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NYCLA-CLE I N S T I T U T E This program has been approved by the Board of Continuing Legal Education of the Supreme Court of New Jersey for 2 hours of total CLE credit. Of these, 1 qualify as hours of credit for Ethics/Professionalism, and 0 qualify as hours of credit toward certification in civil trial law, criminal trial law, workers compensation law and/or matrimonial law. T HE T AX C OURT : A V IEW F ROM THE B ENCH Prepared in connection with a Continuing Legal Education course presented at New York County Lawyers’ Association, 14 Vesey Street, New York, NY presented on Monday, September 23, 2013. S PECIAL G UEST S PEAKER : Hon. John O. Colvin, Chief Judge, U.S. Tax Court; Monica Koch, IRS Counsel M ODERATOR : Frank Agostino, Agostino & Associates, PC 2 TRANSITIONAL & NON-TRANSITIONAL MCLE CREDITS: This course has been approved in accordance with the requirements of the New York State Continuing Legal Education Board for a maximum of 2 Transitional & Non-Transitional credit hours: 1 Ethics; 1 Skills

The Tax CourT: a s t View From The BenCh

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Page 1: The Tax CourT: a s t View From The BenCh

NY

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CL

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IN

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This program has been approved by the Board of Continuing Legal Education of the Supreme Court of New Jersey for 2 hours of total CLE credit. Of these, 1 qualify as hours of credit for Ethics/Professionalism, and 0 qualify as hours of credittoward certification in civil trial law, criminal trial law, workers compensation law and/or matrimonial law.

The Tax CourT: a View From The BenCh

Prepared in connection with a Continuing Legal Education course presented at New York County Lawyers’ Association, 14 Vesey Street, New York, NY

presented on Monday, September 23, 2013.

s p E C I A L G u E s t s p E A k E r :

Hon. John O. Colvin, Chief Judge, U.S. Tax Court; Monica Koch, IRS Counsel

M o d E r A t o r :

Frank Agostino, Agostino & Associates, PC

2 TRANSITIONAL & NON-TRANSITIONAL MCLE CREDITS: This course has been approved in accordance with the requirements of the New York State Continuing Legal Education Board for a maximum of 2 Transitional & Non-Transitional credit hours: 1 Ethics; 1 Skills

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Information Regarding CLE Credits and Certification

The Tax Court: A View from the Bench September 23, 2013; 6:00 PM to 8:00 PM

The New York State CLE Board Regulations require all accredited CLE providers to provide documentation that CLE course attendees are, in fact, present during the course. Please review the following NYCLA rules for MCLE credit allocation and certificate distribution.

i. You must sign-in and note the time of arrival to receive your

course materials and receive MCLE credit. The time will be verified by the Program Assistant.

ii. You will receive your MCLE certificate as you exit the room at

the end of the course. The certificates will bear your name and will be arranged in alphabetical order on the tables directly outside the auditorium.

iii. If you arrive after the course has begun, you must sign-in and note the time of your arrival. The time will be verified by the Program Assistant. If it has been determined that you will still receive educational value by attending a portion of the program, you will receive a pro-rated CLE certificate.

iv. Please note: We can only certify MCLE credit for the actual time

you are in attendance. If you leave before the end of the course, you must sign-out and enter the time you are leaving. The time will be verified by the Program Assistant. Again, if it has been determined that you received educational value from attending a portion of the program, your CLE credits will be pro-rated and the certificate will be mailed to you within one week.

v. If you leave early and do not sign out, we will assume that you left at the midpoint of the course. If it has been determined that you received educational value from the portion of the program you attended, we will pro-rate the credits accordingly, unless you can provide verification of course completion. Your certificate will be mailed to you within one week.

Thank you for choosing NYCLA as your CLE provider!

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New York County Lawyers’ Association

Continuing Legal Education Institute 14 Vesey Street, New York, N.Y. 10007 • (212) 267-6646

The Tax Court: A View from the Bench

September 23, 2013 6:00 PM-8:00 PM

AGENDA

Moderator: Frank Agostino, Agostino & Associates PC Faculty: Hon. John O. Colvin, Chief Judge, U.S. Tax Court

Monica Koch, IRS Counsel

5:30 PM – 6:00 PM Registration 6:00 PM – 8:00 PM Introductions and Discussion **** Reception to follow immediately after the program

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1

A View From the BenchThe Trial of the Tax Court Case and

Ethical Considerations

September 23, 2013

2

Tax Court Jurisdiction

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3

Common Notices Which Are Predicates to US Tax Court Jurisdiction

• Notice of deficiency - Before the IRS can assess and collect certain types of taxes (e.g., income tax, estate and gift tax), a notice of deficiency must be issued to the taxpayer or a notice of liability to a transferee.– If a notice of deficiency is issued, the recipients have the right,

within specified time limits, to litigate the correctness of the deficiency, or the extent of transferee liability in the Tax Court without first paying the tax. IRC §6213(a)

• Notice of Determination - The Tax Court has jurisdiction under IRC §6330(d)(1) with respect to a timely filed petition disputing a valid notice of determination issued by an Appeals officer. See Lunsford v. CIR, 117 T.C. 159 (2001)

• Final Notice of Determination with Respect to IRC § 6015 relief. IRC §6015

4

U.S. Tax Court Petition

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5

Petition

• Filing Fee– The Tax Court recently simplified the

Application for Waiving of Filing Fee so that it is easier to fill out.

• General– Deficiency or Liability Action

• Should conform to Form 1 shown in Appendix I of the Tax Court Rules, and

• Shall comply with the requirements of the Rules relating to Pleadings.

6

Content of Petition in Deficiency or Liability Action

• Individual– Petitioner’s name.– State of legal residence.– Mailing address.– The office of the IRS with which the tax return for

the period in controversy was filed.– The date of the Notice of Deficiency or liability, or

other proper allegations showing jurisdiction of the Court, and the City and State of the Office of the IRS which issued the Notice.

– The amount of the deficiency or liability.

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7

Content of Petition in Deficiency or Liability Action, cont.

• The nature of the tax.• The year or years for which the determination was made.• Clear and concise assignments of each and every error which

the petitioner alleges to have been committed by the Commissioner in the determination of the deficiency or liability.

• Any issued not raised in the assignment of error shall be deemed to be conceded.

• Clear and concise statements of the facts on which the petitioner bases the assignment of error, except for issues to which the burden of proof is on the Commissioner.

• A prayer setting forth the relief sought by the petitioner.• The signature, mailing address, and telephone number of each

petitioner or petitioner’s counsel as well as counsel’s Tax Court bar number.

• A copy of the Notice of deficiency or liability.

8

Rule 33(a) and Rule 23(g)

• Rule 33(a) was amended July 6, 2012 to state that Each pleading shall be signed in the manner provided in Rule 23. Where there is more than one attorney of record, the signature of only one is required. Except when otherwise specifically directed by the Court, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit or declaration.

• Rule 23(g): Effective as of July 6, 2012. Prohibits the Clerk from refusing to file a paper because it is not in the form prescribed by the Rules.

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9

Answer• The Commissioner shall have 60 days from the date

of service of the date of service of the petition within which to file an answer, or 45 days from that date within which to move with respect to the petition.

• Form and Content– The answer should be drawn so that it will advise the

petitioner and the Court fully of the nature of the defense. • Effect: every material allegation set out in the petition

and not expressly admitted or denied in the answer shall be deemed to be admitted.

10

Reply

• Time to Reply or Move– Petitioner shall have 45 days from the date

of service of the answer within which to file a reply, or 30 days from that date within which to move with respect to the answer.

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11

Reply, cont.

• Form and Content:– In response to each material allegation in the

answer and the facts in support thereof on which the Commissioner has the burden of proof, the reply shall contain a specific admission or denial.

• If the petitioner is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation, the petitioner shall so state.

• New Material:– Any new material contained in the reply shall be

deemed to be denied.

12

Timely Petition Required• In all cases, the jurisdiction of the Court also depends

on the timely filing of a petition. – Contempt of Court: may be punished by fine or

imprisonment within the scope of IRC § 7456(c).• Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as

to obstruct the administration of justice• Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions; or• Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order,

rule, decree, or command.– Bankruptcy and Receivership

• For bankruptcy, see 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(8) and IRC 6213(f)(1).• For receivership, see IRC §6871(c)(2).

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13

Pleadings• Initial Pleadings

– Petition (90 days). Rule 20.– Answer (60 days). Rule 36.– Reply (45 days). Rule 37.

• General rules– Purpose of pleadings is to give the parties and the Court fair notice of the

matters in controversy and the basis for their respective positions.– Each averment to a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.

• There are no technical forms of pleading– Consistency:

• A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically.

• If two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of them would be sufficient if made independently, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative claims. Rule 31(c).

– All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.

14

Pleadings: Form – Rule 32• Caption; Names of parties: every pleading must contain a

caption setting forth:– The name of the Court– The title of the case– The docket number, and– A designation to show the nature of the pleading.

• Separate statement: all averments of claim or defense, and supporting statements, shall be made in separately designated paragraphs.– Each paragraph should be limited to a single item or single set of

circumstances.• Adoption by reference: statements may be adopted by reference

in a different part of the same pleading or in another pleading or in any motion.

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15

Signing of Pleadings

• The signature of counsel or a party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has:– read the pleading, and– that, to the best of the signer’s knowledge, information, and

belief formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law, or a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.

• The signature of counsel constitutes a representation by counsel that counsel is authorized to represent the party on whose behalf the pleading is filed.

16

Standing Pretrial Order

• Issued with notice of trial at the direction of the trial judge to facilitate the orderly and efficient disposition of all cases on the trial calendar.

• Failure to comply with the standing pretrial order may subject a party or counsel to sanctions. Rule 131.

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17

Pre-Trial Motions

18

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings - TC Rule 120

• Motion for summary judgment– Matters outside the pleading are presented to the

Court with supporting affidavits.– Summary judgment may be requested upon all or

any part of the legal issues in controversy.• If faced with a motion for summary judgment,

practitioners should be prepared to argue that a genuine issue of material facts does exists necessitating trial

– Decision will be rendered as a matter of law if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact -Tax Court Rule 121.

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Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings - TC Rule 120, cont.• Motion to Submit Case Without Trial

– Party may move to submit case without trial if the submission of evidence is not needed because sufficient facts have been admitted, stipulated, established by deposition, or included in the record in some other way - Tax Court Rule 122.

• Motion in Limine– Motion to exclude certain evidence or expert

report on grounds that it is privileged, its relevance is outweighed by risk of prejudice or confusion, or it is cumulative.

20

Pre-Trial Activities

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21

Duty to Disclose/Informal Discovery

• The Court expects the parties to attempt to attain the objective of discovery through informal consultation or communication before using the Tax Court discovery rules. See Branerton v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 6911 692 (1974).

• The standing pretrial order typically requires the parties to exchange all documents and other evidence that they intend to use at trial (except for impeachment purposes) at least 14 days before trial.– The Court may exclude documents not exchanged in

accordance with standing pretrial order unless good cause is shown.

22

Formal Discovery• Interrogatories - Tax Ct. R. 71

– Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the Court, a party may serve upon any other party no more than 25 written interrogatories, including all discrete subparts but excluding interrogatories described in paragraph (d) of this Rule, to be answered by the party served or, if the party served is a public or private corporation or a partnership or association or governmental agency, by an officer or agent who shall furnish such information as is available to the party. A motion for leave to serve additional interrogatories may be granted by the Court to the extent consistent with Rule 70(c)(1).

• Requests for Production of Documents or Things. Tax Ct. R. 72.

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23

Tax Ct. R. 70 Recent Amendments• Tax Ct. R. 70(a)(2)

– Discovery shall not be commenced, without leave of Court, before the expiration of 30 days after joinder of issue (see Rule 38). Discovery shall be completed and any motion to compel or any other motion with respect to such discovery shall be filed, unless otherwise authorized by the Court, no later than 45 days prior to the date set for call of the case from a trial calendar. Discovery by a deposition under Rule 74(c) may not be commenced before a notice of trial has been issued or the case has been assigned to a Judge or Special Trial Judge and any motion to compel or any other motion with respect to such discovery shall be filed within the time provided by the preceding sentence. Discovery of matters which are relevant only to the issue of a party's entitlement to reasonable litigation or administrative costs shall not be commenced, without leave of Court, before a motion for reasonable litigation or administrative costs has been noticed for a hearing, and discovery shall be completed and any motion to compel or any other motion with respect to such discovery shall be filed, unless otherwise authorized by the Court, no later than 45 days prior to the date set for hearing.

24

Tax Ct. R. 70 Recent Amendments• Tax Ct. R. 70(b):

– The information or response sought through discovery may concern any matter not privileged and which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending case. It is not ground for objection that the information or response sought will be inadmissible at the trial, if that information or response appears reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence, regardless of the burden of proof involved. If the information or response sought is otherwise proper, it is not objectionable merely because the information or response involves an opinion or contention that relates to fact or to the application of law to fact. But the Court may order that the information or response sought need not be furnished or made until some designated time or a particular stage has been reached in the case or until a specified step has been taken by a party.

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25

Tax Ct. R. 70 Recent Amendments• Tax Ct. R. 70(c):

– The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in paragraph (a) shall be limited by the Court if it determines that: (A) The discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (B) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or (C) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. The Court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under Rule 103.

26

Formal Discovery

• Requests for Admissions. Tax Ct. R. 90. • Witness Interviews• Depositions

– Allowed with consent of the parties– Expert witness on its own motion

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27

Stipulations

28

Rule 91

• Required: – Parties are required to stipulate, to the fullest

extent to which complete or qualified agreement can or fairly should be reached, all matters not privileged which are relevant to the pending case, regardless of whether such matters involve fact or opinion or the application of law to fact.

• Comprehensive: – the fact that any matter may have been obtained

through discovery or requests for admission is not grounds for omitting such matter from the stipulation.

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29

Rule 91, cont.

• Form: – In writing– Signed by the parties thereto or by their counsel.– Shall observe the requirements of Tax Court Rule

23 as to form and style of papers, except the stipulation shall be filed in duplicate but only one set of exhibits shall be filed.

• Filing:– Shall be filed by the parties at or before the

commencement of trial.– A stipulation, when filed, does not need to be

offered formally to be considered in evidence.

30

Rule 91, cont.

• Objections– Any objection to all or part of a stipulation should be noted in

the stipulation.• Binding Effect

– A stipulation shall be treated as a conclusive admission by the parties to the stipulation.

• Noncompliance by a party:– Motion to Compel Stipulation: If, after the date of issuance of

trial notice in a case, a party has refused or failed to confer with an adversary with respect to entering into a stipulation, the party proposing stipulation may file a motion to compel stipulation not less than 45 days prior to the date set for call of the case from a trial calendar.

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31

Branerton Conference• Bedrock of Tax Court practice. See

Branerton Corp. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 691 (1974).

• Discovery and requests for admissions may not be commenced by a party until after that party has made a meaningful, good faith attempt to attain the objectives of discovery through informal consultation or communication.

32

Petitioner’s Counsel Room

• What is available in Petitioner’s counsel room to help draft a stipulation?

• Transcripts• Practitioners should have access to computer

for internet access and word processing program.

• www.IRS.gov• Tax Court website – www.ustaxcourt.gov

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33

Trial

34

Tax Court Stuffer Notice• The Tax Court recently updated its procedures with

respect to low-income taxpayers and access to Low Income Taxpayer Clinics (“LITC”).

• The Tax Section of the ABA, the Office of Chief Counsel and the Taxpayer Advocate were all concerned that low income taxpayers were not given enough notice of the existence of LITCs. – Currently the Tax Court sends stuffer notices to self-

represented taxpayers upon acknowledgment of the filing of a petition and when the case is calendared for trial. Beginning October 1, 2013 the Court will start sending stuffer notices 30 days in advance of trial.

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35

Use of Counsel Rooms

• LITCs and Bar sponsored calendar call programs have use of petitioner’s counsel room on the morning of the calendar call.

36

Change of Address

• The Court will send a change of address form (Form 10) with the acknowledgment of the petition to remind petitioners that they need to notify the Court when they change their address. – Tax Ct. R. 21(b)(4) requires petitioners to

inform the Court of a change of address.

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37

Call of the Calendar

• Time– The new 30 day notice of LITCs sent to

self-represented taxpayers encourages the taxpayer to arrive by 9AM on the date of the calendar call. The Court is now requesting practitioners participating in a calendar call program to arrive at the Court at least one hour before the beginning of the calendar call.

38

Call of the Calendar, cont.• A regular trial session of the Tax Court is ordinarily scheduled

for one to two weeks.• Trial session commences with call of the calendar.• When a case is called at the calendar, the taxpayer’s counsel

(or taxpayer if pro se) and respondent’s counsel must be prepared to inform the judge whether the case has been settled and, if so, to state for the record the basis of the settlement or to submit a written stipulation of the settlement.

• If the parties have not reached a basis of settlement, the case will be set for trial.

• Stipulation of Facts– Pro se taxpayers routinely do not prepare stipulations of fact.– Respondent prepares Stipulations of fact for taxpayers to sign.– Petitioner’s counsel must counsel taxpayers on the need to

stipulate and the binding nature of stipulations .

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39

Standards of Review• Deficiency

– Montgomery v. CIR, 122 T.C. 1 (2004)• A person who has not received a notice of deficiency and has not had a

prior administrative or judicial opportunity to challenge the amounts assessed may challenge the liability as part of the collection review procedure.

• Innocent Spouse relief under IRC § 6015(f)– De novo. See Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 11.

• Innocent Spouse relief under § 6015(b) and (c):– De novo. See Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 11.

• When reviewing IRS determination under IRC §§ 6330/6320 -CDP– Abuse of discretion

• Reliance on a failure to pay current taxes in rejecting a collection alternative does not constitute an abuse of discretion. See Orum v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 1 (2004).

40

Burden of Proof: TC Rule 142• In general the burden of proof is on the petitioner, except as

otherwise provided for by statute or determined by the Court.• Exceptions:

– New matters– Increase in deficiency– Affirmative defenses

• Fraud– In any case involving fraud with intent to evade tax, the burden of

proof is on the respondent.– Standard is clear and convincing evidence.

• Transferee liability– Burden of proof is on the respondent to show that a petitioner is

liable as a transferee of property of a taxpayer, but not to show that the taxpayer was liable for the tax. See IRC § 6901(a).

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41

Burden of Proof: IRC § 7491(a)• Taxpayer can shift the burden to respondent if, in any court proceeding,:

– Taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer.

– Taxpayer has complied with requirements of the Code to substantiate any item.– Taxpayer has maintained all records required under the code. See Sec. 6001; Sec.

1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. for record keeping requirements. – Taxpayer has cooperated with reasonable requests by the Secretary for witnesses,

information, documents, meetings and interviews, and– In the case of a partnership, corporation, or trust, the taxpayer is described in IRC §

7430(c)(4)(A)(ii). • See Jones, “The Burden of Proof 10 Years After the Shift,” 121 Tax Notes 287

(October 20, 2008) for an analysis leading to the conclusion that in most cases the shift has had no impact and the decision is ultimately based on the preponderance of the evidence.

• See Knudsen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2007-340 and 131 T.C. 185 (2008) (supplemental op.).

• See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. No. 28 (2001).

42

Burden of Proof: IRC § 7491(b)

• Secretary has the burden of proof in any court proceeding with respect to any item of income which was reconstructed by the Secretary solely through the use of statistical information of unrelated taxpayers.

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43

Burden of Proof: IRC § 7491(c) Penalties

• Secretary has the burden of production with respect to liability for penalties, additions to tax, or additional amounts imposed.

• Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. No. 28 (2001).: Commissioner must come forward with sufficient evidence indicating that it is appropriate to impose the relevant penalty.– Once the Commissioner meets his burden of production, the

taxpayer must come forward with evidence sufficient to persuade a Court that the Commissioner’s determination if incorrect. See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. No. 128 (2001).

44

IRC § 6201(d)• If an information return serves as the basis for

the determination of a deficiency, IRC §6201(d) provides that in any court proceeding, if:– Taxpayer asserts a reasonable dispute with

respect to income reported on an information return, and

– Taxpayer has fully cooperated with the Commissioner,

– Then the Commissioner has the burden of producing reasonable and probative information in addition to the information return.

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45

Evidence

• Rule 143: Trials before the Court will be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in trials without a jury in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

46

Evidence: Hearsay• FRE 802: an out of court statement introduced to prove the truth of that

statement.• Exceptions applicable to certain self-represented taxpayers:

– FRE 803(6) Business Records• A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form of acts, events, conditions,

opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business to make the record

• The records can be introduced with the testimony of the custodian of records or by certification that complies with FRE 902(11), FRE 902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the source indicates untrustworthiness.

• FRE 902(11)– A party intending to offer into evidence under this rule must provide written notice of that intention to all

adverse parties, and must make the record and declaration available for inspection sufficiently in advance of their offer into evidence to provide an adverse party the opportunity to challenge them.

• Tax returns: – A tax return is generally considered inadmissible hearsay with the exception that the

return may constitute an admission by the taxpayer or someone on the taxpayer’s behalf.

• Note: if the taxpayer stipulates to the tax return, they have waived any hearsay argument.

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47

Opening Statement• Should start with a theme and end with that

same theme.• Provide a roadmap for the Court of how and

why the decision should be written in your favor.

• Personalize your client– It will be more difficult for the Court to find for the

government if you depict your client in a positive light.

• Will adverse decision affect third parties?– Taxpayer’s employees– Taxpayer’s family

48

Opening Statement, cont.• Do not abandon an issue.

– After petitioner’s opening statement, respondent will ask the Court whether petitioner has conceded any issue not discussed in their opening statement. IRM 35.6.2.6 (08-11-2004).

– If petitioner raises a new issue without having amended his pleadings and respondent is prejudiced by surprise, respondent will argue that the “new issue” is not before the court.

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49

Tax Court Rule 155• Rule 155 Computations

– If the parties are not in agreement as to the amount to be included in the decision in accordance with the findings and conclusions of the Court, then each party shall file with the Court a computation of the amount believed by such party to be in accordance with the Court's findings and conclusions. In the case of an overpayment, the computation shall also include the amount and date of each payment made by the petitioner. A party shall file such party's computation within 90 days of service of the opinion or order, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

50

Procedures Involving Taxpayer Interviews

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51

IRC § 7521• Section 7521(a) Recording of Interview by Taxpayer: any officer

or employee of the IRS shall allow the taxpayer to make an audio recording:– Upon advance request– At taxpayer’s expense– With taxpayer’s own equipment

• Taxpayers are entitled to record face-to-face CDP hearings. See Keene v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. at 14.

• “In-person interview” refers to an interview in which the IRS representative and taxpayer are face-to-face. Taxpayers are not entitled to record telephone CDP hearings. See Calafati v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. No. 16.

52

IRC § 7521, cont.• 7521(b) Safeguards: an officer or employee of the

IRS shall provide to the taxpayer prior to the interview:– In the case of an interview relating to the determination of

tax, an explanation of the audit process and the taxpayer’s rights under such process, or

– In the case of an interview relating to the collection of tax, an explanation of the collection process and the taxpayer’s rights under such process.

• Section 7521(a) applies to representatives.• This section does not apply to criminal investigations.

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53

Giamelli v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 14 (2007)

• Tax Court held that their review is limited to the determination issued by respondent’s Appeals Office. Since the only issue raised at Appeals was an installment agreement, petitioner cannot then raise a new issue in Tax Court.– The original taxpayer died after his CDP hearing.

At Tax Court, his estate attempted to argue that the estate was a different person and therefore had not had the opportunity to raise the issue. The Court disagreed.

54

Chenery Doctrine• An administrative law principle that says a reviewing

court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action by the grounds invoked by the agency. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).

• Antioco v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-35: The Tax Court determined that the Chenery Doctrine applied in the CDP context and therefore the Court cannot uphold a notice of determination on grounds other than those actually relied upon by the Appeals Officer.

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55

Trial of “S” Cases

56

The Small Tax Case

• Both the Code and the Tax Court rules contain special provisions applicable to “small tax cases”.

• A small tax case is one in which neither the amount of the deficiency placed in dispute nor the amount of any claimed overpayment exceeds $50,000.– Small case procedures are also available for a petitioner for

innocent spouse relief under IRC § 6015(e) where the amount of relief sought does not exceed $50,000.

– Small case procedure are available for CDP appeals under IRC § 6320(c) or IRC § 6330 (d) where the unpaid tax does not exceed $50,000.

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Small Case Procedures are Elective

• Limitations:– In small tax cases the Court does not have jurisdiction to enter a decision

finding a deficiency or overpayment greater than the $50,000 jurisdictional amount.

– Small case decisions are not reviewable by an appellate court and are not precedent for any other case.

• Election is made on the petition or after the petition but before trial.• Tax Court has the authority to revoke small case election on its own

motion before trial.– Tax Court rejected small tax case status where the issues were common to

other cases pending before it. Page v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1, 12 (1986). • Practice Tip: A taxpayer can obtain small tax case status where a

deficiency notice determines a deficiency greater than the statutory amount by contesting an amount less than the statutory amount, even if there is only one legal issue underlying the entire determined deficiency. Kallich v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 676 (1987), acq., 1989-1 C.B. 1.

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Rule 177• Rule 177 provides that trials of small tax

cases will be conducted as informally as possible, consistent with orderly procedures, and any evidence deemed by the court to have probative value will be admissible. – IRM 35.6.2.12 (08-11-2004) states that where a

pro se petitioner is doing his best to present his case to the court, technical evidentiary or procedural objections should not be made.

• Respondent’s counsel should assist the pro se petitioner to bring out all of the facts, and cross-examination should be for the purpose of presenting to the court all the pertinent and competent evidence.

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Common Issues in “S” Cases: Collection Due Process

• After a CDP hearing, the Appeals Officer will issue a Notice of Determination which advises the taxpayer of their right to seek judicial review within 30 days after the date of the Notice of Determination.– The timing of a request for Tax Court Review concerning denials of

relief under IRC § 6015 is 90 days.– The request for review must be filed within 30 days if relief is

requested for other issues raised in the CDP hearing. Treas. Reg. §301.6320-1(f)(2), Q&A-F2.

• The Tax Court reviews the Appeals Officer’s determination under an abuse of discretion standard.– In its review for abuse of discretion, the Tax Court generally only

considers arguments and issues that were raised at the CDP hearing or otherwise brought to the attention to the Appeals office.

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Common Issues in “S” Cases: Collection Due Process, cont.

• Robinette v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 85 (2004):– There is a disagreement between the Tax Court, and the

IRS, Eighth Circuit and other courts concerning the scope of the record on which such review should be based.

– The Tax Court has held that it may review new evidence in the course of reviewing whether an appeals officer abused his discretion, i.e., its review is not limited to evidence presented during the administrative appeal.

– The Eighth Circuit, in Robinette v. Commissioner, 439 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 2006), reversed the Tax Court taking the position that, consistent with general principles of administrative law and the Administrative Procedures Act, judicial review of the IRS’s decision should be limited to the administrative record developed at the hearing before Appeals.

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Common Issues in “S” Cases: Substantiation

• Taxpayer bears the burden of proving the entitlement to claimed deductions. See Tax Court Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).

• IRC § 6001– Every taxpayer liable for any tax under the Internal

Revenue Code, or for collection thereof, shall keep records, render such statements, make such returns, and comply with such rules and regulations as the Secretary may from time to time prescribe.

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Substantiation: Cohan Rule

• When the taxpayer establishes that the Taxpayer paid or incurred deductible expenses but does not establish the amount of the deduction to which the taxpayer is entitled, the Taxpayer may be entitled to estimate the amount allowable. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d. Cir. 1930).

• The taxpayer must present sufficient evidence for the Court to make an estimate because without such a basis, any allowance would amount to largesse.

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Substantiation: Car Expense

• Adams v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-92. Mileage log that only indicates the state visited does not substantiate under Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5T(b)(6)(i)(B). Furthermore, the general lack of business purpose contained in the Taxpayer’s ledger was grounds for finding that she did not substantiate.

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Substantiation: Medical Expenses• Taxpayers are entitled to deduct the amount of the

taxpayer’s and the taxpayer’s spouse or dependent’s medical care expenses to the extent those expenses exceed 10% of the taxpayers AGI.

• Examples:– Cost of diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention

of disease, and costs for treatments affecting any structure or function of the body. IRC § 213 (d)(1)(A).

• Two-part “but for” test in Jacobs v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 813, 819 (1974). Petitioner must prove expenditures:– Were an essential element of the treatment, and– Would not otherwise been incurred for non-medical reasons.

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Substantiation: Charitable Deductions - IRC § 170

• Charitable contribution is the voluntary transfer of property without adequate consideration.

• Payments to a qualified organization are deductible as charitable contributions to the extent that they exceed the fair market value of any material benefit received in return.

• A § 170 deduction for the full amount is allowed only if the donor receives no substantial benefit from the contribution.

• If the taxpayer receives an item of value for a payment to a charitable organization:– Payment is not deductible unless taxpayer intends to make a gift,

and– Any deduction is limited to the excess of the payment over the fair

market value of what is received in exchange.

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Substantiation: Charitable Deductions, cont.

• Charitable deductions are allowed as a deduction only if verified under regulations prescribed by the Secretary.

– The obligation to substantiate charitable contribution deductions are clear and unambiguous.

– No disclosure statement is required when:• The goods or services given to a donor meet the standards for insubstantial value• There is no donative element involved in a particular transaction with a charity, or• There is only an intangible religious benefit provided to the donor.

• Taxpayer shall maintain for each contribution one of the following:– Cancelled check– Receipt from the donee charitable organization showing the name of the donee, date of

contribution and amount of contribution.– In the absence of a cancelled check or receipt from the donee, other reliable written

records showing the name of the donee, the date of contribution and amount of the contribution. .

• Non-Cash Charitable Contributions– Value is the fair market value at the time of the contribution.– Need name of donee, date and location of the contribution, and description of the

property.

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Substantiation: Employee Business Expenses - Form 2106• Purpose: Form is used if the taxpayer is an

employee deducting ordinary and necessary expenses for their job.– Ordinary Expense: common and accepted in the

taxpayer’s trade or business– Must be of a common or frequent occurrence in

the type of business involved– Necessary Expense: helpful and appropriate for

the taxpayer’s business• Must be directly connected with or pertaining

to the taxpayer’s trade or business.

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Substantiation: Business Use of a Home

• Qualifying for a Deduction for Business Use of a Home:– Taxpayer must use part of the home:

• Exclusively and regularly as principal place of business.• Exclusively and regularly as the place where taxpayers meets or deals with

patients, clients, or customers in the normal course of trade or business.• In the case of separate structure not attached to the home, in connection with

trade or business.• On a regular basis for certain storage use.• For rental use.• As a daycare facility.

• Where taxpayer’s business is conducted in part at a home office and in part at other locations, the following two primary factors are considered in determining whether the home office qualifies under IRC §280A(c)(1)(A) as the taxpayer’s principal place of business:

– Relative importance of activities performed at each business location, and– Amount of time spent at each location.

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Substantiation: Business Use of a Home, cont.

• Exclusive Use Test– To qualify, taxpayer must use a specific area of home solely for the purpose

of carrying on a trade or business.– Taxpayer does not meet requirements of exclusive use test if taxpayer uses

the area in question both for business and personal purposes.– Exception: If taxpayer uses part of the home for storage of inventory or

product samples, the taxpayer can deduct expenses for the business use of the taxpayer’s home without the exclusive use test it the taxpayer:

• Sells products at wholesale or retail as trade or business• Keeps inventory or product samples in the home as trade or business• Taxpayer’s home is the only fixed location of trade or business• Taxpayers uses the storage space on a regular basis, and• The space taxpayer uses is a separately identifiable space suitable for storage.

• Regular Use Test– Taxpayer must use specific area of taxpayer’s home for business on a

regular basis.• Incidental or occasional business use of not regular use.• Use must be continuous, ongoing, or recurring.

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Substantiation: Travel and Entertainment Expenses

• Taxpayer can deduct ordinary and necessary expenses incurred while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business.

• To deduct travel and entertainment expenses, taxpayer must not only satisfy the general requirements of IRC § 162 but also the strict substantiation requirements of IRC § 274(d).– The Cohan Doctrine cannot be used to estimate a deduction for

travel expenses. Schladweiler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-351, affd. 28 Fed. Appx. 602 (8th Cir. 2002).

– No deduction is allowed for travel and entertainment unless the taxpayer substantiates by adequate records or sufficient evidence corroborating the taxpayer’s own statement, the following elements:

• Amount of each separate expenditure• Date of departure and return and the number of days spent on

business• The place of destination of city, and• The business reason or expected business benefit from the travel.

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Substantiation: Travel and Entertainment Expenses, cont.

• A contemporaneous log is not required, but corroborative evidence used to support the deduction must have a high degree of probative value to elevate such statement to the level of credibility of a contemporaneous log.

• Travel away from the home generally requires that the taxpayer remain either overnight or for a period requiring sleep or rest.

• Taxpayers cannot deduct the daily cost of commuting to and from work, as such expenses is considered to be personal and nondeductible. Brockman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-3; Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 473-474 (1946).

• Taxpayers cannot deduct travel expenses for a spouse or dependent unless those person are employees or have a bona fide business purpose. IRC § 274(m)(3)(A) & (B).

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Substantiation: Entertainment Expenses

• Taxpayer can deduct entertainment expenses if they are both ordinary and necessary and meet one of the following tests.– Expenses must be directly related to the active conduct of the

taxpayer’s trade or business, or• Taxpayer must have had more than a generalized expectation of

deriving income or a specific benefit at some indefinite future time from those entertained.

• Expenses for entertainment, even if connected with the taxpayers trade or business, will generally be considered not directly related to active conduct of taxpayers trade or business if the entertainment occurred under circumstances where the was little or no possibility of engaging in the active conduct of trade or business.

– Meeting or discussion at a sporting event is generally considered a circumstance where there is little or no possibility of engaging in the active conduct of a trade or business. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c)(7)(ii)(a).

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Substantiation: Cellular Phone• Cell phones are listed property and require

substantiation. • Tash v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-

120. Court disallowed claimed cell phone expenses because the record did not indicate whether petitioner used his cellular phone for business and/or personal calls.

• The employer must require the employee to have the cell phone in order for it to be deductible.

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Dependency Exemption• Section 151(a) and (c) allows a taxpayers an annual

exemption deduction for each dependent as defined in section 152.– Dependent is either a qualifying child or a qualifying relative.– Four requirements: qualifying child means an individual:

• Who bears a relationship to the taxpayer described in paragraph (2)

• Who has the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half of such taxable year

• Who meets the age requirements of paragraph (3)• Who has not provided over one-half of such individual’s own

support for the calendar year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer begins, and

• Who has not filed a joint return with the individual’s spouse under section 6013.

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Section 152(e) Special Rule for Divorced Parents

• Non-custodial parent may be entitled to claim a dependency exemption deduction for a child notwithstanding the residency requirement of section 152(c)(1)(B), the support requirement of section 152(d)(1)(C), and the so-called tie-breaking rule of section 152(c)(4).

• A child will be treated as the non-custodial parent’s qualifying child or relative if five requirements are. See sec. 152(e)(1) and (2).

• Section 152(e)– A child who receives over one-half of the child’s support during the calendar year from

the child’s parents:• Who are divorced or legally separated under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance• Who are separated under a written separation agreement, or• Who live apart at all times during the last 6 months of the calendar year, and

– Such child is in the custody of 1 or both of the child’s parent for more than one-half of the calendar year, such child shall be treated as being the qualifying child or relative of the non-custodial parent if:

• The custodial parent signs a written declaration that such custodial parent will not claim such child as a dependent for any taxable year beginning in such calendar year

• The non-custodial parent attaches such written declaration to the non-custodial parent’s return

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Section 152(e) Special Rule for Divorced Parents, cont.

• The IRS has issued Form 8332 in order to standardize the written declaration requirement of section 152(e).

– Form 8332 requires:• Name of child.• Name and social security number of the non-custodial parent claiming the

dependency exemption deduction.• Social security number of the custodial parent.• Signature of the custodial parent.• Date of the custodial parent’s signature.• The years for which the claims were released.

• Form 8332 is not required but any other written declaration must conform to the substance of Form 8332. See Miller v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 184, 189 (2000), aff’d on another ground sub nom.

• Judge Vasquez held that attaching proof a custody arrangement does not satisfy Section 152. See Sanatana v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-49. The Court held that the mediation agreement attached to the return was so ambiguous as to not satisfy the requirements of Section 153(e).

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Free Exercise of Religion• Begay v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-

17. Taxpayer argued that her Navajo clan considered a child to be a member of the clan and therefore a qualifying child. – Court held that taxpayer not entitled to claim child

as dependent. – Section 152(c) does not require a taxpayer to

forego their religious beliefs nor deny a tax benefit because of such beliefs so exercise of religion argument not valid.

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Earned Income Credit

• Section 32(a) provides an earned income credit for an eligible individual for so much of the taxpayer’s earned income for the taxable year as does not exceed the earned income amount.– Eligibility is based on income and

qualifying children.

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First time home buyer credit• Section 36

– An individual who is a first-time homebuyer of a principal residence in the U.S. shall be allowed a credit of an amount equal to 10% of the purchase price but not exceeding $8,000.

• First time homebuyer means any individual if such individual had no present ownership interest in a principal residence during the 3-year period ending on the date of the purchase of the principal residence.

• Married Filing Separately: Credit is limited to $4,000.• Unmarried individuals allocate the credit.• Phase-out for income in excess of $125,000.• No credit is allowed for the purchase of an residence if the purchase price exceeds $800,000.• Purchaser must be over 18 years of age.

– Rodriguez v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2011-122. The Court held that the purchase of a home by a minor taxpayer’s parents by taxpayer’s guardian lacked economic substance, and thus under step transaction, taxpayer’s subsequent purchase of the home from guardian was effectively a purchase from the taxpayer’s parents that prohibited the taxpayer from claiming the first time homebuyer credit.

– Zampella v Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2012-359. The Tax Court held that the taxpayer did not “purchase” the home used to claim the credit. The taxpayer inherited a one-half interest in the home from his mother and purchased the other half from his brother.

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Witnesses• To compel the attendance of a witness at trial, a party can

obtain a subpoena from the Clerk’s office in Washington, D.C. or from the trial clerk at the trial session.

• As provided for in Tax Court Rule 147, the party must fill out the subpoena and have it served by the marshal or by another person who is not a party.

• Service is accomplished by delivering a copy of the subpoena to the witness and by tendering the witness’s fee for one day’s attendance and the mileage allowed by law.

• There is no geographical limit for service of a Tax Court subpoena.

• Under Tax Court Rule 147(b), a party may also use a subpoena to require a witness to produce books, papers, documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things.

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Settlement Options

82

Voluntary Binding Arbitration• Parties may move that any factual issue in controversy be

resolved through voluntary binding arbitration. A joint stipulation must accompany the motion, stating the issues to be resolved through arbitration and the parties’ agreement to be bound by the findings of the arbitrator. The arbitrator is appointed by Court order. Tax Court Rule 124.

• Report by Parties: the parties shall promptly report to the Court the findings made by the arbitrator and shall attach to their report any written report or summary that the arbitrator may have prepared.

• Selection and Payment of the Arbitrator– Parties must stipulate to a procedure for jointly selecting the

arbitrator with each party agreeing to pay one half of the arbitrator’s compensation, expenses and related fees. IRM 35.5.5.2 (08-11-2004).

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Voluntary Binding Arbitration, cont.• Limitations with Respect to the Arbitrator

– Information to be considered• Parties stipulation should precisely describe the kind of information and any

limitations related thereto that the arbitrator is permitted to consider.– Contacts with or by the arbitrator

• Stipulation should prohibit ex parte contacts with the arbitrator.– Scope of arbitrator’s work

• Stipulation should reflect that the arbitrator is not permitted to make any findings or provide reasoning that represents an interpretation of the law.

– Legal Guidance to the arbitrator• Any applicable legal guidance should be stipulated beforehand.• In extraordinary circumstances when some guidance has been overlooked, the

parties may further stipulate to the provision of legal guidance to the arbitrator.• General Supervisory Powers of the Court

– Parties must stipulate to the general supervisory powers of the court.– Stipulation should note that the case will be assigned to a particular judge or

special trial judge who will have continuing jurisdiction over the case.– The court’s participation is in the nature of oversight.

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Mediation• Mediation is a confidential process in which a neutral third party directs

settlement discussions.• Non-binding• Agreement to Mediate - IRM 35.5.5.8 (12-14-2010)

– The IRM states that the agreement should be as concise as possible but include the following elements:

• Specify the issues to be mediated• Provide how and when each party will present its case to the mediator• Might require each party to submit a list of participants• Contain an acknowledgment by the taxpayer that all participants shall have access to all

taxpayer’s returns• Prohibit ex-parte contacts with mediator• Acknowledgment of IRC § 7214(a)(8)• If Appeals mediator is selected, written agreement shall include a statement confirming the

employee’s proposed service as mediator and waiver of conflicts• Agreement should state that mediation is confidential• Any party may withdraw at any time• Any settlement reached shall not serve as an estoppel in any other proceeding• Schedule of dates

• Nothing contained in Tax Court Rule 124 shall be construed to exclude use by the parties of other forms of voluntary disposition of cases including mediation.

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Negotiating with Respondent’s Representatives

• Recently, Respondent’s counsel has brought an Appeals Officer to calendar calls to negotiate with taxpayers.– Taxpayers sometimes show up to calendar

call with records to substantiate claimed deductions that Respondent’s counsel has not previously seen.

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Remand• Absent limiting statutes, courts generally have “the inherent authority to

issue such orders as they deem necessary and prudent to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases,” Williams v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 920, 932 (1989) (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-65 (1980), and quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)).

• The Tax Court noted in Friday v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 220, 221-22 (2005), that the Court can remand to an agency if it retains jurisdiction over the underlying case, such as an Appeals Office does in a CDP determination.

• The Tax Court can remand in CDP cases when an Appeals officer abused his discretion in some way. See Med. Practice Solutions, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-214 (remanding because the Appeals officer determined to proceed with collection without making the requisite verifications).

• Tax Court can remand when the Appeals officer did not develop the record enough for the Court to properly review it. See Hoyle v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 197, 204-05 (2008).

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Remand, cont.• Tax Court has remanded where the law changed between the

CDP hearing and the Tax Court trial if that may have affected a taxpayer’s presentation of his case. Harrell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-271.

• Remand is appropriate in cases where there has been a material change in a taxpayers’ factual circumstances between the time of the hearing and the time a case is put on the trial calendar. See Churchill v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2011-182. – Court can remand a CDP case for consideration of changed

circumstances if it would be helpful, necessary or productive. • The hearing on remand provides the parties with the opportunity

to complete the initial IRC § 6320 hearing while preserving the taxpayer’s right to receive judicial review of the ultimate administrative determination. Kelby v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 79, 86 (2008); Wadleigh v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 280, 299 (2010).

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Settlement in “S” Cases• Purpose of the “S” case procedure is to reduce the time involved

in the preparation, execution, and filing of settlement documents in a small case.

• Computations: small cases may be settled on the basis of a specific dollar amount agreed upon by both parties to approximate the amount that would have been reached if formal computations had been made.

• Contact with Collection: if it would facilitate the settlement of a small case, consideration should be given to assisting the petitioner in making the initial contact with Collection.

• Counsel Settlement Memorandum: The Office of Chief Counsel encourages brevity in Counsel Settlement Memoranda in small case.

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Post-Trial Briefing

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Time for Filing Briefs• Simultaneous briefs

– Opening briefs within 75 days after conclusion of trial

– Answering briefs 45 days thereafter– The Court’s preference has been for simultaneous

briefs• Seriatim briefs

– Opening briefs within 75 days after conclusion of trial

– Answering brief within 45 days thereafter– Reply brief within 30 days after the due date of the

answering brief

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Points Relied Upon

• Centerpiece of the brief.– If reader is not persuaded after reading this

section, then brief should be rewritten or practitioner should consider settlement.

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Requested Findings of Fact• If written correctly from a properly tried case,

the argument section should be superfluous.• Should be viewed as the building one

detailed brick at a time.• Should be drawn from the record with very

little poetic license.• Should always be followed by one or more

citation to the record

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Argument• Carefully structured• Easy to follow• Precisely researched• Should provide the Court with the materials to draft a scholarly opinion in your

favor• Should provide the Court with powerful quotes or literary allusions• Citations must be precise• Avoid citing Memorandum decisions where regular opinions are available• Argument

– Start with affirmative contentions– Leave rebuttal material to the end or to the reply brief

• Form and neatness are important• Careful thought should be given to how the argument appears on the page

– Are there visual breaks– Are critical elements broken into subsections and underscored

• Tempo is important– Do arguments start strong and end strong?

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Reply Brief• Reply brief should be drawn only after

you have outlined the structure of your opponent’s argument.

• Argument in rebuttal should focus upon the critical points in your opponent’s structure.

• Remainder of the argument should seek to undermine the Court’s confidence in your opponent.

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Volunteer Attorneys/Students

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Tax Court Rule 24(a)(5) - Law Student Assistance Effective as of May 5, 2011• With the permission of the presiding Judge or Special

Trial Judge, and under the direct supervision of counsel in a case, a law student may assist such counsel by presenting all or any part of the party's case at a hearing or trial. In addition, a law student may assist counsel in a case in drafting a pleading or other document to be filed with the Court. A law student may not, however, enter an appearance in any case, be recognized as counsel in a case, or sign a pleading or other document filed with the Court. The Court may acknowledge the law student assistance.

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Student Participation in Court Proceedings Under the Academic Clinical• The Court will permit students who are enrolled in an

academic clinic for credit and in good standing with their school to participate in proceedings before the Court pursuant to the following procedures:– lead counsel who intends to request permission for a

student/fellow to participate in proceeding before the Court shall obtain from the petitioner advance written consent for the student/fellow to participate in the case. This written consent does not need to be submitted to the Court;

– when a case is called for trial, lead counsel shall answer the calendar call, advise the Court whether the case is ready for hearing or trial, and introduce any student/fellow enrolled in the academic clinic who seeks permission to participate in the proceedings;

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Academic Clinical, cont.• If the Court permits a student/fellow to participate in a case upon

compliance with the previous two requirements, lead counsel shall remain in the courtroom at petitioners’ counsel table at all times during the hearing or trial of the case. A student/fellow who is permitted to participate in a case may, at the discretion of the presiding Judge or Special Trial Judge, present all or any part of a petitioner’s case at a hearing or trial. A presiding Judge or Special Trial Judge may at any time exercise discretion to require the student/fellow to step aside and to require lead counsel to complete the hearing or trial.

• An academic clinic submitting a pleading, motion, stipulation, or other paper to the Court for filing may include a statement in the body of the document including the name of any student/fellow enrolled in the academic clinic who participated in the preparation of the document. However, a student/fellow may not sign a document submitted to the Court for filing.

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Additional Activities• Help develop record in petitioner’s counsel

room• Legal research• Draft subpoenas• Prepare post-trial briefs

– Deadlines– Oversight

• Prepare witness/petitioner for trial– Students can receive special admission from the

Court to practice• Admitted attorney requests for special admission

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Appeal

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Appeal• No appeal of “S” cases.• Venue is based on location of taxpayer’s

residence (individuals) or principal place of business (corporations) when petition was filed.

• Taxpayer and the government may agree to appeal to a different circuit. IRC § 7482.

• Notice of appeal must be filed within 90 days after entry of decision. IRC § 7483, Tax Court Rule 190.

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IRC § 7482(b)• If an issue does not fall under any of the

enumerated categories in IRC §7482(b)(1)(A) through (F), then the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia may review decisions of the Tax Court.– IRC § 6015 is not included in the enumerated

categories.• See James Bamberg, A Different Point of

Venue: The Plainer Meaning of Section 7482(b)(1), 61 Tax Lawyer 445 (Winter 2008).

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Tax Court Rule 201Incorporation of Model Rules

Practitioners before the Court shall carry on their practice in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Association (“ABA”).

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Before the Notice of Deficiency:The Government’s Obligation to Examine the Notice of

Deficiency and determine if it is supported by competent evidence.

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Greenberg’s Express v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 324 (1974) • The petitioners sought an order directing the IRS to produce

records relating to the examination of Thomas and Joseph Gambino by the IRS or the DOJ in order to show that the examination was not in good faith and for a legitimate purpose.– The Tax Court was not persuaded by mere allegation that the

government might destroy evidence supporting the Gambinos’ claims.

– Generally the Court will not look behind the Notice of Deficiency to examine the evidence used or the propriety of the IRS’s motives or of the administrative policy or procedure involved in making a determination. Human Engineering Institute v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 61, 66 (1973).

– The exception to that rule is that on occasion the Court will look behind the Notice of Deficiency when there is substantial evidence of unconstitutional conduct on the IRS’s part and the integrity of the judicial process would be impugned. Efrain T. Suarez v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 792 (1972).

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Weimerskirch v. Commissioner, 596 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1979)

• The “Naked Notice”• The Court held that there was no

presumption of correctness attached to a naked notice asserting omitted income, unsupported by any predicate evidence and the taxpayer is relieved of the burden of going forward with the evidence.

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Other Cases and MaterialsI.R.C. § 7491

• Burden shifts where taxpayer produces credible evidence.—– General rule.--If, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible

evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B, the Secretary shall have the burden of proof with respect to such issue.

• Limitations.--Paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to an issue only if—– the taxpayer has complied with the requirements under this title to

substantiate any item;– the taxpayer has maintained all records required under this title and has

cooperated with reasonable requests by the Secretary for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews; and

– in the case of a partnership, corporation, or trust, the taxpayer is described in section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii) Subparagraph (C) shall not apply to any qualified revocable trust (as defined in section 645(b)(1)) with respect to liability for tax for any taxable year ending after the date of the decedent's death and before the applicable date (as defined in section 645(b)(2)).

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Filing the Tax Court Petition

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Filing the Tax Court Petition• Issue:

– Can you file a Petition if you have no defense to the deficiency?

– Can you “require the government to prove its case?”• Answer:

– Probably Not. • A petitioner must introduce credible evidence before requiring

the government to prove their findings. Nevertheless, the failure to do so will generally not result in a penalty under sec. 6673 unless the court finds the petitioner is purposely delaying the process with a meritless “tax protester” claim or known frivolous defenses.

110

31 CFR § 10 Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service

• 31 U.S.C. §330. Practice before the Department– Under 31 U.S.C. § 330, the Secretary of the Treasury has the authority to

regulate and sanction all representatives practicing before the Treasury Department, including its agencies such as the IRS, and the applicable regulations are codified under 31 CFR § 10.

• IRS Circular 230, under the authority of 31 CFR § 10, spells out the duties and sanctions of all persons representing taxpayers before the Internal Revenue Service. Representatives, as described in the text, covers a wide range of tax practitioners including but not limited to CPA’s, tax attorneys, tax preparers, etc. The rules spelled out in this section, for the most part, mimic the candor and professionalism requirements of the ABA rules for Attorney Conduct.

– Specifically, 31 CFR § 10.20 requires that the practitioner have actual or good faith belief that the information provided to the court is accurate and true, with the following Sec. 10.21 and 10.22 referring to known client omissions and diligence to checking the accuracy of the information being presented to the court.

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111

31 CFR § 10, cont.• Sec. 10.23 further states that “a practitioner may not

unreasonably delay the prompt disposition of any matter before the Internal Revenue Service.” This sub-section, read in conjunction with the preceding ones, prohibits a practitioner from putting forth any matter that he has unreasonably failed check upon its truth and accuracy as it would cause a delay of the process.

• 31 CFR § 10.50 specifies the types and amount of sanctions that may be imposed on practitioners for a violation of the above rules and regulations. Namely, under this authority, the Secretary may, after notice and opportunity to respond, censure, suspend, or disbar any practitioner from appearing before the Department. Further, the Secretary may impose monetary penalties in an amount “not exceed[ing] the gross income derived (or to be derived) from the conduct giving rise to the penalty.”

112

I.R.C. § 6673 Sanctions and Costs Awarded by Courts

• Sec. 7491 states that the Secretary shall have the burden of proof if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issues relevant to his tax liability, and sec. 6673 imposes a penalty of up to $25,000.00 on any taxpayer who institutes or maintains a proceeding which is frivolous or groundless, or one brought about primarily for delay.

• In Coleman v. C.I.R., the Seventh Circuit described a frivolous petition as one that is “contrary to established law and unsupported by a reasoned, colorable argument for change in the law.” The court further explained that it uses a subjective bad faith test as well as an objective “should have known” test for determining whether the petitioner should be penalized under sec. 6673. In the majority of cases where petitioners have been unable to produce credible evidence to support their positions, the court has denied to impose a penalty under sec. 6673, leaving the taxpayers with a stern warning instead.

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113

I.R.C. § 6673, cont.• That was the case in Stewart v. C.I.R., where the court decided

not to impose penalties since at least one of the petitioner’s arguments was not frivolous. The court nevertheless stated that “[it] may impose this penalty in the future if he makes frivolous arguments or institutes proceedings primarily for delay.”

• Several courts however have penalized petitioners for advancing “tax protester” claims, or repeated groundless claims, or wholly frivolous claims for the sole purpose of causing delay. In Sauers v. C.I.R., the court penalized the petitioner under sec. 6673 for filing memos with his petition regarding “tax protester” arguments, and filing several lengthy documents purporting to be motions. Similarly in Wetzel v. C.I.R., the court imposed the penalty since “Petitioner [was] a professional tax return preparer who knew or should have known that his arguments are frivolous.”

114

ABA Rules of Attorney Conduct

• ABA Model Rule 3.3 – Candor Toward The Tribunal – A lawyer shall not knowingly:

• make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer

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115

I.R.C. § 7491

• General rule.--If, in any court proceeding, a taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayer for any tax imposed by subtitle A or B, the Secretary shall have the burden of proof with respect to such issue.

116

I.R.C. § 7491 Cont.• Limitations - Paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to

an issue only if:– the taxpayer has complied with the requirements under this

title to substantiate any item;– the taxpayer has maintained all records required under this

title and has cooperated with reasonable requests by the Secretary for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and interviews; and

– in the case of a partnership, corporation, or trust, the taxpayer is described in section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii) Subparagraph (C) shall not apply to any qualified revocable trust (as defined in section 645(b)(1)) with respect to liability for tax for any taxable year ending after the date of the decedent's death and before the applicable date (as defined in section 645(b)(2)).

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117

I.R.C. § 6673

• Tax Court proceedings—– Procedures instituted primarily for delay, etc.--

Whenever it appears to the Tax Court that—• proceedings before it have been instituted or maintained

by the taxpayer primarily for delay,• the taxpayer's position in such proceeding is frivolous or

groundless, or• the taxpayer unreasonably failed to pursue available

administrative remedies, the Tax Court, in its decision, may require the taxpayer to pay to the United States a penalty not in excess of $25,000.

118

ABA Model Rule 3.2 - Expediting Litigation

• A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.

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119

Abrams v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 82 T.C. 403 (1984)

• Court reprimanding petitioner saying that “[w]hen the costs incurred by this Court and respondent are taken into consideration, the maximum damages authorized by the statute do not begin to indemnify the United States for the expenses which petitioner's frivolous and groundless action has occasioned.”

120

Smith v. C.I.R., 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 377 (T.C. 2000)

• Concluding that “petitioner's position is frivolous and groundless and was instituted primarily for delay,” and setting a penalty of $3,500 under sec. 6673.

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121

Holmes v. C.I.R., 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1050 (T.C. 2006)

• Finding petitioner liable for instituting the procedures primarily for delay.

122

Answering the Petition

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123

Issue• Does the government have to admit that

documents necessary to calculate deficiency or statute of limitations are "lost?”

• Answer: Probably Not.

• Are there any civil counterparts to Brady, Jencks and Giglio?

124

Brady, Jencks and Giglio• The discovery obligations of federal

prosecutors are generally established by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 16 and 26.2, 18 U.S.C. §3500 (the Jencks Act), Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).

• Are there any civil counterparts to Brady, Jencks and Giglio?

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125

Answer• Although there is considerable debate over whether

government agencies are even held to the same standards as criminal prosecutors when handling evidence, it is largely accepted that mere negligence, without more, is not grounds for a finding of Due Process violation.

• There seems to be no settled law on this issue, as explained in Garavaglia v. C.I.R., however a closer analysis of related legal principles may provide a glimpse into a yet to be determined area of tax court procedure.

126

IRM 13.1.15/ § 1203 Employee Misconduct Allegation

• Internal sources, taxpayers, or third parties may refer improper behavior by an IRS agent to his manager or the Human Capital Office, Employee Conduct and Compliance Office (ECCO) pursuant to § 1203 by filling a Form 12217.

• Sec. 1203 covers the following types of IRS agent and employee misconduct:

– False statements under oath;– Falsification of documents;– Assault or battery;– Misuse of IRC § 6103 (Disclosure);– Threat of Audit;– Seizure violations;– Infringement of taxpayer’s constitutional rights;– Harassment/Retaliation;– Discrimination;– Failure to file; or– Understatement of liability.

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127

Brady Rule Consideration• Most courts have rejected the application of Brady to civil and

administrative hearings. In Mister Disc. Stockbrokers, Inc. v. S.E.C., the Seventh Circuit very methodically disclaimed the petitioner’s argument.

– First, the court noted that the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure are not applicable in administrative hearings, and that each agency can create their own discovery rules so long as they insure that fundamental fairness is met as required for due process. Also, the court pointed out that administrative proceedings do not warrant such extensive discovery rules as criminal proceedings since the possible penalties are not as severe, even if they are “quasi-criminal” as described by the petitioner in the case.

– In U.S. ex rel. (Redacted) v. (Redacted), the court once again pointed to the fundamentally different consequences of a civil case from a criminal sanction as the reason for denying a Brady-like discovery request.

– In Tandon v. C.I.R., the application of the Brady rule was denied simply because “the [c]ircuit has never applied the Brady rule to a civil proceeding for determining the amount of one's tax liability.”

128

Brady Rule Consideration, cont.• Only a few courts have dared to rule that the Brady rule should

also apply to civil and administrative hearings, the most notable being the Southern District Court of New York in Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. FTC. – In Sperry, the court said that “the essentials of due process at the

administrative level require similar disclosures by the agency where consistent with the public interest. In civil actions, also, the ultimate objective is not that Government “shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”

– Similarly, in Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Los Alamos Constructors, Inc., ruling on an appeal from an administrative hearing, the court firmly believed that “the responsibilities of government lawyers [are] fully applicable to government counsel in civil cases.” This was based on the idea that U.S. Attorneys are representatives of a sovereignty and thus should be impartial in all dealings. This line of argument has gained little traction in recent years, as civil and administrative courts seem to favor judicial economy.

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129

Other Cases and Materials• Ferguson v. Roper, 400 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2005).

– Court did not find a Due Process violation in the prosecution’s loss of potentially exculpatory evidence “[a]bsent a showing of bad faith on the part of the police or prosecutor,” which petitioner could not provide.

• Dixon v. C.I.R., 316 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2003).– Court imposed sanctions upon Respondents in Tax Court for

manipulating witnesses and destroying or hiding exculpatory evidence stating that “When we conclude that the integrity of the judicial process has been harmed, however, and the fraud rises to the level of “an unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to improperly influence the court in its decisions,” we not only can act, we should.”

130

Other Cases and Materials, cont.

• N.L.R.B. v. Nueva Eng'g, Inc., 761 F.2d 961 (4th Cir. 1985).– On appeal from an administrative hearing, court finds Brady

rule request meritless stating that “an action for violations of the National Labor Relations Act is civil in nature, does not involve potential incarceration and violation of the Act does not carry with it the stigma of a criminal conviction.”

• Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993).– Court finding in favor of applying the Brady rule considering

that “the consequences of denaturalization and extradition [are] equal or exceed those of most criminal convictions.”

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131

Other Cases and Materials, cont.

• Justin Goetz, Hold Fast the Keys to the Kingdom: Federal Administrative Agencies and the Need for Brady Disclosure, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1424, 1435-36 (2011).– Article explores the role of Brady/Giglio in administrative

court hearings by comparing several agencies’ procedures with the Federal Rules, ultimately declaring “this results in two separate standards for civil defendants--greater protections in Article III courts and lesser protections in the Article I courts hitherto profiled in addition to the substantial differences in due process protections between Brady criminal defendants and civil enforcement defendants.”

132

ABA Model Rule 3.3 – Candor Toward The Tribunal

• A lawyer shall not knowingly:– make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to

correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;

– fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or

– offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.

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133

ABA Model Rule 3.3, cont.• A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding

and who knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.

• The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.

• In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.

134

ABA Model Rule 3.4 – Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel

• A lawyer shall not:– unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or

unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act;

– falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law;

– knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists;

– in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party;

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135

ABA Model Rule 3.4, cont.• A lawyer shall not:

– in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused; or

– request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless:

– the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client; and

– the lawyer reasonably believes that the person’s interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such information.

136

Backdating a/k/a Temporal Modification of Documents

• Not necessarily illegal or unethical if the document seeks to be effective as of a prior date. A document may be backdated to memorialize past action or intent. The threshold question is whether the event occurred on the backdate or whether the event occurred on another date.

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137

Backdating That Fabricates

– U.S. Projector & Elec. Corp. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1969-549 for the finding that the act of executing rescission agreement fixed petitioner’s liability to return funds previously received, the event which determined the timing of a tax deduction. The back dating was the event that fixed the resulting tax treatment, not memorializing it.

– United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 1997) involved an attorney who sought to conceal his client’s assets from the IRS by backdating promissory notes to make it appear that the client was obligated to repay certain unconditionally received amounts.

– Medieval Attraction N.V. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 924 (1996) involved an effort to claim tax deductions by backdating documents to make it appear that intangible property had been transferred to a related party so that payments to the related party could be treated as tax deductible royalties.

138

Other Taxpayers' Files (Offensive and Defensive Use of sec. 6103)

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139

Issue• Under what circumstances can the

government use information in another taxpayer's files against a petitioner in Tax Court?

• Under what circumstances can the petitioner in Tax Court access information in another taxpayer's file?

• Prior reports of IRS agents acting as government experts.

140

Answer• The analysis of I.R.C. § 6103 inherently begins with 5 U.S.C. §

552, commonly known as the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). – Requests for tax returns and other documents held by Federal

Agencies are done under FOIA and thus, all of its exemptions apply.

– Of particular interest to tax petitioners are Exemptions 3 and 5. Under Exemption 3, the government may prevent the release of records that are “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute.”

– In this light, sec. 6103 becomes relevant in that it requires that “returns and return information” remain confidential unless otherwise authorized by Title 26.

– Exemption 5 protects inter-or intra-agency letters or memoranda “which would not be available by law to a party ... in litigation with the agency.

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141

Answer, cont.• The government may access information in another taxpayers

return if the information fits within the parameters of sec. 6103(h)(4), allowing disclosure of a return “(B) if the treatment of an item reflected on such return is directly related to the resolution of an issue in the proceeding; (C) if such return or return information directly relates to a transactional relationship between a person who is a party to the proceeding and the taxpayer which directly affects the resolution of an issue in the proceeding.” – In In re U.S., the court, following a lengthy statutory de-construction

analysis, held that “directly related” language should be read narrowly, saying that “[t]he disclosure of a third party return in a tax proceeding will be subject to [an items-test], except that such items ... must have a direct relationship to the resolution of an issue of the taxpayer's liability.”

– Violation of Sec. 6103 disclosure rules is among the listed grounds for a Sec. 1203 Complaint against an IRS Agent/ employee.

142

IRS Reports under FOIA• IRS reports have been generally held as attorney-

work product or as part of the agency’s “deliberative process” and privileged under FOIA Exemption 5.1 The protection of reports as “deliberative process” is designed to prevent the release of inter or intra-agency communication made as part of the government’s decision and policy making process. “A document is predecisional if it was prepared in order to assist an agency decisionmaker in arriving at his decision, rather than to support a decision already made.”

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143

Other Cases and Materials• ABA Model Rule 3.4

– See above• ABA Model Rule 4.4 Respect For Rights Of Third

Persons– In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that

have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.

– A lawyer who receives a document or electronically stored information relating to the representation of the lawyer's client and knows or reasonably should know that the document or electronically stored information was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.

144

What third-party contacts must the government disclose? Does I.R.C.

§ 7602 apply in Tax Court?

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145

Westreco, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-501

• Counsel for Respondent was actively involved in an audit of the taxpayer for years subsequent to what the Court was considering. During the audit process counsel for Respondent issued administrative summonses for documents and testimony of the taxpayers’ employees under I.R.C. 7602. The issues before the Court and with the audit were substantially similar.– The Tax Court held that counsel’s participation in the audit

undermined the Tax Court’s rules of discovery. – The Tax Court was also concerned that the stipulation process

would be made more difficult and greatly delayed while subsequent years’ summons were pursued.

– Respondent would also be unable to provide a full and timely response to the taxpayer’s discovery request. Respondent’s litigating posture would be continually be delayed and would depend on the progress of the subsequent year examination.

146

Mary Kay Ash v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 459 (1991)

• The Court found that summons issued before the filing of petition were not subject to Westreco restrictions.

• The Court was also unwilling to restrict information gathered through issuance of summons before the petition was filed but resulted in information being gathered post-petition. The Court noted that it was unable to enforce its discovery rules prior to the filing of a petition.

• The opinion was reviewed by the Court with Judges Nims, Korner, Shields, Hamblen, Cohen, Clapp, Gerber, Jacobs, Parr, Wells, Colvin, and Halpern agreeing with the majority.

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147

Protective Orders• Excessive Discovery

– The Tax Court may order a protective order where the IRS engages in inappropriate and excessive formal discovery without any conference between the parties.

• Protective orders from other courts– The Tax Court has allowed the Commissioner

access to documents in another case that was subject to a protective order by the other court.

148

Communication with Persons Represented by Counsel

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149

Can the Government contact employees of the Taxpayer?

• ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2:– In representing a client, a lawyer shall not

communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.

150

Can the Government contact employees of the Taxpayer, cont.

• Comment [7] provides:– In the case of a represented organization, this Rule prohibits

communications with a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with the organization’s lawyer concerning the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with respect to the matter or whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability. Consent of the organization’s lawyer is not required for communication with a former constituent. If a constituent of the organization is represented in the matter by his or her own counsel, the consent by that counsel to a communication will be sufficient for purposes of this Rule. Compare Rule 3.4(f). In communicating with a current or former constituent of an organization, a lawyer must not use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of the organization. See Rule 4.4.

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151

• Model Rule 4.2 advances the well recognized public policy favoring the preservation and protection of the attorney-client relationship. See Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 148 F.R.D. 259, 260 (S.D.Iowa 1993).

152

Communicating with Former Employees -FU Investment Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 408 (1995)

• The Tax Court was asked to address whether the protection of Model Rule 4.2 extended to former employees of a corporation/petitioner.

– The Court in holding that Rule 4.2 does not extend to former employees, cited the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Opinion 91-359 in which the ABA takes the view that Rule 4.2 should not be interpreted to prohibit ex-parte communications with former employees.

– The Court was cautious in that they recognized that circumstances may arise where certain precautions (including a narrowly drawn protective order) may be warranted to ensure that such ex-parte contacts are not simply a forum for counsel to seek information protected by the attorney-client privilege.

– The Court advised Respondent that they must advise former employees that respondent and petitioner are adverse parties to a proceeding and that the attorney must conduct the interview in conformity with Model Rule 4.3 (Dealing with Unrepresented Persons).

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153

Henthorn Motions• U.S. v. Henthorn, 931 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1991)

provides that, in the context of a criminal case, the government must disclose information favorable to the defense that meets the appropriate standard of materiality. The government is obligated upon a defendant’s request to examine the personnel files of government employees it intends to call as witnesses in a criminal trial in order to determine if any portions of the files ought to be made available to the defense for impeachment purposes once the defense has made a demand for their production.

154

IRS Treatment of Requests for Personnel Records

• IRM § 11.3.35.8.1 (01-01-2006)– Requests and demands for testimony and/or

production of personnel and payroll records in private litigation or administrative proceedings is coordinated by the IRS Disclosure Office with the Transactional Processing Center (TPC).

– The Office of Personnel Management regulations require that subpoenas for personnel records must be approved by a judge or magistrate of a court of competent jurisdiction in order to meet the court order exception in the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. §552a(b)(11)).

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155

5 U.S.C. 552a - FOIA• Exemption 11

– No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains, unless disclosure of the record would be pursuant to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction.

156

FOIA Exemption 6

• 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6) generally prohibits the disclosure of personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.

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157

IRS Employee Timesheets

• Federal Courts have held that disclosure of an IRS employees time sheets, which are “similar” to personnel files, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

158

Immunizing Witnesses

• What efforts can and should the government take to immunize witnesses needed by a taxpayer?

• In the context of criminal cases 18 U.S.C. § 6002 grants prosecutors broad discretion to grant immunity to a witness, but grants no right to defendant to do the same.

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159

Immunizing Witnesses, cont.• The Third Circuit has recognized a judicial authority

to grant immunity “when it is found that a potential defense witness can offer testimony which is clearly exculpatory and essential to the defense case and when the government has not strong interest in withholding immunity. See Gov’t of V.I. v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 974 (3d Cir. 1980).

• United States v. Burke, 425 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2005) recognizes the principle that, although the court cannot order the government to immunize a defense witness, courts can dismiss an indictment where the prosecutor’s refusal to grant immunity has violated the defendant’s right to due process.

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A VIEW FROM THE BENCH

WHEN: Monday, September 23, 2013, 6:00 PM – 9:00 PM Seminar from 6:00 PM – 8:00 PM Reception from 8:00 PM – 9:00 PM WHERE: New York County Lawyers’ Association 14 Vesey Street New York, NY 10007 FEATURING: TOPICS: THE HONORABLE JOHN COLVIN United States Tax Court

How to Effectively Represent the Previously Self-Represented

Ethical Issues Concerning Pro Bono Representation

RECEPTION SPONSORED BY:

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1. Tax Court Jurisdiction

a. Common Notices in Pro Bono Cases Which Are Predicates to US Tax CourtJurisdiction:

i. Notice of deficiency - Before the IRS can assess and collect certain typesof taxes (e.g., income tax, estate and gift tax), a notice of deficiency mustbe issued to the taxpayer or a notice of liability to a transferee.

(1) If a notice of deficiency is issued, the recipients have the right,within specified time limits, to litigate the correctness of thedeficiency, or the extent of transferee liability in the Tax Courtwithout first paying the tax. IRC §6213(a)

ii. Notice of Determination - The Tax Court has jurisdiction under IRC§6330(d)(1) with respect to a timely filed petition disputing a valid noticeof determination issued by an Appeals officer. See Lunsford v. CIR, 117T.C. 159 (2001)

iii. Final Notice of Determination with Respect to IRC § 6015 relief. IRC§6015

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2. U.S. Tax Court Petition

a. Petition:

i. Filing Fee

(1) The Tax Court recently simplified the Application for Waiving ofFiling Fee so that it is easier to fill out.

ii. General

(1) Deficiency or Liability Action

(a) Should conform to Form 1 shown in Appendix I of the TaxCourt Rules, and

(b) Shall comply with the requirements of the Rules relating toPleadings.

iii. Content of Petition in Deficiency or liability action:

(1) Individual

(a) Petitioner’s name

(b) State of legal residence

(c) mailing address

(d) The office of the IRS with which the tax return for theperiod in controversy was filed

(e) the date of the Notice of Deficiency or liability, or otherproper allegations showing jurisdiction of the Court, andthe City and State of the Office of the IRS which issued theNotice.

(f) The amount of the deficiency or liability

(g) The nature of the tax

(h) the year or years for which the determination was made

(i) Clear and concise assignments of each and every errorwhich the petitioner alleges to have been committed by theCommissioner in the determination of the deficiency orliability

(i) Any issued not raised in the assignment of errorshall be deemed to be conceded.

(j) Clear and concise statements of the facts on which the

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petitioner bases the assignment of error, except for issues towhich the burden of proof is on the Commissioner

(k) A prayer setting forth the relief sought by the petitioner

(l) The signature, mailing address, and telephone number ofeach petitioner or petitioner’s counsel as well as counsel’sTax Court bar number.

(i) Rule 33(a) was amended July 6, 2012 to state thatEach pleading shall be signed in the mannerprovided in Rule 23. Where there is more than oneattorney of record, the signature of only one isrequired. Except when otherwise specificallydirected by the Court, pleadings need not beverified or accompanied by affidavit or declaration.

(m) A copy of the Notice of deficiency or liability

iv. Rule 23(g): Effective as of July 6, 2012. Prohibits the Clerk from refusingto file a paper because it is not in the form prescribed by the Rules.

b. Answer

i. The Commissioner shall have 60 days from the date of service of the dateof service of the petition within which to file an answer, or 45 days fromthat date within which to move with respect to the petition.

ii. Form and Content

(1) The answer should be drawn so that it will advise the petitionerand the Court fully of the nature of the defense.

iii. Effect: every material allegation set out in the petition and not expresslyadmitted or denied in the answer shall be deemed to be admitted.

c. Reply

i. Time to reply or move

(1) Petitioner shall have 45 days from the date of service of the answerwithin which to file a reply, or 30 days from that date within whichto move with respect to the answer.

ii. Form and Content:

(1) In response to each material allegation in the answer and the factsin support thereof on which the Commissioner has the burden ofproof, the reply shall contain a specific admission or denial

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1 Unless otherwise noted all references to Rules are to the U.S. Tax Court Rules.

(a) if the petitioner is without knowledge or informationsufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation,the petitioner shall so state.

iii. New Material:

(1) Any new material contained in the reply shall be deemed to bedenied.

d. Timely Petition required: in all cases, the jurisdiction of the Court also dependson the timely filing of a petition.

i. Contempt of Court: may be punished by fine or imprisonment within thescope of IRC § 7456(c).

(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as toobstruct the administration of justice

(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions; or

(3) Disobedience or resistence to its lawful writ, process, order, rule,decree, or command

ii. Bankruptcy and Receivership

(1) For bankruptcy, see 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(8) and IRC 6213(f)(1).

(2) For receivership, see IRC §6871(c)(2).

e. Pleadings

i. Initial Pleadings

(1) Petition (90 days). Rule 20.1

(2) Answer (60 days). Rule 36.

(3) Reply (45 days). Rule 37.

ii. General rules

(1) Purpose of pleadings is to give the parties and the Court fair noticeof the matters in controversy and the basis for their respectivepositions

(2) Each averment to a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.

(a) There are no technical forms of pleading

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(3) Consistency:

(a) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim ordefense alternatively or hypothetically

(b) If two or more statements are made in the alternative andone of them would be sufficient if made independently, thepleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency ofone or more of the alternative claims. Rule 31(c).

(4) All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice.

iii. Form - Rule 32

(1) Caption; Names of parties: every pleading must contain a captionsetting forth:

(a) The name of the Court

(b) The title of the case

(c) The docket number, and

(d) A designation to show the nature of the pleading

(2) Separate statement: all averments of claim or defense, andsupporting statements, shall be made in separately designatedparagraphs

(a) Each paragraph should be limited to a single item or singleset of circumstances

(3) Adoption by reference: statements may be adopted by reference ina different part of the same pleading or in another pleading or inany motion

iv. Signing of Pleadings

(1) The signature of counsel or a party constitutes a certificate by thesigner that the signer has:

(a) read the pleading, and

(b) that, to the best of the signer’s knowledge, information, andbelief formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well groundedin fact and is warranted by existing law, or a good faithargument for an extension, modification, or reversal ofexisting law; and that it is not interposed for any improperpurpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay orneedless increase in the cost of litigation.

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(2) The signature of counsel constitutes a representation by counselthat counsel is authorized to represent the party on whose behalfthe pleading is filed.

f. Standing Pretrial Order:

i. Issued with notice of trial at the direction of the trial judge to facilitate theorderly and efficient disposition of all cases on the trial calendar

ii. Failure to comply with the standing pretrial order may subject a party orcounsel to sanctions. Rule 131.

iii. A sample pre-trial order is included in the Exhibits section.

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3. Pre-trial motions

a. Motion for judgment on the pleadings - Tax Court Rule 120

i. Motion for summary judgment

(1) Matters outside the pleading are presented to the Court withsupporting affidavits

(2) Summary judgment may be requested upon all or any part of thelegal issues in controversy

(a) if faced with a motion for summary judgment, practitionersshould be prepared to argue that a genuine issue of materialfacts does exists necessitating trial

(3) Decision will be rendered as a matter of law if there is no genuineissue as to any material fact - Tax Court rule 121.

ii. Motion to Submit Case Without Trial

(1) Party may move to submit case without trial if the submission ofevidence is not needed because sufficient facts have been admitted,stipulated, established by deposition, or included in the record insome other way - Tax Court Rule 122.

iii. Motion in Limine

(1) Motion to exclude certain evidence or expert report on groundsthat it is privileged, its relevance is outweighed by risk of prejudiceor confusion, or it is cumulative.

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4. Pre-Trial Activities

a. Duty to Disclose/Informal Discovery

i. The Court expects the parties to attempt to attain the objective ofdiscovery through informal consultation or communication before usingthe Tax Court discovery rules. See Branerton v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.6911 692 (1974).

ii. The standing pretrial order typically requires the parties to exchange alldocuments and other evidence that they intend to use at trial (except forimpeachment purposes) at least 14 days before trial.

(1) The Court may exclude documents not exchanged in accordancewith standing pretrial order unless good cause is shown.

b. Formal Discovery

i. Interrogatories - Tax Ct. R. 71

(1) Unless otherwise stipulated or ordered by the Court, a party mayserve upon any other party no more than 25 written interrogatories,including all discrete subparts but excluding interrogatoriesdescribed in paragraph (d) of this Rule, to be answered by theparty served or, if the party served is a public or privatecorporation or a partnership or association or governmentalagency, by an officer or agent who shall furnish such informationas is available to the party. A motion for leave to serve additionalinterrogatories may be granted by the Court to the extent consistentwith Rule 70(c)(1).

ii. Requests for Production of Documents or Things. Tax Ct. R. 72.

iii. Tax Ct. R. 70 Recent Amendments

(1) Tax Ct. R. 70(a)(2)

(a) Discovery shall not be commenced, without leave of Court,before the expiration of 30 days after joinder of issue (seeRule 38). Discovery shall be completed and any motion tocompel or any other motion with respect to such discoveryshall be filed, unless otherwise authorized by the Court, nolater than 45 days prior to the date set for call of the casefrom a trial calendar. Discovery by a deposition under Rule74(c) may not be commenced before a notice of trial hasbeen issued or the case has been assigned to a Judge orSpecial Trial Judge and any motion to compel or any othermotion with respect to such discovery shall be filed withinthe time provided by the preceding sentence. Discovery of

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matters which are relevant only to the issue of a party'sentitlement to reasonable litigation or administrative costsshall not be commenced, without leave of Court, before amotion for reasonable litigation or administrative costs hasbeen noticed for a hearing, and discovery shall becompleted and any motion to compel or any other motionwith respect to such discovery shall be filed, unlessotherwise authorized by the Court, no later than 45 daysprior to the date set for hearing.

(2) Tax Ct. R. 70(b):

(a) The information or response sought through discovery mayconcern any matter not privileged and which is relevant tothe subject matter involved in the pending case. It is notground for objection that the information or responsesought will be inadmissible at the trial, if that informationor response appears reasonably calculated to lead todiscovery of admissible evidence, regardless of the burdenof proof involved. If the information or response sought isotherwise proper, it is not objectionable merely because theinformation or response involves an opinion or contentionthat relates to fact or to the application of law to fact. Butthe Court may order that the information or responsesought need not be furnished or made until somedesignated time or a particular stage has been reached inthe case or until a specified step has been taken by a party.

(3) Tax Ct. R. 70(c):

(a) The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods setforth in paragraph (a) shall be limited by the Court if itdetermines that: (A) The discovery sought is unreasonablycumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some othersource that is more convenient, less burdensome, or lessexpensive; (B) the party seeking discovery has had ampleopportunity by discovery in the action to obtain theinformation sought; or (C) the discovery is undulyburdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs ofthe case, the amount in controversy, limitations on theparties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stakein the litigation. The Court may act upon its own initiativeafter reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under Rule103.

iv. Requests for Admissions. Tax Ct. R. 90.

v. Witness Interviews

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vi. Depositions

(1) Allowed with consent of the parties

(2) Expert witness on its own motion

c. Stipulations

i. Rule 91

(1) Required:

(a) Parties are required to stipulate, to the fullest extent towhich complete or qualified agreement can or fairly shouldbe reached, all matters not privileged which are relevant tothe pending case, regardless of whether such mattersinvolve fact or opinion or the application of law to fact.

(2) Comprehensive:

(a) the fact that any matter may have been obtained throughdiscovery or requests for admission is not grounds foromitting such matter from the stipulation

(3) Form:

(a) In writing

(b) Signed by the parties thereto or by their counsel

(c) shall observe the requirements of Tax Court Rule 23 as toform and style of papers, except the stipulation shall befiled in duplicate but only one set of exhibits shall be filed

(4) Filing:

(a) Shall be filed by the parties at or before the commencementof trial

(b) a stipulation when filed does not need to be offeredformally to be considered in evidence

(5) Objections:

(a) any objection to all or part of a stipulation should be notedin the stipulation

(6) Binding Effect

(a) a stipulation shall be treated as a conclusive admission bythe parties to the stipulation

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(7) Noncompliance by a party:

(a) Motion to Compel Stipulation: If, after the date of issuanceof trial notice in a case, a party has refused or failed toconfer with an adversary with respect to entering into astipulation, the party proposing stipulation may file amotion to compel stipulation not less than 45 days prior tothe date set for call of the case from a trial calendar.

ii. Branerton Conference

(1) Bedrock of Tax Court practice. See Branerton Corp. v.Commissioner, 61 T.C. 691 (1974).

(2) Discovery and requests for admissions may not be commenced bya party until after that party has made a meaningful, good faithattempt to attain the objectives of discovery through informalconsultation or communication.

iii. IRM 35.4.3.2 (08-11-2004)

iv. What is available in Petitioner’s counsel room to help draft a stipulation?

(1) Transcripts

(2) Practitioners should have access to computer for internet accessand word processing program

(3) Www.IRS.gov

(4) Tax Court website - www.ustaxcourt.gov

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5. Trial

a. Tax Court stuffer notice

i. The Tax Court recently updated its procedures with respect to low-incometax payers and access to Low Income Taxpayer Clinics (“LITC”).

ii. The Tax Section of the ABA, the Office of Chief Counsel and theTaxpayer Advocate were all concerned that low income taxpayers werenot given enough notice of the existence of LITCs.

(1) Currently the Tax Court send stuffer notices to self-representedtaxpayers upon acknowledgment of the filing of a petition andwhen the case is calendared for trial. Beginning October 1, 2013the Court will start sending stuffer notices 30 days in advance oftrial.

b. Use of Counsel Rooms

i. LITCs and Bar sponsored calendar call programs have use of petitioner’scounsel room on the morning of the calendar call.

c. Change of Address

i. The Court will send a change of address form (Form 10) with theacknowledgment of the petition to remind petitioners that they need tonotify the Court when they change their address.

(1) Tax Ct. R. 21(b)(4) requires petitioners to inform the Court of achange of address.

d. Call of the Calendar

i. Time

(1) The new 30 day notice of LITCs sent to self-represented taxpayersencourages the taxpayer to arrive by 9AM on the date of thecalendar call. The Court is now requesting practitionersparticipating in a calendar call program to arrive at the Court atleast one hour before the beginning of the calendar call.

ii. General

(1) A regular trial session of the Tax Court is ordinarily scheduled forone to two weeks.

(2) Trial session commences with call of the calendar

(3) When a case is called at the calendar, the taxpayer’s counsel (ortaxpayer if pro se) and respondent’s counsel must be prepared to

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inform the judge whether the case has been settled and, if so, tostate for the record the basis of the settlement or to submit awritten stipulation of the settlement.

(4) If the parties have not reached a basis of settlement, the case willbe set for trial.

(5) Stipulation of Facts

(a) Pro se taxpayers routinely do not prepare stipulations offact

(b) Respondent prepares Stipulations of fact for taxpayers tosign

(c) Petitioner’s counsel must counsel taxpayers on the need tostipulate and the binding nature of stipulations

e. Standards of Review:

i. Deficiency

(1) Montgomery v. CIR, 122 T.C. 1 (2004)

(a) A person who has not received a notice of deficiency andhas not had a prior administrative or judicial opportunity tochallenge the amounts assessed may challenge the liabilityas part of the collection review procedure.

ii. Innocent Spouse relief under IRC § 6015(f)

(1) De novo. See Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 11.

iii. Innocent Spouse relief under § 6015(b) and (c):

(1) De novo. See Porter v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 11.

iv. When reviewing IRS determination under IRC §§ 6330/6320 - CDP

(1) Abuse of discretion

(a) Reliance on a failure to pay current taxes in rejecting acollection alternative does not constitute an abuse ofdiscretion. See Orum v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 1 (2004).

f. Burden of Proof

i. Tax Court Rule 142

(1) In general the burden of proof is on the petitioner, except asotherwise provided for by statute or determined by the Court

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(2) Exceptions:

(a) New matters

(b) Increase in deficiency

(c) Affirmative defenses

(3) Fraud

(a) In any case involving fraud with intent to evade tax, theburden of proof is on the respondent

(i) Standard is clear and convincing evidence

(4) Transferee liability

(a) Burden of proof is on the respondent to show that apetitioner is liable as a transferee of property of a taxpayer,but not to show that the taxpayer was liable for the tax. SeeIRC § 6901(a).

ii. IRC § 7491

(1) 7491(a):

(a) Taxpayer can shift the burden to respondent if, in any courtproceeding,:

(i) taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respectto any factual issue relevant to ascertaining theliability of the taxpayer

(ii) taxpayer has complied with requirements of theCode to substantiate any item

(iii) taxpayer has maintained all records required underthe code. See Sec. 6001; Sec. 1.6001-1(a), IncomeTax Regs. for record keeping requirements.

(iv) taxpayer has cooperated with reasonable requestsby the Secretary for witnesses, information,documents, meetings and interviews, and

(v) in the case of a partnership, corporation, or trust, thetaxpayer is described in IRC § 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii).

(b) See Jones, “The Burden of Proof 10 Years After the Shift,”121 Tax Notes 287 (October 20, 2008) for an analysisleading to the conclusion that in most cases the shift hashad no impact and the decision is ultimately based on the

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preponderance of the evidence.

(c) See Knudsen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2007-340 and131 T.C. 185 (2008) (supplemental op.).

(d) See Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. No. 28 (2001).

(2) 7491(b):

(a) Secretary has the burden of proof in any court proceedingwith respect to any item of income which wasreconstructed by the Secretary solely through the use ofstatistical information of unrelated taxpayers.

(3) 7491(c) Penalties

(a) Secretary has the burden of production with respect toliability for penalties, additions to tax, or additionalamounts imposed

(b) Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. No. 28 (2001).:Commissioner must come forward with sufficient evidenceindicating that it is appropriate to impose the relevantpenalty

(i) once the Commissioner meets his burden ofproduction, the taxpayer must come forward withevidence sufficient to persuade a Court that theCommissioner’s determination if incorrect. SeeHigbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. No. 128 (2001).

iii. IRC § 6201(d)

(1) If an information return serves as the basis for the determination ofa deficiency, IRC § 6201(d) provides that in any court proceeding,if:

(a) Taxpayer asserts a reasonable dispute with respect toincome reported on an information return, and

(b) Taxpayer has fully cooperated with the Commissioner, thenthe Commissioner has the burden of producing reasonableand probative information in addition to the informationreturn.

g. Evidence

i. Rule 143: trials before the Court will be conducted in accordance with therules of evidence applicable in trials without a jury in the U.S. DistrictCourt for the District of Columbia.

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ii. Hearsay

(1) FRE 802: an out of court statement introduced to prove the truth ofthat statement

(2) Applicable exceptions in Tax Court

(a) FRE 803(6) Business Records

(i) A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation,in any form of acts, events, conditions, opinions, ordiagnoses, made at or near the time by, or frominformation transmitted by, a person withknowledge, if kept in the course of a regularlyconducted business activity, and if it was theregular practice of that business to make the record

(ii) The records can be introduced with the testimony ofthe custodian of records or by certification thatcomplies with FRE 902(11), FRE 902(12), or astatute permitting certification, unless the sourceindicates untrustworthiness.

(iii) FRE 902(11)

1) A party intending to offer into evidenceunder this rule must provide written noticeof that intention to all adverse parties, andmust make the record and declarationavailable for inspection sufficiently inadvance of their offer into evidence toprovide an adverse party the opportunity tochallenge them.

(3) Tax returns:

(a) A tax return is generally considered inadmissible hearsaywith the exception that the return may constitute anadmission by the taxpayer or someone on the taxpayer’sbehalf.

(i) Note: if the taxpayer stipulates to the tax return,they have waived any hearsay argument.

h. Opening Statement

i. Should start with a theme and end with that same theme

ii. Provide a roadmap for the Court of how and why the decision should bewritten in your favor

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iii. Personalize your client

(1) It will be more difficult for the Court to find for the government ifyou depict your client in a positive light

(a) Will adverse decision affect third parties?

(i) Taxpayer’s employees

(ii) Taxpayer’s family

iv. Do not abandon an issue

(1) After petitioner’s opening statement, respondent will ask the Courtwhether petitioner has conceded any issue not discussed in theiropening statement. IRM 35.6.2.6 (08-11-2004).

(2) If petitioner raises a new issue without having amended hispleadings and respondent is prejudiced by surprise, respondent willargue that the “new issue” is not before the court.

i. Rule 155 Computations

i. If the parties are not in agreement as to the amount to be included in thedecision in accordance with the findings and conclusions of the Court,then each party shall file with the Court a computation of the amountbelieved by such party to be in accordance with the Court's findings andconclusions. In the case of an overpayment, the computation shall alsoinclude the amount and date of each payment made by the petitioner. Aparty shall file such party's computation within 90 days of service of theopinion or order, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

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6. Procedures Involving Taxpayer Interviews

a. IRC § 7521

i. 7521(a) Recording of Interview by Taxpayer: any officer or employee ofthe IRS shall allow the taxpayer to make an audio recording:

(1) Upon advance request

(2) At taxpayer’s expense

(3) With taxpayer’s own equipment

ii. Taxpayers are entitled to record face-to-face CDP hearings. See Keene v.Commissioner, 121 T.C. at 14.

iii. “In-person interview” refers to an interview in which the IRSrepresentative and taxpayer are face-to-face. Taxpayers are not entitled torecord telephone CDP hearings. See Calafati v. Commissioner, 127 T.C.No. 16.

iv. 7521(b) Safeguards: an officer or employee of the IRS shall provide to thetaxpayer prior to the interview:

(1) In the case of an interview relating to the determination of tax, anexplanation of the audit process and the taxpayer’s rights undersuch process, or

(2) In the case of an interview relating to the collection of tax, anexplanation of the collection process and the taxpayer’s rightsunder such process

v. Section 7521(a) applies to representatives

vi. This section does not apply to criminal investigations

7. Giamelli v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 14 (2007):

a. Tax Court held that their review is limited to the determination issued byrespondent’s Appeals Office. Since the only issue raised at Appeals was aninstallment agreement, petitioner cannot then raise a new issue in Tax Court.

i. The original taxpayer died after his CDP hearing. At Tax Court, his estateattempted to argue that the estate was a different person and therefore hadnot had the opportunity to raise the issue. The Court disagreed.

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8. Chenery Doctrine

a. An administrative law principle that says a reviewing court, in dealing with adetermination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized tomake, must judge the propriety of such action by the grounds invoked by theagency. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).

b. Antioco v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-35: The Tax Court determined thatthe Chenery Doctrine applies in the CDP context and therefore the Court cannotuphold a notice of determination on grounds other than those actually relied uponby the Appeals Officer.

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9. Trial of “S” cases:

a. Both the Code and the Tax Court rules contain special provisions applicable to“small tax cases”.

b. A small tax case is one in which neither the amount of the deficiency placed indispute nor the amount of any claimed overpayment exceeds $50,000.

i. Small case procedures are also available for a petitioner for innocentspouse relief under IRC § 6015(e) where the amount of relief sought doesnot exceed $50,000.

ii. Small case procedure are available for CDP appeals under IRC § 6320(c)or IRC § 6330 (d) where the unpaid tax does not exceed $50,000.

c. Small case procedures are elective

i. Limitations:

(1) In small tax cases the Court does not have jurisdiction to enter adecision finding a deficiency or overpayment grater than the$50,000 jurisdictional amount.

(2) Small case decisions are not reviewable by an appellate court andare not precedent for any other case.

ii. Election is made on the petition or after the petition but before trial

iii. Tax Court has the authority to revoke small case election on its ownmotion before trial

(1) Tax Court rejected small tax case status where the issues werecommon to other cases pending before it. Page v. Commissioner,86 T.C. 1, 12 (1986).

iv. Practice Tip: A taxpayer can obtain small tax case status where adeficiency notice determines a deficiency greater than the statutoryamount by contesting an amount less than the statutory amount, even ifthere is only one legal issue underlying the entire determined deficiency.Kallich v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 676 (1987), acq., 1989-1 C.B. 1.

d. Rule 177 provides that trials of small tax cases will be conducted as informally aspossible, consistent with orderly procedures, and any evidence deemed by thecourt to have probative value will be admissible.

i. IRM 35.6.2.12 (08-11-2004) states that where a pro se petitioner is doinghis best to present his case to the court, technical evidentiary or proceduralobjections should not be made.

(1) Respondent’s counsel should assist the pro se petitioner to bring

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out all of the facts, and cross-examination should be for thepurpose of presenting to the court all the pertinent and competentevidence.

e. Common Issues in “S” Cases:

i. Collection Due Process

(1) After a CDP hearing, the Appeals Officer will issue a Notice ofDetermination which advises the taxpayer of their right to seekjudicial review within 30 days after the date of the Notice ofDetermination

(a) The timing of a request for Tax Court Review concerningdenials of relief under IRC § 6015 is 90 days.

(b) The request for review must be filed within 30 days if reliefis requested for other issues raised in the CDP hearing.Treas. Reg. § 301.6320-1(f)(2), Q&A-F2.

(2) The Tax Court reviews the Appeals Officer’s determination underan abuse of discretion standard.

(a) In its review for abuse of discretion, the Tax Courtgenerally only considers arguments and issues that wereraised at the CDP hearing or otherwise brought to theattention to the Appeals office.

(3) Robinette v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 85 (2004):

(a) There is a disagreement between the Tax Court, and theIRS, Eighth Circuit and other courts concerning the scopeof the record on which such review should be based.

(b) The Tax Court has held that it may review new evidence inthe course of reviewing whether an appeals officer abusedhis discretion, i.e., its review is not limited to evidencepresented during the administrative appeal.

(c) The Eighth Circuit, in Robinette v. Commissioner, 439F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 2006), reversed the Tax Court taking theposition that, consistent with general principles ofadministrative law and the Administrative Procedures Act,judicial review of the IRS’s decision should be limited tothe administrative record developed at the hearing beforeAppeals.

ii. Substantiation

(1) Taxpayer bears the burden of proving the entitlement to claimed

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deductions. See Tax Court Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290U.S. 111 (1933).

(2) IRC § 6001

(a) Every taxpayer liable for any tax under the InternalRevenue Code, or for collection thereof, shall keep records,render such statements, make such returns, and complywith such rules and regulations as the Secretary may fromtime to time prescribe

(3) Cohan Rule

(a) When the taxpayer establishes that the Taxpayer paid orincurred deductible expenses but does not establish theamount of the deduction to which the taxpayer is entitled,the Taxpayer may be entitled to estimate the amountallowable. Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d. Cir.1930).

(i) The taxpayer must present sufficient evidence forthe Court to make an estimate because without sucha basis, any allowance would amount to largesse.

(4) Car Expense

(a) Adams v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-92. Mileagelog that only indicates the state visited does not substantiateunder Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5T(b)(6)(i)(B). Furthermore, thegeneral lack of business purpose contained in theTaxpayer’s ledger was grounds for finding that she did notsubstantiate.

(5) Medical Expenses

(a) Taxpayers are entitled to deduct the amount of thetaxpayer’s and the taxpayer’s spouse or dependent’smedical care expenses to the extent those expenses exceed7.5% of the taxpayers AGI.

(b) Examples:

(i) Cost of diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, orprevention of disease, and costs for treatmentsaffecting any structure or function of the body. IRC§ 213 (d)(1)(A).

(c) Two-part “but for” test in Jacobs v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.813, 819 (1974). Petitioner must prove expenditures:

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(i) Were an essential element of the treatment, and

(ii) Would not otherwise been incurred for non-medicalreasons

(6) Charitable Deductions - IRC § 170

(a) Charitable contribution is the voluntary transfer of propertywithout adequate consideration.

(b) Payments to a qualified organization are deductible ascharitable contributions to the extent that they exceed thefair market value of any material benefit received in return

(c) A § 170 deduction for the full amount is allowed only if thedonor receives no substantial benefit from the contribution

(d) If the taxpayer receives an item of value for a payment to acharitable organization:

(i) Payment is not deductible unless taxpayer intends tomake a gift, and

(ii) Any deduction is limited to the excess of thepayment over the fair market value of what isreceived in exchange.

(e) Charitable deductions are allowed as a deduction only ifverified under regulations prescribed by the Secretary

(i) The obligation to substantiate charitablecontribution deductions are clear and unambiguous

(ii) No disclosure statement is required when:

1) The goods or services given to a donor meetthe standards for insubstantial value

2) There is no donative element involved in aparticular transaction with a charity, or

3) There is only an intangible religious benefitprovided to the donor

(f) Taxpayer shall maintain for each contribution one of thefollowing:

(i) Cancelled check

(ii) Receipt from the donee charitable organizationshowing the name of the donee, date of contribution

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and amount of contribution

(iii) In the absence of a cancelled check or receipt fromthe donee, other reliable written records showingthe name of the donee, the date of contribution andamount of the contribution.

(g) Non-Cash Charitable Contributions

(i) Value is the fair market value at the time of thecontribution

(ii) Need name of donee, date and location of thecontribution, and description of the property

(7) Employee Business Expenses - Form 2106

(a) Purpose: Form is used if the taxpayer is an employeededucting ordinary and necessary expenses for their job

(b) Ordinary Expense: common and accepted in the taxpayer’strade or business

(i) Must be of a common or frequent occurrence in thetype of business involved

(c) Necessary Expense: helpful and appropriate for thetaxpayer’s business

(i) Must be directly connected with or pertaining to thetaxpayer’s trade or business.

(8) Business Use of a Home

(a) Qualifying for a Deduction for Business Use of a Home:

(i) Taxpayer must use part of the home:

1) Exclusively and regularly as principal placeof business

2) Exclusively and regularly as the place wheretaxpayers meets or deals with patients,clients, or customers in the normal course oftrade or business

3) In the case of separate structure not attachedto the home, in connection with trade orbusiness

4) On a regular basis for certain storage use

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5) For rental use, or

6) As a daycare facility.

(b) Where taxpayer’s business is conducted in part at a homeoffice and in part at other locations, the following twoprimary factors are considered in determining whether thehome office qualifies under IRC § 280A(c)(1)(A) as thetaxpayer’s principal place of business:

(i) Relative importance of activities performed at eachbusiness location, and

(ii) Amount of time spent at each location

(c) Exclusive Use Test

(i) To qualify, taxpayer must use a specific area ofhome solely for the purpose of carrying on a tradeor business.

(ii) Taxpayer does not meet requirements of exclusiveuse test if taxpayer uses the area in question bothfor business and personal purposes

(iii) Exception: If taxpayer uses part of the home forstorage of inventory or product samples, thetaxpayer can deduct expenses for the business useof the taxpayer’s home without the exclusive usetest it the taxpayer:

1) Sells products at wholesale or retail as tradeor business

2) Keeps inventory or product samples in thehome as trade or business

3) Taxpayer’s home is the only fixed locationof trade or business

4) Taxpayers uses the storage space on aregular basis, and

5) The space taxpayer uses is a separatelyidentifiable space suitable for storage

(d) Regular Use Test

(i) Taxpayer must use specific area of taxpayer’s homefor business on a regular basis.

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1) Incidental or occasional business use of notregular use

2) Use must be continuous, ongoing, orrecurring.

(9) Travel and Entertainment Expenses - IRC § 274

(a) Taxpayer can deduct ordinary and necessary expensesincurred while away from home in the pursuit of a trade orbusiness

(b) To deduct travel and entertainment expenses, taxpayermust not only satisfy the general requirements of IRC §162 but also the strict substantiation requirements of IRC §274(d).

(i) The Cohan Doctrine cannot be used to estimate adeduction for travel expenses. Schladweiler v.Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-351, affd. 28 Fed.Appx. 602 (8th Cir. 2002).

(ii) No deduction is allowed for travel andentertainment unless the taxpayer substantiates byadequate records or sufficient evidencecorroborating the taxpayer’s own statement, thefollowing elements:

1) Amount of each separate expenditure

2) Date of departure and return and the numberof days spent on business

3) The place of destination of city, and

4) The business reason or expected businessbenefit from the travel.

(c) A contemporaneous log is not required, but corroborativeevidence used to support the deduction must have a highdegree of probative value to elevate such statement to thelevel of credibility of a contemporaneous log

(d) Travel away from the home generally requires that thetaxpayer remain either overnight or for a period requiringsleep or rest

(e) Taxpayers cannot deduct the daily cost of commuting toand from work, as such expenses is considered to bepersonal and nondeductible. Brockman v. Commissioner,

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T.C. Memo. 2003-3; Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S.465, 473-474 (1946).

(f) Taxpayers cannot deduct travel expenses for a spouse ordependent unless those person are employees or have abona fide business purpose. IRC § 274(m)(3)(A) & (B).

(10) Entertainment Expenses

(a) Taxpayer can deduct entertainment expenses if they areboth ordinary and necessary and meet one of the followingtests

(i) Expenses must be directly related to the activeconduct of the taxpayer’s trade or business, or

1) Taxpayer must have had more than ageneralized expectation of deriving incomeor a specific benefit at some indefinite futuretime from those entertained

2) Expenses for entertainment, even ifconnected with the taxpayers trade orbusiness, will generally be considered notdirectly related to active conduct oftaxpayers trade or business if theentertainment occurred under circumstanceswhere the was little or no possibility ofengaging in the active conduct of trade orbusiness.

a) Meeting or discussion at a sportingevent is generally considered acircumstance where there is little orno possibility of engaging in theactive conduct of a trade or business.Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c)(7)(ii)(a).

(11) Cellular Phone

(a) Cell phones are listed property and require substantiation.

(b) Tash v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-120. Courtdisallowed claimed cell phone expenses because the recorddid not indicate whether petitioner used his cellular phonefor business and/or personal calls.

(c) The employer must require the employee to have the cellphone in order for it to be deductible.

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iii. Dependency Exemption

(1) Section 151(a) and (c) allows a taxpayers an annual exemptiondeduction for each dependent as defined in section 152.

(a) Dependent is either a qualifying child or a qualifyingrelative

(b) Four requirements: qualifying child means an individual

(i) Who bears a relationship to the taxpayer describedin paragraph (2)

(ii) Who has the same principal place of abode as thetaxpayer for more than one-half of such taxableyear

(iii) who meets the age requirements of paragraph (3)

(iv) who has not provided over one-half of suchindividual’s own support for the calendar year inwhich the taxable year of the taxpayer begins, and

(v) who has not filed a joint return with the individual’sspouse under section 6013

(2) Section 152(e) special rule for divorced parents

(a) Non-custodial parent may be entitled to claim adependency exemption deduction for a childnotwithstanding the residency requirement of section152(c)(1)(B), the support requirement of section152(d)(1)(C), and the so-called tie-breaking rule of section152(c)(4).

(b) A child will be treated as the non-custodial parent’squalifying child or relative if five requirements are. Seesec. 152(e)(1) and (2).

(c) Section 152(e)

(i) A child who receives over one-half of the child’ssupport during the calendar year from the child’sparents:

1) Who are divorced or legally separated undera decree of divorce or separate maintenance

2) Who are separated under a writtenseparation agreement, or

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3) Who live apart at all times during the last 6months of the calendar year, and

(ii) Such child is in the custody of 1 or both of thechild’s parent for more than one-half of the calendaryear, such child shall be treated as being thequalifying child or relative of the non-custodialparent if:

1) The custodial parent signs a writtendeclaration that such custodial parent willnot claim such child as a dependent for anytaxable year beginning in such calendar year

2) The non-custodial parent attaches suchwritten declaration to the non-custodialparent’s return

(d) The IRS has issued Form 8332 in order to standardize thewritten declaration requirement of section 152(e).

(i) Form 8332 requires:

1) Name of child

2) Name and social security number of thenon-custodial parent claiming thedependency exemption deduction

3) Social security number of the custodialparent

4) Signature of the custodial parent

5) Date of the custodial parent’s signature

6) The years for which the claims werereleased.

(e) Form 8332 is not required but any other written declarationmust conform to the substance of Form 8332. See Miller v.Commissioner, 114 T.C. 184, 189 (2000), aff’d on anotherground sub nom.

(f) Judge Vasquez held that attaching proof a custodyarrangement does not satisfy Section 152. See Sanatana v.Commissioner, T.C. Memo.2012-49. The Court held thatthe mediation agreement attached to the return was soambiguous as to not satisfy the requirements of Section153(e).

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(3) Free Exercise of Religion

(a) Begay v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-17. Taxpayerargued that her Navajo clan considered a child to be amember of the clan and therefore a qualifying child.

(i) Court held that taxpayer not entitled to claim childas dependent.

(ii) Section 152(c) does not require a taxpayer to foregotheir religious beliefs nor deny a tax benefit becauseof such beliefs so exercise of religion argument notvalid.

iv. Earned Income Credit

(1) Section 32(a) provides an earned income credit for an eligibleindividual for so much of the taxpayer’s earned income for thetaxable year as does not exceed the earned income amount

(a) eligibility is based on income and qualifying children

v. First time home buyer credit

(1) Section 36

(a) An individual who is a first-time homebuyer of a principalresidence in the U.S. shall be allowed a credit of an amountequal to 10% of the purchase price but not exceeding$8,000.

(i) First time homebuyer means any individual if suchindividual had no present ownership interest in aprincipal residence during the 3-year period endingon the date of the purchase of the principalresidence

(ii) Married Filing Separately: Credit is limited to$4,000.

(iii) Unmarried individuals allocate the credit

(iv) Phase-out for income in excess of $125,000.

(v) No credit is allowed for the purchase of anresidence if the purchase price exceeds $800,000.

(vi) Purchaser must be over 18 years of age.

(b) Rodriguez v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2011-122. The

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Court held that the purchase of a home by a minortaxpayer’s parents by taxpayer’s guardian lacked economicsubstance, and thus under step transaction, taxpayer’ssubsequent purchase of the home from guardian waseffectively a purchase from the taxpayer’s parents thatprohibited the taxpayer from claiming the first timehomebuyer credit

(c) Zampella v Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2012-359. The TaxCourt held that the taxpayer did not “purchase” the homeused to claim the credit. The taxpayer inherited a one-halfinterest in the home from his mother and purchased theother half from his brother.

f. Witnesses

i. To compel the attendance of a witness at trial, a party can obtain asubpoena from the Clerk’s office in Washington, D.C. or from the trialclerk at the trial session.

ii. As provided for in Tax Court Rule 147, the party must fill out thesubpoena and have it served by the marshal or by another person who isnot a party.

iii. Service is accomplished by delivering a copy of the subpoena to thewitness and be tendering the witness’s fee for one day’s attendance andthe mileage allowed by law

iv. There is no geographical limit for service of a Tax Court subpoena

v. Under Tax Court Rule 147(b), a party may also use a subpoena to requirea witness to produce books, papers, documents, electronically storedinformation, or tangible things

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10. Settlement Options

a. Voluntary Binding Arbitration

i. Parties may move that any factual issue in controversy be resolvedthrough voluntary binding arbitration. A joint stipulation must accompanythe motion, stating the issues to be resolved through arbitration and theparties’ agreement to be bound by the findings of the arbitrator. Thearbitrator is appointed by Court order. Tax Court Rule 124.

ii. Report by Parties: the parties shall promptly report to the Court thefindings made by the arbitrator and shall attach to their report any writtenreport or summary that the arbitrator may have prepared

iii. Selection and Payment of the Arbitrator

(1) Parties must stipulate to a procedure for jointly selecting thearbitrator with each party agreeing to pay one half of thearbitrator’s compensation, expenses and related fees. IRM 35.5.5.2(08-11-2004).

iv. Limitations with Respect to the Arbitrator

(1) Information to be considered

(a) parties stipulation should precisely describe the kind ofinformation and any limitations related thereto that thearbitrator is permitted to consider

(2) Contacts with or by the arbitrator

(a) stipulation should prohibit ex parte contacts with thearbitrator

(3) Scope of arbitrator’s work

(a) stipulation should reflect that the arbitrator is not permittedto make any findings or provide reasoning that representsan interpretation of the law

(4) Legal Guidance to the arbitrator

(a) any applicable legal guidance should be stipulatedbeforehand

(b) in extraordinary circumstances when some guidance hasbeen overlooked, the parties may further stipulate to theprovision of legal guidance to the arbitrator

v. General Supervisory Powers of the Court

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(1) Parties must stipulate to the general supervisory powers of thecourt.

(2) Stipulation should note that the case will be assigned to aparticular judge or special trial judge who will have continuingjurisdiction over the case.

(3) The court’s participation is in the nature of oversight

b. Other Methods

i. Mediation

(1) Mediation is a confidential process in which a neutral third partydirects settlement discussions.

(2) Non-binding

(3) Agreement to Mediate - IRM 35.5.5.8 (12-14-2010)

(a) The IRM states that the agreement should be as concise aspossible but include the following elements

(i) Specify the issues to be mediated

(ii) Provide how and when each party will present itscase to the mediator

(iii) Might require each party to submit a list ofparticipants

(iv) Contain an acknowledgment by the taxpayer that allparticipants shall have access to all taxpayer’sreturns

(v) Prohibit ex-parte contacts with mediator

(vi) Acknowledgment of IRC § 7214(a)(8)

(vii) If Appeals mediator is selected, written agreementshall include a statement confirming the employee’sproposed service as mediator and waiver ofconflicts

(viii) Agreement should state that mediation isconfidential

(ix) Any party may withdraw at any time

(x) Any settlement reached shall not serve as anestoppel in any other proceeding

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(xi) Schedule of dates

ii. Nothing contained in Tax Court Rule 124 shall be construed to excludeuse by the parties of other forms of voluntary disposition of cases ,including mediation.

c. Negotiating with Respondent’s Representatives

i. Recently, Respondent’s counsel has brought an Appeals Officer tocalendar calls to negotiate with taxpayers.

(1) Taxpayers show up to calendar call with records to substantiateclaimed deductions that Respondent’s counsel has not previouslyseen

d. Remand

i. Absent limiting statutes, courts generally have “the inherent authority toissue such orders as they deem necessary and prudent to achieve theorderly and expeditious disposition of cases,” Williams v. Commissioner,92 T.C. 920, 932 (1989) (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S.752, 764-65 (1980), and quoting Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626,630-31 (1962)).

ii. The Tax Court noted in Friday v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 220, 221-22(2005), that the Court can remand to an agency if it retains jurisdictionover the underlying case, such as an Appeals Office does in a CDPdetermination.

iii. The Tax Court can remand in CDP cases when an Appeals officer abusedhis discretion in some way. See Med. Practice Solutions, LLC v.Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-214 (remanding because the Appealsofficer determined to proceed with collection without making the requisiteverifications).

iv. Tax Court can remand when the Appeals officer did not develop therecord enough for the Court to properly review it. See Hoyle v.Commissioner, 131 T.C. 197, 204-05 (2008).

v. Tax Court has remanded where the law changed between the CDP hearingand the Tax Court trial if that may have affected a taxpayer’s presentationof his case. Harrell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-271.

vi. Remand is appropriate in cases where there has been a material change ina taxpayers’ factual circumstances between the time of the hearing and thetime a case is put on the trial calendar. See Churchill v. Commissioner,T.C. Memo 2011-182.

(1) Court can remand a CDP case for consideration of changed

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circumstances if it would be helpful, necessary or productive.

vii. The hearing on remand provides the parties with the opportunity tocomplete the initial IRC § 6320 hearing while preserving the taxpayer’sright to receive judicial review of the ultimate administrativedetermination. Kelby v. Commissioner, 130 T.C. 79, 86 (2008); Wadleighv. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 280, 299 (2010).

e. Settlement in “S” Cases

i. IRM 35.5.2.9 (08-11-2004)

(1) Purpose of the “S” case procedure is to reduce the time involved inthe preparation, execution, and filing of settlement documents in asmall case.

(2) Computations: small cases may be settled on the basis of a specificdollar amount agreed upon by both parties to approximate theamount that would have been reached if formal computations hadbeen made.

(3) Contact with Collection: if it would facilitate the settlement of asmall case, consideration should be given to assisting the petitionerin making the initial contact with Collection.

(4) Counsel Settlement Memorandum: The Office of Chief Counselencourages brevity in Counsel Settlement Memoranda in smallcase.

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11. Post-trial briefing

a. Time for filing briefs

i. Simultaneous briefs

(1) Opening briefs within 75 days after conclusion of trial

(2) Answering briefs 45 days thereafter

(3) The Court’s preference has been for simultaneous briefs

ii. Seriatim briefs

(1) Opening briefs within 75 days after conclusion of trial

(2) Answering brief within 45 days thereafter

(3) Reply brief withing 30 days after the due date of the answeringbrief

b. Points Relied Upon

i. Centerpiece of the brief

(1) If reader is not persuaded after reading this section, then briefshould be rewritten or practitioner should consider settlement

c. Requested Findings of Fact

i. If written correctly from a properly tried case, the argument section shouldbe superfluous.

ii. Should be viewed as the building one detailed brick at a time.

iii. Should be drawn from the record with very little poetic license.

iv. Should always be followed by one or more citation to the record

d. Argument

i. Carefully structured

ii. Easy to follow

iii. Precisely researched

iv. Should provide the Court with the materials to draft a scholarly opinion inyour favor

v. Should provide the Court with powerful quotes or literary allusions

vi. Citations must be precise

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vii. Avoid citing Memorandum decisions where regular opinions are available

viii. Argument

(1) Start with affirmative contentions

(2) Leave rebuttal material to the end or to the reply brief

ix. Form and neatness are important

x. Careful thought should be given to how the argument appears on the page

(1) Are there visual breaks

(2) Are critical elements broken into subsections and underscored

xi. Tempo is important

(1) Do arguments start strong and end strong?

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12. Reply Brief

a. Reply brief should be drawn only after you have outlined the structure of youropponent’s argument

b. Argument in rebuttal should focus upon the critical points in your opponent’sstructure

c. Remainder of the argument should seek to undermine the Court’s confidence inyour opponent

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13. Volunteer Attorneys/Students

a. Tax Court Rule 24(a)(5) - Law Student Assistance effective as of May 5, 2011

i. With the permission of the presiding Judge or Special Trial Judge, andunder the direct supervision of counsel in a case, a law student may assistsuch counsel by presenting all or any part of the party's case at a hearingor trial. In addition, a law student may assist counsel in a case in drafting apleading or other document to be filed with the Court. A law student maynot, however, enter an appearance in any case, be recognized as counsel ina case, or sign a pleading or other document filed with the Court. TheCourt may acknowledge the law student assistance.

b. Student Participation in Court Proceedings Under the Academic Clinical

i. The Court will permit students who are enrolled in an academic clinic forcredit and in good standing with their school to participate in proceedingsbefore the Court pursuant to the following procedures:

(1) lead counsel who intends to request permission for a student/fellowto participate in proceeding before the Court shall obtain from thepetitioner advance written consent for the student/fellow toparticipate in the case. This written consent does not need to besubmitted to the Court;

(2) when a case is called for trial, lead counsel shall answer thecalendar call, advise the Court whether the case is ready forhearing or trial, and introduce any student/fellow enrolled in theacademic clinic who seeks permission to participate in theproceedings;

(3) If the Court permits a student/fellow to participate in a case uponcompliance with the previous two requirements, lead counsel shallremain in the courtroom at petitioners’ counsel table at all timesduring the hearing or trial of the case. A student/fellow who ispermitted to participate in a case may, at the discretion of thepresiding Judge or Special Trial Judge, present all or any part of apetitioner’s case at a hearing or trial. A presiding Judge or SpecialTrial Judge may at any time exercise discretion to require thestudent/fellow to step aside and to require lead counsel to completethe hearing or trial.

(4) An academic clinic submitting a pleading, motion, stipulation, orother paper to the Court for filing may include a statement in thebody of the document including the name of any student/fellowenrolled in the academic clinic who participated in the preparationof the document. However, a student/fellow may not sign adocument submitted to the Court for filing.

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c. Help develop record in petitioner’s counsel room

d. Legal research

e. Draft subpoenas

f. Prepare post-trial briefs

i. Deadlines

ii. Oversight

g. Prepare witness/petitioner for trial

i. Students can receive special admission from the Court to practice

(1) Admitted attorney requests for special admission

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14. Appeal

a. No appeal of “S” cases

b. Venue is based on location of taxpayer’s residence (individuals) or principal placeof business (corporations) when petition was filed.

c. Taxpayer and the government may agree to appeal to a different circuit. IRC §7482.

d. Notice of appeal must be filed within 90 days after entry of decision. IRC § 7483,Tax Court Rule 190.

e. IRC § 7482(b)

i. If an issue does not fall under any of the enumerated categories in IRC §7482(b)(1)(A) through (F), then the Court of Appeals for the District ofColumbia may review decisions of the Tax Court

(1) IRC § 6015 is not included in the enumerated categories

ii. See James Bamberg, A Different Point of Venue: The Plainer Meaning ofSection 7482(b)(1), 61 Tax Lawyer 445 (Winter 2008).

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15. Tax Court Rule 201 - Incorporation of Model Rules

a. Practitioners before the Court shall carry on their practice in accordance with theletter and spirit of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American BarAssociation (“ABA”).

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2 Thomas and Joseph Gambino were the sons of Carlo Gambino, the alleged head of thealleged Gambino Crime Family.

16. Before the Notice of Deficiency

a. Greenberg’s Express v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 324 (1974)

i. The petitioners sought an order directing the IRS to produce recordsrelating to the examination of Thomas and Joseph Gambino by the IRS orthe DOJ in order to show that the examination was not in good faith andfor a legitimate purpose. 2

(1) The Tax Court was unpersuaded by mere allegation that thegovernment might destroy evidence supporting the Gambinos’claims.

(2) Generally the Court will not look behind the Notice of Deficiencyto examine the evidence used or the propriety of the IRS’s motivesor of the administrative policy or procedure involved in making adetermination. Human Engineering Institute v. Commissioner, 61T.C. 61, 66 (1973).

b. Efrain T. Suarez v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 792 (1972)

i. The exception to that rule is that on occasion the Court will look behindthe Notice of Deficiency when there is substantial evidence ofunconstitutional conduct on the IRS’s part and the integrity of the judicialprocess would be impugned. Efrain T. Suarez v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.792 (1972).

c. Weimerskirch v. Commissioner, 596 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1979)

i. The Court held that there was no presumption of correctness attached to anaked notice asserting omitted income, unsupported by any predicateevidence and the taxpayer is relieved of the burden of going forward withthe evidence.

d. I.R.C. § 7491

i. A condition precedent to shifting the burden of proof is that the taxpayerhas cooperated with reasonable requests by the Secretary for witnesses,information, documents, meetings, and interviews.

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17. Filing the Tax Court Petition

a. Issue:

i. Can you file a Petition if your client has no defense to the deficiency?

ii. Can you "require the government to prove its case?"

b. Answer: Probably Not.

i. A petitioner must introduce credible evidence before requiring thegovernment to prove their findings. Nevertheless, the failure to do so willgenerally not result in a penalty under IRC § 6673 unless the court findsthe petitioner is purposely delaying the process with a meritless “taxprotester” claim or known frivolous defenses.

ii. 31 CFR § 10 Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service

(1) 31 U.S.C. § 330. Practice before the Department

(a) Under 31 U.S.C. § 330, the Secretary of the Treasury hasthe authority to regulate and sanction all representativespracticing before the Treasury Department, including itsagencies such as the IRS, and the applicable regulations arecodified under 31 CFR § 10.

(2) IRS Circular 230, under the authority of 31 CFR § 10, spells outthe duties and sanctions of all persons representing taxpayersbefore the Internal Revenue Service. Representatives, as describedin the text, covers a wide range of tax practitioners including butnot limited to CPA’s, tax attorneys, tax preparers, etc. The rulesspelled out in this section, for the most part, mimic the candor andprofessionalism requirements of the ABA rules for AttorneyConduct.

(a) Specifically, 31 CFR § 10.20 requires that thepractitioner have actual or good faith belief that theinformation provided to the court is accurate andtrue, with the following Sec. 10.21 and 10.22referring to known client omissions and diligence tochecking the accuracy of the information beingpresented to the court.

(b) Sec. 10.23 further states that “a practitioner may notunreasonably delay the prompt disposition of anymatter before the Internal Revenue Service.” Thissub-section, read in conjunction with the precedingones, prohibits a practitioner from putting forth anymatter that he has unreasonably failed check upon

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3 31 CFR § 10.50(c)(2).4 IRC § 74915 IRC § 66736 Coleman v. Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1986).7 Id. at 71.8 Id. at 72.9 Stewart v. Commissioner., T.C. Memo. 2005-212.10 Id.

its truth and accuracy as it would cause a delay ofthe process.

(3) 31 CFR § 10.50 specifies the types and amount of sanctions thatmay be imposed on practitioners for a violation of the above rulesand regulations. Namely, under this authority, the Secretary may,after notice and opportunity to respond, censure, suspend, or disbarany practitioner from appearing before the Department. Further,the Secretary may impose monetary penalties in an amount “notexceed[ing] the gross income derived (or to be derived) from theconduct giving rise to the penalty.”3

iii. I.R.C. § 6673 Sanctions and Costs Awarded by Courts

(1) Sec. 7491 states that the Secretary shall have the burden of proof ifthe taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect to anyfactual issues relevant to his tax liability,4 and IRC § 6673 imposesa penalty of up to $25,000.00 on any taxpayer who institutes ormaintains a proceeding which is frivolous or groundless, or onebrought about primarily for delay.5

(2) In Coleman v. Commissioner.,6 the Seventh Circuit described afrivolous petition as one that is “contrary to established law andunsupported by a reasoned, colorable argument for change in thelaw.”7 The court further explained that it uses a subjective badfaith test as well as an objective “should have known” test fordetermining whether the petitioner should be penalized under IRC§ 6673.8

(3) In the majority of cases where petitioners have been unable toproduce credible evidence to support their positions, the court hasdenied to impose a penalty under I.R.C. § 6673, leaving thetaxpayers with a stern warning instead.

(4) That was the case in Stewart v. C.I.R.,9 where the court decidednot to impose penalties since at least one of the petitioner’sarguments was not frivolous. The court nevertheless stated that“[it] may impose this penalty in the future if he makes frivolousarguments or institutes proceedings primarily for delay.”10

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11 Sauers v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1985).12 Wetzel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-11.13

(5) Several courts however have penalized petitioners for advancing“tax protester” claims, or repeated groundless claims, or whollyfrivolous claims for the sole purpose of causing delay. In Sauers v.C.I.R., the court penalized the petitioner under sec. 6673 for filingmemos with his petition regarding “tax protester” arguments, andfiling several lengthy documents purporting to be motions.11 Similarly in Wetzel v. C.I.R., the court imposed the penalty since“Petitioner [was] a professional tax return preparer who knew orshould have known that his arguments are frivolous.”12

iv. ABA Rules of Attorney Conduct13

(1) ABA Model Rule 3.3 – Candor Toward The Tribunal

(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:

(i) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal orfail to correct a false statement of material fact orlaw previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;

c. Other cases and materials:

i. I.R.C. § 7491

(1) Burden shifts where taxpayer produces credible evidence.—

(a) General rule.--If, in any court proceeding, a taxpayerintroduces credible evidence with respect to any factualissue relevant to ascertaining the liability of the taxpayerfor any tax imposed by subtitle A or B, the Secretary shallhave the burden of proof with respect to such issue.

(2) Limitations.--Paragraph (1) shall apply with respect to an issueonly if—

(a) the taxpayer has complied with the requirements under thistitle to substantiate any item;

(b) the taxpayer has maintained all records required under thistitle and has cooperated with reasonable requests by theSecretary for witnesses, information, documents, meetings,and interviews; and

(c) in the case of a partnership, corporation, or trust, thetaxpayer is described in section 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii)Subparagraph (C) shall not apply to any qualified revocable

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trust (as defined in section 645(b)(1)) with respect toliability for tax for any taxable year ending after the date ofthe decedent's death and before the applicable date (asdefined in section 645(b)(2)).

ii. I.R.C. § 6673

(1) Tax Court proceedings.—

(a) Procedures instituted primarily for delay, etc.--Whenever itappears to the Tax Court that—

(i) proceedings before it have been instituted ormaintained by the taxpayer primarily for delay,

(ii) the taxpayer's position in such proceeding isfrivolous or groundless, or

(iii) the taxpayer unreasonably failed to pursue availableadministrative remedies, the Tax Court, in itsdecision, may require the taxpayer to pay to theUnited States a penalty not in excess of $25,000.

iii. ABA Model Rule 3.2 - Expediting Litigation

(1) A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigationconsistent with the interests of the client.

iv. Abrams v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 403 (1984).

(1) Court reprimanding petitioner saying that “[w]hen the costsincurred by this Court and respondent are taken into consideration,the maximum damages authorized by the statute do not begin toindemnify the United States for the expenses which petitioner'sfrivolous and groundless action has occasioned.”

v. Smith v. C.I.R., T.C. Memo. 2000-290.

(1) Concluding that “petitioner's position is frivolous and groundlessand was instituted primarily for delay,” and setting a penalty of$3,500 under sec. 6673.

vi. Holmes v. C.I.R., T.C. Memo. 2006-80.

(1) Finding petitioner liable for instituting the procedures primarily fordelay.

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14 It is generally agreed that mere negligence, without more, is not grounds for a finding ofDue Process violation. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d281 (1988).15 . Garavaglia v. C.I.R., T.C. Memo. 2011-228. aff'd, 2013 WL 1458024 (6th Cir. Apr. 11,2013).

18. Answering the Petition

a. Issue: Does the government have to disclose in their answer thatdocuments necessary to calculate deficiency or statute oflimitations are "lost?”

i. Answer: Probably Not

ii. The obligations of federal prosecutors in criminal cases are generallyestablished by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 16 and 26.2, 18U.S.C. § 3500 (the Jencks Act), Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). Brady, Jencks andGiglio do not apply in civil cases.

b. Are there any civil counterparts to Brady, Jencks and Giglio.

i. Answer:

ii. Probably Not. There is considerable debate over the standards applicableto government agencies in a civil case.14

iii. The law is evolving. As explained in Garavaglia v. C.I.R.,15 however,there is trend toward viewing ethical obligations that go to the merits of ataxpayer’s claim as opposed to procedural as applying in civil casesbrought by the government.

iv. IRM 13.1.15/ RRA98 § 1203 Employee Misconduct Allegation

(1) Internal sources, taxpayers, or third parties may refer improperbehavior by an IRS agent to his manager or the Human CapitalOffice, Employee Conduct and Compliance Office (ECCO)pursuant to RRA98 § 1203 by filling a Form 12217.

(2) Sec. 1203 covers the following types of IRS agent and employeemisconduct:

(a) False statements under oath;

(b) Falsification of documents;

(c) Assault or battery;

(d) Misuse of IRC § 6103 (Disclosure);

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16 Mister Disc. Stockbrokers, Inc. v. S.E.C., 768 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1985)17 Id. at 878.18 Id.19 U.S. ex rel. (Redacted) v. (Redacted), 209 F.R.D. 475, 482 (D. Utah 2001)20 Tandon v. C.I.R., 210 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2000)

(e) Threat of Audit;

(f) Seizure violations;

(g) Infringement of taxpayer’s constitutional rights;

(h) Harassment/Retaliation;

(i) Discrimination;

(j) Failure to file; or

(k) Understatement of liability.

v. Brady Rule Consideration

(1) Most courts have rejected the application of Brady to civil andadministrative hearings. In Mister Disc. Stockbrokers, Inc. v.S.E.C., the Seventh Circuit rejected petitioner’s Brady basedarguments.16 First, the court noted that the Federal Rules of Civiland Criminal Procedure are not applicable in administrativehearings, and that each agency can create their own discovery rulesso long as they insure that fundamental fairness is met as requiredfor due process.17

(2) Also, the court pointed out that administrative proceedings do notwarrant such extensive discovery rules as criminal proceedingssince the possible penalties are not as severe, even if they are“quasi-criminal” as described by the petitioner in the case.18

(3) In U.S. ex rel. (Redacted) v. (Redacted), the court once againpointed to the fundamentally different consequences of a civil casefrom a criminal sanction as the reason for denying a Brady-likediscovery request.19

(4) In Tandon v. C.I.R., the application of the Brady rule was deniedsimply because “the [c]ircuit has never applied the Brady rule to acivil proceeding for determining the amount of one's taxliability.”20

(5) Only a few courts have dared to rule that the Brady rule shouldalso apply to civil and administrative hearings, the most notablebeing the Southern District Court of New York in Sperry &

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21 Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. FTC, 256 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).22 Id. at 142.23 Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Los Alamos Constructors, Inc., 382 F. Supp.1373, 1383 (D.N.M. 1974)24 Id.25 Id.

Hutchinson Co. v. FTC.21

(6) In Sperry, the court said that “the essentials of due process at theadministrative level require similar disclosures by the agencywhere consistent with the public interest. In civil actions, also, theultimate objective is not that Government “shall win a case, butthat justice shall be done.”22

(7) Similarly, in Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. LosAlamos Constructors, Inc.,23 ruling on an appeal from anadministrative hearing, the court firmly believed that “theresponsibilities of government lawyers [are] fully applicable togovernment counsel in civil cases.”24 This was based on the ideathat U.S. Attorneys are representatives of a sovereignty and thusshould be impartial in all dealings.25 This line of argument hasgained little traction in recent years, as civil and administrativecourts seem to favor judicial economy.

c. Other cases and materials:

i. Ferguson v. Roper, 400 F.3d 635 (8th Cir. 2005).

(1) Court did not find a Due Process violation in the prosecution’s lossof potentially exculpatory evidence “[a]bsent a showing of badfaith on the part of the police or prosecutor,” which petitionercould not provide.

ii. Dixon v. C.I.R., 316 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2003).

(1) Court imposed sanctions upon Respondents in tax Court formanipulating witnesses and destroying or hiding exculpatoryevidence stating that “When we conclude that the integrity of thejudicial process has been harmed, however, and the fraud rises tothe level of “an unconscionable plan or scheme which is designedto improperly influence the court in its decisions,” we not only canact, we should.”

iii. N.L.R.B. v. Nueva Eng'g, Inc., 761 F.2d 961 (4th Cir. 1985).

(1) On appeal from an administrative hearing, court finds Brady rulerequest meritless stating that “an action for violations of theNational Labor Relations Act is civil in nature, does not involve

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potential incarceration and violation of the Act does not carry withit the stigma of a criminal conviction.”

iv. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993).

(1) Court finding in favor of applying the Brady rule considering that“the consequences of denaturalization and extradition [are] equalor exceed those of most criminal convictions.”

v. Justin Goetz, Hold Fast the Keys to the Kingdom: Federal AdministrativeAgencies and the Need for Brady Disclosure, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1424,1435-36 (2011).

(1) Article explores the role of Brady/Giglio in administrative courthearings by comparing several agencies’ procedures with theFederal Rules, ultimately declaring “this results in two separatestandards for civil defendants--greater protections in Article IIIcourts and lesser protections in the Article I courts hitherto profiledin addition to the substantial differences in due process protectionsbetween Brady criminal defendants and civil enforcementdefendants.”

vi. ABA Model Rule 3.3 – Candor Toward The Tribunal

(1) A lawyer shall not knowingly:

(a) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail tocorrect a false statement of material fact or law previouslymade to the tribunal by the lawyer;

(b) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in thecontrolling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directlyadverse to the position of the client and not disclosed byopposing counsel; or

(c) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If alawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a witness called by thelawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comesto know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonableremedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure tothe tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, otherthan the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, thatthe lawyer reasonably believes is false.

(2) A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding andwho knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or hasengaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to theproceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, ifnecessary, disclosure to the tribunal.

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(3) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to theconclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliancerequires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.

(4) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of allmaterial facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal tomake an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.

vii. ABA Model Rule 3.4 – Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel

(1) A lawyer shall not:

(i) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access toevidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal adocument or other material having potentialevidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel orassist another person to do any such act;

(ii) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness totestify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witnessthat is prohibited by law;

(iii) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules ofa tribunal, except for an open refusal based on anassertion that no valid obligation exists;

(iv) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discoveryrequest or fail to make reasonably diligent effort tocomply with a legally proper discovery request byan opposing party;

(v) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does notreasonably believe is relevant or that will not besupported by admissible evidence, assert personalknowledge of facts in issue except when testifyingas a witness, or state a personal opinion as to thejustness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, theculpability of a civil litigant or the guilt orinnocence of an accused; or

(vi) request a person other than a client to refrain fromvoluntarily giving relevant information to anotherparty unless:

1) the person is a relative or an employee orother agent of a client; and

2) the lawyer reasonably believes that theperson’s interests will not be adversely

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affected by refraining from giving suchinformation.

viii. Tax Court Bill of Rights II (“TBOR II”)

(1) TBOR II defines three elements of misconduct in IRM § 13.1.15.2(01-06-2006):

(a) An IRS employee violated a law, regulation, or rule ofconduct;

(b) An IRS system failed to function properly or within propertime frames; or

(c) An IRS employee treated a taxpayer inappropriately in thecourse of official business. For example, rudeness, overzealousness, excessive aggressiveness, discriminatorytreatment, and intimidation.

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19. Backdating - a/k/a Temporal Modifications of documents

a. Not necessarily illegal or unethical if the document seeks to be effective as of aprior date. A document may be backdated to memorialize past action or intent.The threshold question is whether the event occurred on the backdate or whetherthe event occurred on another date.

b. Backdating that fabricates

i. Examples:

(1) U.S. Projector & Elec. Corp. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1969-549 for the finding that the act of executing rescission agreementfixed petitioner’s liability to return funds previously received, theevent which determined the timing of a tax deduction. The backdating was the event that fixed the resulting tax treatment, notmemorializing it.

(2) United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 1997) involved anattorney who sought to conceal his client’s assets from the IRS bybackdating promissory notes to make it appear that the client wasobligated to repay certain unconditionally received amounts.

(3) Medieval Attraction N.V. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-455involved an effort to claim tax deductions by backdatingdocuments to make it appear that intangible property had beentransferred to a related party so that payments to the related partycould be treated as tax deductible royalties.

c. For a further discussion of backdating please see Backdating: Legal and EthicalConsequences of Temporal Modifications Tax Update XXXI by Robert R.Keatinge. A copy of the article can be found athttp://www.sdbar.org/CLE/Keatinge%20-%20Backdating%20SD.pdf.

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26 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)27 I.R.C. § 6103(a)28 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5)29 I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4)

30 In re U.S., 669 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

20. Other Taxpayers' Files (Offensive and Defensive Use of sec. 6103)

a. Issue:

i. Under what circumstances can the government use information in anothertaxpayer's files against a petitioner in Tax Court?

ii. Under what circumstances can the petitioner in Tax Court accessinformation in another taxpayer's file?

iii. Prior reports of IRS agents acting as government experts.

b. Answer:

i. The analysis of I.R.C. § 6103 inherently begins with 5 U.S.C. § 552,commonly known as the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Requestsfor tax returns and other documents held by Federal Agencies are doneunder FOIA and thus, all of its exemptions apply. Of particular interest totax petitioners are Exemptions 3 and 5. Under Exemption 3, thegovernment may prevent the release of records that are “specificallyexempted from disclosure by statute.”26 In this light, sec. 6103 becomesrelevant in that it requires that “returns and return information” remainconfidential unless otherwise authorized by Title 26.27 Exemption 5protects inter-or intra-agency letters or memoranda “which would not beavailable by law to a party ... in litigation with the agency.”28

ii. The government may access information in another taxpayers return if theinformation fits within the parameters of sec. 6103(h)(4), allowingdisclosure of a return “(B) if the treatment of an item reflected on suchreturn is directly related to the resolution of an issue in the proceeding; (C)if such return or return information directly relates to a transactionalrelationship between a person who is a party to the proceeding and thetaxpayer which directly affects the resolution of an issue in theproceeding.”29 In In re U.S., the court, following a lengthy statutory de-construction analysis, held that “directly related” language should be readnarrowly, saying that “[t]he disclosure of a third party return in a taxproceeding will be subject to [an items-test], except that such items ...must have a direct relationship to the resolution of an issue of thetaxpayer's liability.”30

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31 Life Extension Found., Inc. v. I.R.S., CIV. 12-280 RJL, 2013 WL 171086 (D.D.C. Jan. 16,2013).32 Id.33 Id.

(1) Violation of Sec. 6103 disclosure rules is among the listed groundsfor a Sec. 1203 Complaint against an IRS Agent/ employee.

iii. IRS reports have been generally held as attorney-work product or as partof the agency’s “deliberative process” and privileged under FOIAExemption 5.31 The protection of reports as “deliberative process” isdesigned to prevent the release of inter or intra-agency communicationmade as part of the government’s decision and policy making process.32 “A document is predecisional if it was prepared in order to assist anagency decisionmaker in arriving at his decision, rather than to support adecision already made.”33

c. Other cases and materials:

i. ABA Model Rule 3.4

(1) See above

ii. ABA Model Rule 4.4 Respect For Rights Of Third Persons

(1) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have nosubstantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden athird person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate thelegal rights of such a person.

(2) A lawyer who receives a document or electronically storedinformation relating to the representation of the lawyer's client andknows or reasonably should know that the document orelectronically stored information was inadvertently sent shallpromptly notify the sender.

21. What third-party contacts must the government disclose? Does I.R.C. § 7602 apply inTax Court?

a. The Tax Court in Westreco, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-501:

i. Counsel for Respondent was actively involved in an audit of the taxpayerfor years subsequent to what the Court was considering. During the auditprocess counsel for Respondent issued administrative summonses fordocuments and testimony of the taxpayers’ employees under I.R.C. §7602. The issues before the Court and with the audit were substantiallysimilar.

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(1) The Tax Court held that counsel’s participation in the auditundermined the Tax Court’s rules of discovery.

(2) The Tax Court was also concerned that the stipulation processwould be made more difficult and greatly delayed whilesubsequent years’ summons is pursued.

(3) Respondent would also be unable to provide a full and timelyresponse to the taxpayer’s discovery request. Respondent’slitigating posture would be continually be delayed and woulddepend on the progress of the subsequent year examination.

b. See also Mary Kay Ash v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 459 (1991).

i. The Court found that summons issued before the filing of petition was notsubject to Westreco restrictions.

ii. The Court was also unwilling to restrict information gathered throughissuance of summons before the petition was filed but resulted ininformation being gathered post-petition. The Court noted that it wasunable to enforce its discovery rules prior to the filing of a petition.

iii. The opinion was reviewed by the Court with Judges Nims, Korner,Shields, Hamblen, Cohen, Clapp, Gerber, Jacobs, Parr, Wells, Colvin, andHalpern agreeing with the majority.

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34 Schneider Interests LP v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 151 (2002).35 Melea Ltd v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 218 (2002)(corporation compelled to producedeposition transcripts from a patent infringement case that were subject to a protective orderin that case; however; the Tax Court continued the terms of protection granted by the patenttrial court to the information allowed to the Commissioner).

22. Protective Orders

a. Excessive Discovery

i. The Tax Court may order a protective order where the IRS engages ininappropriate and excessive formal discovery without any conferencebetween the parties.34

b. Protective orders from other courts

i. The Tax Court has allowed the Commissioner access to documents inanother case that were subject to a protective order by the other court.35

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23. Communication with Persons Represented by Counsel

a. Can the Government contact employees of the Taxpayer?

i. ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2:

(1) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about thesubject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to berepresented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer hasthe consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law ora court order.

(2) Comment [7] provides:

(a) In the case of a represented organization, this Ruleprohibits communications with a constituent of theorganization who supervises, directs or regularly consultswith the organization’s lawyer concerning the matter or hasauthority to obligate the organization with respect to thematter or whose act or omission in connection with thematter may be imputed to the organization for purposes ofcivil or criminal liability. Consent of the organization’slawyer is not required for communication with a formerconstituent. If a constituent of the organization isrepresented in the matter by his or her own counsel, theconsent by that counsel to a communication will besufficient for purposes of this Rule. Compare Rule 3.4(f).In communicating with a current or former constituent ofan organization, a lawyer must not use methods ofobtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of theorganization. See Rule 4.4.

(3) Model Rule 4.2 advances the well recognized public policyfavoring the preservation and protection of the attorney-clientrelationship. See Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 148 F.R.D. 259,260 (S.D.Iowa 1993).

(4) The Tax Court in FU Investment Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 104T.C. 408 (1995) was asked to address whether the protection ofModel Rule 4.2 extended to former employees of acorporation/petitioner.

(a) The Court in holding that Rule 4.2 does not extend toformer employees, cited the ABA Standing Committee onEthics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Opinion 91-359 in which the ABA takes the view that Rule 4.2 shouldnot be interpreted to prohibit ex-parte communications withformer employees.

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36 5. U.S.C. 552a(b)(11).

(b) The Court was cautious in that they recognized thatcircumstances may arise where certain precautions(including a narrowly drawn protective order) may bewarranted to ensure that such ex-parte contacts are notsimply a forum for counsel to seek information protectedby the attorney-client privilege.

(c) The Court advised Respondent must advise formeremployees that respondent and petitioner are adverseparties to a proceeding and that the attorney must conductthe interview in conformity with Model Rule 4.3 (Dealingwith Unrepresented Persons).

b. Henthorn Motions

i. U.S. v. Henthorn, 931 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1991) provides that, in the contextof a criminal case, the government must disclose information favorable tothe defense that meets the appropriate standard of materiality.

ii. IRM § 11.3.35.8.1 (01-01-2006)

(1) Requests and demands for testimony and/or production ofpersonnel and payroll records in private litigation or administrativeproceedings is coordinated by the IRS Disclosure Office with theTransactional Processing Center (TPC).

(2) The Office of Personnel Management regulations require thatsubpoenas for personnel records must be approved by a judge ormagistrate of a court of competent jurisdiction in order to meet thecourt order exception in the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(11)).

iii. 5 U.S.C. § 552a

(1) No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a systemof records by any means of communication to any person, or toanother agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with theprior written consent of, the individual to whom the recordpertains, unless disclosure of the record would be pursuant to theorder of a court of competent jurisdiction.36

iv. FOIA Exemption 6

(1) 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6) generally prohibits the disclosure of personneland medical files and similar files the disclosure of which wouldconstitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.

(2) IRS Employee Time sheets

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37 Berger v. I.R.S., 487 F.Supp.2d 482 (D.N.J. 2007).

(a) Federal Courts have held that disclosure of an IRSemployee’s time sheets, which are “similar” to personnelfiles, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion ofpersonal privacy.37

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24. Immunizing Witnesses

a. What efforts can and should the government take to immunize witnesses neededby a taxpayer?

b. In the context of criminal cases 18 U.S.C. § 6002 grants prosecutors broaddiscretion to grant immunity to a witness, but grants no right to defendant to dothe same.

i. The Third Circuit has recognized a judicial authority to grant immunity“when it is found that a potential defense witness can offer testimonywhich is clearly exculpatory and essential to the defense case and whenthe government has not strong interest in withholding immunity. SeeGov’t of V.I. v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 974 (3d Cir. 1980).

ii. United States v. Burke, 425 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2005) recognizes theprinciple that, although the court cannot order the government toimmunize a defense witness, courts can dismiss an indictment where theprosecutor’s refusal to grant immunity has violated the defendant’s rightto due process.

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Faculty Biographies

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FRANK AGOSTINO, ESQ.President, Agostino & Associates, P.C.

AREAS OF EMPHASISCivil Tax LitigationCriminal Tax LitigationIRS and State Administrative ProceedingsTrusts and Estates Planning and Litigation

EDUCATIONL.L.M., New York University, 1981J.D., New York Law School, cum laude, 1982B.A., The City College of New York, cum laude, 1981

Mr. Agostino is the President of Agostino & Associates, PC, a twelve attorney firm inHackensack, New Jersey. Mr. Agostino concentrates his practice in criminal and civil tax mattersbefore federal and state taxing authorities. He was an attorney with the Internal Revenue ServiceDistrict Counsel Office in Springfield, Illinois and Newark, New Jersey. He also served as aSpecial Assistant United States Attorney concentrating in criminal tax prosecution. He has beenan adjunct professor on tax controversy at Seton Hall University and Rutgers University. Hefrequently lectures on tax controversy and litigation matters.

CONTACT INFORMATIONEmail: [email protected]. 201.488.5400 ext. 107

BAR ADMISSIONSNew YorkNew JerseyU.S. Tax CourtU.S. District Court, District of New JerseyU.S. Court of Appeals, Second CircuitU.S. Court of Appeals, Third CircuitU.S. Court of Appeals, Federal CircuitU.S. Court of Federal Claims

PUBLICATIONS“Tweel and the Taxpayer’s Affirmative Duty to Ask the Government What It Intends to Do withthe Information Provided,” Journal of Tax Practice & Procedure, August-September 2012.

Book Review of “A Practitioner’s Guide to Innocent Spouse Relief,” Tax Notes, June 20, 2011

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PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIESAmerican Bar Association (Tax Section)New York County Lawyers AssociationAmerican College of Tax CounselFederal Bar Association

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Judge John O. Colvin

Chambers Telephone Number: 202-521-0662

Biography:

Judge. b. Ohio. A.B., University of Missouri, 1968; J.D., 1971; LL.M., Taxation, Georgetown University Law Center, 1978. During college and law school, employed by Niedner, Niedner, Nack and Bodeux, St. Charles, MO; Missouri Attorney General John C. Danforth and Missouri State Representative Richard C. Marshall, Jefferson City, MO; and U.S. Senator Mark O. Hatfield and Congressman Thomas B. Curtis, Washington, DC. Admitted to practice law in Missouri, 1971, and District of Columbia, 1974. Office of the Chief Counsel, U.S. Coast Guard, Washington, D.C., 1971-75. Served as Tax Counsel, Senator Bob Packwood, 1975-84; Chief Counsel, 1985-87, and Chief Minority Counsel, 1987-88, U.S. Senate Finance Committee; Officer, Tax Section, Federal Bar Association, since 1978; Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, since 1987. Numerous civic and community activities. Appointed by President Reagan as Judge, United States Tax Court, on September 1, 1988, for a term ending August 31, 2003. Reappointed on August 12, 2004, for a term ending August 11, 2019. Elected as Chief Judge for two-year terms effective June 1, 2006, June 1, 2008, and June 1, 2010; and for the interim period March 8 through August 6, 2013.

Last updated: August 8, 2013

Page 1 of 1Judge Colvin

9/16/2013http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/judges/colvin.htm

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Monica E. Koch, Associate Area Counsel, Long Island, NY

• Ms. Koch graduated St. John's University in 1984 with a B.A. (magna cum laude) in Government, and double minor in German and Business. She attended St. John's University School of Law and received her J.D. in 1987. After a 21 year stint as a field attorney actively involved in Tax Court litigation, she was promoted to Associate Area Counsel for the Long Island Office. She is the recipient of the 1995 Attorney of the Year Award and the 2002 “Cube Award” for significant Tax Court Litigation, and has successfully litigated several fraud cases. She is an adjunct professor at LIU-Post, teaching Tax Practice and Procedure. Her article: ”IRC 6651(f) v. IRC 6663 – Same Badges, Different Application”, was published in the QuarterlyFraud Digest (Nov. 2006).