The Timing of Strategic Decisions: Candidacy Decisions in 1982 and 1984

The Timing of Strategic Decisions: Candidacy Decisions in 1982 and 1984Author(s): Clyde WilcoxSource: Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Nov., 1987), pp. 565-572Published by: Comparative Legislative Research CenterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/439749 .

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Research Note

CLYDE WILCOX Georgetown University

The Timing of Strategic Decisions: Candidacy Decisions in 1982 and 1984

Although the model of congressional elections proposed by Jacobson and Kernell has been the subject of some controversy, to date there has been no attempt to investigate one of their central claims: that potential candidates decide whether to run in the spring of the election year. This paper uses previously unanalyzed data from the Federal Election Commission to test this claim. The results suggest that most serious candidates do indeed decide by the spring, but that in 1982 and 1984 over half of serious nonincumbent candidates made their candidacy decisions before March of the election year. This suggests that models of congressional elections may have to incorporate even earlier measures of economic conditions and presidential popularity.

Jacobson and Kernell's (1981) model of House elections attempts to resolve a paradox in the research findings. Presidential popularity and national economic issues are strongly related to aggregate election results in the House, but attempts to identify these effects at the individual level in survey data have proven disappointing. Jacobson and Kernell suggest that presidential popularity and economic indicators affect the decisions of potential candidates for the House, who must decide whether to run by the spring of the election year. Strong potential challengers to incumbents of the same party as the president are more likely to run when the approval ratings and economic indicators are poor; strong potential challengers to incumbents of the opposite party are spurred to contest when the indicators are positive. Under differing circumstances, then, the parties recruit strong or weak crops of nonincumbents. It is the characteristics and behavior of these nonincumbents which explain the aggregate correlations of presidential popularity and economic conditions to electoral results.

The model did a good job of predicting the results of congressional elections through 1980, but in 1982 the Republicans fared con- siderably better than the model predicted. (See Jacobson and Kernell, 1982, however, for a prediction of this result.) In an epilogue in their sec-

LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, XII, 4, November 1987 565



Clyde Wilcox

ond edition (1983), the authors suggest that the actions of the national party organizations may affect the timing of the strategic decisions of nonincumbents. In particular, they argued that the Republican party organizations in 1981 recruited strong challengers earlier than had previously been the norm. Since the president's popularity and economic indicators were more positive at that point, many Republicans made the decision to run before the full implications of the economic recession had become apparent. Although this explanation makes some intuitive sense, the authors present no data to support their claim.

Indeed, the timing of strategic decisions has been discussed with a relative paucity of data. Born (1986) argues that "the assumption that the first part of an election year is the crucial period for making candidacy decisions is itself questionable. No systematic evidence is sup- plied" (p. 600). Indeed, the only relevant data are either dated (Huckshorn and Spencer, 1971) or based on the responses of a small subset of nonincumbent candidates (Maisel, 1982).1

Data are available to examine the timing of strategic decisions of nonincumbents. When candidates for federal office have raised or spent at least $5,000, they are required by law to file statements of candidacy with the Federal Election Commission. The dynamics of the presidential campaign often lead contenders to delay this filing by conducting activi- ties under the auspices of PACs or foundations, but no similar incentives exist for House candidates.2

The date on which the candidate filed his or her statement of candidacy is probably somewhat later than the date on which he or she actually decided to run for office. Since a nonincumbent must begin to raise money immediately to mount a serious campaign, however, the lag will in most cases be small.3 Moreover, this measure of the timing of candidacy decisions may be more valid than a recalled self-report. Can- didates who agonize over their decision may decide to run, then change their mind on one or more occasions. These candidates may recall the date of their first decision or the date on which they ceased to vacillate. A behavior measure, with a concrete measure of timing, may be preferable to the vagaries of recall.

The Timing of Strategic Decisions

This paper will examine the dates on which candidates filed statements of candidacy with the Federal Election Commission during the 1981-1982 and the 1983-1984 election cycles. All nonincumbents who filed statements for each of the given cycles are included in the analysis.4 To ease the discussion, filing dates will be grouped into four categories:

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Candidacy Decisions

TABLE 1 Timing of Decision to Run, 1982 and 1984

(in percentages)

Filing of Statement of Candidacy

During Year Before January or March or June to

Candidates Election Year February April October N

All Nonincumbents

1982 21.8 15.3 37.4 25.6 859 1984 23.0 17.6 36.4 23.0 731

All Major Party Nonincumbents in General Election

1982 20.0 15.1 37.0 27.8 370 1984 17.9 16.5 37.9 27.6 340

Source: Federal Election Commission records.

the year prior to the election year, January or February of the election year, March or April of the election year, and June through October of the election year. Table 1 presents the filing dates of all nonincumbents in the 1982 and 1984 House elections and those for major party nonincumbent candidates who actually ran in the general election.

Among all nonincumbents, more than 20% filed statements of candidacy during the year prior to the election year in each election cycle. Over 15% filed statements during the first two months of the election year in both 1982 and 1984. Assuming the average lag between the decision to run and the filing of statements is about a month, this would in- dicate that well over a third of the candidates in both cycles made their decisions significantly earlier than the spring of the election year. Slightly more than a third of the candidates in both elections filed statements during March and April, and nearly a quarter filed in June or later.

These results might be skewed by the large number of third party and independent candidates who, lacking any realistic prospect of winning, are free to disregard the strategic environment. To eliminate the in- fluence of these candidates, Table 1 also provides separate information on those nonincumbents who are major party candidates in the general election. These candidates, who have won their parties' nomination, should have been more clearly influenced by their strategic environment. Among these candidates, however, the distribution of filing dates is quite similar to that for all nonincumbents.

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Clyde Wilcox

TABLE 2 Timing of Decision to Run by Serious Candidates, 1982 and 1984

(in percentages)


During Year Indicator of Before January or March or June to Serious Candidacy Election Year February April October N

Campaign Receipts

over $100,000 1982 20.6 20.6 45.5 13.2 121 1984 21.6 17.6 51.0 9.8 51

over $250,000 1982 27.1 27.1 40.7 5.1 59 1984 32.0 26.0 36.0 6.0 50

over $400,000 1982 51.2 16.3 30.2 2.3 43 1984 45.3 30.2 22.6 1.9 53

Strength at Polls

40 to 44%0 of Vote 1982 20.0 16.9 41.5 21.5 65 1984 26.9 19.2 40.4 13.5 52

45% or More of Vote 1982 25.2 21.7 42.6 10.4 115 1984 34.6 27.2 29.6 8.6 81


The Timing of Strategic Decisions of Serious Candidates

These findings might also be skewed by the inclusion of candidates who have little serious chance of winning. Perennial challengers to safe incumbents may file early in the cycle, and the party may recruit a sacrificial lamb late in the cycle to challenge an invulnerable incumbent. An analysis of only serious candidates might produce different results. Table 2 presents the data for candidates who meet criteria for identifying serious candidates. Since serious candidates should be more successful in fundraising than others, this table categorizes major party candidates in the general election by the total receipts of their campaigns. In addition, those candidates who showed some strength at the polls are examined, with those who received between 40% and 44% of the vote differentiated from those who received over 45%.

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Candidacy Decisions

The results suggest that serious candidates are more likely to decide to run early in the election cycle. The relationship between the timing of candidacy decisions and receipts is clear, with around half of those candidates who raised at least $400,000 in both election cycles filing statements during the year prior to the election year. Although the relationship between electoral success and the timing of candidacy decisions is not as strong, it is still quite clear. Around half of those who garnered 45% or more of the general election vote had filed statements of candidacy by the end of February in the election year; only one in ten filed statements after May. In both cases, late filers are almost exclu- sively found in the party favored by the strategic environment. As the election year unfolds, incumbents previously considered safe may shift to the vulnerable category. Democrats in 1982 might enter a campaign late and do well, and Republicans in 1984 could also occasionally mount credible campaigns in a short period.

In general, these data support Jacobson and Kernell's model. Serious nonincumbent candidates decide to run early in the election cycle, when the indicators may be quite different from those at the time of the election. In 1982 and 1984 these decisions occurred somewhat earlier than the spring of the election year, however. Around half the serious candidates (as defined by either measure) had filed statements by the end of February of the election year. Indeed, in 1984 75% of candidates who raised over $400,000 and 62% of those who received over 45% of the vote had filed statements before March. Moreover, although the differences are not statistically significant, the mean date of filing was earlier in 1984 than in 1982. This is somewhat evident in the data in Table 2. Between 1982 and 1984, the percentage of serious candidates who filed prior to March of the election year grew from 66% to 75% among those who raised more than $400,000 and from 47% to 62% among those who received more than 45% of the vote. Although two cases do not make a trend, it will be interesting to see whether candidacy decisions are made even earlier in the next few elections.5

Partisan Differences in the Timing of Strategic Decisions

As noted above, Jacobson and Kernell argue that an organized recruiting effort by the Republicans in 1982 resulted in earlier decisions by a group of quality challengers. These candidates might have demurred had they made their decisions later in the spring, when the full implications of the recession were becoming apparent. Table 3 breaks down the decision times of the nonincumbent major party candidates in the general election by party, for all such candidates and for those who

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Clyde Wilcox

TABLE 3 Timing of Decision to Run, 1982 and 1984, by Party

(in percentages)


During Year Before January or March or June to

Candidates Election Year February April October N

All Candidates in General Election

Democrats 1982 14.7 16.3 39.5 30.5 190 1984 17.0 15.0 42.5 26.1 153

Republicans 1982 25.5 13.9 34.4 25.0 180 1984 18.7 17.6 34.2 28.9 187

Candidates Receiving 45% or More of Vote in General Election

Democrats 1982 22.2 23.5 43.8 11.1 81 1984 38.5 19.2 30.1 11.5 26

Republicans 1982 32.4 17.6 41.2 8.8 34 1984 32.7 30.1 29.1 7.3 55


garnered 45% or more of the general election vote. The data tend to con- firm Jacobson and Kernell's assertion. Among all major party nonincumbents in the general election, the Republicans were significantly more likely to have filed statements of candidacy in the year prior to the election year. This difference was mirrored among candidates who received at least 45% of the vote, with nearly a third of Republican nonincumbents in this category filing during the off-year.

During the 1984 cycle, however, the partisan difference seems to have disappeared. Indeed, among nonincumbents who received at least 45% of the vote, Democrats were more likely than Republicans to have filed for election during the year prior to the election year. This difference was not due to later decisions by serious Republican nonincumbents but far more early decisions by Democratic nonincumbents than in 1984.

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Candidacy Decisions

Conclusions

Although the model of congressional elections described by Jacobson and Kernell has attracted considerable attention, to date there has been little empirical evidence on the timing of the strategic decisions of potential candidates. This paper has presented data which suggest that most potential candidates do indeed decide to run for office by the spring of the election year, as Jacobson and Kernell suggest. During the 1982 and 1984 elections, however, more than half the serious nonincumbent candidates decided before the beginning of March of the election year.

The data hint at a trend towards earlier decisions by serious candidates. If confirmed by data from future election cycles, such a trend might be explained by stronger recruiting efforts by the parties or by the growing awareness among serious candidates that successful fundraising may require many months of effort. The results of this study suggest that the indicators used in the Jacobson and Kernell model to predict candidacy decisions-presidential popularity and economic conditions-should perhaps be based on earlier data, perhaps from the off- year.

Clyde Wilcox is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 20057.

NOTES

I would like to thank Bob Biersack, Elizabeth Cook, and anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. The data for this study were made available by the Federal Election Commission.

1. In addition to his in-depth interviews, Maisel surveyed nonincumbents, but the return rate of 30% is not impressive. His work is nevertheless worthy of serious attention because of the extraordinary richness of insight it contains.

2. In a few cases, Senate candidates will form exploratory committees to "test the waters." These committees are rare, and can usually be easily identified. In the House, however, such committees are virtually nonexistent.

3. This is most likely to be true for serious candidates. Although it is impossible to estimate accurately the lag between the actual decision to run and the filing of the statement of candidacy, the lag may not be important to this analysis. The principle finding of this study, that candidates file statements significantly earlier than the literature suggests, is true regardless of the length of the lag time. In fact, longer lag times would make this finding even more true.

4. Candidates who did not file statements of candidacy or who were involved in special elections were excluded from this analysis. The number of excluded candidates was approximately 70 in each cycle.

5. A trend towards earlier decisions would be consistent with our understanding of the dynamics of campaign finance. The analogy to earlier activity among presidential hopefuls may also be applicable.

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REFERENCES

Born, Richard. 1986. Strategic Politicians and Unresponsive Voters. American Political Science Review, 80:599-612.

Huckshorn, Robert, and Robert Spencer. 1971. The Politics of Defeat: Campaigning for Congress. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press.

Jacobson, Gary, and Samuel Kernell. 1981; 2d ed., 1983. Strategy and Choice in Con- gressional Elections. New Haven: Yale University Press.

_ . 1982. Strategy and Choice in the 1982 Congressional Elections. PS, 15:423-430. Maisel, Louis. 1982. From Obscurity to Oblivion: Running in the Congressional Primary.

Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.



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The Timing of Strategic Decisions: Candidacy Decisions in 1982 and 1984