The Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa ...spgabac.org/Site/Wp-content/Uploads/2017/06/Plaquette-GABAC-anglais-OK-VF.pdfThe Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa

The Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa (GABAC) is a specialised body of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) whose missions include :

• Combatingmoneylaunderingandtheproceedsofcrime;• ImplementingappropriatemeasuresinasmoothandconcertedfashiontosupporttheseeffortswithintheCEMAC;• Assessingtheimpactandeffectivenessofthemeasuresadopted;• Assistingmemberstateswiththeiranti-moneylaunderingpolicy;• WorkingwithexistingAfricanandinternationalorganisations.

GABAC has been an associate member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) sinceOctober2015.

©2017GABAC.AllrightsreservedThisdocumentmaynotbereproducedortranslatedwithoutexpresspermissionfromGABAC.

GROUPE D’ACTION CONTRE LE BLANCHIMENT D’ARGENT EN AFRIQUE CENTRALE

entsContents

Executivesummary………………………………………………………………………Introduction………………………………………………………………………………Chapter I:Context…………………………………………...…………………………I.1.Generalcontext…………………………………………………………...…………I.2.Specificcontext……………………………………………………….......…………

Chapter II :Discussion……………………………...….........…………………………II.1.Objectives……………………………………...……………………………………II.1.1.Generalobjective………………………………………...………………………II.1.2.Specificobjectives………………………………...……………………….....……II.1.3.Méthodology………………………………………………………………………II.1.3.1.Collectingandprocessingphenomenologicaldata…………...............…………II.1.3.2.Collectingandprocessingdataonthefinancingofterrorism…...................……

Chapter III:Reviewofliterature………..…………….…………………...……………

Chapter IV:Cross-borderconnections,theregionalisationofterrorismandopportunitiesforendogenousfinancingintheLakeChadBasin………….............................…..………IV.1.Arelativelyhomogenoussocio-culturalareapromotingtheestablishmentofcross-bordernetworks………………….............……………………IV.2.Fromsmugglerstoterrorists,knowledgeoftheterrainandtrafficcapitalisedbyBokoHaram…………………………………………IV.3.Thelureofprofitforyoungpeoplepersistinginresourcefulnessandsocialpressure…………………………………………………………………………

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Chapter V :Analysisoftypologiesandredflags………………...........……………………V.1.Typologies………………………………………………………………………………Typology 1:Misuseofnon-profitorganisations…...….................................………………Typology 2 :Misuseofmoneytransferagencies……................................…………………Typology 3:Misuseoffinancialestablishments…………...………….....................………Typology 4:Illicittrafficking……………..……………...…………………………………Typology 5:Financingbyeconomicoperators……………..........................………………Typology 6:Collectingandremittingfunds………………..………………………………Typology 7:Extortion……………...….................…………………………………………Typology 8:Financingbypoliticallyexposedpersons…….…….........................…………Typology 9:Kidnappingwithdemandsforransom……….........…..………………………Typology 10:Ambushesandlooting………………...………...……………………………Typology 11 :Crimeinvolvingwildlife…….…………………………...…..………………V.2.Riskindicatorsandredflags……………………………................……………………V.2.1.Riskindicatorsofterrorismfinancing………………..................…….............………V.2.2.Riskindicatorsofterrorismandredflagexpansion………………......................……

Conclusionetrecommendations………………………………………………….…………Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………...………Recommendations……………………………………………...……………………………Indicativebibliography…………………………....................………………………………

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Since independenceof the countries therein,CentralAfricahasbeenoneof themostunstablesub-regionsofthecontinent.However,despitethepresenceoftheLordResistanceArmy (LRA) in the east of theCAR since 2008, the countriesremainedrelativelylittleaffectedbythecurrentnotionofterrorism.ThissituationhaschangedsincetheirruptionofBokoHaramonthestrategicsceneoftheLakeChadBasin.DeadlyattacksbyBokoHaram,whichwaslistedasaterroristorganisationin2014,directlyconcernCameroonandChad,withapotentialriskofinfiltrationintotheCAR.Hencethistypologyexercise,extendedtoananalysisofthecontext,tobet-terdevelopanunderstandingfirstlyoftheextensionofterroristactivityinCentralAfricaandsecondlythemechanismsforfinancingterrorism.Thedatausedtoachievethisendshowsthatthephenomenonneedstobeanalysedfromaholistic,cross-borderperspective.Asub-regionalapproachisthereforere-quired,atthelevelofthecountriesconcerned,bothfortheintelligenceofthefoun-dations,players,actionsandincidencesofterrorismandforidentifyingtherisks,trendsandmethodsoffinancing.Local,mainlycross-border,socialandeconomicmodels, togetherwith the socio-political context, provide terrorist organisationswiththemeansfornetworking,recruitmentandself-sufficiency.Ithasemergedthatthemostseriouscurrentterrorist threatinthesub-regionco-mesfromthereligiousextremismdistilledbyBokoHaram, takingadvantageofthesocio-economicproblemsfacingyoungpeopleandbackwardnessintermsofschoolingandprofessionaltraining,especiallyinborderareas.BokoHaramhastakenadvantageoftheporosityofborders,knowledgeoftheter-rainandexistingsocial,culturalandeconomicinteractionstorecruitfromsocialcategoriesthatarereceptivetoitsreligiousdiscourseandtheperspectiveofeasygainsofferedbytheprofitabilityofthedisorderthatithasjustcreated.Ithasalsoemergedthatothercategoriesofoperatorshaveseenanopportunityforbusiness,especiallythroughhostagesandvarioussuppliesprovidedfortheterroristorgani-sationinexchangeforenticingpayments.TheLRA,foritspart,isbenefitingfromthelonginstabilityinthecontactzonesbetweenCentralAfricaandEastAfrica to transmigrate to thebordersofStates,carryingoutincursionsintotheCAR.Littleinformationishoweveravailableonitsactualmechanismsoffinancing.Asregardsthefinancingofterrorism,itisclearthatalthoughterroristorganisationsreceiveexternalfunding,theymainlyproducetheirownresources.Otherforeign

summaryExecutive

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The financing of terrorism in Central Africa © 2017

terroristgroupsraisefundsinthesub-region.EleventypologiesofconfirmedfinancingofterrorisminCentralAfricahavebeenidentified,namelymisuseofnon-profitorganisations;misuseofnewmethodsofpayment;misuseofmoneytransferagencies;illicittrafficking;financingbyecono-micoperators;theraisingandremittanceofmoney;extortion;financingbypoliti-callyexposedpersons;kidnappingwithdemandsforransom;ambushesandlootingandcrimeinvolvingwildlife.Otherpotentialsourcesoffinancinghavealsobeenidentified.Theseincludeinformalmanualmoneyexchange,thetraffickingofagri-culturalproductsandthetraffickingofgems.Themoneyraisedpassesthrougharangeofchannels,includingphysicaltransportand remittance as already practised by economic operators trading outside of the region;transferbyelectronicmeansandtheprovisionofgoodsinsteadofcash.Betweennorth-easternNigeria,theextremenorthofCameroonandwesternChad,the ways in which funds are raised and circulated rely on trading agents and cir-cuits, inparticularcross-bordersmuggling.BokoHaramusesfundsgeneratedinCentralAfricainparticulartopurchaseweapons,foodsuppliesandproductsusedtomakeexplosivedevicesortofinancecellsandremuneratecertaincategoriesofitsmembers.As with the widespread wayside robberies and kidnappings that the studied area has experiencedoverthepasttwodecades,terrorisminCentralAfricaismulti-faceted.Someofthesefacetsaremanifest,whereasothersstilllackprecision.Itsfinancial,economicandsocial impact,however, is considerable,particularly inCameroonandChad.Hencetheexistenceofnationalandsub-regionalcounter-terrorismmea-sures,introducedbothbyStatesdirectlyimpactedandbythoseawareoftheriskofinfiltration.Majorriskshavebeenhighlightedregardingthedisseminationofterroristcells.Theanalysisoftheconditionsofeffectivenessofthesemeasuresandofcellscombatingthefinancingofterrorismsuggestthatasthethreatissub-regional,theimplemen-tationorconsolidationof integratedcounter-terrorismpartnerships, involvingallservicesconcernedbyissuesregardinghumanandanimalcross-bordermigration,economicandsocialexchanges,defenceandsecurity,tradeandfinancialflow,etc.,is urgent

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Over time,CentralAfrica has proved to be themost unstable sub-region of theAfricancontent.Shortlyafterindependencein1960,theCongowasplungedintowar,subsequentlytriggeringthefirstinterventionbyUNpeacekeepers.Sincethen,thispartofthecontinent,whichgenerallycorrespondstotheECCAS*zone,hasen-dlesslyexperiencedsuccessivemassviolence,withsprawlingcivilwarsthathavehaddevastatingeffectsonpeace,safety,developmentandcommunity life in thecountriesthathavehadlittletimetostarttheirnationalconstruction.AsidefromGabonandEquatorialGuinea,whichhavebeenrelativelysparedbysecuritycrises,eachoftheelevenothercountrieshasexperiencedperiodsofmajorinstabilityduemainlytopoliticalandintra-communityfightingandorganisedcrime.Angola,Burundi, theRepublic of theCongo,Rwanda and theDRCongo haveexperiencedlongyearsofviolencebetweenmilitaryfactionsunderpinnedbygeo-politicalrivalriesdatingbacktotheColdWar,geo-strategicalreconfigurationwarspre-datingtheEast-Westconflictandethno-politicalcombats.Althoughnotdirect-lyconcernedbythisstudy,thesecountriesneverthelessplayaroleindisseminatingawarinfrastructure,theeffectsofwhicharefeltbeyondtheGreatLakesregion.In such an open sub-region, violence is not exclusive to States, since fighters,weapons and criminal resources resulting from the exploitation of controlledland, spreadand sometimesplaya role in inflaming the socio-political situationof neighbouring countries. The example of violence perpetrated by Jean-PierreBemba’sMLCfighters in theCAR is indicativeof the regionalisationof crises,theconvertibilityofrebelsandthetransferofarmsfromonezonetoanotherinaprocess that reproducesconflicts.This ishowcriminalorganisationssuchas theLord Resistance Army (LRA) managed to renew their arsenal within the local black market.Thespatial frameworkof this study lieswithin thezonecoveredby theCentralAfricaEconomicandMonetaryCommunity(CEMAC),comprisingCameroon,theCentralAfricanRepublic,Chad,theCongo,theGabonandEquatorialGuinea.Thelatterthreearenotdirectlyconcernedbythisstudy,sincenoterroristactivityper-petratedbyarecognisedorganisationhasyetbeenreportedwithintheirrespectiveterritories.However,thefactthattheybordercountriesthatareaffectedbyactsofterrorismandfromwhichnationalsparticipateinterroristoperations,hasledthe

ctionintroduction

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* Economic Community of Central African States comprising the following States: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Republic of Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda and Sao Tome & Principe.

GABAC to include them in this analysis of the facts and risks of terrorism in general and,moreparticularly,itsfinancing.Inaddition,thesub-regionalapproachadoptedbythestudyjustifieslookingbeyondtheborders,whichareultimatelyporous.Inordertoremainconsistentwiththesubjectofthestudy,theonlyStatesdirect-lyconcernedareCameroon,ChadandtheCAR,whichareexperiencingterroristactivity and confirmed risks of activity, aswell as thefinancing of terrorism. Itshouldbenoted that the termsof referencerequirefirstlyabetterunderstandingofallaspectsofthisrelativelynewphenomenoninthesub-regionandsecondly,intelligenceofitsfinancingmechanisms.However,thisstudyonlyinvolveslocalphenomenologicalparametersthataffectthemechanismsoffinancingterrorism.

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I.1 General context

InCameroonattheendofthe1980s,atthetimeoftheirruptionofasevereeco-nomiccrisis,ruralandcross-bordercrimeemerged,followedbyextensivehostagetakingalongitseasternborderandseapiracy.Onaninternallevel,highwayban-dits,kidnappersandpirateshadsuchaneconomicandsocialimpactthattheyleadto thecreationofa special forcecalled theRapidResponseBrigade,whichhassinceconductedanti-criminal,counter-insurgencyandcounter-terroristmissions,notablyagainstBokoHarem.Chadhasexperiencedabellicosepoliticalperiod,characterisedfrom1966to2008by a succession of rebellions and coups, some successful and some not, aimedatoverthrowing theexisting regime.Overaperiodofnearlyhalfacentury, thiscountryhasseendozensofpolitico-militarygroupsform,breakupandreproduce.Chad’seasternborderwithSudanhasbeenthelaunchpadforallmajorrebellions.ThissideisalsowheretheSudaneseJanjaweedcarriesoutattacksand,aboveall,where a range of smuggling operations are conducted between the East and Central Africa,notablytheCAR.Inthisstudy,thedescriptionofthemilitarypastofChadhighlightsthechallengethiscountryrepresentsforterrorisminAfricaingeneral,aswellasthechallengeitsetsforthisphenomenonintheLakeChadBasininparticular.Indeed,innearlyhalfacenturyofcontinualconfrontationbetweenrebelfactionsandgovernmentforces,Chadhasaccumulatedthreemilitaryvariableswithsometimescontradicto-rystrategicaleffects,namelyestablishedexperienceofanti-guerrillafightingintheSahelregion,extensivelogisticsandthousandsofformerfightersneedingtostartanewlife.ThisstrategicexperienceenablesN’Djamenatointervenetohelpcountriesthreate-ned by terrorist attacks, as can be seenwith the deployment of Chadian forcesinMali,Nigeria,CameroonandNigerinasynergyofactionswitharmedforcesfromFrance, theUNor thecountriesaffected,dependingonthecase.However,manywarweaponshavebeendisseminatedclandestinelyfromorviaChad,someofwhichareused inorganisedcrime,notably terrorism.ActiveparticipationbyChadinintegratedanti-radicalisationinitiativesledbytheSahelG5,supportedmi-litarilybyOperationBarkhane,togetherwithitsdiplomaticactivismtofindarapidsolutiontotheLibyanproblem,theprolongationofwhichisprovidingfertilesoilforDaesh,addstothespecificsituationofChadontheAfricanchessboardinthefightagainstterroristorganisations.Inlightoftheabove,itisclearthatChadhas,onewayoranother,openedfireonthemainterroristorganisationsactiveontheAfricancontinent,namelyAQIM,BokoHaramandIslamicState.AsfortheCentralAfricanRepublic,itisparticularlythepresenceoftheLRAintheeastofthecountry,borderingontheDRCongo,thatmakesitacountrysubjecttoterroristthreats.However,therearegroundsforexaminingthecriminalisationofitssocio-politicalandeconomicenvironmenttoexploretherisksofinstrumentali-

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Chapter I n Context

sationofitsweaknessesbyopportunists.Forthepasttwodecades,thecountryhasbeentornapartbymutinies,coupsd’état,foreigninterventionandtheoccupationofentireswathesofterritorybyarmedgroups.Themostseriouscrisisisthatopposingarmedgroupsgathered togetherunder theSelekamovement to theAnti-Balaka,causinghundredsofthousandsofpeopletofleetoneighbouringcountries,de-struc-turing many community resources and bringing the country back to its initial efforts ofnationalconstruction.AreportbyaUN-commissionedgroupofexpertsrecentlyportrayedagrimviewofthecriminaleconomiesprofitingfromdisorderinCentralAfrica.Irrespectiveoftheirnameandareaofoperation,armedgroupsplunder,organisetheplunderingorreceiveashareoftheplunderingofthenaturalresourcesofCentralAfrica.With tolls, plundering, poaching, racketeering, illegalmining andmiscellaneoustrafficking,theCentralAfricanhinterlandhasbeendescribedasanopen-airbankfromwhichwarlordshelp themselves,whilst thepopulationstruggleseverydayundertheweightofpovertymadeworsebyabreakdownineconomicactivitydueto the lack of security.Creating fear and profiting fromdisorder thus appear tobe the common threads of awar economy, combinedwith flourishing entrepre-neurship based on insecurity. In nearly allCARborder areas, transmigration ofarmedgroupsmakes iteasier for illegalactivities to takehold.Thiscontexthaspromotedthesettingupofnon-profitorganisations,whoseobviouslycriminalac-tivitieshaveemerged,withoutitbeingpossibletorepressthemintime.PoorStatecontrolovertheperipheriesfostersthering-fencingofborderareas,whosecovetedresourcesarelikelytofundterrorists,justastheycanfinancethemilitary-criminalandpolitical-militarygroupsthatplundertheseareas.Thecountryisalsoexposedtoenvironmentalcrime, theproductsofwhich transit throughporousborders tosupplyAsianmarkets.Thisbriefdescriptionof the socio-political contextof the studiedareabrings tolightthepre-existenceoforganisedcross-bordercrimeinthebordersbetweenCa-meroon,CARandChad,togetherwithbordersbetweenthesecountriesandsomeoftheirneighbours,inparticularSudan,SouthSudan,theDCRandNigeria.Aboveall,itmakesitpossibletotranscendanimmediateinterpretationofthesecuritypro-blemsraisedatanygiventime**,asthereisacrime-feedingsubstratepresentinthemediumorlong-termcontext,dependingonthecase.Thissubstrateisasystemofconflictsthatfacilitatestherenewalofthreatsinapermanentlyunstablesub-region.Thesearenolongerfacts,butrathercriminalphenomena,forwhichthenatureofthegame,inotherwordsthemethods,variesaccordingtotherelatingissues,whichcantakeonidentity-based,politicalorreligiousconnotations,withouteverdispo-singoftheconsiderableeconomicandfinancialmotivation.Itisalsoimportanttoperceivetheterrorismofthestudyareaasaphenomenontobeanalysedinasystemicmanner.Asub-regionalapproachisthereforerequired,at thelevelofthecountriesconcerned,bothfortheintelligenceofallaspectsofterrorismandforidentifyingtherisks,trendsandmethodsofitsfinancing.Further

11** See GABAC, Rapport de l’exercice de typologie sur l’utilisation abusive des organismes à but non lucratif à des fins de financement du terrorisme en Afrique Centrale, 2015.


oninthereport,wewillseehowthelocalandmainlycross-bordereconomicandsocialmodels provide terrorist organisationswith the resources for networking,recruitmentandself-sufficiency.

I.2 Specific context

TerrorismisperpetratedinCentralAfricabytwoofficiallylistedorganisations.Ittakesadvantagehoweverofthestructuredcriminalworkings,methodsandriskscreatedbydisparateorganisations,which,despitemeasuresaimedatsecuringtheborders,continuetoplunderthesub-regionborderzones.

- TheLordResistanceArmy(LRA):foundedin1988,ithasbeenactiveintheeastoftheCARsince2008.TheLRAespeciallyoperatesintheregionsofHautMbomou,MbomouandHauteKotto.TheoriginalkeyobjectiveoftheLRAwastooverthrowtheregimeofPresidentYoweriMuseveniandsetupanewregimebasedontheTenCommandments.Mostsourcesnowsuggestthatthegroupiscurrentlyfightingforitssurvival.TheLRAhasallegedlybeenreducedtobetween200and300menroamingtheruralareasonthebordersofSudan(Darfur),SouthSudan,theCARandtheDRCongo.Itismadeupofrecruits,includingkidnappedchild-ren,andsurvives throughpoachingandthe illegal tradeof ivory,wood,oreandweapons,witharmedgroupsinDarfur.AccordingtoinformationprovidedbyCen-tralAfricanmembersoftheTaskForce,LRAfightersaretraffickingwithex-Selekaarmedgroups.

TheLRAwaslistedasaterroristorganisationbytheUSDepartmentofStatein2001andbytheAfricanUnionin2011.Theforests,porousborders,lowgovern-mentpresencenearthebordersandthering-fencingofcertainborderareasbyar-med groups all help to foster criminal economies and the transmigration of armed groups.TheLRAtakesadvantageofthisconfusion.

- BokoHarem,whichcallsitselfJama’atAhlal-SunnahLidda’awatiwalJihad(GroupofthePeopleofSunnahforPreachingandJihad),isanIslamicsectcreatedin2002byMohammedYusuf,ayoungpreacherfromtheIzalamovement,amel-tingpotofreformisminNigeria.YusefbrokeawayfromIzala,amovementthatcalls for the participation of Muslims in the political life of their country in order to mouldthesystemaccordingtoitsvisionofsociety.Yusef,ontheotherhand,wasanti-system,salafistanddeterminedtooverthrowmoderninstitutionsandtheirlea-derstosetupasocietygovernedbyIslamiclaw,theSharia.Hissocialandpoliticalsatireaccusedthoserulingthecountryofhavingsetupasystemofpoorgovernance

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inNigeriathatwasresponsibleforimmorality,povertyandmassunemployment,whilst theminoritybenefits fromcorruptionandnepotism tomonopolisepublicresources.Bothmillenarianandfocusedonthesocialproblemsofmodern-dayNi-geria,Yusefwanted Islamicorthodoxy ledbyaCaliphate tocleanse the IslamicreligiousenvironmentoftheSufibrotherhoodsaccusedofdilutingoriginalIslamwithpracticesforeigntotheTraditionsbequeathedbytheProphetMohammed.SincethedeathofYusufduringtheMaiduguriconfrontationinJuly2009,thesecthasbecomemilitarised,adheringtoviolentextremism,ring-fencingareasborde-ringonCamerooninnorth-easternNigeria,gainingterritorythroughattacksandsuccessesagainsttheNigeriansecurityforces,retreatingfollowingoffensivesfromthesecurityforcesandtheMultinationalJointTaskForceorganisedbythecoun-triessufferingfromattacks,recruitingwidelyfromyoungpeopleintheLakeChadBasin,massacringcivilians,perpetratingsuicideattacksandlayinganti-personnelmines,destroyingvillagesandinfrastructures,frequentlyperformingdecapitations,drivingpeoplefromtheirhomesandrecruitingwidelyfromyoungpeopleinbor-derareas.BokoHaramwaslistedasaterroristorganisationin2014andisdeemedtobethemostviolentarmedgroupintheworld.InCamerooninJuly2016,thereweremorethan56,000Nigerianrefugees,nearly200,000internallydisplacedper-sonsandover1,100civilianandmilitarydeaths1.InApril2016,32,728Nigerianrefugees were registered in Chad2.

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1 Sources: HCR/Maroua and Cameroon defence and security forces2 Expert report, 2nd regional summit on security in the Lake Chad Basin, 12 and 13 May 2016)

TheLRAhasbeen carryingout terrorist activities in the east of theCARsince2008.BokoHaramstartedextendingitsfieldofactiontoCameroonandChadin2013,holdingoutagainstnationalarmiesandevenasub-regionalcoalitionwhichhashowevergraduallyreduceditsroomformanoeuvre.Howhavegroupsclaimingtobeonareligiousmissionmanagedtoturnthemselvesintomurderouscriminalorganisationsandresilientterrorists,despitetheresourcesthatStates,regionalandinternationalorganisationsinparticularhavedeployedtoendtheiroperations?Theanswertothisquestioncallsfirstlyforananalysisofallaspects of terrorism in Central Africa and secondly for a greater understanding of themechanismsthroughwhichtheyfinancetheiroperations.

II.1. Objectives

II.1.1. General objective

Thegeneralobjectiveof this study is todrawupaphenomenologyof terrorisminCentralAfricaand identify itssourcesandmethodsoffinancing toreveal theloopholesinnationalandsub-regionalinstrumentstocombatthefinancingofter-rorism,aswellasincreasingtheabilityofStatestoeffectivelycombattheaccess,movementanduseoffinancialresourcesbyterroristorganisationsandtheindivi-dualsthathelpthemcarryoutcriminalacts. II.1.2. Specific objectives

-ToanalysethedeterminantsofterrorismanditsspecificitiesinCentralAfrica;-Toidentifythemethodsandtechniquesusedbyterroristsandtheirfollowerstoraise,moveandusefunds,detailing,insofaraspossible, thebreakdownofworkbetweenthevariousplayersinthefinancingchain;-TocategorisethedifferentmethodsoffinancingusedinCentralAfrica;-To increase theabilityofauthorities inchargeofenquiriesandproceedings tounderstandhowlegalandillegalfundsareusedforfinancingterrorism;-Toidentifyrelevantindicatorsandredflags;-To help financial and supervisory institutions to take decisions relating to themonitoringofdeclarationsofsuspiciousoperationswithrespecttothefinancingofterrorism;-Tohelpdecision-makersand legislativeand judicialauthorities to identifyandcloseloopholesinlegislationonterrorismandthefinancingofterrorism.

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Chapter II nThe issue

II.1.3. Méthodology

This study has been performed using double entry methodology meeting the two main orientationsprescribedbythetermsofreference.

II.1.3.1 Collecting and processing phenomenological data

AnumberofstudieshavebeenproducedonarmedgroupsinCentralAfrica,inpar-ticularontheLRAandBokoHaram.Althoughthefirstofthetwoorganisationsisquite well known due to its age and the assessment of its human impact on the borders ofUganda,theDRCongo,SouthSudanandtheCAR,thisisnotthecasefortheac-tivitiesoftheNigerianIslamicsectinCentralAfrica.Toavoidrepetitionofwidelyknownfacts,collecteddatahasfocusedontryingtounderstandthemachinationsofBokoHaraminthissub-region.Apart fromtheuseofopensources, thesearchforempiricaldatahasneverthelessproventobetheonlycredibleapproachtotrytoachieveabetterunderstandingofthefinancialactivitiesofBokoHaraminCameroonandChad.Thetopicalityofthesubject,togetherwithdataconfidentialityandsecurityparanoia,haverestrictedaccesstoinformation,leadingtoalternativeapproachesbeingneces-saryforthegatheringofdata.Usinginterviewswithlocalsandthoseworkinginad-ministrationandsecurity,togetherwiththesparsestatisticaldataprovidedbythese-curityforcesandinternationalorganisationsworkinginthefield,andcapitalisationofmiscellaneoussourcesprovidedbymembersoftheTaskForce,itisindeedamethodofresearchviatracesthathasbeenadopted.Duetothedataavailable,thestudyfo-cusesontheterroristactivitiesandfinancingofBokoHaraminCameroonandChad.

II.1.3.2 Collecting and processing data on the financing of terrorism Inthisaspect,theapproachisinlinewiththeframeworklaiddownbytheFATFasregardstypologiesfocusingonrisks,trendsandmethods.Tothiseffect,existingstu-dieshavebeentakenintoaccount,someofwhicharesummarisedinthereviewofliterature,toidentifyfieldsatriskandthemechanismsforfinancingterrorismlistedelsewhereandpotentiallyfieldsofvulnerabilityinthesub-region.Similarly,thepro-jectscopeforthiscombinedexerciseofanalysisandtypologywasset inadvance,namelytohelpStatesandbodiespreventingandrepressingterrorismanditsfinancingto better understand the determinants,mechanisms, effects and loopholes used byterroriststomobilise,moveandusetheirfunds.Thestudyalsoassessestheimple-mentationofgoodpracticecontainedintherelatedFATFRecommendationsand,if

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necessary,proposecorrectivemeasurestoimprovethecomplianceofnationalandsub-regionalinstrumentsandstrategiesforcombatingthefinancingofterrorisminCentralAfrica.Tothisend,theGABAChas:

- CreatedaTaskForcecomprisingfifteenmembersfromthesixcountriesoftheCEMACzoneandrepresentingthefollowingadministrations:justice,defence,internalsecurityandintelligence,andfinancialintelligenceunits(FIU);

- Drafted a questionnaire,with the technical support of the FATF and theInter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa(GIABA),whichithasthendistributedtoStates,requestingthefollowinginfor-mationinparticular:abriefdescriptionofthenationalsocio-politicalandsecuritycontextdetailingexistingarmedgroups;casestudiesonthefinancingofterrorism;anassessmentofthevulnerabilitiesofthefinancialintelligencesystem;thesources,flowandvolumesoftransactionsrelatingtothefinancingofterrorism;theoriginsanddestinationsoffunds;relevantlegalproceedingseitherclosedorinprogress;trendsandindicatorsforthefinancingofterrorism,etc.Requestsformoreinforma-tiononspecificsubjectswerealsosent;

- OrganisedfourTaskForcemeetings:inBanguiinFebruary2016toenableTaskForcememberstomeet,harmonisetheirviewsonthestudytobeperformedanddrawupanimplementationschedule;inDoualainApril2016andinN’Djame-na in May 2016 to assess the data collected and the data to be completed prior to the firstdraftingofthetext;inLibrevilleinAugust2016tosubmitthefirstdraft;

- ParticipatedinJointTaskForcemeetings,involvingtheGABAC,GIABAandtheFATF,onthefinancingofterrorisminCentralandWesternAfrica.It has been demonstrated herein that, investigating the sources andmechanismsoffinancingterrorismintheareainquestionshouldnotberestrictedtotheusualmethodsand targetsofbanking informationandother investigations into formaltransactions.Thenewaspectsofterrorisminthisareaofveryscarcebanking,cha-racterisedbythephysicalmovementoffundsandtradingofexchanges,callsfordiversificationofthesourcesandapproachesforcollectingdatainordertotakeintoaccountthecustomarymethodsofproducingandmovingfundsthatterroristsmayuse.Hencetheglobalapproachadoptedbythisreport:verifyingifthemechanismsforfinancing terrorismknownelsewhere areused in the studied zone and iden-tifyingnewtypologies.

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Since2001,agreatdealofliteraturehasstudiedterrorism,inparticulartheIslamicterrorismembodiedbyAlQaeda,theIslamicStateGroupandtheirrelatedgroups.Alongside the innumerablescientificarticlesandworkson thesubject, journals3 havespecialisedintheanalyticalmonitoringofadynamicphenomenonthathasnotbeenoutoftheheadlinessincetheattacksthatyearontheUnitedStates.Authorsgenerallyattributepolitical,ideologicaland,morerecently,socio-econo-miccausestotherelationsandmethodsofcontemporaryterrorism.Thismorere-centdevelopmentinthoughtcanbeexplainedbytheincreasingenrolmentofyoungpeoplebyterroristorganisations,drawinguponthemostunderprivilegedlayersofsociety,includinginEurope,fromwheremanyforeignfightershavesetofftojoinDaeshinIraqandSyria.In2004,KofiAnnan,endorsingtheUNHigh-levelPanelreportonThreats,Challen-gesandChange,commentedonthecomplexityofmoderndaythreats,saying:We cannot treat issues such as terrorism or civil wars or extreme poverty in isola-tion. The implications of this interconnectedness are profound. Our strategies must be comprehensive. Our institutions must overcome their narrow preoccupations and learn to work across issues in a concerted fashion4”. Since then, terrorismhasexpandedtonewareas,sometimesadoptinganinsurrectionalconnotationandsometimesmergingwithorganisedcrime.Aboveall,itpridesitselfonlarge-scalemassacres,conceptualisingthebarbarityitcauses,andclaimsonlytostopwhenitstime has come to rule5.

Between the partisans of absolute repression and those putting forward a more flexibleapproachfocusingonpromotinggoodgovernance,BanKi-moonhasop-tedforananticipativeapproachfocusingonpreventionagainstviolentextremism,drivenmainlybysocio-economicfactors.Effectivegovernance,developmentandpreventionformthetemplateofthenewUNPlanofactiontopreventviolentextre-mismpublishedinMay2016.

TheLRAhasbeenthesubjectofanumberofanalyses,someofwhichportrayitasamoribundorganisationreducedtoacriminalgangofafewhundredmen,whilstothersarescepticalastoitsdesignationasaterroristorganisation.HundredsofinsightshavebeenpublishedasregardsBokoHaram,mainlyintheformofarticles,noteson theeconomicsituationandreports.Most focuson thebackgroundofthesectanditsviolentactions.Withitbeingdifficulttoaccesstoinformationheldbythelegalandsecurityservices,difficulttoaccesstothezoneofaction,difficulttoaccessBokoHarammilitantsandwiththefragmentarynatureofavailabledata,intelligenceonBokoHaramisreducedtoconjectureandtheoreticalandconceptualdisarraywhichprovidesfurtherjustificationforthepertinenceofpursuingtheinvestigationandseekingmoreinformation.Itisespeciallyimportant

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Chapter III n Review of literature

3 See for example CTCSentinel, Perspectives on Terrorism3 Fifty-ninth session Agenda item 55 Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit, Note by the Secretary-General Koffi Annan, 2 December 2004. A59/5655 Abu Bakr Naji, Gestion de la barbarie, Editions de Paris, 2007.

toascertaintheextentofregionalisationofthemovementandmorespecifically,thecircumstances,natureandeffectofitsexpansionintoCentralAfrica.Theothercoreissueofthisstudyinvolvesthefinancingofterrorism.Thishasbeenatopicalsubjectsince2001.AsW.A.Tupmanpointedoutinanarticlewithanevo-cativetitle6,manycertaintiessurroundingterrorismanditsfinancingarecontradic-tedbytheambiguityofsaidconcepts,whichmaycauseconfusionandconflationifcareisnottaken.Hedoesneverthelesshighlightthefactthatmethodsoffinancingterrorismgenerallyfollowthoseoforganisedcrime.Thenatureofthisstudy,howe-ver,callsforanaccreditedcomprehensionofterroristfinancing.AccordingtotheInterpretiveNoteofRecommendation2,“thetermterroristfinancingincludesthefinancingofterroristactsandofterroristsorterroristorganisations”.Consequently,itisthetrendsandmethodsoffinancingidentifiedbypriortypologyexercisesthatestablishthemechanismsknowninthisfield.

ThefirstreportproducedbytheFATFonterroristfinancingdatesbackto20087.Itemergesthatthefinancialrequirementsofterroristorganisationsvaryaccordingtotheirsize,organisation,extent,etc.Moneyisusedtofinanceoperations,fortheoperationalchargesoforganisationsandtodevelopanenvironmentthatfavoursthedeploymentoftheiractivities.Carryingoutaterroristactcostsless,butpreparingit requires relatively high resources (maintaining networks and cells, recruiting,carrying out propaganda, financing, activities, etc.).Opportunism andflexibilitycharacterisethemethodsoffinancing,whichnotablyincludenon-profitorganisa-tions(NPOs),standardinvestmentsandtheuseoftheirownfunds.Terroristsalsobenefitfromillegalmethodsoffinancing,includingdrugs,fraudandgovernmentsupportinfragileStates.Tomovefunds,theyusethephysicalcarryingofcash,themovementofgoods,NPOsandalternativesystemsoftransfer.

Infact,allmethodsusedtomovemoneyarerisky.Topreventterroristfinancing,the2008Reportrecommendscombiningcounter-terroristintelligenceandfinancialintelligencetoenhance theabilityofauthorities todetectandconduct investiga-tionsintoterroristactivities.Fourmainareasforcombatingterroristfinancingarealsoidentified:legalactionagainstfragileStatesandtaxhavens;workingwiththeprivatesectortoensuretheavailabilityofinformationtobeabletodetectterroristfinancing;buildingabetterunderstandingbetweenpublicandprivatesectors;andincreasingtheroleoffinancialintelligenceasatoolforcombatingterrorism.

In2015,amoreextensivereport8summarisedcasesresultingfromseveraltypologyexercisesandothersources.Itobservedthatinlessthanadecade,methodsoffinan-cinghadevolvedwithchangesinterroristorganisations.Hencetheneedtomoreclearlyascertain theuseoffunds(areasofexpenditure) toprevent terroristacts:

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6 W. A. Tupman, “Ten myths about terrorist financing”, Journal of Money Laundering Control, vol. 12, no. 2, 2009.7 Terrorist Financing, Rapport GAFI 2008.8 Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks, 2015 FATF Report

operational requirements and personnel; propaganda and recruitment; training,wages,paymentsandmiscellaneouscompensationforthefamiliesofthedeceased;andactionaimedatthevulnerablelayersofsocietytoundermineStatesupportandpromoterecruitment.Informationalsoneedstobegatheredonthefinancialagentsoforganisations,suchaswhoconnectsthefunds,whodoestheaccounts,howthefundsaremovedandwhohandlesthetransactions,etc.TheReportindicatesthatthefundsaretransferredviabanks,remittanceagencies(particularlyintheabsenceofAML/CFTmechanisms for this sector,agentsandotheremployeescanmaketransfers and falsify supporting documents on behalf of terrorist groups) and cash couriers.

Thetraditionalmethodsoffinancingfundsare:privatedonors,misuseofNPOs,criminalactivities(smuggling,counterfeiting,bankrobberies,drugs,taxfraud,ex-tortionandransoms),self-financingofcells(loansandsavings),incomefrombu-sinesses(carrental,restaurants,etc.),financingfromStates(eventhoughwedonothaveaclearlyestablishedtypologyonthisissue).Emergingrisksinclude,infirstplace,self-financedForeignTerroristFighters,whoprovidelogisticsupport,recruitandfacilitatetheobtainingoftraveldocuments,meansoftransportandaccesstoconflictzones.Moderndaymeansofcommunicationandpaymentarealsoaboonforterroristswhocollectfundsviasocialnetworksandnewpaymentmethods(suchasvirtualcurrencies,pre-paidcardsandelectronictransfers).It isacknowledgedthatasregardsnewpaymentmethods,asignificantamountofworkremainstobecarried out to ascertain how they are instrumentalised by terrorists. In addition,terroristsexploitnaturalresources,suchasmineralores,oil,gasandpreciousme-tals,mainlyinareasoutsideofStatecontrol.Theyarealsoinvolvedinextortion,smuggling,kidnappingforransom,theftandtheillegaltradingofivoryandcoal.AsregardsthespecificcaseofAfrica,theGIABAReportisourinitialfocusofat-tention.ItwasproducedinacontextofemergingterrorismintheSahel,whereterro-ristorganisations(includingtheAQIM,MOJWA,AnsarDineandAl-Mourabitoun)spread,committingterroristactsinNigeria,NigerandMali.Thisreportestablishesfour typologies:financingvia tradeandother lucrativeactivities;viaNGOsandcharitypayments;viathesmugglingofweapons,merchandiseandcurrency(cashcouriers);andbydrugtrafficking.TwocasesrespectivelyillustratetheinvolvementofPoliticallyExposedPersonsandtheuseofalternativetransfers(Hawala).Oneofthepioneeringaspectsofthestudywastohaveshowedhowvulnerablein-dividuals,inthesecasepupilsinKoranicschools,aremanipulatedtocollectfundsforBokoHaram.InadditiontoprovidingproofthatthemechanismsidentifiedbytheFATFfinanceterrorisminWestAfrica,thestudyalsoopensleadsforinvestiga-tionsintowhatitcallstheendogenousproductionoffunds.Itiswithrespecttothisself-financingthatthepresentreport***seeksoutnewmethodsoffund-raisingbyterrorists,inparticularthemembersofBokoHaram.

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*** GIABA, Terrorism Financing in western Africa, 2013.

TheGIABAReportdetailsseveralestablishedmethodsoffinancingbyBokoHa-ram inWestAfrica. It has been reviewed and extended by the joint FATF-GA-BAC-GIABAstudyonterroristfinancinginWestandCentralAfrica.TheGABACcontributedtothisstudybyattendingTaskForcemeetingsandprovidingexamplesofcases.ThisstudyshowsthatBokoHaramisself-financedmainlythroughex-tortionandthespoilsresultingfromattacksonbanksandvillages.Aswewillseeinthepresentstudy,othermethodsoffinancinghavebeenidentified,verifiedandonlyconfirmedbetweenSeptemberandDecember2016.TheJointReportright-lyestablishedthatthesourcesofterroristfinancingarelargelysimilarinthetwosub-regions.Consequently,ithasemergedthatcooperationbetweenStatesisthebestapproachtocounterthefinancing****.

OpensourceshavealsomentionedfinancingbyBokoHaremfromneighbouringNigeria.CitingsourcesfromtheUSDepartmentoftheTreasury,Reuters***** has reportedthatBokoHaramhasreceivedseveralhundredthousanddollarsfromtheAQIM,which is relatively insignificant compared to the amounts it reaps fromransoms.

ReportingontheFrenchfamilyofTanguyMoulin-Fournier,kidnappedintheex-tremenorthofCamerooninFebruary2013,thepressagencyannouncedthat“BokoHaramwaspaidanequivalentofabout$3.15millionbyFrenchandCamerooniannegotiatorsbeforethehostageswerereleased,accordingtoaconfidentialNigeriangovernmentreportlaterobtainedbyReuters”.

JacobZenfromtheCombatingTerrorismCenteratWestpoint,reportsthatthesectreliesmoreonlocalfinancing,listingthepoliticalandbusinesscirclesofBornoatthetimeofMuhammadYusuf,beforethefinanciersgraduallyappearonthescene,someofwhicharerecruitedfromthecross-bordersmugglingregulars:“BOKO HARAM has made inroads with new financiers, who are from Borno and bordering areas of Cameroon’s Extreme North Region… These financiers provide BOKO HARAM with weapons and a route to negotiation with the Cameroonian go-vernment in kidnapping-for-ransom operations. One Cameroonian financier, Alhaji Abdalla, is a vehicle exporter based in Amchide whose business operations extend to Qatar (the vehicles likely move from Doha to other ports in Asia). He served as a key negotiator for Boko Haram in talks with the Cameroonian government for the release of the French Moulin-Fournier family of seven…in February 2013. The government paid a $3.14 million ransom and released BOKO HARAM prisoners in

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**** FATF/GIABA/GABAC/, Terrorist Financing in west and Central Africa (october 2016)***** http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nigeria-bokoharam-insight-idUSKBN0F636920140701

April 2013 in exchange for the family9”.

Accordingtosecuritysources,AbdallahdidtakepartinnegotiationswithBokoHaram,buthissubsequentquestioningbysecurityservicesopensloopholesintheinteractionsbetweenthesocio-culturalnetworks,businessnetworksandcriminalnetworks.

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9 Jacob Zen, « BokoHaram: Recruitment, Financing, and Arms Trafficking in the Lake Chad Region », CTC Sentinel, vol 7, Issue 10, October 2014, p. 8.

Thischaptersetsoutthelinkbetweenthemanycross-borderplayers,thedi-versityoftheeconomicandsocialexchangenetworksthatconnectthemandthe opportunities that the informal nature of the workings and corridors of movementofbothpeopleandgoodsofferBokoHaramforitsrecruitmentoffollowersandproductionofresources.Thisinparticularinvolvesdemonstra-tingthattothesouthofLakeChadandtheSudaneseborderatMaiduguri,thesamesocio-culturalareaexists,inwhichindividuals,goodsandideashavebeencirculatingimmutablyformanyyears,involvingbothinstrumentsofde-velopmentandproductsoftrafficking.Asisthecasewithothercross-borderzones,playersexploittheintegrationthatStateshavefacilitatedbyreducingbordercontrolsorthatStatesendureinplaceswhereborderzonesareareasofinstabilityduetothemovementofarmedgroupsortheirring-fencing.

IV.1. A relatively homogenous socio-cultural area promoting the establishment of cross-border networks

InthesouthernpartoftheChadBasin,afewlargecross-borderethnicgroupscontrolbothtraditionalandmodernpoliticalpoweratthelocallevel,togetherwithcross-bordertradeandexternalexchanges.ThesearemainlytheShuwaArabs, theKanuri andKotoko from the north-east ofNigeria to thewestofChad, transiting via theLogone and theChari inCameroon.The othercommunitiesaresmallerandarefoundinsmallerareas,althoughtheseareasalsostraddleborders,suchas theMafa in theMandaraMountainsand theBoudoumaandKanembouontheislandsandshoresoftheLake.Themajorgroupshavedailycontactwitheachother,asalthoughthecolonialbordersdid not necessarily divide the same families,manymarriages have sealedlong-lastingties.Ethnicityandbusinessgohand-in-handwithrespecttothecontrolofproduc-tionsectorsorthedistributionofgoods.Forexample,whilstfishingandthefishtradearetheprerogativeoftheKotokoandtheMusgum,thedistributionofcolanutsandprovisionsappearstobehandledbytheKanuri.TheArabs,on

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Chapter IV n Cross-border connections, the regionalisation of terrorism and opportunities for endogenous financing in the Lake Chad Basin

theotherhand,aremoreinvolvedintheimporttrade,especiallyfromtheMiddleEast.Although there are various gateways between the economic players fromthesedifferentcommunities,weagreewithKarineBennaflathattradenetworksintheBasinarecharacterisedbymonopoliesandco-optations10.BetweenMaidugu-ri,N’Djamena,Maroua,FotokolandKousseri,thesebusinesslinksareinterwovenwithsociallinksandarecatalystsforintegration,yettheyalsoconstitutechannelsforinfra-stateregulationandthereforearisk.Howhave these cross-border relationsbeen exploitedbyBokoHaram?RatherthanredundantlyresearchingtheethnicitiesofBokoHaram,itisintheinstrumen-taluseofeconomic-identitynetworksintheChadbasinthatweneedtolookfortheirpotentialdirector indirectparticipation in thefinancingorcommissionofterroristacts.ThecaseoftheeconomicoperatordescribedabovebyJacobZen,togetherwith those of other individuals questioned by security forces, suggestthatwhenitcomestoidentifyingtherisksofterrorismbeingfinancedbyecono-micoperators,weneedtolookatthesecross-bordertransactionscombinedwithidentitynetworks,whichterroristscanexploitoruseforsupplies,asissuggested,moreover,bythefieldnotesgatheredwhenseekingdataforthisstudy.

IV.2. From smugglers to terrorists, knowledge of the terrain and traffic capitalised by Boko Haram

ThesecondaspectoftheregionalisationfromwhichBokoHarambenefits,arisesfromtheidentityoftheindividualsthatthesectemployeesinitsdivisionofopera-tionalwork.Ithasemergedfromlegalandsecuritysources,aswellasfrompressdata,thatmanyemirs,recruitersandotherBokoHaramheadsofsectorsinitsope-rationalareasareformertraffickersofavarietyofsubstances,aswellasdriversdrivingtoandfromthebordertowns(suchasBanki,Kousseri,Fotokol,AmchidéandLimani)andGamburuorMaiduguri,andthosetransportingsmuggledgoods,particularlyfuel.Thisalsoappliestothoseinchargeoflogistics,thetransportofweapons,dailysuppliesortheprocurementofsparepartsformotorbikesandothervehicles.One legalsourcestates that theoperatingcostsofcellssetupoutsideNigeriawerepaidbyAbubakerShekauhimself,whilstinternalsectorswereabletofinance themselves. Ithasalsoemerged fromreadingarticlesand interviewsthatwholesalers previously livingbetweenAmchidé andBanki orFotokol andGambaru,tocitejustoneexample,playaroleinmanagingtheoperationalfrontoftheorganisationandprovidefinancingopportunitiesforBokoHaram,notablybytakinghostages.

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10 Karine Bennafla, Le commerce frontalier en Afrique Centrale [Cross-border trade in Central Africa], Paris, Karthala.

IV.3. The lure of profit for young people persisting in resourcefulness and social pressure

TheStatesoftheChadBasinandinternationalpartnershaveconvergingviewsontheurgencyofprovidingviablesolutionstothesocio-economicproblemsofyoungpeoplebythecreationofjobs,increasededucationandvocationaltraining.Thisin-tegratedapproachisaimedatpreventingradicalisationandviolentextremismmorewidely,aswehavepostulatedthatitisthesocialinsecurityandexclusiveKoraniceducationofthemajorityoftheseyoungpeoplethatBokoHaraminstrumentalisestospearheadreligiousintolerance.Hereagain,itisworthemphasisingthatvarioussourceshaveprovedthatShekau’sorganisationrecruitedIslamicscholarsfromCa-meroonandChadtoindoctrinaterecruitsparalleltotheirmilitarytraining.Thereishoweveranothercategoryofyoungpeople,whohaveoftenquicklystartedafamilyandwhocarryoutjobsofminorimportance,whojoinedtheinsurgentsbecausetherecruitersheldoutthepromiseofeasygainsfromspoilsandotherex-pectedbenefits11.Thesecurityandlegalforcesreferredtolistthefollowing“jobs”forpresumedre-cruits.Theiroccupationsarequotedasdescribedinthedocuments:sellersofplas-tic;sellersofrice;motorbikemechanics;motorbikesalesmen;sellersofboubous;embroiderers;sellersofbuckets;sellersofmilletandbeans;shopkeepers;tailors;drivers;sellersofsmuggledmedicines;sellersofemptyperfumebottles;sellersoffuel;motorcycletaxidrivers,etc.BeforejoiningBokoHaram,theylivedinplacessuchasMaroua,Amchidé,BankiandKousseri.IdeologymeanslittleeithertothiscategoryofindividualsorforthemanymotorcycletaxidriversarrestedwhilsttransportingweaponsandmunitionshiddeninvariousgoodsbetweenN’Djamena,KousseriandtheNigeriaborder.ItissmugglersthatarefamiliarwiththebackroadsthathaveaddedvalueinthepricepaidbyBokoHaramaccordingtothecategoryofweaponstobedelivered.Ideology also counts little for thosewho devote themselves to the exchange ortraffickingoftheproductsneededforthesect’soperations,suchasfuel,gasandchemicalsubstances.Infact,thisisanexampleofwhatAlainBauercalls“lumpen-terrorism12”.This is also partly how the expansion ofBokoHaram toLakeChad should beinterpreted, inotherwordsasa “proletarian” strategy to reconquer resourcesbyislanders.ChristianSeignobos13developsthisinterpretationofthedeterminantsofmembershipoftheKanembou,Boudouma,Mobeursandothercommunitieslivingonthelakeislandsandsurroundingareas.HesuggeststhattheIslamicinsurgencyprovidedanopportunityforthesepopulationstoregainpossessionoftheincomegeneratedbytheexploitationoftheagricultural,grazingandfishingresourcesofthislargeoasisintheheartofasemi-aridenvironment.TheyhavewitnessedlanddisputesbetweentheStatesborderingtheLakesince1983,togetherwiththeinfluxofenvironmentalmigrantsfromvariouscountiesoftheChadBasinandtheSahelandanincreaseintraffickingandexploitationofboththefishandlandbyentre-preneursfromurbanareas,whohavelargelybenefitedfromthefruitoffishingandagriculture.Poorthereforeandwithoutanymeansofproductionoftheirown,localpopulationshavebeenreducedtoworkingforthe“foreign”investorsinexchange

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11 Security and legal sources: statements from prisoners12 Alain Bauer, Dernières nouvelles du crime [Latest in crime], Paris, Editions du CNRS, 2013.13 C. Seignobos, 2016, “BokoHaram : innovations guerrières depuis les Monts Mandara” [Boko Haram: innovations in warfare from the Mandara Mountains], Afrique contemporainen° 225.

formodestremunerationincomparisonwithincomingrevenue.Theythereforere-mainstructurallyindebtedinanenvironmentwherethegeneralschoolenrolmentrateisunder10%andwherebasicsocialservicesarethinontheground.JoiningBokoHaramthereforeseemslikeanindigenousrevoltonthepartofyoungpeople,whoalsoseeitasanopportunitytomakeagreatdealofmoneyquickly,asconfirmedbyacertainnumberaftertheirarrestfollowingtheN’DjamenaattacksinJuneandJuly2015,whichkilled62people,including10suicidebombers,andleftnearly 200 wounded14.FortheIslamicsect,thisisalsoasurewayofextendingitsterritorialstrongholdandaccessingamajorsourceofself-financing,asconsiderablequantitiesoffishandpeppersleavetheLakeeachdayforthemarketsofneighbouringcountries.Onthissubject,BakarySambereportsthat“BokoHaramhasmanagedtoreorganisethesechannelsforitsowneconomicbenefit,whichitusestofinanceitsviolentac-tionsaroundabasinthatishighlystrategicalasarearbaseandfallbackzone.SomegovernmentsourcesinNigerestimatetheamountcollectedweekly,solelyintheNigeriaborderregionofDiffa,tobe8billionCFAFrancs(around€12,000,000)15.”.Itisthereforeperhapsnotbychancethatoutofthe10peoplesentencedandexecutedinN’DjamenainSeptember2015followingtheattacks,sevenwerefishermenandsixwereBoudoumafromLakeChad,allagedunder30and,exceptforone,withwivesandchildren16.Furthermore,itcanbededucedfromtherapiddeploymentofsocio-economicactionsparalleltothereinforcementofdefenceresourcesattheLakethattheChadiangovernmentisawareofthelinkbetweencrimeandpovertyinthisregion,overwhichstrategiccontrolisessentialforthesocio-economicandpoliticalstabilityoftheChadianBasiningeneralandChadinparticular.

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14 Chadian security sources15 Bakary Sambe, “BokoHaram dans le Bassin du Lac Tchad. Au-delà du sécuritaire, le danger ethniciste et le désastre humanitaire [Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin. Over and beyond security issues, danger of ethnicity and humanitarian disaster] », La Lettre de l’Observatoire No. 2, May 2016, http://timbuktu-institute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Boko-Haram-dans-le-bassin-du-Lac-Tchad.pdf16 Legal sources

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Case n°1:MisuseofaforeignNPO

TheattentionoftheFIUwasdrawntoareportofsuspicionconcerningaconside-rableflowofmoneybetween2012and2014,comprisingcashdeposits.Intotal,over10.5billionCFAfrancs(around16millioneuros)weredepositedbyanationalof a country neighbouringCameroon, amember of theLakeChadBasinCom-mission,intothebankaccountofanNGOcalled“ABC”.Theoriginofthefundsremainsunknown.These fundswere thenwithdrawn in cash from theKousséribranchofthebankintheextremenorthofCameroon.FIUinvestigationsintothiscasereachedthefollowingconclusions:TheNGO“ABC”isinternationallyclassi-fiedasajihadistpropagandaorgan.Ithasestablishedtieswithterroristgroups(itwascreatedbyamemberoftheMuslimBrotherhood,hasestablishedlinkswithAlQaeda,AnsarAlIslam,thearmedbranchofHamas,theKashmirRebels,etc.).ThebrotherofOsamaBenLadenwasthetreasurerof“ABC”untiltheUSterroristattacksofSeptember2001.USsecretservicesuncoveredtheroleoftheNGOinthe logisticsupportof the2001WorldTradeCenterattacks.Onan internationallevel,theactivitiesof“ABC”havebeenbannedintheUSA(2002),Canada(2004),GreatBritain(2004),Pakistan(2004)andIndiaonsuspicionofprovidingfinancialsupportforterroristorganisations.TheFIUreachedtheconclusionthattheNGO“ABC”wasbeingusedasanins-trument to fundBokoHaramfightersunder thecoverofcharitywork.TheFIUconclusionsarebasedon:PrioractivitiesoftheNGO(anestablishedroleinraisingfundsforAlQaeda)andamassiveincreaseinthevolumeofbankdepositssince2012(intensificationofBokoHaramarmedoperations).Theunknownoriginofthefunds,despiteallefforts.Theareaswherethefundsarewithdrawnandincompa-tibilitiesbetweentheamountoffundsandtheactualactivitiesoftheNGOinthefield.TheFIUsentareporttotheMilitaryTribunalpursuanttolegalprovisions.Aconfidentialintelligencenotewassenttootheroperationalsecurityservices.


Chapter V n Analysis of typologiesand red flags

V.1. Typologies

TentypologiesofestablishedterroristfinancinginCentralAfricahavebeeniden-tified.

Typology 1:Misuseofnon-profitorganisations

ThekeypromotersoftheNGOinCameroonhavebeenarrested.

Source:Cameroun

Case n°2 :TerroristfinancingbyeconomicplayersraisingfundsandmisusinganNPO

The attention of the FIUwas drawn to a number of transfersmade by a natio-naleconomicoperatortoanABCNGObasedintheDemocraticRepublicoftheCongo.Thesectorofactivityofthisoperatorandthereasonsforthetransactiondidnotappearcompatible.Indeed,theeconomicoperatoriswell-knownintheimport-exportsector.Hege-nerallyperformslarge-scalecommercialtransactions.Furthermore,heisamajorpoliticalfigure.YetthetransfersofverylargeamountsofmoneytotheDCRdonotappearcompliantwithhisknowncommercialactivity.FIU investigations have shown that within a two-year period (2011 and 2012),nearly2.5billionCFAfrancs(around€3,000,000)weretransferredbythisecono-micoperatortotheABCNGO.TheABCNGObelongstotwoLebanesebrothers,MoussaandNabil,listedbytheUnitedNationsSanctionsCommitteeasfundraisersfortheHezbollahterroristgroup.Accordingtoinformationreceivedfromforeignpartners, the brothersMoussa andNabil recently forged an alliancewith theAlQaeda in the IslamicMaghreb (AQIM).The intelligencewas transmitted to thestateprosecutor(Article40oftheECCASRegulations).Operationalsecurityser-viceshavebeeninformed.

Source:Cameroun

Case n°3 :FinancingbyforeignsupporterstransitingviaanNPO

Apersonnamed“Chérif”,withnodeclaredoccupation,openedanaccountwithalocalbankinthelastquarterof2014.Oncetheaccountwasopened,aninternatio-naltransferofover360millionCFAfrancs(around548,780euros)wascreditedtotheaccountofMr“Chérif”withoutanyeconomicallyvalidjustification.ThebankfiledareportofsuspicionwiththeFIU.TheFIUinvestigationsinto thepersonsinvolvedandthereasonsforthistransaction,togetherwiththefinancialenviron-mentandactivitiesofMr“Chérif”revealedthefollowing:theaccountinquestionwasopenedsolelyforthepurposesofthisoperation;thetransferwasorderedby

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28

anNGOfromaEuropeancountry; thefundstransitingtheaccountofMr“Ché-rif”were in fact intended for aMr “Said”, representing a charity that allegedlyworksin theCameroon-Niger-Nigeria-Chadborderareas;accordingtotheinter-nalintelligenceservices,thisNPOisactuallyadummyassociationcontrolledbyBokoHaram,whichusedthecoveroftheassociationviaitsfollowers“Chérif”and“Said”totransferfundsraisedbyitssupportersabroad.Thecaseisduebeforethecompetentcourts;Messrs“Chérif”and“Said”havebeenarrestedandthenetworkiscurrentlybeingdismantled.

Source:Tchad

Case n°4 :Attemptedfinancingviaafraudulenttransferoffunds,abusingbothabankandanNPO.

On6May2012,areportofsuspicionfrombankPreachedtheFIU,reportinganelectronictransferof345,531,367CFAfrancs(around€526,800)sentfromaEu-ropeancountrytoanIslamicNGOwithheadquartersinBirmingham,viathebankaccountofMrV,butforthebenefitofanNGO.Investigationsestablishedthatthiswasafraudulenttransferoffundsmadeelectro-nicallyfromthewebsiteofthecentralbank.Thisinvolvedcybercriminalshackingintothebank’scomputersystem.Thebeneficiary,MrV,representingtheNGOinChad,wasactuallyconductingsubversiveterrorist-relatedactivities.

Source:Tchad


Thesecasesgiveanideaofthevarietyofformsofmisusetowhichtheterroristsandtheirfinancierssubmitorganisationsnormallydesignedtorelievethedifficul-tiesencounteredbythevulnerablelayersofsociety.TheproliferationofNPOs,to-getherwiththeirdiversityandsourcesoffinancing,whetherprivateorfromabroad,constitutemajorchallengesforauthoritiesinchargeofmonitoringtheiractivitiesandcheckingtheycomplywithregulations,inparticulartheirtermsofreference.Yetstudieshaveshownthatdespitegoodregulationofthesector,NPOsareundertheradarofadministrativeandfinancialsupervision,which,inthecaseofCentralAfrica, does not have sufficient personnel or adequate logistics tomonitor theiractivitiesinthefield.Inaddition,therarityofcommunicationplatformsbetweenthedonorsandthepublicservicesmeansthattheStateshavenoinformationaboutthefinancingofNPOs,which,furthermore,rarelyregistertheirmanagementandfinancialreportswithsupervisoryauthorities,asstipulatedbyregulations.ItshouldbenotedthatChadhaswithdrawnitsaccreditationfromcertainNGOsforhavingoversteppedtheirstatutorymissionsbygettinginvolvedinreligiousactivism.

Case n°1:Theraisingoffundsviaafinancialmessagingcompany

“Peter”,aCameroonnational,livedinBamendainthenorth-westregionofCame-roon.Hehadnofixedemploymentandearnedmoneyfromasmallcigarettestall.TheattentionoftheFIUwasdrawntoPeter’srepeatedreceptionofWesternUnionmoneytransfersin2014.FIUinvestigationsconcludedasfollows:TherewerenofamilylinksbetweenMrPeterandthepersondispatchingthemoney;Petercollectednearly112millionCFAfrancs(170,731euros)viaWesternUnionbetweenJanuaryandMarch2014;Dis-patchesweredividedintotransactionsofunder1millionCFAfrancs.Thereasonprovided for all these transactionswas “Family assistance to illegal immigrantsof ‘Gamma’ town”.There areno illegal immigrants listedby the administrativeauthorities in the townof“Gamma” located in thenorth-westofCameroon.MrPeter,whoisunknowntoallauthorities,hasnotcarriedoutanysocialactionsinthisregionofCameroon.ThefundsweredispatchedfromSaudiArabia,SouthSu-dan,KenyaandMali;ThefundswereallwithdrawnfromWesternUnionbrancheslocatedinthecombatzonesoftheExtremeNorth,eventhoughtheywereintendedforthe“Immigrantsofthetownof‘Gamma’”locatedintheNorthWest.Thesecu-rityservicesreportedregulartravelbyMrPetertoMaiduguriinNigeria.

Source:Cameroun

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Inlightofitssocio-economiccontext,thesituationoftheCARattractsanincrea-singnumberofcharities,withouttheStatebeingabletosupervisetheiractivities.Thehumanitariancrisisduetotheinfluxofrefugees,returneesandinternallydis-placedpopulationsintheChadBasinhasresultedinacleargrowthincivilsocietyorganisationsoperating,inthecaseofCameroon,undertheregimeofauthorisa-tion,whichcanbeobtainedmorequicklythanNGOaccreditation.

Typology 2 : Misuse of money transfer agencies

In today’sworld,financialmessaging isoneof theweak links in the internatio-nalmechanismsforcombatingthefinancingofterrorism,asitenablespeoplenotknowntofinancialestablishments(walk-inclients)toeasilymovemoneyanywhereintheworld.Theuseoffinancialmessagingcompaniesinthestudiedzoneissprea-dingrapidly,almostentirelyreplacingfaxedmoneyorderswhich,untilthebegin-ningofthe2000s,wastheonlyfastwayoftransferringmoney.Yettheinstabilityoftelephonelines,expansionofdigitaltechnology,upsurgeininsecurityonroadsandnearmarkets,andthedevelopmentoftradeinparticular,havecombinedtofirstlyencouragethecreationordomicilingofMicro-FinanceInstitutions(MFI)inareasofflourishingeconomicactivityandsecondlygeneratewidespreaduseoffinancialmessagingcompanies.

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Case n°1:Misuseofamanualcurrencyexchangeoffice

B.ExchangecurrencyexchangeofficewasbasedinCamville,atownontheborderwithNigeria.Camville(Cameroon)andNigerville(Nigeria)formasinglegeogra-phicaltown,withtheborderconsistingofasimplestreet.Upuntil2012,B.Exchangehadanaverageannualturnoverof100millionCFAfrancs(around€152,500),mainlygeneratedbythesaleofforeigncurrencytoCha-dian,CameroonianandNigerianshopkeepers.Theattentionof theFIUwasdrawn toamassive increase incurrencypurchaseoperationsbyB.Exchangebetween2012and2014.TheresultsoftheFIUinvesti-gationswereasfollows:Between2012and2014,B.Exchangepurchasedcurrencyfromlocalbanksforatotalamountof226billionCFAfrancs(€344.52million).The currency was acquired from local banks on the basis of forged currency pur-chaseauthorisations,allegedlyissuedbytheMinistryofFinance.Theoriginofthefundsusedforthecashpurchaseofsomuchcurrencyfromthebanksisunknown.B.Exchangeusedforgedtraveldocumentsandpassportstoaccountfortheuseoftheacquiredcurrency.RegularcontactbetweenthepromoterofB.ExchangeandcertaincommandersofBokoHaramwerediscoveredbythesecurityservices(oneofthesefightershadbeenkilledduringaskirmishwiththeCameroonArmyandfoundtohavenearly50,000eurosinhispack).TheFIUforwardeditsinformationtothestateprosecutorinDecember2014(Ar-ticle40oftheECCASRegulations).Theoperationalsecurityserviceswerenoti-fied(informationsharedwiththeoperationalintelligenceservices).Thoseinvolvedwerearrested.Theexchangeofficewasshutdown.

Source:Cameroun


AlongsideforeigncompaniessuchasWesternUnionandMoneyGram,nationalcompanieshavebeencreated,suchastheExpressUnioninCameroon,thathaveopenedbranchesinneighbouringcountriesanddiversifiedtheirrangeofservicestoincludebankingservices.Morerecently,mobiletelephonecompanieshavein-troducedMobileMoney.AswithNPOs,transferringmoneytoreturnees,internallydisplaced populations and refugees outside of camps can carry risks of terrorist financing.Someindicationsofthishaveemergedfromdataprovidedbysecurityservices,whichshowtheconvergenceofsendingsmallamountsofmoneyfromNigeriatobenignpeopleintheExtremeNorthofCameroon.

Typology 3 : Misuse of financial establishments

Case n°2 :NetworkforraisingandtransferringfundsbyBokoHaramfollowersviaamicro-financeestablishment

Mr“Kala”, aNigeriannational, livedbetweenMaroua andN’Djamena;hewasknowninbothtownsasafarmerofvarioustypesofvegetables.Basedoncertaininformationheldbytheoperationalintelligenceservicesandafteraperiodofob-servationbysaidservices(tailing,phonetapping,etc.),itwasestablishedthatsince2012,Mr“Kala”hadbeeninregularcontact(onceaweek)withBokoHaramfol-lowers,whowerealsobeingtailed.TheoperationalsecurityservicesthenbroughtintheFIUtoinvestigatethebusinessactivitiesofMr“Kala”.FIUinvestigationsrevealedthat:Mr“Kala”heldtwobankaccountsinamicro-fi-nance institution (Beta Finance) with branches in the main cities of the ten Came-roonregions.Histwoaccountswereheldbythe“BetaFinance”branchinKousseri.Whenopeninghisaccountswith“BetaFinance”,Mr“Kala”statedhisoccupationasa“salesman”withoutprovidinganyotherdetails.Heisnotknowntothetaxau-thorities.ThebankaccountsofMr“Kala”operatedexactlyastransitionaccounts,usedbyterroristnetworkstoraisemoneyorbydrugstraffickerstotransfermoney.Indeed, itwasobserved that largeamountsofmoneyweredeposited incashbyseveraldozenindividualsontothetwoaccountsinquestionfrom“BetaFinance”branchesinvariouscitiesinthecountry.Themoneythusdepositedwasthenim-mediatelywithdrawn in cashbyMr “Kala” inKousseri. In total, 38.789billionCFAfrancs(around€59,500,000)werethusraisedbythisnetworkbetween2012and2015.83Cameroon,Chad,MaliandNigeriannationalswereidentifiedasde-positorsofcashintothetwoaccountsofMr“Kala”incitiesinseveralregionsofCameroon.Thesedepositorshavenobusinessactivitythatcouldpotentiallyjustifypossessionofsuchcapital;thetotaldepositedbysomeofthemduringthisperiodexceeded1billionCFAfrancs.Whenwithdrawingthemoneyfromthe“BetaFi-nance”branchinKousseri,Mr“Kala”wasalwaysaccompaniedbytwoindividuals(suspectedbysecurityservicestobeBokoHaramlogisticians).Thiscaseisstillbeinginvestigatedbysecurityservices.Thedepositorsarestillbeingtrackeddownandarrested.

Source:Cameroun

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Manualexchangeoperationsconstituteoneofthekeyvulnerabilitiesinterroristfi-nancing,duelargelytotheuseofcurrencyininternationalcommercialtransactions(thebuyingofweapons)andtheeaseofmovinglargesumsofmoneyinverysmallvolumes(useof€500notes).

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Case n°1 :Financingviatraditionalbusinessactivities

AreportofsuspicionsenttotheFIUdenouncedasuspicioustransactionbetweenacompanyXsellingmiscellaneousproducts(foammattresses,plasticmats,etc.)anda foreignoperatorM.This transaction involved the transferof176,203,000CFAfrancs (around€268,602)orderedbycompanyX for thebenefitof foreignoperatorMfortheprovisionofaservicetobeperformedonthenationalterritorybycompanyX.FIUinvestigationsrevealedthat:operatorMisinfactacoverusedbyBokoHa-ramleaders;companyXisadummycompanycontrolledbytheBokoHaramsect.CompanyXwasformedtorepatriatefundsgeneratedviafictitiousserviceprovi-sionagreements.TheactualbeneficiaryofthefinancialtransactionswastheBokoHaramsectvia its followers inChad.Following the investigation, thiscasewaspassedontothecompetentcourts.Arrestshavebeenmadeandthecaseispendinginthecourts.

Source:Chad


This case also illustrates the vulnerabilities of the financial sector in general inthese areas where business transactions with immediate neighbours and the areas forobtainingsuppliesofarangeofgoods,arerapidlyexpanding.Rulesofcautionare not always followed in the case of economic operators open to the outside world andwhocansuddenlyincreasetheirfinancialsurface.Theyalsobearwitnesstothesignificantriskofeconomic-identitynetworksbeingexploitedbyterrorism,whichusespre-existingbusinessrelationsandpersonalrelationshipsforitsownbenefit.The second case fully demonstrates the advantage of encouraging cooperationbetweennationalintelligenceunitsandoperationalintelligenceservicesforachie-vingbetterresultsintrackingdownterroristfinancing.Italsotakesintoaccountthetrans-nationalisationoffundraisingnetworkscontrolledbyBokoHaramfollowers,involvingCameroon,Nigeria,MaliandChadnationals.Furthermore,thecasesug-gests the urgency for increasing the sharing of information between neighbouring countriesandbetweencountriesbelongingtoseparatesub-regionssubjectedtoaterroristthreat.Italsohighlightsthevulnerabilityofmicro-financeinstitutionswithrespecttomisuseforthepurposesoffinancingterrorism.TheseMFIhaveincreasedinnumberinborderzones, improvingtheperceptioncertaineconomicoperatorspreviouslyhadofbanks,preferringastheydidtocarrysubstantialamountsofmo-neyoftenkeptathome.TheirvulnerabilitytomoneylaunderinginCentralAfricawasalreadysomewhatperceptible.

Typology 4 : Illicit trafficking

Case n°2:Pillagingoflivestock

Duringthefirstquarterof2014,anassociationofChadianlivestocksellersleavingNigeriaonfootwith2,030cattlewasrobbedofitsanimalsbymembersofBokoHaram, on the border and onNigerian territory.On 8March 2016, inMidai, aNigerianvillageontheborderwithChad,BokoHarammembersstole700cattlefromthelocalpopulation.Thesetwooperationsprovidedthesectwithresourcesequivalentto2730x300,000CFAfrancs,namely819millionCFAfrancs(around1.248millioneuros).

Source:Chad

Case n° 3:BokoHaramfinancingviaincomefromlivestocktheft

In2013,alocalbankfiledareportofsuspiciontotheFIU,describingasuspiciousoperation.ThisinvolvedacashdepositfollowedbythewithdrawalofalldepositedfundsbyaMr“Rabia”.Followingan investigationby theFIU incooperationwithnationalsecurityser-vices, it emerged that:Mr “Rabia”was a national from a country neighbouringChad;HeenteredChadon14February2013carrying79.75millionCFAfrancs(€122,000)incash;thisamountwasdepositedinthebankaccountopenedforthispurposewiththesaidbank.Thismoneywasallegedlyincomefromthesaleofli-vestockbyMr“Rabia”.TheaforementionedwasidentifiedasamemberofBokoHaramandthelivestocksoldcamefromthevariouspillagingbytheterroristgroupoflocalfarmers.TheFIUpassedthecaseontothecompetentcourtsandMr“Ra-bia”wasarrested.

Source:Chad

Case n° 4 :Livestocktheftandcross-bordertrafficking

The recurrenceof livestock theft recordedbyadministrativeauthorities,defenceandsecurityforcesandtraditionalauthorities,togetherwiththeincreaseinprose-cutionsrelatingtotheseactsintheareaofMayoSava(Cameroon),adjoiningnor-th-eastNigeria,areseriousgroundsforsuspectingthatBokoHaramterroristsaremakinguseofthismethodoffinancing.Asthedecentraliseddepartmentsoflives-tock,fisheriesandanimalindustries(MINEPIA)recordalltypesoflivestockmo-

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vementwithintheirjurisdiction,theGABACcontactedtheMinisterinquestiontorequestaconsolidatedassessmentoflivestocktheftinthezonesaffectedbyBokoHaram.Afieldmissionofthesaidministryincludedthisconcerninitsagenda.Asummaryofcollecteddataestablishesthefollowinglosses:31,101cattle,19,306small ruminants and 4,003 poultry.The financial assessment is as follows: “thefinancialassessmentrecordsfinancialworthof8,553,414,500CFAfrancs(around€13,000,000).The species concerned are cattle,mainly stolen by terrorists, fol-lowedbysmallruminantsandthenpoultry.Horses,donkeysandcamelshavenotberecorded”.Inlightofthiswidespreadtrafficking,theGovernoroftheExtremeNorthRegionhasorderedthetemporaryclosureof21cattlemarkets.

Source:MINEPIA/Cameroun,“RapportdelaMissiond’évaluationdesrépercus-sionsdel’insécuritéliéeauxexactionsdel’organisationterroristeBokoHaramsurlesous-secteurélevageetpêche[ReportbytheAssessmentMissionontheeffectsofinsecurityrelatedtoexactionsoftheBokoHaramterroristorganisationonthefarmingandfishingsub-sector]”,June2016.

Case n° 5 :Motorcycletrafficking

Following the suicideattacksof June2015 inN’Djamena, investigationsby thesecurity committee implemented in Chad led to the dismantling of a motorcycle traffickingnetworkonbehalfofBokoHaram.Thisoperatedasfollows:acourierappointedbyBokoHaramdeliversre-sellers(alsoappointedbyBokoHaram)motorcyclesinspareparts,forreassemblingandsellingon the localmarket. Income from the sales is passedonto a collector inchargeof transferring it incash to theBokoHarambase.Whenquestioned, thesuspectsdeclared thata re-sellercould receivearound30motorcyclespermon-th.Eachmotorcycleissoldforbetween400,000(around€610)and500,000CFAfrancs(around€762).Thesamesourcescitedthenamesoffinancialintermediariesand routes along the chain which leads from where the motorcycles are sold to reci-pientsofthecashintheSambisaForest.SecuritysourcesmentionedthattheleaderoftheBokoHaramcellinN’DjamenahadpreviouslybeeninvolvedinmotorcycletraffickinginaCameroontown,beforemovingawayforfearofbeingrecognisedbythedisplacedpopulationsthatwerefloodingin.

Source:Chad


Thesecases represent a sampleof the localfinancingopportunitieswhichBokoHaramcanaccess.Firstly,thereiscapitalisationofthefoodindustrybytakingoverorparticipatinginthesupplyofeverydayfoodstuffs.

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Case n° 1 :FinancingofBokoHarambyaneconomicoperator

In2012,abankfiledareportofsuspiciondenouncingunusualoperationsperfor-medbyaneconomicoperatornamedMr“Tango”.Indeed,Mr“Tango”,anocca-sionalclientofsaidbank,orderedamoneytransferviaaninternationalfinancialmessagingcompanyof89.67millionCFAfrancs(€137,000)forthebenefitofMr“Nono”,residinginaGulfstate.TheactivityofMr“Nono”,togetherwiththeeco-nomicreasonsforthetransactionandtheoriginofthetransferredfunds,hadnotbeenclearlyprovidedforthebank.Following the investigations performed by theFIU, both as regards internal in-telligence sources/financial institutions and certain diplomatic representations, itemergedthat:accordingtothedeclarationsofMr“Tango”,thetransactionwassup-posedtocoverhotelcosts;Mr“Nono”isaWestAfricannationalidentifiedbyse-curityservicesduetohisterroristactivitiesintheSahel,mainlywithBokoHaram.TheFIUreferredthecasetothecourtsandMrTangowasarrestedforfinancingterrorism.

Source:Chad

Case n° 2 :Illicitfinancialgainandfacilitatingthecommittingofterroristactsbyan economic operator

Inthefirsthalfof2015,aMrIdainvitedaMrKarkabi,residinginKousseri(Ca-meroon),toN’DjamenatopickupcertainmembersofhisfamilyanddrivethemtoKousseri,whereanotherpersonwouldbewaitingtotakethemtoNigeria.WhentheyarrivedinKousseri,theywerearrestedbysecurityservicesasaresultofthe


Fishandmeatarethetwosourcesofanimalprotein,consumeddailyinmassivequantities,withapermanentsub-regionaldemand.Thesearesourcesoffastwealth.Secondly,thereistheareaofmanufacturedproducts,whichplayaroleintransport,weddingsandhomes,etc.Motorcyclesarenowthemethodoftransportcompetingwithbuses for short-distance inter-urban transport, exceeding taxis in somecityareas.Theyare themain instrument for smugglingbetween thecountriesof theChadBasin.This typology is essential forunderstanding the specificitiesof ter-rorismanditsfinancingintheChadBasin,asitisthecentrepieceoftherelationbetweeneconomictraditionsandcriminalpractice.Furthermore,itcallsonStatestoimprovetheircontrolovercross-borderexchanges,involvingserviceswhicharenotnormallyassociatedwithcombatingterroristfinancing.

Typology 5 : Financing by economic operators

intelligencetheypossessedwithrespecttothefamily.InvestigationsrevealedthatKarkabiwasaninformalChadiantransporter,wellknowninthecityofKousseri.Foratleastsixyears,hehadbeensmugglingweaponsbetweenChadandCame-roononhismotorcycle.At thebeginning,heworkedwithaMrKasko,residinginBlangoua,towhomhedeliveredbagsofmilletcontaininghiddenAK-47typeassaultweapons.Theseweaponshadbeenobtainedat theAbéchébusstation inN’DjamenafromacertainAbouky,whohimselfobtainedthemfromtheChad-Su-dan border.Theweapons thatKarkabi transportedwere then sold byKaskoauxwaysiderobbers,knownas“roadblockers”.Receiving30,000CFAfrancsforeachweapondelivered,hewasabletobuildupasmallfortuneanddecidedtobuyacarwithwhichhecouldearnevenmoremoney.AidedbytheBokoHaramphenome-non,hebecamefriendswith“Ida”,aNigerianinthepayoftheterroristgroupforwhichhedeliveredweaponsandexplosives.UsingKarkabi’svehicle,theyconti-nuedtosupplytheterroristbaseslocatedinNigeriaviaChadandCameroon.OnceIdahadbeenidentifiedasthemastermindbehindtheN’Djamenaattacks,investi-gationswerecarriedoutbyCameroonandChadsecurityservicestoestablishtheidentityofothermembersofthenetwork.

Source:Cameroun

Case n° 3 : Logistical support for a terrorist group

On10January2015inMora,“Ripo”and“Isaka”werearrestedbythepoliceforbreachingsecuritydirectivesinforceinthislocation,whichhadbeenatargetforterroristattacks.Subsequent investigations established that Isakawas the tribal chief of theOruregion,fromwherehehadfledin2013duetoBokoHaramattacks,beforeseekingrefugeinIbashi,whereheformedafriendshipwithRipoandamannamedKasko.Together,theydecidedtosendfueltoOru,wheretherewasanestablishedneed.Initially,thiswasfordrivingmillstogrindthecerealsbelongingtoKaskoinordertofeedtheremainingpopulation.Tothisend,Ripo,thevigilancecommitteecoor-dinatorofMviam,wascalledupontocarryoutthetask.HehadtocollectdrumsofdieselthathadbeendepositedbyKaskoinMoukissa’sshop.KaskoalsotravelledtoOru,carryingfoodstuffsofallkinds.Ripo,however,whoreceivedthedeliveriesofdiesel,handedthemovertoanyindividualwhointroducedthemselvesasanem-ployeeofKasko.Hetookadvantageofthesituationtosupplyaverylargequantityofdieseltohischildhoodfriend,acertainIbasso,knownbythesecurityforcesasahighlyactiveagentfromtheBokoHaramterroristgroup.Similarly,Kasko,whoclaimedtotheoperatinghismills,didnothowevermakeanyprofits.

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Investigations established thatKaskowas sending fuel to themembersofBokoHaramwhowereroamingtheareasofLimaniandOmaka.

Source:Cameroun

Case n° 4:Supplyofproductsusedtocommitactsofterrorism

On24March2014inthecityofKousseri,amannamedAkoutouwasarrestedbyasecurityforcespatrol.HewassuspectedofbeingamemberoftheBokoHaramsect.In2002,followingthedeathofhisfatherandduetoincreasingfamilydifficulties,AkoutoulefthisvillagetojoinhiselderbrotherKemtainKousseri.Thebrotherownedadomesticgasbottlesupplystoreinthecity.Onhisarrival,heenrolledinaKoranicschool,wheretheteacherintroducedhimtoamancalledAkim,amemberofBokoHaramlivinginBanki.Alongsidehisreligiousstudies,hebecameinvol-vedinhiselderbrother’sactivity,whichmainlyconsistedoftraffickingdomesticgasbottles.TomeettheconstantincreaseindemandfromAkim,hestartedtravel-lingregularlytoChadwherehepurchasedanumberof12kgbottlesat12,000CFAfrancsapiece.Hethensiphonedthegasoffinto6kgbottlesanddeliveredtheminlargequantitiestoAkim,whousedthemtomakeimprovisedexplosivedevices.Hethensoldtheothersat8,000CFAfrancsabottlethroughthestandardchannels.On24March2014,Akoutouwasarrestedinthecompanyofotherindividuals,inparti-cularamannamedBika,whosecellphonecontainedBokoHaramvideos.Anotherofhiscompanions,Dodoum,wasarrestedbysecurityforces inMarouaandfor-mallyidentifiedbyanumberofwitnessesasapreacherinthepayofBokoHaram

Source:Cameroun

Aswiththecasesofmanualcurrencyexchange,thesegiveanideaoftheambiguitythatcancovertheactivitiesofeconomicoperators,especiallyinborderareas.Ope-ningoutwards,whetheronalocalorinternationallevel,isobviouslyariskfactorforinteractionwithterroristnetworks,especiallyincountriesunderthethreatofterro-rism.Theyhighlighttheneedtofindacompromisebetweenfreeexerciseofecono-micactivityandthestrengtheningofcontrolsonmoneytransfertransactionsofallkinds,andtheinvolvementofservicesinchargeoftransportincreatingdatabasesofaccreditedtransporters.Thelownumberofvehiclechecksandthehighnumberofsmugglingroutesfacilitatethetraffickingofarms,which,inthiscase,aredeliveredinsmallquantitiestoBokoHaramviaillegalcross-bordertransportoperators.Thesecond case also shows how criminal players are reproduced with changes in the practicesoforganisedcrime.Thetwoothercasesonceagainillustratestheurgentneedtoinvolveservicesinchargeoftradeandtransport,aswellasunions,inthepreventionofterrorism,particularlythecommittingofterroristacts.

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Case n° 1 : Collecting and remitting funds by cash couriers

Whencontrollingthebordercrossingsofpersonsandgoods,thesecurityservicesintercepted a large quantity of different currencies hidden in goods belonging to a MrZ,anationalofaWestAfricancountry.Thiscurrencycomprised:- 568,000eurosin500-euronotes(1,136notes)- 460,000eurosin100-euronotes(4,606notes)- 135,000Bahraindinarsin20-dinarnotes(6,750notes).Investigationsestablishedthat:- MrZ,anationalofaWestAfricancountry,hadalreadytravelledtoChadonseveraloccasionsasatourist.- MrZwasacashcourieridentifiedbythesecurityservices.- HewasamemberoftheBokoHaramterroristgroup.MrZwasarrestedandtheseizedcurrencywasplacedunderseal.

Source:Chad

Case n°1 : Financing through forced contributions

UndertheinvestigationscarriedoutfollowingtheJune2015attacks,severalsus-pectedmembersofBokoHaramwerearrestedinChad.Duringquestioning,theynamedahighlyrespected tribalandreligious leadernamedDaoud, living in theLakeChadregion,asaBokoHaramactivist.TheauthoritiesweresurprisedattheinvolvementandparticipationofthisrespectablecharacterinBokoHaramfinan-

Typology 6 : Collecting and remitting funds

Typology 7 : Extortion

Thiscaseraisestheproblematicissueofthecirculationofcashinthestudiedarea.Despite the risks arising from lack of security due to the frequency of armed at-tacks,economicoperatorshavecontinuedtotransportlargesumsofmoney.Thelengthoftheborders,numerouscrossingpointsandbackroadsforavoidingcus-toms,insufficientsecurityforcesallocatedtomonitorborderareasandcorruptionamonggovernmentofficialsarejustsomeofthefactorsthatencouragethephysicalcarryingofcash.Thefactthatthismoneyisoftenkeptinhomesmakesitdifficulttodetermineitsoriginandvolume,ortrackthemovementsofcouriers.Itischancesearches,whichhavebecomeroutineduetoBokoHaram,thatleadtomoneyhid-deningoodsbeingdiscovered,asisalsothecasewithweaponsandmunition.

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cingandrecruitment.Investigationsbysecurityservicesestablishedthat:- DaoudhadbeenactivelycollaboratingwithBokoHaramsincethebegin-ningofitsactivitiesintheLakeregion.- Accordingtohisdeclarations,thiswasaforcedcollaborationinexchangeforprotectionofhiscommunityandgoodsfromthescourgeofBokoHaram.- Tothisend,Daoudcollectedmoney,suppliesandcattlefromhiscommu-nity,whichhethenforwardedmonthlytoBokoHaramchiefs.- Youngsterswerealso recruitedascontributionsofyoungmen fromeachfamily.Daoudwasarrestedbythesecurityforcesforfinancingterrorism.

Source:Tchad

Case n° 2 : Financing through illegal payments

AmajorChadianeconomicoperatorofNigerianorigin,withasignificantpartofhisfamilyinNigeria,wascitedbyterroristsarrestedundertheinvestigationsconduc-tedsubsequenttotheJune2015attacksasoneoftheBokoHaramfinanciers.Thesecurityservicesidentifiedandarrestedhim.Afterquestioning,headmittedpaying5,000,000CFAfrancseachmonthintheformofchequesmadeouttoanindividualholdinganaccountwithalocalbank.Hedeclaredthathehadnevermetthepersoninquestion.ThesemonthlypaymentsweremadetoprotecthisfamilylivingunderdeaththreatsinNigeria.InvestigationsbyintelligenceservicesconfirmedthatthiseconomicoperatordidindeedhavefamilylivinginKanoandMaiduguri.Thebankalsoconfirmedmonthlypaymentsof5,000,000CFAfrancsfromhisaccountduringtheprevioustwoyears.ThebeneficiaryofthechequeswasidentifiedbyterroristsarrestedaftertheaforementionedattacksasoneofthelocalBokoHaramchiefs.Bothheandtheeconomicoperatorwerebroughtbeforethecompetentcourts.

Source:Chad

This case demonstrates continuity between the methods used by organised crime andthoseadoptedbyterrorists.BetweentheperiodofwaysiderobberiesandtheemergenceofterrorisminCentralAfrica,therewasalmostadecadeofprosperityofkidnappingswiththepaymentofransoms.Fromthenorth-westoftheCARtotheshoresofLakeChad,theelderchildrenofPeullineages,thechildrenoffarmersandtradespeopleandtheirchildrenhaveinparticularbeenkidnappedbyvariousgroupsthathavethendemandedandobtainedthepaymentofransoms.

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From2003 onwards, tens of thousands of farmers, sometimes deprived of theircattlewhichtheyhavehadtoselltomeetthekidnappers’demands,movedawayfrominsecureareastofindrefugeinneighbouringcountries.Despitethepresenceofsecurityforces,manyfamilieshavepreferredtopaytheransomsaskidnappershavebeenknowntoexecuteanumberofhostageswhenthemoneyhasnotbeenpaid.Thisphenomenon is continuing in theRegionofAdamaoua inCameroon.Unwillingly,parentsareparticipatinginthefinancingoforganisedcrimeand,intheaforementionedcase,tothefinancingofBokoHaram.Thisappliestocommunityleadersandfamilies,whohavefacedthedilemmaofgivingintothedemandsofBokoHaramorfleeing.CameroonandChadian securityand legal sourceshavereportedonthispredicamentofhavingtochoosebetweenthesurvivalinstinctorcomplicitywithaterroristorganisation.

Case n°1 : Financing of armed groups and terrorist acts by politically exposedpersons

In2003,an“Alpha”countrywasrepeatedlyattackedonitsborderwiththe“Beta”countrybyanarmedgroupfrom“Beta”whichinitiallyhadnogrievancewith“Al-pha”.TheinterceptionoftelephonecallsbyleadersofthearmedgrouprevealedasignificantnumberofcallstoaMr“Sam”,aneconomicoperatorandpoliticianwhoisanationalandresidentofthe“Alpha”country,whohadbusinessrelationswithanumberoftradersinthe“Beta”country.Investigations conducted into money transfer institutions and mobile telephoneoperators revealed that: itwas at the request of “Yota”, a politician, citizen andresidentofthe“Alpha”countrythat“Sam”allegedlyenteredintocontactwiththearmedgroupviaitspartners,thefinancialpreyofthesaidgroup.ThisinvolvedYotainflictingterrorinthispartofthe“Alpha”country,aftertheterroristthreatthathademergedinanotherpartofthiscountry.TheterroristactsandmedicalcareofthegroupwerefinancedbyYotaeitherbymoneytransferredtothegroupleadersorbycashcarriedbySam,whofrequentlytravelledtothe“Beta”country.

Conclusion:YotaandSamcommittedthecrimeofterrorismfinancing,asdefinedbytheECCASRegulationsandotherlegalprovisions.Thiscaseisstillbeingun-dergoingadjudicationinthenationalcourtsofthe“Alpha”country.

Case n° 2 : Financing of terrorism and the laundering of the proceeds of terrorism by a local politician

Mr“MOTO”,anationalofcountry“A”ofCentralAfrica,highlypopularamongthepeopleofhisregionoforigin,wascontactedbytheauthoritiesoftheRepublic

Typology 8 : Financing by politically exposed persons

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tonegotiatethereleaseofforeigntouriststakenhostagebytheBokoHaramterro-ristgroup.Thedemandedandnegotiatedransomwaspaidandthehostageswerereleased. Shortly after, other kidnappings occurred and the same procedurewasfollowedtoreleasethehostages.Investigationsundertakenrevealedthefollowing:Withoutbeingamemberoftheterroristorganisation,MrMotoallegedlyhadacquaintanceswithwhomhemain-tainedintelligencetohisbenefit.Afterthefirstnegotiations,MrMotoputhimselfforwardasacandidateandthenwonthelocalelections.Hiscampaignwasfinancedby the commission received from thenegotiation.MrMoto’s standardof livingallegedlysuddenlyincreasedandhedevelopedanumberofbusinessactivities.Af-terthefirstreleasetransaction,hehimselforganisedandfinancedotherkidnappingoperations,assistedbyhisacquaintanceswhoweremembersoftheterroristorgani-sation.ItwasestablishedthatMrMotocommittedthecrimeoffinancingterrorism,aswellaslaunderingtheproceedsofterrorism,asstipulatedandpunishableunderlegalprovisionsinforce.MrMotoandseveralofhisacolyteswerebroughtbeforetherelevantcourts.

Case n°1 : Financing through hostage ransoms

In2013and2014,BokoHaramcarriedoutseveraloperationsthatresultedinthekidnappingofpeopleintheExtremeNorthofCameroon.Fouroftheoperationswerespecificallyaimedatkidnappingdesignatedtargets.Securitysourcesstatethefollowing facts:- On16May2014,BokoHarammembersattackedtheofficesofaChineseroadconstructioncompanyinWazaintheareaofLogoneandChari.Theyseized10Chinesemembersofthestaff,10vehiclesandexplosives;- On19February2013,sevenFrenchtouristswerekidnappedneartheWazaNationalParkintheExtremeNorthofCameroon.BokoHaramconfirmeditwasholdingthem;- InNovember2013,aFrenchpriestwaskidnapped inNguetchewein theExtremeNorthofCamerooninanoperationapparentlyco-ordinatedbyBokoHa-ramanditsAnasarudissidence;- InApril2014,twoItalianpriestsandaCanadiannunwerekidnappedintheparishofTchérénearMaroua,byarmedmenbelongingtoBokoHaram;- On22July2014,hundredsofheavilyarmedindividualsbelongingtoBokoHaramstormedthelocalityofKolofataintheareaofMayoSava,followinganin-filtrationduringthenightfromtheNigerianborder.Itwasthedaybeforeareligiousfestivalinvolvinghundredsofpeoplethathadcometopayhomagetoamajorpo-liticalfigurewhooriginatedfromthetown.Thisparticularlyviolentattackresulted

Typology 9 : Kidnapping with demands for ransom

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inthekidnappingof17people,includingthewifeofthepolitician.Allthehostageswerereleasedfollowingnegotiations.Noofficialsourcehasconfir-medthepaymentofaransom.However,anumberofcluestendtosuggestthiswasthe case :- Banknotes,probablypartoftheransom,wereseized;- Oneofthenegotiatorswasarrestedbythesecurityservicesandisstillheldincustody;- Onepersonwasarrestedandremainsincustodyinrelationtothekidnappings;- Certainintermediariesinthenegotiationshavebeenbroughtbeforethecourts.

Source:cross-referencingofsecurity,legalandopensources

Case n° 1 : MrsAminawasastallholderattheseasonalmarketofDoumbère,whereshesolda rangeof consumergoods, aswell as second-hand items. InApril 2016, alongwith eight otherwomen, shewas arrested by the security forces.Threemonthspreviously,thelocalityofDoumiahadbeenlootedbyagroupofarmedindividualsusingtrucks.Theypillagedthe locality,ransackingshopsandstoreswhichwereemptiedoflargequantitiesofconsumergoodsandvariousitemsofequipment.MrHosha,ashopkeeper,whohadnumerouskitchenutensilsstolen,thensawseveralcookingpotsfromhisstockforsalebyMrsAminaonthemarketinDoumbère.In-vestigationsrevealedthatMrsAminaandhercompanionswereregularlysuppliedbyadormantbranchofBokoHaram,whogavethemproductsandobjectstosell.Theyalsoreceivedremuneration.Atthetimeoftheirarrest,theyhadalreadybeenactiveforatwo-yearperiod,duringwhichtimetheyhadsoldmanyitemsinvariouslocalmarkets.

Case n° 2 :

InJuly2015,mennamedAlidou,BouskaandIsmawerearrestedbythesecurityforcesafterbeingdenouncedbytheheadoftheBirdinalocality.BouskahadcometothevillageandbeenprovidedwithaccommodationbybrothersAlidouandIsma.

Typology 10 : Ambushes and looting

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TheattentionofthevillageheadwasdrawntothefactthatBouskahadanampu-tated arm and followed an intensive care programme involving a large quantityofdrugs.Thevillageheadnotified the security forceswhich for some timehadbeenlookingforagroupofindividualsthathadransackedthepharmacyofKountiHospitalCentre,stealingmorethan10tonsofdrugsandarangeofpharmaceuti-calitems.DescriptionsofthecriminalsprovidedduringtheinvestigationmatchedthoseofAlidou,BouskaandIsma,whosegrouphadjustclashedwithanationaldefenceforceofthecountry,resultingintheinjuryofBouska,whohadmanagedtoescape.TheirquestioningrevealedthatthestolendrugshadbeentransferredtothegeneralstaffoftheBokoHaramterroristgroup.

Casen°1:Thesaleandexchangeofpoachedproducts

TheChadiandefenceandsecurityforceshavearrestedpoachersoriginatingfromseveralcountries.Theywereinpossessionofarangeofwildlifeproducts(espe-ciallyelephanttusks)resultingfromtheircriminalactivities.AmongthearrestedpoacherswereseveralterroristslistedasmembersoftheLRA,andmembersoftheSelekagroup.Whenquestioned,theystatedtheywereonanassignmentorderedbytheirrespectivegeneralstaffstoexchangethesewildlifeproductsforweapons,

Aswithcattleandfish,therearesomanyspecificcaseswithinthistypologythatitvergesonalistofInBriefnewsitems.Attackstargetingtrucksandpassengertrans-portvehicles,togetherwithraidstoplundergoods,arenumerousanddailyoccur-rences.Theysometimesdemonstratetheconfusionbetweenorganisedcrimeandterrorism.Accordingtothetestimoniesofvictimsandthesecuritysources,theseattacksformthemainmethodofprovidingsuppliestoBokoHaramunitsspreadoverdifferentareas.Insomecases,theseareintentionaldeliveriesofsupplies,dis-guisedasattacksonthetruckstransportingthem.This iswhere it isworth remembering that asmembership of BokoHaram in-creases, recruits are obliged to self-finance from the spoils resulting from theseattacks.ThesameobservationappliestotheLRA,whofrequentlypillageandcarryoutotheraggressionsonthebelongingsofpeopleintheEastoftheCAR,inparti-cular.AccordingtotheLRACrisisTracker,“TheLRA(…)conducted145lootingsbetweenJune2011andJune2012…looting,orthestealingofgoods,isseriousandlife-alteringforgeographicallyandeconomicallyisolatedcommunities.WhentheLRAlootsacommunity,theyarerobbingthatcommunityofnotonlyitsresources,butalsoitslivelihood;andacrosstheDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRCongo)andCentralAfricanRepublic(CAR),theLRAcommitsthisatrocitydaily17.«

Typologiy n° 11 : Crime involving wildlife

17 http://invisiblechildren.com/blog/2014/06/18/lra-lootings-and-its-life-altering-effects/43


carsandsupplies,orelsetosellthem.ThepurchasersinthiscriminalnetworkaretheheadsoftheJanjaweedgroupbasedinDarfur,withwhomtheLRAandSelekahavebusinessrelations.Duringthisoperation,thedefenceforcesrecoveredandconfiscatedawarweaponintheirpossession.AssistedbytheconsularservicesofaWesterncountry,itwasestablishedthatthisweaponhadbeenlawfullyacquiredbytheUgandanarmyin1999.

Source:Chad

Case n° 2:Riskoffishingandtheillegaltrafficoffishproducts

ThebanimposedbyNigeronsellingfishfromLakeChadledtheCameroonau-thoritiestotakeaninterestintheriskoftheillegalexploitationofthisresourcebyBokoHaraminitssectionsoftheLake.Observationofthefishmarketrevealedthatcatcheswereindeclineandthequantitiessoldhadbeenhalvedoverathree-yearperiod,withfishermennolongerallowedaccesstothefishingareasorhavingsimplygivenuptheactivity.Thecumulativeeffectofthereductionamountedtoa lossofbusinessevaluatedat8,554,296,000CFAfrancs (around€13,000,000).AsinsecurityhadledtothedepartureoffishermenfromtheLakeChadarea,thishadan improvisedeffectofacircumstantialbiological restperiod.Thisresultedinanincreaseinnumberandstrongdevelopmentoffishingresources,leadingtolargercatchesandlargerfish.Thisnowprovidesbaitfortheterroristswhotargetthefishermenattractedbythisboon,whohavenohesitationinfishingdespitethedangerstowhichtheyareexposingthemselves.

Source:MINEPIA/Cameroun,“RapportdelaMissiond’évaluationdesrépercus-sionsdel’insécuritéliéeauxexactionsdel’organisationterroristeBokoHaramsurlesous-secteurélevageetpêche[ReportbytheAssessmentMissionontheeffectsofinsecurityrelatedtoexactionsoftheBokoHaramterroristorganisationonthefarmingandfishingsub-sector]»,June2016

Thistypologyraisestheincreasingproblemofenvironmentalcrime.Armedgroupsareresponsibleforthewidespreadtakingofnaturalresourcesandprotectedspaces.Despite the security and regulatory measures taken to protect elephants in parti-cular, their tusks are at the core of increased traffickingbetweenCentralAfricaand Asia18.Thedeterminationofpoachersismatchedbytheiroperatingmethods,which involvemobilisingsmallarmiesandusingheavyweaponry.Thiswas thecaseinJanuary2012,withthemassacreofhundredsofelephantsfortheirtusksintheBoubaNdjiddaReserveinCameroon.

18 https://www.savetherhino.org/rhino_info/thorny_issues/is_elephant_and_rhino_poaching_funding_terrorism44


V.2. Risk indicators and red flags

V.2.1. Risk indicators of the financing of terrorism

Thesearenotformalcases,butprobablemechanisms.

• Productionandsaleofagriculturalproducts:peoplelivingontheshoresofLakeChadreceivemodestamountsofmoneyfromBokoHaramintheformofloanstofinance thegrowingofpotatoes,onionsandothervegetablesandsell themonlocalmarkets.(Securitysources).

• Informalmanualcurrencyexchange:aCameroonFIUreportstatesthattheactivityofmanualcurrencyexchangeisflourishinginDoualaandYaoundé.Thismainlyinvolvesprivateoperators,mostlyoriginatingfromMali, theIvoryCoast,Senegal andGuinea. Informalmanual currency exchangewaswidespread in theAmchidé-Bankiregionbeforelocalswereforcedtoleavetheareaduetoinsecurity.BokoHaramhadinstalledoneofitsbasesinBanki.

• Preciousmetaltrafficking:thecontrolofAnti-Balaka,ex-Selekaandotherpolitico-militaryarmedgroupsovertheminingareasofCARislikelytopromotetraffickingforterroristgroupsoperatinginCentralAfricaandbeyond.

AlthoughthesepoacherscamefromChad,investigationshaveshownthatpoachersalsocome fromother countries, especiallySudan.Linkshaveemergedwith theJanjaweed,whoareinvolvedinarmstraffickingintoCentralAfrica.Thisisacriminaleconomyfinancedbyresourcesraisedviacriminalactsandrein-vestedintraffickingaimedatmaintainingorganisedcrime,includingterrorism.Inthiscontext,itappearsincreasinglyevidentthatAlShabbab,theJanjaweedandtheLRAareengagedin the lucrative traffickingofrhinoceroshornandivory toAsia.InvestigationsbyCentralAfricansecurityserviceshavealsoshownthativo-rystoredontheCentralAfricanterritoryisexchangedbymembersoftheLRAforuniforms,weapons, chargers andmunition supplied by the Janjaweedmilitia ofDarfur.Theydelivertheivorytointermediaries,whothensellitontotheAsianmarkets.Asanexample,thediscoveryofastashofelephanttusksintheCentralAfricanjunglenearDjéma(north-eastCAR,closetoDarfur)furtherconfirmedtheimportanceofpoachinginthemechanismsforfinancingtheLRA19.Advancedmilitarytrainingofeco-wardens,togetherwithmilitarisedprotectionofwildlifereservesandmonitoringofisolateddepositsofgemsneedtobestrengthe-ned inmost countries on account of thegold rushobserved inChad, continuedattacks on elephants in Cameroon and the CAR and many other forms of illegal ac-cesstonaturalresources.Thissituationonceagainraisestheneedforcross-borderpartnerships.

19 Sources : Journal de Bangui du 12 février 2013, Ministère des eaux et forêts de la RCA.45


V.2.2. Risk indicators of the expansion of terrorism and red flags

• BokoHarammembersarrestedfollowingtheN’DjamenaattacksrevealedtheexistenceofcellsinotherareasofChadandKousseri,inparticular;

• ThepersistenceofviolentextremisminCAR,whichislikelytoattractjihaditerroristgroups;

• PiracyattacksonpetroltankersinGaboneseterritorialwatersin2015andwide-scalepoachingintheMikebeborderareabetweenCameroonandtheCongobothcontributetotheriskofterrorismfinancingactivitiesexpandingintothispartofCentralAfrica.Thiszonecontainsnationalsofanumberofcountries(Gabonese,Cameroonians,Congolese,CentralAfricans,Chadians,Senegalese,Burkinabes,Malians,Chinese,Malaysians,GhanaiansandLebanese,etc.),whocarryoutnumerousoffences,includingpoaching,miningpreciousmetals(includinggold)anddeforestation;

• NationalsfromCameroonandChad,trainedinterrorismintheranksofBokoHaram,whichhasrecruitedtheminlargenumbers,constituteanongoing,latentthreat;

• Theabsencesofarofanyde-radicalisationpoliciespromotesthepersistenceofterrorism.ThisalsoappliestothemixedresultsofDDRpolicies,whichleadtofightersbeingrecycledintootherformsofviolence;

• CentralAfricaisincontactwithregionsunderthethreatofterroristgroups,piratesandothercriminalgroups,whosemovementsinporousborderzonesfacilitatesrepeatedthreatsandthepotentialinfiltrationofterroristactivities;

• Lowsecuritylevelsinidentificationandnationalitydocumentsfacilitatethehidingofterroristsandotherwantedpersons;

• Withouttheperpetuationofsub-regionalmechanismstofightterrorism,suchastheMultinationalJointTaskForce,thereisariskthattheterroristgroups will relocate

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ConclusionThisstudyshowsthatBokoHaramdrawsadvantagefromaregionalenvironmentthatfacilitatescross-bordercriminalactivity.Theporosityofborders,integrationofeconomicandsocialnetworksintheborderzonesoftheChadBasin,theinformalnatureofeconomicexchangesandtheexistenceofanitineranteconomybasedonthe sale of produce are some of the endogenous factors that the organisation instru-mentalisesbothtocarryoutitsattacksandmobiliseitsresources.Povertyandtheunder-employmentofyoungpeople,whoinadditionreceivelittleformaleducation,provideitwitharecruitmentpoolofpeoplewhosesocio-economicfrustrationsareinstrumentalised within the framework of an insurgency that is both ideological and socio-economicinnature.Themovementofcashfromonemarkettoanotheroronecountrytoanotherfaci-litatestheconcealmentoftransactions.Overall,ithasemergedthatitistheregio-nalisationofbusinessnetworks,communityidentitiesandexchangesthatenablestheorganisation todiversify its sourcesoffinance,movestolengoodsand raisefunds.Insufficientcross-bordercooperationasregardssecurityingeneralandthefight against terrorism in particular, are a factor that contributes to the ongoingpersistenceofthreats.TothisisaddedthecorruptionanddeficienciesreportedintheimplementationofinstrumentstocombatterrorismfinancingcontainedintherelevantFATFRecommendationsandcommunitytexts.

RecommendationsTherecommendationsarechieflyaimedatStates,astheyprovidetheimpetusandguidelinesrequiredforimplementingthelegalinstruments,trainingandpartnershipssuggested by the Task Force :

A. A. Regulation or implementation of existing norms

1-Adaptnationalandsub-regionalregulationsandlawstothenewterroristthreatsandtheirfinancing,takingintoaccounttheirspecificnatureandsensitivity.Inves-tigationprocedures,characterisationofoffencesandpowersofinvestigativeautho-ritiesmustbeinlinewiththenewtrendsinthisareaofcrime.

2-Adoptnationalandsub-regionallegislationthatsupervisesfinancialmessagingand enables effective control of transfer operations involving funds and securi-tiesmadebymoneytransfercompaniesbothinternallyandinternationally.Inthiscontext, it isurgent tooblige internationalmoneytransfercompanies tocreateanational and legally independent entity that is accountable for operations performed withintheirnetwork.

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3-Implementamechanismtodetectandneutralise“Hawala»typenetworks,whichenablefundsandsecuritiestobemovedwithoutanytraceability.

4-Improvesupervisionofnewmethodsofpaymentimplementedbyeconomicplayersaspartoffinancialinclusionpolicies,inordertopreventmisusebyterroristgroups.

5-RevitaliseandempoweradministrationsthatoverseeNPOsandespeciallyNGOs.Accreditationprocedures, identificationof theirdirectors,controlof theiractivities,formal determinationof their source offinancing andknowledgeof their bank ac-countsareafundamentalaspectofthefightagainstterrorismfinancing.Morewidely,implementtherelevantrecommendationsofthetypologyexerciseonthemisuseofNPOsinthefinancingofterrorisminCentralAfrica.

6 -Urgently takemeasures to computerise civil status and improve the securityofnationalidentities.

7-ImplementRegulationno.02/03/CEMAC/UMAC/CMof4April2003onpaymentsystems,methodsandincidents,theprovisionsofwhichshouldconsiderablyreducethemovementofcashineconomictransactions.

8-Strengthennationalandcommunitylegislationonenvironmentalcrimes.

9-ImplementalltheFATFRecommendationsonterroristfinancing.

B. Training those involved in combating terrorist financing

1.Trainthoseinvolvedinthechainofthepreventionandsuppressionofterrorismanditsfinancingwithrespecttofinancialinvestigationandcounter-radicalisationmethods.Disseminatethevarioustypologiesofterrorismfinancingrecordedwor-ldwideamongthedepartmentsresponsibleforapplyingthelaw.

2.Raiseawarenessamongthoseinvolvedonthediligencerequiredintermsofde-tectingoperationspotentiallylinkedtoterroristfinancing.

C. National and sub-regional partnerships

1.InvolvetheGABACwithallforumsorganisedbytheECCASinvolvingsecurityproblemsinthesub-region;

2.EncourageconsultationsbetweenthevariousmonetaryauthoritiesandtheBEAC/COBAC for improving supervision ofmanual currency exchange opera-tions.Due to the securitycontext,States shouldprohibit thedirect importingofcurrencybycommercialbanksandmicro-financeinstitutions.Asaparallelmove,strictmeasuresshouldbeintroducedtocounterinformalcurrencymarkets,whilstreviewingapplicablelawstofacilitatetheopeningofcurrencyexchangeofficesby

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thoseoperatingintheinformalsector,whichwouldimproveclarityinthemove-mentofcurrency.

3.Bringtherelevantpublicservicesandfinancialinstitutionsofallkindstogetherontoapermanentplatformforconsultingandexchanginginformationonterroristfinancing.

4.Createacooperationframeworkforservices,whichcouldtaketheformofa“Na-tionalCriminalIntelligenceCentre»,comprisingthefinancialintelligenceservices,policeintelligenceunits,localpolice,thearmy,customsandexternalintelligenceservices.ThisCentrewouldfuseinformationheldseparatelybythevariousentities.Intelligenceproducedby thisCentreshouldbeable tobeuseddirectlyasproofduringlegalproceedings.

5.CreateexchangeplatformsbetweentheCRFandotherintelligenceservicesandensuretheyattendappropriatemeetingstowhichtheGABACisalsoinvited.ThecostinvolvedinthisparticipationshouldbepaidbytheStates.

D. Implementation of integrated strategies for combating terrorism and its financing

1.Drawupa sub-regional anti-terrorist strategyadapted todevelopments in thethreatandendogenousfinancingrisks

2.Carryouturgentactionstoresolvethesocio-economicproblemsofunderprivile-gedgroups,particularlyyoungpeople.

3.Updatedataonpoaching in the sub-regionand itspotential linkswith crimi-nalsystemsoperatingin,fromandtowardsCentralAfrica;renderthesub-regionalforceoperationalincombatingthisphenomenon.

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IndicativebibliographyAbuBakrNaji,Gestiondelabarbarie,EditionsdeParis,2007.

Bakary Sambe, «BokoHaram dans leBassin du LacTchad.Au-delà du sécuritaire, ledangerethnicisteetledésastrehumanitaire»,LaLettredel’ObservatoireN°2,mai2016,http://timbuktu-institute.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Boko-Haram-dans-le-bassin-du-Lac-Tchad.pdfhttp://invisiblechildren.com/blog/2014/06/18/lra-lootings-and-its-life-alte-ring-effects/https://www.savetherhino.org/rhino_info/thorny_issues/is_elephant_and_rhi-no_poaching_funding_terrorism

Bauer,Alain,Dernièresnouvellesducrime,Paris,EditionsduCNRS,2013.

Bennafla,Karine,LecommercefrontalierenAfriqueCentrale,Paris,Karthala.

EmergingTerroristFinancingRisks,RapportGAFI2015

FATF/GIABA/GABAC,TerroristFinancinginWestandCentralAfrica,October2016.

GABAC,Rapportdel’exercicedetypologiesurl’utilisationabusivedesorganismesàbutnonlucratifàdesfinsdefinancementduterrorismeenAfriqueCentrale,2015. GIABA,LefinancementduterrorismeenAfriquedel’Ouest,2013.

Rapportdesexperts,2èsommetrégionalsurlasécuritédansleBassinduLacTchaddes12 et 13 mai 2016)

Seignobos,Christian,2016,«BokoHaram:innovationsguerrièresdepuislesMontsMan-dara»,Afriquecontemporainen°225.

TerroristFinancing,RapportGAFI2008.

Tupman, W.A.,«Tenmythsabout terroristfinancing»,JournalofMoneyLaunderingControl,vol.12,n°2,2009.

Zen,Jacob,«BokoHaram:Recruitment,Financing,andArmsTraffickingintheLakeChadRegion»,CTCSentinel,vol7,Issue10,October2014,p.8.

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Documents

The Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa ...spgabac.org/Site/Wp-content/Uploads/2017/06/Plaquette-GABAC-anglais-OK-VF.pdfThe Task Force on Money Laundering in Central Africa