The Theory of Multiple Intelligences - IMI Infinity · CHAPTER 24 The Theory of Multiple Intelligences Katie Davis, Joanna Christodoulou, Scott Seider, and Howard Gardner Part 1:

CHAPTER 24

The Theory of Multiple Intelligences

Katie Davis, Joanna Christodoulou, Scott Seider,and Howard Gardner

Part 1: Background

The theory of multiple intelligences, devel-oped by psychologist Howard Gardner inthe late 1970s and early 1980s, posits thatindividuals possess eight or more relativelyautonomous intelligences. Individuals drawon these intelligences, individually and cor-porately, to create products and solve prob-lems that are relevant to the societiesin which they live (Gardner, 1983, 1993,1999, 2006b, 2006c). The eight identi-fied intelligences include linguistic intel-ligence, logical-mathematical intelligence,spatial intelligence, musical intelligence,bodily-kinesthetic intelligence, naturalisticintelligence, interpersonal intelligence, andintrapersonal intelligence (Gardner, 1999).According to Gardner’s analysis, only twointelligences – linguistic and logical mathe-matical – have been valued and tested for inmodern secular schools; it is useful to thinkof that language-logic combination as “aca-demic” or “scholarly intelligence.” In con-ceiving of intelligence as multiple ratherthan unitary in nature, the theory of mul-tiple intelligences – hereafter MI theory –

represents a departure from traditional con-ceptions of intelligence first formulated inthe early 20th century, measured today byIQ tests, and studied in great detail by Piaget(1950, 1952) and other cognitively orientedpsychologists.

As described elsewhere in this volume,French psychologist Alfred Binet (Binet &Simon, 1911; Binet & Simon, 1916) designedthe precursor to the modern-day intel-ligence test in the early 1900s to iden-tify French schoolchildren in need of spe-cial educational interventions. Binet’s scale,along with the contemporaneous workof English psychologist Charles Spearman(1904, 1927) on general intelligence or g,served as the principal catalysts for con-ceiving of all forms of intellectual activityas stemming from a unitary or general abil-ity for problem solving (Perkins & Tishman,2001). Within academic psychology, Spear-man’s theory of general intelligence (org) remains the predominant conception ofintelligence (Brody, 2004; Deary et al., 2007;Jensen, 2008) and the basis for more than70 IQ tests in circulation (e.g., Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales Fifth Edition, 2003;

485

486 KATIE DAVIS, JOANNA CHRISTODOULOU, SCOTT SEIDER, AND HOWARD GARDNER

Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales ThirdEdition, 2008). MI theory, in contrast, assertsthat individuals who demonstrate a particu-lar aptitude in one intelligence will not nec-essarily demonstrate a comparable aptitudein another intelligence (Gardner, 2006b). Forexample, an individual may possess a profileof intelligences that is high in spatial intelli-gence but moderate or low in interpersonalintelligence or vice versa. This conceptionof intelligence as multiple rather than sin-gular forms the primary distinction betweenMI theory and the conception of intelligencethat dominates Western psychological the-ory and much of common discourse.

A second key distinction concerns the ori-gins of intelligence. While some contem-porary scholars have asserted that intelli-gence is influenced by environmental factors(Diamond & Hopson, 1998; Lucas, Morley,& Cole, 1998; Neisser et al., 1996; Nisbett,2009), many proponents of the concept ofgeneral intelligence conceive of intelligenceas an innate trait with which one is born andwhich one can therefore do little to change(Eysenck, 1994; Herrnstein & Murray,1994; Jensen, 1980, 1998). In contrast, MI the-ory conceives of intelligence as a combina-tion of heritable potentials and skills thatcan be developed in diverse ways throughrelevant experiences (Gardner, 1983). Forexample, one individual might be born witha high intellectual potential in the bodily-kinesthetic sphere that allows him or her tomaster the intricate steps of a ballet per-formance with relative ease. For anotherindividual, achieving similar expertise inthe domain of ballet requires many addi-tional hours of study and practice. Bothindividuals are capable of becoming strongperformers – experts – in a domain thatdraws on their bodily-kinesthetic intelli-gence; however, the pathways along whichthey travel to become strong performersmay well differ quantitatively (in terms ofspeed) and perhaps qualitatively (in terms ofprocess).

MI theory is neither the sole challengerto Spearman’s (1904, 1927) conception ofgeneral intelligence nor the only theoryto conceive of intelligence as pluralistic.

Among others, Thorndike (1920; Thorndike,Bregman, Cobb, & Woodyard, 1927) con-ceived of intelligence as the sum ofthree parts: abstract intelligence, mechan-ical intelligence, and social intelligence.Thurstone (1938, Thurstone & Thurstone,1941) argued that intelligence could betterbe understood as consisting of seven pri-mary abilities. Guilford (1967; Guilford &Hoepfner, 1971) conceptualized intelligenceas consisting of four content categories, fiveoperational categories, and six product cate-gories; he ultimately proposed 150 differentintellectual faculties. Sternberg (1985, 1990)offered a triarchic theory of intelligence thatidentified analytic, creative, and practicalintelligences. Finally, Ceci (1990, 1996) hasdescribed multiple cognitive potentials thatallow for knowledge to be acquired and rela-tionships between concepts and ideas to beconsidered.

Gardner’s theory of multiple intelli-gences, however, is perhaps the best knownof these pluralistic theories. This notorietyis due, in part, to the sources of evidenceon which Gardner drew, and, in part, toits enthusiastic embrace by the educationalcommunity (Armstrong, 1994; Kornhaber,1999; Shearer, 2004). Many hundreds ofschools across the globe have incorporatedMI principles into their mission, curriculum,and pedagogy; and hundreds of books havebeen written (in numerous languages) on therelevance of MI theory to educators and edu-cational institutions (Chen, Moran, & Gard-ner, 2009). In 2005, a 10-acre “science experi-ence park” opened in Sonderberg, Denmark,with more than 50 different exhibits throughwhich participants can explore their ownprofile of intelligences (Danfoss Universe,2007). In what follows, we outline the majorclaims of this far-reaching theory as well assome of the adjustments to the theory madeover the past 25 years.

It should be pointed out that Gard-ner’s conceptualization of multiple intelli-gence does not belong exclusively to Gard-ner; other scholars and practitioners havemade numerous applications of the prin-cipal tenets, sometimes with little regardfor Gardner’s own claims. In this chapter,

THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES 487

however, we focus principally on MI theoryand practices as put forth by Gardner.

Gardner’s (1983, 1999) conception ofintelligence as pluralistic grew out of hisobservation that individuals who demon-strated substantial talent in domains asdiverse as chess, music, athletics, politics,and entrepreneurship possessed capacitiesin these domains that should be accountedfor in conceptualizing intelligence. Accord-ingly, in developing MI theory and itsbroader characterization of intelligence,Gardner did not focus on the creation andinterpretation of psychometric instruments.Rather, he drew upon research findings fromevolutionary biology, neuroscience, anthro-pology, psychometrics, and psychologicalstudies of prodigies and savants. Throughsynthesis of relevant research across thesefields, Gardner established several criteriafor identification of a unique intelligence(see Table 24.1).

Drawing on these criteria, Gardner ini-tially identified seven intelligences. How-ever, in the mid-1990s, he concluded that aneighth intelligence, naturalistic intelligence,met the criteria for identification as an intel-ligence as well (see Table 24.2). Naturalis-tic intelligence allows individuals to identifyand distinguish among products of the nat-ural world such as animals, plants, types ofrocks, and weather patterns (Gardner, 1999).Meteorology, botany, and zoology are allprofessions in which one would likely findindividuals who demonstrate high levels ofnaturalistic intelligence. In a world wherethis particular skill is less important for sur-vival than it was in earlier times, naturalis-tic capacities are brought to bear in makingconsequential distinctions with respect toman-made objects displayed in a consumersociety.

These descriptions of the eight intelli-gences that comprise MI theory relied uponthe domains or disciplines in which one typi-cally finds individuals who demonstrate highlevels of each intelligence. This is becausewe do not yet have psychometric or neu-roimaging techniques that directly assess anindividual’s capacity for a particular intelli-gence. For example, no test has been devised

Table 24.1. Criteria for Identification of anIntelligence

� It should be seen in relative isolation inprodigies, autistic savants, stroke victims, orother exceptional populations. In otherwords, certain individuals shoulddemonstrate particularly high or low levels ofa particular capacity in contrast to othercapacities.

� It should have a distinct neuralrepresentation – that is, its neural structureand functioning should be distinguishablefrom that of other major human faculties.

� It should have a distinct developmentaltrajectory. That is, different intelligencesshould develop at different rates and alongpaths which are distinctive.

� It should have some basis in evolutionarybiology. In other words, an intelligence oughtto have a previous instantiation in primate orother species and putative survival value.

� It should be susceptible to capture in symbolsystems, of the sort used in formal orinformal education.

� It should be supported by evidence frompsychometric tests of intelligence.

� It should be distinguishable from otherintelligences through experimentalpsychological tasks.

� It should demonstrate a core,information-processing system. That is, thereshould be identifiable mental processes thathandle information related to eachintelligence.

(Gardner 1983; Kornhaber, Fierros, & Veneema,2004)

to assess directly whether an individual pos-sesses a profile of intelligences high in spa-tial intelligence; however, one might reason-ably infer that an individual who demon-strates excellent performance in the domainof architecture or sculpture or geometrypossesses high spatial intelligence. Likewise,excellence in the domains of ballet or ortho-pedic surgery suggests the possession of highbodily-kinesthetic intelligence. It is possiblethat in the future more direct methods ofmeasuring intelligences may be devised –for example, through evidence about neuralstructures or even through genetic markers.


Table 24.2. Gardner’s Eight Intelligences

Intelligence Description

Linguistic An ability to analyzeinformation and createproducts involving oral andwritten language such asspeeches, books, and memos.

Logical-Mathematical

An ability to develop equationsand proofs, makecalculations, and solveabstract problems.

Spatial An ability to recognize andmanipulate large-scale andfine-grained spatial images.

Musical An ability to produce,remember, and makemeaning of different patternsof sound.

Naturalist An ability to identify anddistinguish among differenttypes of plants, animals, andweather formations that arefound in the natural world.

Bodily-Kinesthetic

An ability to use one’s ownbody to create products orsolve problems.

Interpersonal An ability to recognize andunderstand other people’smoods, desires, motivations,and intentions.

Intrapersonal An ability to recognize andunderstand one’s own moods,desires, motivations, andintentions.

In the 25-year history of the theory,numerous researchers have proposed addi-tional intelligences that range from moralintelligence to humor intelligence to cook-ing intelligence (Boss, 2005; Goleman, 1995).Gardner (2006b) himself has speculatedabout an existential intelligence that reflectsan individual’s capacity for considering “bigquestions” about life, death, love, and being.Individuals with high levels of this hypoth-esized intelligence might likely be found inphilosophy departments, religious seminar-ies, or the ateliers of artists. To date, how-ever, naturalistic intelligence has been the

only definitive addition to the original setof seven intelligences. In Gardner’s judg-ment, neither existential intelligence nor anyof the other proposed intelligences suffi-ciently meet the criteria for identificationas a unique intelligence (a discussion of thereliability of these criteria in identifying can-didate intelligences is offered in Part 2 ofthis chapter). In future years, new proposedintelligences might be found to meet thecriteria for identification as a unique intel-ligence (Battro & Denham, 2007; Chen &Gardner, 2005). Conversely, future researchmay reveal that existing intelligences suchas linguistic intelligence are more accuratelyconceived of as several subintelligences.These inevitable adjustments and adapta-tions of MI theory, however, are less impor-tant than the theory’s overarching principle:namely, that intelligence is better conceivedof as multiple and content-specific ratherthan unitary and general.

In describing intelligence(s) as pluralistic,MI theory conceives of individuals as pos-sessing a profile of intelligences in whichthey demonstrate varying levels of strengthsand weakness for each of the eight intelli-gences. It is a misstatement within the MIframework, then, to characterize an individ-ual as possessing “no” capacity for a particu-lar intelligence (Gardner, 1999). Individualsmay certainly demonstrate low levels of aparticular intelligence, but, except in casesinvolving severe congenital or acquired braindamage, all individuals possess the full rangeof intelligences. It would be equally inac-curate within the MI framework, however,to assert that everyone demonstrates supe-riority or giftedness in at least one of theintelligences (Gardner, 1999). As a pluralis-tic theory, the fundamental assertion of MItheory is that individuals do demonstratevariation in their levels of strength and weak-ness across the intelligences. Unfortunately,this variation does not mean that every indi-vidual will necessarily demonstrate superioraptitude in one or more of the intelligences.

After 25 years of reflection on the theory,Gardner accentuates two primary claims:(1) All individuals possess the full range of


intelligences – the intelligences are whatdefine human beings, cognitively speaking;(2) no two individuals, not even identicaltwins, exhibit precisely the same profile ofintellectual strengths and weaknesses. Theseconstitute the principal scientific claims ofthe theory; educational or other practicalimplications go beyond the scope of the the-ory, in a strict sense.

Part 2: Review of Issues andPseudo-Issues Spawned bythe Theory

During the years since its inception, MI the-ory has drawn considerable attention, pri-marily from psychologists and educators.The attention has come in many forms, fromscholarly critiques regarding the develop-ment, scope, and empirical basis of the the-ory, to educational curricula that claim todevelop children’s intelligences in an opti-mal way. This attention has led to newdevelopments in the theory and promis-ing practical applications in the classroom.Yet, several reviews and critiques of MI the-ory reveal misunderstandings regarding itsempirical foundation and theoretical con-ception of human cognition. In this section,we use these misunderstandings as a spring-board for exploring the theory in greaterdepth, with the purpose of illuminating itsmajor claims and conceptual contours.

The Foundation and Provinceof MI Theory

Some critics of MI theory argue that it isnot grounded in empirical research and can-not, therefore, be proved or disproved onthe basis of new empirical findings (Water-house, 2006; White, 2006). In fact, MI the-ory is based entirely on empirical findings.The intelligences were identified on the basisof hundreds of empirical studies spanningmultiple disciplines (Gardner, 1983, 1993;Gardner & Moran, 2006). Noted, too, isthe relative lack of empirical studies specif-ically designed to test the theory as a whole

(Visser, Ashton, & Vernon, 2006). Like otherbroad theories, such as evolution or platetectonics, which synthesize experimental,observational, and theoretical work, MI the-ory cannot be proved or disproved on thebasis of a single test or experiment. Rather, itgains or loses credibility as findings accumu-late over time. Indeed, subsequent findingshave prompted ongoing review and revi-sions of MI theory, such as the additionof new intelligences and the conceptualiza-tion of intelligence profiles. Much of theempirical work conducted since 1983 lendssupport to various aspects of the theory.For instance, studies on children’s theory ofmind and the identification of pathologiesthat involve losing a sense of social judgmentprovide strong evidence for a distinct inter-personal intelligence (Gardner, 1993; Gard-ner, Feldman & Krechevsky, 1998a, 1998b,1998c; Malkus, Feldman, & Gardner, 1988;Ramos-Ford, Feldman, & Gardner, 1988).

Relatively few critiques of MI theory haveaddressed the criteria used to identify andevaluate a candidate intelligence. This stateof affairs is somewhat unexpected, sincethe criteria serve as the theory’s foundation.Moreover, by drawing on cross-disciplinarysources of evidence, the criteria representa pioneering effort to broaden the wayin which human intellectual capacities areidentified and evaluated. White (2006) is oneof the few scholars to question this effort. Hesuggests that the selection and applicationof the criteria is a subjective – and there-fore flawed – process. A psychologist witha different intellectual biography, he argues,would have arrived at a different set of cri-teria and, consequently, a different set ofintelligences.

The professional training that precededMI theory no doubt played an important rolein its formulation. We do not argue the factof this influence, simply its effect. MI theoryis the product of several years spent examin-ing human cognition through several disci-plinary lenses, including psychology, sociol-ogy, neurology, biology, and anthropology,as well as the arts and humanities. The cri-teria that emerged from this examination


formed the basis of a systematic investiga-tion of candidate faculties. Thus, in con-trast to White’s depiction of an idiosyn-cratic process marked by one researcher’sintellectual preoccupations, the identifica-tion and application of the criteria representa systematic and comprehensive approachto the study of human intelligence. More-over, any attempt to pluralize intelligenceinevitably involves either an agreed-uponstopping point (an acceptance of the crite-rion as stated) or an infinite regress (whatstimulated this criterion rather than anothercriterion?). Nonetheless, White is correctthat ultimately the ascertainment of whatis, or is not, a separate intelligence involvesa synthesizing frame of mind (Gardner,2006a), if not a certain degree of subjectivity.

Many critiques of MI theory pay scantattention to the criteria and focus insteadon the level of analysis used to classifyhuman intellectual faculties. Some schol-ars argue that the eight intelligences arenot specific enough. Indeed, findings fromneuroscience lend support to the call forincreased specificity in the classification ofintellectual capacities. As Gardner pointedout in the original publications (Gardner,1983, 1993), it is likely that musical intel-ligence comprises several subintelligencesrelating to various dimensions of music,such as rhythm, harmony, melody, andtimbre. An analogous comment can bestated for each of the other intelligences.In fact, one test of MI theory would bewhether the subintelligences within eachintelligence correlate more highly with eachother than they correlate with subintelli-gences within other intelligences. Were theclassification of intelligences expanded toinclude such specific faculties, however, thenumber would quickly become unwieldyand virtually untranslatable to educators. Atthe other extreme are those scholars whoclaim that MI theory expands the defini-tion of intelligence to such a degree thatit is no longer a useful construct. Gard-ner has argued elsewhere that a concept ofintelligence that is yoked to linguistic andlogical-mathematical capacities is too nar-row and fails to capture the wide range

of human intellectual functioning (Gardner,1993; Gardner & Moran, 2006). MI theoryseeks a middle ground between an innumer-able set of highly specific intelligences, onthe one hand, and a single, all-purpose intel-ligence, on the other.

The description of individuals in termsof several relatively independent computa-tional capacities would seem to put MI the-ory at odds with g (psychometricians’ termfor general intelligence). Willingham (2004)argues that a theory of intelligence that doesnot include g is inconsistent with existingpsychometric data. These data, consistingtypically of correlations between scores on aseries of oral questions or paper-and-pencilinstruments, do provide considerable evi-dence for the existence of g. They do not,however, provide insight into the scope ofg, or its usefulness as a construct. NeitherWillingham nor other “geocentric” theoristshave yet provided a satisfactory definitionfor g. One might argue that g is merely thecommon factor that underlies the set of tasksdevised by psychologists in their attempt topredict scholastic success. Perhaps g mea-sures speed or flexibility of response; capac-ity to follow instructions; or motivation tosucceed at an artificial, decontextualizedtask. None of these possibilities necessarilyplaces g at odds with MI theory – and indeedGardner has never denied the existence orutility of g for certain analytic purposes. Thecurrent perseveration on g does, however,suggest a narrowness that fails to captureadequately the broad range of human cog-nition. Just how much of excellence acrossthe range of intelligences reflects a cur-rent or future version of g is at present notknown.

Delineating the Boundariesof an Intelligence

It is sometimes challenging to draw cleardistinctions between intelligences and otherhuman capacities (Gardner, 2006c). Indeed,even when we have mapped out com-pletely the neurological underpinnings ofthe human mind, the drawing of theseboundaries will probably continue to involve


considerable judgment. At the same time,the undergirding criteria and level of anal-ysis of MI theory can be usefully employedto draw a number of key distinctions. Forinstance, since intelligences operate on spe-cific content (e.g., language, music, theapprehension of other persons), they can beseparated from so-called across the board or“horizontal” capacities like attention, moti-vation, and cognitive style. Whereas thesegeneral capacities are thought to applyacross a range of situations, the “vertical”intelligences are used by individuals to makesense of specific content, information, orobjects in the world. Thus, while attentionis required to engage in any type of intel-lectual work and motivation is needed tosustain and enhance it, attention and moti-vation remain separate from the operation ofan intelligence. Moreover, it is possible thatan individual may be quite attentive and/ormotivated with respect to one kind of con-tent and much less so with respect to othercontents.

Similarly, an individual’s cognitive style(sometimes referred to as a learning or work-ing style) is not tied to specific content inthe same way as is an intelligence (Gardner,1995). A cognitive style putatively denotesthe general manner in which an individ-ual approaches cognitive tasks. For instance,where one person may approach a range ofsituations with careful deliberation, anotherperson may respond more intuitively. Incontrast, the operation of an intelligenceentails the computation of specific contentin the world (such as phonemes, numericalpatterns, or musical sounds). A closer lookat individuals’ cognitive styles may revealcontent-specificity. For instance, a studentwho approaches a chemistry experiment in amethodical and deliberative manner may beless reflective when practicing the piano orwriting an essay. By the same token, individ-uals bring to bear different styles dependingon the intelligence or group of intelligencesthey are using. The key distinction is thatone can bring either a deliberative or intu-itive style to the interpretation of a poem,but there is no question that some degree oflinguistic intelligence will be needed.

Indeed, in an illuminating discussion ofthe relation between style and intelligence,Silver and Strong (1997) suggest that anintrovert strong in linguistic intelligencemight become a poet, while an extrovertwith comparable linguistic competence ismore likely to become a debater. This obser-vation also highlights the fact that there isnot a one-to-one correspondence betweenspecific types of content and the intelli-gences. Writing a poem and engaging in adebate are two distinct activities that eachdraw on linguistic intelligence. Moreover, itis not the case that a skilled debater will nec-essarily be a successful poet. In addition tousing linguistic intelligence, a debater mayemploy logical-mathematical intelligence tostructure a coherent argument, whereas apoet may draw on musical intelligence tocompose a sonnet. Other factors besidesintelligence, such as motivation, personality,and will power, will likely prove influential,as well.

Other putative general capacities, likememory and critical thinking, may not be sogeneral, either. For instance, we know thatindividuals draw on different types of mem-ory for different purposes. Episodic memoryenables us to remember particular eventslike a high school graduation or wedding,whereas procedural memory allows us torecall how to drive a car or knit a scarf. Thesedifferent types of memory draw on differentneural systems of the brain. Neuropsycho-logical evidence documents that memory forone type of content, such as language, canbe separated from memory for other typesof content, such as music, shapes, move-ment, and so on (Gardner, 2006b). Simi-larly, the kind of critical thinking requiredto edit a book is certainly different fromthe kind of critical thinking required to bal-ance a budget, plan a dinner party, trans-pose a piece of music, or resolve a domesticconflict.

The understanding that intelligencesoperate on specific content can also helpto distinguish them from sensory sys-tems. Whereas sensory systems are themeans through which the brain receivesinformation from the outside world, the


intelligences have been conceptualized ascomputational systems that make sense ofthat information once it has been received andirrespective of the means of reception. Thus,the senses and the intelligences are inde-pendent systems. The type and quality ofthe information received by a sensory sys-tem determines the intelligence, or set ofintelligences, employed, not the sensory sys-tem itself. Thus, linguistic intelligence canoperate equivalently on language that is per-ceived through eye, ear, or touch. Evenmusical intelligence, which is most closelylinked to a specific sensory system (audi-tion), may be fractionated into informationthat can be obtained via diverse transducers(e.g., rhythm, timbre).

The distinction between an intelligenceand a skill is another common source ofconfusion. Unlike sensory systems, whichprecede intellectual work, skills manifest asa product of such work. More specifically,they are the cognitive performances thatresult from the operation of one or moreintelligences (Gardner & Moran, 2006).Within and across cultures, the types of skillsdisplayed by individuals vary widely, fromcartoon drawing to swimming, from writingcomputer code to navigating ships. Skills acton the external world. As a result, they areshaped by the supports and constraints ofthe environment. Thus, whether an individ-ual’s bodily-kinesthetic and spatial intelli-gences are put to use in swimming or marinenavigation depends on an individual’s accessto a body of water, a willing instructor, andtime for practice. Living in a culture that val-ues the ability to swim or sail (or scuba diveor catch fish) is another influential factor.

Skills can be grouped according to thedomain in which they operate. A domain(a neutral term designed to encompass aprofession, discipline, or craft) is any type oforganized activity in a society in which indi-viduals demonstrate varying levels of exper-tise. A list of domains can readily be gen-erated by considering the broad range ofoccupations in a society, such as lawyer,journalist, dancer, or electrician. (In modernsociety, the yellow pages serve as a conve-nient index of significant domains.) As such,

a domain is a social construct that existsoutside the individual, in society; skills inthat domain can be acquired through variousroutes. An intelligence, on the other hand,is a biopsychological potential that all indi-viduals possess by virtue of being human.

Because some domains have the samename as certain intelligences, they are oftenconflated. However, an individual can, andoften does, draw on several intelligenceswhen performing in a given domain. A suc-cessful musical performance, for example,does not simply depend on musical intelli-gence; bodily-kinesthetic, spatial, and eveninterpersonal and intrapersonal intelligencesare likely at work, as well. By the sametoken, fluent computation of an intelligencedoes not dictate choice of profession; aperson with high interpersonal intelligencemight choose to enter teaching, acting, pub-lic relations, sales, therapy, or the ministry.

Domains are continually being reshapedby the work of creative individuals (Feld-man, 1980). Newton changed the domain ofphysics with his universal law of gravitationand laws of motion, and Einstein reconcep-tualized it again with his theory of relativity.Like intelligences, creativity involves solv-ing problems or fashioning products; how-ever, creativity requires doing so in a novelway. Yet, novelty in itself does not consti-tute creativity. An individual who fashionsa novel product may not necessarily altera domain. Sufficient mastery of a domain isrequired to detect certain anomalies and for-mulate new techniques or ideas that resolvethese anomalies. Since it generally takes 10

years, or several thousand hours, to mastera domain, and several more years to alterit (Hayes, 1989; Simon & Chase, 1973), cre-ativity requires concerted focus and dedica-tion to one domain. For this reason, a personrarely achieves high levels of creativity inmore than one domain. Moreover, individ-uals do not have the final word on theircreativity. According to Csikszentmihalyi(1996), creativity is a communal judgmentthat is ultimately rendered by the gatekeep-ers and practitioners of the domain; there isno statute of limitations as to when thesejudgments are made.


In contrast, the intelligences are useddaily across a variety of domains. In one day,a person may use linguistic intelligence towrite a letter to a friend, read the assem-bly instructions for a piece of furniture, andquestion the fairness of a government pol-icy in a class debate. In developing one ormore intelligences to a high degree, individ-uals become experts in a domain and arereadily recognized as such. It may well bethat individuals who become experts exhibita personality configuration and motivationalstructure quite different from that displayedby creators (Gardner, 1993). For example,creators are likely to take on risks and dealeasily with setbacks, while experts may berisk-averse and aim toward perfection inwell-developed spheres.

In delineating the boundaries of anintelligence, Gardner hesitated to posit anexecutive function (a “central intelligencesagency”) that coordinates the relationshipsamong the intelligences, or between theintelligences and other human capacities(Gardner, 1983, 2006b). The first problemone encounters when considering an exec-utive function is the prospect of infiniteregression: who is in charge of the execu-tive? Further, it is worth noting that manyhuman groups, whether artistic, athletic, orcorporate, follow a decentralized model oforganization and perform effectively with-out an executive whose role it is to coordi-nate and direct behavior. At the same time,neuropsychological evidence suggests thatparticular executive functions, such as self-regulation and planning, are controlled bymechanisms in the frontal lobe. Instead ofviewing such functions as constituting a sep-arate entity that oversees the intelligencesand other human capacities, Gardner andMoran (2007) argue that executive functionsare likely one, clearly vital, emerging compo-nent of intrapersonal intelligence. Definedas the capacity to discern and use informa-tion about oneself, intrapersonal intelligenceengenders a sense of personal coherence intwo ways: by providing understanding ofoneself, or self-awareness; and by regulatinggoal-directed behavior, or executive func-tion. Thus, executive function is that part

of intrapersonal intelligence responsible forplanning and organizing actions in a deliber-ative and strategic way. Viewed in this way,executive function does not form the apexof a hierarchical structure but rather consti-tutes one vital component of an essentiallydecentralized process.

Assessing Candidate Intelligences

Over the years, there have been many callsfor new intelligences to be added to the orig-inal list of seven. Yet, as noted, in morethan 25 years, the list has grown by onlyone (and a possible second). This relativelysmall expansion is partly due to Gardner’sintellectual conservatism; mostly, however,it can be attributed to the failure of can-didate intelligences to meet sufficiently thecriteria for inclusion. For instance, some ofthe proposed intelligences are really generalcapacities that do not operate on specificcontent. Posner’s (2004) “attention intelli-gence” and Luhrmann’s (2006) “absorptionintelligence” fall into this category. Absorp-tion is arguably one component of atten-tion and both are prerequisites for intel-lectual work. It is not evident how eitherone is tied to specific content, informa-tion, or objects in the world. For this rea-son, attention and absorption are perhapsmore properly viewed as components ofthe sensory systems that precede and facili-tate the operation of any one of the intelli-gences.

Artistic intelligence is another candidateintelligence that is not tied to any specificcontent. Since each intelligence can be usedin an artistic or a nonartistic way, it does notmake sense to speak of a separate artisticintelligence. Linguistic intelligence is usedby both playwrights and lawyers, and spa-tial intelligence is used by sculptors andbuilding contractors. Musical intelligencemay be used to compose a symphony, toannounce the arrival of horses onto a racetrack, or to soothe pain in the dental chair.The decision to deploy an intelligence moreor less artistically is left to the individual.The culture in which he or she lives can alsoprove consequential, as cultures vary in the


degree to which they encourage and supportartistic expression.

Candidate intelligences raise additionalconsiderations. Scholars (including Gardnerhimself) have explored the possibility ofa moral intelligence (Boos, 2005; Gardner,1997, 2006b). Morality is clearly an impor-tant component of human society, but itis not clear that it is felicitously describedas an intelligence. MI theory is descriptive,not normative. As computational capacitiesbased in human biology and human psychol-ogy, intelligences can be put to either moralor immoral uses in society. Martin LutherKing, Jr., used his linguistic intelligence tocraft and deliver inspiring speeches aboutthe quest for civil rights through peacefulmeans. In stark contrast, Slobodan Milose-vic used his linguistic intelligence to call forthe subjugation and eventual exterminationof entire groups of people. The two men alsodeployed their interpersonal intelligences indistinct ways. MI theory merely delineatesthe boundaries of biopsychological capaci-ties; the way in which one decides to usethese capacities is a separate matter.

A closer look at another oft-proposedcandidate – humor intelligence – under-scores a second ploy. There is no need to adda new intelligence when it can be explainedthrough a combination of existing intelli-gences. Thus, humor can be seen as a playfulmanipulation of our logical capacity. Come-dians draw on their logical-mathematicalintelligence to turn the logic of everydayexperience on its head. They also employtheir interpersonal intelligence to “read” anaudience and make decisions about the tim-ing of individual jokes and the overall direc-tion of their act. In this way, it is more appro-priate to speak of comedians as exercisinga particular blend of logical-mathematicaland interpersonal intelligences rather thanas displaying separate humor intelligence.In a similar manner, Battro and Denham(2007) make an intriguing case for a digi-tal intelligence, but it is not clear whetheror how digital intelligence can be untan-gled from logical-mathematical intelligence(with a smidgeon of bodily-kinesthetic intel-ligence tacked on).

Cooking is another candidate intelligencethat is more properly viewed as an amalgamof existing intelligences. In preparing a meal,for instance, one might draw on interper-sonal intelligence to decide on a menu thatwill please the guests; linguistic intelligenceto read the recipe; logical-mathematicalintelligence to adjust the ingredient mea-surements for the size of the party; andbodily-kinesthetic intelligence to dice thevegetables, tenderize the meat, and whipthe cream. The preparation of a fine mealmay also draw on the only full-fledged addi-tion to the original list of intelligences: natu-ralist intelligence. Cooks will draw on theirnaturalist intelligence to distinguish amongingredients and perhaps tweak a recipe bycombining ingredients in an unexpectedlyflavorful way. Of course, sensory systemsare important in cooking, but it is the oper-ations performed upon the sensory infor-mation that yields intelligent (or nonintel-ligent!) outcomes.

Part 3: Scholarly Work in the Wakeof MI Theory

Since its inception, the theory of multipleintelligences has been a subject of schol-arly inquiry and educational experimenta-tion. We here examine three major fronts:research, assessment, and educational inter-ventions.

Research

A notable point of departure is the prob-lem of how to decide which research is rel-evant to testing MI theory as it has beendescribed in these pages. Some researchthat is described in MI terms may beirrelevant (e.g., informal and unvalidatedquestionnaires, assessments using paper andpencil or multiple-choice tests alone),whereas research that does not mention MIexplicitly could be important (e.g., trans-fer and correlations between competen-cies, aptitude-treatment interactions, parsi-monious models of cognitive neuroscience


brain activation patterns, etc.). Otherconceptions of intellect have faced a similarchallenge in psychology (Mayer & Caruso,2008).

Cognitive Neuroscience and MI

Evidence for the several intelligences cameoriginally from the study of how mental fac-ulties were associated or dissociated as a con-sequence of damage to the brain, and espe-cially to cortical structures. With the surgein the types of neuroimaging tools in therecent decades, far more specified inquiriesrelevant to MI are possible. Nowadays a con-sensus obtains that there is not a one-to-one correspondence between types of intel-ligence and areas of the cortex. Nonethelessit is still germane to detail how the con-structs outlined by MI can relate to brainstructure and function.

Until this point, most neuroimagingstudies of intellect have examined the braincorrelates of general intelligence (IQ). Thesestudies have revealed that general intelli-gence is correlated with activations in frontalregions (Duncan et al., 2000) as well as sev-eral other brain regions (e.g., Jung & Haier,2007), with speed of neural conduction(Gogtay et al., 2004). An analogous kind ofstudy can be carried out with respect to spe-cific intelligences (cf. emotional intelligenceas reviewed by Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade,2008). Ultimately it would be desirableto secure an atlas of the neural correlatesof each of the intelligences, along withindices of how they do or do not operate inconcert. Researchers should remain open tothe possibility that intelligences may havedifferent neural representations, in differentcultures – the examples of linguistic intelli-gence (speaking, reading, writing) comes tomind.

From a neuropsychological point of view,the critical test for MI theory will be theways in which intellectual strengths maponto neural structures and connections. Itcould be, as proponents of general intelli-gence claim, that individuals with certainneural structures and connections will beoutstanding in all or at least, predictably, in

some intelligences. Were this to be the case,the neuropsychological underpinnings of MItheory would be challenged. It could alsobe the case that individuals with intellectualstrengths in a particular area show similarbrain profiles, and that those who exhibitcontrasting intellectual strengths show acontrasting set of neural profiles. It mightalso be the case that certain neural structures(e.g., precociously developing frontal lobes)or functions (speed of conduction) place one“at promise” for intellectual precocity moregenerally, but that certain kinds of experi-ences then cause specialization to emerge –in which case, a profile of neurally discreteintelligences will ultimately consolidate.

Similar lines of argument can unfoldwith respect to the genetic basis of intelli-gence. To this point, those with very highor very low IQs display distinct combina-tions of genes, though it is already clear thatthere will not be a single gene, or even asmall set of genes, that codes for intellect.What remains to be determined is whetherthose with quite distinctive behavioral pro-files (e.g., individuals who are highly musi-cal, highly linguistic, and/or highly skilledin physical activities) exhibit distinctivegenetic clusters as well. Put vividly, can theBach family or the Curie family or the Polgarfamily be distinguished genetically from thegeneral population and from one another?Or, as with the neural argument just pro-pounded, certain genetic profiles may aidone to achieve expertise more quickly, butthe particular area of expertise will necessar-ily yield quite distinctive cognitive profiles inthe adult.

It is germane to inquire whether, shouldneural evidence and genetic evidence favorthe notion of a single general intelligence andprovide little evidence for biological mark-ers of the specific intelligences, MI theorywill be disproved scientifically. A questionwill still remain about how individuals endup possessing quite distinct profiles of abili-ties and disabilities. Whether the answer tothat question will lie in studies drawn fromgenetics, neurology, psychology, sociology,anthropology, or some combination thereof,remains to be determined.


MI Assessments

From the start, a distinctive hallmark of MItheory has been its spurning of simple paper-and-pencil or “one shot” behavioral mea-sures. Instead, with respect to assessment,Gardner has called for multiple measures ofperformance and ecologically valid testingenvironments and tasks. This approach toMI has been actualized by a large initiativefor children, Project Spectrum.

Project Spectrum is an assessment sys-tem for young children that features a class-room rich in opportunities to work withdifferent materials – in the manner of awell-stocked children’s museum (Gardneret al., 1998a, 1998b, 1998c; Malkus et al., 1988;Ramos-Ford, Feldman, & Gardner, 1988; seealso http://www.pz.harvard.edu/research/Spectrum.htm). The Spectrum approachyields information based on meaningfulactivities that allow for a demonstration ofthe strengths of the several intelligences.While validity is not something that canbe examined with preschoolers, Spectrumtasks have been shown to demonstrate reli-ability (Gardner et al., 1998a, 1998b, 1998c).

Spectrum transcends traditional assess-ments such as the IQ tests in several ways.First, it highlights components of thought(e.g., musical competence, knowledge ofother persons) that are not typically consid-ered indices of smartness (Gardner, 1993).Second, the assessment is based on “handson” activities that have proved to be engag-ing and meaningful for preschool childrendrawn from a range of social backgrounds(Chen & Gardner, 1997). Third, the initiativeseeks to document approaches to learning(working styles) as well as the distributionof strengths and weaknesses across the sev-eral intelligences – the so-called SpectrumProfile. (For a comprehensive descriptionof components and guidelines by domainfor activities, see Adams & Feldman, 1993;Krechevsky, 1998; Krechevsky & Gardner,1990; for observational guidelines see Chen& Gardner, 1997).

Empirical studies using the Project Spec-trum materials have been instructive anduseful. In one study, researchers worked

with at-risk students in a local elemen-tary school’s first grade (Chen & Gard-ner, 1997). The majority of students (13/15)demonstrated identifiable strengths basedon assessments spanning many areas of per-formance including visual arts, mechanicalscience, movement, music, social under-standing, mathematics, science, and lan-guage (Chen & Gardner, 1997). Gardner(1993) has described this approach as effortsto identify how a student is smart as opposedto whether the student is smart. Identifyingsuch strengths has the potential to detach anat-risk or struggling student from unidimen-sional labels and offer a more holistic formu-lation with respect to student strengths andpotentials.

Other empirical investigations havesought to document the validity of MIclaims. Visser et al. (2006) operational-ized the eight intelligences and selectedtwo assessments for each. Further, theresearchers categorized the intelligencesinto purely cognitive (linguistic, spatial,logical-mathematical, naturalistic, and inter-personal), motor (bodily-kinesthetic), acombination of cognitive and personality(intrapersonal and possibly interpersonal),and a combination of cognitive and sen-sory (musical). Study results showed astrong loading on g, or general intelligence,for intelligences categorized as cognitiveas well as intercorrelations among intelli-gences, suggesting that strong MI claims arenot held up empirically.

The study findings stand in contrast tothose reported from Project Spectrum stud-ies, as well as those put forth by other inves-tigators (e.g., Maker, Nielson, & Rogers,1994). These contrasting results may beattributed to the use of standard psychomet-ric measures, as opposed to the employmentof broader (but less specific) tasks that aimfor ecological validity and that can be usedroutinely in the course of daily school activ-ities.

As a visit to any search engine will doc-ument, many researchers and practition-ers of an educational bent have developedrough-and-ready measures of the severalintelligences. The best known such effort is


Branton Shearer’s Multiple IntelligencesDevelopmental Assessment Scale (MIDAS,1999), which has been used as a tool for mea-suring MI in many research projects, hasbeen translated into several languages andhas been administered to thousands of sub-jects all over the world (Shearer, 2007). TheMIDAS, and other less widely used instru-ments, provide a useful snapshot of howindividuals view their own intellectual pro-files. Such self-descriptions do not, how-ever, allow one to distinguish one’s ownpreferences from one’s own computationalabilities, nor is it clear that individuals arenecessarily competent to assess their areasof strength. (How many persons considerthemselves in the bottom half of the pop-ulation with respect to driving skill, or senseof humor?) Optimally, descriptions of a per-son should come from several knowledge-able individuals, not just the person him-self or herself. And optimally, the measuresshould tap actual intellectual strengths. Ofthe methods with which we are familiar,Project Spectrum comes closest to meetingthese desiderata.

With respect to assessment generally,Gardner and colleagues (Chen & Gardner,1997) have advocated several key points.As reviewed earlier, an important startingpoint is the assumption that intelligencemay be pluralistic rather than a unitaryentity. Another key point is that the intel-ligences are shaped by cultural and educa-tional influences; it follows that measuringthem in natural contexts is preferable, if theresults are to be ecologically valid. Recog-nizing the limitations of static assessmentis also important – while such assessmentsessions may serve other purposes, theydo not fulfill the tenets of MI which callsfor dynamic assessment to accompany theuse of intelligences in culturally meaningfulcontexts.

Perhaps most important, intelligences cannever be observed in isolation; they can onlybe manifest in the performance and tasks ofskills that are available, and optimally, val-ued in a cultural context. Hence the notionof a single measure of an intelligence makeslittle sense. Rather, any intelligence – say,

linguistic – ought to be observed in severalcontexts: speaking, reading, telling a story,making an argument, learning a foreign lan-guage, and so on. Taken together, suchdiverse measures would converge on linguis-tic intelligence; one assumes that what eachtask shares in common with the remainingtasks is reliance on some facet of linguis-tic intelligence. In sum, MI assessment callsfor multiple measures for each intelligenceand “intelligence-fair” materials that do notrely on verbal or logical-mathematical skills.Gold standard MI assessments should avoidseveral pitfalls and aim for several goals,summarized in Table 24.3.

Research on MI as an EducationalIntervention

We turn finally to studies of educational set-tings that have developed methods based onthe core ideas of MI theory. In the mostambitious study to date, Kornhaber, Fierros,and Veenema (2004) compiled data on theimpact of these methods across many educa-tional settings using interview and question-naire data to collect educators’ perceptionsof the impact of MI-based methods. Fea-tured were interview data from 41 schools,which had been implementing MI-inspiredcurricular practices for at least three years.Staff at four-fifths of the schools associatedimprovements in standardized test scoreswith the implementation of MI-based prac-tices. Additionally, use of these methodswas also associated with improvements instudent discipline (54% of schools), parentparticipation (60% of schools), and perfor-mances of students diagnosed with learningdisabilities (78% of schools). The researchersattributed the success of MI-based practicesto six compass point practices: attention tothe school culture, readiness to subscribe tothe ideas from the theory of Multiple Intel-ligences and building classroom and schoolcapacity to use the theory, use of the theoryas a framework for improving work quality,collaborations, opportunities for choice, anda role for the arts.

Investigations of MI in educational set-tings have taken several forms, including


Table 24.3. Assessment Characteristics for the Multiple Intelligences andTraditional Counterparts

Traditional Assessment MI Assessment

Over-reliant on linguistic and logicalmathematical abilities and measures

Samples the gamut of intelligences anddomains

Deficit-focused Identifies relative and absolute strengthsLimited connection between assessment

and curricular activity/tasksGives immediate feedback to students; is

meaningful for students; uses materials withwhich children are familiar

Captures performance in a single score Produces scores on a range of tasks, acrossseveral domains for each intelligence

Is detached from context Has ecological validity; presents problems in thecontext of problem solving; is instructive forteachers

(Adapted from Chen & Gardner, 1997).

descriptions of how the theory contributesto education (e.g., Barrington, 2004), howMI can be applied in the curriculum (e.g.,Dias Ward & Dias, 2004; Nolen, 2003;Ozdemir, Guneysu, & Tekkaya, 2006; Wal-lach & Callahan, 1994), and how MI operateswithin or across schools (e.g., Campbell &Campbell, 1999; Greenhawk, 1997; Hickey,2004; Hoerr, 1992, 1994, 2004; Wagmeister& Shifrin, 2000). MI approaches have beencredited with better performance and reten-tion of knowledge as compared to a tra-ditional approach (for science instructionfor fourth-graders) (Ozdemir et al., 2006)and with understanding content in morecomplex ways (Emig, 1997). Similarly, MIapproaches in the curriculum have beencredited with giving teachers a frameworkfor making instructional decisions (Ozdemiret al., 2006). Teele, who has devised oneof the principal MI self-administered instru-ments, suggests that “intrinsic motivation,positive self-image, and a sense of responsi-bility develop when students become stake-holders in the educational process andaccept responsibility for their own actions”(1996, p. 72).

Part 4: Conclusion: Looking Ahead

In a number of ways, MI theory differs fromother psychological approaches to intel-

ligence. Rather than proceeding from orcreating psychometric instruments, the the-ory emerged from an interdisciplinary con-sideration of the range of human capaci-ties and faculties. The theory has garneredconsiderable attention, far more in edu-cational circles than in the corridors ofstandard psychological testing and experi-mentation. Consistent with that emphasis,numerous educational experiments build onMI theory, and many of them claim suc-cess. However, because MI theory doesnot dictate specific educational practices,and because any educational intervention ismultifaceted, it is not possible to attributeschool success or failure strictly to MIinterventions. Direct experimental tests ofthe theory are difficult to implement andso the status of the theory within aca-demic psychology remains indeterminate.The biological basis of the theory – itsneural and genetic correlates – should beclarified in the coming years. But in theabsence of consensually agreed upon mea-sures of the intelligences, either individu-ally or in conjunction with one another, thepsychological validity of the theory will con-tinue to be elusive.

What does the future hold for MI the-ory? It seems reasonable to expect that theseideas will continue to be of interest to edu-cators and other practitioners. Having ini-tially catalyzed an interest in elementary


schools, particularly with respect to stu-dents with learning problems, the theory hasbeen picked up by schools of all sorts, aswell as museums and other institutions ofinformal learning. MI ideas are also invadingother occupational spheres, such as business,and have proved of special interest to thosecharged with hiring, assembling teams, orplacing personnel (Moran & Gardner, 2006).

Uses of MI ideas within and outside for-mal educational settings hold great promise.In particular, new digital media and vir-tual realities offer numerous ways in whichlearners can master required knowledge andskills. At one time, it may have seemedadvisable or even necessary to search forthe “one best way” to teach a topic. Now,at a time when computers can deliver con-tents and processes in numerous ways, andwhen learners can take increasing controlof their own educational destinies, a plu-rality of curricula, pedagogy, and assess-ments figures to become the norm. Individ-ualized education does not depend on theexistence of MI theory; and yet MI-inspiredpractices provide promising approaches foreffective teaching and learning (Birchfieldet al., 2008). Moreover, as lifelong learningbecomes more important around the world,the prospects of developing, maintaining,and enhancing the several intelligences gainurgency.

Initially, MI ideas were introduced inthe United States and the first MI-inspiredexperiments took place there. But over thelast two decades, MI ideas and practiceshave spread to numerous countries andregions. There are both striking similaritiesand instructive differences in the ways inwhich these regions implement MI ideas,formally and informally. An initial sur-vey appears in Multiple Intelligences Aroundthe World (Chen, Moran, & Gardner,2009). In addition to chronicling numerousimplementations of MI theory in more thana dozen countries, this work also providesa fascinating and original portrait of how“memes” about intelligence take and spreadin different educational soils.

Gardner has long maintained that MI can-not be an educational goal in itself. Educa-

tional goals, value judgments, must emergefrom discussions and debates among respon-sible leaders and citizens. Once goals havebeen laid out, the question then arises:How and in what ways, can MI ideas aidin the achievement of these goals? To besure, a tight answer to that question canrarely be given. Nonetheless, over time itshould certainly become clearer which MIideas, in combination with which goals,have pedagogical effectiveness and whichdo not. Within Project Zero, the researchgroup with which Gardner has been asso-ciated since its inception in 1967, MI ideashave proved particularly congenial with thegoal of “education for deep understanding”(Gardner 1999, 2006b).

Whether or not explicitly recognized assuch, MI ideas are likely to endure withinthe worlds of education, business, and dailypractice – like the terms emotional intelli-gence and social intelligence (Goleman 1995,2006), they are already becoming part ofthe conventional wisdom. The status ofMI theory within psychology, biology, andother social and natural sciences remains tobe determined. Attempts will be made todefine and redefine the set of intelligences,to evaluate the criteria by which they areidentified and measured, to consider theirrelationships to one another, and their statusvis-a-vis “general intelligence.” In all prob-ability, like other attempts at intellectualsynthesis, some facets will become acceptedin scholarship, while other parts will fadeaway or remain topics for debate. What ismost likely to last in MI theory is the set ofcriteria for what counts as an intelligenceand the idea of intelligence as pluralistic,with links to specific contents in the humanand primate environments. The particularlist of intelligences and subintelligences willdoubtless be reformulated as a result ofcontinuing studies in psychology, neuro-science, and genetics.

References

Adams, M., & Feldman, D. H. (1993). ProjectSpectrum: A theory-based approach to early


education. In R. Pasnak & M. L. Howe (Eds.),Emerging themes in cognitive development. NewYork, NY: Springer-Verlag.

Armstrong, T. (1994). Multiple intelligences in theclassroom. Alexandria, VA: Association forSupervision and Curriculum Development.

Barrington, E. (2004). Teaching to student diver-sity in higher education: How multiple intel-ligence theory can help. Teaching in HigherEducation, 9, 421–434.

Battro, A. M., & Denham, P. J. (2007). Haciauna inteligencia. Buenos Aires, Argentina:Academia Nacional de Educacion.

Binet, A., & Simon, T. (1911). A method of measur-ing the development of the intelligence of youngchildren. Lincoln, IL: Courier.

Binet, A., & Simon, T. (1916). The develop-ment of intelligence in children. Baltimore, MD:Williams & Wilkins.

Birchfield, D., Thornburg, H., Megowan-Romanowicz, C., Hatton, S., Mechtley, B.,Dolgov, I., & Burleson, W. (2008). Embodi-ment, multimodality, and composition: Con-vergent themes across HCI and education formixed-reality learning environments. Journalof Advances in Human-Computer Interaction,2008, Article ID 874563.

Boss, J. (2005). The autonomy of moral intelli-gence. Educational Theory, 44(4), 399–416.

Brody, N. (2004). What cognitive intelligence isand what emotional intelligence is not. Psy-chological Inquiry, 15(3), 234–238.

Campbell, L., & Campbell, B. (1999). Multipleintelligences and student achievement. Alexan-dria, VA: ASCD.

Ceci, S. J. (1990). On intelligence, more or less: Abioecological treatise on intellectual development.Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Ceci, S. J. (1996). On intelligence (rev. ed.). Cam-bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Chen, J.-Q., & Gardner, H. (1997). Assessmentbased on multiple-intelligences theory. In D.P. Flanagan & P. L. Harrison (Eds.), Contempo-rary intellectual assessment: Theories, tests, andissues (Vol. 2, pp. 77–102). New York, NY:Guilford Press.

Chen, Jie-Qi, & Gardner, H. (2005). Multipleintelligences: Assessment based on multiple-intelligence theory. In D. Flanagan & P. Har-rison (Eds.), Contemporary intellectual assess-ment: Theories, tests and issues. New York:Guilford Press.

Chen, J., Moran, S., & Gardner, H. (2009). Mul-tiple intelligences around the world. New York,NY: Jossey-Bass.

Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1996). Creativity: Flow andthe psychology of discovery and invention. NewYork: HarperCollins.

Danfoss Universe. (2007). Retrieved July 1, 2007,from http://www.danfossuniverse.com.

Deary, I., Strand, S., Smith, P., & Fernandes, C.(2007). Intelligence and educational achieve-ment. Intelligence, 35, 13–21.

Diamond, M., & Hopson, J. (1998). Magic treesof the mind: How to nurture your child’s intel-ligence, creativity, and healthy emotions frombirth through adolescence. New York, NY:Dutton.

Dias Ward, C., & Dias, M. J. (2004). Ladybugsacross the curriculum. Science and Children,41(7), 40–44.

Duncan, J., Seitz, R.J., Kolodny, J., Bor, D.,Herzog, H., Ahmed, A., Newell, F.N., &Emslie, H. (2000). A neural basis for gen-eral intelligence. Science, 289(5478), 457–460.

Emig, V. B. (1997). A multiple intelligencesinventory. Educational Leadership, 55(1), 47.

Eysenck, H. (1994). Manual for the Eysenck per-sonality questionnaire (EPQ-R Adult). SanDiego, CA: Educational Industrial TestingService.

Feldman, D. H. (1980). Beyond universals in cog-nitive development. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Gardner, H. (1983). Frames of mind: The theoryof multiple intelligences. New York, NY: BasicBooks.

Gardner, H. (1993). Frames of mind: The theoryof multiple intelligences (10th anniversary ed.).New York, NY: Basic Books.

Gardner, H. (1997). Is there a moral intelligence?In M. Runco (Ed.), The creativity researchhandbook. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.

Gardner, H. (1999). The disciplined mind: Whatall students should understand. New York, NY:Simon & Schuster.

Gardner, H. (2006a). Five minds for the future.Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

Gardner, H. (2006b). Multiple intelligences: Newhorizons. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Gardner, H. (2006c). Replies to my critics. In J. A.Schaler (Ed.), Howard Gardner under fire: Therebel psychologist faces his critics (pp. 277–344).Chicago, IL: Open Court.

Gardner, H., Feldman, D. H., & Krechevsky,M. (Gen. Eds.). (1998a). Project Zero frame-works for early childhood education: Volume1, Building on children’s strengths: The expe-rience of Project Spectrum (Volume authorsJ.-Q. Chen, M. Krechevsky, & J. Viens, with


E. Isberg). New York, NY: Teachers CollegePress. Translated into Chinese, Italian, Span-ish, and Portuguese.

Gardner, H., Feldman, D. H., & Krechevsky,M. (Gen. Eds.). (1998b). Project Zero frame-works for early childhood education: Volume 2,Project Spectrum early learning activities (Vol-ume author J-Q. Chen, with E. Isberg and M.Krechevsky). New York, NY: Teachers Col-lege Press. Translated into Chinese, Italian,Spanish, and Portuguese.

Gardner, H., Feldman, D. H., & Krechevsky, M.(Gen. Eds.). (1998c). Project Zero frameworksfor early childhood education: Volume 3, ProjectSpectrum preschool assessment handbook (Vol-ume author M. Krechevsky). New York, NY:Teachers College Press. Translated into Chi-nese, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese.

Gardner, H., & Laskin, E. (1995). Leading minds:An anatomy of leadership. New York, NY:BasicBooks.

Gardner, H., & Moran, S. (2006). The scienceof multiple intelligences theory: A responseto Lynn Waterhouse. Educational Psychologist,41(4), 227–232.

Gogtay, N., Giedd, J. N., Lusk, L., Hayashi,K. M., Greenstein, D., Vaituzis, A. C., etal. (2004). Dynamic mapping of humancortical development during childhoodthrough early adulthood. PNAS, 101(21), 8174–8179.

Goleman D. 1995. Emotional intelligence. NewYork, NY: Bantam Books.

Goleman, D. (2006). Social intelligence: The newscience of human relationships. New York, NY:Bantam Books.

Greenhawk, J. (1997). Multiple intelligencesmeet standards. Educational Leadership, 55(1),62–64.

Guilford, J. P. (1967). The nature of human intel-ligence. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

Guilford, J. P., & Hoepfner, R. (1971). The anal-ysis of intelligence. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

Haier, R. J., & Jung, R. E. (2007). Beautiful minds(i.e., brains) and the neural basis of intelli-gence. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30(2),174–178.

Hayes, J. R. (1989). Cognitive processes in cre-ativity. In J. A. Glover, R. R. Ronning, &C. R. Reynolds (Eds.), Handbook of creativity(pp. 135–145). New York, NY: PlenumPress.

Hickey, G. (2004). “Can I pick more than oneproject? Case studies of five teachers who

used MI-based instructional planning”. Teach-ers College Record, 106(1), 77–86.

Herrnstein, R.J., & Murray, C. (1994). The bellcurve: Intelligence and class structure in Ameri-can life. New York, NY: Free Press.

Hoerr, T. (2004). How MI informs teaching atNew City School. Teachers College Record,106(1), 40–48.

Hoerr, T. R. (1992). How our school applied mul-tiple intelligences theory. Educational Leader-ship, 50(2), 67–68.

Hoerr, T. R. (1994). How the New City Schoolapplies the multiple intelligences. EducationalLeadership, 52(3), 29–33.

Jensen, A. R. (1980). Bias in mental testing. NewYork, NY: Free Press.

Jensen, A. R. (1998). The g factor: The sci-ence of mental ability. Westport, CT: Praeger/Greenwoood.

Jensen, A. (2008). Why is reaction timecorrelated with psychometric ‘g’? CurrentDirections in Psychological Science, 2(2), 53–56.

Jung, R. E. & Haier, R. J. (2007). The parieto-frontal integration theory (P-FIT) of intel-ligence: Converging neuroimaging evidence.Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30(2), 135–154.

Kornhaber, M. (1999). Multiple intelligences the-ory in practice. In J. H. Block, S. T. Everson,& T. R. Guskey (Eds.), Comprehensive schoolreform: A program perspective. Dubuque, IA:Kendall/Hunt.

Kornhaber, M., Fierros, E., & Veenema, S. (2004).Multiple intelligences: Best ideas from researchand practice. Boston, MA: Pearson Educa-tion.

Krechevsky, M. (1998). Project Spectrum preschoolassessment handbook. New York, NY: Teach-ers College Press.

Krechevsky, M., & Gardner, H. (1990). Theemergence and nurturance of multiple intel-ligences: The Project Spectrum approach.In M. J. Howe (Ed.), Encouraging thedevelopment of exceptional skills and tal-ents. Leicester, UK: British PsychologicalSociety.

Lucas, A., Morley, R., & Cole, T. (1998). Ran-domised trial of early diet in preterm babiesand later intelligence quotient. British MedicalJournal, 317, 1481–1487.

Luhrmann, T. M. (2006). On spirituality. In J. A.Schaler (Ed.), Howard Gardner under fire: Therebel psychologist faces his critics (pp. 115–142).Chicago, IL: Open Court.


Maker, C. J., Nielson, A. B., & Rogers, J. A.(1994). Giftedness, diversity, and problem-solving. Teaching Exceptional Children, 27(1),4–19.

Malkus, U. C., Feldman, D. H., & Gardner, H.(1988). Dimensions of mind in early child-hood. In A. D. Pellegrini (Ed.), Psychologicalbases for early education (pp. 25–38). Oxford,UK: John Wiley.

Mayer, J. D., Roberts, R. D., & Barsade, S.G. (2008). Human abilities: Emotional intel-ligence. Annual Review of Psychology, 59(1),507–536.

Moran, S., & Gardner, H. (2006). Multiple intelli-gences in the workplace. In H. Gardner, Mul-tiple intelligences: New horizons (pp. 213–232).New York, NY: BasicBooks.

Moran, S., & Gardner, H. (2007). “Hill, skill,and will”: Executive function from a multiple-intelligences perspective. In L. Meltzer (Ed.),Executive function in education: From theory topractice (pp. 19–38). New York, NY: GuilfordPress.

Neisser, U., Boodoo, G., Bouchard, T., Boykin,A. W., Brody, N., Ceci, S. J., Halpern,D., Loehlin, J., Perloff, R., Sternberg, R., &Urbina, S. (1996) Intelligence: Knowns andunknowns. American Psychologist 51, 77–101.

Nisbett, R. E. (2009). Intelligence and how to getit: Why schools and cultures count. New York,NY: W. W. Norton.

Nolen, J. L. (2003). Multiple intelligences in theclassroom. Educational Leadership, 124(1), 115–119.

Ozdemir, P., Guneysu, S., & Tekkaya, C. (2006).Enhancing learning through multiple intelli-gences. Journal of Biological Education, 40(2),74–78.

Perkins, D., & Tishman, S. (2001). Dispositionalaspects of intelligence. In J. Collis, S. Messick,& U. Scheifele (Eds.), Intelligence and personal-ity: Bridging the gap in theory and measurement.Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Piaget, J. (1950). The psychology of intelligence.London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Piaget, J. (1952). The origins of intelligence in chil-dren. New York, NY: International Universi-ties Press.

Posner, M. I. (2004). Neural systems and individ-ual differences. Teachers College Record, 106(1),24–30.

Ramos-Ford, V., Feldman, D. H., & Gardner,H. (1988). A new look at intelligence throughproject spectrum. New Horizons for Learning,8(3), 6–15.

Shearer, B. (1999). Multiple intelligences develop-mental assessment scale. Kent, OH: MultipleIntelligences Research and Consulting.

Shearer, C. B. (2004). Using a multiple intelli-gences assessment to promote teacher devel-opment and student achievement. TeachersCollege Record, 106(1), 147–162.

Shearer, C. B. (2007). The MIDAS: Professionalmanual (rev. ed.). Kent, OH: MI Research andConsulting.

Silver, H., & Strong, R. (1997). Integrating learn-ing styles and multiple intelligences. Educa-tional Leadership, 55(1), 22.

Simon, H. A., & Chase, W. (1973). Skill in chess.American Scientist, 61, 394–403.

Spearman, Charles. (1904). General intelli-gence, objectively determined and measured.American Journal of Psychology. 15, 201–293.

Spearman, C. (1927). The abilities of man. London,UK: Macmillan.

Stanford-Binet Intelligences Scales (SB5), FifthEdition. (2003). Rolling Meadows, IL: River-side Publishing. http://www.riverpub.com/products/sb5/scoring.html.

Sternberg, R. J. (1985). Beyond IQ: A triarchictheory of human intelligence. New York, NY:Cambridge University Press.

Sternberg, R. J. (1990). Metaphors of mind. NewYork, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Teele, S. (1996). Redesigning the educational sys-tem to enable all students to succeed. NASSPBulletin, 80(583), 65–75.

Thorndike, E. (1920). A constant error in psycho-logical ratings. Journal of Applied Psychology,4, 25–29.

Thorndike, E., Bregman, E., Cobb, M., & Wood-yard, E. (1927). The measurement of intelligence.New York, NY: Teachers College Bureau ofPublications.

Thurstone, L. (1938). Primary mental abilities.Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Thurstone, L. L., & Thurstone, T. G. (1941). Fac-torial studies of intelligence. Chicago, IL: Uni-versity of Chicago Press.

Visser, B. A., Ashton, M. C., & Vernon, P. A.(2006). Beyond g: Putting multiple intelli-gences theory to the test. Intelligence, 34(5),487–502.

Wagmeister, J., & Shifrin, B. (2000). Thinkingdifferently, Learning differently. EducationalLeadership, 58(3), 45.

Wallach, C., & Callahan, S. (1994). The 1st gradeplant museum. Educational Leadership, 52(3),32–34.


Waterhouse, L. (2006). Multiple intelligences,the Mozart effect, and emotional intelligence:A critical review. Educational Psychologist,41(4), 207–225.

Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales, FourthEdition. (2008). Pearson. http://www.pearsonassess.com

White, J. (2006). Multiple invalidities. In J. A.Schaler (Ed.), Howard Gardner under fire: Therebel psychologist faces his critics (pp. 45–72).Chicago, IL: Open Court.

Willingham, D. T. (2004). Reframing the mind.Education Next, 4(3), 19–24.

Documents

The Theory of Multiple Intelligences - IMI Infinity · CHAPTER 24 The Theory of Multiple Intelligences Katie Davis, Joanna Christodoulou, Scott Seider, and Howard Gardner Part 1: