The Third Reich in Power, 1933-1939 by Richard J. EvansReview by: Stanley HoffmannForeign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 2005), pp. 144-145Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20031804 .

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rights revolution, we needed a new Lincoln-a figure on the steps of whose monument Martin Luther King, Jr., could redefine the American dream as a dream of racial equality. Lind obstinately and perversely insists on looking for the Lincoln of history rather than for the Lin coln of faith. What he finds is a very annoying Lincoln more like Mark Hanna than John Brown: a protectionist and a racialist whose antislavery passion was linked to a pro-big-business agenda and a broad political drive to reserve the Amer ican West for whites only. Some historians have denounced Lind for failing to recog nize an evolution in Lincoln's racial views in the closing months of his life. Perhaps,

but Lincoln's plans for a quick and mild Reconstruction and his continuing contacts with Southern white leaders linked to Henry Clay's old Whig Party underline the degree to which Lincoln still seemed to find inspiration in Clay's vision as he struggled with the problem of rebuilding a union tested and divided by a bitter Civil War.

Western Europe STANLEY HOFFMANN

Postwar:A History ofEurope Since 1945. BY TONY JUDT. Penguin Press, 2005,

960 pp. $37.95. Nobody is more qualified than Judt to combine serious descriptive history with incisive, original political analysis, to cover

both western and eastern Europe, and to pass stinging yet informed judgments on the behavior and evasions, the deeds and the failings, of his subjects. He gives a very fine picture of the Stalinized half

of the continent; a sympathetic account of the 1960s, which put an end to "a 180-year cycle of ideological politics in Europe"; and a virtuoso account of the policies of the European Community. He calls

Gorbachev a victim of "the scale of the contradictions" his attempt at a "controlled revolution" aroused and describes movingly the longing for "returning to Europe" in the Eastern Europe of 1989. Nor does he believe that Washington "brought down" communism: it "imploded of its own accord." In describing a Europe no longer divided by the Iron Curtain, Judt notes the decline of the intellectuals and wide spread nostalgia. And yet he sees the emergence of "Europe as a way of life," as a continent where the state remains central. He concludes with a moving piece on the Holocaust, an "essay on modern European memory." This monu mental work is a tour de force and here "tour de force" must remain in French, despite Judt's remarks on the decline of the French language.

The ThirdReich in Power, 1933-1939. BY RICHARD J. EVANS. Penguin Press,

2005, 800 pp. $37.95. The second of a three-volume history of the Third Reich, Evans' new book is a

masterly and exhaustive account of the transformation of Germany by the Nazi regime as Hitler prepared the nation for

war. Nazism, in Evans' view, was not a new religion, but rather a militaristic enterprise. He rejects the argument that because the terror only affected small minorities, the regime did not primarily rely on terror as a mode of control-it "intimidated Germans into acquiescence."

Yet its main goal was "to rouse [the

population] into positive, enthusiastic

[144] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume84No. 6

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endorsement" of Nazi ideals and policies hence the vital importance of propaganda and the reduction of art to an instrument of propaganda. Anti-Semitism became "a principle governing private life as well as public" after September 1935, and Evans describes eloquently what this meant. He concludes, however, that "above all ... it

was the Nazis' nationalism that won peo ple's support; and it was Hitler who set the pace towards his ultimate goal: 'war."'

This is a most impressive study-and an endlessly distressing one.

Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic RelationsAfter the Iraq War. EDITED BY DANIEL LEVY, MAX

PENSKY, AND JOHN TORPEY. Verso, 2005, 231 pp. $75.oo (paper, $23.00).

Beyond Paradise and Power. Europe, America, and the Future ofa Troubled Partnershbip. EDITED BY TOD LINDBERG. Routledge, 2004, 224 pp. $85.00 (paper, $19.95).

These two collections of essays examine the rift between the United States and its European allies, caused by the new foreign policy of the Bush administration and the war in Iraq. The Levy, Pensky, and Torpey collection begins with the 2003 "manifesto" ofJiirgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida and gathers short pieces published in European newspapers (with the bizarre exception of French ones).

The collection edited by Lindberg is a set of longer pieces, comments on or re sponses to Robert Kagan's famous essay on power and weakness-on Martian (that is, martial) America and Venusian Europe.

Two or three years after these pieces were written, most do not seem as impres sive as they may have when they first came out. On the European side, the clash

between Washington and "old Europe" has not become a permanent cleavage, and the Europeans have spent far more time trying to rearrange their own house than denouncing their ally. The responses to Habermas and Derrida show a very broad range of reactions, misgivings, worries, and hesitations and convey a strong sense of collective impotence. The longer pieces in the Lindberg volume have the merit of showing that Kant was not as unrealistic as Kagan suggested and that the two sides of the Atlantic will continue to need each other. In the house of transatlantic relations, there was a genuinely damaging fire, but there was even more smoke and more coughing than actual burns.

The Idea ofa European Superstate: Public Justfication andEuropean Integration. BY GLYN MORGAN. Princeton University Press, 2005, 204 pp. $29.95.

This well-written, well-argued, and challenging essay offers both a strong contribution to the debate about the shape of European integration and an argument for the relevance of political philosophy to international relations. Morgan tries to establish what kind of Europe best fuilfills the requirements of "public justification."

He settles on three components of a democratic standard of justification: a requirement of publicity (arguments "must appeal to reasons that all suitably situated Europeans could accept"), a requirement of accessibility (arguments "must be un derstandable by ordinary people"), and a requirement of sufficiency (arguments

must show that a federal European politics "provides an effective and efficient protec tion for the goods or benefits that purport to justify its existence"). Morgan moves

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