMember
Statecompetence,andthatincasesofsharedresponsibilityorsilenceboththeEUanditsMemberStates(or
State)mightberesponsible.SeeFrankHoffmeister, ‘TheContributionofEUPracticeto InternationalLaw’ in
MariseCremona(ed),DevelopmentsinEUExternalRelationsLaw(Oxford:OUP,2008),at65.26Article8.21oftheComprehensiveEconomicandTradeAgreement(CETA)betweentheCanadaandtheEU
and itsMember States (initialled 26 September 2016; revised version published 29 February 2016; not yet
signed(http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf)
7
performingthattreaty.27Atmost,onemightarguethattheirliabilitywouldbejointinterms
ofquantum,anissuewhichisoflittlerelevancetoWTOlaw.28
2. IdentifyingtheUK’sseparaterightsandobligations(a) Introduction
IftheUKalreadypossessesalloftherightsandobligationsofanoriginalWTOMember,it
willcontinuetopossessalloftheserightsandobligationsonceit leavestheEU.Whatwill
change is the EU’s role in exercising these rights and assuming responsibility for the
performanceoftheseobligations,arolewhichwillbehenceforthbeexercisedsolelybythe
UK. What remains is to identify the UK’s rights and obligations. This is relatively
unproblematicinrelationtoWTOrightsandobligationsthatapplyonanergaomnespartesbasis with respect to all WTO Members, or to WTO Members within an established
category, suchasdeveloping countries,orwhen theUK is specificallynamed.29Nomore,
therefore, needs to be said about the UK’s rights and obligations under the WTO
Agreement,theGATT1994(exceptforArticleII),theGATS(exceptforArticleXX),TRIPS,or
theDSU.
This said, questions arise in relation to rights and obligations concerning the UK’s
commitments under Article II of theGATT 1994 andArticle XX of theGATS, in particular
whenthesecommitmentsgivetheEU,byname,rightsorobligationsthatarequantified,for
example, in the form of quotas and money (such as the right to subsidise agricultural
production up to a certain amount). In these areas, itwould undoubtedly be practical to
arriveataninterpretationoftheUK’srightsandobligations,extractedfromtheEU’srights
andobligations,bynegotiation.However,thispracticalsolutionshouldnotobscurethefact
thatwhatisatissueistheproperidentificationofexistinglegalrightsandobligations,even
if this is adifficult task. In theabsenceofagreement, therewillbenoalternativebut for
disaffectedWTOMemberstoenforcetheirrightsinWTOdisputesettlementproceedings,if
they consider that the UK is not respecting these rights, or has otherwise nullified or
impairedbenefitsaccruingundertheGATT1994ortheGATS.
27Eeckhout,aboveatn22,at457.
28Atpresent, financialcompensation isnotawarded inWTOlaw,although itcanformpartofasettlement.
The question of quantum might also however be relevant for determining ‘appropriate countermeasures’
undertheSCMAgreement intermsoftheamountofaprohibitedsubsidyratherthanbythe injurycaused.
This approachwas adoptedby theArbitrator inBrazil – Aircraft (Article 22.6 – Canada),WT/DS46/ARB, 12
December2000,para3.60.But ithasnotbeen followed,however, interaliabecauseof thedifficulties that
would arise in the case of multiple complainants. See eg Arbitrator, US – FSC (Article 22.6 – US),WT/DS108/ARB, 30 August 2002, para 6.27.On joint and joint and several liability between the EU and its
MemberStatesintheWTO,seeFlett,aboveatn17.
29ThisincludesspecialsafeguardmeasuresintheformofincreasedcustomsdutiesaspermittedunderArticle
5 of the WTO Safeguards Agreement. The latest available figures are for the marketing year 2012/2014,
showingtheactivationofprice-based(butnotvolume-based)specialsafeguardmechanismsforpoultryand
sugar products: see WTO Committee on Agriculture, Notification – European Union (special safeguard
measures),G/AG/N/EU/19,4May2014.
8
(b) TheUK’sshareoftariffratequotasofotherWTOMembers
ThefirstquestionconcernstheidentificationoftheUK’sshareoftariffratequotasoffered
by otherWTOMembers to the EU on a country-specific basis, such as theUS tariff rate
quota for cheese. Article XIII:2 of the GATT 1994, which applies to tariff rate quotas,30
permits an importing WTO Member to allocate quotas, in the first instance on a non-
discriminatorybasis.31However,ArticleXIII:2(d)alsooffersanimportingWTOMemberthe
optionofreachingan‘agreementwithrespecttotheallocationofsharesinthequotawith
all other contracting parties having a substantial interest in supplying the product
concerned’ or to allocate a quota to such parties based on their share of total imports32
duringaprevious representativeperiod,33 ‘dueaccountbeing takenofanyspecial factors
whichmayhaveaffectedormaybeaffectingthetradeintheproduct.’34Asbetweenthese
two options, there is a clear incentive for WTO Members with a substantial interest in
supplyingagivenproducttoreachanagreementontheallocationofaquota,becausesuch
anagreementdoesnotneedtotakeanyaccountofimportsfromWTOMemberswithouta
substantialinterestorfromnon-WTOMembers.35Thisisbecause,intheabsenceofsuchan
agreement,animportingWTOMemberispermittedtoallocatethosesharesbothtoWTO
Memberswithoutasubstantialinterest36andtonon-WTOMembers,
37providedthatitdoes
soonanon-discriminatorybasisvis-à-vis the ‘other’WTOMemberswithouta substantial
interest.38
Forpresentpurposes,theimportantpointisthattheUKhasarighttoaccessanotherWTO
Member’stariffratequotawhenithasasubstantialinterestinthoseexports.Italsohasa
right to access a quota, on a non-discriminatory basis, when that WTO Member has
allocatedpartofthatquotatoanyWTOMemberwithoutasubstantialinterestortonon-
WTOMembers.Ofcourse,thismaynotleadtoaperfectresult.Itcouldbethat,unbundled
fromtheEU’sexportsasawholetheUK’sexportswillbesufficiently lowthattheUKwill
not have a substantial interest guaranteeing it a share of the quota. But that is a
commercial,notalegalproblem.
30ArticleXIII:5oftheGATT1994.
31 Article XIII:2(a) of the GATT 1994. Article XIII:2 aims to ‘mimic’ the comparative advantages of all WTO
Membersproducing likeproductswhichmightparticipateunderaquota:WTOAppellateBodyReport,EC–BananasIII(Article21.5–EcuadorII/US),WT/DS27/AB/RW2/ECU,adopted22December2008,para338.
32WTOAppellateBodyReport,EC–Poultry,WT/DS69/AB/R,adopted23July1998,para106.
33 The representative period is undefined, but is usually the previous three years:WTO Panel Report,EC –
Bananas III, adopted 25 September 1997, para 7.94. Theremay however be special circumstances, such as
market distortions, in which case other periods may be used: WTO Arbitrator, EC – Bananas III,WT/DS27/ARB/US,9April1999,paras5.29-5.33.
34ArticleXIII:2(d)hasbeencalledalexspecialistoArticleXIII:1oftheGATT1994.SeeWTOPanelReport,EC–
BananasIII,WT/DS27/R,ibid,para7.75.
35Suchagreementsareonlyeverprovisional,andaresubjecttorevisionintheeventthatanyWTOMember,
neworotherwise,acquiresorincreasesitssubstantialinterestinsupplyingtheproductsconcerned.SeeWTO
PanelReport,EC–BananasIII,aboveatn33,para7.92.36WTOPanelReport,EC–BananasIII,ibid,para7.75.
37WTOPanelReport,EC–Poultry,WT/DS69/R,adopted23July1998,para230,n140.
38WTOPanelReport,EC–BananasIII,aboveatn33,para7.75. Itremainsunclearwhether it ispossibleto
leavethe‘other’sharesunallocated,orwhethertheymustbeallocatedtoWTOMemberswithasubstantial
interest,ortothosewithoutasubstantialinterest.
9
(c) TheUK’sshareofEU’simporttariffratequotas
A more complicated question concerns the identification of the UK’s commitment to
provide certain country-specific tariff ratequotasas listed in theEU’sexisting schedule.39
Therearetwopracticalsolutions.OnewouldbefortheUKtobindacommitmenttocover
allproductscurrentlythesubjectofanEUtariffratequotaatthedutyrateofthatquota;
theotherwouldbefortheUKtoreachanagreementwithallsuppliers,orallsupplierswith
a substantial interest,whichwould then be protected under the first sentence of Article
XIII:2(d)oftheGATT1994.ItismoredifficulttodeterminetheUK’slegalobligationsinthe
absenceofeitherofthesepracticalsolutions.
Thissaid, it is importanttonotethattheUKhasexisting legalobligations inrespectof its
shareof thetariff ratequotassetout in theEUschedule.Fundamentally, then,as theEU
scheduleispartoftheGATT1994,40thisisaquestionoftreatyinterpretation,whichmeans
that the task of identifying the UK’s tariff rate quota obligations is to determine the
commonunderstandingofallWTOMembersatthetimetheEUtariffratequotaswerelast
incorporated as an integral part of the GATT 1994.41 The key question iswhether itwas
agreed,or,more likely, assumed thatEUMemberStateswouldnothaveaccess to those
quotas.Ifthisisthecase,whichisalmostcertain,theUK’scommitmentsinrespectofthe
EU’stariffratequotacanbereadtoexcludeEU-27imports.However,thisdoesnotdispose
of the issue, because schedules cannot override otherWTO obligations, including Article
XIII:2(d)oftheGATT1994.42Thismeansthat,providedthatthereisnootherbasisonwhich
theEU-27exportsthoseproductstotheUK,suchasafreetradeagreementorawaiver,43
that,asanordinaryWTOMember,theEU-27wouldhavearighttoaccessanyUKtariffrate
quota for any product for which it has a substantial exporting interest. That, of course,
reducesthevalueofanytariffratequotaforothersuppliers.
39 See above at n 9 for the EU’s schedules. Existing tariff rate quotas are notified in WTO Committee on
Agriculture,Notification–EuropeanUnion(tariffratequotas:imports),G/AG/N/EU/30,2September2016and
WTO Committee on Agriculture, Notification – European Union (tariff rate quotas: administration),
G/AG/N/EU/31,2September2016.Quotaswerefilledabove70%forthefollowingproducts,notallofwhich
are produced in the UK: beef, lamb, chicken, turkey, garlic, millet, sugar, cheddar, potatoes, carrots and
turnips, sweet peppers, dried onions, grapes, apples, pears, almonds, maize, rice, manioc starch, pasta,
chocolate,cereals,preservedfruit,fruit juices,wine,corngluten,dog,catandcertainanimalfeed:WTOdoc
G/AG/N/EU/30,ibid.
40ArticleII:7oftheGATT1994.
41ThiswouldbeinaccordancewiththeintroductorylanguageoftheGATT1994or,later,inaccordancewith
ArticleII:7oftheGATTdirectly.Itshouldbenotedthat,asitamountstoatreatyrevision,thecriticaldatefor
interpreting a schedule is the date of its certification or, failing that, its latest legal revision (onwhich see
belowattextton87),nottheearlierdatethatthequotawasfirstagreed,whichisrelevantforanon-violation
complaint:WTOAppellateBodyReport,EC–Computer Equipment,WT/DS62/AB/R, adopted22 June1998,
para150.
42InWTOAppellateBodyReport,EC–Poultry,aboveatn32,paras96(andalso96-102),theAppellateBody
stated that a tariff rate quota resulting from a renegotiation of a concession under Article XXVIII was still
subjecttothenon-discriminationruleinArticleXIII.
43GATT1947PanelReport,EEC–Newsprint,L/5680,adopted20November1984,para55;WTOArbitrator,EC
–BananasIII,aboveatn33,para5.8.
10
Therearevariousoptionswhichcouldcounteractsucharesult.Onewouldbetoconcludea
free tradeagreementwith theEUproviding forduty freeaccess to theproductsat issue.
Another would be to treat the UK’s withdrawal from the EU as a ‘special factor’ that,
according toArticle XIII:2(d), can justify adjustments to the allocationof shares basedon
global tradepatterns.Suchan interpretationwouldallowtheEUtobeexcludedfromthe
allocation of the quota. However, the Note to Article XI, which is applicable to Article
XIII:2(d),44 indicates that ‘special factors’ relate to changes in productive capacity, not
changesofa legalnature.Second,andrelatedtothis,theresultofsuchan interpretation
wouldbetonullifytherights,underArticleXIII:2(d),ofanyWTOMemberleavingacustoms
uniontoaccessatariffratequotaagreedwhenthatWTOMemberwasamemberofthat
customsunion.Thiswouldbearesultwithsignificantsystemicimplications.
Anotherpossibility isto ignorethequestionoftheUK’s legalobligations,andfocusrather
onthereasonableexpectationsof thetraditional importersunderatariff ratequota.This
canbedonebymeansofanon-violationcomplaintagainsttheUKunderArticleXXIII:1(b)of
theGATT1994,basedonaclaimthattheUKhasnullifiedorimpairedbenefitsaccruingto
that complainant under the GATT 1994 by a measure, regardless of whether or not it
violatedaWTOrulethatwasnotreasonablyexpectedatthetimethatthetariffratequota
wasnegotiated.
Suchaclaimwouldhavetosatisfyseveralconditions.Itwouldneedtobeestablishedthat
theUK’sleavingtheEU,anditsconsequentnewschedule,nullifiedbenefitsaccruingtothat
WTOMemberunderArticleXIIIoftheGATT1994.AsquotasharesunderArticleXIII:2are
subject to fluctuation, a disaffected WTO Member could not have had any reasonable
expectationofexportinganygivenquantitiesunderthetariffratequota.However,itismay
be that itwasnotexpectedat the time the tariff ratequotawasagreed thatnon-UKEU
importswouldbeallocatedsharesofthatquota.45Second,themeasureatissuemusthave
beenreasonablyunexpectedatthetimethetariffratequotawasagreed.Thiswouldbethe
caseforanytariffratequotaagreedatmostbetween6August1974,thedateofcirculation
of the firstEUschedule includingtheUK,46andthedatewhenthatWTOMembercanbe
said to have been aware of the possibility that the UK might leave the EU.47 Any such
expectationswouldalsohavetobelimitedtoimportsintotheUKfromEUMemberStates
atthetimetherelevanttariffratequotawasagreed.Iftheseconditionsaremadeout,then
acomplainingWTOMemberwouldbeentitledtoamutuallysatisfactoryadjustment,which
may include compensation.48 If successful, that complainant would then be entitled to a
44TheNoteAdArticleXIII:4oftheGATT1994makesacrossreferencetotheNoteAdArticleXI,whichstates
that ‘[t]heterm“special factors” includeschanges inrelativeproductiveefficiencyasbetweendomesticand
foreign producers, or as between different foreign producers, but not changes artificially brought about by
meansnotpermittedundertheAgreement’.
45WTOPanel Report,EC–Poultry, above at n 37, para 293, noting thatBrazil hadnotmade such a claim,
suggestingimplicitlythatitmighthavemadesuchaclaim.
46WTOPanelReport,Japan–Film,WT/DS44/R,adopted22April1998,paras10.64-10.70.
47Thatdatemightbe,attheearliest,1December2009,thedateofentryintoforceoftheTreatyonEuropean
Union,Article50ofwhichprovidesforthepossibilityofanEUMemberStateleavingtheEU,or25April2013.
Itmightalsobesomewhatlater,on23June2016,whentheUKvotedtoleavetheEU,butarguablynolater
thanthatdate.
48Article26(1)(b)and(d)oftheWTODisputeSettlementUnderstanding.
11
‘mutuallysatisfactoryadjustment’fromtheUK,whichwouldmostlikelybeachievedbyan
increaseintheUKtariffratequotatoincludeimportsfromtheEU-27imports(or,perhaps,
onlyfromthoseEUMemberswhowereMembersatthetimethatthetariffratequotawas
agreed).
Basedonthisanalysis,itwouldbeprudentfortheUKtobind,unilaterally,tariffratequotas
on products covered by existing EU tariff rate quotas based on imports from all sources,
includingtheEU-27,overarepresentativeperiodofthreeyears.49
(d) TheUK’sshareoftheEUagriculturalsubsidycommitments
A next question concerns the UK’s share of the EU’s commitment not to subsidise
agriculturalproductionbeyondagivenannualquantum,or,todescribethisfromtheother
direction,theUK’sshareoftheEU’slibertytosubsidiseuptothatquantum.Inreality,this
questionisunlikelytobeverycontroversial,50astheEU’sactualdomesticsubsidiesareonly
7%of its scheduledamount51and theEUhasalreadyabolishedexport subsidies,
52 in line
withthe2015WTONairobiMinisterialDecisiononExportCompetition.53Nonetheless,the
theoreticalquestionremains.
Onceagain,WTOlawsuppliesnodirectrulesorprinciplesfordeterminingtheUK’sshareof
asharedlibertytosubsidiseagriculturalproduction.Onemightwonderwhethertheorigins
of the UK’s and EU’s respective subsidy commitments would be a suitable basis for this
calculation.Aswithtariffratequotas,thismightberelevantwithrespecttoanon-violation
complaint.Giventhereductionincommitmentsovertime,however, it isunlikelythatany
WTOMemberwouldmakesuchaclaim.AmorerealisticoptionwouldbebasedontheUK’s
existingsharesoftheEU’ssubsidisationpolicy,eitherintermsofits(higher)contributions
or its (lower) receipts.54 As between these two options, given that the purpose of the
commitmentsistoreducedistortionsinthedomesticmarketplace,itissuggestedthatthe
strongerbasisfordeterminingtheUK’srighttosubsidisewouldbetheUK’sreceiptsfrom
the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), rather than its contributions to that policy,
49 See above at n 33. An interesting question, raised by David Roberts, concerns the appropriate date for
determining a currency conversion should the UK wish to convert specific duties from euros/quantity to
sterling/quantity.
50 Alan Matthews, ‘WTO dimensions of a UK “Brexit” and agricultural trade’, http://capreform.eu/wto-
dimensions-of-a-uk-brexit-and-agricultural-trade/, 5 January 2016. Statistical issues resulting from transit of
products to the UK via other EU ports (the ‘Rotterdam issue’) may add a certain practical difficulty. See
Yorkshire Agricultural Society, The Implications of ‘Brexit’ for UK Agriculture, 2016,
http://yas.co.uk/uploads/files/YAS_FSN_Brexit_-_Full_Report.pdf,at29.
51 In themarketing year 2012/13, domestic supportwas€5.9bnof apossible €72.3bn:WTOCommitteeon
Agriculture,Notification–EuropeanUnion,WT/G/AG/N/EU/26,2November2015.52 In themarketing year 2014/2015, export subsidy commitments were zero out of a possible €8bn,WTO
CommitteeonAgriculture,Notification–EuropeanUnion,G/AG/N/EU/29,20May2016.
53WTOMinisterialConference,DecisiononExportCompetition,19December2015,WT/MIN(15)/45,para6.
For discussion of the legal value of this decision see Lorand Bartels, ‘The Relationship between the WTO
AgreementonAgricultureandtheSCMAgreement:AnAnalysisofHierarchyRulesintheWTOLegalSystem’
(2016)50JournalofWorldTrade7,at17-19.
54LarsBrink, ‘UKBrexitandWTOfarmsupport limits’,13July2016,http://capreform.eu/uk-brexit-and-wto-
farm-support-limits/.
12
whicharebasedontheUK’sshareofEUgrossnationalincome.55Itisthereforesuggested
thattheUK’ssubsidycommitmentbecalculatedastheratioofUK:EUCAPpayments(overa
representativeperiodofthreeyears)appliedtotheEU’stotalsubsidycommitments.56
3. TheUK’sGATSschedules
AnextquestionconcernstheUK’scommitmentsunderArticleXXoftheGATS.57Theseare
generic,subjecttolimitationsonanEUMemberStatebasis.Thesecaneasilybetransposed
toanewexclusiveUKGATSschedule.
Thereishoweveraslightlynicheissueconcerningtheterritorial limitationtotheschedule
annexedbytheEUandtheUKtotheGATS,accordingtowhich‘[t]hespecificcommitments
inthisscheduleapplyonlytotheterritoriesinwhichtheTreatiesestablishingtheEuropean
Communities are applied and under the conditions laid down in these Treaties’.58 Read
strictly,thisclausewouldhavetheeffectthat,afterleavingtheEU,theUKwouldhaveno
realcommitments,asitscommitmentswouldapplytoaterritoryinrespectofwhichithas
nojurisdiction.ThiswouldleadtothesituationthattheUKwouldpossessallrightsandergaomnes partes obligations, but it would have no obligations in relation to specificcommitments under theGATS. This is not impossible. It appears to be assumed that the
WTOagreementsapplytoterritoriesofWTOMembersthatarenotsubjecttoaschedule
(such as the Faroe Islands, a dependency of Denmark).59 Nonetheless, this might risk a
situationofrebussicstantibus,andinanycaseadifferentoutcomeseemsmorelikely.
This outcome is based on the principle of customary international law that a treaty only
bindsastateinrespectofitsterritory‘unlessadifferentintentionappearsfromthetreaty
or is otherwise established’.60 It might be arguable that the territorial application clause
representsjustsuchadifferentintention.61However,itisreadilyapparentthatthisclause
waspredicatedupon theEUMember States continuingas such. It is therefore suggested
that, once the UK leaves the EU, that clause be read either as applying to UK territory
55Ifonewerepreparedtodrawananalogybetweenarighttosubsidiseagriculturalproductionandmovable
propertyrelatedtoterritory,thiswouldalsoaccordwiththeruleintheViennaConventiononSuccessionof
StatesinRespectofStatePropertyprovidingthat‘movableStatepropertyofthepredecessorStateconnected
withtheactivityofthepredecessorStateinrespectoftheterritorytowhichthesuccessionofStatesrelates
shallpasstothesuccessorState’.Art14(2)(b)andArt15(1)(d)ofthe1983ViennaConventiononSuccessionof
StatesinRespectofStateProperty,ArchivesandDebts(done8April1983,notyetinforce).
56In2015,theUK’sshareofCommonAgriculturalPolicyreceiptswas6.7%.SeespreadsheetattachedtoAlan
Matthews, ‘Impact of Brexit on CAP budget net balances for remaining Member States’, 5 August 2016,
http://capreform.eu/impact-of-brexit-on-cap-budget-net-balances-for-remaining-member-states/ at
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B6KoZ_bJBQHYbzQ0cFNsMG5VTGc/view?usp=sharing.
57EuropeanCommunitiesandtheirMemberStates–ScheduleofSpecificCommitments,GATS/SC/31,above
atn12.
58ibid.
59 Matthew Kennedy, ‘Overseas Territories in the WTO’ (2016) 65 International and Comparative Law
Quarterly741,at745.
60Article29oftheViennaConventionontheLawofTreaties,(openedforsignature23May1969;enteredinto
forceon27January1980)(1980)1155UNTS331.
61SchedulesofconcessionsareanintegralpartoftheGATT1994,accordingtoArticleII:7ofthisagreement.
13
describedinthatclause,orelseignoredentirely,withtheresultthattheUK’scommitments
wouldextendtoallUKterritoryunlessexpresslylimited.
Thisisnotasradicalasuggestionasmightbethought.Accordingtothe‘movingfrontiers’
principle,aruleofcustomary international law,62whenterritorypasses fromonestateto
another,thetreatiesoftheformerstateceasetoapplytothatterritoryandthetreatiesof
the latter state commence applying to that territory. Importantly, this rule includes
limitationson treaties, suchas reservations,63and there isno reasonwhy this rulewould
not likewiseapplytoterritorial limitations.Theresult,whichaccordswithcommonsense,
would be that the territorial application clause in the current EU schedule would simply
ceasetoberelevanttotheUKonceitleavestheEU,andthiscouldbereflectedbymeansof
arectificationtothatschedule.
In any case, onemight doubt whether, in practice, this territorial application is likely to
causemuchcontroversy.Asarule,WTOMembersareunlikelytocomplainthataschedule
coverstoomuch,ratherthantoolittle.Forexample,whentheUKnotifiedtheWTOthatits
commitments now covered the Isle of Man, it made no exception for services64
notwithstandingthefactthattheEUtreatiesdonotapplytotheIsleofManinrespectof
services,65andthispassedwithoutanyobjectionsbyanyotherWTOMembers.
4. Proceduresforrectifyingandmodifyingschedulesofconcessions
TheseconsiderationsinformtheprocedureapplicabletotheUKinannexingnewschedules
totheGATT1994andtheGATS.
ThecurrentprocedureformakingchangestoaGATT1994scheduleissetoutinthe1980
Decision on Procedures for Modification and Rectification of Schedules of Tariff
Concessions,66 which is binding as part of the GATT 1994.
67 This Decision distinguishes
betweenmodifications, on theonehand, and ‘other changes,’ on theother. Paragraph1
describesmodifications,relevantly,asfollows:
62 The ‘moving frontiers’ rule is codified in Article 15 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on the Succession of
States inRespectofTreaties (1978)1946UNTS3, in force6November1996. In1990Germanynotified the
GATT1947contractingpartiesthatitwasnowapplyingtheGATT1947totheterritoryoftheformerGerman
DemocraticRepublicandEastBerlin,which ithadabsorbed.SeeGATTDocL/6759,31October1990.There
werenoobjections.
63 First report on succession of States in respect of treaties, by Sir Francis Vallat, Special Rapporteur,
InternationalLawCommission,CommentarytoArticle14[later15],UNDocA/CN.4/278(1974)II(1)Yearbook
oftheInternationalLawCommission1,at210,para11.
64ConfirmedbyemailcommunicationwiththeUKForeignandCommonwealthOffice.
65Article355(5)(c)of theTreatyon theFunctioningof theEuropeanUnion,discussed in FionaMurray,The
EuropeanUnionandMemberStateTerritories(TheHague:TMCAsser,2012),at152.
66GATTContractingParties,ProceduresforModificationandRectificationofSchedulesofTariffConcessions,
Decisionof26March1980,L/4962.
67IntroductorylanguagetotheGATT1994,para1(b)(iv).
14
Changes in the authentic texts of Schedules annexed to the General Agreement
whichreflectmodificationsresultingfromactionunderArticleII,ArticleXVIII,Article
XXIV,ArticleXXVIIorArticleXXVIIIshallbecertifiedbymeansofCertifications.
It is notable that each of the provisions listed in this paragraph is concerned with
negotiations following a desire of aWTOMember to increase duties or other barriers to
trade.ArticleII:5grantsanaffectedWTOMemberarighttoconsultanotherWTOMember
if the first Member considers that a product is not receiving the expected treatment
contemplated by a concession; Article XVIII grants developing country WTO Members a
right to raise trade barriers for the purposes of infant industry production, subject to
compensation; Article XXIV:6 refers to the procedure in Article XVIII for WTO Members
wishingto increaseasaresultof formingaregional tradeagreement;ArticleXXVIIgrants
WTOmemberstherighttowithdrawingorwithholdingconcessionsinitiallynegotiatedwith
a party that never became or ceased to become a WTO Member; and Article XXVIII
establishesaright foraWTOmemberwishingtomodifyorwithdrawaconcession,anda
mechanism forconsultingandnegotiatingcompensationwithcertainotheraffectedWTO
Members.Consequently,infact,subsidycommitmentscannotbe‘modified’,becausethey
cannotbeincreased.68
Bycontrast,paragraph2ofthe1980Decisiondescribesother‘changes’asfollows:
Changes in the authentic texts of Schedules shall bemadewhen amendments or
rearrangements which do not alter the scope of a concession are introduced in
national customs tariffs in respect of bound items. Such changes and other
rectificationsofapurelyformalcharactershallbemadebymeansofCertifications.
Itisalittlenoticedfactthatparagraph2describesnotonlyformalrectifications,whichare
concernedwith accuracy, but also ‘other amendments and rearrangementswhichdonot
alter the scope of a concession’. Given that paragraph 1 is concernedwithmodifications
thatnegativelyaffect concessions, it is submitted that thisphrasemust refernotboth to
changes that are neutral, and to those that lead to improvements to bound concessions.
Support for this proposition may be found in the parallel GATS Council Decision, which
distinguishesbetweenordinarymodificationsunderArticleXXIof theGATS,69on theone
hand,and ‘modifications…whichconsistofnewcommitments, improvements toexisting
ones,orrectificationsorchangesofapurelytechnicalcharacterthatdonotalterthescope
orthesubstanceoftheexistingcommitments’.70Objectionstoordinarymodifications,ifnot
withdrawn, leadtoarbitrationtodetermineappropriatecompensation,71whileobjections
tomodifications that do not alter schedules, at least initially, lead to revised versions of
68BernardHoekmanandPetrosMavroidis,‘MFNClubsandSchedulingAdditionalCommitmentsintheGATT:
LearningfromtheGATS’,EUIWorkingPaperRSCAS2016/6,at8n24.
69 WTO Council for Trade in Services, Procedures for the Implementation of Article XXI of the General
AgreementonTradeinServices(GATS)(ModificationofSchedules),19July1999.
70 WTO Council for Trade in Services, Decision on Procedures for the Certification of Rectifications or
Improvements to Schedules of Specific Commitments, adopted 14 April 2000, S/L/83, 18 April 2000. The
ProceduresaresetoutinS/L/84,18April2000.
71ArticleXXI:3(a)oftheGATS.
15
non-alteringmodifications,72although,ifobjectionspersist,modificationssubmittedasnon-
alteringaretreatedasordinarymodifications,73andthereforealsoresultinarbitration.
Thereis,admittedly,adifficultywiththisproposition,whichliesinthefactthat,atleastin
thecontextoftheGATT1994,ithasbeenflatlycontradictedbytheAppellateBody.InEC–BananasIII(Art21.5–EcuadorII/US),theAppellateBodysaid:
Theordinarymeaningoftheterm‘modify’appearstoincludeboththesituationin
whichthescopeofaconcessionisreduced(forexample,atariffincrease)andwhen
thescopeisexpanded(forexample,atariffreduction).74
Itissubmitted,however,thattheAppellateBodyiswrong.Thisisbecauseitfailstorespect
the basic fact that renegotiations of concessions are intended to maintain the expected
benefitsofthoseconcessionsoverall,evenifnewconcessionsaremadeindifferentsectors
asaresult.75Itthereforemakesnosensetosaythatchangestoaschedulearetobeseenas
‘modifications’ when those benefits are not in question, still less when they are being
improved. Indeed, the Appellate Body itself seems to recognise this, implicitly, in the
sentence following that just quoted. It said ‘whether the proposedmodification actually
constitutes a reduction or an expansion of the concessionmay only become clear in the
course of the renegotiations’.76 While seemingly supportive, this sentence actually
undermines its approach because as it is based on the assumption that the proposed
reductionofaconcessiontriggerstheneedforrenegotiations.Buttheonlydamagecaused
byaloweredtariffisinthecontextofpreferenceerosion,whichisnotabenefitprotected
by the WTO.77 At most, and sensibly, this sentence recognises that there can be
disagreement about whether a proposed change does, in fact, reduce the scope of a
concession.Butthisisanargumentaboutambiguity;itisnotanargumentthatanychange
countsasa‘modification’.78
EveniftheAppellateBodyrulingissound,it issuggestedthatthereshouldbeacarveout
for new schedules scheduled by newly autonomous WTO Members, based on practice
72WTOCTS,S/L/84,aboveatn70,para3.
73Ibid,para3.
74WTOAppellateBodyReport,EC–BananasIII(Article21.5–EcuadorII/US),aboveatn31,para450.
75 PetrosMavroidis,TheRegulationof International Trade, Vol 1, TheGATT (Cambridge,MA:MIT, 2015) at
374.
76WTOAppellateBodyReport,EC–BananasIII(Article21.5–EcuadorII/US),aboveatn31,para450.
77TheGATT1947PanelReport,Germany–Sardines,G/26,circulated31October1952,notadopted,foundin
favour of a nonviolation complaint due to preference erosion on sardines due to the lowering duties on
herring and sprats. The reason for the report, however, was specifically that Germany had assured the
complainant,Norway,thatthiswouldnotoccur.
78Perhapsthisstatementcanbeexplainedbytheunusualwayinwhichthepointarose.Ecuadorhadargued
that because the EU had twice commenced renegotiation procedures under Article XXVIII of the GATT, a
particular EU quota, the validity of which was at issue in the proceedings, could not have expired. The
AppellateBodyobjected,asexplained,toreachtheconclusionthat‘thefactthattheEuropeanCommunities
initiatedtwiceArticleXXVIIInegotiations tomodify itsconcessions isnotconclusiveas towhether the tariff
quotaconcessiondidnotexpireon31December2002’. Ibid,para452.Itwouldhavebeensufficientforthe
Appellate Body to say that the views of the EUon thematterwere irrelevant; therewas no need to draw
preciselytheoppositeconclusion.
16
under the GATT 1947, which should, in the first instance, be treated as ‘changes’ in a
schedulenotamountingtoamodificationwithinthemeaningofparagraph1of the1980
Decision.Thispracticeisfoundinparagraph5ofthe1980Decision,whichstates:
The procedure of Certification under this Decision may be applied for the
establishmentofconsolidatedSchedulesorofnewSchedulesunderparagraph5(c)
ofArticleXXVI,whereinallchangesaremodificationsorrectificationsreferredtoin
paragraphs1or2.
Some background is necessary. Article XXVI:5(c) of the GATT 1947 permitted newly
autonomous customs territories, which in practice was mainly decolonized independent
states,towhichtheGATT1947hadbeenmadeapplicable,tosucceedtoGATTcontracting
party status,79 upon request and with the sponsorship of the responsible (or formerly
responsible) GATT contracting party.80 Upon succession, the newly autonomous territory
inherited all of the rights and obligations thatwere previously applicable to its territory,
including scheduled commitments (and qualifications)81 which the formerly responsible
contractingpartyhadmadeeffectiveinrespectofitsterritory.82Sometimes,thismeantthat
79AlbertaFabbricotti,‘ArticleXXVI’inRüdigerWolfrum,Peter-TobiasStollandHolgerHestermeyer(eds),WTO
– Trade in Goods,Max Planck Commentaries onWorld Trade Law, Vol 5 (Leiden: Brill, 2011). The right of
succession– tobedeemedacontractingparty–wasautomatic,on request,provided that the requestwas
sponsored by the responsible (or formerly responsible) contracting party. See GATT Council, Minutes of
Meeting25Aprilto1May1963,GATTDocC/M/15,15May1962,at7.Theautomaticityofthisprocedureis
reflected in themore accurate use, at least after 1963, of the terminology of ‘succession’: Tatsuro Kunigi,
‘StateSuccessionintheFrameworkofGATT’(1965)59AmericanJournalofInternationalLaw268,at272and
275.Goingbeyondtheusualrulesinsomerespect,newlyautonomousterritorieswerealsopermittedagrace
periodpriortodecidingwhethertoapplyforsuccession(duringwhich,toalimitedextent,theyweretreated
as de facto GATT contracting parties): GATT Contracting Parties, Application of the Provisions of ArticleXXVI:5(c), Recommendation adopted by the Contracting Parties on 1 November 1957, GATT Doc L/748, 21
November 1957. This reflection period was later extended indefinitely, until the WTO required that all
Memberssubmitschedules.Seepara1(a)oftheWTOMinisterialDecisionontheAcceptanceofandAccession
totheAgreementEstablishingtheWorldTradeOrganization,and,extendingtheperiod,WTOGeneralCouncil,
DecisionontheFinalizationofNegotiationsonSchedulesonGoodsandServices,31January1995,WT/L/30,7
February 1995. Craig VanGrasstek,TheHistory and Future of theWorld TradeOrganization (Geneva:WTO,
2013),at125,notesthat‘[s]everalofthecountriesthatwerestillnegotiatingbythetimetheWTOcameinto
beingmightwellhaveregrettednottakingadvantageofthisoption.’
80Thecriterionofsponsorshipwassolelyevidentiary.ItwastoclarifyforotherGATT1947contractingparties
thattheterritoryatissuewas,infact,autonomousinmatterscoveredbytheGATT1947.
81Asthe1961WorkingPartyontheapplicationofArticleXXXVtoJapansaid‘therecouldbenodoubtthata
government becoming a contracting party under Article XXVI:5(c) does so on the terms and conditions
previously accepted by the metropolitan government on behalf of the territory in question.’ See GATT
ContractingParties,ReportoftheWorkingPartyonArticleXXXVReview,GATTDocL/1545,6September1961,
para19.Seealsobelow,attextton98,foranexampleofastateleavingacustomsunionGATTcontracting
partyandassuming its commitments. This is inaccordancewith the rule stated inArticle20(1)of the1978
Convention,aboveatn62.
82 Contrary to earlier practice, theGATT Panel Report, Jamaica –Margins of Preference, GATTDoc L/3485,
adopted2February1971,para13,para13,determinedthatthedatefordeterminingtheapplicationofGATT
obligations(incasu,preferencemarginsunderArticleI:4oftheGATT1947)wasthedateonwhichtheoriginal
obligationswereundertaken(incasu,1947),notthedateonwhichautonomywasacquired(incasu,1962).
The assumptionof previously applicable commitments contrastswithArticle 20(2) of the 1978Convention,
aboveatn62,according towhichnewly independentstateswerepermitted to formulatenewreservations
upontheirnotificationofsuccessiontoamultilateraltreaty.
17
succeeding contracting parties preferred not to inherit these rights and obligations, and
ratheraccedetotheGATT1947asanewcontractingparty.83Importantly,andrelevantlyto
the present situation, the submission of new GATT 1947 schedules in this context were
treatedasother‘changes’,exceptwhentheschedulerequiredanincreaseindutiesbeyond
theboundrate.84
ItissubmittedthattheUK’sdeparturefromtheEUisthesameasthesituationdescribedby
Article XXVI:5(c) of theGATT 1947, insofar as both concern the acquisition by a customs
territoryoffullautonomyinmatterscoveredbytheGATT1947,orWTO.Itistruethatthe
purposeofArticleXXVI:5(c)wastoestablisharightofsuccessiontocontractingpartystatus,
whereas the UK is already a full WTO Member. However, both the UK and such new
independent states share the same need to adopt, in their own name, the schedule of
concessionsthatformerlyappliedtotheirterritoriesbyvirtueofaGATTcontractingparty
(orWTOMember)withautonomyandresponsibilityinmatterscoveredbytheGATT1947
andWTOrespectively.Itissubmittedthatforthisreason,practiceunderArticleXXVI:5(c)of
the GATT 1947 in relation to the identification of the commitments of the newly
autonomous customs territories should ‘guide’ the WTO, even though technically this
practiceonlyapplies tocases fallingunderArticleXXVI:5(c),which isno longeroperative.
Still, this is another reasonwhy theUK isentitled to submitanewschedule to theGATT
1994asa‘change’notamountingtoamodification,soastoenabletheUKtoavoidhaving
togothroughtheproceduresformodification.
The significance of submitting newUKGATT 1994 andGATS schedule for certification as
‘changes’and rectificationswithin themeaningof the respectiveprocedures is thatother
WTOMembershave limitedgroundsonwhich theymayobject.Paragraph3of the1980
Decisionstatesasfollows:
The draft containing the changes described in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be
communicated by the Director-General to all the contracting parties and shall
becomeaCertificationprovidedthatnoobjectionhasbeenraisedbyacontracting
partywithinthreemonthsonthegroundthat, in thecaseofchangesdescribed in
paragraph1,thedraftdoesnotcorrectlyreflectthemodificationsor,inthecaseof
changesdescribedinparagraph2,theproposedrectificationisnotwithintheterms
ofthatparagraph.
The2000GATSDecisiondoesnotexpresslyrestrictthegroundsonwhichobjectionsmaybe
made, but it does specify that ‘[a] Member making an objection should to the extent
possible identify the specific elements of the modifications which gave rise to that
objection.’85Byimplication,thesamegroundsshouldberelevanthere,orelsetherewould
83AnexamplewasCambodia,whichpreferrednot tocommit to thehighscheduledcommitments thathad
beenappliedtoitsterritory(aspartoftheIndo-Chinacustomsunion)underFrance’sscheduleofconcessions.
SeeGATTContractingParties,AccessionofCambodia:StatementbyCambodia,GATTDocL/900,1November
1958.ItwassimilarforTunisia,asdiscussedbyKunigi,aboveatn79,at279.
84Forexample,CameroonacceptedthatitwouldhavebeenrequiredtorenegotiateitsscheduleunderArticle
XXIV:6oftheGATT1947ifithadtoincreaseitstariffbindingsduetoitsmembershipofacustomsunion.See
GATT,AccessionbyNewly-IndependentAfricanStatestotheGATT,INT(62)142,3November1962,para18.
85ibid,para2.
18
be no need to distinguish betweenmodifications and other changes.On the other hand,
there is no practice of rejecting an improperly grounded objection, even if the WTO
Director-Generalbyimplicationhasthispower,inordertoadministertheseprocedures.
Thismeansthat,regardlessoftheUK’sproposedschedules,andeveniftheyrepresent,ona
proper analysis, other ‘changes’ and rectifications and not modifications, it is likely that
otherWTOMemberswillobjectinanycase.Giventhis,itisimportanttonotethatthelegal
effectofcertificationisevidentiary.TherightofWTOMemberstomodifyorwithdrawtheir
commitmentsis‘absolute’86andstemsfromtherelevantprovisionsoftheGATT1994and
GATS,87 not from secondary instruments on certification. In the event of an objection to
certification,asamatterofpracticeitwilleitherbethelastcertifiedscheduleisapplicable
or,shouldthisbecontested,theschedulethat,legally,reflectsthecommitmentsmadebya
WTOMemberinaccordancewithproperprocedures.88Inthepresentcase,itmatterslittle
if WTO Members refuse to certify the UK’s new schedule. What counts is that it UK
accuratelyreflectsitsexistingcommitments,astheyarecurrentlyexpressedintheEUGATT
1994andtheEUandUKGATSschedules.Ultimately,ifthereisanydisputeastowhethera
UKmeasureviolatesascheduledcommitment,thematter, includingthedefinitionofthat
commitment,willfalltobeinterpretedinWTOdisputesettlementproceedings.
5. GovernmentProcurementAgreement2014
AfinalquestionconcernstheUK’sstatusundertherevisedWTOGovernmentProcurement
Agreement(GPA2014),aplurilateralWTOagreement.ArticleXXII:1statesthat:
This Agreement shall enter into force on 1 January 1996 for those governments1
whoseagreedcoverageiscontainedintheAnnexesofAppendixIofthisAgreement,
andwhichhave,bysignature,acceptedtheAgreementon15April1994,orhave,by
that date, signed the Agreement subject to ratification and have subsequently
ratifiedtheAgreementbefore1January1996.
1 For thepurposeof thisAgreement, the term ‘government’ is deemed to include
thecompetentauthoritiesoftheEuropeanUnion.
It is the EU alone, and not the UK, that is the relevant party to this agreement.89
Accordingly, it is at present the EU that is solely responsible for its obligationsunder the
agreement,includinginrespectoftheactionsofgovernmentauthoritiesthatareorgansof
itsMemberStates.ItissubmittedthatonleavingtheEU,theUKwillsucceedtotheGPAin
86 Anwarul Hoda, Tariff Negotiations and Renegotiations under the GATT and the WTO (Cambridge: CUP,
2001),at15.
87CfJohnJackson,WorldTradeandtheLawofGATT(Cambridge,MA:TheMITPress,1997),at75.
88See,eg,WTOPanelReport,Russia–TariffTreatment,WT/DS485/R,circulated12August2016,para7.54;
GATT Panel Report, Jamaica – Margins of Preference, above at n 82, para 13; WTO Council for Trade in
Services,ibid,S/L/84,para4(byimplication).
89AgreementonGovernmentProcurement(1996)1915UNTS103,n2.FourEUMemberStates,butnotthe
UK,ratifiedtheGPA1995:ibid.Therevised2014AgreementonGovernmentProcurementwashoweveronly
acceptedbytheEU,notbytheseMemberStates:WTO,StatusofWTOLegalInstruments,aboveatn7,at128-29.
19
itsownright,inaccordancewithrulesofcustomaryinternationallawonthesuccessionof
statestotreaties,andpracticeundertheGATT1947,which‘guides’theWTO.90
Therearetwopreliminarypoints.First,whetherstatessucceedtotreatiesisindependentof
whethertheysucceedtothemembershipof internationalorganizations,wherepractice is
mixed.91Second,whileitistruethatthe1978ConventiononSuccessionofStatesinrespect
of Treaties is, strictly speaking, inapplicable to predecessors which are international
organizations and not states, there is practice concerning the succession of states from
unionsandfederationsformedbythemwithotherstates.Thispracticeisvirtuallyuniform:
inalmostallcasesthestateresumingitsautonomysucceededtotherightsandobligations
in treaties entered into by that federation or union.92 This includes, in particular, trade
agreements.A1971studybytheUNSecretariat,havingreviewedstatepractice,concluded
that ‘in general themembers of a union remain bound by the trade agreements of the
unionfollowingitsdissolution,atleastifthereisaclearcontinuityoftheentityinvolved.’93
This accordswith the basic rule in the 1978 Convention, which is that states succeed to
treaties concluded by the predecessor state that apply to themor,where relevant, their
territory.94
There is also GATT 1947 practice to the same effect. This concerned the Federation of
RhodesiaandNyasaland(alsocalledtheCentralAfricanFederation),whichwasformedby
90ArticleXVI:1oftheWTOAgreement.
91KonradBühler,StateSuccessionandMembershipinInternationalOrganizations(TheHague:Kluwer,2001),
at 309-12, concludes his book with the proposition that international organizations that are functionally
limited,particularlyinrelationtopoliticalissues,recognizethesuccessionofmembership,whileothers,such
astheUnitedNations,donot.PracticeundertheGATT1947,afunctionallyspecificquasi-organisation,isopen
to interpretation.Most cases of direct succession involve the independence of former colonies,whichwas
specifically regulated underArticle XXVI:5(c) of theGATT 1947. Beyond this, there examples of unions that
succeeded to the contracting party status of a constituent entity, such as the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland,butalsocontrarypractice,suchasthatconcerningtheCzechandSlovakRepublics,whichacceded
asnewGATTcontractingpartiesuponthedissolutionofCzechoslovakia,whichhadbeenaGATTcontracting
party.Ontheotherhand,thesenewcontractingpartieswerepermittedtoretainCzechoslovakia’srightsand
obligations without any need for negotiations, so de facto this can be considered a case of succession,supportingBühler’sargument,thoughhedoesnotrefertothisexample.
92 DP O’Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law, Vol II: International Relations
(Cambridge: CUP, 1967), at 164-178, discussing the dissolutions of the Union of Colombia (1829-31), the
GermanConfederation(1866),theUnitedArabRepublic(1960),theMaliFederation(1960),theFederationof
RhodesiaandNyasaland(1963),andtheseparationofSingaporefromMalaysia(1965).O’Connelliscriticalof
casesinwhichasucceedingstatedidnotassumetheobligationincurredbythefederationorunion,suchas
Mali(ibid,at172).Hedistinguishesthesecasesfromthoseofsecessioninvolvingdismemberment,suchasthe
dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy (1919) and Rwanda-Burundi (1962), but even here a
general principle can be discerned, with anomalies explained on their facts, in favour of the continuity of
treatiesforthenewlyemergedstates(ibid,at178-182).
93UNSecretariat,SuccessionofStatesinrespectofbilateraltreaties:thirdstudypreparedbytheSecretariat
[tradeagreements],UNDocA/CN.4/243/Add.1,24March1971,para182.
94 Article 34 of the 1978 Vienna Convention, above at n 62. There is a possible exception for newly
independent ex-colonies, and perhaps others in a similar situation (eg Ethiopia–Eritrea Claims Commission,
PrisonersofWar–Eritrea’sClaim17,PartialAward(2003)26RIAA23,para35),forwhichsuccessionmaynot
beautomatic,butwhichmayratherbeattheirelection:Articles16and17,ibid(withsomeexceptions).Thisis
acontroversialrule,butforpresentpurposesthisdoesnotmatter,asthisrulemirrors,andis inpartdrawn
from,thepracticeunderArticleXXVI:5(c)oftheGATT1947.
20
SouthernRhodesia,NorthernRhodesiaandNyasalandin1953,andwhichsucceededtothe
contracting party status of Southern Rhodesia.95 The United Kingdom,which at the time
retainedameasureofsovereigntyoverallofthesepartiesundergeneralinternationallaw,
certified that theFederationhad the requisiteautonomy inmatterscoveredby theGATT
1947,96but infact itwouldseemthatthiswasacaseofstraightforwardsuccessionunder
international law, not under Article XXVI:5(c) of the GATT 1947. The relevant decision
contains a preamble stating that ‘by the said Declarations [of the United Kingdom and
SouthernRhodesia],theGovernmentofSouthernRhodesiahasnotifiedtheCONTRACTING
PARTIESthattheFederalGovernmenthassucceededtotherightsandobligationsunderthe
Agreement formerly accepted by Southern Rhodesia’.97 It is only after this that the
contracting parties declared that the Federationwas ‘deemed to be a contracting party’.
TheFederationthereforeapparentlysucceededasacontractingpartyontwobases:first,as
the successor to SouthernRhodesia,which took effect as of theunilateral declarationby
Southern Rhodesia, and second, independently, by declaration of the GATT contracting
parties,mostlikely,althoughthisprovisionwasnotcitedinrelevantrespects,underArticle
XXVI:5(c). For present purposes, of course, it is the first element of this practice that is
relevant.ItshouldsufficethattheUKdeclaresunilaterallythatitsucceedstotheEU’sstatus
asapartytotheGPA2014inrespectofitselfanditsterritory.
This precedent also has a second dimension. The Federation dissolved in 1963, at which
pointSouthernRhodesianotifiedtheGATTcontractingpartiesasfollows:
In resuming its former status as a contracting party to the GATT, the Southern
RhodesianGovernmentaccepts,inrespectoftheterritoryofSouthernRhodesia
(i) therightsandobligationsincurredbytheformerFederalGovernment
under various protocols, declarations and recommendations,
includingthedisinvocationofArticleXXXVinrespectofJapan;
(ii) thatScheduleXVIonceagainbecomesSouthernRhodesia'sSchedule
intheGATTandthattherightsandobligationsoftheformerFederal
Government in relation to the concessions negotiated with other
contractingpartieswillbeapplicabletoSouthernRhodesia;and
(iii) the base date provisions of theDecision of 19November 1960 and
theprovisionsof the furtherDecisionof19November1960 relative
95GATT,CentralAfricanFederation–JointStatementissuedbytheUnitedKingdomandSouthernRhodesian
Delegations for the Information of the Contracting Parties, L/132, 22 September 1953, discussed in GATT
ContractingParties,SummaryRecordoftheThirteenthMeeting,6October1953,SR.8/13,12October1953.
SeealsoGATT,CentralAfricanFederation–JointNotificationbytheGovernmentsoftheUnitedKingdomand
Southern Rhodesia, L/172, 6 November 1953 and GATT Contracting Parties, Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland–Declarationof1November1954,L/278,11November1954.
96GATTContractingParties,FederationofRhodesiaandNyasaland–Declaration,L/278,ibid.
97ibid.
21
totheCustomsTreatmentforProductsofUnitedKingdomDependent
Territories.98
TherewasnoobjectionfromotherGATT1947contractingparties,whichmaybetakenas
acquiescence in this claim. For present purposes, the relevance of Southern Rhodesia’s
assumptionoftherightsandobligationsincurredbytheFederationisthatthisoccurredby
wayof right.Again, this supports theproposition that theUK isentitledat itselection to
succeedtotheGPA2014initsownname.
Finally, it is relevant that other GPA 2014 parties have, at least to some extent,
acknowledgedthattheEUisapartytotheGPA2014inpartonbehalfofitsMemberStates.
InaGPACommitteeDecisionapprovingthemodificationbytheEUofitsAnnexesbyadding
entities of new EUMember States, the GPA Committee ‘[r]ecogniz[ed] that … these ten
countrieswill,asmemberStatesoftheEuropeanCommunities,formpartoftheEuropean
CommunitiesforthepurposesoftheAgreementandbeboundbytheAgreement’.99Strictly
speaking, this cannotmean that these EUMember States are bounddirectly by theGPA
2014.ItprobablyreferstothefactthattheEUMemberStatesareboundunderEUlawby
the GPA 2014. However, what this also means, it may be suggested, is that otherWTO
MembershaveexpresslyrecognizedthattheEU’sstatusaspartytotheGPA2014isatleast
inpartonbehalfofitsMemberStatesinrespectoftheirterritory.Thisshouldbesufficient
to estop those other GPA 2014 parties from rejecting a UK claim to succeed to this
agreementinitsownname.
6. Conclusion
Tosummarise,onthebasisoftheanalysisofferedhere,theUKalreadytodaypossessesfull
WTOrightsandobligationsundertheWTOmultilateraltradeagreements,eveniftheseare,
at present, for themost part, exercised and performed on its behalf by the EU. Inmany
respectsitisnotcomplicatedtoidentifytheserightsandobligations,andthisisparticularly
true of rights and obligations applicable erga omnes partes to all WTO Members (or
categoriesofMembers).ThereisaquestionconcerningtheterritoriallimitationintheUK’s
GATSschedule,accordingtowhichthescheduleonlyappliestoEUterritory,butitisargued,
based on the ‘moving frontiers’ rule, that this limitation can be ignored in theUK’s new
schedule.
ComplicationsarisewheretheUK’srightscorrespondtopartofanobligation,determined
onaquantifiedbasis, that iscurrentlysetout in theEUandEUMemberStateschedules.
98GATT,SubmissionbytheSouthernRhodesianGovernmentfortheInformationofContractingParties,GATT
DocL/2167,4March1964.Thisclaimalsohadapracticalincident,insofarasSouthernRhodesianotifiedthe
GATTcontractingpartiesshortlyafterthisdeclarationthatitwaswithdrawingasafeguardmeasurethathad
been imposed by the Federation. GATT, Southern Rhodesia – Article XIX –Modification of Restrictions on
CertainTextilePiece-Goods,GATTDocL/2213,28April1964.
99WTOCommitteeonGovernmentProcurement,DecisionPursuanttoArticleXXIV:6(a)oftheAgreementon
Government Procurement, 23 April 2004, GPA/78, 4 May 2004 (EU-25), WTO Committee on Government
Procurement, Decision Pursuant to Article XXIV:6(a) of the Agreement on Government Procurement, 8
December 2006, GPA/90, 11 December 2006 (EU-27) and WTO Committee on Government Procurement,
DecisionPursuanttoArticleXXIV:6(a)oftheAgreementonGovernmentProcurement,27June2013,GPA/118,
27June2013(EU-28).
22
ThisisthecasefortheEU’srighttosubsidiseagriculturalproductionuptoasetlimit.Itwas
suggested that the UK should adopt a subsidy commitment calculated by applying the
UK:EU ratio of payments from the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy over the past three
years to these commitments. As to the UK’s quantified obligations corresponding to the
EU’s country-specific tariff ratequotas, it is likely that, inpractice,quotasare likely tobe
establishedwithrelevantWTOMembersbyagreement,inaccordancewithArticleXIII:2of
theGATT1994.However, suchagreements shouldbe reachedagainst thebackgroundof
thefactthattheUKcurrentlypossessesobligationswithrespecttothesetariffratequotas;
it is just difficult to know what these obligations mean in practice. The real problem,
however, isthatregardlessofhowaquotamightbedetermined,theEU-27wouldhavea
right to access this quota under Article XIII:2. This would raise the possibility of a non-
violation complaint, on the basis that at the time the quotas were agreed, they would
exclude imports from other EU Member States. To forestall such a complaint, it was
suggested that the UK could offer tariff rate quotas corresponding to recent imports,
includingfromtheEU-27,overarepresentativemostlikelythree-yearperiod.
As to the procedure to be followed, it was suggested that the UK should submit new
schedulesunderArticleIIoftheGATT1994andArticleXXoftheGATS,asother‘changes’
andrectificationstothecurrentEUschedule,inrespectofitselfanditsterritory.Itisalmost
certain that otherWTOMembers will object to these schedules, but, importantly, these
objectionsdonotrequiretheUKtoenterintorenegotiationoftheUK’sentireschedule,as
is sometimes thought to be the case. Other WTO Members hold no veto over the
determinationoftheUK’sschedulesoroveritslegalpositionwithintheWTOinanyother
respect. At most, objections might lead to arbitration on the value of a compensatory
adjustmentfollowinganallegedmodificationoftheUK’sservicesconcession(whichmight
be zero) and dispute settlement proceedings in respect of any givenmeasure alleged to
violatetheUK’scommitmentsorthatotherwisenullifiesorimpairsbenefitsundertheGATT
1994ortheGATS.However,itisalsosubmittedthattheUKwillbeabletoforestallanysuch
proceedingsbydetermining its tariff ratequotaandsubsidycommitmentsalong the lines
suggestedhere.