THE TALIBAN AND THE CIVIL WARENTANGLEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

Nasreen Ghufran

Civil wars and revolution are instruments that may beused by those who want to bring about a change in a country However suchchange comes with a heavy price when existing structures are transformeddrastically from one form to another The use of these tools comes at highcost as it entails great chaos and destruction Usually a revolution is followedby a civil war as the change is not acceptable to some and strong resistancefollows But a civil war can occur without a revolution Because of its pro-tracted nature the Afghan civil war has passed through different phases Af-ghanistanrsquos case is unique because at first it was the socialist revolution of1978 that started the civil war But the revolution did not bring about thechange envisaged The revolutionaries were not able to enlist the support ofthe Afghan masses because they were not convinced about their program andideals The civil war that erupted then still continues

The Taliban emerged in Afghanistanrsquos political scene with the avowed ob-jective of ending the civil war and bringing peace to the country In thisarticle while I will make passing references to the earlier efforts of theTaliban to conclude the civil war in Afghanistan the focus here will be on thecurrent phase of the civil war in which the Taliban are the dominant forceWhile waging war against the Northern Alliance the Taliban now control90 of Afghanistan They are putting all their efforts into achieving a com-plete victory Ironically the Taliban remain entangled in the civil war de-spite their aim to disentangle it During their five years of de facto rule theTaliban are also trying to gain international legitimacy However such rec-ognition has not been granted to them This article will conclude by showing

Nasreen Ghufran is Assistant Professor Department of InternationalRelations University of Peshawar North West Frontier Province Pakistan

Asian Survey 413 pp 462ndash487 ISSN 0004ndash4687Oacute 2001 by The Regents of the University of California All rights reservedSend Requests for Permission to Reprint to Rights and Permissions University of CaliforniaPress Journals Division 2000 Center St Ste 303 Berkeley CA 94704ndash1223

462

NASREEN GHUFRAN 463

how regional powers have a stake in maintaining the status quo in Afghani-stan

The Roots of the Civil War in AfghanistanCivil wars are costly because they damage the entire infrastructure of coun-tries The Afghan case is no exception which has seen many players bothnational and international trying to enforce their own agendas and seek theirnational interests through the conflict The country itself has mostly beenpoor and of little economic importance internationally However Afghani-stanrsquos strategic location at the crossroads between Iran Central Asia the Ara-bian Sea and India has given its mountain passes a significance for centuriesThis significance has been noted by the famous poet Mohammed Iqbal whodescribed Afghanistan as the ldquoheart of Asiardquo while Lord Curzon one of themost famous British viceroys of India called it the ldquocockpit of Asiardquo1

In contemporary times Afghanistanrsquos strategic significance has been en-hanced because it lies close to several energy-rich countries in Central AsiaThe country straddles a major route for the transport of energy resources toviable markets and thrusts Afghanistan into the game of international oil andgas politics The countryrsquos geographic position has contributed the singlemost important element to the shaping of its history ethnic diversity econ-omy and political situation in the region and the world Unfortunately polit-ical geography also has contributed to the continuation of its civil war

The current civil war is now two decades old The Afghan war has beenbloody and destructive Out of the countryrsquos population of nearly 17 millionabout one million Afghans have been killed in the war so far In additionaround five million Afghans have become refugees and around two to threemillion people are displaced across different regions of the country Byrough estimates there are about eight million anti-personnel and two millionanti-tank mines in Afghanistan The infrastructure and institutions of thestate have largely been destroyed According to the United Nations (UN)socioeconomic conditions of the population are among the worst in theworld Health care is rudimentary and many are without access to basichealthcare provision Maternal mortality is one of the highest in the worldGiven the amount of destruction Afghanistan will require massive recon-struction and rebuilding once the war is ended

The Afghans have paid a heavy price for the ongoing civil war destruc-tion death disabled bodies refugees and displacement and above all dis-unity The countryrsquos citizens are a disillusioned people who do not knowtheir direction and future Efforts to end the civil war in Afghanistan have

1 Ahmed Rashid Taliban Islam Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (New YorkI B Tauris 2000) p 7

464 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

not been successful The Taliban one of the warrsquos by-products have beenmaking efforts to restore peace but have not yet been able to steer the countrytoward complete peace and order In this article I will show how the com-plexity of the Afghan situation has produced added difficulties for the variousactors engaged in the quest to end the conflict

Theoretical Perspectives on theTermination of Civil Wars

Once civil wars begin they become almost impossible to end short of a deci-sive military victory Nonetheless almost half of all such wars since 1940did involve serious negotiations designed to find early solutions to the con-flicts Unfortunately less than half again of these negotiations (about one-fifth) actually resulted in successful peace settlements The majority of thesenegotiations failed Despite what appeared to be strong incentives to stopfighting and what often appeared to be strong yearnings for peace groupsrarely agreed to settle for compromise settlements that would allow themeither to share political power or peacefully part company In the end thecombatants eventually returned to war

Settlements to civil wars can have the unanticipated effect of makinggroups less secure than they would be if they continued the war This out-come occurs because a settlement leaves groups physically intermingled withtheir former enemies Moreover a settlement to a civil war could institution-alize an unsettling balance of power among the participants In each of thesescenarios it is the fear of the negative consequences of settlement that con-vinces groups to choose the more secure but violent path of war Accordingto Paul Piller

[i]f the stakes are chiefly indivisible so that neither side can get most of what itwants without depriving the others of most of what it wants negotiations are lessapt to be successful Stakes are usually less divisible in civil wars than in othertypes the issue is whether one side or the other shall control the country Thestruggle for power becomes a struggle for survival as the options narrow to thesingle one of a fight to the finish2

Moreover the problem of civil war resolution has been viewed mainly asone of war termination Civil wars are seldom analyzed within the scope ofthe more difficult but accurate problem of rebuilding a state from the chaos oframpant anarchy Resolving a civil war is never simply a matter of agreeingto a cease-fire That would only be the case if functioning legitimate statestructures already existed and a new leader merely needed to be appointed

2 Barbara F Walter Exiting from War Cooperating under Even the Most Difficult Condi-tions (New York Institute of War and Peace Studies 1996) p 5

NASREEN GHUFRAN 465

The settlement of civil war will always entail the accommodation of newgroups into government and a new political system to support multiparty ruleDomestic cooperation under anarchy is difficult and often breaks down

Barbara Walter has synthesized some of the theories on the causes for thecontinuation of civil wars According to her civil wars can be divided intofour broad categories (1) historical hatreds namely groups fight becausethey hate each other and have no desire to cooperate (2) conflicts of interestin which groups fighting for control of a single state inevitably encounterconflicts of interest that are difficult to reconcile (3) greedy elites that isstubborn threatened or self-interested leaders often with little to lose by con-tinuing to fight and (4) security dilemmas in which fear and uncertainty dur-ing the war can ultimately sabotage cooperation efforts and perpetuateviolence

A study of the causes for the continuation of the Afghan civil war encom-passes all of these reasons At certain times during the war groups haveplaced strong obstacles to other groups Therefore the actors in Afghani-stanrsquos civil war do not entertain the route of negotiations and choose insteadto continue pursuing war In the Afghan civil war different players haveparticipated in it and changed their roles over time but none have been will-ing to negotiate in a flexible manner to conclude a settlement

The Saur Revolution of 1978 cannot be ignored in any analysis of theAfghan civil war nor can the current conflict be delinked from it Accordingto Barnett Rubin the 1978 revolution introduced Marxist-oriented radical re-forms in Afghanistan that led to disruptive changes in the social economicand political structures of a predominantly feudo-tribal society The reformswere intended to bring about much-needed economic change by abolishingthe oligarchic power arrangements that in the judgment of Afghan revolu-tionaries had prevented progress and development in the past

While the substance of various reforms was highly desirable and couldeven be considered fundamental to any process of development in a feudaland tribal society the political form in which the reforms were articulatedcontrasted with the popular cultural and social norms of the Afghan massesSpecifically the landowning and religious establishment feared losses of eco-nomic and social privileges if the reforms were implemented This led toresistance from the masses and the growth of countrywide opposition De-spite the fact that the opposition was divided and loosely organized alongethnic and regional lines it effectively exploited the contradictions betweenthe ideology of the regime and popular Afghan cultural norms The charac-terization of the reforms as un-Islamic and the Soviet support for the regimeworked effectively in favor of the resistance The active involvement of theSoviet military forces in suppressing the Afghan resistance in order to stabi-lize the Marxist regime further strengthened the opposition forces

466 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

This period saw the Soviets and the socialist regime locked in a struggleagainst the Islamist opposition The ideological and social cleavages putthem on opposite sides External powers got involved backing their own fa-vorites in the war exacerbating the cold war rivalry The conclusion of theGeneva Accords in 1988 produced a shift in the war as the agreement elimi-nated one major cause of the war the Soviet factor The Soviet forces with-drew from Afghanistan by 1989 consequently the Marxist regime lostsupport and finally stepped down to hand over power to the mujahideen(freedom fighters)

In 1992 the Northern Alliance was established in opposition to the com-munist government led by President Najibullah The group consisted of Gen-eral Abdul Rashid Dostum former head of Najibullahrsquos militia forcesAhmed Shah Masood head of the Jamiat-i-Islami Party and Hizb-i-Wahadata pro-Shirsquoa party The resistance groups that fought the Soviet troops anddefeated the Soviet-backed government in Kabul then turned on each otherOn becoming a ruling elitemdasha goal of any combatant in a civil warmdashagreedy power struggle starts among the different factions as each wants agreater share and say in the government During the early stages of the civilwar there were also seven factions operating from Pakistan the Hizb-i-Is-lami (Islamic party) led by Gulbaddin Hekmatyar the Jamiat-i-Islami (Is-lamic society) led by Burhanuddin Rabbani the Ittihad-i-Islami (Islamicunity) led by Rasul Sayyaf the Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic party) led by MaulviYunus Khalis the Mahaz Milli Islami (NIFA the National Islamic front ofAfghanistan) led by Syed Ahmed Gailani the Jabha-imdashNijat-i-Milli (Na-tional salvation front) led by Sibghatullah Mujjadidi and Harakat-e-Inqilabi-i-Islami (Movement of the Islamic revolution) led by Maulvi MohammadNabi Mohammadi As they could not bridge their political differences thecivil war took the form of an intra-mujahideen struggle Peace remained elu-sive despite UN efforts

Amid this turbulence and confusion another force the Taliban a unitedtraditionalist Islamic contender emerged in 1994 By 1996 they took controlof Kabul and pushed the mujahideen back into their opposition barracks Atthe time a war-weary population welcomed the Taliban forces Howeverthe ousted Rabbani regime did not give up its claim to be the legitimate gov-ernment and has therefore opposed the Taliban As a result complete mili-tary victory eluded them and since then the Taliban have engaged in a fightagainst the Northern Alliance

The Talibanrsquos Changing Rolein the Civil War

The Taliban was one of many groups that participated in the struggle againstSoviet forces When the Taliban launched their own movement across Af-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 467

ghanistan they began to catch the attention of the international media Oncethey overran the country militarily so swiftly and yet so peacefully they sim-ply could not go unnoticed A lot of theories started emerging about theirorigin characteristics and objectives Nevertheless they were and still are acomplex phenomenon The Talibanrsquos leadership has been calculatedly mys-terious about the origins of the movement After the Soviet withdrawalTaliban leaders had gone back to their seminaries in order to complete theirstudies

However they were not happy with what went on in the country duringrule by the mujahideen They felt that their sacrifices were going to waste aspower wrangling and corruption continued This motivated them to start themovement Its major missions were to bring peace and order and implementSharirsquoah (Islamic law) in what they believed to be its true sense Accordingto Mullah Omar one of the key Taliban leaders the Taliban ldquotook up arms toachieve the aims of the Afghan jihad and save our people from further suffer-ing at the hands of the so-called mujahideen We had complete faith in GodAlmighty We never forgot that He can bless us with victory or plunge usinto defeatrdquo3

The rapid emergence of the Islamic Movement of Taliban of Afghanistanled to many positive expectations As an initially peaceful neutral and non-greedy force they appeared on the scene when the Afghans had lost all faithin the countryrsquos leadership Their early critics did not predict that the Talibanwould make any difference in the outcome of the war or be able to managesuccess With little fighting the Taliban took control over the southern partof the country within a few months There they disarmed militia com-manders and reestablished law and order by applying a rather strict interpre-tation of Islamic law With a piecemeal approach the Taliban soon occupiedlarger territories and became a formidable force

Their agenda was clear and convincing for the war-weary public as theaims of the movement unfolded According to Kamal Matinuddin the imme-diate goals of the new movement were to disarm all rival militia fight againstthose who did not accept their request enforce Islamic law in the areas theyliberated and retain all areas the Taliban captured4 As a truly grassrootsIslamist movement the Taliban could rely on the support of the masses Bythis time the loyalty of the mujahideen to their respective factions was notstrong They could be purchased or persuaded to switch sides whenever theyfound it in their interest to do so In town after town armed men desertedtheir leaders and joined the Taliban Desertions brought weapons as the Rus-

3 Rashid Taliban p 234 Kamal Matinuddin The Taliban Phenomenon Afghanistan 1994ndash1997 (Karachi Pakistan

Oxford University Press 1999) p 26

468 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

sians had left behind a heavily armed country As the Taliban marchedalong they picked up guns mortars tanks and even aircraft

What was unusual about the Talibanrsquos strategy is that they were relativelysuccessful in avoiding direct fighting with other potential rival groups Theyadopted a simple strategy that was markedly different and peaceful Whenapproaching an unconquered territory the Taliban would first send a delega-tion of ulama (clerics) to talk to any local militia commanders The ulamathen invited them to implement Islamic law and establish peace by handingover their arms and ammunition These clerics argued that the weapons be-longed to the Bait-ul-Mal (National treasury) under the rule of a single gov-ernment If the local militia commander agreed to the request by thedelegation then there was no fighting In case that the delegation of ulamafailed to secure a peaceful surrender the Taliban then would send a seconddelegation including elderly pious people of the area along with a Talibanrepresentative If the second delegation failed to secure a surrender to theirdemands then the Taliban would take up arms against the hold-out militia

Since disarming the local militia was the foremost priority of the Talibanthe latterrsquos stockpile of weapons kept increasing every time they overran aprovince Most of the time the weapons were handed over peacefully be-cause local militia commanders considered the Taliban to be a neutral even abenign force Moreover local commanders were eager to avoid furtherbloodshed Though simple the Talibanrsquos peaceful strategymdashbut with theveiled threat of forcemdashhas been difficult to understand It could be arguedthat during the initial stages of the Afghan civil war the Taliban achievedmost of their victories without waging a fight

Using this unique strategy the Taliban continued to make headway to thecapital without much resistance from the former rulers They took control ofthree of Afghanistanrsquos largest cities Herat in 1995 Kabul in 1996 and Ma-zar Sharif in 1997 They did it with few casualties among their troops andeven fewer among civilians Initially they were the only force capable ofrestoring law and order By 1997 the Taliban controlled around 90 of thecountry by disarming and in certain cases incorporating the former militiacommanders and assorted mujahideen

Restoration of peace and order are prerequisites to end civil war As Bar-nett Rubin has documented the Taliban denounced the failure of the muja-hideen leaders to establish security They accused the former militia com-manders of becoming thieves and even rapists They tore down all check-points set up to extort money and refused all bribes at their own Theycleared the bandits off the roads and instead of slaughtering their opponents

NASREEN GHUFRAN 469

merely disarmed them Their message seemed simple and appealing to mostAfghans peace order and Islamic law5

Establishing peace in a country like Afghanistan is by no means an easytask particularly in light of how long the civil war has been underway Evensome critics of the Taliban talk about the restoration of peace in Taliban-controlled areas ldquoBefore the Taliban this country belonged to warlords andthe simple act of going to visit my village was an impossibilityrdquo said a UNofficial who is an Afghan ldquoMy daughters sit in the house and cry to me Wewant education This is heartbreaking but peace is the first priority for peo-ple here The Taliban must be given credit for accomplishing thisrdquo6

In his in-depth analysis Franz Schurmann concluded that it is the power ofthe Talibanrsquos ideas and the stability they have brought to war-torn Afghani-stan that makes them so frightening Their proven effectiveness in maintain-ing law and order as well as their adherence to the commandments of Islamand cultural norms which see traditional Afghan women as being obedientrather than challenging to men seem to have won over the predominantlyilliterate peasants and working class

After so many years of debilitating warfare concentrated in and around thecities the urbane educated elite who would challenge these norms have van-ished More importantly for centuries the great mass of Afghans has thrivedunder the most primitive political and economic conditions while the pasttwo decades have brought only war poverty and insecurity For most Af-ghans therefore their present situation under the Taliban appears to be if notideal the best among possible alternatives The removal of small arms andheavy weapons from public view is an accomplishment of immense propor-tions as weapons were everywhere and used indiscriminately

The situation in the territory controlled by the Northern Alliance is quitedifferent The opposition controls a tiny but significant 10 of the country inthe north There people are so fearful of crime that they often doubt theadvantages of the relatively liberal order under which they live It appearsthat in Afghanistan freedom and safety are opposites The Alliance had beeninstrumental in bringing down Najibullahrsquos government in April 1992 but itdisintegrated shortly after its victory because of power struggles within thegroup However when the Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996 thethree participant groups resurrected the Northern Alliance in opposition onceagain Accurate figures regarding the total mobilizing force of the allianceare not available but by a rough estimate they would number around 80000troops In contrast the Talibanrsquos active forces number about 100000

5 Barnett Rubin The Search for Peace in Afghanistan From Buffer State to Failed State(New Haven Conn Yale University Press 1995) p 140

6 Barry Bearak ldquoAfghans Ruled by Taliban Poor Isolated but Securerdquo New York Times(NYT) October 10 1998

470 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

The nominal head of the Northern Alliance is Burhanuddin Rabbani al-though in reality he shares power with his primary military backer AhmedShah Masood Both of them belong to the Jamiat-i-Islami which is apredominantly Tajik Islamist party Rabbanirsquos regime controls most of thecountryrsquos embassies abroad and retains Afghanistanrsquos seat in the UN Ah-med Shah Masood built Afghanistanrsquos most sophisticated military-politicalorganization the Shurandashyi-Nazar-i-Shamali (Supervisory Council of theNorth SCN) The SCN coordinated Jamiat commanders and also createdregion-wide forces that developed into Masoodrsquos Urdu-i-Islami (IslamicArmy) Rabbani and Masood get their main support from the northeasternlargely Tajik portion of the country Due to his military performance andcontrol of the strategic Panjsher Valley Masood is popularly known as theldquolion of Panjsherrdquo

General Abdul Rashid Dostum and his ethnic Uzbek Junbishndashi-Milli (Na-tional movement) Party also form part of the Northern Alliance The latterrsquosbase of support lies primarily among the Sunni Muslim Uzbeks A largenumber of fighters forming part of this organization (the numbers vary be-tween 15000 and 16000) had a reputation of being the best-equipped forcesThe Hizb-i-Wahadat-i-Islami yi-Afghanistan (Islamic unity party of Afghani-stan) is the principal Shirsquoa party in Afghanistan its support is mainly amongthe ethnic Hazara group This group was originally formed under Iraniansponsorship in order to unite eight Shirsquoa parties Its leader is Karim Khaliliwho is based in Hazarajat7

Until they captured Kabul in 1996 the Taliban expressed no desire to rulethe country Ever since then the Taliban have committed themselves to con-quering the entire country The problems with the Taliban began when theystarted acting as the ruling elite Eventually their growing international iso-lation plus their ineffective administration alienated large numbers of Af-ghans As the civil war continues they are becoming more rigid Thisattitude has doomed expectations that the civil war will end Indeed whilethe Talibanrsquos achievements as a peace force had good beginnings as theyears have passed they seem to have become entangled in the civil war thatthey intended to disentangle During the early period of the civil war theTaliban did achieve some remarkable accomplishments above all revivingthe lost trust of the Afghans However their strong opposition to the forcesof the North has earned them a reputation for inflexibility

The Taliban transformed themselves from a movement into a ruling gov-ernment Their main priorities were to bring peace while at the same time tostay in power to implement their vision of an Islamic state But resistance tothis vision remains strong and the Northern Alliance is still giving the

7 Ibid

NASREEN GHUFRAN 471

Taliban a difficult time Despite the relative isolation of the Northern Alli-ancersquos forces and their extended lines of communication they have been ableto continue owing to military assistance from outside governments This aidhas come in a variety of forms ranging from the direct transfer of materiel tothe dispatch of military advisors and support personnel albeit in limited num-bers Next to none of these transfers have been publicly documented viasubmissions to the UNrsquos register on conventional arms Ironically much ofthe Northern Alliancersquos military support comes from nations participating inthe so-called ldquoSix-Plus-Twordquo contact group (Pakistan Iran UzbekistanChina Turkmenistan Tajikistan and Russia and the United States) whosemembers have publicly pledged not to provide military support to any Af-ghan combatants and prevent the use of member state territories for suchpurposes

The Northern Alliancersquos main suppliers are Iran and Russia with secon-dary roles played by Tajikistan Uzbekistan (at least until 1998) Turkmeni-stan and Kyrgyzstan Moscow denies that it is arming the Afghan rebels Inan interview with the New York Times Masood has said that he receivesmuch of his equipment from the Russian mafia not the Russian governmentHowever Russia has reportedly provided Dostum with 500 T-55 and T-62tanks that are used against areas that oppose his rule Russia has also sup-plied him with a large number of Frog 7 and Luna M missiles8

The assistance from some Central Asian republics has been an importantsource of support to the Northern Alliance Uzbekistanrsquos president IslamKarimov has clandestinely supported his fellow Uzbeks His country hassupplied the Northern Alliance with tanks aircraft and technical personnelThis support has been provided with the expectation that Uzbek-dominatedprovinces in northern Afghanistan would provide a buffer against the spreadof fundamentalism The secular regime of Turkmenistanrsquos presidentSapamurad Niyazov has publicly joined other Central Asian republics in ar-ticulating the dangers of the Afghan civil war spreading into the neighboringstates However the government of Turkmenistan is not too keen in gettingembroiled and providing overt backing to those fighting the Taliban

Anti-Taliban forces are being trained in a dozen or so camps located alongIranrsquos eastern border Since May 1997 6000 Afghan military personnelhave been dispatched from these camps to various war fronts in northernAfghanistan Most of Iranrsquos aid has been going to the Hizb-i-Wahadat PartyIran has also purchased two Su-22 and one Su-24 fighter-bombers for AhmedShah Masood and sent Iranian pilots to help plan air operations for the North-ern Alliance

8 James Risen ldquoRussians Are Back in Afghanistan Aiding Rebelsrdquo NYT July 27 1998

472 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

Clearly the challenges to the Taliban have grown over the years particu-larly in the political and economic field They continue fighting on the onehand while on the other they are increasingly worried about their growingpolitical isolation However isolation has not moderated them Theystaunchly believe in their ideology which makes it difficult for others to un-derstand them as something other than an extremist force Economicallythey are in a vulnerable position because they are operating in a war-devas-tated country and the Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan have beentargeted for heavy international sanctions

The Formation of the Taliban Governmentand Its Effect on the Civil War

By 1997 the Taliban had accomplished major military successes in the civilwar After the capture of Kabul they also began to prove themselves in thepolitical arena They felt the need of forming an alternate government tocounter the legitimacy of Rabbanirsquos regime Aware that peace and politicalstability in the country would ultimately make them a credible force theTaliban instituted a framework of shuras (consultative bodies) to achievethose aims The most visible Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad OmarAkhund then asked the shuras to give some political shape to the movement

The Taliban also gave the country a new official name changing it fromthe Islamic State of Afghanistan to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA)in October 1997 The group justified the new name as reflecting the groundrealities However the opposition has termed the change to be an undemo-cratic move A prominent Afghan intellectual Rasul Amin in a BBC PushtoService interview spoke of the new name as something that to him felt asthough it was a transplant from the Arab world However Mullah WakilAhmed a senior Taliban leader and spokesman of the movement said it wasnot the first time that Afghanistanrsquos name has been changed In the pastwords such as ldquorepublicrdquo or ldquodemocraticrdquo were added to Afghanistanrsquos nameThe emirate system however is not acceptable to the opposition as Talibanpossess no popular or legal mandate to govern or impose such But for theTaliban changing the countryrsquos appellation represents breaking with the pastand reforming the political system

The Talibanrsquos initially loose bureaucratic structures have been trans-formed too Mullah Mohammad Omar Akhund was elected Amir-ul-Momineen (Commander of the believers) by an assembly of about 1200 in-vited ulama in the city of Kandahar in spring 1996 Since then Mullah Omarhas been at the top of the ruling structure in Afghanistan Though he remainsin the background his word is final and almost has the force of law in themovement Mullah Omar lives simply known for having few needs and withno particular taste in food or dress He is alarmingly careless about his per-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 473

TABLE 1 Ethnic Composition and Cabinet Portfolios of the 10-Member Shura Basedin Kandahar

Names Ethnicity Portfolio

Mullah Mohammad Omar Ghilzai Amir-ul-MonineenAkhund Pushtun

Mullah Mohammad Rabbani Pushtun Chairman of the Caretaker CouncilDeputy Commander of the Taliban

movementMullah Mohammad Fadel Pushtun Minister of DefenseMullah Mohammad Ghaus Pushtun Minister of Foreign AffairsMullah Mohammad Hassan Pushtun Minister of SecurityMaulvi Ghaisuddin Agha Uzbek Minister of EducationMaulvi Abdur Raqib Uzbek Minister for RefugeesQari Deen Mohammad Tajik Minister for PlanningMullah Abdul Razzaq Tajik Member Supervisory CouncilMaulvi Abdul Saleem Uzbek Deputy Minister of Education

sonal security is not a gifted orator and his study of religion is limited as hewas not able to complete his religious education because of the war Despitethis background he inspires confidence among his supporters because of hispiety and the strength of his beliefs

Mullah Omar is assisted by a loose network of shuras A central shuracomprising 10 members was established in Kandahar (see Table 1) All di-rectives and policies were initiated from here and it virtually became the cap-ital of the Taliban-controlled areas (indeed Kandahar is the currentheadquarters of the Taliban movement) Aside from the core group of 10meetings of the original shura also saw participation from military com-manders tribal leaders and ulama this indeterminate structure is one of thekey features of the Talibanrsquos central shura Mullah Omar also tried to main-tain a balance between the Pushtuns and non-Pushtuns in the shura TheTaliban have been criticized for dividing Afghanistan along ethnic linesHowever despite the effort to integrate non-Pushtuns into the shura theTaliban have not been able to shed their Pushtun moorings and have not beenconsidered as impartial regarding other ethnicities

The takeover of Kabul and the formation of a central shura reflected theTalibanrsquos desire to have a more lasting stay on the political scene The cen-tral shura is assisted by a cabinet a shura in Kabul and a military shuraThese three bodies report to the central shura in Kandahar Clearly theseadministrative structures are different from the past governments For in-stance a talib (religious student) in a ministerial post is something unknownin Afghan history Nevertheless even the Taliban have found that control-

474 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

TABLE 2 Military Command Structure of the Taliban

Position Individual

Commander in Chief Mullah Mohammad Omar AkhundMilitary Chief of Staff Mullah Mohmmad HassanChief of the Army Staff Mullah Rahmatullah AkhundArmy Division Chief Mullah Muhammad Jumma KhanArmy Division Chief Mullah Muhammad YunusArmy Division Chief Mullah Mohammad GulArmy Division Chief Mullah Mohammad Aziz KhanArmored Force No 4 Mullah Mohammad Zahir

ling a territory without a clear administrative system is not possible in con-temporary times

The formation of these shuras was aimed at creating an efficient govern-ment After they captured Kabul the Taliban formed a six-member Provi-sional Ruling Council headed by Mullah Mohammad Rabbani This wasfollowed by the formation of the Kabul Shura of Acting Ministers in 1999The Kabul Shura deals with day-to-day problems of the government the cityand the Kabul military front Important policy recommendations are con-veyed to the Kandahar Shura where decisions are actually made To restoreand maintain peace in the provinces the Taliban appoints governors who arefrom provinces other than those where they are serving This policy appearsto have been welcomed by the people As for the military shura it is a looseorganizational body that plans strategy and can implement some tactical deci-sions (see Table 2) The military shura appears to have no strategic decision-making powers Military strategy key personnel appointments and the allo-cation of funds for offensives are decided upon by the Amir-ul-Momineen

Although their government has few resources and many parts barely func-tion at all the Taliban have adopted a discourse of Afghan nationalism inaddition to their Islamic traditionalism Despite their amorphous politicalleadership the Taliban claim to be trying to recreate a centralized Afghanstate In areas under their control they have appointed provincial governorsand administrators of districts cities and towns from the center9

One of the most remarkable characteristics of the Taliban leadership is thattop government officials often switch from the battlefield to the ministry andback again each time following the orders from Mullah Omar In one sensethis produces remarkable flexibility among the Taliban hierarchy as they allact as both administrators and military commanders This flexibility in the

9 Barnett Rubin ldquoAfghanistan under the Talibanrdquo Current History vol 98 no 625 (Febru-ary 1999) p 81

NASREEN GHUFRAN 475

military command has allowed the leadership to maintain better ties with therank-and-file fighters than might otherwise be the case However theTaliban administration in Kabul has faced problems For instance while anyminister is away at the front no decisions can be taken in that ministryMoreover government ministers are working without pay something un-heard of in modern times They do not use government resources for privateuse curtailing expenses and refraining from indulgence in squandering andextravagance Regular salaries are paid only to professional civil servantsand trained soldiers drawn from the former communist army

As for the Northern Alliance until August 1998 the areas it controlled hadfour main administrative and political centers Mazar Sharif which somegroups aspired to turn into a temporary capital for a government in exile ofthe Islamic State of Afghanistan Talauqan the headquarters of MasoodrsquosSCN Shibergan the location of Dostumrsquos headquarters and Bamiyan theheadquarters of the Hizb-i-Wahadat The Taliban have made inroads intothese areas too because the entire political administrative fabric of northernAfghanistan has broken down Only one of Afghanistanrsquos provinces is nowentirely under the Northern Alliancersquos control Badakhshan an inaccessiblemountainous region in the extreme northeast of the country There are alsoneighboring valleys to the west and a few enclaves in the Afghan interiorover which the Taliban have not yet been able to consolidate control Someelements of the former state administration have survived but political powerresides individually in the various armed groups rather than in a unitary civil-ian structure The groups maintain their own military and command struc-tures they do not have a unified strategy for the joint mobilization ofresources in their struggle against the Taliban

The areas controlled by the Taliban have been subjected to drastic changesto personal behavior The Taliban have put a ban on wine and televisionwhich is perceived to be immoral There is also complete restriction on mu-sic photography and the painting of living things The shaving off of onersquosbeard or trimming it less than a fistful is prohibited as is having a Westernhairstyle Gambling betting pigeon flying dog-racing and sodomy are alsostrictly forbidden

The Taliban have gained international notoriety because they have bannedwomen from working Women are obligated to observe strict purdah (litveiling also refers to covering of bodies) Girls have been stopped fromgoing to schools The Taliban have told all women working outside theirhomes to stay at home Although women who had been working will con-tinue to receive their salaries the Taliban claim that there is no need for themto work any longer They claim that these restrictions have been put in placeto protect the honor and dignity of women At the same time Taliban offi-cials have said that they are not against women working or receiving an edu-

476 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

cation The Taliban claim that they need time and resources to create theproper environment and right texts and curriculum for womenrsquos educationThe Talibanrsquos behavior is modeled after the Islamic revolution in Iran Edu-cational establishments remained closed for many years in the aftermath ofthat revolution They remained closed until the Iranian revolutionaries for-mally established an educational syllabus conforming to their own principles

The Taliban have stated that they wish to establish a pure Islamic state Intheir view this means that women have no place in the public arena Theyare required to stay at home and take care of their husbands and childrenThe Taliban cling to the symbol of a protected woman Women have toobserve a strict dress code wearing a burqa (a garment covering the bodyfrom head to toe) and trousers fully covering their ankles While women hadworn burqa in the pre-Taliban era it had not been an enforced dress code

The Talibanrsquos edicts have had a severe impact on many other women whodo not have a close male relative to accompany them in public Hardest hithave been the countryrsquos estimated 30000 widows many of whom are thesole providers for their families Some widows have been allowed to work inareas under the Taliban control but even for them it is not easy to get permis-sion According to Taliban representatives the current restrictions are said tobe necessary because females are not safe outside their homes Many womenhave strongly reacted to the Taliban policies despite the restrictive climate inTaliban-controlled areas These women do not like what the Taliban havebeen professing They want to work and continue with their education butthese rights are being denied to them The justifications given by Taliban arenot acceptable to the working and more enlightened urban Afghan women Itis therefore not surprising that women have become the most vocal critics ofthe Taliban

The edicts against women also have predictably had a devastating impacton primary level education Before the civil war over four-fifths of primaryschool teachers were women The majority of them are now jobless Theclosure of schools has in turn affected children Many orphaned childrenwho once could make homes at schools are now forced to live on the streetsAn international aid group in 1998 estimated 28000 street children in Kabulalone

Mullah Nuruddin Turabi the Taliban minister of justice defended theTalibanrsquos domestic actions He said ldquoIt is not just a question of men wearingbeards and women wearing burqas In Afghanistan every vice has to bestopped and every virtue promulgatedrdquo10 The Taliban have established anew security service the Ministry of Enforcement of Virtue and Suppressionof Vice for eradicating corruption and other vices from Afghan society Ac-

10 Michael Fathers ldquoFrozen in Timerdquo Time May 2000

NASREEN GHUFRAN 477

cording to Taliban tenets their rules are a jihad (holy war) against sin cor-ruption and cruelty Therefore those who do not abide by the Taliban edictson personal behavior are strictly punished according to a strict application ofIslamic law Hence stoning to death amputations (in case of robbery) andother forms of punishments are carried out in front of large crowds

Nonetheless a crisis of governance remains in Afghanistan To supportersof the Taliban regime its government is one that is accountable and represen-tative of all ethnic groups To many the Taliban have restored Afghan cul-ture Afghan-style self-rule has been implemented in the provinces and theTalibanrsquos supporters note that the countryrsquos civil administration and justicesystem are now based on Islamic and Afghan traditions The opposition re-jects this opinion and condemns the Taliban government of being unrepre-sentative and unaccountable

While all the above-mentioned structures are functioning the governmentfaces tremendous challenges The most obvious one is the governmentrsquosunacceptability to and lack of recognition from the international system letalone by the opposition The political dealings that the government has hadwith others offer evidence of its credibility in the civil war While theTaliban have major control of the countryrsquos land area they have not yet hadmuch success on the political front Forming a government is not enough toend the civil war the Taliban must gain acceptability both at home andabroad

The Talibanrsquos International Legal StatusRecognition of a government in a civil war also helps in ending the conflictbecause both parties involved desire the political economic and militarysupport that can come with it Non-recognition of the Taliban government isan indicator of its standing in the international community The recognitionhas not been forthcoming because of dissatisfaction with Taliban policiesUpon taking Kabul the Taliban had immediately demanded from other statesformal recognition as the only legitimate government of Afghanistan Theyalso demanded to be granted a seat in the UN General Assembly Howeverthey received neither So far only Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UnitedArab Emirates (UAE) have recognized the Taliban government In contrastBurhanuddin Rabbanirsquos Northern Alliance regime despite its weak militaryposition has legitimacy and political backing from the world communityincluding the majority of the Islamic states Most countries preserved thestatus quo and continued to allow the diplomatic missions of the Rabbaniregime

Recognition in international law involves acceptance by a state of a givenentity that this recognized entity possesses an international legal personalityand the rights and privileges that flow from it or that it is the exclusive

478 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

representative of a body with international legal personality The decision togrant or not to grant recognition is a political one within the sovereign discre-tion of individual states Recognition in principle can be accorded to states orgovernments As far as the state of Afghanistan itself is concerned it hasbeen recognized by a large number of countries including all permanentmembers of the UN Security Council for many years However wherepolitical power has fragmented to the extent that it has in Afghanistan inrecent years there may well be more than one group claiming to be the gov-ernment In fact as has been outlined already there are two governmentswithin one country One is militarily strong and controls a large populationand territory but has no legal standing while the other is recognized but hasless control of Afghan territory

Pakistan was the first country to grant international recognition to theTalibanrsquos government Their past links provided the basis for doing so Asnoted earlier virtually all of the Taliban leadership had been refugees in Pa-kistan For several years Taliban leaders studied in the madrasas (religiousschools) affiliated with the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) headed by MaulviFazul ur Rehman Although it has not been conclusively proven that theTaliban are Pakistanrsquos creation much criticism along these lines and othershas been leveled against it Pakistan is said to have played a key role inturning Taliban into a functioning military force by providing training logis-tical support and equipment

In 1997 Pakistan rooted its decision to recognize the Taliban governmentbased on the fact that the latter was in effective control of most of Afghani-stanrsquos territory including the capital By the time recognition was given theTaliban government occupied 90 of Afghanistan and oversaw a populationthat was representative of all of the countryrsquos ethnic groups Since then Paki-stan has been striving to propagate a positive image of the student militia andworking to induce other neighboring countries to recognize them Further-more Pakistan has been making persistent attempts to get the UN to adoptthe vacant seat formula which the Organization of Islamic Conferences haddone during 1996

Pakistanrsquos ties with the Taliban have become increasingly complex owingto the influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan Pakistanmdasha country of 140million mostly poor peoplemdashhas been almost single-handedly housing andfeeding the 12 million Afghan refugees living there since 1995 the year theUN stopped providing food and housing aid Some of the Afghan refugeescurrently in Pakistan have been there since the 1980s having fled the Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan At the time an estimated 32 million refugees livedin Pakistan making it the largest caseload of refugees in the world

Some of the refugees did return to Afghanistan In 1994 approximately77000 went back with the assistance of the UN High Commission for Refu-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 479

gees (UNHCR) An additional 76000 refugees returned to Afghanistan ontheir own11 However the years since then have seen a new wave of refu-gees flowing into Pakistan from northern Afghanistan Many of the freshrefugees are fleeing the fighting there plus a devastating drought This newwave has not been officially registered with any international organizationAs a consequence the statistics regarding refugees in Pakistan are unreliableAn influx of 30000 Afghan refugees came to Pakistan in 2000 and it is esti-mated that more than 50000 have crossed the border since then In that yearPakistan decided to close its border to stop further refugees because it couldnot absorb any more However its border was later reopened because of thedeplorable condition of the refugees and pressure from international humani-tarian relief agencies

Aside from Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UAE are on the list of countriesrecognizing the Talibanrsquos government Saudi Arabiarsquos came only a few daysafter Pakistanrsquos Until mid-1998 Islamabad and Riyadh were on the samepolitical wavelength Saudi Arabia supplied heavily subsidized fuel to theTaliban through Pakistan and also provided general funding After 1998problems between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan developed over the fate ofOsama bin Laden the Saudi millionaire who had been funding the Afghanjihad The Taliban had promised Saudi Arabia that Osama bin Laden wouldnot use his refuge in Afghanistan to support any acts of violence abroadAfter Osama bin Laden was linked to the bombings of US embassies inKenya and Tanzania his continued refuge in Afghanistan became a majorsource of tension between Taliban and the US on one hand and Saudi Ara-bia on the other

Apart from these three countries the Taliban have not managed to estab-lish political ties with other states This becomes a major constraint for agovernment of a country going through civil war If the paramount objectiveis to end the civil war the government has to direct its energies in this direc-tion It cannot expect the US or other countries to come to its rescue

The United States has been a major country involved in AfghanistanAlong with the Soviets the US had fed the civil war since the days of thecold war When Taliban captured Kabul the US State Department an-nounced it would establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban by sendingan official to Kabul This announcement was quickly retracted The StateDepartment spokesman Glyn Davies said the US found nothing objectiona-ble in the steps taken by the Taliban to impose Islamic law and described theTaliban as anti-modern rather than anti-Western Some members of Con-

11 Nasreen Ghufran ldquoRefugees A Comparative Study of India and Pakistanrdquo (paperpresented at the conference ldquoThe Challenge of Cooperation South Asia and Beyondrdquo Kath-mandu Nepal December 1998)

480 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

gress supported the Taliban because their government appeared to serve theUS policy of isolating Iran A Taliban regime would create a firmly Sunnibuffer on Iranrsquos border and potentially provide security for trade routes andpipelines that would break Iranrsquos monopoly on Central Asiarsquos southern traderoutes

But from its initial policy of acquiescence vis-a-vis the Taliban the USmoved to the other extreme of rejecting them completely The US rejectionwas largely because of the pressure exerted by the feminist movement Theprominent feminist Zieba-Shorish Shamley persuaded many US feministgroups to spearhead a signature campaign to mobilize support for Afghanwomen Her efforts helped persuade former President Clinton to take atougher stance against the Taliban12 Washingtonrsquos denouncement of theTaliban also came in the backdrop of the presidential election in the US assupporting a regime that held no respect for human rights would have nega-tively affected Clintonrsquos position13

In 1998 when the Taliban made great military gains against the forces ofthe North they expected to gain recognition and a seat in the UN they hadmajor Afghan cities under their control and their rivals in retreat Talibanrepresentatives claimed that if recognition were granted to their governmentthey would allow a huge pipeline project to proceed that would carry oil andgas from Central Asia to lucrative markets in Pakistan and India This pipe-line would cut through the western part of Afghanistan ldquoEven before thecapture of Mazar-i-Sharif and Taloqan we were fully qualified for recogni-tionrdquo said deputy information minister Abdur Rahman Hotaki referring totwo key opposition bases captured by the militia ldquoThe opposition gave peo-ple an excuse to deny us recognition and prevent us having the pipeline runthrough our country but that excuse has now gonerdquo he said ldquoAll excusesblocking our recognition are gone Therefore it is predicted they will revisetheir policy in view of the current realitiesrdquo he said adding that all ldquotermsand conditions for a legitimate staterdquo have been met14

But the Taliban encountered problems with international organizations In1999 the UN proposed imposing sanctions against the Taliban when it is-sued Security Council Resolution 1267 Adopted unanimously by the Secur-ity Council on October 15 the resolution demanded that the Taliban turn overOsama bin Laden without further delay to authorities in a country where hewill be brought to justice Until the Taliban comply the resolution requiresUN member states to deny permission for Taliban-owned -leased or -oper-ated aircraft to land in or take off from their territory It also calls for the

12 Rashid Taliban pp 180ndash8213 P Stobodan ldquoThe Afghan Conflict and Regional Securityrdquo Strategic Analysis (August

1999) p 72414 Frontier Post (Peshawar) January 14 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 481

freezing of funds and other financial resources including funds derived fromproperty owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban The lat-ter had 30 days in which to comply with this resolution before sanctions wereimposed The Taliban did not comply and the sanctions came into force

Another round of sanctions was imposed on the Taliban in December 2000with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1333 The new sanc-tions called for an arms embargo on the Taliban including foreign militaryassistance It also imposed a ban on travel by the militiarsquos senior leaders abroader flight ban than the one imposed last year to force bin Ladenrsquos surren-der measures to close all Taliban offices overseas and a ban on exports toTaliban areas of acetic anhydride used to manufacture heroin Finally it alsofroze funds and other financial assets of Osama bin Laden and individualsand entities associated with him Mullah Omar reacted to this round of sanc-tions by saying his government would not back out from its stand and princi-ples even if the entire world turned against them15

The continuation of these sanctions has pushed the issue of recognition tothe backburner However the international community is also paying a pricefor not recognizing the legitimacy of the Taliban One of the principal areasin which the Taliban could provide some assistance is in the containment ofthe production of poppy Mullah Omar on several occasions emphasized hiswill to fight against opium production However it has been difficult tomaintain such policy postures in the wake of external sanctions As a resultin 1999 over 90983 hectares of poppies yielded a harvest of over 4581 tonsof dry opium an estimated 70 increase in production over the previousyearrsquos figure

The international sanctions have also affected the incentives of local farm-ers to turn away from poppy production Afghanistanrsquos socioeconomic situa-tion makes opium production one of the only available economic means foraccess to land labor and credit Currently the Afghan peasantryrsquos heavydependence upon opium production associated with the politico-territorialrealities of a tribal society typified by fragile political allegiances is makingit difficult for the Taliban to make any serious attempts at eradication16

Additionally any Taliban attempt to implement a poppy eradication policywill be severely compromised by the governmentrsquos international non-recog-nition This places restrictions on the options open to the government Eventhe UN Drug Control Program cannot legally reach any formal agreementwith the Taliban government as long as the latter is not internationally recog-nized The Taliban government faces a self-imposed catch-22 situation Its

15 Ibid16 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy ldquoTalibanrsquos Drug Dilemma Opium Production vs International

Recognitionrdquo The Analyst (Paris) (1999)

482 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

political policies and actions are deemed unacceptable by the internationalcommunity yet it cannot pursue any eradication policy with any hope ofcomplete success without the international recognition and aid that are beingdenied it owing to those policies and actions17

Future Prospects for Change in theTalibanrsquos Regime

Since 1996 the Taliban have been striving to bring the civil war to a success-ful conclusion Their domestic policies have brought about alienation andcreated fissures within the Afghan society Their inflexible stand on variouspolicies has denied them the credibility they so desire Their authoritarianismand intolerance have alienated non-Pushtun Afghans who make up morethan half the population The flow of thousands of extremist Pakistani andArab Taliban supporters into Afghanistan has fueled the resentment of thelocal populace18

The Taliban are accused of harboring terrorists and extremists who notonly support Taliban but also carry out their extremist policies in the targetedcountries According to a report that appeared in the Far Eastern EconomicReview (FEER) Afghanistan has become a sanctuary for ldquoarmed insurgentsaccused of terrorist attacks in China Iran Uzbekistan Tajikistan and Paki-stanrdquo Some 400 Arab Islamic militants from a dozen Middle Eastern andAfrican countries are said to be part of the 055 Brigade funded by Osama binLaden and fighting alongside Taliban in the current offensive The articlefurther noted that ldquo[t]he diverse groups have their own agendas mainly fo-cused on undermining the regimes at home but some share bin Ladenrsquos zealfor a global Islamic revolution The resulting web of dangerous friendshipsthreatens to export instability throughout the mineral-rich and commerciallyunder-exploited hinterland of Central Asiardquo19

It is obvious that the Taliban must improve their image both at home andabroad as perceptions play an important role in the general acceptability ornon-acceptability of governments in both arenas Currently the Taliban areperceived primarily as a negative element that is unlikely to play any positiverole in resolving the Afghan conflict If they fail in their goal the Afghannation will lose any trust that religious political forces could play any mean-ingful role in resolving the ongoing conflict The Talibanrsquos fate will be more

17 At the time of writing the Taliban were not cooperating in poppy eradication Currentlyit appears this may have changed The Taliban claim to have completely eradicated poppy pro-duction in the areas dominated by their troops and the claim is being verified under UN aus-pices

18 Peter Tomsen ldquoResponse A Chance for Peace in AfghanistanmdashThe Talibanrsquos Days areNumberedrdquo Foreign Affairs 79 (JanuaryndashFebruary 2000) p 179

19 Ahmed Rashid ldquoAfghanistan Heart of Darknessrdquo FEER August 5 1999

NASREEN GHUFRAN 483

or less the same as that which befell the mujahideen if they do not take timelyand corrective measures to improve Afghanistanrsquos deteriorating situation

The Taliban gained support from most of the populace in the beginningbecause they offered themselves a neutral force and declared their intentionto remain so However they are no longer neutral and have become anotherparty to the conflict Their policies have not only infuriated the internationalpublic but also large sections of the Afghan community The large influxesof Afghan refugees into Pakistan reflect the growing disagreement with theirpolicies This disenchantment is unlikely to change if the Taliban do notmoderate their stance The Taliban of course believe their policies to be im-portant for bringing about the change they desire but they do not realize howmuch these policies have alienated people The international community hasexplicitly voiced its criticism of the Taliban regime and consider it to be aliving nightmare for women political dissidents and anyone else who doesnot submit to the laws under the authority of the Ministry for the Fostering ofVirtue and Suppression of Vice The Taliban movement itself came about asa reaction to the self-seeking and self-destructive policies of the mujahideenwhose pretensions to Islam and leadership were discredited It was in thisideological vacuum and a Hobbesian state of anarchy that made the Talibanrsquosrule palatable to common Afghanis20 But if the Talibanrsquos government doesnot soften its present policies and complete peace is not restored it will notbe too late for the common people to turn against them

The year 2001 has seen universal outrage at the offensive launched by theTaliban rulers against Afghanistanrsquos Buddhist past Condemnation has notremained confined to non-Muslim states several Islamic countries includingPakistan have been appalled by the destruction of Buddhist statues in theprovince of Bamiyan Pakistan sent an official delegation whose aim was toprevent the Taliban from destroying the statues Pakistanrsquos foreign ministerAbdul Sattar said ldquoCertainly we believe it was a mistake a blunder and as aresult Afghanistan will suffer consequences for years to comerdquo To this headded that ldquoit is very difficult for me to make a statement as to why they didnot hearrdquo21 Iran likewise strongly condemned the statuesrsquo destruction Astatement released by Iranrsquos Cultural Heritage Organization wondered whyldquocertain Taliban-led individuals calling themselves lsquoclericrsquo have ordered de-struction of ancient sites of the mankind society citing blasphemy and idoliz-

20 Hafeez Malik ldquoPakistan Islam and the Taliban Phenomenonrdquo News International (Paki-stan) June 9 2000

21 Sattarrsquos remarks are in ibid March 11 2001

484 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

ing as reasonsrdquo22 To prevent their destruction Iran even offered to buy thestatues or move them into safekeeping

However the Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil rejectedany offer to prevent the destruction of the statues His negotiations with Pa-kistan did not bear a positive result and he rejected the Iranian offers reiterat-ing that the presence of the statues conflicted with Islamic teaching In thewake of the Talibanrsquos subsequent actions Iran led a UN initiative to takeserious action against the regime Commenting on the statuesrsquo destructionthe Iranian Foreign Ministry stated ldquoUnfortunately the Talibanrsquos destructionof the statues has cast doubts on the comprehensive views offered by Islamicideology in the world Clearly Muslims across the world pin the blame onthe rigid-minded Taliban and by no means embroil the Afghan Muslims inthis counter-cultural moverdquo23

The Bamiyan incident stirred up dual controversies about both the charac-ter of the Taliban regime and the relationship between culture religion andnational heritage in an Islamic state In his characteristic style Mullah Omarshrugged off all objections to the planned destruction of the Buddhist statuessaying ldquomy job is the implementation of Islamic orderrdquo He invoked Islamiclaw a fatwa issued by the Afghan ulama associated with this regime and thedecision of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to support his decision24

Nonetheless the destruction of the statues has further tarnished the Talibanrsquosimage While it may be the case that the Taliban undertook their actions inreaction to the tough sanctions imposed on them by the world the Talibanhave to realize that they are not going to earn any international sympathy orrecognition

Afghanistan has always been important to external powers due to its strate-gic location They have meddled in its affairs both in the past and at presentThe protracted civil war makes it more vulnerable to external penetration Insuch situations it has no other option but to seek help and support fromoutside The external powers are more than willing to do so if it serves theirnational interest The opposition is likely to adopt a similar strategy as theyhave less access to the resources of the country than the ruling authority Hadthere been no external involvement Afghanistanrsquos extended civil war wouldnot have become the protracted and complicated affair that it is

The Afghan civil war has important regional implications Various exter-nal powers are pursuing divergent objectives in Afghanistan and the outcome

22 Cultural Heritage Organization comment is in Iran News (Tehran) March 1 2001 Thisnews item is distributed via Middle East News Online available at lthttpwwwmiddleeastwirecomgt

23 Comments of the Iranian Foreign Ministry reported by the BBC World Service March 52001

24 Rahimullah Yusufzai ldquoA Question of Tolerancerdquo News International March 4 2001

464 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

not been successful The Taliban one of the warrsquos by-products have beenmaking efforts to restore peace but have not yet been able to steer the countrytoward complete peace and order In this article I will show how the com-plexity of the Afghan situation has produced added difficulties for the variousactors engaged in the quest to end the conflict

Theoretical Perspectives on theTermination of Civil Wars

Once civil wars begin they become almost impossible to end short of a deci-sive military victory Nonetheless almost half of all such wars since 1940did involve serious negotiations designed to find early solutions to the con-flicts Unfortunately less than half again of these negotiations (about one-fifth) actually resulted in successful peace settlements The majority of thesenegotiations failed Despite what appeared to be strong incentives to stopfighting and what often appeared to be strong yearnings for peace groupsrarely agreed to settle for compromise settlements that would allow themeither to share political power or peacefully part company In the end thecombatants eventually returned to war

Settlements to civil wars can have the unanticipated effect of makinggroups less secure than they would be if they continued the war This out-come occurs because a settlement leaves groups physically intermingled withtheir former enemies Moreover a settlement to a civil war could institution-alize an unsettling balance of power among the participants In each of thesescenarios it is the fear of the negative consequences of settlement that con-vinces groups to choose the more secure but violent path of war Accordingto Paul Piller

[i]f the stakes are chiefly indivisible so that neither side can get most of what itwants without depriving the others of most of what it wants negotiations are lessapt to be successful Stakes are usually less divisible in civil wars than in othertypes the issue is whether one side or the other shall control the country Thestruggle for power becomes a struggle for survival as the options narrow to thesingle one of a fight to the finish2

Moreover the problem of civil war resolution has been viewed mainly asone of war termination Civil wars are seldom analyzed within the scope ofthe more difficult but accurate problem of rebuilding a state from the chaos oframpant anarchy Resolving a civil war is never simply a matter of agreeingto a cease-fire That would only be the case if functioning legitimate statestructures already existed and a new leader merely needed to be appointed

2 Barbara F Walter Exiting from War Cooperating under Even the Most Difficult Condi-tions (New York Institute of War and Peace Studies 1996) p 5

NASREEN GHUFRAN 465

The settlement of civil war will always entail the accommodation of newgroups into government and a new political system to support multiparty ruleDomestic cooperation under anarchy is difficult and often breaks down

Barbara Walter has synthesized some of the theories on the causes for thecontinuation of civil wars According to her civil wars can be divided intofour broad categories (1) historical hatreds namely groups fight becausethey hate each other and have no desire to cooperate (2) conflicts of interestin which groups fighting for control of a single state inevitably encounterconflicts of interest that are difficult to reconcile (3) greedy elites that isstubborn threatened or self-interested leaders often with little to lose by con-tinuing to fight and (4) security dilemmas in which fear and uncertainty dur-ing the war can ultimately sabotage cooperation efforts and perpetuateviolence

A study of the causes for the continuation of the Afghan civil war encom-passes all of these reasons At certain times during the war groups haveplaced strong obstacles to other groups Therefore the actors in Afghani-stanrsquos civil war do not entertain the route of negotiations and choose insteadto continue pursuing war In the Afghan civil war different players haveparticipated in it and changed their roles over time but none have been will-ing to negotiate in a flexible manner to conclude a settlement

The Saur Revolution of 1978 cannot be ignored in any analysis of theAfghan civil war nor can the current conflict be delinked from it Accordingto Barnett Rubin the 1978 revolution introduced Marxist-oriented radical re-forms in Afghanistan that led to disruptive changes in the social economicand political structures of a predominantly feudo-tribal society The reformswere intended to bring about much-needed economic change by abolishingthe oligarchic power arrangements that in the judgment of Afghan revolu-tionaries had prevented progress and development in the past

While the substance of various reforms was highly desirable and couldeven be considered fundamental to any process of development in a feudaland tribal society the political form in which the reforms were articulatedcontrasted with the popular cultural and social norms of the Afghan massesSpecifically the landowning and religious establishment feared losses of eco-nomic and social privileges if the reforms were implemented This led toresistance from the masses and the growth of countrywide opposition De-spite the fact that the opposition was divided and loosely organized alongethnic and regional lines it effectively exploited the contradictions betweenthe ideology of the regime and popular Afghan cultural norms The charac-terization of the reforms as un-Islamic and the Soviet support for the regimeworked effectively in favor of the resistance The active involvement of theSoviet military forces in suppressing the Afghan resistance in order to stabi-lize the Marxist regime further strengthened the opposition forces

466 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

This period saw the Soviets and the socialist regime locked in a struggleagainst the Islamist opposition The ideological and social cleavages putthem on opposite sides External powers got involved backing their own fa-vorites in the war exacerbating the cold war rivalry The conclusion of theGeneva Accords in 1988 produced a shift in the war as the agreement elimi-nated one major cause of the war the Soviet factor The Soviet forces with-drew from Afghanistan by 1989 consequently the Marxist regime lostsupport and finally stepped down to hand over power to the mujahideen(freedom fighters)

In 1992 the Northern Alliance was established in opposition to the com-munist government led by President Najibullah The group consisted of Gen-eral Abdul Rashid Dostum former head of Najibullahrsquos militia forcesAhmed Shah Masood head of the Jamiat-i-Islami Party and Hizb-i-Wahadata pro-Shirsquoa party The resistance groups that fought the Soviet troops anddefeated the Soviet-backed government in Kabul then turned on each otherOn becoming a ruling elitemdasha goal of any combatant in a civil warmdashagreedy power struggle starts among the different factions as each wants agreater share and say in the government During the early stages of the civilwar there were also seven factions operating from Pakistan the Hizb-i-Is-lami (Islamic party) led by Gulbaddin Hekmatyar the Jamiat-i-Islami (Is-lamic society) led by Burhanuddin Rabbani the Ittihad-i-Islami (Islamicunity) led by Rasul Sayyaf the Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic party) led by MaulviYunus Khalis the Mahaz Milli Islami (NIFA the National Islamic front ofAfghanistan) led by Syed Ahmed Gailani the Jabha-imdashNijat-i-Milli (Na-tional salvation front) led by Sibghatullah Mujjadidi and Harakat-e-Inqilabi-i-Islami (Movement of the Islamic revolution) led by Maulvi MohammadNabi Mohammadi As they could not bridge their political differences thecivil war took the form of an intra-mujahideen struggle Peace remained elu-sive despite UN efforts

Amid this turbulence and confusion another force the Taliban a unitedtraditionalist Islamic contender emerged in 1994 By 1996 they took controlof Kabul and pushed the mujahideen back into their opposition barracks Atthe time a war-weary population welcomed the Taliban forces Howeverthe ousted Rabbani regime did not give up its claim to be the legitimate gov-ernment and has therefore opposed the Taliban As a result complete mili-tary victory eluded them and since then the Taliban have engaged in a fightagainst the Northern Alliance

The Talibanrsquos Changing Rolein the Civil War

The Taliban was one of many groups that participated in the struggle againstSoviet forces When the Taliban launched their own movement across Af-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 467

ghanistan they began to catch the attention of the international media Oncethey overran the country militarily so swiftly and yet so peacefully they sim-ply could not go unnoticed A lot of theories started emerging about theirorigin characteristics and objectives Nevertheless they were and still are acomplex phenomenon The Talibanrsquos leadership has been calculatedly mys-terious about the origins of the movement After the Soviet withdrawalTaliban leaders had gone back to their seminaries in order to complete theirstudies

However they were not happy with what went on in the country duringrule by the mujahideen They felt that their sacrifices were going to waste aspower wrangling and corruption continued This motivated them to start themovement Its major missions were to bring peace and order and implementSharirsquoah (Islamic law) in what they believed to be its true sense Accordingto Mullah Omar one of the key Taliban leaders the Taliban ldquotook up arms toachieve the aims of the Afghan jihad and save our people from further suffer-ing at the hands of the so-called mujahideen We had complete faith in GodAlmighty We never forgot that He can bless us with victory or plunge usinto defeatrdquo3

The rapid emergence of the Islamic Movement of Taliban of Afghanistanled to many positive expectations As an initially peaceful neutral and non-greedy force they appeared on the scene when the Afghans had lost all faithin the countryrsquos leadership Their early critics did not predict that the Talibanwould make any difference in the outcome of the war or be able to managesuccess With little fighting the Taliban took control over the southern partof the country within a few months There they disarmed militia com-manders and reestablished law and order by applying a rather strict interpre-tation of Islamic law With a piecemeal approach the Taliban soon occupiedlarger territories and became a formidable force

Their agenda was clear and convincing for the war-weary public as theaims of the movement unfolded According to Kamal Matinuddin the imme-diate goals of the new movement were to disarm all rival militia fight againstthose who did not accept their request enforce Islamic law in the areas theyliberated and retain all areas the Taliban captured4 As a truly grassrootsIslamist movement the Taliban could rely on the support of the masses Bythis time the loyalty of the mujahideen to their respective factions was notstrong They could be purchased or persuaded to switch sides whenever theyfound it in their interest to do so In town after town armed men desertedtheir leaders and joined the Taliban Desertions brought weapons as the Rus-

3 Rashid Taliban p 234 Kamal Matinuddin The Taliban Phenomenon Afghanistan 1994ndash1997 (Karachi Pakistan

Oxford University Press 1999) p 26

468 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

sians had left behind a heavily armed country As the Taliban marchedalong they picked up guns mortars tanks and even aircraft

What was unusual about the Talibanrsquos strategy is that they were relativelysuccessful in avoiding direct fighting with other potential rival groups Theyadopted a simple strategy that was markedly different and peaceful Whenapproaching an unconquered territory the Taliban would first send a delega-tion of ulama (clerics) to talk to any local militia commanders The ulamathen invited them to implement Islamic law and establish peace by handingover their arms and ammunition These clerics argued that the weapons be-longed to the Bait-ul-Mal (National treasury) under the rule of a single gov-ernment If the local militia commander agreed to the request by thedelegation then there was no fighting In case that the delegation of ulamafailed to secure a peaceful surrender the Taliban then would send a seconddelegation including elderly pious people of the area along with a Talibanrepresentative If the second delegation failed to secure a surrender to theirdemands then the Taliban would take up arms against the hold-out militia

Since disarming the local militia was the foremost priority of the Talibanthe latterrsquos stockpile of weapons kept increasing every time they overran aprovince Most of the time the weapons were handed over peacefully be-cause local militia commanders considered the Taliban to be a neutral even abenign force Moreover local commanders were eager to avoid furtherbloodshed Though simple the Talibanrsquos peaceful strategymdashbut with theveiled threat of forcemdashhas been difficult to understand It could be arguedthat during the initial stages of the Afghan civil war the Taliban achievedmost of their victories without waging a fight

Using this unique strategy the Taliban continued to make headway to thecapital without much resistance from the former rulers They took control ofthree of Afghanistanrsquos largest cities Herat in 1995 Kabul in 1996 and Ma-zar Sharif in 1997 They did it with few casualties among their troops andeven fewer among civilians Initially they were the only force capable ofrestoring law and order By 1997 the Taliban controlled around 90 of thecountry by disarming and in certain cases incorporating the former militiacommanders and assorted mujahideen

Restoration of peace and order are prerequisites to end civil war As Bar-nett Rubin has documented the Taliban denounced the failure of the muja-hideen leaders to establish security They accused the former militia com-manders of becoming thieves and even rapists They tore down all check-points set up to extort money and refused all bribes at their own Theycleared the bandits off the roads and instead of slaughtering their opponents

NASREEN GHUFRAN 469

merely disarmed them Their message seemed simple and appealing to mostAfghans peace order and Islamic law5

Establishing peace in a country like Afghanistan is by no means an easytask particularly in light of how long the civil war has been underway Evensome critics of the Taliban talk about the restoration of peace in Taliban-controlled areas ldquoBefore the Taliban this country belonged to warlords andthe simple act of going to visit my village was an impossibilityrdquo said a UNofficial who is an Afghan ldquoMy daughters sit in the house and cry to me Wewant education This is heartbreaking but peace is the first priority for peo-ple here The Taliban must be given credit for accomplishing thisrdquo6

In his in-depth analysis Franz Schurmann concluded that it is the power ofthe Talibanrsquos ideas and the stability they have brought to war-torn Afghani-stan that makes them so frightening Their proven effectiveness in maintain-ing law and order as well as their adherence to the commandments of Islamand cultural norms which see traditional Afghan women as being obedientrather than challenging to men seem to have won over the predominantlyilliterate peasants and working class

After so many years of debilitating warfare concentrated in and around thecities the urbane educated elite who would challenge these norms have van-ished More importantly for centuries the great mass of Afghans has thrivedunder the most primitive political and economic conditions while the pasttwo decades have brought only war poverty and insecurity For most Af-ghans therefore their present situation under the Taliban appears to be if notideal the best among possible alternatives The removal of small arms andheavy weapons from public view is an accomplishment of immense propor-tions as weapons were everywhere and used indiscriminately

The situation in the territory controlled by the Northern Alliance is quitedifferent The opposition controls a tiny but significant 10 of the country inthe north There people are so fearful of crime that they often doubt theadvantages of the relatively liberal order under which they live It appearsthat in Afghanistan freedom and safety are opposites The Alliance had beeninstrumental in bringing down Najibullahrsquos government in April 1992 but itdisintegrated shortly after its victory because of power struggles within thegroup However when the Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996 thethree participant groups resurrected the Northern Alliance in opposition onceagain Accurate figures regarding the total mobilizing force of the allianceare not available but by a rough estimate they would number around 80000troops In contrast the Talibanrsquos active forces number about 100000

5 Barnett Rubin The Search for Peace in Afghanistan From Buffer State to Failed State(New Haven Conn Yale University Press 1995) p 140

6 Barry Bearak ldquoAfghans Ruled by Taliban Poor Isolated but Securerdquo New York Times(NYT) October 10 1998

470 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

The nominal head of the Northern Alliance is Burhanuddin Rabbani al-though in reality he shares power with his primary military backer AhmedShah Masood Both of them belong to the Jamiat-i-Islami which is apredominantly Tajik Islamist party Rabbanirsquos regime controls most of thecountryrsquos embassies abroad and retains Afghanistanrsquos seat in the UN Ah-med Shah Masood built Afghanistanrsquos most sophisticated military-politicalorganization the Shurandashyi-Nazar-i-Shamali (Supervisory Council of theNorth SCN) The SCN coordinated Jamiat commanders and also createdregion-wide forces that developed into Masoodrsquos Urdu-i-Islami (IslamicArmy) Rabbani and Masood get their main support from the northeasternlargely Tajik portion of the country Due to his military performance andcontrol of the strategic Panjsher Valley Masood is popularly known as theldquolion of Panjsherrdquo

General Abdul Rashid Dostum and his ethnic Uzbek Junbishndashi-Milli (Na-tional movement) Party also form part of the Northern Alliance The latterrsquosbase of support lies primarily among the Sunni Muslim Uzbeks A largenumber of fighters forming part of this organization (the numbers vary be-tween 15000 and 16000) had a reputation of being the best-equipped forcesThe Hizb-i-Wahadat-i-Islami yi-Afghanistan (Islamic unity party of Afghani-stan) is the principal Shirsquoa party in Afghanistan its support is mainly amongthe ethnic Hazara group This group was originally formed under Iraniansponsorship in order to unite eight Shirsquoa parties Its leader is Karim Khaliliwho is based in Hazarajat7

Until they captured Kabul in 1996 the Taliban expressed no desire to rulethe country Ever since then the Taliban have committed themselves to con-quering the entire country The problems with the Taliban began when theystarted acting as the ruling elite Eventually their growing international iso-lation plus their ineffective administration alienated large numbers of Af-ghans As the civil war continues they are becoming more rigid Thisattitude has doomed expectations that the civil war will end Indeed whilethe Talibanrsquos achievements as a peace force had good beginnings as theyears have passed they seem to have become entangled in the civil war thatthey intended to disentangle During the early period of the civil war theTaliban did achieve some remarkable accomplishments above all revivingthe lost trust of the Afghans However their strong opposition to the forcesof the North has earned them a reputation for inflexibility

The Taliban transformed themselves from a movement into a ruling gov-ernment Their main priorities were to bring peace while at the same time tostay in power to implement their vision of an Islamic state But resistance tothis vision remains strong and the Northern Alliance is still giving the

7 Ibid

NASREEN GHUFRAN 471

Taliban a difficult time Despite the relative isolation of the Northern Alli-ancersquos forces and their extended lines of communication they have been ableto continue owing to military assistance from outside governments This aidhas come in a variety of forms ranging from the direct transfer of materiel tothe dispatch of military advisors and support personnel albeit in limited num-bers Next to none of these transfers have been publicly documented viasubmissions to the UNrsquos register on conventional arms Ironically much ofthe Northern Alliancersquos military support comes from nations participating inthe so-called ldquoSix-Plus-Twordquo contact group (Pakistan Iran UzbekistanChina Turkmenistan Tajikistan and Russia and the United States) whosemembers have publicly pledged not to provide military support to any Af-ghan combatants and prevent the use of member state territories for suchpurposes

The Northern Alliancersquos main suppliers are Iran and Russia with secon-dary roles played by Tajikistan Uzbekistan (at least until 1998) Turkmeni-stan and Kyrgyzstan Moscow denies that it is arming the Afghan rebels Inan interview with the New York Times Masood has said that he receivesmuch of his equipment from the Russian mafia not the Russian governmentHowever Russia has reportedly provided Dostum with 500 T-55 and T-62tanks that are used against areas that oppose his rule Russia has also sup-plied him with a large number of Frog 7 and Luna M missiles8

The assistance from some Central Asian republics has been an importantsource of support to the Northern Alliance Uzbekistanrsquos president IslamKarimov has clandestinely supported his fellow Uzbeks His country hassupplied the Northern Alliance with tanks aircraft and technical personnelThis support has been provided with the expectation that Uzbek-dominatedprovinces in northern Afghanistan would provide a buffer against the spreadof fundamentalism The secular regime of Turkmenistanrsquos presidentSapamurad Niyazov has publicly joined other Central Asian republics in ar-ticulating the dangers of the Afghan civil war spreading into the neighboringstates However the government of Turkmenistan is not too keen in gettingembroiled and providing overt backing to those fighting the Taliban

Anti-Taliban forces are being trained in a dozen or so camps located alongIranrsquos eastern border Since May 1997 6000 Afghan military personnelhave been dispatched from these camps to various war fronts in northernAfghanistan Most of Iranrsquos aid has been going to the Hizb-i-Wahadat PartyIran has also purchased two Su-22 and one Su-24 fighter-bombers for AhmedShah Masood and sent Iranian pilots to help plan air operations for the North-ern Alliance

8 James Risen ldquoRussians Are Back in Afghanistan Aiding Rebelsrdquo NYT July 27 1998

472 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

Clearly the challenges to the Taliban have grown over the years particu-larly in the political and economic field They continue fighting on the onehand while on the other they are increasingly worried about their growingpolitical isolation However isolation has not moderated them Theystaunchly believe in their ideology which makes it difficult for others to un-derstand them as something other than an extremist force Economicallythey are in a vulnerable position because they are operating in a war-devas-tated country and the Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan have beentargeted for heavy international sanctions

The Formation of the Taliban Governmentand Its Effect on the Civil War

By 1997 the Taliban had accomplished major military successes in the civilwar After the capture of Kabul they also began to prove themselves in thepolitical arena They felt the need of forming an alternate government tocounter the legitimacy of Rabbanirsquos regime Aware that peace and politicalstability in the country would ultimately make them a credible force theTaliban instituted a framework of shuras (consultative bodies) to achievethose aims The most visible Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad OmarAkhund then asked the shuras to give some political shape to the movement

The Taliban also gave the country a new official name changing it fromthe Islamic State of Afghanistan to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA)in October 1997 The group justified the new name as reflecting the groundrealities However the opposition has termed the change to be an undemo-cratic move A prominent Afghan intellectual Rasul Amin in a BBC PushtoService interview spoke of the new name as something that to him felt asthough it was a transplant from the Arab world However Mullah WakilAhmed a senior Taliban leader and spokesman of the movement said it wasnot the first time that Afghanistanrsquos name has been changed In the pastwords such as ldquorepublicrdquo or ldquodemocraticrdquo were added to Afghanistanrsquos nameThe emirate system however is not acceptable to the opposition as Talibanpossess no popular or legal mandate to govern or impose such But for theTaliban changing the countryrsquos appellation represents breaking with the pastand reforming the political system

The Talibanrsquos initially loose bureaucratic structures have been trans-formed too Mullah Mohammad Omar Akhund was elected Amir-ul-Momineen (Commander of the believers) by an assembly of about 1200 in-vited ulama in the city of Kandahar in spring 1996 Since then Mullah Omarhas been at the top of the ruling structure in Afghanistan Though he remainsin the background his word is final and almost has the force of law in themovement Mullah Omar lives simply known for having few needs and withno particular taste in food or dress He is alarmingly careless about his per-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 473

TABLE 1 Ethnic Composition and Cabinet Portfolios of the 10-Member Shura Basedin Kandahar

Names Ethnicity Portfolio

Mullah Mohammad Omar Ghilzai Amir-ul-MonineenAkhund Pushtun

Mullah Mohammad Rabbani Pushtun Chairman of the Caretaker CouncilDeputy Commander of the Taliban

movementMullah Mohammad Fadel Pushtun Minister of DefenseMullah Mohammad Ghaus Pushtun Minister of Foreign AffairsMullah Mohammad Hassan Pushtun Minister of SecurityMaulvi Ghaisuddin Agha Uzbek Minister of EducationMaulvi Abdur Raqib Uzbek Minister for RefugeesQari Deen Mohammad Tajik Minister for PlanningMullah Abdul Razzaq Tajik Member Supervisory CouncilMaulvi Abdul Saleem Uzbek Deputy Minister of Education

sonal security is not a gifted orator and his study of religion is limited as hewas not able to complete his religious education because of the war Despitethis background he inspires confidence among his supporters because of hispiety and the strength of his beliefs

Mullah Omar is assisted by a loose network of shuras A central shuracomprising 10 members was established in Kandahar (see Table 1) All di-rectives and policies were initiated from here and it virtually became the cap-ital of the Taliban-controlled areas (indeed Kandahar is the currentheadquarters of the Taliban movement) Aside from the core group of 10meetings of the original shura also saw participation from military com-manders tribal leaders and ulama this indeterminate structure is one of thekey features of the Talibanrsquos central shura Mullah Omar also tried to main-tain a balance between the Pushtuns and non-Pushtuns in the shura TheTaliban have been criticized for dividing Afghanistan along ethnic linesHowever despite the effort to integrate non-Pushtuns into the shura theTaliban have not been able to shed their Pushtun moorings and have not beenconsidered as impartial regarding other ethnicities

The takeover of Kabul and the formation of a central shura reflected theTalibanrsquos desire to have a more lasting stay on the political scene The cen-tral shura is assisted by a cabinet a shura in Kabul and a military shuraThese three bodies report to the central shura in Kandahar Clearly theseadministrative structures are different from the past governments For in-stance a talib (religious student) in a ministerial post is something unknownin Afghan history Nevertheless even the Taliban have found that control-

474 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

TABLE 2 Military Command Structure of the Taliban

Position Individual

Commander in Chief Mullah Mohammad Omar AkhundMilitary Chief of Staff Mullah Mohmmad HassanChief of the Army Staff Mullah Rahmatullah AkhundArmy Division Chief Mullah Muhammad Jumma KhanArmy Division Chief Mullah Muhammad YunusArmy Division Chief Mullah Mohammad GulArmy Division Chief Mullah Mohammad Aziz KhanArmored Force No 4 Mullah Mohammad Zahir

ling a territory without a clear administrative system is not possible in con-temporary times

The formation of these shuras was aimed at creating an efficient govern-ment After they captured Kabul the Taliban formed a six-member Provi-sional Ruling Council headed by Mullah Mohammad Rabbani This wasfollowed by the formation of the Kabul Shura of Acting Ministers in 1999The Kabul Shura deals with day-to-day problems of the government the cityand the Kabul military front Important policy recommendations are con-veyed to the Kandahar Shura where decisions are actually made To restoreand maintain peace in the provinces the Taliban appoints governors who arefrom provinces other than those where they are serving This policy appearsto have been welcomed by the people As for the military shura it is a looseorganizational body that plans strategy and can implement some tactical deci-sions (see Table 2) The military shura appears to have no strategic decision-making powers Military strategy key personnel appointments and the allo-cation of funds for offensives are decided upon by the Amir-ul-Momineen

Although their government has few resources and many parts barely func-tion at all the Taliban have adopted a discourse of Afghan nationalism inaddition to their Islamic traditionalism Despite their amorphous politicalleadership the Taliban claim to be trying to recreate a centralized Afghanstate In areas under their control they have appointed provincial governorsand administrators of districts cities and towns from the center9

One of the most remarkable characteristics of the Taliban leadership is thattop government officials often switch from the battlefield to the ministry andback again each time following the orders from Mullah Omar In one sensethis produces remarkable flexibility among the Taliban hierarchy as they allact as both administrators and military commanders This flexibility in the

9 Barnett Rubin ldquoAfghanistan under the Talibanrdquo Current History vol 98 no 625 (Febru-ary 1999) p 81

NASREEN GHUFRAN 475

military command has allowed the leadership to maintain better ties with therank-and-file fighters than might otherwise be the case However theTaliban administration in Kabul has faced problems For instance while anyminister is away at the front no decisions can be taken in that ministryMoreover government ministers are working without pay something un-heard of in modern times They do not use government resources for privateuse curtailing expenses and refraining from indulgence in squandering andextravagance Regular salaries are paid only to professional civil servantsand trained soldiers drawn from the former communist army

As for the Northern Alliance until August 1998 the areas it controlled hadfour main administrative and political centers Mazar Sharif which somegroups aspired to turn into a temporary capital for a government in exile ofthe Islamic State of Afghanistan Talauqan the headquarters of MasoodrsquosSCN Shibergan the location of Dostumrsquos headquarters and Bamiyan theheadquarters of the Hizb-i-Wahadat The Taliban have made inroads intothese areas too because the entire political administrative fabric of northernAfghanistan has broken down Only one of Afghanistanrsquos provinces is nowentirely under the Northern Alliancersquos control Badakhshan an inaccessiblemountainous region in the extreme northeast of the country There are alsoneighboring valleys to the west and a few enclaves in the Afghan interiorover which the Taliban have not yet been able to consolidate control Someelements of the former state administration have survived but political powerresides individually in the various armed groups rather than in a unitary civil-ian structure The groups maintain their own military and command struc-tures they do not have a unified strategy for the joint mobilization ofresources in their struggle against the Taliban

The areas controlled by the Taliban have been subjected to drastic changesto personal behavior The Taliban have put a ban on wine and televisionwhich is perceived to be immoral There is also complete restriction on mu-sic photography and the painting of living things The shaving off of onersquosbeard or trimming it less than a fistful is prohibited as is having a Westernhairstyle Gambling betting pigeon flying dog-racing and sodomy are alsostrictly forbidden

The Taliban have gained international notoriety because they have bannedwomen from working Women are obligated to observe strict purdah (litveiling also refers to covering of bodies) Girls have been stopped fromgoing to schools The Taliban have told all women working outside theirhomes to stay at home Although women who had been working will con-tinue to receive their salaries the Taliban claim that there is no need for themto work any longer They claim that these restrictions have been put in placeto protect the honor and dignity of women At the same time Taliban offi-cials have said that they are not against women working or receiving an edu-

476 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

cation The Taliban claim that they need time and resources to create theproper environment and right texts and curriculum for womenrsquos educationThe Talibanrsquos behavior is modeled after the Islamic revolution in Iran Edu-cational establishments remained closed for many years in the aftermath ofthat revolution They remained closed until the Iranian revolutionaries for-mally established an educational syllabus conforming to their own principles

The Taliban have stated that they wish to establish a pure Islamic state Intheir view this means that women have no place in the public arena Theyare required to stay at home and take care of their husbands and childrenThe Taliban cling to the symbol of a protected woman Women have toobserve a strict dress code wearing a burqa (a garment covering the bodyfrom head to toe) and trousers fully covering their ankles While women hadworn burqa in the pre-Taliban era it had not been an enforced dress code

The Talibanrsquos edicts have had a severe impact on many other women whodo not have a close male relative to accompany them in public Hardest hithave been the countryrsquos estimated 30000 widows many of whom are thesole providers for their families Some widows have been allowed to work inareas under the Taliban control but even for them it is not easy to get permis-sion According to Taliban representatives the current restrictions are said tobe necessary because females are not safe outside their homes Many womenhave strongly reacted to the Taliban policies despite the restrictive climate inTaliban-controlled areas These women do not like what the Taliban havebeen professing They want to work and continue with their education butthese rights are being denied to them The justifications given by Taliban arenot acceptable to the working and more enlightened urban Afghan women Itis therefore not surprising that women have become the most vocal critics ofthe Taliban

The edicts against women also have predictably had a devastating impacton primary level education Before the civil war over four-fifths of primaryschool teachers were women The majority of them are now jobless Theclosure of schools has in turn affected children Many orphaned childrenwho once could make homes at schools are now forced to live on the streetsAn international aid group in 1998 estimated 28000 street children in Kabulalone

Mullah Nuruddin Turabi the Taliban minister of justice defended theTalibanrsquos domestic actions He said ldquoIt is not just a question of men wearingbeards and women wearing burqas In Afghanistan every vice has to bestopped and every virtue promulgatedrdquo10 The Taliban have established anew security service the Ministry of Enforcement of Virtue and Suppressionof Vice for eradicating corruption and other vices from Afghan society Ac-

10 Michael Fathers ldquoFrozen in Timerdquo Time May 2000

NASREEN GHUFRAN 477

cording to Taliban tenets their rules are a jihad (holy war) against sin cor-ruption and cruelty Therefore those who do not abide by the Taliban edictson personal behavior are strictly punished according to a strict application ofIslamic law Hence stoning to death amputations (in case of robbery) andother forms of punishments are carried out in front of large crowds

Nonetheless a crisis of governance remains in Afghanistan To supportersof the Taliban regime its government is one that is accountable and represen-tative of all ethnic groups To many the Taliban have restored Afghan cul-ture Afghan-style self-rule has been implemented in the provinces and theTalibanrsquos supporters note that the countryrsquos civil administration and justicesystem are now based on Islamic and Afghan traditions The opposition re-jects this opinion and condemns the Taliban government of being unrepre-sentative and unaccountable

While all the above-mentioned structures are functioning the governmentfaces tremendous challenges The most obvious one is the governmentrsquosunacceptability to and lack of recognition from the international system letalone by the opposition The political dealings that the government has hadwith others offer evidence of its credibility in the civil war While theTaliban have major control of the countryrsquos land area they have not yet hadmuch success on the political front Forming a government is not enough toend the civil war the Taliban must gain acceptability both at home andabroad

The Talibanrsquos International Legal StatusRecognition of a government in a civil war also helps in ending the conflictbecause both parties involved desire the political economic and militarysupport that can come with it Non-recognition of the Taliban government isan indicator of its standing in the international community The recognitionhas not been forthcoming because of dissatisfaction with Taliban policiesUpon taking Kabul the Taliban had immediately demanded from other statesformal recognition as the only legitimate government of Afghanistan Theyalso demanded to be granted a seat in the UN General Assembly Howeverthey received neither So far only Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UnitedArab Emirates (UAE) have recognized the Taliban government In contrastBurhanuddin Rabbanirsquos Northern Alliance regime despite its weak militaryposition has legitimacy and political backing from the world communityincluding the majority of the Islamic states Most countries preserved thestatus quo and continued to allow the diplomatic missions of the Rabbaniregime

Recognition in international law involves acceptance by a state of a givenentity that this recognized entity possesses an international legal personalityand the rights and privileges that flow from it or that it is the exclusive

478 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

representative of a body with international legal personality The decision togrant or not to grant recognition is a political one within the sovereign discre-tion of individual states Recognition in principle can be accorded to states orgovernments As far as the state of Afghanistan itself is concerned it hasbeen recognized by a large number of countries including all permanentmembers of the UN Security Council for many years However wherepolitical power has fragmented to the extent that it has in Afghanistan inrecent years there may well be more than one group claiming to be the gov-ernment In fact as has been outlined already there are two governmentswithin one country One is militarily strong and controls a large populationand territory but has no legal standing while the other is recognized but hasless control of Afghan territory

Pakistan was the first country to grant international recognition to theTalibanrsquos government Their past links provided the basis for doing so Asnoted earlier virtually all of the Taliban leadership had been refugees in Pa-kistan For several years Taliban leaders studied in the madrasas (religiousschools) affiliated with the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) headed by MaulviFazul ur Rehman Although it has not been conclusively proven that theTaliban are Pakistanrsquos creation much criticism along these lines and othershas been leveled against it Pakistan is said to have played a key role inturning Taliban into a functioning military force by providing training logis-tical support and equipment

In 1997 Pakistan rooted its decision to recognize the Taliban governmentbased on the fact that the latter was in effective control of most of Afghani-stanrsquos territory including the capital By the time recognition was given theTaliban government occupied 90 of Afghanistan and oversaw a populationthat was representative of all of the countryrsquos ethnic groups Since then Paki-stan has been striving to propagate a positive image of the student militia andworking to induce other neighboring countries to recognize them Further-more Pakistan has been making persistent attempts to get the UN to adoptthe vacant seat formula which the Organization of Islamic Conferences haddone during 1996

Pakistanrsquos ties with the Taliban have become increasingly complex owingto the influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan Pakistanmdasha country of 140million mostly poor peoplemdashhas been almost single-handedly housing andfeeding the 12 million Afghan refugees living there since 1995 the year theUN stopped providing food and housing aid Some of the Afghan refugeescurrently in Pakistan have been there since the 1980s having fled the Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan At the time an estimated 32 million refugees livedin Pakistan making it the largest caseload of refugees in the world

Some of the refugees did return to Afghanistan In 1994 approximately77000 went back with the assistance of the UN High Commission for Refu-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 479

gees (UNHCR) An additional 76000 refugees returned to Afghanistan ontheir own11 However the years since then have seen a new wave of refu-gees flowing into Pakistan from northern Afghanistan Many of the freshrefugees are fleeing the fighting there plus a devastating drought This newwave has not been officially registered with any international organizationAs a consequence the statistics regarding refugees in Pakistan are unreliableAn influx of 30000 Afghan refugees came to Pakistan in 2000 and it is esti-mated that more than 50000 have crossed the border since then In that yearPakistan decided to close its border to stop further refugees because it couldnot absorb any more However its border was later reopened because of thedeplorable condition of the refugees and pressure from international humani-tarian relief agencies

Aside from Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UAE are on the list of countriesrecognizing the Talibanrsquos government Saudi Arabiarsquos came only a few daysafter Pakistanrsquos Until mid-1998 Islamabad and Riyadh were on the samepolitical wavelength Saudi Arabia supplied heavily subsidized fuel to theTaliban through Pakistan and also provided general funding After 1998problems between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan developed over the fate ofOsama bin Laden the Saudi millionaire who had been funding the Afghanjihad The Taliban had promised Saudi Arabia that Osama bin Laden wouldnot use his refuge in Afghanistan to support any acts of violence abroadAfter Osama bin Laden was linked to the bombings of US embassies inKenya and Tanzania his continued refuge in Afghanistan became a majorsource of tension between Taliban and the US on one hand and Saudi Ara-bia on the other

Apart from these three countries the Taliban have not managed to estab-lish political ties with other states This becomes a major constraint for agovernment of a country going through civil war If the paramount objectiveis to end the civil war the government has to direct its energies in this direc-tion It cannot expect the US or other countries to come to its rescue

The United States has been a major country involved in AfghanistanAlong with the Soviets the US had fed the civil war since the days of thecold war When Taliban captured Kabul the US State Department an-nounced it would establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban by sendingan official to Kabul This announcement was quickly retracted The StateDepartment spokesman Glyn Davies said the US found nothing objectiona-ble in the steps taken by the Taliban to impose Islamic law and described theTaliban as anti-modern rather than anti-Western Some members of Con-

11 Nasreen Ghufran ldquoRefugees A Comparative Study of India and Pakistanrdquo (paperpresented at the conference ldquoThe Challenge of Cooperation South Asia and Beyondrdquo Kath-mandu Nepal December 1998)

480 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

gress supported the Taliban because their government appeared to serve theUS policy of isolating Iran A Taliban regime would create a firmly Sunnibuffer on Iranrsquos border and potentially provide security for trade routes andpipelines that would break Iranrsquos monopoly on Central Asiarsquos southern traderoutes

But from its initial policy of acquiescence vis-a-vis the Taliban the USmoved to the other extreme of rejecting them completely The US rejectionwas largely because of the pressure exerted by the feminist movement Theprominent feminist Zieba-Shorish Shamley persuaded many US feministgroups to spearhead a signature campaign to mobilize support for Afghanwomen Her efforts helped persuade former President Clinton to take atougher stance against the Taliban12 Washingtonrsquos denouncement of theTaliban also came in the backdrop of the presidential election in the US assupporting a regime that held no respect for human rights would have nega-tively affected Clintonrsquos position13

In 1998 when the Taliban made great military gains against the forces ofthe North they expected to gain recognition and a seat in the UN they hadmajor Afghan cities under their control and their rivals in retreat Talibanrepresentatives claimed that if recognition were granted to their governmentthey would allow a huge pipeline project to proceed that would carry oil andgas from Central Asia to lucrative markets in Pakistan and India This pipe-line would cut through the western part of Afghanistan ldquoEven before thecapture of Mazar-i-Sharif and Taloqan we were fully qualified for recogni-tionrdquo said deputy information minister Abdur Rahman Hotaki referring totwo key opposition bases captured by the militia ldquoThe opposition gave peo-ple an excuse to deny us recognition and prevent us having the pipeline runthrough our country but that excuse has now gonerdquo he said ldquoAll excusesblocking our recognition are gone Therefore it is predicted they will revisetheir policy in view of the current realitiesrdquo he said adding that all ldquotermsand conditions for a legitimate staterdquo have been met14

But the Taliban encountered problems with international organizations In1999 the UN proposed imposing sanctions against the Taliban when it is-sued Security Council Resolution 1267 Adopted unanimously by the Secur-ity Council on October 15 the resolution demanded that the Taliban turn overOsama bin Laden without further delay to authorities in a country where hewill be brought to justice Until the Taliban comply the resolution requiresUN member states to deny permission for Taliban-owned -leased or -oper-ated aircraft to land in or take off from their territory It also calls for the

12 Rashid Taliban pp 180ndash8213 P Stobodan ldquoThe Afghan Conflict and Regional Securityrdquo Strategic Analysis (August

1999) p 72414 Frontier Post (Peshawar) January 14 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 481

freezing of funds and other financial resources including funds derived fromproperty owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban The lat-ter had 30 days in which to comply with this resolution before sanctions wereimposed The Taliban did not comply and the sanctions came into force

Another round of sanctions was imposed on the Taliban in December 2000with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1333 The new sanc-tions called for an arms embargo on the Taliban including foreign militaryassistance It also imposed a ban on travel by the militiarsquos senior leaders abroader flight ban than the one imposed last year to force bin Ladenrsquos surren-der measures to close all Taliban offices overseas and a ban on exports toTaliban areas of acetic anhydride used to manufacture heroin Finally it alsofroze funds and other financial assets of Osama bin Laden and individualsand entities associated with him Mullah Omar reacted to this round of sanc-tions by saying his government would not back out from its stand and princi-ples even if the entire world turned against them15

The continuation of these sanctions has pushed the issue of recognition tothe backburner However the international community is also paying a pricefor not recognizing the legitimacy of the Taliban One of the principal areasin which the Taliban could provide some assistance is in the containment ofthe production of poppy Mullah Omar on several occasions emphasized hiswill to fight against opium production However it has been difficult tomaintain such policy postures in the wake of external sanctions As a resultin 1999 over 90983 hectares of poppies yielded a harvest of over 4581 tonsof dry opium an estimated 70 increase in production over the previousyearrsquos figure

The international sanctions have also affected the incentives of local farm-ers to turn away from poppy production Afghanistanrsquos socioeconomic situa-tion makes opium production one of the only available economic means foraccess to land labor and credit Currently the Afghan peasantryrsquos heavydependence upon opium production associated with the politico-territorialrealities of a tribal society typified by fragile political allegiances is makingit difficult for the Taliban to make any serious attempts at eradication16

Additionally any Taliban attempt to implement a poppy eradication policywill be severely compromised by the governmentrsquos international non-recog-nition This places restrictions on the options open to the government Eventhe UN Drug Control Program cannot legally reach any formal agreementwith the Taliban government as long as the latter is not internationally recog-nized The Taliban government faces a self-imposed catch-22 situation Its

15 Ibid16 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy ldquoTalibanrsquos Drug Dilemma Opium Production vs International

Recognitionrdquo The Analyst (Paris) (1999)

482 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

political policies and actions are deemed unacceptable by the internationalcommunity yet it cannot pursue any eradication policy with any hope ofcomplete success without the international recognition and aid that are beingdenied it owing to those policies and actions17

Future Prospects for Change in theTalibanrsquos Regime

Since 1996 the Taliban have been striving to bring the civil war to a success-ful conclusion Their domestic policies have brought about alienation andcreated fissures within the Afghan society Their inflexible stand on variouspolicies has denied them the credibility they so desire Their authoritarianismand intolerance have alienated non-Pushtun Afghans who make up morethan half the population The flow of thousands of extremist Pakistani andArab Taliban supporters into Afghanistan has fueled the resentment of thelocal populace18

The Taliban are accused of harboring terrorists and extremists who notonly support Taliban but also carry out their extremist policies in the targetedcountries According to a report that appeared in the Far Eastern EconomicReview (FEER) Afghanistan has become a sanctuary for ldquoarmed insurgentsaccused of terrorist attacks in China Iran Uzbekistan Tajikistan and Paki-stanrdquo Some 400 Arab Islamic militants from a dozen Middle Eastern andAfrican countries are said to be part of the 055 Brigade funded by Osama binLaden and fighting alongside Taliban in the current offensive The articlefurther noted that ldquo[t]he diverse groups have their own agendas mainly fo-cused on undermining the regimes at home but some share bin Ladenrsquos zealfor a global Islamic revolution The resulting web of dangerous friendshipsthreatens to export instability throughout the mineral-rich and commerciallyunder-exploited hinterland of Central Asiardquo19

It is obvious that the Taliban must improve their image both at home andabroad as perceptions play an important role in the general acceptability ornon-acceptability of governments in both arenas Currently the Taliban areperceived primarily as a negative element that is unlikely to play any positiverole in resolving the Afghan conflict If they fail in their goal the Afghannation will lose any trust that religious political forces could play any mean-ingful role in resolving the ongoing conflict The Talibanrsquos fate will be more

17 At the time of writing the Taliban were not cooperating in poppy eradication Currentlyit appears this may have changed The Taliban claim to have completely eradicated poppy pro-duction in the areas dominated by their troops and the claim is being verified under UN aus-pices

18 Peter Tomsen ldquoResponse A Chance for Peace in AfghanistanmdashThe Talibanrsquos Days areNumberedrdquo Foreign Affairs 79 (JanuaryndashFebruary 2000) p 179

19 Ahmed Rashid ldquoAfghanistan Heart of Darknessrdquo FEER August 5 1999

NASREEN GHUFRAN 483

or less the same as that which befell the mujahideen if they do not take timelyand corrective measures to improve Afghanistanrsquos deteriorating situation

The Taliban gained support from most of the populace in the beginningbecause they offered themselves a neutral force and declared their intentionto remain so However they are no longer neutral and have become anotherparty to the conflict Their policies have not only infuriated the internationalpublic but also large sections of the Afghan community The large influxesof Afghan refugees into Pakistan reflect the growing disagreement with theirpolicies This disenchantment is unlikely to change if the Taliban do notmoderate their stance The Taliban of course believe their policies to be im-portant for bringing about the change they desire but they do not realize howmuch these policies have alienated people The international community hasexplicitly voiced its criticism of the Taliban regime and consider it to be aliving nightmare for women political dissidents and anyone else who doesnot submit to the laws under the authority of the Ministry for the Fostering ofVirtue and Suppression of Vice The Taliban movement itself came about asa reaction to the self-seeking and self-destructive policies of the mujahideenwhose pretensions to Islam and leadership were discredited It was in thisideological vacuum and a Hobbesian state of anarchy that made the Talibanrsquosrule palatable to common Afghanis20 But if the Talibanrsquos government doesnot soften its present policies and complete peace is not restored it will notbe too late for the common people to turn against them

The year 2001 has seen universal outrage at the offensive launched by theTaliban rulers against Afghanistanrsquos Buddhist past Condemnation has notremained confined to non-Muslim states several Islamic countries includingPakistan have been appalled by the destruction of Buddhist statues in theprovince of Bamiyan Pakistan sent an official delegation whose aim was toprevent the Taliban from destroying the statues Pakistanrsquos foreign ministerAbdul Sattar said ldquoCertainly we believe it was a mistake a blunder and as aresult Afghanistan will suffer consequences for years to comerdquo To this headded that ldquoit is very difficult for me to make a statement as to why they didnot hearrdquo21 Iran likewise strongly condemned the statuesrsquo destruction Astatement released by Iranrsquos Cultural Heritage Organization wondered whyldquocertain Taliban-led individuals calling themselves lsquoclericrsquo have ordered de-struction of ancient sites of the mankind society citing blasphemy and idoliz-

20 Hafeez Malik ldquoPakistan Islam and the Taliban Phenomenonrdquo News International (Paki-stan) June 9 2000

21 Sattarrsquos remarks are in ibid March 11 2001

484 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

ing as reasonsrdquo22 To prevent their destruction Iran even offered to buy thestatues or move them into safekeeping

However the Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil rejectedany offer to prevent the destruction of the statues His negotiations with Pa-kistan did not bear a positive result and he rejected the Iranian offers reiterat-ing that the presence of the statues conflicted with Islamic teaching In thewake of the Talibanrsquos subsequent actions Iran led a UN initiative to takeserious action against the regime Commenting on the statuesrsquo destructionthe Iranian Foreign Ministry stated ldquoUnfortunately the Talibanrsquos destructionof the statues has cast doubts on the comprehensive views offered by Islamicideology in the world Clearly Muslims across the world pin the blame onthe rigid-minded Taliban and by no means embroil the Afghan Muslims inthis counter-cultural moverdquo23

The Bamiyan incident stirred up dual controversies about both the charac-ter of the Taliban regime and the relationship between culture religion andnational heritage in an Islamic state In his characteristic style Mullah Omarshrugged off all objections to the planned destruction of the Buddhist statuessaying ldquomy job is the implementation of Islamic orderrdquo He invoked Islamiclaw a fatwa issued by the Afghan ulama associated with this regime and thedecision of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to support his decision24

Nonetheless the destruction of the statues has further tarnished the Talibanrsquosimage While it may be the case that the Taliban undertook their actions inreaction to the tough sanctions imposed on them by the world the Talibanhave to realize that they are not going to earn any international sympathy orrecognition

Afghanistan has always been important to external powers due to its strate-gic location They have meddled in its affairs both in the past and at presentThe protracted civil war makes it more vulnerable to external penetration Insuch situations it has no other option but to seek help and support fromoutside The external powers are more than willing to do so if it serves theirnational interest The opposition is likely to adopt a similar strategy as theyhave less access to the resources of the country than the ruling authority Hadthere been no external involvement Afghanistanrsquos extended civil war wouldnot have become the protracted and complicated affair that it is

The Afghan civil war has important regional implications Various exter-nal powers are pursuing divergent objectives in Afghanistan and the outcome

22 Cultural Heritage Organization comment is in Iran News (Tehran) March 1 2001 Thisnews item is distributed via Middle East News Online available at lthttpwwwmiddleeastwirecomgt

23 Comments of the Iranian Foreign Ministry reported by the BBC World Service March 52001

24 Rahimullah Yusufzai ldquoA Question of Tolerancerdquo News International March 4 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 465

The settlement of civil war will always entail the accommodation of newgroups into government and a new political system to support multiparty ruleDomestic cooperation under anarchy is difficult and often breaks down

Barbara Walter has synthesized some of the theories on the causes for thecontinuation of civil wars According to her civil wars can be divided intofour broad categories (1) historical hatreds namely groups fight becausethey hate each other and have no desire to cooperate (2) conflicts of interestin which groups fighting for control of a single state inevitably encounterconflicts of interest that are difficult to reconcile (3) greedy elites that isstubborn threatened or self-interested leaders often with little to lose by con-tinuing to fight and (4) security dilemmas in which fear and uncertainty dur-ing the war can ultimately sabotage cooperation efforts and perpetuateviolence

A study of the causes for the continuation of the Afghan civil war encom-passes all of these reasons At certain times during the war groups haveplaced strong obstacles to other groups Therefore the actors in Afghani-stanrsquos civil war do not entertain the route of negotiations and choose insteadto continue pursuing war In the Afghan civil war different players haveparticipated in it and changed their roles over time but none have been will-ing to negotiate in a flexible manner to conclude a settlement

The Saur Revolution of 1978 cannot be ignored in any analysis of theAfghan civil war nor can the current conflict be delinked from it Accordingto Barnett Rubin the 1978 revolution introduced Marxist-oriented radical re-forms in Afghanistan that led to disruptive changes in the social economicand political structures of a predominantly feudo-tribal society The reformswere intended to bring about much-needed economic change by abolishingthe oligarchic power arrangements that in the judgment of Afghan revolu-tionaries had prevented progress and development in the past

While the substance of various reforms was highly desirable and couldeven be considered fundamental to any process of development in a feudaland tribal society the political form in which the reforms were articulatedcontrasted with the popular cultural and social norms of the Afghan massesSpecifically the landowning and religious establishment feared losses of eco-nomic and social privileges if the reforms were implemented This led toresistance from the masses and the growth of countrywide opposition De-spite the fact that the opposition was divided and loosely organized alongethnic and regional lines it effectively exploited the contradictions betweenthe ideology of the regime and popular Afghan cultural norms The charac-terization of the reforms as un-Islamic and the Soviet support for the regimeworked effectively in favor of the resistance The active involvement of theSoviet military forces in suppressing the Afghan resistance in order to stabi-lize the Marxist regime further strengthened the opposition forces

466 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

This period saw the Soviets and the socialist regime locked in a struggleagainst the Islamist opposition The ideological and social cleavages putthem on opposite sides External powers got involved backing their own fa-vorites in the war exacerbating the cold war rivalry The conclusion of theGeneva Accords in 1988 produced a shift in the war as the agreement elimi-nated one major cause of the war the Soviet factor The Soviet forces with-drew from Afghanistan by 1989 consequently the Marxist regime lostsupport and finally stepped down to hand over power to the mujahideen(freedom fighters)

In 1992 the Northern Alliance was established in opposition to the com-munist government led by President Najibullah The group consisted of Gen-eral Abdul Rashid Dostum former head of Najibullahrsquos militia forcesAhmed Shah Masood head of the Jamiat-i-Islami Party and Hizb-i-Wahadata pro-Shirsquoa party The resistance groups that fought the Soviet troops anddefeated the Soviet-backed government in Kabul then turned on each otherOn becoming a ruling elitemdasha goal of any combatant in a civil warmdashagreedy power struggle starts among the different factions as each wants agreater share and say in the government During the early stages of the civilwar there were also seven factions operating from Pakistan the Hizb-i-Is-lami (Islamic party) led by Gulbaddin Hekmatyar the Jamiat-i-Islami (Is-lamic society) led by Burhanuddin Rabbani the Ittihad-i-Islami (Islamicunity) led by Rasul Sayyaf the Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic party) led by MaulviYunus Khalis the Mahaz Milli Islami (NIFA the National Islamic front ofAfghanistan) led by Syed Ahmed Gailani the Jabha-imdashNijat-i-Milli (Na-tional salvation front) led by Sibghatullah Mujjadidi and Harakat-e-Inqilabi-i-Islami (Movement of the Islamic revolution) led by Maulvi MohammadNabi Mohammadi As they could not bridge their political differences thecivil war took the form of an intra-mujahideen struggle Peace remained elu-sive despite UN efforts

Amid this turbulence and confusion another force the Taliban a unitedtraditionalist Islamic contender emerged in 1994 By 1996 they took controlof Kabul and pushed the mujahideen back into their opposition barracks Atthe time a war-weary population welcomed the Taliban forces Howeverthe ousted Rabbani regime did not give up its claim to be the legitimate gov-ernment and has therefore opposed the Taliban As a result complete mili-tary victory eluded them and since then the Taliban have engaged in a fightagainst the Northern Alliance

The Talibanrsquos Changing Rolein the Civil War

The Taliban was one of many groups that participated in the struggle againstSoviet forces When the Taliban launched their own movement across Af-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 467

ghanistan they began to catch the attention of the international media Oncethey overran the country militarily so swiftly and yet so peacefully they sim-ply could not go unnoticed A lot of theories started emerging about theirorigin characteristics and objectives Nevertheless they were and still are acomplex phenomenon The Talibanrsquos leadership has been calculatedly mys-terious about the origins of the movement After the Soviet withdrawalTaliban leaders had gone back to their seminaries in order to complete theirstudies

However they were not happy with what went on in the country duringrule by the mujahideen They felt that their sacrifices were going to waste aspower wrangling and corruption continued This motivated them to start themovement Its major missions were to bring peace and order and implementSharirsquoah (Islamic law) in what they believed to be its true sense Accordingto Mullah Omar one of the key Taliban leaders the Taliban ldquotook up arms toachieve the aims of the Afghan jihad and save our people from further suffer-ing at the hands of the so-called mujahideen We had complete faith in GodAlmighty We never forgot that He can bless us with victory or plunge usinto defeatrdquo3

The rapid emergence of the Islamic Movement of Taliban of Afghanistanled to many positive expectations As an initially peaceful neutral and non-greedy force they appeared on the scene when the Afghans had lost all faithin the countryrsquos leadership Their early critics did not predict that the Talibanwould make any difference in the outcome of the war or be able to managesuccess With little fighting the Taliban took control over the southern partof the country within a few months There they disarmed militia com-manders and reestablished law and order by applying a rather strict interpre-tation of Islamic law With a piecemeal approach the Taliban soon occupiedlarger territories and became a formidable force

Their agenda was clear and convincing for the war-weary public as theaims of the movement unfolded According to Kamal Matinuddin the imme-diate goals of the new movement were to disarm all rival militia fight againstthose who did not accept their request enforce Islamic law in the areas theyliberated and retain all areas the Taliban captured4 As a truly grassrootsIslamist movement the Taliban could rely on the support of the masses Bythis time the loyalty of the mujahideen to their respective factions was notstrong They could be purchased or persuaded to switch sides whenever theyfound it in their interest to do so In town after town armed men desertedtheir leaders and joined the Taliban Desertions brought weapons as the Rus-

3 Rashid Taliban p 234 Kamal Matinuddin The Taliban Phenomenon Afghanistan 1994ndash1997 (Karachi Pakistan

Oxford University Press 1999) p 26

468 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

sians had left behind a heavily armed country As the Taliban marchedalong they picked up guns mortars tanks and even aircraft

What was unusual about the Talibanrsquos strategy is that they were relativelysuccessful in avoiding direct fighting with other potential rival groups Theyadopted a simple strategy that was markedly different and peaceful Whenapproaching an unconquered territory the Taliban would first send a delega-tion of ulama (clerics) to talk to any local militia commanders The ulamathen invited them to implement Islamic law and establish peace by handingover their arms and ammunition These clerics argued that the weapons be-longed to the Bait-ul-Mal (National treasury) under the rule of a single gov-ernment If the local militia commander agreed to the request by thedelegation then there was no fighting In case that the delegation of ulamafailed to secure a peaceful surrender the Taliban then would send a seconddelegation including elderly pious people of the area along with a Talibanrepresentative If the second delegation failed to secure a surrender to theirdemands then the Taliban would take up arms against the hold-out militia

Since disarming the local militia was the foremost priority of the Talibanthe latterrsquos stockpile of weapons kept increasing every time they overran aprovince Most of the time the weapons were handed over peacefully be-cause local militia commanders considered the Taliban to be a neutral even abenign force Moreover local commanders were eager to avoid furtherbloodshed Though simple the Talibanrsquos peaceful strategymdashbut with theveiled threat of forcemdashhas been difficult to understand It could be arguedthat during the initial stages of the Afghan civil war the Taliban achievedmost of their victories without waging a fight

Using this unique strategy the Taliban continued to make headway to thecapital without much resistance from the former rulers They took control ofthree of Afghanistanrsquos largest cities Herat in 1995 Kabul in 1996 and Ma-zar Sharif in 1997 They did it with few casualties among their troops andeven fewer among civilians Initially they were the only force capable ofrestoring law and order By 1997 the Taliban controlled around 90 of thecountry by disarming and in certain cases incorporating the former militiacommanders and assorted mujahideen

Restoration of peace and order are prerequisites to end civil war As Bar-nett Rubin has documented the Taliban denounced the failure of the muja-hideen leaders to establish security They accused the former militia com-manders of becoming thieves and even rapists They tore down all check-points set up to extort money and refused all bribes at their own Theycleared the bandits off the roads and instead of slaughtering their opponents

NASREEN GHUFRAN 469

merely disarmed them Their message seemed simple and appealing to mostAfghans peace order and Islamic law5

Establishing peace in a country like Afghanistan is by no means an easytask particularly in light of how long the civil war has been underway Evensome critics of the Taliban talk about the restoration of peace in Taliban-controlled areas ldquoBefore the Taliban this country belonged to warlords andthe simple act of going to visit my village was an impossibilityrdquo said a UNofficial who is an Afghan ldquoMy daughters sit in the house and cry to me Wewant education This is heartbreaking but peace is the first priority for peo-ple here The Taliban must be given credit for accomplishing thisrdquo6

In his in-depth analysis Franz Schurmann concluded that it is the power ofthe Talibanrsquos ideas and the stability they have brought to war-torn Afghani-stan that makes them so frightening Their proven effectiveness in maintain-ing law and order as well as their adherence to the commandments of Islamand cultural norms which see traditional Afghan women as being obedientrather than challenging to men seem to have won over the predominantlyilliterate peasants and working class

After so many years of debilitating warfare concentrated in and around thecities the urbane educated elite who would challenge these norms have van-ished More importantly for centuries the great mass of Afghans has thrivedunder the most primitive political and economic conditions while the pasttwo decades have brought only war poverty and insecurity For most Af-ghans therefore their present situation under the Taliban appears to be if notideal the best among possible alternatives The removal of small arms andheavy weapons from public view is an accomplishment of immense propor-tions as weapons were everywhere and used indiscriminately

The situation in the territory controlled by the Northern Alliance is quitedifferent The opposition controls a tiny but significant 10 of the country inthe north There people are so fearful of crime that they often doubt theadvantages of the relatively liberal order under which they live It appearsthat in Afghanistan freedom and safety are opposites The Alliance had beeninstrumental in bringing down Najibullahrsquos government in April 1992 but itdisintegrated shortly after its victory because of power struggles within thegroup However when the Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996 thethree participant groups resurrected the Northern Alliance in opposition onceagain Accurate figures regarding the total mobilizing force of the allianceare not available but by a rough estimate they would number around 80000troops In contrast the Talibanrsquos active forces number about 100000

5 Barnett Rubin The Search for Peace in Afghanistan From Buffer State to Failed State(New Haven Conn Yale University Press 1995) p 140

6 Barry Bearak ldquoAfghans Ruled by Taliban Poor Isolated but Securerdquo New York Times(NYT) October 10 1998

470 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

The nominal head of the Northern Alliance is Burhanuddin Rabbani al-though in reality he shares power with his primary military backer AhmedShah Masood Both of them belong to the Jamiat-i-Islami which is apredominantly Tajik Islamist party Rabbanirsquos regime controls most of thecountryrsquos embassies abroad and retains Afghanistanrsquos seat in the UN Ah-med Shah Masood built Afghanistanrsquos most sophisticated military-politicalorganization the Shurandashyi-Nazar-i-Shamali (Supervisory Council of theNorth SCN) The SCN coordinated Jamiat commanders and also createdregion-wide forces that developed into Masoodrsquos Urdu-i-Islami (IslamicArmy) Rabbani and Masood get their main support from the northeasternlargely Tajik portion of the country Due to his military performance andcontrol of the strategic Panjsher Valley Masood is popularly known as theldquolion of Panjsherrdquo

General Abdul Rashid Dostum and his ethnic Uzbek Junbishndashi-Milli (Na-tional movement) Party also form part of the Northern Alliance The latterrsquosbase of support lies primarily among the Sunni Muslim Uzbeks A largenumber of fighters forming part of this organization (the numbers vary be-tween 15000 and 16000) had a reputation of being the best-equipped forcesThe Hizb-i-Wahadat-i-Islami yi-Afghanistan (Islamic unity party of Afghani-stan) is the principal Shirsquoa party in Afghanistan its support is mainly amongthe ethnic Hazara group This group was originally formed under Iraniansponsorship in order to unite eight Shirsquoa parties Its leader is Karim Khaliliwho is based in Hazarajat7

Until they captured Kabul in 1996 the Taliban expressed no desire to rulethe country Ever since then the Taliban have committed themselves to con-quering the entire country The problems with the Taliban began when theystarted acting as the ruling elite Eventually their growing international iso-lation plus their ineffective administration alienated large numbers of Af-ghans As the civil war continues they are becoming more rigid Thisattitude has doomed expectations that the civil war will end Indeed whilethe Talibanrsquos achievements as a peace force had good beginnings as theyears have passed they seem to have become entangled in the civil war thatthey intended to disentangle During the early period of the civil war theTaliban did achieve some remarkable accomplishments above all revivingthe lost trust of the Afghans However their strong opposition to the forcesof the North has earned them a reputation for inflexibility

The Taliban transformed themselves from a movement into a ruling gov-ernment Their main priorities were to bring peace while at the same time tostay in power to implement their vision of an Islamic state But resistance tothis vision remains strong and the Northern Alliance is still giving the

7 Ibid

NASREEN GHUFRAN 471

Taliban a difficult time Despite the relative isolation of the Northern Alli-ancersquos forces and their extended lines of communication they have been ableto continue owing to military assistance from outside governments This aidhas come in a variety of forms ranging from the direct transfer of materiel tothe dispatch of military advisors and support personnel albeit in limited num-bers Next to none of these transfers have been publicly documented viasubmissions to the UNrsquos register on conventional arms Ironically much ofthe Northern Alliancersquos military support comes from nations participating inthe so-called ldquoSix-Plus-Twordquo contact group (Pakistan Iran UzbekistanChina Turkmenistan Tajikistan and Russia and the United States) whosemembers have publicly pledged not to provide military support to any Af-ghan combatants and prevent the use of member state territories for suchpurposes

The Northern Alliancersquos main suppliers are Iran and Russia with secon-dary roles played by Tajikistan Uzbekistan (at least until 1998) Turkmeni-stan and Kyrgyzstan Moscow denies that it is arming the Afghan rebels Inan interview with the New York Times Masood has said that he receivesmuch of his equipment from the Russian mafia not the Russian governmentHowever Russia has reportedly provided Dostum with 500 T-55 and T-62tanks that are used against areas that oppose his rule Russia has also sup-plied him with a large number of Frog 7 and Luna M missiles8

The assistance from some Central Asian republics has been an importantsource of support to the Northern Alliance Uzbekistanrsquos president IslamKarimov has clandestinely supported his fellow Uzbeks His country hassupplied the Northern Alliance with tanks aircraft and technical personnelThis support has been provided with the expectation that Uzbek-dominatedprovinces in northern Afghanistan would provide a buffer against the spreadof fundamentalism The secular regime of Turkmenistanrsquos presidentSapamurad Niyazov has publicly joined other Central Asian republics in ar-ticulating the dangers of the Afghan civil war spreading into the neighboringstates However the government of Turkmenistan is not too keen in gettingembroiled and providing overt backing to those fighting the Taliban

Anti-Taliban forces are being trained in a dozen or so camps located alongIranrsquos eastern border Since May 1997 6000 Afghan military personnelhave been dispatched from these camps to various war fronts in northernAfghanistan Most of Iranrsquos aid has been going to the Hizb-i-Wahadat PartyIran has also purchased two Su-22 and one Su-24 fighter-bombers for AhmedShah Masood and sent Iranian pilots to help plan air operations for the North-ern Alliance

8 James Risen ldquoRussians Are Back in Afghanistan Aiding Rebelsrdquo NYT July 27 1998

472 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

Clearly the challenges to the Taliban have grown over the years particu-larly in the political and economic field They continue fighting on the onehand while on the other they are increasingly worried about their growingpolitical isolation However isolation has not moderated them Theystaunchly believe in their ideology which makes it difficult for others to un-derstand them as something other than an extremist force Economicallythey are in a vulnerable position because they are operating in a war-devas-tated country and the Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan have beentargeted for heavy international sanctions

The Formation of the Taliban Governmentand Its Effect on the Civil War

By 1997 the Taliban had accomplished major military successes in the civilwar After the capture of Kabul they also began to prove themselves in thepolitical arena They felt the need of forming an alternate government tocounter the legitimacy of Rabbanirsquos regime Aware that peace and politicalstability in the country would ultimately make them a credible force theTaliban instituted a framework of shuras (consultative bodies) to achievethose aims The most visible Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad OmarAkhund then asked the shuras to give some political shape to the movement

The Taliban also gave the country a new official name changing it fromthe Islamic State of Afghanistan to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA)in October 1997 The group justified the new name as reflecting the groundrealities However the opposition has termed the change to be an undemo-cratic move A prominent Afghan intellectual Rasul Amin in a BBC PushtoService interview spoke of the new name as something that to him felt asthough it was a transplant from the Arab world However Mullah WakilAhmed a senior Taliban leader and spokesman of the movement said it wasnot the first time that Afghanistanrsquos name has been changed In the pastwords such as ldquorepublicrdquo or ldquodemocraticrdquo were added to Afghanistanrsquos nameThe emirate system however is not acceptable to the opposition as Talibanpossess no popular or legal mandate to govern or impose such But for theTaliban changing the countryrsquos appellation represents breaking with the pastand reforming the political system

The Talibanrsquos initially loose bureaucratic structures have been trans-formed too Mullah Mohammad Omar Akhund was elected Amir-ul-Momineen (Commander of the believers) by an assembly of about 1200 in-vited ulama in the city of Kandahar in spring 1996 Since then Mullah Omarhas been at the top of the ruling structure in Afghanistan Though he remainsin the background his word is final and almost has the force of law in themovement Mullah Omar lives simply known for having few needs and withno particular taste in food or dress He is alarmingly careless about his per-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 473

TABLE 1 Ethnic Composition and Cabinet Portfolios of the 10-Member Shura Basedin Kandahar

Names Ethnicity Portfolio

Mullah Mohammad Omar Ghilzai Amir-ul-MonineenAkhund Pushtun

Mullah Mohammad Rabbani Pushtun Chairman of the Caretaker CouncilDeputy Commander of the Taliban

movementMullah Mohammad Fadel Pushtun Minister of DefenseMullah Mohammad Ghaus Pushtun Minister of Foreign AffairsMullah Mohammad Hassan Pushtun Minister of SecurityMaulvi Ghaisuddin Agha Uzbek Minister of EducationMaulvi Abdur Raqib Uzbek Minister for RefugeesQari Deen Mohammad Tajik Minister for PlanningMullah Abdul Razzaq Tajik Member Supervisory CouncilMaulvi Abdul Saleem Uzbek Deputy Minister of Education

sonal security is not a gifted orator and his study of religion is limited as hewas not able to complete his religious education because of the war Despitethis background he inspires confidence among his supporters because of hispiety and the strength of his beliefs

Mullah Omar is assisted by a loose network of shuras A central shuracomprising 10 members was established in Kandahar (see Table 1) All di-rectives and policies were initiated from here and it virtually became the cap-ital of the Taliban-controlled areas (indeed Kandahar is the currentheadquarters of the Taliban movement) Aside from the core group of 10meetings of the original shura also saw participation from military com-manders tribal leaders and ulama this indeterminate structure is one of thekey features of the Talibanrsquos central shura Mullah Omar also tried to main-tain a balance between the Pushtuns and non-Pushtuns in the shura TheTaliban have been criticized for dividing Afghanistan along ethnic linesHowever despite the effort to integrate non-Pushtuns into the shura theTaliban have not been able to shed their Pushtun moorings and have not beenconsidered as impartial regarding other ethnicities

The takeover of Kabul and the formation of a central shura reflected theTalibanrsquos desire to have a more lasting stay on the political scene The cen-tral shura is assisted by a cabinet a shura in Kabul and a military shuraThese three bodies report to the central shura in Kandahar Clearly theseadministrative structures are different from the past governments For in-stance a talib (religious student) in a ministerial post is something unknownin Afghan history Nevertheless even the Taliban have found that control-

474 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

TABLE 2 Military Command Structure of the Taliban

Position Individual

Commander in Chief Mullah Mohammad Omar AkhundMilitary Chief of Staff Mullah Mohmmad HassanChief of the Army Staff Mullah Rahmatullah AkhundArmy Division Chief Mullah Muhammad Jumma KhanArmy Division Chief Mullah Muhammad YunusArmy Division Chief Mullah Mohammad GulArmy Division Chief Mullah Mohammad Aziz KhanArmored Force No 4 Mullah Mohammad Zahir

ling a territory without a clear administrative system is not possible in con-temporary times

The formation of these shuras was aimed at creating an efficient govern-ment After they captured Kabul the Taliban formed a six-member Provi-sional Ruling Council headed by Mullah Mohammad Rabbani This wasfollowed by the formation of the Kabul Shura of Acting Ministers in 1999The Kabul Shura deals with day-to-day problems of the government the cityand the Kabul military front Important policy recommendations are con-veyed to the Kandahar Shura where decisions are actually made To restoreand maintain peace in the provinces the Taliban appoints governors who arefrom provinces other than those where they are serving This policy appearsto have been welcomed by the people As for the military shura it is a looseorganizational body that plans strategy and can implement some tactical deci-sions (see Table 2) The military shura appears to have no strategic decision-making powers Military strategy key personnel appointments and the allo-cation of funds for offensives are decided upon by the Amir-ul-Momineen

Although their government has few resources and many parts barely func-tion at all the Taliban have adopted a discourse of Afghan nationalism inaddition to their Islamic traditionalism Despite their amorphous politicalleadership the Taliban claim to be trying to recreate a centralized Afghanstate In areas under their control they have appointed provincial governorsand administrators of districts cities and towns from the center9

One of the most remarkable characteristics of the Taliban leadership is thattop government officials often switch from the battlefield to the ministry andback again each time following the orders from Mullah Omar In one sensethis produces remarkable flexibility among the Taliban hierarchy as they allact as both administrators and military commanders This flexibility in the

9 Barnett Rubin ldquoAfghanistan under the Talibanrdquo Current History vol 98 no 625 (Febru-ary 1999) p 81

NASREEN GHUFRAN 475

military command has allowed the leadership to maintain better ties with therank-and-file fighters than might otherwise be the case However theTaliban administration in Kabul has faced problems For instance while anyminister is away at the front no decisions can be taken in that ministryMoreover government ministers are working without pay something un-heard of in modern times They do not use government resources for privateuse curtailing expenses and refraining from indulgence in squandering andextravagance Regular salaries are paid only to professional civil servantsand trained soldiers drawn from the former communist army

As for the Northern Alliance until August 1998 the areas it controlled hadfour main administrative and political centers Mazar Sharif which somegroups aspired to turn into a temporary capital for a government in exile ofthe Islamic State of Afghanistan Talauqan the headquarters of MasoodrsquosSCN Shibergan the location of Dostumrsquos headquarters and Bamiyan theheadquarters of the Hizb-i-Wahadat The Taliban have made inroads intothese areas too because the entire political administrative fabric of northernAfghanistan has broken down Only one of Afghanistanrsquos provinces is nowentirely under the Northern Alliancersquos control Badakhshan an inaccessiblemountainous region in the extreme northeast of the country There are alsoneighboring valleys to the west and a few enclaves in the Afghan interiorover which the Taliban have not yet been able to consolidate control Someelements of the former state administration have survived but political powerresides individually in the various armed groups rather than in a unitary civil-ian structure The groups maintain their own military and command struc-tures they do not have a unified strategy for the joint mobilization ofresources in their struggle against the Taliban

The areas controlled by the Taliban have been subjected to drastic changesto personal behavior The Taliban have put a ban on wine and televisionwhich is perceived to be immoral There is also complete restriction on mu-sic photography and the painting of living things The shaving off of onersquosbeard or trimming it less than a fistful is prohibited as is having a Westernhairstyle Gambling betting pigeon flying dog-racing and sodomy are alsostrictly forbidden

The Taliban have gained international notoriety because they have bannedwomen from working Women are obligated to observe strict purdah (litveiling also refers to covering of bodies) Girls have been stopped fromgoing to schools The Taliban have told all women working outside theirhomes to stay at home Although women who had been working will con-tinue to receive their salaries the Taliban claim that there is no need for themto work any longer They claim that these restrictions have been put in placeto protect the honor and dignity of women At the same time Taliban offi-cials have said that they are not against women working or receiving an edu-

476 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

cation The Taliban claim that they need time and resources to create theproper environment and right texts and curriculum for womenrsquos educationThe Talibanrsquos behavior is modeled after the Islamic revolution in Iran Edu-cational establishments remained closed for many years in the aftermath ofthat revolution They remained closed until the Iranian revolutionaries for-mally established an educational syllabus conforming to their own principles

The Taliban have stated that they wish to establish a pure Islamic state Intheir view this means that women have no place in the public arena Theyare required to stay at home and take care of their husbands and childrenThe Taliban cling to the symbol of a protected woman Women have toobserve a strict dress code wearing a burqa (a garment covering the bodyfrom head to toe) and trousers fully covering their ankles While women hadworn burqa in the pre-Taliban era it had not been an enforced dress code

The Talibanrsquos edicts have had a severe impact on many other women whodo not have a close male relative to accompany them in public Hardest hithave been the countryrsquos estimated 30000 widows many of whom are thesole providers for their families Some widows have been allowed to work inareas under the Taliban control but even for them it is not easy to get permis-sion According to Taliban representatives the current restrictions are said tobe necessary because females are not safe outside their homes Many womenhave strongly reacted to the Taliban policies despite the restrictive climate inTaliban-controlled areas These women do not like what the Taliban havebeen professing They want to work and continue with their education butthese rights are being denied to them The justifications given by Taliban arenot acceptable to the working and more enlightened urban Afghan women Itis therefore not surprising that women have become the most vocal critics ofthe Taliban

The edicts against women also have predictably had a devastating impacton primary level education Before the civil war over four-fifths of primaryschool teachers were women The majority of them are now jobless Theclosure of schools has in turn affected children Many orphaned childrenwho once could make homes at schools are now forced to live on the streetsAn international aid group in 1998 estimated 28000 street children in Kabulalone

Mullah Nuruddin Turabi the Taliban minister of justice defended theTalibanrsquos domestic actions He said ldquoIt is not just a question of men wearingbeards and women wearing burqas In Afghanistan every vice has to bestopped and every virtue promulgatedrdquo10 The Taliban have established anew security service the Ministry of Enforcement of Virtue and Suppressionof Vice for eradicating corruption and other vices from Afghan society Ac-

10 Michael Fathers ldquoFrozen in Timerdquo Time May 2000

NASREEN GHUFRAN 477

cording to Taliban tenets their rules are a jihad (holy war) against sin cor-ruption and cruelty Therefore those who do not abide by the Taliban edictson personal behavior are strictly punished according to a strict application ofIslamic law Hence stoning to death amputations (in case of robbery) andother forms of punishments are carried out in front of large crowds

Nonetheless a crisis of governance remains in Afghanistan To supportersof the Taliban regime its government is one that is accountable and represen-tative of all ethnic groups To many the Taliban have restored Afghan cul-ture Afghan-style self-rule has been implemented in the provinces and theTalibanrsquos supporters note that the countryrsquos civil administration and justicesystem are now based on Islamic and Afghan traditions The opposition re-jects this opinion and condemns the Taliban government of being unrepre-sentative and unaccountable

While all the above-mentioned structures are functioning the governmentfaces tremendous challenges The most obvious one is the governmentrsquosunacceptability to and lack of recognition from the international system letalone by the opposition The political dealings that the government has hadwith others offer evidence of its credibility in the civil war While theTaliban have major control of the countryrsquos land area they have not yet hadmuch success on the political front Forming a government is not enough toend the civil war the Taliban must gain acceptability both at home andabroad

The Talibanrsquos International Legal StatusRecognition of a government in a civil war also helps in ending the conflictbecause both parties involved desire the political economic and militarysupport that can come with it Non-recognition of the Taliban government isan indicator of its standing in the international community The recognitionhas not been forthcoming because of dissatisfaction with Taliban policiesUpon taking Kabul the Taliban had immediately demanded from other statesformal recognition as the only legitimate government of Afghanistan Theyalso demanded to be granted a seat in the UN General Assembly Howeverthey received neither So far only Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UnitedArab Emirates (UAE) have recognized the Taliban government In contrastBurhanuddin Rabbanirsquos Northern Alliance regime despite its weak militaryposition has legitimacy and political backing from the world communityincluding the majority of the Islamic states Most countries preserved thestatus quo and continued to allow the diplomatic missions of the Rabbaniregime

Recognition in international law involves acceptance by a state of a givenentity that this recognized entity possesses an international legal personalityand the rights and privileges that flow from it or that it is the exclusive

478 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

representative of a body with international legal personality The decision togrant or not to grant recognition is a political one within the sovereign discre-tion of individual states Recognition in principle can be accorded to states orgovernments As far as the state of Afghanistan itself is concerned it hasbeen recognized by a large number of countries including all permanentmembers of the UN Security Council for many years However wherepolitical power has fragmented to the extent that it has in Afghanistan inrecent years there may well be more than one group claiming to be the gov-ernment In fact as has been outlined already there are two governmentswithin one country One is militarily strong and controls a large populationand territory but has no legal standing while the other is recognized but hasless control of Afghan territory

Pakistan was the first country to grant international recognition to theTalibanrsquos government Their past links provided the basis for doing so Asnoted earlier virtually all of the Taliban leadership had been refugees in Pa-kistan For several years Taliban leaders studied in the madrasas (religiousschools) affiliated with the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) headed by MaulviFazul ur Rehman Although it has not been conclusively proven that theTaliban are Pakistanrsquos creation much criticism along these lines and othershas been leveled against it Pakistan is said to have played a key role inturning Taliban into a functioning military force by providing training logis-tical support and equipment

In 1997 Pakistan rooted its decision to recognize the Taliban governmentbased on the fact that the latter was in effective control of most of Afghani-stanrsquos territory including the capital By the time recognition was given theTaliban government occupied 90 of Afghanistan and oversaw a populationthat was representative of all of the countryrsquos ethnic groups Since then Paki-stan has been striving to propagate a positive image of the student militia andworking to induce other neighboring countries to recognize them Further-more Pakistan has been making persistent attempts to get the UN to adoptthe vacant seat formula which the Organization of Islamic Conferences haddone during 1996

Pakistanrsquos ties with the Taliban have become increasingly complex owingto the influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan Pakistanmdasha country of 140million mostly poor peoplemdashhas been almost single-handedly housing andfeeding the 12 million Afghan refugees living there since 1995 the year theUN stopped providing food and housing aid Some of the Afghan refugeescurrently in Pakistan have been there since the 1980s having fled the Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan At the time an estimated 32 million refugees livedin Pakistan making it the largest caseload of refugees in the world

Some of the refugees did return to Afghanistan In 1994 approximately77000 went back with the assistance of the UN High Commission for Refu-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 479

gees (UNHCR) An additional 76000 refugees returned to Afghanistan ontheir own11 However the years since then have seen a new wave of refu-gees flowing into Pakistan from northern Afghanistan Many of the freshrefugees are fleeing the fighting there plus a devastating drought This newwave has not been officially registered with any international organizationAs a consequence the statistics regarding refugees in Pakistan are unreliableAn influx of 30000 Afghan refugees came to Pakistan in 2000 and it is esti-mated that more than 50000 have crossed the border since then In that yearPakistan decided to close its border to stop further refugees because it couldnot absorb any more However its border was later reopened because of thedeplorable condition of the refugees and pressure from international humani-tarian relief agencies

Aside from Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UAE are on the list of countriesrecognizing the Talibanrsquos government Saudi Arabiarsquos came only a few daysafter Pakistanrsquos Until mid-1998 Islamabad and Riyadh were on the samepolitical wavelength Saudi Arabia supplied heavily subsidized fuel to theTaliban through Pakistan and also provided general funding After 1998problems between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan developed over the fate ofOsama bin Laden the Saudi millionaire who had been funding the Afghanjihad The Taliban had promised Saudi Arabia that Osama bin Laden wouldnot use his refuge in Afghanistan to support any acts of violence abroadAfter Osama bin Laden was linked to the bombings of US embassies inKenya and Tanzania his continued refuge in Afghanistan became a majorsource of tension between Taliban and the US on one hand and Saudi Ara-bia on the other

Apart from these three countries the Taliban have not managed to estab-lish political ties with other states This becomes a major constraint for agovernment of a country going through civil war If the paramount objectiveis to end the civil war the government has to direct its energies in this direc-tion It cannot expect the US or other countries to come to its rescue

The United States has been a major country involved in AfghanistanAlong with the Soviets the US had fed the civil war since the days of thecold war When Taliban captured Kabul the US State Department an-nounced it would establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban by sendingan official to Kabul This announcement was quickly retracted The StateDepartment spokesman Glyn Davies said the US found nothing objectiona-ble in the steps taken by the Taliban to impose Islamic law and described theTaliban as anti-modern rather than anti-Western Some members of Con-

11 Nasreen Ghufran ldquoRefugees A Comparative Study of India and Pakistanrdquo (paperpresented at the conference ldquoThe Challenge of Cooperation South Asia and Beyondrdquo Kath-mandu Nepal December 1998)

480 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

gress supported the Taliban because their government appeared to serve theUS policy of isolating Iran A Taliban regime would create a firmly Sunnibuffer on Iranrsquos border and potentially provide security for trade routes andpipelines that would break Iranrsquos monopoly on Central Asiarsquos southern traderoutes

But from its initial policy of acquiescence vis-a-vis the Taliban the USmoved to the other extreme of rejecting them completely The US rejectionwas largely because of the pressure exerted by the feminist movement Theprominent feminist Zieba-Shorish Shamley persuaded many US feministgroups to spearhead a signature campaign to mobilize support for Afghanwomen Her efforts helped persuade former President Clinton to take atougher stance against the Taliban12 Washingtonrsquos denouncement of theTaliban also came in the backdrop of the presidential election in the US assupporting a regime that held no respect for human rights would have nega-tively affected Clintonrsquos position13

In 1998 when the Taliban made great military gains against the forces ofthe North they expected to gain recognition and a seat in the UN they hadmajor Afghan cities under their control and their rivals in retreat Talibanrepresentatives claimed that if recognition were granted to their governmentthey would allow a huge pipeline project to proceed that would carry oil andgas from Central Asia to lucrative markets in Pakistan and India This pipe-line would cut through the western part of Afghanistan ldquoEven before thecapture of Mazar-i-Sharif and Taloqan we were fully qualified for recogni-tionrdquo said deputy information minister Abdur Rahman Hotaki referring totwo key opposition bases captured by the militia ldquoThe opposition gave peo-ple an excuse to deny us recognition and prevent us having the pipeline runthrough our country but that excuse has now gonerdquo he said ldquoAll excusesblocking our recognition are gone Therefore it is predicted they will revisetheir policy in view of the current realitiesrdquo he said adding that all ldquotermsand conditions for a legitimate staterdquo have been met14

But the Taliban encountered problems with international organizations In1999 the UN proposed imposing sanctions against the Taliban when it is-sued Security Council Resolution 1267 Adopted unanimously by the Secur-ity Council on October 15 the resolution demanded that the Taliban turn overOsama bin Laden without further delay to authorities in a country where hewill be brought to justice Until the Taliban comply the resolution requiresUN member states to deny permission for Taliban-owned -leased or -oper-ated aircraft to land in or take off from their territory It also calls for the

12 Rashid Taliban pp 180ndash8213 P Stobodan ldquoThe Afghan Conflict and Regional Securityrdquo Strategic Analysis (August

1999) p 72414 Frontier Post (Peshawar) January 14 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 481

freezing of funds and other financial resources including funds derived fromproperty owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban The lat-ter had 30 days in which to comply with this resolution before sanctions wereimposed The Taliban did not comply and the sanctions came into force

Another round of sanctions was imposed on the Taliban in December 2000with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1333 The new sanc-tions called for an arms embargo on the Taliban including foreign militaryassistance It also imposed a ban on travel by the militiarsquos senior leaders abroader flight ban than the one imposed last year to force bin Ladenrsquos surren-der measures to close all Taliban offices overseas and a ban on exports toTaliban areas of acetic anhydride used to manufacture heroin Finally it alsofroze funds and other financial assets of Osama bin Laden and individualsand entities associated with him Mullah Omar reacted to this round of sanc-tions by saying his government would not back out from its stand and princi-ples even if the entire world turned against them15

The continuation of these sanctions has pushed the issue of recognition tothe backburner However the international community is also paying a pricefor not recognizing the legitimacy of the Taliban One of the principal areasin which the Taliban could provide some assistance is in the containment ofthe production of poppy Mullah Omar on several occasions emphasized hiswill to fight against opium production However it has been difficult tomaintain such policy postures in the wake of external sanctions As a resultin 1999 over 90983 hectares of poppies yielded a harvest of over 4581 tonsof dry opium an estimated 70 increase in production over the previousyearrsquos figure

The international sanctions have also affected the incentives of local farm-ers to turn away from poppy production Afghanistanrsquos socioeconomic situa-tion makes opium production one of the only available economic means foraccess to land labor and credit Currently the Afghan peasantryrsquos heavydependence upon opium production associated with the politico-territorialrealities of a tribal society typified by fragile political allegiances is makingit difficult for the Taliban to make any serious attempts at eradication16

Additionally any Taliban attempt to implement a poppy eradication policywill be severely compromised by the governmentrsquos international non-recog-nition This places restrictions on the options open to the government Eventhe UN Drug Control Program cannot legally reach any formal agreementwith the Taliban government as long as the latter is not internationally recog-nized The Taliban government faces a self-imposed catch-22 situation Its

15 Ibid16 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy ldquoTalibanrsquos Drug Dilemma Opium Production vs International

Recognitionrdquo The Analyst (Paris) (1999)

482 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

political policies and actions are deemed unacceptable by the internationalcommunity yet it cannot pursue any eradication policy with any hope ofcomplete success without the international recognition and aid that are beingdenied it owing to those policies and actions17

Future Prospects for Change in theTalibanrsquos Regime

Since 1996 the Taliban have been striving to bring the civil war to a success-ful conclusion Their domestic policies have brought about alienation andcreated fissures within the Afghan society Their inflexible stand on variouspolicies has denied them the credibility they so desire Their authoritarianismand intolerance have alienated non-Pushtun Afghans who make up morethan half the population The flow of thousands of extremist Pakistani andArab Taliban supporters into Afghanistan has fueled the resentment of thelocal populace18

The Taliban are accused of harboring terrorists and extremists who notonly support Taliban but also carry out their extremist policies in the targetedcountries According to a report that appeared in the Far Eastern EconomicReview (FEER) Afghanistan has become a sanctuary for ldquoarmed insurgentsaccused of terrorist attacks in China Iran Uzbekistan Tajikistan and Paki-stanrdquo Some 400 Arab Islamic militants from a dozen Middle Eastern andAfrican countries are said to be part of the 055 Brigade funded by Osama binLaden and fighting alongside Taliban in the current offensive The articlefurther noted that ldquo[t]he diverse groups have their own agendas mainly fo-cused on undermining the regimes at home but some share bin Ladenrsquos zealfor a global Islamic revolution The resulting web of dangerous friendshipsthreatens to export instability throughout the mineral-rich and commerciallyunder-exploited hinterland of Central Asiardquo19

It is obvious that the Taliban must improve their image both at home andabroad as perceptions play an important role in the general acceptability ornon-acceptability of governments in both arenas Currently the Taliban areperceived primarily as a negative element that is unlikely to play any positiverole in resolving the Afghan conflict If they fail in their goal the Afghannation will lose any trust that religious political forces could play any mean-ingful role in resolving the ongoing conflict The Talibanrsquos fate will be more

17 At the time of writing the Taliban were not cooperating in poppy eradication Currentlyit appears this may have changed The Taliban claim to have completely eradicated poppy pro-duction in the areas dominated by their troops and the claim is being verified under UN aus-pices

18 Peter Tomsen ldquoResponse A Chance for Peace in AfghanistanmdashThe Talibanrsquos Days areNumberedrdquo Foreign Affairs 79 (JanuaryndashFebruary 2000) p 179

19 Ahmed Rashid ldquoAfghanistan Heart of Darknessrdquo FEER August 5 1999

NASREEN GHUFRAN 483

or less the same as that which befell the mujahideen if they do not take timelyand corrective measures to improve Afghanistanrsquos deteriorating situation

The Taliban gained support from most of the populace in the beginningbecause they offered themselves a neutral force and declared their intentionto remain so However they are no longer neutral and have become anotherparty to the conflict Their policies have not only infuriated the internationalpublic but also large sections of the Afghan community The large influxesof Afghan refugees into Pakistan reflect the growing disagreement with theirpolicies This disenchantment is unlikely to change if the Taliban do notmoderate their stance The Taliban of course believe their policies to be im-portant for bringing about the change they desire but they do not realize howmuch these policies have alienated people The international community hasexplicitly voiced its criticism of the Taliban regime and consider it to be aliving nightmare for women political dissidents and anyone else who doesnot submit to the laws under the authority of the Ministry for the Fostering ofVirtue and Suppression of Vice The Taliban movement itself came about asa reaction to the self-seeking and self-destructive policies of the mujahideenwhose pretensions to Islam and leadership were discredited It was in thisideological vacuum and a Hobbesian state of anarchy that made the Talibanrsquosrule palatable to common Afghanis20 But if the Talibanrsquos government doesnot soften its present policies and complete peace is not restored it will notbe too late for the common people to turn against them

The year 2001 has seen universal outrage at the offensive launched by theTaliban rulers against Afghanistanrsquos Buddhist past Condemnation has notremained confined to non-Muslim states several Islamic countries includingPakistan have been appalled by the destruction of Buddhist statues in theprovince of Bamiyan Pakistan sent an official delegation whose aim was toprevent the Taliban from destroying the statues Pakistanrsquos foreign ministerAbdul Sattar said ldquoCertainly we believe it was a mistake a blunder and as aresult Afghanistan will suffer consequences for years to comerdquo To this headded that ldquoit is very difficult for me to make a statement as to why they didnot hearrdquo21 Iran likewise strongly condemned the statuesrsquo destruction Astatement released by Iranrsquos Cultural Heritage Organization wondered whyldquocertain Taliban-led individuals calling themselves lsquoclericrsquo have ordered de-struction of ancient sites of the mankind society citing blasphemy and idoliz-

20 Hafeez Malik ldquoPakistan Islam and the Taliban Phenomenonrdquo News International (Paki-stan) June 9 2000

21 Sattarrsquos remarks are in ibid March 11 2001

484 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

ing as reasonsrdquo22 To prevent their destruction Iran even offered to buy thestatues or move them into safekeeping

However the Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil rejectedany offer to prevent the destruction of the statues His negotiations with Pa-kistan did not bear a positive result and he rejected the Iranian offers reiterat-ing that the presence of the statues conflicted with Islamic teaching In thewake of the Talibanrsquos subsequent actions Iran led a UN initiative to takeserious action against the regime Commenting on the statuesrsquo destructionthe Iranian Foreign Ministry stated ldquoUnfortunately the Talibanrsquos destructionof the statues has cast doubts on the comprehensive views offered by Islamicideology in the world Clearly Muslims across the world pin the blame onthe rigid-minded Taliban and by no means embroil the Afghan Muslims inthis counter-cultural moverdquo23

The Bamiyan incident stirred up dual controversies about both the charac-ter of the Taliban regime and the relationship between culture religion andnational heritage in an Islamic state In his characteristic style Mullah Omarshrugged off all objections to the planned destruction of the Buddhist statuessaying ldquomy job is the implementation of Islamic orderrdquo He invoked Islamiclaw a fatwa issued by the Afghan ulama associated with this regime and thedecision of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to support his decision24

Nonetheless the destruction of the statues has further tarnished the Talibanrsquosimage While it may be the case that the Taliban undertook their actions inreaction to the tough sanctions imposed on them by the world the Talibanhave to realize that they are not going to earn any international sympathy orrecognition

Afghanistan has always been important to external powers due to its strate-gic location They have meddled in its affairs both in the past and at presentThe protracted civil war makes it more vulnerable to external penetration Insuch situations it has no other option but to seek help and support fromoutside The external powers are more than willing to do so if it serves theirnational interest The opposition is likely to adopt a similar strategy as theyhave less access to the resources of the country than the ruling authority Hadthere been no external involvement Afghanistanrsquos extended civil war wouldnot have become the protracted and complicated affair that it is

The Afghan civil war has important regional implications Various exter-nal powers are pursuing divergent objectives in Afghanistan and the outcome

22 Cultural Heritage Organization comment is in Iran News (Tehran) March 1 2001 Thisnews item is distributed via Middle East News Online available at lthttpwwwmiddleeastwirecomgt

23 Comments of the Iranian Foreign Ministry reported by the BBC World Service March 52001

24 Rahimullah Yusufzai ldquoA Question of Tolerancerdquo News International March 4 2001

466 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

This period saw the Soviets and the socialist regime locked in a struggleagainst the Islamist opposition The ideological and social cleavages putthem on opposite sides External powers got involved backing their own fa-vorites in the war exacerbating the cold war rivalry The conclusion of theGeneva Accords in 1988 produced a shift in the war as the agreement elimi-nated one major cause of the war the Soviet factor The Soviet forces with-drew from Afghanistan by 1989 consequently the Marxist regime lostsupport and finally stepped down to hand over power to the mujahideen(freedom fighters)

In 1992 the Northern Alliance was established in opposition to the com-munist government led by President Najibullah The group consisted of Gen-eral Abdul Rashid Dostum former head of Najibullahrsquos militia forcesAhmed Shah Masood head of the Jamiat-i-Islami Party and Hizb-i-Wahadata pro-Shirsquoa party The resistance groups that fought the Soviet troops anddefeated the Soviet-backed government in Kabul then turned on each otherOn becoming a ruling elitemdasha goal of any combatant in a civil warmdashagreedy power struggle starts among the different factions as each wants agreater share and say in the government During the early stages of the civilwar there were also seven factions operating from Pakistan the Hizb-i-Is-lami (Islamic party) led by Gulbaddin Hekmatyar the Jamiat-i-Islami (Is-lamic society) led by Burhanuddin Rabbani the Ittihad-i-Islami (Islamicunity) led by Rasul Sayyaf the Hizb-i-Islami (Islamic party) led by MaulviYunus Khalis the Mahaz Milli Islami (NIFA the National Islamic front ofAfghanistan) led by Syed Ahmed Gailani the Jabha-imdashNijat-i-Milli (Na-tional salvation front) led by Sibghatullah Mujjadidi and Harakat-e-Inqilabi-i-Islami (Movement of the Islamic revolution) led by Maulvi MohammadNabi Mohammadi As they could not bridge their political differences thecivil war took the form of an intra-mujahideen struggle Peace remained elu-sive despite UN efforts

Amid this turbulence and confusion another force the Taliban a unitedtraditionalist Islamic contender emerged in 1994 By 1996 they took controlof Kabul and pushed the mujahideen back into their opposition barracks Atthe time a war-weary population welcomed the Taliban forces Howeverthe ousted Rabbani regime did not give up its claim to be the legitimate gov-ernment and has therefore opposed the Taliban As a result complete mili-tary victory eluded them and since then the Taliban have engaged in a fightagainst the Northern Alliance

The Talibanrsquos Changing Rolein the Civil War

The Taliban was one of many groups that participated in the struggle againstSoviet forces When the Taliban launched their own movement across Af-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 467

ghanistan they began to catch the attention of the international media Oncethey overran the country militarily so swiftly and yet so peacefully they sim-ply could not go unnoticed A lot of theories started emerging about theirorigin characteristics and objectives Nevertheless they were and still are acomplex phenomenon The Talibanrsquos leadership has been calculatedly mys-terious about the origins of the movement After the Soviet withdrawalTaliban leaders had gone back to their seminaries in order to complete theirstudies

However they were not happy with what went on in the country duringrule by the mujahideen They felt that their sacrifices were going to waste aspower wrangling and corruption continued This motivated them to start themovement Its major missions were to bring peace and order and implementSharirsquoah (Islamic law) in what they believed to be its true sense Accordingto Mullah Omar one of the key Taliban leaders the Taliban ldquotook up arms toachieve the aims of the Afghan jihad and save our people from further suffer-ing at the hands of the so-called mujahideen We had complete faith in GodAlmighty We never forgot that He can bless us with victory or plunge usinto defeatrdquo3

The rapid emergence of the Islamic Movement of Taliban of Afghanistanled to many positive expectations As an initially peaceful neutral and non-greedy force they appeared on the scene when the Afghans had lost all faithin the countryrsquos leadership Their early critics did not predict that the Talibanwould make any difference in the outcome of the war or be able to managesuccess With little fighting the Taliban took control over the southern partof the country within a few months There they disarmed militia com-manders and reestablished law and order by applying a rather strict interpre-tation of Islamic law With a piecemeal approach the Taliban soon occupiedlarger territories and became a formidable force

Their agenda was clear and convincing for the war-weary public as theaims of the movement unfolded According to Kamal Matinuddin the imme-diate goals of the new movement were to disarm all rival militia fight againstthose who did not accept their request enforce Islamic law in the areas theyliberated and retain all areas the Taliban captured4 As a truly grassrootsIslamist movement the Taliban could rely on the support of the masses Bythis time the loyalty of the mujahideen to their respective factions was notstrong They could be purchased or persuaded to switch sides whenever theyfound it in their interest to do so In town after town armed men desertedtheir leaders and joined the Taliban Desertions brought weapons as the Rus-

3 Rashid Taliban p 234 Kamal Matinuddin The Taliban Phenomenon Afghanistan 1994ndash1997 (Karachi Pakistan

Oxford University Press 1999) p 26

468 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

sians had left behind a heavily armed country As the Taliban marchedalong they picked up guns mortars tanks and even aircraft

What was unusual about the Talibanrsquos strategy is that they were relativelysuccessful in avoiding direct fighting with other potential rival groups Theyadopted a simple strategy that was markedly different and peaceful Whenapproaching an unconquered territory the Taliban would first send a delega-tion of ulama (clerics) to talk to any local militia commanders The ulamathen invited them to implement Islamic law and establish peace by handingover their arms and ammunition These clerics argued that the weapons be-longed to the Bait-ul-Mal (National treasury) under the rule of a single gov-ernment If the local militia commander agreed to the request by thedelegation then there was no fighting In case that the delegation of ulamafailed to secure a peaceful surrender the Taliban then would send a seconddelegation including elderly pious people of the area along with a Talibanrepresentative If the second delegation failed to secure a surrender to theirdemands then the Taliban would take up arms against the hold-out militia

Since disarming the local militia was the foremost priority of the Talibanthe latterrsquos stockpile of weapons kept increasing every time they overran aprovince Most of the time the weapons were handed over peacefully be-cause local militia commanders considered the Taliban to be a neutral even abenign force Moreover local commanders were eager to avoid furtherbloodshed Though simple the Talibanrsquos peaceful strategymdashbut with theveiled threat of forcemdashhas been difficult to understand It could be arguedthat during the initial stages of the Afghan civil war the Taliban achievedmost of their victories without waging a fight

Using this unique strategy the Taliban continued to make headway to thecapital without much resistance from the former rulers They took control ofthree of Afghanistanrsquos largest cities Herat in 1995 Kabul in 1996 and Ma-zar Sharif in 1997 They did it with few casualties among their troops andeven fewer among civilians Initially they were the only force capable ofrestoring law and order By 1997 the Taliban controlled around 90 of thecountry by disarming and in certain cases incorporating the former militiacommanders and assorted mujahideen

Restoration of peace and order are prerequisites to end civil war As Bar-nett Rubin has documented the Taliban denounced the failure of the muja-hideen leaders to establish security They accused the former militia com-manders of becoming thieves and even rapists They tore down all check-points set up to extort money and refused all bribes at their own Theycleared the bandits off the roads and instead of slaughtering their opponents

NASREEN GHUFRAN 469

merely disarmed them Their message seemed simple and appealing to mostAfghans peace order and Islamic law5

Establishing peace in a country like Afghanistan is by no means an easytask particularly in light of how long the civil war has been underway Evensome critics of the Taliban talk about the restoration of peace in Taliban-controlled areas ldquoBefore the Taliban this country belonged to warlords andthe simple act of going to visit my village was an impossibilityrdquo said a UNofficial who is an Afghan ldquoMy daughters sit in the house and cry to me Wewant education This is heartbreaking but peace is the first priority for peo-ple here The Taliban must be given credit for accomplishing thisrdquo6

In his in-depth analysis Franz Schurmann concluded that it is the power ofthe Talibanrsquos ideas and the stability they have brought to war-torn Afghani-stan that makes them so frightening Their proven effectiveness in maintain-ing law and order as well as their adherence to the commandments of Islamand cultural norms which see traditional Afghan women as being obedientrather than challenging to men seem to have won over the predominantlyilliterate peasants and working class

After so many years of debilitating warfare concentrated in and around thecities the urbane educated elite who would challenge these norms have van-ished More importantly for centuries the great mass of Afghans has thrivedunder the most primitive political and economic conditions while the pasttwo decades have brought only war poverty and insecurity For most Af-ghans therefore their present situation under the Taliban appears to be if notideal the best among possible alternatives The removal of small arms andheavy weapons from public view is an accomplishment of immense propor-tions as weapons were everywhere and used indiscriminately

The situation in the territory controlled by the Northern Alliance is quitedifferent The opposition controls a tiny but significant 10 of the country inthe north There people are so fearful of crime that they often doubt theadvantages of the relatively liberal order under which they live It appearsthat in Afghanistan freedom and safety are opposites The Alliance had beeninstrumental in bringing down Najibullahrsquos government in April 1992 but itdisintegrated shortly after its victory because of power struggles within thegroup However when the Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996 thethree participant groups resurrected the Northern Alliance in opposition onceagain Accurate figures regarding the total mobilizing force of the allianceare not available but by a rough estimate they would number around 80000troops In contrast the Talibanrsquos active forces number about 100000

5 Barnett Rubin The Search for Peace in Afghanistan From Buffer State to Failed State(New Haven Conn Yale University Press 1995) p 140

6 Barry Bearak ldquoAfghans Ruled by Taliban Poor Isolated but Securerdquo New York Times(NYT) October 10 1998

470 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

The nominal head of the Northern Alliance is Burhanuddin Rabbani al-though in reality he shares power with his primary military backer AhmedShah Masood Both of them belong to the Jamiat-i-Islami which is apredominantly Tajik Islamist party Rabbanirsquos regime controls most of thecountryrsquos embassies abroad and retains Afghanistanrsquos seat in the UN Ah-med Shah Masood built Afghanistanrsquos most sophisticated military-politicalorganization the Shurandashyi-Nazar-i-Shamali (Supervisory Council of theNorth SCN) The SCN coordinated Jamiat commanders and also createdregion-wide forces that developed into Masoodrsquos Urdu-i-Islami (IslamicArmy) Rabbani and Masood get their main support from the northeasternlargely Tajik portion of the country Due to his military performance andcontrol of the strategic Panjsher Valley Masood is popularly known as theldquolion of Panjsherrdquo

General Abdul Rashid Dostum and his ethnic Uzbek Junbishndashi-Milli (Na-tional movement) Party also form part of the Northern Alliance The latterrsquosbase of support lies primarily among the Sunni Muslim Uzbeks A largenumber of fighters forming part of this organization (the numbers vary be-tween 15000 and 16000) had a reputation of being the best-equipped forcesThe Hizb-i-Wahadat-i-Islami yi-Afghanistan (Islamic unity party of Afghani-stan) is the principal Shirsquoa party in Afghanistan its support is mainly amongthe ethnic Hazara group This group was originally formed under Iraniansponsorship in order to unite eight Shirsquoa parties Its leader is Karim Khaliliwho is based in Hazarajat7

Until they captured Kabul in 1996 the Taliban expressed no desire to rulethe country Ever since then the Taliban have committed themselves to con-quering the entire country The problems with the Taliban began when theystarted acting as the ruling elite Eventually their growing international iso-lation plus their ineffective administration alienated large numbers of Af-ghans As the civil war continues they are becoming more rigid Thisattitude has doomed expectations that the civil war will end Indeed whilethe Talibanrsquos achievements as a peace force had good beginnings as theyears have passed they seem to have become entangled in the civil war thatthey intended to disentangle During the early period of the civil war theTaliban did achieve some remarkable accomplishments above all revivingthe lost trust of the Afghans However their strong opposition to the forcesof the North has earned them a reputation for inflexibility

The Taliban transformed themselves from a movement into a ruling gov-ernment Their main priorities were to bring peace while at the same time tostay in power to implement their vision of an Islamic state But resistance tothis vision remains strong and the Northern Alliance is still giving the

7 Ibid

NASREEN GHUFRAN 471

Taliban a difficult time Despite the relative isolation of the Northern Alli-ancersquos forces and their extended lines of communication they have been ableto continue owing to military assistance from outside governments This aidhas come in a variety of forms ranging from the direct transfer of materiel tothe dispatch of military advisors and support personnel albeit in limited num-bers Next to none of these transfers have been publicly documented viasubmissions to the UNrsquos register on conventional arms Ironically much ofthe Northern Alliancersquos military support comes from nations participating inthe so-called ldquoSix-Plus-Twordquo contact group (Pakistan Iran UzbekistanChina Turkmenistan Tajikistan and Russia and the United States) whosemembers have publicly pledged not to provide military support to any Af-ghan combatants and prevent the use of member state territories for suchpurposes

The Northern Alliancersquos main suppliers are Iran and Russia with secon-dary roles played by Tajikistan Uzbekistan (at least until 1998) Turkmeni-stan and Kyrgyzstan Moscow denies that it is arming the Afghan rebels Inan interview with the New York Times Masood has said that he receivesmuch of his equipment from the Russian mafia not the Russian governmentHowever Russia has reportedly provided Dostum with 500 T-55 and T-62tanks that are used against areas that oppose his rule Russia has also sup-plied him with a large number of Frog 7 and Luna M missiles8

The assistance from some Central Asian republics has been an importantsource of support to the Northern Alliance Uzbekistanrsquos president IslamKarimov has clandestinely supported his fellow Uzbeks His country hassupplied the Northern Alliance with tanks aircraft and technical personnelThis support has been provided with the expectation that Uzbek-dominatedprovinces in northern Afghanistan would provide a buffer against the spreadof fundamentalism The secular regime of Turkmenistanrsquos presidentSapamurad Niyazov has publicly joined other Central Asian republics in ar-ticulating the dangers of the Afghan civil war spreading into the neighboringstates However the government of Turkmenistan is not too keen in gettingembroiled and providing overt backing to those fighting the Taliban

Anti-Taliban forces are being trained in a dozen or so camps located alongIranrsquos eastern border Since May 1997 6000 Afghan military personnelhave been dispatched from these camps to various war fronts in northernAfghanistan Most of Iranrsquos aid has been going to the Hizb-i-Wahadat PartyIran has also purchased two Su-22 and one Su-24 fighter-bombers for AhmedShah Masood and sent Iranian pilots to help plan air operations for the North-ern Alliance

8 James Risen ldquoRussians Are Back in Afghanistan Aiding Rebelsrdquo NYT July 27 1998

472 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

Clearly the challenges to the Taliban have grown over the years particu-larly in the political and economic field They continue fighting on the onehand while on the other they are increasingly worried about their growingpolitical isolation However isolation has not moderated them Theystaunchly believe in their ideology which makes it difficult for others to un-derstand them as something other than an extremist force Economicallythey are in a vulnerable position because they are operating in a war-devas-tated country and the Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan have beentargeted for heavy international sanctions

The Formation of the Taliban Governmentand Its Effect on the Civil War

By 1997 the Taliban had accomplished major military successes in the civilwar After the capture of Kabul they also began to prove themselves in thepolitical arena They felt the need of forming an alternate government tocounter the legitimacy of Rabbanirsquos regime Aware that peace and politicalstability in the country would ultimately make them a credible force theTaliban instituted a framework of shuras (consultative bodies) to achievethose aims The most visible Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad OmarAkhund then asked the shuras to give some political shape to the movement

The Taliban also gave the country a new official name changing it fromthe Islamic State of Afghanistan to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA)in October 1997 The group justified the new name as reflecting the groundrealities However the opposition has termed the change to be an undemo-cratic move A prominent Afghan intellectual Rasul Amin in a BBC PushtoService interview spoke of the new name as something that to him felt asthough it was a transplant from the Arab world However Mullah WakilAhmed a senior Taliban leader and spokesman of the movement said it wasnot the first time that Afghanistanrsquos name has been changed In the pastwords such as ldquorepublicrdquo or ldquodemocraticrdquo were added to Afghanistanrsquos nameThe emirate system however is not acceptable to the opposition as Talibanpossess no popular or legal mandate to govern or impose such But for theTaliban changing the countryrsquos appellation represents breaking with the pastand reforming the political system

The Talibanrsquos initially loose bureaucratic structures have been trans-formed too Mullah Mohammad Omar Akhund was elected Amir-ul-Momineen (Commander of the believers) by an assembly of about 1200 in-vited ulama in the city of Kandahar in spring 1996 Since then Mullah Omarhas been at the top of the ruling structure in Afghanistan Though he remainsin the background his word is final and almost has the force of law in themovement Mullah Omar lives simply known for having few needs and withno particular taste in food or dress He is alarmingly careless about his per-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 473

TABLE 1 Ethnic Composition and Cabinet Portfolios of the 10-Member Shura Basedin Kandahar

Names Ethnicity Portfolio

Mullah Mohammad Omar Ghilzai Amir-ul-MonineenAkhund Pushtun

Mullah Mohammad Rabbani Pushtun Chairman of the Caretaker CouncilDeputy Commander of the Taliban

movementMullah Mohammad Fadel Pushtun Minister of DefenseMullah Mohammad Ghaus Pushtun Minister of Foreign AffairsMullah Mohammad Hassan Pushtun Minister of SecurityMaulvi Ghaisuddin Agha Uzbek Minister of EducationMaulvi Abdur Raqib Uzbek Minister for RefugeesQari Deen Mohammad Tajik Minister for PlanningMullah Abdul Razzaq Tajik Member Supervisory CouncilMaulvi Abdul Saleem Uzbek Deputy Minister of Education

sonal security is not a gifted orator and his study of religion is limited as hewas not able to complete his religious education because of the war Despitethis background he inspires confidence among his supporters because of hispiety and the strength of his beliefs

Mullah Omar is assisted by a loose network of shuras A central shuracomprising 10 members was established in Kandahar (see Table 1) All di-rectives and policies were initiated from here and it virtually became the cap-ital of the Taliban-controlled areas (indeed Kandahar is the currentheadquarters of the Taliban movement) Aside from the core group of 10meetings of the original shura also saw participation from military com-manders tribal leaders and ulama this indeterminate structure is one of thekey features of the Talibanrsquos central shura Mullah Omar also tried to main-tain a balance between the Pushtuns and non-Pushtuns in the shura TheTaliban have been criticized for dividing Afghanistan along ethnic linesHowever despite the effort to integrate non-Pushtuns into the shura theTaliban have not been able to shed their Pushtun moorings and have not beenconsidered as impartial regarding other ethnicities

The takeover of Kabul and the formation of a central shura reflected theTalibanrsquos desire to have a more lasting stay on the political scene The cen-tral shura is assisted by a cabinet a shura in Kabul and a military shuraThese three bodies report to the central shura in Kandahar Clearly theseadministrative structures are different from the past governments For in-stance a talib (religious student) in a ministerial post is something unknownin Afghan history Nevertheless even the Taliban have found that control-

474 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

TABLE 2 Military Command Structure of the Taliban

Position Individual

Commander in Chief Mullah Mohammad Omar AkhundMilitary Chief of Staff Mullah Mohmmad HassanChief of the Army Staff Mullah Rahmatullah AkhundArmy Division Chief Mullah Muhammad Jumma KhanArmy Division Chief Mullah Muhammad YunusArmy Division Chief Mullah Mohammad GulArmy Division Chief Mullah Mohammad Aziz KhanArmored Force No 4 Mullah Mohammad Zahir

ling a territory without a clear administrative system is not possible in con-temporary times

The formation of these shuras was aimed at creating an efficient govern-ment After they captured Kabul the Taliban formed a six-member Provi-sional Ruling Council headed by Mullah Mohammad Rabbani This wasfollowed by the formation of the Kabul Shura of Acting Ministers in 1999The Kabul Shura deals with day-to-day problems of the government the cityand the Kabul military front Important policy recommendations are con-veyed to the Kandahar Shura where decisions are actually made To restoreand maintain peace in the provinces the Taliban appoints governors who arefrom provinces other than those where they are serving This policy appearsto have been welcomed by the people As for the military shura it is a looseorganizational body that plans strategy and can implement some tactical deci-sions (see Table 2) The military shura appears to have no strategic decision-making powers Military strategy key personnel appointments and the allo-cation of funds for offensives are decided upon by the Amir-ul-Momineen

Although their government has few resources and many parts barely func-tion at all the Taliban have adopted a discourse of Afghan nationalism inaddition to their Islamic traditionalism Despite their amorphous politicalleadership the Taliban claim to be trying to recreate a centralized Afghanstate In areas under their control they have appointed provincial governorsand administrators of districts cities and towns from the center9

One of the most remarkable characteristics of the Taliban leadership is thattop government officials often switch from the battlefield to the ministry andback again each time following the orders from Mullah Omar In one sensethis produces remarkable flexibility among the Taliban hierarchy as they allact as both administrators and military commanders This flexibility in the

9 Barnett Rubin ldquoAfghanistan under the Talibanrdquo Current History vol 98 no 625 (Febru-ary 1999) p 81

NASREEN GHUFRAN 475

military command has allowed the leadership to maintain better ties with therank-and-file fighters than might otherwise be the case However theTaliban administration in Kabul has faced problems For instance while anyminister is away at the front no decisions can be taken in that ministryMoreover government ministers are working without pay something un-heard of in modern times They do not use government resources for privateuse curtailing expenses and refraining from indulgence in squandering andextravagance Regular salaries are paid only to professional civil servantsand trained soldiers drawn from the former communist army

As for the Northern Alliance until August 1998 the areas it controlled hadfour main administrative and political centers Mazar Sharif which somegroups aspired to turn into a temporary capital for a government in exile ofthe Islamic State of Afghanistan Talauqan the headquarters of MasoodrsquosSCN Shibergan the location of Dostumrsquos headquarters and Bamiyan theheadquarters of the Hizb-i-Wahadat The Taliban have made inroads intothese areas too because the entire political administrative fabric of northernAfghanistan has broken down Only one of Afghanistanrsquos provinces is nowentirely under the Northern Alliancersquos control Badakhshan an inaccessiblemountainous region in the extreme northeast of the country There are alsoneighboring valleys to the west and a few enclaves in the Afghan interiorover which the Taliban have not yet been able to consolidate control Someelements of the former state administration have survived but political powerresides individually in the various armed groups rather than in a unitary civil-ian structure The groups maintain their own military and command struc-tures they do not have a unified strategy for the joint mobilization ofresources in their struggle against the Taliban

The areas controlled by the Taliban have been subjected to drastic changesto personal behavior The Taliban have put a ban on wine and televisionwhich is perceived to be immoral There is also complete restriction on mu-sic photography and the painting of living things The shaving off of onersquosbeard or trimming it less than a fistful is prohibited as is having a Westernhairstyle Gambling betting pigeon flying dog-racing and sodomy are alsostrictly forbidden

The Taliban have gained international notoriety because they have bannedwomen from working Women are obligated to observe strict purdah (litveiling also refers to covering of bodies) Girls have been stopped fromgoing to schools The Taliban have told all women working outside theirhomes to stay at home Although women who had been working will con-tinue to receive their salaries the Taliban claim that there is no need for themto work any longer They claim that these restrictions have been put in placeto protect the honor and dignity of women At the same time Taliban offi-cials have said that they are not against women working or receiving an edu-

476 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

cation The Taliban claim that they need time and resources to create theproper environment and right texts and curriculum for womenrsquos educationThe Talibanrsquos behavior is modeled after the Islamic revolution in Iran Edu-cational establishments remained closed for many years in the aftermath ofthat revolution They remained closed until the Iranian revolutionaries for-mally established an educational syllabus conforming to their own principles

The Taliban have stated that they wish to establish a pure Islamic state Intheir view this means that women have no place in the public arena Theyare required to stay at home and take care of their husbands and childrenThe Taliban cling to the symbol of a protected woman Women have toobserve a strict dress code wearing a burqa (a garment covering the bodyfrom head to toe) and trousers fully covering their ankles While women hadworn burqa in the pre-Taliban era it had not been an enforced dress code

The Talibanrsquos edicts have had a severe impact on many other women whodo not have a close male relative to accompany them in public Hardest hithave been the countryrsquos estimated 30000 widows many of whom are thesole providers for their families Some widows have been allowed to work inareas under the Taliban control but even for them it is not easy to get permis-sion According to Taliban representatives the current restrictions are said tobe necessary because females are not safe outside their homes Many womenhave strongly reacted to the Taliban policies despite the restrictive climate inTaliban-controlled areas These women do not like what the Taliban havebeen professing They want to work and continue with their education butthese rights are being denied to them The justifications given by Taliban arenot acceptable to the working and more enlightened urban Afghan women Itis therefore not surprising that women have become the most vocal critics ofthe Taliban

The edicts against women also have predictably had a devastating impacton primary level education Before the civil war over four-fifths of primaryschool teachers were women The majority of them are now jobless Theclosure of schools has in turn affected children Many orphaned childrenwho once could make homes at schools are now forced to live on the streetsAn international aid group in 1998 estimated 28000 street children in Kabulalone

Mullah Nuruddin Turabi the Taliban minister of justice defended theTalibanrsquos domestic actions He said ldquoIt is not just a question of men wearingbeards and women wearing burqas In Afghanistan every vice has to bestopped and every virtue promulgatedrdquo10 The Taliban have established anew security service the Ministry of Enforcement of Virtue and Suppressionof Vice for eradicating corruption and other vices from Afghan society Ac-

10 Michael Fathers ldquoFrozen in Timerdquo Time May 2000

NASREEN GHUFRAN 477

cording to Taliban tenets their rules are a jihad (holy war) against sin cor-ruption and cruelty Therefore those who do not abide by the Taliban edictson personal behavior are strictly punished according to a strict application ofIslamic law Hence stoning to death amputations (in case of robbery) andother forms of punishments are carried out in front of large crowds

Nonetheless a crisis of governance remains in Afghanistan To supportersof the Taliban regime its government is one that is accountable and represen-tative of all ethnic groups To many the Taliban have restored Afghan cul-ture Afghan-style self-rule has been implemented in the provinces and theTalibanrsquos supporters note that the countryrsquos civil administration and justicesystem are now based on Islamic and Afghan traditions The opposition re-jects this opinion and condemns the Taliban government of being unrepre-sentative and unaccountable

While all the above-mentioned structures are functioning the governmentfaces tremendous challenges The most obvious one is the governmentrsquosunacceptability to and lack of recognition from the international system letalone by the opposition The political dealings that the government has hadwith others offer evidence of its credibility in the civil war While theTaliban have major control of the countryrsquos land area they have not yet hadmuch success on the political front Forming a government is not enough toend the civil war the Taliban must gain acceptability both at home andabroad

The Talibanrsquos International Legal StatusRecognition of a government in a civil war also helps in ending the conflictbecause both parties involved desire the political economic and militarysupport that can come with it Non-recognition of the Taliban government isan indicator of its standing in the international community The recognitionhas not been forthcoming because of dissatisfaction with Taliban policiesUpon taking Kabul the Taliban had immediately demanded from other statesformal recognition as the only legitimate government of Afghanistan Theyalso demanded to be granted a seat in the UN General Assembly Howeverthey received neither So far only Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UnitedArab Emirates (UAE) have recognized the Taliban government In contrastBurhanuddin Rabbanirsquos Northern Alliance regime despite its weak militaryposition has legitimacy and political backing from the world communityincluding the majority of the Islamic states Most countries preserved thestatus quo and continued to allow the diplomatic missions of the Rabbaniregime

Recognition in international law involves acceptance by a state of a givenentity that this recognized entity possesses an international legal personalityand the rights and privileges that flow from it or that it is the exclusive

478 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

representative of a body with international legal personality The decision togrant or not to grant recognition is a political one within the sovereign discre-tion of individual states Recognition in principle can be accorded to states orgovernments As far as the state of Afghanistan itself is concerned it hasbeen recognized by a large number of countries including all permanentmembers of the UN Security Council for many years However wherepolitical power has fragmented to the extent that it has in Afghanistan inrecent years there may well be more than one group claiming to be the gov-ernment In fact as has been outlined already there are two governmentswithin one country One is militarily strong and controls a large populationand territory but has no legal standing while the other is recognized but hasless control of Afghan territory

Pakistan was the first country to grant international recognition to theTalibanrsquos government Their past links provided the basis for doing so Asnoted earlier virtually all of the Taliban leadership had been refugees in Pa-kistan For several years Taliban leaders studied in the madrasas (religiousschools) affiliated with the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) headed by MaulviFazul ur Rehman Although it has not been conclusively proven that theTaliban are Pakistanrsquos creation much criticism along these lines and othershas been leveled against it Pakistan is said to have played a key role inturning Taliban into a functioning military force by providing training logis-tical support and equipment

In 1997 Pakistan rooted its decision to recognize the Taliban governmentbased on the fact that the latter was in effective control of most of Afghani-stanrsquos territory including the capital By the time recognition was given theTaliban government occupied 90 of Afghanistan and oversaw a populationthat was representative of all of the countryrsquos ethnic groups Since then Paki-stan has been striving to propagate a positive image of the student militia andworking to induce other neighboring countries to recognize them Further-more Pakistan has been making persistent attempts to get the UN to adoptthe vacant seat formula which the Organization of Islamic Conferences haddone during 1996

Pakistanrsquos ties with the Taliban have become increasingly complex owingto the influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan Pakistanmdasha country of 140million mostly poor peoplemdashhas been almost single-handedly housing andfeeding the 12 million Afghan refugees living there since 1995 the year theUN stopped providing food and housing aid Some of the Afghan refugeescurrently in Pakistan have been there since the 1980s having fled the Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan At the time an estimated 32 million refugees livedin Pakistan making it the largest caseload of refugees in the world

Some of the refugees did return to Afghanistan In 1994 approximately77000 went back with the assistance of the UN High Commission for Refu-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 479

gees (UNHCR) An additional 76000 refugees returned to Afghanistan ontheir own11 However the years since then have seen a new wave of refu-gees flowing into Pakistan from northern Afghanistan Many of the freshrefugees are fleeing the fighting there plus a devastating drought This newwave has not been officially registered with any international organizationAs a consequence the statistics regarding refugees in Pakistan are unreliableAn influx of 30000 Afghan refugees came to Pakistan in 2000 and it is esti-mated that more than 50000 have crossed the border since then In that yearPakistan decided to close its border to stop further refugees because it couldnot absorb any more However its border was later reopened because of thedeplorable condition of the refugees and pressure from international humani-tarian relief agencies

Aside from Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UAE are on the list of countriesrecognizing the Talibanrsquos government Saudi Arabiarsquos came only a few daysafter Pakistanrsquos Until mid-1998 Islamabad and Riyadh were on the samepolitical wavelength Saudi Arabia supplied heavily subsidized fuel to theTaliban through Pakistan and also provided general funding After 1998problems between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan developed over the fate ofOsama bin Laden the Saudi millionaire who had been funding the Afghanjihad The Taliban had promised Saudi Arabia that Osama bin Laden wouldnot use his refuge in Afghanistan to support any acts of violence abroadAfter Osama bin Laden was linked to the bombings of US embassies inKenya and Tanzania his continued refuge in Afghanistan became a majorsource of tension between Taliban and the US on one hand and Saudi Ara-bia on the other

Apart from these three countries the Taliban have not managed to estab-lish political ties with other states This becomes a major constraint for agovernment of a country going through civil war If the paramount objectiveis to end the civil war the government has to direct its energies in this direc-tion It cannot expect the US or other countries to come to its rescue

The United States has been a major country involved in AfghanistanAlong with the Soviets the US had fed the civil war since the days of thecold war When Taliban captured Kabul the US State Department an-nounced it would establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban by sendingan official to Kabul This announcement was quickly retracted The StateDepartment spokesman Glyn Davies said the US found nothing objectiona-ble in the steps taken by the Taliban to impose Islamic law and described theTaliban as anti-modern rather than anti-Western Some members of Con-

11 Nasreen Ghufran ldquoRefugees A Comparative Study of India and Pakistanrdquo (paperpresented at the conference ldquoThe Challenge of Cooperation South Asia and Beyondrdquo Kath-mandu Nepal December 1998)

480 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

gress supported the Taliban because their government appeared to serve theUS policy of isolating Iran A Taliban regime would create a firmly Sunnibuffer on Iranrsquos border and potentially provide security for trade routes andpipelines that would break Iranrsquos monopoly on Central Asiarsquos southern traderoutes

But from its initial policy of acquiescence vis-a-vis the Taliban the USmoved to the other extreme of rejecting them completely The US rejectionwas largely because of the pressure exerted by the feminist movement Theprominent feminist Zieba-Shorish Shamley persuaded many US feministgroups to spearhead a signature campaign to mobilize support for Afghanwomen Her efforts helped persuade former President Clinton to take atougher stance against the Taliban12 Washingtonrsquos denouncement of theTaliban also came in the backdrop of the presidential election in the US assupporting a regime that held no respect for human rights would have nega-tively affected Clintonrsquos position13

In 1998 when the Taliban made great military gains against the forces ofthe North they expected to gain recognition and a seat in the UN they hadmajor Afghan cities under their control and their rivals in retreat Talibanrepresentatives claimed that if recognition were granted to their governmentthey would allow a huge pipeline project to proceed that would carry oil andgas from Central Asia to lucrative markets in Pakistan and India This pipe-line would cut through the western part of Afghanistan ldquoEven before thecapture of Mazar-i-Sharif and Taloqan we were fully qualified for recogni-tionrdquo said deputy information minister Abdur Rahman Hotaki referring totwo key opposition bases captured by the militia ldquoThe opposition gave peo-ple an excuse to deny us recognition and prevent us having the pipeline runthrough our country but that excuse has now gonerdquo he said ldquoAll excusesblocking our recognition are gone Therefore it is predicted they will revisetheir policy in view of the current realitiesrdquo he said adding that all ldquotermsand conditions for a legitimate staterdquo have been met14

But the Taliban encountered problems with international organizations In1999 the UN proposed imposing sanctions against the Taliban when it is-sued Security Council Resolution 1267 Adopted unanimously by the Secur-ity Council on October 15 the resolution demanded that the Taliban turn overOsama bin Laden without further delay to authorities in a country where hewill be brought to justice Until the Taliban comply the resolution requiresUN member states to deny permission for Taliban-owned -leased or -oper-ated aircraft to land in or take off from their territory It also calls for the

12 Rashid Taliban pp 180ndash8213 P Stobodan ldquoThe Afghan Conflict and Regional Securityrdquo Strategic Analysis (August

1999) p 72414 Frontier Post (Peshawar) January 14 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 481

freezing of funds and other financial resources including funds derived fromproperty owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban The lat-ter had 30 days in which to comply with this resolution before sanctions wereimposed The Taliban did not comply and the sanctions came into force

Another round of sanctions was imposed on the Taliban in December 2000with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1333 The new sanc-tions called for an arms embargo on the Taliban including foreign militaryassistance It also imposed a ban on travel by the militiarsquos senior leaders abroader flight ban than the one imposed last year to force bin Ladenrsquos surren-der measures to close all Taliban offices overseas and a ban on exports toTaliban areas of acetic anhydride used to manufacture heroin Finally it alsofroze funds and other financial assets of Osama bin Laden and individualsand entities associated with him Mullah Omar reacted to this round of sanc-tions by saying his government would not back out from its stand and princi-ples even if the entire world turned against them15

The continuation of these sanctions has pushed the issue of recognition tothe backburner However the international community is also paying a pricefor not recognizing the legitimacy of the Taliban One of the principal areasin which the Taliban could provide some assistance is in the containment ofthe production of poppy Mullah Omar on several occasions emphasized hiswill to fight against opium production However it has been difficult tomaintain such policy postures in the wake of external sanctions As a resultin 1999 over 90983 hectares of poppies yielded a harvest of over 4581 tonsof dry opium an estimated 70 increase in production over the previousyearrsquos figure

The international sanctions have also affected the incentives of local farm-ers to turn away from poppy production Afghanistanrsquos socioeconomic situa-tion makes opium production one of the only available economic means foraccess to land labor and credit Currently the Afghan peasantryrsquos heavydependence upon opium production associated with the politico-territorialrealities of a tribal society typified by fragile political allegiances is makingit difficult for the Taliban to make any serious attempts at eradication16

Additionally any Taliban attempt to implement a poppy eradication policywill be severely compromised by the governmentrsquos international non-recog-nition This places restrictions on the options open to the government Eventhe UN Drug Control Program cannot legally reach any formal agreementwith the Taliban government as long as the latter is not internationally recog-nized The Taliban government faces a self-imposed catch-22 situation Its

15 Ibid16 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy ldquoTalibanrsquos Drug Dilemma Opium Production vs International

Recognitionrdquo The Analyst (Paris) (1999)

482 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

political policies and actions are deemed unacceptable by the internationalcommunity yet it cannot pursue any eradication policy with any hope ofcomplete success without the international recognition and aid that are beingdenied it owing to those policies and actions17

Future Prospects for Change in theTalibanrsquos Regime

Since 1996 the Taliban have been striving to bring the civil war to a success-ful conclusion Their domestic policies have brought about alienation andcreated fissures within the Afghan society Their inflexible stand on variouspolicies has denied them the credibility they so desire Their authoritarianismand intolerance have alienated non-Pushtun Afghans who make up morethan half the population The flow of thousands of extremist Pakistani andArab Taliban supporters into Afghanistan has fueled the resentment of thelocal populace18

The Taliban are accused of harboring terrorists and extremists who notonly support Taliban but also carry out their extremist policies in the targetedcountries According to a report that appeared in the Far Eastern EconomicReview (FEER) Afghanistan has become a sanctuary for ldquoarmed insurgentsaccused of terrorist attacks in China Iran Uzbekistan Tajikistan and Paki-stanrdquo Some 400 Arab Islamic militants from a dozen Middle Eastern andAfrican countries are said to be part of the 055 Brigade funded by Osama binLaden and fighting alongside Taliban in the current offensive The articlefurther noted that ldquo[t]he diverse groups have their own agendas mainly fo-cused on undermining the regimes at home but some share bin Ladenrsquos zealfor a global Islamic revolution The resulting web of dangerous friendshipsthreatens to export instability throughout the mineral-rich and commerciallyunder-exploited hinterland of Central Asiardquo19

It is obvious that the Taliban must improve their image both at home andabroad as perceptions play an important role in the general acceptability ornon-acceptability of governments in both arenas Currently the Taliban areperceived primarily as a negative element that is unlikely to play any positiverole in resolving the Afghan conflict If they fail in their goal the Afghannation will lose any trust that religious political forces could play any mean-ingful role in resolving the ongoing conflict The Talibanrsquos fate will be more

17 At the time of writing the Taliban were not cooperating in poppy eradication Currentlyit appears this may have changed The Taliban claim to have completely eradicated poppy pro-duction in the areas dominated by their troops and the claim is being verified under UN aus-pices

18 Peter Tomsen ldquoResponse A Chance for Peace in AfghanistanmdashThe Talibanrsquos Days areNumberedrdquo Foreign Affairs 79 (JanuaryndashFebruary 2000) p 179

19 Ahmed Rashid ldquoAfghanistan Heart of Darknessrdquo FEER August 5 1999

NASREEN GHUFRAN 483

or less the same as that which befell the mujahideen if they do not take timelyand corrective measures to improve Afghanistanrsquos deteriorating situation

The Taliban gained support from most of the populace in the beginningbecause they offered themselves a neutral force and declared their intentionto remain so However they are no longer neutral and have become anotherparty to the conflict Their policies have not only infuriated the internationalpublic but also large sections of the Afghan community The large influxesof Afghan refugees into Pakistan reflect the growing disagreement with theirpolicies This disenchantment is unlikely to change if the Taliban do notmoderate their stance The Taliban of course believe their policies to be im-portant for bringing about the change they desire but they do not realize howmuch these policies have alienated people The international community hasexplicitly voiced its criticism of the Taliban regime and consider it to be aliving nightmare for women political dissidents and anyone else who doesnot submit to the laws under the authority of the Ministry for the Fostering ofVirtue and Suppression of Vice The Taliban movement itself came about asa reaction to the self-seeking and self-destructive policies of the mujahideenwhose pretensions to Islam and leadership were discredited It was in thisideological vacuum and a Hobbesian state of anarchy that made the Talibanrsquosrule palatable to common Afghanis20 But if the Talibanrsquos government doesnot soften its present policies and complete peace is not restored it will notbe too late for the common people to turn against them

The year 2001 has seen universal outrage at the offensive launched by theTaliban rulers against Afghanistanrsquos Buddhist past Condemnation has notremained confined to non-Muslim states several Islamic countries includingPakistan have been appalled by the destruction of Buddhist statues in theprovince of Bamiyan Pakistan sent an official delegation whose aim was toprevent the Taliban from destroying the statues Pakistanrsquos foreign ministerAbdul Sattar said ldquoCertainly we believe it was a mistake a blunder and as aresult Afghanistan will suffer consequences for years to comerdquo To this headded that ldquoit is very difficult for me to make a statement as to why they didnot hearrdquo21 Iran likewise strongly condemned the statuesrsquo destruction Astatement released by Iranrsquos Cultural Heritage Organization wondered whyldquocertain Taliban-led individuals calling themselves lsquoclericrsquo have ordered de-struction of ancient sites of the mankind society citing blasphemy and idoliz-

20 Hafeez Malik ldquoPakistan Islam and the Taliban Phenomenonrdquo News International (Paki-stan) June 9 2000

21 Sattarrsquos remarks are in ibid March 11 2001

484 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

ing as reasonsrdquo22 To prevent their destruction Iran even offered to buy thestatues or move them into safekeeping

However the Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil rejectedany offer to prevent the destruction of the statues His negotiations with Pa-kistan did not bear a positive result and he rejected the Iranian offers reiterat-ing that the presence of the statues conflicted with Islamic teaching In thewake of the Talibanrsquos subsequent actions Iran led a UN initiative to takeserious action against the regime Commenting on the statuesrsquo destructionthe Iranian Foreign Ministry stated ldquoUnfortunately the Talibanrsquos destructionof the statues has cast doubts on the comprehensive views offered by Islamicideology in the world Clearly Muslims across the world pin the blame onthe rigid-minded Taliban and by no means embroil the Afghan Muslims inthis counter-cultural moverdquo23

The Bamiyan incident stirred up dual controversies about both the charac-ter of the Taliban regime and the relationship between culture religion andnational heritage in an Islamic state In his characteristic style Mullah Omarshrugged off all objections to the planned destruction of the Buddhist statuessaying ldquomy job is the implementation of Islamic orderrdquo He invoked Islamiclaw a fatwa issued by the Afghan ulama associated with this regime and thedecision of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to support his decision24

Nonetheless the destruction of the statues has further tarnished the Talibanrsquosimage While it may be the case that the Taliban undertook their actions inreaction to the tough sanctions imposed on them by the world the Talibanhave to realize that they are not going to earn any international sympathy orrecognition

Afghanistan has always been important to external powers due to its strate-gic location They have meddled in its affairs both in the past and at presentThe protracted civil war makes it more vulnerable to external penetration Insuch situations it has no other option but to seek help and support fromoutside The external powers are more than willing to do so if it serves theirnational interest The opposition is likely to adopt a similar strategy as theyhave less access to the resources of the country than the ruling authority Hadthere been no external involvement Afghanistanrsquos extended civil war wouldnot have become the protracted and complicated affair that it is

The Afghan civil war has important regional implications Various exter-nal powers are pursuing divergent objectives in Afghanistan and the outcome

22 Cultural Heritage Organization comment is in Iran News (Tehran) March 1 2001 Thisnews item is distributed via Middle East News Online available at lthttpwwwmiddleeastwirecomgt

23 Comments of the Iranian Foreign Ministry reported by the BBC World Service March 52001

24 Rahimullah Yusufzai ldquoA Question of Tolerancerdquo News International March 4 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 467

ghanistan they began to catch the attention of the international media Oncethey overran the country militarily so swiftly and yet so peacefully they sim-ply could not go unnoticed A lot of theories started emerging about theirorigin characteristics and objectives Nevertheless they were and still are acomplex phenomenon The Talibanrsquos leadership has been calculatedly mys-terious about the origins of the movement After the Soviet withdrawalTaliban leaders had gone back to their seminaries in order to complete theirstudies

However they were not happy with what went on in the country duringrule by the mujahideen They felt that their sacrifices were going to waste aspower wrangling and corruption continued This motivated them to start themovement Its major missions were to bring peace and order and implementSharirsquoah (Islamic law) in what they believed to be its true sense Accordingto Mullah Omar one of the key Taliban leaders the Taliban ldquotook up arms toachieve the aims of the Afghan jihad and save our people from further suffer-ing at the hands of the so-called mujahideen We had complete faith in GodAlmighty We never forgot that He can bless us with victory or plunge usinto defeatrdquo3

The rapid emergence of the Islamic Movement of Taliban of Afghanistanled to many positive expectations As an initially peaceful neutral and non-greedy force they appeared on the scene when the Afghans had lost all faithin the countryrsquos leadership Their early critics did not predict that the Talibanwould make any difference in the outcome of the war or be able to managesuccess With little fighting the Taliban took control over the southern partof the country within a few months There they disarmed militia com-manders and reestablished law and order by applying a rather strict interpre-tation of Islamic law With a piecemeal approach the Taliban soon occupiedlarger territories and became a formidable force

Their agenda was clear and convincing for the war-weary public as theaims of the movement unfolded According to Kamal Matinuddin the imme-diate goals of the new movement were to disarm all rival militia fight againstthose who did not accept their request enforce Islamic law in the areas theyliberated and retain all areas the Taliban captured4 As a truly grassrootsIslamist movement the Taliban could rely on the support of the masses Bythis time the loyalty of the mujahideen to their respective factions was notstrong They could be purchased or persuaded to switch sides whenever theyfound it in their interest to do so In town after town armed men desertedtheir leaders and joined the Taliban Desertions brought weapons as the Rus-

3 Rashid Taliban p 234 Kamal Matinuddin The Taliban Phenomenon Afghanistan 1994ndash1997 (Karachi Pakistan

Oxford University Press 1999) p 26

468 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

sians had left behind a heavily armed country As the Taliban marchedalong they picked up guns mortars tanks and even aircraft

What was unusual about the Talibanrsquos strategy is that they were relativelysuccessful in avoiding direct fighting with other potential rival groups Theyadopted a simple strategy that was markedly different and peaceful Whenapproaching an unconquered territory the Taliban would first send a delega-tion of ulama (clerics) to talk to any local militia commanders The ulamathen invited them to implement Islamic law and establish peace by handingover their arms and ammunition These clerics argued that the weapons be-longed to the Bait-ul-Mal (National treasury) under the rule of a single gov-ernment If the local militia commander agreed to the request by thedelegation then there was no fighting In case that the delegation of ulamafailed to secure a peaceful surrender the Taliban then would send a seconddelegation including elderly pious people of the area along with a Talibanrepresentative If the second delegation failed to secure a surrender to theirdemands then the Taliban would take up arms against the hold-out militia

Since disarming the local militia was the foremost priority of the Talibanthe latterrsquos stockpile of weapons kept increasing every time they overran aprovince Most of the time the weapons were handed over peacefully be-cause local militia commanders considered the Taliban to be a neutral even abenign force Moreover local commanders were eager to avoid furtherbloodshed Though simple the Talibanrsquos peaceful strategymdashbut with theveiled threat of forcemdashhas been difficult to understand It could be arguedthat during the initial stages of the Afghan civil war the Taliban achievedmost of their victories without waging a fight

Using this unique strategy the Taliban continued to make headway to thecapital without much resistance from the former rulers They took control ofthree of Afghanistanrsquos largest cities Herat in 1995 Kabul in 1996 and Ma-zar Sharif in 1997 They did it with few casualties among their troops andeven fewer among civilians Initially they were the only force capable ofrestoring law and order By 1997 the Taliban controlled around 90 of thecountry by disarming and in certain cases incorporating the former militiacommanders and assorted mujahideen

Restoration of peace and order are prerequisites to end civil war As Bar-nett Rubin has documented the Taliban denounced the failure of the muja-hideen leaders to establish security They accused the former militia com-manders of becoming thieves and even rapists They tore down all check-points set up to extort money and refused all bribes at their own Theycleared the bandits off the roads and instead of slaughtering their opponents

NASREEN GHUFRAN 469

merely disarmed them Their message seemed simple and appealing to mostAfghans peace order and Islamic law5

Establishing peace in a country like Afghanistan is by no means an easytask particularly in light of how long the civil war has been underway Evensome critics of the Taliban talk about the restoration of peace in Taliban-controlled areas ldquoBefore the Taliban this country belonged to warlords andthe simple act of going to visit my village was an impossibilityrdquo said a UNofficial who is an Afghan ldquoMy daughters sit in the house and cry to me Wewant education This is heartbreaking but peace is the first priority for peo-ple here The Taliban must be given credit for accomplishing thisrdquo6

In his in-depth analysis Franz Schurmann concluded that it is the power ofthe Talibanrsquos ideas and the stability they have brought to war-torn Afghani-stan that makes them so frightening Their proven effectiveness in maintain-ing law and order as well as their adherence to the commandments of Islamand cultural norms which see traditional Afghan women as being obedientrather than challenging to men seem to have won over the predominantlyilliterate peasants and working class

After so many years of debilitating warfare concentrated in and around thecities the urbane educated elite who would challenge these norms have van-ished More importantly for centuries the great mass of Afghans has thrivedunder the most primitive political and economic conditions while the pasttwo decades have brought only war poverty and insecurity For most Af-ghans therefore their present situation under the Taliban appears to be if notideal the best among possible alternatives The removal of small arms andheavy weapons from public view is an accomplishment of immense propor-tions as weapons were everywhere and used indiscriminately

The situation in the territory controlled by the Northern Alliance is quitedifferent The opposition controls a tiny but significant 10 of the country inthe north There people are so fearful of crime that they often doubt theadvantages of the relatively liberal order under which they live It appearsthat in Afghanistan freedom and safety are opposites The Alliance had beeninstrumental in bringing down Najibullahrsquos government in April 1992 but itdisintegrated shortly after its victory because of power struggles within thegroup However when the Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996 thethree participant groups resurrected the Northern Alliance in opposition onceagain Accurate figures regarding the total mobilizing force of the allianceare not available but by a rough estimate they would number around 80000troops In contrast the Talibanrsquos active forces number about 100000

5 Barnett Rubin The Search for Peace in Afghanistan From Buffer State to Failed State(New Haven Conn Yale University Press 1995) p 140

6 Barry Bearak ldquoAfghans Ruled by Taliban Poor Isolated but Securerdquo New York Times(NYT) October 10 1998

470 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

The nominal head of the Northern Alliance is Burhanuddin Rabbani al-though in reality he shares power with his primary military backer AhmedShah Masood Both of them belong to the Jamiat-i-Islami which is apredominantly Tajik Islamist party Rabbanirsquos regime controls most of thecountryrsquos embassies abroad and retains Afghanistanrsquos seat in the UN Ah-med Shah Masood built Afghanistanrsquos most sophisticated military-politicalorganization the Shurandashyi-Nazar-i-Shamali (Supervisory Council of theNorth SCN) The SCN coordinated Jamiat commanders and also createdregion-wide forces that developed into Masoodrsquos Urdu-i-Islami (IslamicArmy) Rabbani and Masood get their main support from the northeasternlargely Tajik portion of the country Due to his military performance andcontrol of the strategic Panjsher Valley Masood is popularly known as theldquolion of Panjsherrdquo

General Abdul Rashid Dostum and his ethnic Uzbek Junbishndashi-Milli (Na-tional movement) Party also form part of the Northern Alliance The latterrsquosbase of support lies primarily among the Sunni Muslim Uzbeks A largenumber of fighters forming part of this organization (the numbers vary be-tween 15000 and 16000) had a reputation of being the best-equipped forcesThe Hizb-i-Wahadat-i-Islami yi-Afghanistan (Islamic unity party of Afghani-stan) is the principal Shirsquoa party in Afghanistan its support is mainly amongthe ethnic Hazara group This group was originally formed under Iraniansponsorship in order to unite eight Shirsquoa parties Its leader is Karim Khaliliwho is based in Hazarajat7

Until they captured Kabul in 1996 the Taliban expressed no desire to rulethe country Ever since then the Taliban have committed themselves to con-quering the entire country The problems with the Taliban began when theystarted acting as the ruling elite Eventually their growing international iso-lation plus their ineffective administration alienated large numbers of Af-ghans As the civil war continues they are becoming more rigid Thisattitude has doomed expectations that the civil war will end Indeed whilethe Talibanrsquos achievements as a peace force had good beginnings as theyears have passed they seem to have become entangled in the civil war thatthey intended to disentangle During the early period of the civil war theTaliban did achieve some remarkable accomplishments above all revivingthe lost trust of the Afghans However their strong opposition to the forcesof the North has earned them a reputation for inflexibility

The Taliban transformed themselves from a movement into a ruling gov-ernment Their main priorities were to bring peace while at the same time tostay in power to implement their vision of an Islamic state But resistance tothis vision remains strong and the Northern Alliance is still giving the

7 Ibid

NASREEN GHUFRAN 471

Taliban a difficult time Despite the relative isolation of the Northern Alli-ancersquos forces and their extended lines of communication they have been ableto continue owing to military assistance from outside governments This aidhas come in a variety of forms ranging from the direct transfer of materiel tothe dispatch of military advisors and support personnel albeit in limited num-bers Next to none of these transfers have been publicly documented viasubmissions to the UNrsquos register on conventional arms Ironically much ofthe Northern Alliancersquos military support comes from nations participating inthe so-called ldquoSix-Plus-Twordquo contact group (Pakistan Iran UzbekistanChina Turkmenistan Tajikistan and Russia and the United States) whosemembers have publicly pledged not to provide military support to any Af-ghan combatants and prevent the use of member state territories for suchpurposes

The Northern Alliancersquos main suppliers are Iran and Russia with secon-dary roles played by Tajikistan Uzbekistan (at least until 1998) Turkmeni-stan and Kyrgyzstan Moscow denies that it is arming the Afghan rebels Inan interview with the New York Times Masood has said that he receivesmuch of his equipment from the Russian mafia not the Russian governmentHowever Russia has reportedly provided Dostum with 500 T-55 and T-62tanks that are used against areas that oppose his rule Russia has also sup-plied him with a large number of Frog 7 and Luna M missiles8

The assistance from some Central Asian republics has been an importantsource of support to the Northern Alliance Uzbekistanrsquos president IslamKarimov has clandestinely supported his fellow Uzbeks His country hassupplied the Northern Alliance with tanks aircraft and technical personnelThis support has been provided with the expectation that Uzbek-dominatedprovinces in northern Afghanistan would provide a buffer against the spreadof fundamentalism The secular regime of Turkmenistanrsquos presidentSapamurad Niyazov has publicly joined other Central Asian republics in ar-ticulating the dangers of the Afghan civil war spreading into the neighboringstates However the government of Turkmenistan is not too keen in gettingembroiled and providing overt backing to those fighting the Taliban

Anti-Taliban forces are being trained in a dozen or so camps located alongIranrsquos eastern border Since May 1997 6000 Afghan military personnelhave been dispatched from these camps to various war fronts in northernAfghanistan Most of Iranrsquos aid has been going to the Hizb-i-Wahadat PartyIran has also purchased two Su-22 and one Su-24 fighter-bombers for AhmedShah Masood and sent Iranian pilots to help plan air operations for the North-ern Alliance

8 James Risen ldquoRussians Are Back in Afghanistan Aiding Rebelsrdquo NYT July 27 1998

472 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

Clearly the challenges to the Taliban have grown over the years particu-larly in the political and economic field They continue fighting on the onehand while on the other they are increasingly worried about their growingpolitical isolation However isolation has not moderated them Theystaunchly believe in their ideology which makes it difficult for others to un-derstand them as something other than an extremist force Economicallythey are in a vulnerable position because they are operating in a war-devas-tated country and the Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan have beentargeted for heavy international sanctions

The Formation of the Taliban Governmentand Its Effect on the Civil War

By 1997 the Taliban had accomplished major military successes in the civilwar After the capture of Kabul they also began to prove themselves in thepolitical arena They felt the need of forming an alternate government tocounter the legitimacy of Rabbanirsquos regime Aware that peace and politicalstability in the country would ultimately make them a credible force theTaliban instituted a framework of shuras (consultative bodies) to achievethose aims The most visible Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad OmarAkhund then asked the shuras to give some political shape to the movement

The Taliban also gave the country a new official name changing it fromthe Islamic State of Afghanistan to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA)in October 1997 The group justified the new name as reflecting the groundrealities However the opposition has termed the change to be an undemo-cratic move A prominent Afghan intellectual Rasul Amin in a BBC PushtoService interview spoke of the new name as something that to him felt asthough it was a transplant from the Arab world However Mullah WakilAhmed a senior Taliban leader and spokesman of the movement said it wasnot the first time that Afghanistanrsquos name has been changed In the pastwords such as ldquorepublicrdquo or ldquodemocraticrdquo were added to Afghanistanrsquos nameThe emirate system however is not acceptable to the opposition as Talibanpossess no popular or legal mandate to govern or impose such But for theTaliban changing the countryrsquos appellation represents breaking with the pastand reforming the political system

The Talibanrsquos initially loose bureaucratic structures have been trans-formed too Mullah Mohammad Omar Akhund was elected Amir-ul-Momineen (Commander of the believers) by an assembly of about 1200 in-vited ulama in the city of Kandahar in spring 1996 Since then Mullah Omarhas been at the top of the ruling structure in Afghanistan Though he remainsin the background his word is final and almost has the force of law in themovement Mullah Omar lives simply known for having few needs and withno particular taste in food or dress He is alarmingly careless about his per-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 473

TABLE 1 Ethnic Composition and Cabinet Portfolios of the 10-Member Shura Basedin Kandahar

Names Ethnicity Portfolio

Mullah Mohammad Omar Ghilzai Amir-ul-MonineenAkhund Pushtun

Mullah Mohammad Rabbani Pushtun Chairman of the Caretaker CouncilDeputy Commander of the Taliban

movementMullah Mohammad Fadel Pushtun Minister of DefenseMullah Mohammad Ghaus Pushtun Minister of Foreign AffairsMullah Mohammad Hassan Pushtun Minister of SecurityMaulvi Ghaisuddin Agha Uzbek Minister of EducationMaulvi Abdur Raqib Uzbek Minister for RefugeesQari Deen Mohammad Tajik Minister for PlanningMullah Abdul Razzaq Tajik Member Supervisory CouncilMaulvi Abdul Saleem Uzbek Deputy Minister of Education

sonal security is not a gifted orator and his study of religion is limited as hewas not able to complete his religious education because of the war Despitethis background he inspires confidence among his supporters because of hispiety and the strength of his beliefs

Mullah Omar is assisted by a loose network of shuras A central shuracomprising 10 members was established in Kandahar (see Table 1) All di-rectives and policies were initiated from here and it virtually became the cap-ital of the Taliban-controlled areas (indeed Kandahar is the currentheadquarters of the Taliban movement) Aside from the core group of 10meetings of the original shura also saw participation from military com-manders tribal leaders and ulama this indeterminate structure is one of thekey features of the Talibanrsquos central shura Mullah Omar also tried to main-tain a balance between the Pushtuns and non-Pushtuns in the shura TheTaliban have been criticized for dividing Afghanistan along ethnic linesHowever despite the effort to integrate non-Pushtuns into the shura theTaliban have not been able to shed their Pushtun moorings and have not beenconsidered as impartial regarding other ethnicities

The takeover of Kabul and the formation of a central shura reflected theTalibanrsquos desire to have a more lasting stay on the political scene The cen-tral shura is assisted by a cabinet a shura in Kabul and a military shuraThese three bodies report to the central shura in Kandahar Clearly theseadministrative structures are different from the past governments For in-stance a talib (religious student) in a ministerial post is something unknownin Afghan history Nevertheless even the Taliban have found that control-

474 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

TABLE 2 Military Command Structure of the Taliban

Position Individual

Commander in Chief Mullah Mohammad Omar AkhundMilitary Chief of Staff Mullah Mohmmad HassanChief of the Army Staff Mullah Rahmatullah AkhundArmy Division Chief Mullah Muhammad Jumma KhanArmy Division Chief Mullah Muhammad YunusArmy Division Chief Mullah Mohammad GulArmy Division Chief Mullah Mohammad Aziz KhanArmored Force No 4 Mullah Mohammad Zahir

ling a territory without a clear administrative system is not possible in con-temporary times

The formation of these shuras was aimed at creating an efficient govern-ment After they captured Kabul the Taliban formed a six-member Provi-sional Ruling Council headed by Mullah Mohammad Rabbani This wasfollowed by the formation of the Kabul Shura of Acting Ministers in 1999The Kabul Shura deals with day-to-day problems of the government the cityand the Kabul military front Important policy recommendations are con-veyed to the Kandahar Shura where decisions are actually made To restoreand maintain peace in the provinces the Taliban appoints governors who arefrom provinces other than those where they are serving This policy appearsto have been welcomed by the people As for the military shura it is a looseorganizational body that plans strategy and can implement some tactical deci-sions (see Table 2) The military shura appears to have no strategic decision-making powers Military strategy key personnel appointments and the allo-cation of funds for offensives are decided upon by the Amir-ul-Momineen

Although their government has few resources and many parts barely func-tion at all the Taliban have adopted a discourse of Afghan nationalism inaddition to their Islamic traditionalism Despite their amorphous politicalleadership the Taliban claim to be trying to recreate a centralized Afghanstate In areas under their control they have appointed provincial governorsand administrators of districts cities and towns from the center9

One of the most remarkable characteristics of the Taliban leadership is thattop government officials often switch from the battlefield to the ministry andback again each time following the orders from Mullah Omar In one sensethis produces remarkable flexibility among the Taliban hierarchy as they allact as both administrators and military commanders This flexibility in the

9 Barnett Rubin ldquoAfghanistan under the Talibanrdquo Current History vol 98 no 625 (Febru-ary 1999) p 81

NASREEN GHUFRAN 475

military command has allowed the leadership to maintain better ties with therank-and-file fighters than might otherwise be the case However theTaliban administration in Kabul has faced problems For instance while anyminister is away at the front no decisions can be taken in that ministryMoreover government ministers are working without pay something un-heard of in modern times They do not use government resources for privateuse curtailing expenses and refraining from indulgence in squandering andextravagance Regular salaries are paid only to professional civil servantsand trained soldiers drawn from the former communist army

As for the Northern Alliance until August 1998 the areas it controlled hadfour main administrative and political centers Mazar Sharif which somegroups aspired to turn into a temporary capital for a government in exile ofthe Islamic State of Afghanistan Talauqan the headquarters of MasoodrsquosSCN Shibergan the location of Dostumrsquos headquarters and Bamiyan theheadquarters of the Hizb-i-Wahadat The Taliban have made inroads intothese areas too because the entire political administrative fabric of northernAfghanistan has broken down Only one of Afghanistanrsquos provinces is nowentirely under the Northern Alliancersquos control Badakhshan an inaccessiblemountainous region in the extreme northeast of the country There are alsoneighboring valleys to the west and a few enclaves in the Afghan interiorover which the Taliban have not yet been able to consolidate control Someelements of the former state administration have survived but political powerresides individually in the various armed groups rather than in a unitary civil-ian structure The groups maintain their own military and command struc-tures they do not have a unified strategy for the joint mobilization ofresources in their struggle against the Taliban

The areas controlled by the Taliban have been subjected to drastic changesto personal behavior The Taliban have put a ban on wine and televisionwhich is perceived to be immoral There is also complete restriction on mu-sic photography and the painting of living things The shaving off of onersquosbeard or trimming it less than a fistful is prohibited as is having a Westernhairstyle Gambling betting pigeon flying dog-racing and sodomy are alsostrictly forbidden

The Taliban have gained international notoriety because they have bannedwomen from working Women are obligated to observe strict purdah (litveiling also refers to covering of bodies) Girls have been stopped fromgoing to schools The Taliban have told all women working outside theirhomes to stay at home Although women who had been working will con-tinue to receive their salaries the Taliban claim that there is no need for themto work any longer They claim that these restrictions have been put in placeto protect the honor and dignity of women At the same time Taliban offi-cials have said that they are not against women working or receiving an edu-

476 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

cation The Taliban claim that they need time and resources to create theproper environment and right texts and curriculum for womenrsquos educationThe Talibanrsquos behavior is modeled after the Islamic revolution in Iran Edu-cational establishments remained closed for many years in the aftermath ofthat revolution They remained closed until the Iranian revolutionaries for-mally established an educational syllabus conforming to their own principles

The Taliban have stated that they wish to establish a pure Islamic state Intheir view this means that women have no place in the public arena Theyare required to stay at home and take care of their husbands and childrenThe Taliban cling to the symbol of a protected woman Women have toobserve a strict dress code wearing a burqa (a garment covering the bodyfrom head to toe) and trousers fully covering their ankles While women hadworn burqa in the pre-Taliban era it had not been an enforced dress code

The Talibanrsquos edicts have had a severe impact on many other women whodo not have a close male relative to accompany them in public Hardest hithave been the countryrsquos estimated 30000 widows many of whom are thesole providers for their families Some widows have been allowed to work inareas under the Taliban control but even for them it is not easy to get permis-sion According to Taliban representatives the current restrictions are said tobe necessary because females are not safe outside their homes Many womenhave strongly reacted to the Taliban policies despite the restrictive climate inTaliban-controlled areas These women do not like what the Taliban havebeen professing They want to work and continue with their education butthese rights are being denied to them The justifications given by Taliban arenot acceptable to the working and more enlightened urban Afghan women Itis therefore not surprising that women have become the most vocal critics ofthe Taliban

The edicts against women also have predictably had a devastating impacton primary level education Before the civil war over four-fifths of primaryschool teachers were women The majority of them are now jobless Theclosure of schools has in turn affected children Many orphaned childrenwho once could make homes at schools are now forced to live on the streetsAn international aid group in 1998 estimated 28000 street children in Kabulalone

Mullah Nuruddin Turabi the Taliban minister of justice defended theTalibanrsquos domestic actions He said ldquoIt is not just a question of men wearingbeards and women wearing burqas In Afghanistan every vice has to bestopped and every virtue promulgatedrdquo10 The Taliban have established anew security service the Ministry of Enforcement of Virtue and Suppressionof Vice for eradicating corruption and other vices from Afghan society Ac-

10 Michael Fathers ldquoFrozen in Timerdquo Time May 2000

NASREEN GHUFRAN 477

cording to Taliban tenets their rules are a jihad (holy war) against sin cor-ruption and cruelty Therefore those who do not abide by the Taliban edictson personal behavior are strictly punished according to a strict application ofIslamic law Hence stoning to death amputations (in case of robbery) andother forms of punishments are carried out in front of large crowds

Nonetheless a crisis of governance remains in Afghanistan To supportersof the Taliban regime its government is one that is accountable and represen-tative of all ethnic groups To many the Taliban have restored Afghan cul-ture Afghan-style self-rule has been implemented in the provinces and theTalibanrsquos supporters note that the countryrsquos civil administration and justicesystem are now based on Islamic and Afghan traditions The opposition re-jects this opinion and condemns the Taliban government of being unrepre-sentative and unaccountable

While all the above-mentioned structures are functioning the governmentfaces tremendous challenges The most obvious one is the governmentrsquosunacceptability to and lack of recognition from the international system letalone by the opposition The political dealings that the government has hadwith others offer evidence of its credibility in the civil war While theTaliban have major control of the countryrsquos land area they have not yet hadmuch success on the political front Forming a government is not enough toend the civil war the Taliban must gain acceptability both at home andabroad

The Talibanrsquos International Legal StatusRecognition of a government in a civil war also helps in ending the conflictbecause both parties involved desire the political economic and militarysupport that can come with it Non-recognition of the Taliban government isan indicator of its standing in the international community The recognitionhas not been forthcoming because of dissatisfaction with Taliban policiesUpon taking Kabul the Taliban had immediately demanded from other statesformal recognition as the only legitimate government of Afghanistan Theyalso demanded to be granted a seat in the UN General Assembly Howeverthey received neither So far only Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UnitedArab Emirates (UAE) have recognized the Taliban government In contrastBurhanuddin Rabbanirsquos Northern Alliance regime despite its weak militaryposition has legitimacy and political backing from the world communityincluding the majority of the Islamic states Most countries preserved thestatus quo and continued to allow the diplomatic missions of the Rabbaniregime

Recognition in international law involves acceptance by a state of a givenentity that this recognized entity possesses an international legal personalityand the rights and privileges that flow from it or that it is the exclusive

478 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

representative of a body with international legal personality The decision togrant or not to grant recognition is a political one within the sovereign discre-tion of individual states Recognition in principle can be accorded to states orgovernments As far as the state of Afghanistan itself is concerned it hasbeen recognized by a large number of countries including all permanentmembers of the UN Security Council for many years However wherepolitical power has fragmented to the extent that it has in Afghanistan inrecent years there may well be more than one group claiming to be the gov-ernment In fact as has been outlined already there are two governmentswithin one country One is militarily strong and controls a large populationand territory but has no legal standing while the other is recognized but hasless control of Afghan territory

Pakistan was the first country to grant international recognition to theTalibanrsquos government Their past links provided the basis for doing so Asnoted earlier virtually all of the Taliban leadership had been refugees in Pa-kistan For several years Taliban leaders studied in the madrasas (religiousschools) affiliated with the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) headed by MaulviFazul ur Rehman Although it has not been conclusively proven that theTaliban are Pakistanrsquos creation much criticism along these lines and othershas been leveled against it Pakistan is said to have played a key role inturning Taliban into a functioning military force by providing training logis-tical support and equipment

In 1997 Pakistan rooted its decision to recognize the Taliban governmentbased on the fact that the latter was in effective control of most of Afghani-stanrsquos territory including the capital By the time recognition was given theTaliban government occupied 90 of Afghanistan and oversaw a populationthat was representative of all of the countryrsquos ethnic groups Since then Paki-stan has been striving to propagate a positive image of the student militia andworking to induce other neighboring countries to recognize them Further-more Pakistan has been making persistent attempts to get the UN to adoptthe vacant seat formula which the Organization of Islamic Conferences haddone during 1996

Pakistanrsquos ties with the Taliban have become increasingly complex owingto the influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan Pakistanmdasha country of 140million mostly poor peoplemdashhas been almost single-handedly housing andfeeding the 12 million Afghan refugees living there since 1995 the year theUN stopped providing food and housing aid Some of the Afghan refugeescurrently in Pakistan have been there since the 1980s having fled the Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan At the time an estimated 32 million refugees livedin Pakistan making it the largest caseload of refugees in the world

Some of the refugees did return to Afghanistan In 1994 approximately77000 went back with the assistance of the UN High Commission for Refu-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 479

gees (UNHCR) An additional 76000 refugees returned to Afghanistan ontheir own11 However the years since then have seen a new wave of refu-gees flowing into Pakistan from northern Afghanistan Many of the freshrefugees are fleeing the fighting there plus a devastating drought This newwave has not been officially registered with any international organizationAs a consequence the statistics regarding refugees in Pakistan are unreliableAn influx of 30000 Afghan refugees came to Pakistan in 2000 and it is esti-mated that more than 50000 have crossed the border since then In that yearPakistan decided to close its border to stop further refugees because it couldnot absorb any more However its border was later reopened because of thedeplorable condition of the refugees and pressure from international humani-tarian relief agencies

Aside from Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UAE are on the list of countriesrecognizing the Talibanrsquos government Saudi Arabiarsquos came only a few daysafter Pakistanrsquos Until mid-1998 Islamabad and Riyadh were on the samepolitical wavelength Saudi Arabia supplied heavily subsidized fuel to theTaliban through Pakistan and also provided general funding After 1998problems between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan developed over the fate ofOsama bin Laden the Saudi millionaire who had been funding the Afghanjihad The Taliban had promised Saudi Arabia that Osama bin Laden wouldnot use his refuge in Afghanistan to support any acts of violence abroadAfter Osama bin Laden was linked to the bombings of US embassies inKenya and Tanzania his continued refuge in Afghanistan became a majorsource of tension between Taliban and the US on one hand and Saudi Ara-bia on the other

Apart from these three countries the Taliban have not managed to estab-lish political ties with other states This becomes a major constraint for agovernment of a country going through civil war If the paramount objectiveis to end the civil war the government has to direct its energies in this direc-tion It cannot expect the US or other countries to come to its rescue

The United States has been a major country involved in AfghanistanAlong with the Soviets the US had fed the civil war since the days of thecold war When Taliban captured Kabul the US State Department an-nounced it would establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban by sendingan official to Kabul This announcement was quickly retracted The StateDepartment spokesman Glyn Davies said the US found nothing objectiona-ble in the steps taken by the Taliban to impose Islamic law and described theTaliban as anti-modern rather than anti-Western Some members of Con-

11 Nasreen Ghufran ldquoRefugees A Comparative Study of India and Pakistanrdquo (paperpresented at the conference ldquoThe Challenge of Cooperation South Asia and Beyondrdquo Kath-mandu Nepal December 1998)

480 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

gress supported the Taliban because their government appeared to serve theUS policy of isolating Iran A Taliban regime would create a firmly Sunnibuffer on Iranrsquos border and potentially provide security for trade routes andpipelines that would break Iranrsquos monopoly on Central Asiarsquos southern traderoutes

But from its initial policy of acquiescence vis-a-vis the Taliban the USmoved to the other extreme of rejecting them completely The US rejectionwas largely because of the pressure exerted by the feminist movement Theprominent feminist Zieba-Shorish Shamley persuaded many US feministgroups to spearhead a signature campaign to mobilize support for Afghanwomen Her efforts helped persuade former President Clinton to take atougher stance against the Taliban12 Washingtonrsquos denouncement of theTaliban also came in the backdrop of the presidential election in the US assupporting a regime that held no respect for human rights would have nega-tively affected Clintonrsquos position13

In 1998 when the Taliban made great military gains against the forces ofthe North they expected to gain recognition and a seat in the UN they hadmajor Afghan cities under their control and their rivals in retreat Talibanrepresentatives claimed that if recognition were granted to their governmentthey would allow a huge pipeline project to proceed that would carry oil andgas from Central Asia to lucrative markets in Pakistan and India This pipe-line would cut through the western part of Afghanistan ldquoEven before thecapture of Mazar-i-Sharif and Taloqan we were fully qualified for recogni-tionrdquo said deputy information minister Abdur Rahman Hotaki referring totwo key opposition bases captured by the militia ldquoThe opposition gave peo-ple an excuse to deny us recognition and prevent us having the pipeline runthrough our country but that excuse has now gonerdquo he said ldquoAll excusesblocking our recognition are gone Therefore it is predicted they will revisetheir policy in view of the current realitiesrdquo he said adding that all ldquotermsand conditions for a legitimate staterdquo have been met14

But the Taliban encountered problems with international organizations In1999 the UN proposed imposing sanctions against the Taliban when it is-sued Security Council Resolution 1267 Adopted unanimously by the Secur-ity Council on October 15 the resolution demanded that the Taliban turn overOsama bin Laden without further delay to authorities in a country where hewill be brought to justice Until the Taliban comply the resolution requiresUN member states to deny permission for Taliban-owned -leased or -oper-ated aircraft to land in or take off from their territory It also calls for the

12 Rashid Taliban pp 180ndash8213 P Stobodan ldquoThe Afghan Conflict and Regional Securityrdquo Strategic Analysis (August

1999) p 72414 Frontier Post (Peshawar) January 14 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 481

freezing of funds and other financial resources including funds derived fromproperty owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban The lat-ter had 30 days in which to comply with this resolution before sanctions wereimposed The Taliban did not comply and the sanctions came into force

Another round of sanctions was imposed on the Taliban in December 2000with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1333 The new sanc-tions called for an arms embargo on the Taliban including foreign militaryassistance It also imposed a ban on travel by the militiarsquos senior leaders abroader flight ban than the one imposed last year to force bin Ladenrsquos surren-der measures to close all Taliban offices overseas and a ban on exports toTaliban areas of acetic anhydride used to manufacture heroin Finally it alsofroze funds and other financial assets of Osama bin Laden and individualsand entities associated with him Mullah Omar reacted to this round of sanc-tions by saying his government would not back out from its stand and princi-ples even if the entire world turned against them15

The continuation of these sanctions has pushed the issue of recognition tothe backburner However the international community is also paying a pricefor not recognizing the legitimacy of the Taliban One of the principal areasin which the Taliban could provide some assistance is in the containment ofthe production of poppy Mullah Omar on several occasions emphasized hiswill to fight against opium production However it has been difficult tomaintain such policy postures in the wake of external sanctions As a resultin 1999 over 90983 hectares of poppies yielded a harvest of over 4581 tonsof dry opium an estimated 70 increase in production over the previousyearrsquos figure

The international sanctions have also affected the incentives of local farm-ers to turn away from poppy production Afghanistanrsquos socioeconomic situa-tion makes opium production one of the only available economic means foraccess to land labor and credit Currently the Afghan peasantryrsquos heavydependence upon opium production associated with the politico-territorialrealities of a tribal society typified by fragile political allegiances is makingit difficult for the Taliban to make any serious attempts at eradication16

Additionally any Taliban attempt to implement a poppy eradication policywill be severely compromised by the governmentrsquos international non-recog-nition This places restrictions on the options open to the government Eventhe UN Drug Control Program cannot legally reach any formal agreementwith the Taliban government as long as the latter is not internationally recog-nized The Taliban government faces a self-imposed catch-22 situation Its

15 Ibid16 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy ldquoTalibanrsquos Drug Dilemma Opium Production vs International

Recognitionrdquo The Analyst (Paris) (1999)

482 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

political policies and actions are deemed unacceptable by the internationalcommunity yet it cannot pursue any eradication policy with any hope ofcomplete success without the international recognition and aid that are beingdenied it owing to those policies and actions17

Future Prospects for Change in theTalibanrsquos Regime

Since 1996 the Taliban have been striving to bring the civil war to a success-ful conclusion Their domestic policies have brought about alienation andcreated fissures within the Afghan society Their inflexible stand on variouspolicies has denied them the credibility they so desire Their authoritarianismand intolerance have alienated non-Pushtun Afghans who make up morethan half the population The flow of thousands of extremist Pakistani andArab Taliban supporters into Afghanistan has fueled the resentment of thelocal populace18

The Taliban are accused of harboring terrorists and extremists who notonly support Taliban but also carry out their extremist policies in the targetedcountries According to a report that appeared in the Far Eastern EconomicReview (FEER) Afghanistan has become a sanctuary for ldquoarmed insurgentsaccused of terrorist attacks in China Iran Uzbekistan Tajikistan and Paki-stanrdquo Some 400 Arab Islamic militants from a dozen Middle Eastern andAfrican countries are said to be part of the 055 Brigade funded by Osama binLaden and fighting alongside Taliban in the current offensive The articlefurther noted that ldquo[t]he diverse groups have their own agendas mainly fo-cused on undermining the regimes at home but some share bin Ladenrsquos zealfor a global Islamic revolution The resulting web of dangerous friendshipsthreatens to export instability throughout the mineral-rich and commerciallyunder-exploited hinterland of Central Asiardquo19

It is obvious that the Taliban must improve their image both at home andabroad as perceptions play an important role in the general acceptability ornon-acceptability of governments in both arenas Currently the Taliban areperceived primarily as a negative element that is unlikely to play any positiverole in resolving the Afghan conflict If they fail in their goal the Afghannation will lose any trust that religious political forces could play any mean-ingful role in resolving the ongoing conflict The Talibanrsquos fate will be more

17 At the time of writing the Taliban were not cooperating in poppy eradication Currentlyit appears this may have changed The Taliban claim to have completely eradicated poppy pro-duction in the areas dominated by their troops and the claim is being verified under UN aus-pices

18 Peter Tomsen ldquoResponse A Chance for Peace in AfghanistanmdashThe Talibanrsquos Days areNumberedrdquo Foreign Affairs 79 (JanuaryndashFebruary 2000) p 179

19 Ahmed Rashid ldquoAfghanistan Heart of Darknessrdquo FEER August 5 1999

NASREEN GHUFRAN 483

or less the same as that which befell the mujahideen if they do not take timelyand corrective measures to improve Afghanistanrsquos deteriorating situation

The Taliban gained support from most of the populace in the beginningbecause they offered themselves a neutral force and declared their intentionto remain so However they are no longer neutral and have become anotherparty to the conflict Their policies have not only infuriated the internationalpublic but also large sections of the Afghan community The large influxesof Afghan refugees into Pakistan reflect the growing disagreement with theirpolicies This disenchantment is unlikely to change if the Taliban do notmoderate their stance The Taliban of course believe their policies to be im-portant for bringing about the change they desire but they do not realize howmuch these policies have alienated people The international community hasexplicitly voiced its criticism of the Taliban regime and consider it to be aliving nightmare for women political dissidents and anyone else who doesnot submit to the laws under the authority of the Ministry for the Fostering ofVirtue and Suppression of Vice The Taliban movement itself came about asa reaction to the self-seeking and self-destructive policies of the mujahideenwhose pretensions to Islam and leadership were discredited It was in thisideological vacuum and a Hobbesian state of anarchy that made the Talibanrsquosrule palatable to common Afghanis20 But if the Talibanrsquos government doesnot soften its present policies and complete peace is not restored it will notbe too late for the common people to turn against them

The year 2001 has seen universal outrage at the offensive launched by theTaliban rulers against Afghanistanrsquos Buddhist past Condemnation has notremained confined to non-Muslim states several Islamic countries includingPakistan have been appalled by the destruction of Buddhist statues in theprovince of Bamiyan Pakistan sent an official delegation whose aim was toprevent the Taliban from destroying the statues Pakistanrsquos foreign ministerAbdul Sattar said ldquoCertainly we believe it was a mistake a blunder and as aresult Afghanistan will suffer consequences for years to comerdquo To this headded that ldquoit is very difficult for me to make a statement as to why they didnot hearrdquo21 Iran likewise strongly condemned the statuesrsquo destruction Astatement released by Iranrsquos Cultural Heritage Organization wondered whyldquocertain Taliban-led individuals calling themselves lsquoclericrsquo have ordered de-struction of ancient sites of the mankind society citing blasphemy and idoliz-

20 Hafeez Malik ldquoPakistan Islam and the Taliban Phenomenonrdquo News International (Paki-stan) June 9 2000

21 Sattarrsquos remarks are in ibid March 11 2001

484 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

ing as reasonsrdquo22 To prevent their destruction Iran even offered to buy thestatues or move them into safekeeping

However the Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil rejectedany offer to prevent the destruction of the statues His negotiations with Pa-kistan did not bear a positive result and he rejected the Iranian offers reiterat-ing that the presence of the statues conflicted with Islamic teaching In thewake of the Talibanrsquos subsequent actions Iran led a UN initiative to takeserious action against the regime Commenting on the statuesrsquo destructionthe Iranian Foreign Ministry stated ldquoUnfortunately the Talibanrsquos destructionof the statues has cast doubts on the comprehensive views offered by Islamicideology in the world Clearly Muslims across the world pin the blame onthe rigid-minded Taliban and by no means embroil the Afghan Muslims inthis counter-cultural moverdquo23

The Bamiyan incident stirred up dual controversies about both the charac-ter of the Taliban regime and the relationship between culture religion andnational heritage in an Islamic state In his characteristic style Mullah Omarshrugged off all objections to the planned destruction of the Buddhist statuessaying ldquomy job is the implementation of Islamic orderrdquo He invoked Islamiclaw a fatwa issued by the Afghan ulama associated with this regime and thedecision of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to support his decision24

Nonetheless the destruction of the statues has further tarnished the Talibanrsquosimage While it may be the case that the Taliban undertook their actions inreaction to the tough sanctions imposed on them by the world the Talibanhave to realize that they are not going to earn any international sympathy orrecognition

Afghanistan has always been important to external powers due to its strate-gic location They have meddled in its affairs both in the past and at presentThe protracted civil war makes it more vulnerable to external penetration Insuch situations it has no other option but to seek help and support fromoutside The external powers are more than willing to do so if it serves theirnational interest The opposition is likely to adopt a similar strategy as theyhave less access to the resources of the country than the ruling authority Hadthere been no external involvement Afghanistanrsquos extended civil war wouldnot have become the protracted and complicated affair that it is

The Afghan civil war has important regional implications Various exter-nal powers are pursuing divergent objectives in Afghanistan and the outcome

22 Cultural Heritage Organization comment is in Iran News (Tehran) March 1 2001 Thisnews item is distributed via Middle East News Online available at lthttpwwwmiddleeastwirecomgt

23 Comments of the Iranian Foreign Ministry reported by the BBC World Service March 52001

24 Rahimullah Yusufzai ldquoA Question of Tolerancerdquo News International March 4 2001

468 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

sians had left behind a heavily armed country As the Taliban marchedalong they picked up guns mortars tanks and even aircraft

What was unusual about the Talibanrsquos strategy is that they were relativelysuccessful in avoiding direct fighting with other potential rival groups Theyadopted a simple strategy that was markedly different and peaceful Whenapproaching an unconquered territory the Taliban would first send a delega-tion of ulama (clerics) to talk to any local militia commanders The ulamathen invited them to implement Islamic law and establish peace by handingover their arms and ammunition These clerics argued that the weapons be-longed to the Bait-ul-Mal (National treasury) under the rule of a single gov-ernment If the local militia commander agreed to the request by thedelegation then there was no fighting In case that the delegation of ulamafailed to secure a peaceful surrender the Taliban then would send a seconddelegation including elderly pious people of the area along with a Talibanrepresentative If the second delegation failed to secure a surrender to theirdemands then the Taliban would take up arms against the hold-out militia

Since disarming the local militia was the foremost priority of the Talibanthe latterrsquos stockpile of weapons kept increasing every time they overran aprovince Most of the time the weapons were handed over peacefully be-cause local militia commanders considered the Taliban to be a neutral even abenign force Moreover local commanders were eager to avoid furtherbloodshed Though simple the Talibanrsquos peaceful strategymdashbut with theveiled threat of forcemdashhas been difficult to understand It could be arguedthat during the initial stages of the Afghan civil war the Taliban achievedmost of their victories without waging a fight

Using this unique strategy the Taliban continued to make headway to thecapital without much resistance from the former rulers They took control ofthree of Afghanistanrsquos largest cities Herat in 1995 Kabul in 1996 and Ma-zar Sharif in 1997 They did it with few casualties among their troops andeven fewer among civilians Initially they were the only force capable ofrestoring law and order By 1997 the Taliban controlled around 90 of thecountry by disarming and in certain cases incorporating the former militiacommanders and assorted mujahideen

Restoration of peace and order are prerequisites to end civil war As Bar-nett Rubin has documented the Taliban denounced the failure of the muja-hideen leaders to establish security They accused the former militia com-manders of becoming thieves and even rapists They tore down all check-points set up to extort money and refused all bribes at their own Theycleared the bandits off the roads and instead of slaughtering their opponents

NASREEN GHUFRAN 469

merely disarmed them Their message seemed simple and appealing to mostAfghans peace order and Islamic law5

Establishing peace in a country like Afghanistan is by no means an easytask particularly in light of how long the civil war has been underway Evensome critics of the Taliban talk about the restoration of peace in Taliban-controlled areas ldquoBefore the Taliban this country belonged to warlords andthe simple act of going to visit my village was an impossibilityrdquo said a UNofficial who is an Afghan ldquoMy daughters sit in the house and cry to me Wewant education This is heartbreaking but peace is the first priority for peo-ple here The Taliban must be given credit for accomplishing thisrdquo6

In his in-depth analysis Franz Schurmann concluded that it is the power ofthe Talibanrsquos ideas and the stability they have brought to war-torn Afghani-stan that makes them so frightening Their proven effectiveness in maintain-ing law and order as well as their adherence to the commandments of Islamand cultural norms which see traditional Afghan women as being obedientrather than challenging to men seem to have won over the predominantlyilliterate peasants and working class

After so many years of debilitating warfare concentrated in and around thecities the urbane educated elite who would challenge these norms have van-ished More importantly for centuries the great mass of Afghans has thrivedunder the most primitive political and economic conditions while the pasttwo decades have brought only war poverty and insecurity For most Af-ghans therefore their present situation under the Taliban appears to be if notideal the best among possible alternatives The removal of small arms andheavy weapons from public view is an accomplishment of immense propor-tions as weapons were everywhere and used indiscriminately

The situation in the territory controlled by the Northern Alliance is quitedifferent The opposition controls a tiny but significant 10 of the country inthe north There people are so fearful of crime that they often doubt theadvantages of the relatively liberal order under which they live It appearsthat in Afghanistan freedom and safety are opposites The Alliance had beeninstrumental in bringing down Najibullahrsquos government in April 1992 but itdisintegrated shortly after its victory because of power struggles within thegroup However when the Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996 thethree participant groups resurrected the Northern Alliance in opposition onceagain Accurate figures regarding the total mobilizing force of the allianceare not available but by a rough estimate they would number around 80000troops In contrast the Talibanrsquos active forces number about 100000

5 Barnett Rubin The Search for Peace in Afghanistan From Buffer State to Failed State(New Haven Conn Yale University Press 1995) p 140

6 Barry Bearak ldquoAfghans Ruled by Taliban Poor Isolated but Securerdquo New York Times(NYT) October 10 1998

470 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

The nominal head of the Northern Alliance is Burhanuddin Rabbani al-though in reality he shares power with his primary military backer AhmedShah Masood Both of them belong to the Jamiat-i-Islami which is apredominantly Tajik Islamist party Rabbanirsquos regime controls most of thecountryrsquos embassies abroad and retains Afghanistanrsquos seat in the UN Ah-med Shah Masood built Afghanistanrsquos most sophisticated military-politicalorganization the Shurandashyi-Nazar-i-Shamali (Supervisory Council of theNorth SCN) The SCN coordinated Jamiat commanders and also createdregion-wide forces that developed into Masoodrsquos Urdu-i-Islami (IslamicArmy) Rabbani and Masood get their main support from the northeasternlargely Tajik portion of the country Due to his military performance andcontrol of the strategic Panjsher Valley Masood is popularly known as theldquolion of Panjsherrdquo

General Abdul Rashid Dostum and his ethnic Uzbek Junbishndashi-Milli (Na-tional movement) Party also form part of the Northern Alliance The latterrsquosbase of support lies primarily among the Sunni Muslim Uzbeks A largenumber of fighters forming part of this organization (the numbers vary be-tween 15000 and 16000) had a reputation of being the best-equipped forcesThe Hizb-i-Wahadat-i-Islami yi-Afghanistan (Islamic unity party of Afghani-stan) is the principal Shirsquoa party in Afghanistan its support is mainly amongthe ethnic Hazara group This group was originally formed under Iraniansponsorship in order to unite eight Shirsquoa parties Its leader is Karim Khaliliwho is based in Hazarajat7

Until they captured Kabul in 1996 the Taliban expressed no desire to rulethe country Ever since then the Taliban have committed themselves to con-quering the entire country The problems with the Taliban began when theystarted acting as the ruling elite Eventually their growing international iso-lation plus their ineffective administration alienated large numbers of Af-ghans As the civil war continues they are becoming more rigid Thisattitude has doomed expectations that the civil war will end Indeed whilethe Talibanrsquos achievements as a peace force had good beginnings as theyears have passed they seem to have become entangled in the civil war thatthey intended to disentangle During the early period of the civil war theTaliban did achieve some remarkable accomplishments above all revivingthe lost trust of the Afghans However their strong opposition to the forcesof the North has earned them a reputation for inflexibility

The Taliban transformed themselves from a movement into a ruling gov-ernment Their main priorities were to bring peace while at the same time tostay in power to implement their vision of an Islamic state But resistance tothis vision remains strong and the Northern Alliance is still giving the

7 Ibid

NASREEN GHUFRAN 471

Taliban a difficult time Despite the relative isolation of the Northern Alli-ancersquos forces and their extended lines of communication they have been ableto continue owing to military assistance from outside governments This aidhas come in a variety of forms ranging from the direct transfer of materiel tothe dispatch of military advisors and support personnel albeit in limited num-bers Next to none of these transfers have been publicly documented viasubmissions to the UNrsquos register on conventional arms Ironically much ofthe Northern Alliancersquos military support comes from nations participating inthe so-called ldquoSix-Plus-Twordquo contact group (Pakistan Iran UzbekistanChina Turkmenistan Tajikistan and Russia and the United States) whosemembers have publicly pledged not to provide military support to any Af-ghan combatants and prevent the use of member state territories for suchpurposes

The Northern Alliancersquos main suppliers are Iran and Russia with secon-dary roles played by Tajikistan Uzbekistan (at least until 1998) Turkmeni-stan and Kyrgyzstan Moscow denies that it is arming the Afghan rebels Inan interview with the New York Times Masood has said that he receivesmuch of his equipment from the Russian mafia not the Russian governmentHowever Russia has reportedly provided Dostum with 500 T-55 and T-62tanks that are used against areas that oppose his rule Russia has also sup-plied him with a large number of Frog 7 and Luna M missiles8

The assistance from some Central Asian republics has been an importantsource of support to the Northern Alliance Uzbekistanrsquos president IslamKarimov has clandestinely supported his fellow Uzbeks His country hassupplied the Northern Alliance with tanks aircraft and technical personnelThis support has been provided with the expectation that Uzbek-dominatedprovinces in northern Afghanistan would provide a buffer against the spreadof fundamentalism The secular regime of Turkmenistanrsquos presidentSapamurad Niyazov has publicly joined other Central Asian republics in ar-ticulating the dangers of the Afghan civil war spreading into the neighboringstates However the government of Turkmenistan is not too keen in gettingembroiled and providing overt backing to those fighting the Taliban

Anti-Taliban forces are being trained in a dozen or so camps located alongIranrsquos eastern border Since May 1997 6000 Afghan military personnelhave been dispatched from these camps to various war fronts in northernAfghanistan Most of Iranrsquos aid has been going to the Hizb-i-Wahadat PartyIran has also purchased two Su-22 and one Su-24 fighter-bombers for AhmedShah Masood and sent Iranian pilots to help plan air operations for the North-ern Alliance

8 James Risen ldquoRussians Are Back in Afghanistan Aiding Rebelsrdquo NYT July 27 1998

472 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

Clearly the challenges to the Taliban have grown over the years particu-larly in the political and economic field They continue fighting on the onehand while on the other they are increasingly worried about their growingpolitical isolation However isolation has not moderated them Theystaunchly believe in their ideology which makes it difficult for others to un-derstand them as something other than an extremist force Economicallythey are in a vulnerable position because they are operating in a war-devas-tated country and the Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan have beentargeted for heavy international sanctions

The Formation of the Taliban Governmentand Its Effect on the Civil War

By 1997 the Taliban had accomplished major military successes in the civilwar After the capture of Kabul they also began to prove themselves in thepolitical arena They felt the need of forming an alternate government tocounter the legitimacy of Rabbanirsquos regime Aware that peace and politicalstability in the country would ultimately make them a credible force theTaliban instituted a framework of shuras (consultative bodies) to achievethose aims The most visible Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad OmarAkhund then asked the shuras to give some political shape to the movement

The Taliban also gave the country a new official name changing it fromthe Islamic State of Afghanistan to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA)in October 1997 The group justified the new name as reflecting the groundrealities However the opposition has termed the change to be an undemo-cratic move A prominent Afghan intellectual Rasul Amin in a BBC PushtoService interview spoke of the new name as something that to him felt asthough it was a transplant from the Arab world However Mullah WakilAhmed a senior Taliban leader and spokesman of the movement said it wasnot the first time that Afghanistanrsquos name has been changed In the pastwords such as ldquorepublicrdquo or ldquodemocraticrdquo were added to Afghanistanrsquos nameThe emirate system however is not acceptable to the opposition as Talibanpossess no popular or legal mandate to govern or impose such But for theTaliban changing the countryrsquos appellation represents breaking with the pastand reforming the political system

The Talibanrsquos initially loose bureaucratic structures have been trans-formed too Mullah Mohammad Omar Akhund was elected Amir-ul-Momineen (Commander of the believers) by an assembly of about 1200 in-vited ulama in the city of Kandahar in spring 1996 Since then Mullah Omarhas been at the top of the ruling structure in Afghanistan Though he remainsin the background his word is final and almost has the force of law in themovement Mullah Omar lives simply known for having few needs and withno particular taste in food or dress He is alarmingly careless about his per-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 473

TABLE 1 Ethnic Composition and Cabinet Portfolios of the 10-Member Shura Basedin Kandahar

Names Ethnicity Portfolio

Mullah Mohammad Omar Ghilzai Amir-ul-MonineenAkhund Pushtun

Mullah Mohammad Rabbani Pushtun Chairman of the Caretaker CouncilDeputy Commander of the Taliban

movementMullah Mohammad Fadel Pushtun Minister of DefenseMullah Mohammad Ghaus Pushtun Minister of Foreign AffairsMullah Mohammad Hassan Pushtun Minister of SecurityMaulvi Ghaisuddin Agha Uzbek Minister of EducationMaulvi Abdur Raqib Uzbek Minister for RefugeesQari Deen Mohammad Tajik Minister for PlanningMullah Abdul Razzaq Tajik Member Supervisory CouncilMaulvi Abdul Saleem Uzbek Deputy Minister of Education

sonal security is not a gifted orator and his study of religion is limited as hewas not able to complete his religious education because of the war Despitethis background he inspires confidence among his supporters because of hispiety and the strength of his beliefs

Mullah Omar is assisted by a loose network of shuras A central shuracomprising 10 members was established in Kandahar (see Table 1) All di-rectives and policies were initiated from here and it virtually became the cap-ital of the Taliban-controlled areas (indeed Kandahar is the currentheadquarters of the Taliban movement) Aside from the core group of 10meetings of the original shura also saw participation from military com-manders tribal leaders and ulama this indeterminate structure is one of thekey features of the Talibanrsquos central shura Mullah Omar also tried to main-tain a balance between the Pushtuns and non-Pushtuns in the shura TheTaliban have been criticized for dividing Afghanistan along ethnic linesHowever despite the effort to integrate non-Pushtuns into the shura theTaliban have not been able to shed their Pushtun moorings and have not beenconsidered as impartial regarding other ethnicities

The takeover of Kabul and the formation of a central shura reflected theTalibanrsquos desire to have a more lasting stay on the political scene The cen-tral shura is assisted by a cabinet a shura in Kabul and a military shuraThese three bodies report to the central shura in Kandahar Clearly theseadministrative structures are different from the past governments For in-stance a talib (religious student) in a ministerial post is something unknownin Afghan history Nevertheless even the Taliban have found that control-

474 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

TABLE 2 Military Command Structure of the Taliban

Position Individual

Commander in Chief Mullah Mohammad Omar AkhundMilitary Chief of Staff Mullah Mohmmad HassanChief of the Army Staff Mullah Rahmatullah AkhundArmy Division Chief Mullah Muhammad Jumma KhanArmy Division Chief Mullah Muhammad YunusArmy Division Chief Mullah Mohammad GulArmy Division Chief Mullah Mohammad Aziz KhanArmored Force No 4 Mullah Mohammad Zahir

ling a territory without a clear administrative system is not possible in con-temporary times

The formation of these shuras was aimed at creating an efficient govern-ment After they captured Kabul the Taliban formed a six-member Provi-sional Ruling Council headed by Mullah Mohammad Rabbani This wasfollowed by the formation of the Kabul Shura of Acting Ministers in 1999The Kabul Shura deals with day-to-day problems of the government the cityand the Kabul military front Important policy recommendations are con-veyed to the Kandahar Shura where decisions are actually made To restoreand maintain peace in the provinces the Taliban appoints governors who arefrom provinces other than those where they are serving This policy appearsto have been welcomed by the people As for the military shura it is a looseorganizational body that plans strategy and can implement some tactical deci-sions (see Table 2) The military shura appears to have no strategic decision-making powers Military strategy key personnel appointments and the allo-cation of funds for offensives are decided upon by the Amir-ul-Momineen

Although their government has few resources and many parts barely func-tion at all the Taliban have adopted a discourse of Afghan nationalism inaddition to their Islamic traditionalism Despite their amorphous politicalleadership the Taliban claim to be trying to recreate a centralized Afghanstate In areas under their control they have appointed provincial governorsand administrators of districts cities and towns from the center9

One of the most remarkable characteristics of the Taliban leadership is thattop government officials often switch from the battlefield to the ministry andback again each time following the orders from Mullah Omar In one sensethis produces remarkable flexibility among the Taliban hierarchy as they allact as both administrators and military commanders This flexibility in the

9 Barnett Rubin ldquoAfghanistan under the Talibanrdquo Current History vol 98 no 625 (Febru-ary 1999) p 81

NASREEN GHUFRAN 475

military command has allowed the leadership to maintain better ties with therank-and-file fighters than might otherwise be the case However theTaliban administration in Kabul has faced problems For instance while anyminister is away at the front no decisions can be taken in that ministryMoreover government ministers are working without pay something un-heard of in modern times They do not use government resources for privateuse curtailing expenses and refraining from indulgence in squandering andextravagance Regular salaries are paid only to professional civil servantsand trained soldiers drawn from the former communist army

As for the Northern Alliance until August 1998 the areas it controlled hadfour main administrative and political centers Mazar Sharif which somegroups aspired to turn into a temporary capital for a government in exile ofthe Islamic State of Afghanistan Talauqan the headquarters of MasoodrsquosSCN Shibergan the location of Dostumrsquos headquarters and Bamiyan theheadquarters of the Hizb-i-Wahadat The Taliban have made inroads intothese areas too because the entire political administrative fabric of northernAfghanistan has broken down Only one of Afghanistanrsquos provinces is nowentirely under the Northern Alliancersquos control Badakhshan an inaccessiblemountainous region in the extreme northeast of the country There are alsoneighboring valleys to the west and a few enclaves in the Afghan interiorover which the Taliban have not yet been able to consolidate control Someelements of the former state administration have survived but political powerresides individually in the various armed groups rather than in a unitary civil-ian structure The groups maintain their own military and command struc-tures they do not have a unified strategy for the joint mobilization ofresources in their struggle against the Taliban

The areas controlled by the Taliban have been subjected to drastic changesto personal behavior The Taliban have put a ban on wine and televisionwhich is perceived to be immoral There is also complete restriction on mu-sic photography and the painting of living things The shaving off of onersquosbeard or trimming it less than a fistful is prohibited as is having a Westernhairstyle Gambling betting pigeon flying dog-racing and sodomy are alsostrictly forbidden

The Taliban have gained international notoriety because they have bannedwomen from working Women are obligated to observe strict purdah (litveiling also refers to covering of bodies) Girls have been stopped fromgoing to schools The Taliban have told all women working outside theirhomes to stay at home Although women who had been working will con-tinue to receive their salaries the Taliban claim that there is no need for themto work any longer They claim that these restrictions have been put in placeto protect the honor and dignity of women At the same time Taliban offi-cials have said that they are not against women working or receiving an edu-

476 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

cation The Taliban claim that they need time and resources to create theproper environment and right texts and curriculum for womenrsquos educationThe Talibanrsquos behavior is modeled after the Islamic revolution in Iran Edu-cational establishments remained closed for many years in the aftermath ofthat revolution They remained closed until the Iranian revolutionaries for-mally established an educational syllabus conforming to their own principles

The Taliban have stated that they wish to establish a pure Islamic state Intheir view this means that women have no place in the public arena Theyare required to stay at home and take care of their husbands and childrenThe Taliban cling to the symbol of a protected woman Women have toobserve a strict dress code wearing a burqa (a garment covering the bodyfrom head to toe) and trousers fully covering their ankles While women hadworn burqa in the pre-Taliban era it had not been an enforced dress code

The Talibanrsquos edicts have had a severe impact on many other women whodo not have a close male relative to accompany them in public Hardest hithave been the countryrsquos estimated 30000 widows many of whom are thesole providers for their families Some widows have been allowed to work inareas under the Taliban control but even for them it is not easy to get permis-sion According to Taliban representatives the current restrictions are said tobe necessary because females are not safe outside their homes Many womenhave strongly reacted to the Taliban policies despite the restrictive climate inTaliban-controlled areas These women do not like what the Taliban havebeen professing They want to work and continue with their education butthese rights are being denied to them The justifications given by Taliban arenot acceptable to the working and more enlightened urban Afghan women Itis therefore not surprising that women have become the most vocal critics ofthe Taliban

The edicts against women also have predictably had a devastating impacton primary level education Before the civil war over four-fifths of primaryschool teachers were women The majority of them are now jobless Theclosure of schools has in turn affected children Many orphaned childrenwho once could make homes at schools are now forced to live on the streetsAn international aid group in 1998 estimated 28000 street children in Kabulalone

Mullah Nuruddin Turabi the Taliban minister of justice defended theTalibanrsquos domestic actions He said ldquoIt is not just a question of men wearingbeards and women wearing burqas In Afghanistan every vice has to bestopped and every virtue promulgatedrdquo10 The Taliban have established anew security service the Ministry of Enforcement of Virtue and Suppressionof Vice for eradicating corruption and other vices from Afghan society Ac-

10 Michael Fathers ldquoFrozen in Timerdquo Time May 2000

NASREEN GHUFRAN 477

cording to Taliban tenets their rules are a jihad (holy war) against sin cor-ruption and cruelty Therefore those who do not abide by the Taliban edictson personal behavior are strictly punished according to a strict application ofIslamic law Hence stoning to death amputations (in case of robbery) andother forms of punishments are carried out in front of large crowds

Nonetheless a crisis of governance remains in Afghanistan To supportersof the Taliban regime its government is one that is accountable and represen-tative of all ethnic groups To many the Taliban have restored Afghan cul-ture Afghan-style self-rule has been implemented in the provinces and theTalibanrsquos supporters note that the countryrsquos civil administration and justicesystem are now based on Islamic and Afghan traditions The opposition re-jects this opinion and condemns the Taliban government of being unrepre-sentative and unaccountable

While all the above-mentioned structures are functioning the governmentfaces tremendous challenges The most obvious one is the governmentrsquosunacceptability to and lack of recognition from the international system letalone by the opposition The political dealings that the government has hadwith others offer evidence of its credibility in the civil war While theTaliban have major control of the countryrsquos land area they have not yet hadmuch success on the political front Forming a government is not enough toend the civil war the Taliban must gain acceptability both at home andabroad

The Talibanrsquos International Legal StatusRecognition of a government in a civil war also helps in ending the conflictbecause both parties involved desire the political economic and militarysupport that can come with it Non-recognition of the Taliban government isan indicator of its standing in the international community The recognitionhas not been forthcoming because of dissatisfaction with Taliban policiesUpon taking Kabul the Taliban had immediately demanded from other statesformal recognition as the only legitimate government of Afghanistan Theyalso demanded to be granted a seat in the UN General Assembly Howeverthey received neither So far only Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UnitedArab Emirates (UAE) have recognized the Taliban government In contrastBurhanuddin Rabbanirsquos Northern Alliance regime despite its weak militaryposition has legitimacy and political backing from the world communityincluding the majority of the Islamic states Most countries preserved thestatus quo and continued to allow the diplomatic missions of the Rabbaniregime

Recognition in international law involves acceptance by a state of a givenentity that this recognized entity possesses an international legal personalityand the rights and privileges that flow from it or that it is the exclusive

478 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

representative of a body with international legal personality The decision togrant or not to grant recognition is a political one within the sovereign discre-tion of individual states Recognition in principle can be accorded to states orgovernments As far as the state of Afghanistan itself is concerned it hasbeen recognized by a large number of countries including all permanentmembers of the UN Security Council for many years However wherepolitical power has fragmented to the extent that it has in Afghanistan inrecent years there may well be more than one group claiming to be the gov-ernment In fact as has been outlined already there are two governmentswithin one country One is militarily strong and controls a large populationand territory but has no legal standing while the other is recognized but hasless control of Afghan territory

Pakistan was the first country to grant international recognition to theTalibanrsquos government Their past links provided the basis for doing so Asnoted earlier virtually all of the Taliban leadership had been refugees in Pa-kistan For several years Taliban leaders studied in the madrasas (religiousschools) affiliated with the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) headed by MaulviFazul ur Rehman Although it has not been conclusively proven that theTaliban are Pakistanrsquos creation much criticism along these lines and othershas been leveled against it Pakistan is said to have played a key role inturning Taliban into a functioning military force by providing training logis-tical support and equipment

In 1997 Pakistan rooted its decision to recognize the Taliban governmentbased on the fact that the latter was in effective control of most of Afghani-stanrsquos territory including the capital By the time recognition was given theTaliban government occupied 90 of Afghanistan and oversaw a populationthat was representative of all of the countryrsquos ethnic groups Since then Paki-stan has been striving to propagate a positive image of the student militia andworking to induce other neighboring countries to recognize them Further-more Pakistan has been making persistent attempts to get the UN to adoptthe vacant seat formula which the Organization of Islamic Conferences haddone during 1996

Pakistanrsquos ties with the Taliban have become increasingly complex owingto the influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan Pakistanmdasha country of 140million mostly poor peoplemdashhas been almost single-handedly housing andfeeding the 12 million Afghan refugees living there since 1995 the year theUN stopped providing food and housing aid Some of the Afghan refugeescurrently in Pakistan have been there since the 1980s having fled the Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan At the time an estimated 32 million refugees livedin Pakistan making it the largest caseload of refugees in the world

Some of the refugees did return to Afghanistan In 1994 approximately77000 went back with the assistance of the UN High Commission for Refu-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 479

gees (UNHCR) An additional 76000 refugees returned to Afghanistan ontheir own11 However the years since then have seen a new wave of refu-gees flowing into Pakistan from northern Afghanistan Many of the freshrefugees are fleeing the fighting there plus a devastating drought This newwave has not been officially registered with any international organizationAs a consequence the statistics regarding refugees in Pakistan are unreliableAn influx of 30000 Afghan refugees came to Pakistan in 2000 and it is esti-mated that more than 50000 have crossed the border since then In that yearPakistan decided to close its border to stop further refugees because it couldnot absorb any more However its border was later reopened because of thedeplorable condition of the refugees and pressure from international humani-tarian relief agencies

Aside from Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UAE are on the list of countriesrecognizing the Talibanrsquos government Saudi Arabiarsquos came only a few daysafter Pakistanrsquos Until mid-1998 Islamabad and Riyadh were on the samepolitical wavelength Saudi Arabia supplied heavily subsidized fuel to theTaliban through Pakistan and also provided general funding After 1998problems between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan developed over the fate ofOsama bin Laden the Saudi millionaire who had been funding the Afghanjihad The Taliban had promised Saudi Arabia that Osama bin Laden wouldnot use his refuge in Afghanistan to support any acts of violence abroadAfter Osama bin Laden was linked to the bombings of US embassies inKenya and Tanzania his continued refuge in Afghanistan became a majorsource of tension between Taliban and the US on one hand and Saudi Ara-bia on the other

Apart from these three countries the Taliban have not managed to estab-lish political ties with other states This becomes a major constraint for agovernment of a country going through civil war If the paramount objectiveis to end the civil war the government has to direct its energies in this direc-tion It cannot expect the US or other countries to come to its rescue

The United States has been a major country involved in AfghanistanAlong with the Soviets the US had fed the civil war since the days of thecold war When Taliban captured Kabul the US State Department an-nounced it would establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban by sendingan official to Kabul This announcement was quickly retracted The StateDepartment spokesman Glyn Davies said the US found nothing objectiona-ble in the steps taken by the Taliban to impose Islamic law and described theTaliban as anti-modern rather than anti-Western Some members of Con-

11 Nasreen Ghufran ldquoRefugees A Comparative Study of India and Pakistanrdquo (paperpresented at the conference ldquoThe Challenge of Cooperation South Asia and Beyondrdquo Kath-mandu Nepal December 1998)

480 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

gress supported the Taliban because their government appeared to serve theUS policy of isolating Iran A Taliban regime would create a firmly Sunnibuffer on Iranrsquos border and potentially provide security for trade routes andpipelines that would break Iranrsquos monopoly on Central Asiarsquos southern traderoutes

But from its initial policy of acquiescence vis-a-vis the Taliban the USmoved to the other extreme of rejecting them completely The US rejectionwas largely because of the pressure exerted by the feminist movement Theprominent feminist Zieba-Shorish Shamley persuaded many US feministgroups to spearhead a signature campaign to mobilize support for Afghanwomen Her efforts helped persuade former President Clinton to take atougher stance against the Taliban12 Washingtonrsquos denouncement of theTaliban also came in the backdrop of the presidential election in the US assupporting a regime that held no respect for human rights would have nega-tively affected Clintonrsquos position13

In 1998 when the Taliban made great military gains against the forces ofthe North they expected to gain recognition and a seat in the UN they hadmajor Afghan cities under their control and their rivals in retreat Talibanrepresentatives claimed that if recognition were granted to their governmentthey would allow a huge pipeline project to proceed that would carry oil andgas from Central Asia to lucrative markets in Pakistan and India This pipe-line would cut through the western part of Afghanistan ldquoEven before thecapture of Mazar-i-Sharif and Taloqan we were fully qualified for recogni-tionrdquo said deputy information minister Abdur Rahman Hotaki referring totwo key opposition bases captured by the militia ldquoThe opposition gave peo-ple an excuse to deny us recognition and prevent us having the pipeline runthrough our country but that excuse has now gonerdquo he said ldquoAll excusesblocking our recognition are gone Therefore it is predicted they will revisetheir policy in view of the current realitiesrdquo he said adding that all ldquotermsand conditions for a legitimate staterdquo have been met14

But the Taliban encountered problems with international organizations In1999 the UN proposed imposing sanctions against the Taliban when it is-sued Security Council Resolution 1267 Adopted unanimously by the Secur-ity Council on October 15 the resolution demanded that the Taliban turn overOsama bin Laden without further delay to authorities in a country where hewill be brought to justice Until the Taliban comply the resolution requiresUN member states to deny permission for Taliban-owned -leased or -oper-ated aircraft to land in or take off from their territory It also calls for the

12 Rashid Taliban pp 180ndash8213 P Stobodan ldquoThe Afghan Conflict and Regional Securityrdquo Strategic Analysis (August

1999) p 72414 Frontier Post (Peshawar) January 14 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 481

freezing of funds and other financial resources including funds derived fromproperty owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban The lat-ter had 30 days in which to comply with this resolution before sanctions wereimposed The Taliban did not comply and the sanctions came into force

Another round of sanctions was imposed on the Taliban in December 2000with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1333 The new sanc-tions called for an arms embargo on the Taliban including foreign militaryassistance It also imposed a ban on travel by the militiarsquos senior leaders abroader flight ban than the one imposed last year to force bin Ladenrsquos surren-der measures to close all Taliban offices overseas and a ban on exports toTaliban areas of acetic anhydride used to manufacture heroin Finally it alsofroze funds and other financial assets of Osama bin Laden and individualsand entities associated with him Mullah Omar reacted to this round of sanc-tions by saying his government would not back out from its stand and princi-ples even if the entire world turned against them15

The continuation of these sanctions has pushed the issue of recognition tothe backburner However the international community is also paying a pricefor not recognizing the legitimacy of the Taliban One of the principal areasin which the Taliban could provide some assistance is in the containment ofthe production of poppy Mullah Omar on several occasions emphasized hiswill to fight against opium production However it has been difficult tomaintain such policy postures in the wake of external sanctions As a resultin 1999 over 90983 hectares of poppies yielded a harvest of over 4581 tonsof dry opium an estimated 70 increase in production over the previousyearrsquos figure

The international sanctions have also affected the incentives of local farm-ers to turn away from poppy production Afghanistanrsquos socioeconomic situa-tion makes opium production one of the only available economic means foraccess to land labor and credit Currently the Afghan peasantryrsquos heavydependence upon opium production associated with the politico-territorialrealities of a tribal society typified by fragile political allegiances is makingit difficult for the Taliban to make any serious attempts at eradication16

Additionally any Taliban attempt to implement a poppy eradication policywill be severely compromised by the governmentrsquos international non-recog-nition This places restrictions on the options open to the government Eventhe UN Drug Control Program cannot legally reach any formal agreementwith the Taliban government as long as the latter is not internationally recog-nized The Taliban government faces a self-imposed catch-22 situation Its

15 Ibid16 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy ldquoTalibanrsquos Drug Dilemma Opium Production vs International

Recognitionrdquo The Analyst (Paris) (1999)

482 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

political policies and actions are deemed unacceptable by the internationalcommunity yet it cannot pursue any eradication policy with any hope ofcomplete success without the international recognition and aid that are beingdenied it owing to those policies and actions17

Future Prospects for Change in theTalibanrsquos Regime

Since 1996 the Taliban have been striving to bring the civil war to a success-ful conclusion Their domestic policies have brought about alienation andcreated fissures within the Afghan society Their inflexible stand on variouspolicies has denied them the credibility they so desire Their authoritarianismand intolerance have alienated non-Pushtun Afghans who make up morethan half the population The flow of thousands of extremist Pakistani andArab Taliban supporters into Afghanistan has fueled the resentment of thelocal populace18

The Taliban are accused of harboring terrorists and extremists who notonly support Taliban but also carry out their extremist policies in the targetedcountries According to a report that appeared in the Far Eastern EconomicReview (FEER) Afghanistan has become a sanctuary for ldquoarmed insurgentsaccused of terrorist attacks in China Iran Uzbekistan Tajikistan and Paki-stanrdquo Some 400 Arab Islamic militants from a dozen Middle Eastern andAfrican countries are said to be part of the 055 Brigade funded by Osama binLaden and fighting alongside Taliban in the current offensive The articlefurther noted that ldquo[t]he diverse groups have their own agendas mainly fo-cused on undermining the regimes at home but some share bin Ladenrsquos zealfor a global Islamic revolution The resulting web of dangerous friendshipsthreatens to export instability throughout the mineral-rich and commerciallyunder-exploited hinterland of Central Asiardquo19

It is obvious that the Taliban must improve their image both at home andabroad as perceptions play an important role in the general acceptability ornon-acceptability of governments in both arenas Currently the Taliban areperceived primarily as a negative element that is unlikely to play any positiverole in resolving the Afghan conflict If they fail in their goal the Afghannation will lose any trust that religious political forces could play any mean-ingful role in resolving the ongoing conflict The Talibanrsquos fate will be more

17 At the time of writing the Taliban were not cooperating in poppy eradication Currentlyit appears this may have changed The Taliban claim to have completely eradicated poppy pro-duction in the areas dominated by their troops and the claim is being verified under UN aus-pices

18 Peter Tomsen ldquoResponse A Chance for Peace in AfghanistanmdashThe Talibanrsquos Days areNumberedrdquo Foreign Affairs 79 (JanuaryndashFebruary 2000) p 179

19 Ahmed Rashid ldquoAfghanistan Heart of Darknessrdquo FEER August 5 1999

NASREEN GHUFRAN 483

or less the same as that which befell the mujahideen if they do not take timelyand corrective measures to improve Afghanistanrsquos deteriorating situation

The Taliban gained support from most of the populace in the beginningbecause they offered themselves a neutral force and declared their intentionto remain so However they are no longer neutral and have become anotherparty to the conflict Their policies have not only infuriated the internationalpublic but also large sections of the Afghan community The large influxesof Afghan refugees into Pakistan reflect the growing disagreement with theirpolicies This disenchantment is unlikely to change if the Taliban do notmoderate their stance The Taliban of course believe their policies to be im-portant for bringing about the change they desire but they do not realize howmuch these policies have alienated people The international community hasexplicitly voiced its criticism of the Taliban regime and consider it to be aliving nightmare for women political dissidents and anyone else who doesnot submit to the laws under the authority of the Ministry for the Fostering ofVirtue and Suppression of Vice The Taliban movement itself came about asa reaction to the self-seeking and self-destructive policies of the mujahideenwhose pretensions to Islam and leadership were discredited It was in thisideological vacuum and a Hobbesian state of anarchy that made the Talibanrsquosrule palatable to common Afghanis20 But if the Talibanrsquos government doesnot soften its present policies and complete peace is not restored it will notbe too late for the common people to turn against them

The year 2001 has seen universal outrage at the offensive launched by theTaliban rulers against Afghanistanrsquos Buddhist past Condemnation has notremained confined to non-Muslim states several Islamic countries includingPakistan have been appalled by the destruction of Buddhist statues in theprovince of Bamiyan Pakistan sent an official delegation whose aim was toprevent the Taliban from destroying the statues Pakistanrsquos foreign ministerAbdul Sattar said ldquoCertainly we believe it was a mistake a blunder and as aresult Afghanistan will suffer consequences for years to comerdquo To this headded that ldquoit is very difficult for me to make a statement as to why they didnot hearrdquo21 Iran likewise strongly condemned the statuesrsquo destruction Astatement released by Iranrsquos Cultural Heritage Organization wondered whyldquocertain Taliban-led individuals calling themselves lsquoclericrsquo have ordered de-struction of ancient sites of the mankind society citing blasphemy and idoliz-

20 Hafeez Malik ldquoPakistan Islam and the Taliban Phenomenonrdquo News International (Paki-stan) June 9 2000

21 Sattarrsquos remarks are in ibid March 11 2001

484 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

ing as reasonsrdquo22 To prevent their destruction Iran even offered to buy thestatues or move them into safekeeping

However the Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil rejectedany offer to prevent the destruction of the statues His negotiations with Pa-kistan did not bear a positive result and he rejected the Iranian offers reiterat-ing that the presence of the statues conflicted with Islamic teaching In thewake of the Talibanrsquos subsequent actions Iran led a UN initiative to takeserious action against the regime Commenting on the statuesrsquo destructionthe Iranian Foreign Ministry stated ldquoUnfortunately the Talibanrsquos destructionof the statues has cast doubts on the comprehensive views offered by Islamicideology in the world Clearly Muslims across the world pin the blame onthe rigid-minded Taliban and by no means embroil the Afghan Muslims inthis counter-cultural moverdquo23

The Bamiyan incident stirred up dual controversies about both the charac-ter of the Taliban regime and the relationship between culture religion andnational heritage in an Islamic state In his characteristic style Mullah Omarshrugged off all objections to the planned destruction of the Buddhist statuessaying ldquomy job is the implementation of Islamic orderrdquo He invoked Islamiclaw a fatwa issued by the Afghan ulama associated with this regime and thedecision of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to support his decision24

Nonetheless the destruction of the statues has further tarnished the Talibanrsquosimage While it may be the case that the Taliban undertook their actions inreaction to the tough sanctions imposed on them by the world the Talibanhave to realize that they are not going to earn any international sympathy orrecognition

Afghanistan has always been important to external powers due to its strate-gic location They have meddled in its affairs both in the past and at presentThe protracted civil war makes it more vulnerable to external penetration Insuch situations it has no other option but to seek help and support fromoutside The external powers are more than willing to do so if it serves theirnational interest The opposition is likely to adopt a similar strategy as theyhave less access to the resources of the country than the ruling authority Hadthere been no external involvement Afghanistanrsquos extended civil war wouldnot have become the protracted and complicated affair that it is

The Afghan civil war has important regional implications Various exter-nal powers are pursuing divergent objectives in Afghanistan and the outcome

22 Cultural Heritage Organization comment is in Iran News (Tehran) March 1 2001 Thisnews item is distributed via Middle East News Online available at lthttpwwwmiddleeastwirecomgt

23 Comments of the Iranian Foreign Ministry reported by the BBC World Service March 52001

24 Rahimullah Yusufzai ldquoA Question of Tolerancerdquo News International March 4 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 469

merely disarmed them Their message seemed simple and appealing to mostAfghans peace order and Islamic law5

Establishing peace in a country like Afghanistan is by no means an easytask particularly in light of how long the civil war has been underway Evensome critics of the Taliban talk about the restoration of peace in Taliban-controlled areas ldquoBefore the Taliban this country belonged to warlords andthe simple act of going to visit my village was an impossibilityrdquo said a UNofficial who is an Afghan ldquoMy daughters sit in the house and cry to me Wewant education This is heartbreaking but peace is the first priority for peo-ple here The Taliban must be given credit for accomplishing thisrdquo6

In his in-depth analysis Franz Schurmann concluded that it is the power ofthe Talibanrsquos ideas and the stability they have brought to war-torn Afghani-stan that makes them so frightening Their proven effectiveness in maintain-ing law and order as well as their adherence to the commandments of Islamand cultural norms which see traditional Afghan women as being obedientrather than challenging to men seem to have won over the predominantlyilliterate peasants and working class

After so many years of debilitating warfare concentrated in and around thecities the urbane educated elite who would challenge these norms have van-ished More importantly for centuries the great mass of Afghans has thrivedunder the most primitive political and economic conditions while the pasttwo decades have brought only war poverty and insecurity For most Af-ghans therefore their present situation under the Taliban appears to be if notideal the best among possible alternatives The removal of small arms andheavy weapons from public view is an accomplishment of immense propor-tions as weapons were everywhere and used indiscriminately

The situation in the territory controlled by the Northern Alliance is quitedifferent The opposition controls a tiny but significant 10 of the country inthe north There people are so fearful of crime that they often doubt theadvantages of the relatively liberal order under which they live It appearsthat in Afghanistan freedom and safety are opposites The Alliance had beeninstrumental in bringing down Najibullahrsquos government in April 1992 but itdisintegrated shortly after its victory because of power struggles within thegroup However when the Taliban captured Kabul in September 1996 thethree participant groups resurrected the Northern Alliance in opposition onceagain Accurate figures regarding the total mobilizing force of the allianceare not available but by a rough estimate they would number around 80000troops In contrast the Talibanrsquos active forces number about 100000

5 Barnett Rubin The Search for Peace in Afghanistan From Buffer State to Failed State(New Haven Conn Yale University Press 1995) p 140

6 Barry Bearak ldquoAfghans Ruled by Taliban Poor Isolated but Securerdquo New York Times(NYT) October 10 1998

470 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

The nominal head of the Northern Alliance is Burhanuddin Rabbani al-though in reality he shares power with his primary military backer AhmedShah Masood Both of them belong to the Jamiat-i-Islami which is apredominantly Tajik Islamist party Rabbanirsquos regime controls most of thecountryrsquos embassies abroad and retains Afghanistanrsquos seat in the UN Ah-med Shah Masood built Afghanistanrsquos most sophisticated military-politicalorganization the Shurandashyi-Nazar-i-Shamali (Supervisory Council of theNorth SCN) The SCN coordinated Jamiat commanders and also createdregion-wide forces that developed into Masoodrsquos Urdu-i-Islami (IslamicArmy) Rabbani and Masood get their main support from the northeasternlargely Tajik portion of the country Due to his military performance andcontrol of the strategic Panjsher Valley Masood is popularly known as theldquolion of Panjsherrdquo

General Abdul Rashid Dostum and his ethnic Uzbek Junbishndashi-Milli (Na-tional movement) Party also form part of the Northern Alliance The latterrsquosbase of support lies primarily among the Sunni Muslim Uzbeks A largenumber of fighters forming part of this organization (the numbers vary be-tween 15000 and 16000) had a reputation of being the best-equipped forcesThe Hizb-i-Wahadat-i-Islami yi-Afghanistan (Islamic unity party of Afghani-stan) is the principal Shirsquoa party in Afghanistan its support is mainly amongthe ethnic Hazara group This group was originally formed under Iraniansponsorship in order to unite eight Shirsquoa parties Its leader is Karim Khaliliwho is based in Hazarajat7

Until they captured Kabul in 1996 the Taliban expressed no desire to rulethe country Ever since then the Taliban have committed themselves to con-quering the entire country The problems with the Taliban began when theystarted acting as the ruling elite Eventually their growing international iso-lation plus their ineffective administration alienated large numbers of Af-ghans As the civil war continues they are becoming more rigid Thisattitude has doomed expectations that the civil war will end Indeed whilethe Talibanrsquos achievements as a peace force had good beginnings as theyears have passed they seem to have become entangled in the civil war thatthey intended to disentangle During the early period of the civil war theTaliban did achieve some remarkable accomplishments above all revivingthe lost trust of the Afghans However their strong opposition to the forcesof the North has earned them a reputation for inflexibility

The Taliban transformed themselves from a movement into a ruling gov-ernment Their main priorities were to bring peace while at the same time tostay in power to implement their vision of an Islamic state But resistance tothis vision remains strong and the Northern Alliance is still giving the

7 Ibid

NASREEN GHUFRAN 471

Taliban a difficult time Despite the relative isolation of the Northern Alli-ancersquos forces and their extended lines of communication they have been ableto continue owing to military assistance from outside governments This aidhas come in a variety of forms ranging from the direct transfer of materiel tothe dispatch of military advisors and support personnel albeit in limited num-bers Next to none of these transfers have been publicly documented viasubmissions to the UNrsquos register on conventional arms Ironically much ofthe Northern Alliancersquos military support comes from nations participating inthe so-called ldquoSix-Plus-Twordquo contact group (Pakistan Iran UzbekistanChina Turkmenistan Tajikistan and Russia and the United States) whosemembers have publicly pledged not to provide military support to any Af-ghan combatants and prevent the use of member state territories for suchpurposes

The Northern Alliancersquos main suppliers are Iran and Russia with secon-dary roles played by Tajikistan Uzbekistan (at least until 1998) Turkmeni-stan and Kyrgyzstan Moscow denies that it is arming the Afghan rebels Inan interview with the New York Times Masood has said that he receivesmuch of his equipment from the Russian mafia not the Russian governmentHowever Russia has reportedly provided Dostum with 500 T-55 and T-62tanks that are used against areas that oppose his rule Russia has also sup-plied him with a large number of Frog 7 and Luna M missiles8

The assistance from some Central Asian republics has been an importantsource of support to the Northern Alliance Uzbekistanrsquos president IslamKarimov has clandestinely supported his fellow Uzbeks His country hassupplied the Northern Alliance with tanks aircraft and technical personnelThis support has been provided with the expectation that Uzbek-dominatedprovinces in northern Afghanistan would provide a buffer against the spreadof fundamentalism The secular regime of Turkmenistanrsquos presidentSapamurad Niyazov has publicly joined other Central Asian republics in ar-ticulating the dangers of the Afghan civil war spreading into the neighboringstates However the government of Turkmenistan is not too keen in gettingembroiled and providing overt backing to those fighting the Taliban

Anti-Taliban forces are being trained in a dozen or so camps located alongIranrsquos eastern border Since May 1997 6000 Afghan military personnelhave been dispatched from these camps to various war fronts in northernAfghanistan Most of Iranrsquos aid has been going to the Hizb-i-Wahadat PartyIran has also purchased two Su-22 and one Su-24 fighter-bombers for AhmedShah Masood and sent Iranian pilots to help plan air operations for the North-ern Alliance

8 James Risen ldquoRussians Are Back in Afghanistan Aiding Rebelsrdquo NYT July 27 1998

472 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

Clearly the challenges to the Taliban have grown over the years particu-larly in the political and economic field They continue fighting on the onehand while on the other they are increasingly worried about their growingpolitical isolation However isolation has not moderated them Theystaunchly believe in their ideology which makes it difficult for others to un-derstand them as something other than an extremist force Economicallythey are in a vulnerable position because they are operating in a war-devas-tated country and the Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan have beentargeted for heavy international sanctions

The Formation of the Taliban Governmentand Its Effect on the Civil War

By 1997 the Taliban had accomplished major military successes in the civilwar After the capture of Kabul they also began to prove themselves in thepolitical arena They felt the need of forming an alternate government tocounter the legitimacy of Rabbanirsquos regime Aware that peace and politicalstability in the country would ultimately make them a credible force theTaliban instituted a framework of shuras (consultative bodies) to achievethose aims The most visible Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad OmarAkhund then asked the shuras to give some political shape to the movement

The Taliban also gave the country a new official name changing it fromthe Islamic State of Afghanistan to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA)in October 1997 The group justified the new name as reflecting the groundrealities However the opposition has termed the change to be an undemo-cratic move A prominent Afghan intellectual Rasul Amin in a BBC PushtoService interview spoke of the new name as something that to him felt asthough it was a transplant from the Arab world However Mullah WakilAhmed a senior Taliban leader and spokesman of the movement said it wasnot the first time that Afghanistanrsquos name has been changed In the pastwords such as ldquorepublicrdquo or ldquodemocraticrdquo were added to Afghanistanrsquos nameThe emirate system however is not acceptable to the opposition as Talibanpossess no popular or legal mandate to govern or impose such But for theTaliban changing the countryrsquos appellation represents breaking with the pastand reforming the political system

The Talibanrsquos initially loose bureaucratic structures have been trans-formed too Mullah Mohammad Omar Akhund was elected Amir-ul-Momineen (Commander of the believers) by an assembly of about 1200 in-vited ulama in the city of Kandahar in spring 1996 Since then Mullah Omarhas been at the top of the ruling structure in Afghanistan Though he remainsin the background his word is final and almost has the force of law in themovement Mullah Omar lives simply known for having few needs and withno particular taste in food or dress He is alarmingly careless about his per-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 473

TABLE 1 Ethnic Composition and Cabinet Portfolios of the 10-Member Shura Basedin Kandahar

Names Ethnicity Portfolio

Mullah Mohammad Omar Ghilzai Amir-ul-MonineenAkhund Pushtun

Mullah Mohammad Rabbani Pushtun Chairman of the Caretaker CouncilDeputy Commander of the Taliban

movementMullah Mohammad Fadel Pushtun Minister of DefenseMullah Mohammad Ghaus Pushtun Minister of Foreign AffairsMullah Mohammad Hassan Pushtun Minister of SecurityMaulvi Ghaisuddin Agha Uzbek Minister of EducationMaulvi Abdur Raqib Uzbek Minister for RefugeesQari Deen Mohammad Tajik Minister for PlanningMullah Abdul Razzaq Tajik Member Supervisory CouncilMaulvi Abdul Saleem Uzbek Deputy Minister of Education

sonal security is not a gifted orator and his study of religion is limited as hewas not able to complete his religious education because of the war Despitethis background he inspires confidence among his supporters because of hispiety and the strength of his beliefs

Mullah Omar is assisted by a loose network of shuras A central shuracomprising 10 members was established in Kandahar (see Table 1) All di-rectives and policies were initiated from here and it virtually became the cap-ital of the Taliban-controlled areas (indeed Kandahar is the currentheadquarters of the Taliban movement) Aside from the core group of 10meetings of the original shura also saw participation from military com-manders tribal leaders and ulama this indeterminate structure is one of thekey features of the Talibanrsquos central shura Mullah Omar also tried to main-tain a balance between the Pushtuns and non-Pushtuns in the shura TheTaliban have been criticized for dividing Afghanistan along ethnic linesHowever despite the effort to integrate non-Pushtuns into the shura theTaliban have not been able to shed their Pushtun moorings and have not beenconsidered as impartial regarding other ethnicities

The takeover of Kabul and the formation of a central shura reflected theTalibanrsquos desire to have a more lasting stay on the political scene The cen-tral shura is assisted by a cabinet a shura in Kabul and a military shuraThese three bodies report to the central shura in Kandahar Clearly theseadministrative structures are different from the past governments For in-stance a talib (religious student) in a ministerial post is something unknownin Afghan history Nevertheless even the Taliban have found that control-

474 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

TABLE 2 Military Command Structure of the Taliban

Position Individual

Commander in Chief Mullah Mohammad Omar AkhundMilitary Chief of Staff Mullah Mohmmad HassanChief of the Army Staff Mullah Rahmatullah AkhundArmy Division Chief Mullah Muhammad Jumma KhanArmy Division Chief Mullah Muhammad YunusArmy Division Chief Mullah Mohammad GulArmy Division Chief Mullah Mohammad Aziz KhanArmored Force No 4 Mullah Mohammad Zahir

ling a territory without a clear administrative system is not possible in con-temporary times

The formation of these shuras was aimed at creating an efficient govern-ment After they captured Kabul the Taliban formed a six-member Provi-sional Ruling Council headed by Mullah Mohammad Rabbani This wasfollowed by the formation of the Kabul Shura of Acting Ministers in 1999The Kabul Shura deals with day-to-day problems of the government the cityand the Kabul military front Important policy recommendations are con-veyed to the Kandahar Shura where decisions are actually made To restoreand maintain peace in the provinces the Taliban appoints governors who arefrom provinces other than those where they are serving This policy appearsto have been welcomed by the people As for the military shura it is a looseorganizational body that plans strategy and can implement some tactical deci-sions (see Table 2) The military shura appears to have no strategic decision-making powers Military strategy key personnel appointments and the allo-cation of funds for offensives are decided upon by the Amir-ul-Momineen

Although their government has few resources and many parts barely func-tion at all the Taliban have adopted a discourse of Afghan nationalism inaddition to their Islamic traditionalism Despite their amorphous politicalleadership the Taliban claim to be trying to recreate a centralized Afghanstate In areas under their control they have appointed provincial governorsand administrators of districts cities and towns from the center9

One of the most remarkable characteristics of the Taliban leadership is thattop government officials often switch from the battlefield to the ministry andback again each time following the orders from Mullah Omar In one sensethis produces remarkable flexibility among the Taliban hierarchy as they allact as both administrators and military commanders This flexibility in the

9 Barnett Rubin ldquoAfghanistan under the Talibanrdquo Current History vol 98 no 625 (Febru-ary 1999) p 81

NASREEN GHUFRAN 475

military command has allowed the leadership to maintain better ties with therank-and-file fighters than might otherwise be the case However theTaliban administration in Kabul has faced problems For instance while anyminister is away at the front no decisions can be taken in that ministryMoreover government ministers are working without pay something un-heard of in modern times They do not use government resources for privateuse curtailing expenses and refraining from indulgence in squandering andextravagance Regular salaries are paid only to professional civil servantsand trained soldiers drawn from the former communist army

As for the Northern Alliance until August 1998 the areas it controlled hadfour main administrative and political centers Mazar Sharif which somegroups aspired to turn into a temporary capital for a government in exile ofthe Islamic State of Afghanistan Talauqan the headquarters of MasoodrsquosSCN Shibergan the location of Dostumrsquos headquarters and Bamiyan theheadquarters of the Hizb-i-Wahadat The Taliban have made inroads intothese areas too because the entire political administrative fabric of northernAfghanistan has broken down Only one of Afghanistanrsquos provinces is nowentirely under the Northern Alliancersquos control Badakhshan an inaccessiblemountainous region in the extreme northeast of the country There are alsoneighboring valleys to the west and a few enclaves in the Afghan interiorover which the Taliban have not yet been able to consolidate control Someelements of the former state administration have survived but political powerresides individually in the various armed groups rather than in a unitary civil-ian structure The groups maintain their own military and command struc-tures they do not have a unified strategy for the joint mobilization ofresources in their struggle against the Taliban

The areas controlled by the Taliban have been subjected to drastic changesto personal behavior The Taliban have put a ban on wine and televisionwhich is perceived to be immoral There is also complete restriction on mu-sic photography and the painting of living things The shaving off of onersquosbeard or trimming it less than a fistful is prohibited as is having a Westernhairstyle Gambling betting pigeon flying dog-racing and sodomy are alsostrictly forbidden

The Taliban have gained international notoriety because they have bannedwomen from working Women are obligated to observe strict purdah (litveiling also refers to covering of bodies) Girls have been stopped fromgoing to schools The Taliban have told all women working outside theirhomes to stay at home Although women who had been working will con-tinue to receive their salaries the Taliban claim that there is no need for themto work any longer They claim that these restrictions have been put in placeto protect the honor and dignity of women At the same time Taliban offi-cials have said that they are not against women working or receiving an edu-

476 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

cation The Taliban claim that they need time and resources to create theproper environment and right texts and curriculum for womenrsquos educationThe Talibanrsquos behavior is modeled after the Islamic revolution in Iran Edu-cational establishments remained closed for many years in the aftermath ofthat revolution They remained closed until the Iranian revolutionaries for-mally established an educational syllabus conforming to their own principles

The Taliban have stated that they wish to establish a pure Islamic state Intheir view this means that women have no place in the public arena Theyare required to stay at home and take care of their husbands and childrenThe Taliban cling to the symbol of a protected woman Women have toobserve a strict dress code wearing a burqa (a garment covering the bodyfrom head to toe) and trousers fully covering their ankles While women hadworn burqa in the pre-Taliban era it had not been an enforced dress code

The Talibanrsquos edicts have had a severe impact on many other women whodo not have a close male relative to accompany them in public Hardest hithave been the countryrsquos estimated 30000 widows many of whom are thesole providers for their families Some widows have been allowed to work inareas under the Taliban control but even for them it is not easy to get permis-sion According to Taliban representatives the current restrictions are said tobe necessary because females are not safe outside their homes Many womenhave strongly reacted to the Taliban policies despite the restrictive climate inTaliban-controlled areas These women do not like what the Taliban havebeen professing They want to work and continue with their education butthese rights are being denied to them The justifications given by Taliban arenot acceptable to the working and more enlightened urban Afghan women Itis therefore not surprising that women have become the most vocal critics ofthe Taliban

The edicts against women also have predictably had a devastating impacton primary level education Before the civil war over four-fifths of primaryschool teachers were women The majority of them are now jobless Theclosure of schools has in turn affected children Many orphaned childrenwho once could make homes at schools are now forced to live on the streetsAn international aid group in 1998 estimated 28000 street children in Kabulalone

Mullah Nuruddin Turabi the Taliban minister of justice defended theTalibanrsquos domestic actions He said ldquoIt is not just a question of men wearingbeards and women wearing burqas In Afghanistan every vice has to bestopped and every virtue promulgatedrdquo10 The Taliban have established anew security service the Ministry of Enforcement of Virtue and Suppressionof Vice for eradicating corruption and other vices from Afghan society Ac-

10 Michael Fathers ldquoFrozen in Timerdquo Time May 2000

NASREEN GHUFRAN 477

cording to Taliban tenets their rules are a jihad (holy war) against sin cor-ruption and cruelty Therefore those who do not abide by the Taliban edictson personal behavior are strictly punished according to a strict application ofIslamic law Hence stoning to death amputations (in case of robbery) andother forms of punishments are carried out in front of large crowds

Nonetheless a crisis of governance remains in Afghanistan To supportersof the Taliban regime its government is one that is accountable and represen-tative of all ethnic groups To many the Taliban have restored Afghan cul-ture Afghan-style self-rule has been implemented in the provinces and theTalibanrsquos supporters note that the countryrsquos civil administration and justicesystem are now based on Islamic and Afghan traditions The opposition re-jects this opinion and condemns the Taliban government of being unrepre-sentative and unaccountable

While all the above-mentioned structures are functioning the governmentfaces tremendous challenges The most obvious one is the governmentrsquosunacceptability to and lack of recognition from the international system letalone by the opposition The political dealings that the government has hadwith others offer evidence of its credibility in the civil war While theTaliban have major control of the countryrsquos land area they have not yet hadmuch success on the political front Forming a government is not enough toend the civil war the Taliban must gain acceptability both at home andabroad

The Talibanrsquos International Legal StatusRecognition of a government in a civil war also helps in ending the conflictbecause both parties involved desire the political economic and militarysupport that can come with it Non-recognition of the Taliban government isan indicator of its standing in the international community The recognitionhas not been forthcoming because of dissatisfaction with Taliban policiesUpon taking Kabul the Taliban had immediately demanded from other statesformal recognition as the only legitimate government of Afghanistan Theyalso demanded to be granted a seat in the UN General Assembly Howeverthey received neither So far only Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UnitedArab Emirates (UAE) have recognized the Taliban government In contrastBurhanuddin Rabbanirsquos Northern Alliance regime despite its weak militaryposition has legitimacy and political backing from the world communityincluding the majority of the Islamic states Most countries preserved thestatus quo and continued to allow the diplomatic missions of the Rabbaniregime

Recognition in international law involves acceptance by a state of a givenentity that this recognized entity possesses an international legal personalityand the rights and privileges that flow from it or that it is the exclusive

478 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

representative of a body with international legal personality The decision togrant or not to grant recognition is a political one within the sovereign discre-tion of individual states Recognition in principle can be accorded to states orgovernments As far as the state of Afghanistan itself is concerned it hasbeen recognized by a large number of countries including all permanentmembers of the UN Security Council for many years However wherepolitical power has fragmented to the extent that it has in Afghanistan inrecent years there may well be more than one group claiming to be the gov-ernment In fact as has been outlined already there are two governmentswithin one country One is militarily strong and controls a large populationand territory but has no legal standing while the other is recognized but hasless control of Afghan territory

Pakistan was the first country to grant international recognition to theTalibanrsquos government Their past links provided the basis for doing so Asnoted earlier virtually all of the Taliban leadership had been refugees in Pa-kistan For several years Taliban leaders studied in the madrasas (religiousschools) affiliated with the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) headed by MaulviFazul ur Rehman Although it has not been conclusively proven that theTaliban are Pakistanrsquos creation much criticism along these lines and othershas been leveled against it Pakistan is said to have played a key role inturning Taliban into a functioning military force by providing training logis-tical support and equipment

In 1997 Pakistan rooted its decision to recognize the Taliban governmentbased on the fact that the latter was in effective control of most of Afghani-stanrsquos territory including the capital By the time recognition was given theTaliban government occupied 90 of Afghanistan and oversaw a populationthat was representative of all of the countryrsquos ethnic groups Since then Paki-stan has been striving to propagate a positive image of the student militia andworking to induce other neighboring countries to recognize them Further-more Pakistan has been making persistent attempts to get the UN to adoptthe vacant seat formula which the Organization of Islamic Conferences haddone during 1996

Pakistanrsquos ties with the Taliban have become increasingly complex owingto the influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan Pakistanmdasha country of 140million mostly poor peoplemdashhas been almost single-handedly housing andfeeding the 12 million Afghan refugees living there since 1995 the year theUN stopped providing food and housing aid Some of the Afghan refugeescurrently in Pakistan have been there since the 1980s having fled the Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan At the time an estimated 32 million refugees livedin Pakistan making it the largest caseload of refugees in the world

Some of the refugees did return to Afghanistan In 1994 approximately77000 went back with the assistance of the UN High Commission for Refu-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 479

gees (UNHCR) An additional 76000 refugees returned to Afghanistan ontheir own11 However the years since then have seen a new wave of refu-gees flowing into Pakistan from northern Afghanistan Many of the freshrefugees are fleeing the fighting there plus a devastating drought This newwave has not been officially registered with any international organizationAs a consequence the statistics regarding refugees in Pakistan are unreliableAn influx of 30000 Afghan refugees came to Pakistan in 2000 and it is esti-mated that more than 50000 have crossed the border since then In that yearPakistan decided to close its border to stop further refugees because it couldnot absorb any more However its border was later reopened because of thedeplorable condition of the refugees and pressure from international humani-tarian relief agencies

Aside from Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UAE are on the list of countriesrecognizing the Talibanrsquos government Saudi Arabiarsquos came only a few daysafter Pakistanrsquos Until mid-1998 Islamabad and Riyadh were on the samepolitical wavelength Saudi Arabia supplied heavily subsidized fuel to theTaliban through Pakistan and also provided general funding After 1998problems between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan developed over the fate ofOsama bin Laden the Saudi millionaire who had been funding the Afghanjihad The Taliban had promised Saudi Arabia that Osama bin Laden wouldnot use his refuge in Afghanistan to support any acts of violence abroadAfter Osama bin Laden was linked to the bombings of US embassies inKenya and Tanzania his continued refuge in Afghanistan became a majorsource of tension between Taliban and the US on one hand and Saudi Ara-bia on the other

Apart from these three countries the Taliban have not managed to estab-lish political ties with other states This becomes a major constraint for agovernment of a country going through civil war If the paramount objectiveis to end the civil war the government has to direct its energies in this direc-tion It cannot expect the US or other countries to come to its rescue

The United States has been a major country involved in AfghanistanAlong with the Soviets the US had fed the civil war since the days of thecold war When Taliban captured Kabul the US State Department an-nounced it would establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban by sendingan official to Kabul This announcement was quickly retracted The StateDepartment spokesman Glyn Davies said the US found nothing objectiona-ble in the steps taken by the Taliban to impose Islamic law and described theTaliban as anti-modern rather than anti-Western Some members of Con-

11 Nasreen Ghufran ldquoRefugees A Comparative Study of India and Pakistanrdquo (paperpresented at the conference ldquoThe Challenge of Cooperation South Asia and Beyondrdquo Kath-mandu Nepal December 1998)

480 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

gress supported the Taliban because their government appeared to serve theUS policy of isolating Iran A Taliban regime would create a firmly Sunnibuffer on Iranrsquos border and potentially provide security for trade routes andpipelines that would break Iranrsquos monopoly on Central Asiarsquos southern traderoutes

But from its initial policy of acquiescence vis-a-vis the Taliban the USmoved to the other extreme of rejecting them completely The US rejectionwas largely because of the pressure exerted by the feminist movement Theprominent feminist Zieba-Shorish Shamley persuaded many US feministgroups to spearhead a signature campaign to mobilize support for Afghanwomen Her efforts helped persuade former President Clinton to take atougher stance against the Taliban12 Washingtonrsquos denouncement of theTaliban also came in the backdrop of the presidential election in the US assupporting a regime that held no respect for human rights would have nega-tively affected Clintonrsquos position13

In 1998 when the Taliban made great military gains against the forces ofthe North they expected to gain recognition and a seat in the UN they hadmajor Afghan cities under their control and their rivals in retreat Talibanrepresentatives claimed that if recognition were granted to their governmentthey would allow a huge pipeline project to proceed that would carry oil andgas from Central Asia to lucrative markets in Pakistan and India This pipe-line would cut through the western part of Afghanistan ldquoEven before thecapture of Mazar-i-Sharif and Taloqan we were fully qualified for recogni-tionrdquo said deputy information minister Abdur Rahman Hotaki referring totwo key opposition bases captured by the militia ldquoThe opposition gave peo-ple an excuse to deny us recognition and prevent us having the pipeline runthrough our country but that excuse has now gonerdquo he said ldquoAll excusesblocking our recognition are gone Therefore it is predicted they will revisetheir policy in view of the current realitiesrdquo he said adding that all ldquotermsand conditions for a legitimate staterdquo have been met14

But the Taliban encountered problems with international organizations In1999 the UN proposed imposing sanctions against the Taliban when it is-sued Security Council Resolution 1267 Adopted unanimously by the Secur-ity Council on October 15 the resolution demanded that the Taliban turn overOsama bin Laden without further delay to authorities in a country where hewill be brought to justice Until the Taliban comply the resolution requiresUN member states to deny permission for Taliban-owned -leased or -oper-ated aircraft to land in or take off from their territory It also calls for the

12 Rashid Taliban pp 180ndash8213 P Stobodan ldquoThe Afghan Conflict and Regional Securityrdquo Strategic Analysis (August

1999) p 72414 Frontier Post (Peshawar) January 14 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 481

freezing of funds and other financial resources including funds derived fromproperty owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban The lat-ter had 30 days in which to comply with this resolution before sanctions wereimposed The Taliban did not comply and the sanctions came into force

Another round of sanctions was imposed on the Taliban in December 2000with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1333 The new sanc-tions called for an arms embargo on the Taliban including foreign militaryassistance It also imposed a ban on travel by the militiarsquos senior leaders abroader flight ban than the one imposed last year to force bin Ladenrsquos surren-der measures to close all Taliban offices overseas and a ban on exports toTaliban areas of acetic anhydride used to manufacture heroin Finally it alsofroze funds and other financial assets of Osama bin Laden and individualsand entities associated with him Mullah Omar reacted to this round of sanc-tions by saying his government would not back out from its stand and princi-ples even if the entire world turned against them15

The continuation of these sanctions has pushed the issue of recognition tothe backburner However the international community is also paying a pricefor not recognizing the legitimacy of the Taliban One of the principal areasin which the Taliban could provide some assistance is in the containment ofthe production of poppy Mullah Omar on several occasions emphasized hiswill to fight against opium production However it has been difficult tomaintain such policy postures in the wake of external sanctions As a resultin 1999 over 90983 hectares of poppies yielded a harvest of over 4581 tonsof dry opium an estimated 70 increase in production over the previousyearrsquos figure

The international sanctions have also affected the incentives of local farm-ers to turn away from poppy production Afghanistanrsquos socioeconomic situa-tion makes opium production one of the only available economic means foraccess to land labor and credit Currently the Afghan peasantryrsquos heavydependence upon opium production associated with the politico-territorialrealities of a tribal society typified by fragile political allegiances is makingit difficult for the Taliban to make any serious attempts at eradication16

Additionally any Taliban attempt to implement a poppy eradication policywill be severely compromised by the governmentrsquos international non-recog-nition This places restrictions on the options open to the government Eventhe UN Drug Control Program cannot legally reach any formal agreementwith the Taliban government as long as the latter is not internationally recog-nized The Taliban government faces a self-imposed catch-22 situation Its

15 Ibid16 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy ldquoTalibanrsquos Drug Dilemma Opium Production vs International

Recognitionrdquo The Analyst (Paris) (1999)

482 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

political policies and actions are deemed unacceptable by the internationalcommunity yet it cannot pursue any eradication policy with any hope ofcomplete success without the international recognition and aid that are beingdenied it owing to those policies and actions17

Future Prospects for Change in theTalibanrsquos Regime

Since 1996 the Taliban have been striving to bring the civil war to a success-ful conclusion Their domestic policies have brought about alienation andcreated fissures within the Afghan society Their inflexible stand on variouspolicies has denied them the credibility they so desire Their authoritarianismand intolerance have alienated non-Pushtun Afghans who make up morethan half the population The flow of thousands of extremist Pakistani andArab Taliban supporters into Afghanistan has fueled the resentment of thelocal populace18

The Taliban are accused of harboring terrorists and extremists who notonly support Taliban but also carry out their extremist policies in the targetedcountries According to a report that appeared in the Far Eastern EconomicReview (FEER) Afghanistan has become a sanctuary for ldquoarmed insurgentsaccused of terrorist attacks in China Iran Uzbekistan Tajikistan and Paki-stanrdquo Some 400 Arab Islamic militants from a dozen Middle Eastern andAfrican countries are said to be part of the 055 Brigade funded by Osama binLaden and fighting alongside Taliban in the current offensive The articlefurther noted that ldquo[t]he diverse groups have their own agendas mainly fo-cused on undermining the regimes at home but some share bin Ladenrsquos zealfor a global Islamic revolution The resulting web of dangerous friendshipsthreatens to export instability throughout the mineral-rich and commerciallyunder-exploited hinterland of Central Asiardquo19

It is obvious that the Taliban must improve their image both at home andabroad as perceptions play an important role in the general acceptability ornon-acceptability of governments in both arenas Currently the Taliban areperceived primarily as a negative element that is unlikely to play any positiverole in resolving the Afghan conflict If they fail in their goal the Afghannation will lose any trust that religious political forces could play any mean-ingful role in resolving the ongoing conflict The Talibanrsquos fate will be more

17 At the time of writing the Taliban were not cooperating in poppy eradication Currentlyit appears this may have changed The Taliban claim to have completely eradicated poppy pro-duction in the areas dominated by their troops and the claim is being verified under UN aus-pices

18 Peter Tomsen ldquoResponse A Chance for Peace in AfghanistanmdashThe Talibanrsquos Days areNumberedrdquo Foreign Affairs 79 (JanuaryndashFebruary 2000) p 179

19 Ahmed Rashid ldquoAfghanistan Heart of Darknessrdquo FEER August 5 1999

NASREEN GHUFRAN 483

or less the same as that which befell the mujahideen if they do not take timelyand corrective measures to improve Afghanistanrsquos deteriorating situation

The Taliban gained support from most of the populace in the beginningbecause they offered themselves a neutral force and declared their intentionto remain so However they are no longer neutral and have become anotherparty to the conflict Their policies have not only infuriated the internationalpublic but also large sections of the Afghan community The large influxesof Afghan refugees into Pakistan reflect the growing disagreement with theirpolicies This disenchantment is unlikely to change if the Taliban do notmoderate their stance The Taliban of course believe their policies to be im-portant for bringing about the change they desire but they do not realize howmuch these policies have alienated people The international community hasexplicitly voiced its criticism of the Taliban regime and consider it to be aliving nightmare for women political dissidents and anyone else who doesnot submit to the laws under the authority of the Ministry for the Fostering ofVirtue and Suppression of Vice The Taliban movement itself came about asa reaction to the self-seeking and self-destructive policies of the mujahideenwhose pretensions to Islam and leadership were discredited It was in thisideological vacuum and a Hobbesian state of anarchy that made the Talibanrsquosrule palatable to common Afghanis20 But if the Talibanrsquos government doesnot soften its present policies and complete peace is not restored it will notbe too late for the common people to turn against them

The year 2001 has seen universal outrage at the offensive launched by theTaliban rulers against Afghanistanrsquos Buddhist past Condemnation has notremained confined to non-Muslim states several Islamic countries includingPakistan have been appalled by the destruction of Buddhist statues in theprovince of Bamiyan Pakistan sent an official delegation whose aim was toprevent the Taliban from destroying the statues Pakistanrsquos foreign ministerAbdul Sattar said ldquoCertainly we believe it was a mistake a blunder and as aresult Afghanistan will suffer consequences for years to comerdquo To this headded that ldquoit is very difficult for me to make a statement as to why they didnot hearrdquo21 Iran likewise strongly condemned the statuesrsquo destruction Astatement released by Iranrsquos Cultural Heritage Organization wondered whyldquocertain Taliban-led individuals calling themselves lsquoclericrsquo have ordered de-struction of ancient sites of the mankind society citing blasphemy and idoliz-

20 Hafeez Malik ldquoPakistan Islam and the Taliban Phenomenonrdquo News International (Paki-stan) June 9 2000

21 Sattarrsquos remarks are in ibid March 11 2001

484 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

ing as reasonsrdquo22 To prevent their destruction Iran even offered to buy thestatues or move them into safekeeping

However the Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil rejectedany offer to prevent the destruction of the statues His negotiations with Pa-kistan did not bear a positive result and he rejected the Iranian offers reiterat-ing that the presence of the statues conflicted with Islamic teaching In thewake of the Talibanrsquos subsequent actions Iran led a UN initiative to takeserious action against the regime Commenting on the statuesrsquo destructionthe Iranian Foreign Ministry stated ldquoUnfortunately the Talibanrsquos destructionof the statues has cast doubts on the comprehensive views offered by Islamicideology in the world Clearly Muslims across the world pin the blame onthe rigid-minded Taliban and by no means embroil the Afghan Muslims inthis counter-cultural moverdquo23

The Bamiyan incident stirred up dual controversies about both the charac-ter of the Taliban regime and the relationship between culture religion andnational heritage in an Islamic state In his characteristic style Mullah Omarshrugged off all objections to the planned destruction of the Buddhist statuessaying ldquomy job is the implementation of Islamic orderrdquo He invoked Islamiclaw a fatwa issued by the Afghan ulama associated with this regime and thedecision of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to support his decision24

Nonetheless the destruction of the statues has further tarnished the Talibanrsquosimage While it may be the case that the Taliban undertook their actions inreaction to the tough sanctions imposed on them by the world the Talibanhave to realize that they are not going to earn any international sympathy orrecognition

Afghanistan has always been important to external powers due to its strate-gic location They have meddled in its affairs both in the past and at presentThe protracted civil war makes it more vulnerable to external penetration Insuch situations it has no other option but to seek help and support fromoutside The external powers are more than willing to do so if it serves theirnational interest The opposition is likely to adopt a similar strategy as theyhave less access to the resources of the country than the ruling authority Hadthere been no external involvement Afghanistanrsquos extended civil war wouldnot have become the protracted and complicated affair that it is

The Afghan civil war has important regional implications Various exter-nal powers are pursuing divergent objectives in Afghanistan and the outcome

22 Cultural Heritage Organization comment is in Iran News (Tehran) March 1 2001 Thisnews item is distributed via Middle East News Online available at lthttpwwwmiddleeastwirecomgt

23 Comments of the Iranian Foreign Ministry reported by the BBC World Service March 52001

24 Rahimullah Yusufzai ldquoA Question of Tolerancerdquo News International March 4 2001

470 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

The nominal head of the Northern Alliance is Burhanuddin Rabbani al-though in reality he shares power with his primary military backer AhmedShah Masood Both of them belong to the Jamiat-i-Islami which is apredominantly Tajik Islamist party Rabbanirsquos regime controls most of thecountryrsquos embassies abroad and retains Afghanistanrsquos seat in the UN Ah-med Shah Masood built Afghanistanrsquos most sophisticated military-politicalorganization the Shurandashyi-Nazar-i-Shamali (Supervisory Council of theNorth SCN) The SCN coordinated Jamiat commanders and also createdregion-wide forces that developed into Masoodrsquos Urdu-i-Islami (IslamicArmy) Rabbani and Masood get their main support from the northeasternlargely Tajik portion of the country Due to his military performance andcontrol of the strategic Panjsher Valley Masood is popularly known as theldquolion of Panjsherrdquo

General Abdul Rashid Dostum and his ethnic Uzbek Junbishndashi-Milli (Na-tional movement) Party also form part of the Northern Alliance The latterrsquosbase of support lies primarily among the Sunni Muslim Uzbeks A largenumber of fighters forming part of this organization (the numbers vary be-tween 15000 and 16000) had a reputation of being the best-equipped forcesThe Hizb-i-Wahadat-i-Islami yi-Afghanistan (Islamic unity party of Afghani-stan) is the principal Shirsquoa party in Afghanistan its support is mainly amongthe ethnic Hazara group This group was originally formed under Iraniansponsorship in order to unite eight Shirsquoa parties Its leader is Karim Khaliliwho is based in Hazarajat7

Until they captured Kabul in 1996 the Taliban expressed no desire to rulethe country Ever since then the Taliban have committed themselves to con-quering the entire country The problems with the Taliban began when theystarted acting as the ruling elite Eventually their growing international iso-lation plus their ineffective administration alienated large numbers of Af-ghans As the civil war continues they are becoming more rigid Thisattitude has doomed expectations that the civil war will end Indeed whilethe Talibanrsquos achievements as a peace force had good beginnings as theyears have passed they seem to have become entangled in the civil war thatthey intended to disentangle During the early period of the civil war theTaliban did achieve some remarkable accomplishments above all revivingthe lost trust of the Afghans However their strong opposition to the forcesof the North has earned them a reputation for inflexibility

The Taliban transformed themselves from a movement into a ruling gov-ernment Their main priorities were to bring peace while at the same time tostay in power to implement their vision of an Islamic state But resistance tothis vision remains strong and the Northern Alliance is still giving the

7 Ibid

NASREEN GHUFRAN 471

Taliban a difficult time Despite the relative isolation of the Northern Alli-ancersquos forces and their extended lines of communication they have been ableto continue owing to military assistance from outside governments This aidhas come in a variety of forms ranging from the direct transfer of materiel tothe dispatch of military advisors and support personnel albeit in limited num-bers Next to none of these transfers have been publicly documented viasubmissions to the UNrsquos register on conventional arms Ironically much ofthe Northern Alliancersquos military support comes from nations participating inthe so-called ldquoSix-Plus-Twordquo contact group (Pakistan Iran UzbekistanChina Turkmenistan Tajikistan and Russia and the United States) whosemembers have publicly pledged not to provide military support to any Af-ghan combatants and prevent the use of member state territories for suchpurposes

The Northern Alliancersquos main suppliers are Iran and Russia with secon-dary roles played by Tajikistan Uzbekistan (at least until 1998) Turkmeni-stan and Kyrgyzstan Moscow denies that it is arming the Afghan rebels Inan interview with the New York Times Masood has said that he receivesmuch of his equipment from the Russian mafia not the Russian governmentHowever Russia has reportedly provided Dostum with 500 T-55 and T-62tanks that are used against areas that oppose his rule Russia has also sup-plied him with a large number of Frog 7 and Luna M missiles8

The assistance from some Central Asian republics has been an importantsource of support to the Northern Alliance Uzbekistanrsquos president IslamKarimov has clandestinely supported his fellow Uzbeks His country hassupplied the Northern Alliance with tanks aircraft and technical personnelThis support has been provided with the expectation that Uzbek-dominatedprovinces in northern Afghanistan would provide a buffer against the spreadof fundamentalism The secular regime of Turkmenistanrsquos presidentSapamurad Niyazov has publicly joined other Central Asian republics in ar-ticulating the dangers of the Afghan civil war spreading into the neighboringstates However the government of Turkmenistan is not too keen in gettingembroiled and providing overt backing to those fighting the Taliban

Anti-Taliban forces are being trained in a dozen or so camps located alongIranrsquos eastern border Since May 1997 6000 Afghan military personnelhave been dispatched from these camps to various war fronts in northernAfghanistan Most of Iranrsquos aid has been going to the Hizb-i-Wahadat PartyIran has also purchased two Su-22 and one Su-24 fighter-bombers for AhmedShah Masood and sent Iranian pilots to help plan air operations for the North-ern Alliance

8 James Risen ldquoRussians Are Back in Afghanistan Aiding Rebelsrdquo NYT July 27 1998

472 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

Clearly the challenges to the Taliban have grown over the years particu-larly in the political and economic field They continue fighting on the onehand while on the other they are increasingly worried about their growingpolitical isolation However isolation has not moderated them Theystaunchly believe in their ideology which makes it difficult for others to un-derstand them as something other than an extremist force Economicallythey are in a vulnerable position because they are operating in a war-devas-tated country and the Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan have beentargeted for heavy international sanctions

The Formation of the Taliban Governmentand Its Effect on the Civil War

By 1997 the Taliban had accomplished major military successes in the civilwar After the capture of Kabul they also began to prove themselves in thepolitical arena They felt the need of forming an alternate government tocounter the legitimacy of Rabbanirsquos regime Aware that peace and politicalstability in the country would ultimately make them a credible force theTaliban instituted a framework of shuras (consultative bodies) to achievethose aims The most visible Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad OmarAkhund then asked the shuras to give some political shape to the movement

The Taliban also gave the country a new official name changing it fromthe Islamic State of Afghanistan to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA)in October 1997 The group justified the new name as reflecting the groundrealities However the opposition has termed the change to be an undemo-cratic move A prominent Afghan intellectual Rasul Amin in a BBC PushtoService interview spoke of the new name as something that to him felt asthough it was a transplant from the Arab world However Mullah WakilAhmed a senior Taliban leader and spokesman of the movement said it wasnot the first time that Afghanistanrsquos name has been changed In the pastwords such as ldquorepublicrdquo or ldquodemocraticrdquo were added to Afghanistanrsquos nameThe emirate system however is not acceptable to the opposition as Talibanpossess no popular or legal mandate to govern or impose such But for theTaliban changing the countryrsquos appellation represents breaking with the pastand reforming the political system

The Talibanrsquos initially loose bureaucratic structures have been trans-formed too Mullah Mohammad Omar Akhund was elected Amir-ul-Momineen (Commander of the believers) by an assembly of about 1200 in-vited ulama in the city of Kandahar in spring 1996 Since then Mullah Omarhas been at the top of the ruling structure in Afghanistan Though he remainsin the background his word is final and almost has the force of law in themovement Mullah Omar lives simply known for having few needs and withno particular taste in food or dress He is alarmingly careless about his per-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 473

TABLE 1 Ethnic Composition and Cabinet Portfolios of the 10-Member Shura Basedin Kandahar

Names Ethnicity Portfolio

Mullah Mohammad Omar Ghilzai Amir-ul-MonineenAkhund Pushtun

Mullah Mohammad Rabbani Pushtun Chairman of the Caretaker CouncilDeputy Commander of the Taliban

movementMullah Mohammad Fadel Pushtun Minister of DefenseMullah Mohammad Ghaus Pushtun Minister of Foreign AffairsMullah Mohammad Hassan Pushtun Minister of SecurityMaulvi Ghaisuddin Agha Uzbek Minister of EducationMaulvi Abdur Raqib Uzbek Minister for RefugeesQari Deen Mohammad Tajik Minister for PlanningMullah Abdul Razzaq Tajik Member Supervisory CouncilMaulvi Abdul Saleem Uzbek Deputy Minister of Education

sonal security is not a gifted orator and his study of religion is limited as hewas not able to complete his religious education because of the war Despitethis background he inspires confidence among his supporters because of hispiety and the strength of his beliefs

Mullah Omar is assisted by a loose network of shuras A central shuracomprising 10 members was established in Kandahar (see Table 1) All di-rectives and policies were initiated from here and it virtually became the cap-ital of the Taliban-controlled areas (indeed Kandahar is the currentheadquarters of the Taliban movement) Aside from the core group of 10meetings of the original shura also saw participation from military com-manders tribal leaders and ulama this indeterminate structure is one of thekey features of the Talibanrsquos central shura Mullah Omar also tried to main-tain a balance between the Pushtuns and non-Pushtuns in the shura TheTaliban have been criticized for dividing Afghanistan along ethnic linesHowever despite the effort to integrate non-Pushtuns into the shura theTaliban have not been able to shed their Pushtun moorings and have not beenconsidered as impartial regarding other ethnicities

The takeover of Kabul and the formation of a central shura reflected theTalibanrsquos desire to have a more lasting stay on the political scene The cen-tral shura is assisted by a cabinet a shura in Kabul and a military shuraThese three bodies report to the central shura in Kandahar Clearly theseadministrative structures are different from the past governments For in-stance a talib (religious student) in a ministerial post is something unknownin Afghan history Nevertheless even the Taliban have found that control-

474 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

TABLE 2 Military Command Structure of the Taliban

Position Individual

Commander in Chief Mullah Mohammad Omar AkhundMilitary Chief of Staff Mullah Mohmmad HassanChief of the Army Staff Mullah Rahmatullah AkhundArmy Division Chief Mullah Muhammad Jumma KhanArmy Division Chief Mullah Muhammad YunusArmy Division Chief Mullah Mohammad GulArmy Division Chief Mullah Mohammad Aziz KhanArmored Force No 4 Mullah Mohammad Zahir

ling a territory without a clear administrative system is not possible in con-temporary times

The formation of these shuras was aimed at creating an efficient govern-ment After they captured Kabul the Taliban formed a six-member Provi-sional Ruling Council headed by Mullah Mohammad Rabbani This wasfollowed by the formation of the Kabul Shura of Acting Ministers in 1999The Kabul Shura deals with day-to-day problems of the government the cityand the Kabul military front Important policy recommendations are con-veyed to the Kandahar Shura where decisions are actually made To restoreand maintain peace in the provinces the Taliban appoints governors who arefrom provinces other than those where they are serving This policy appearsto have been welcomed by the people As for the military shura it is a looseorganizational body that plans strategy and can implement some tactical deci-sions (see Table 2) The military shura appears to have no strategic decision-making powers Military strategy key personnel appointments and the allo-cation of funds for offensives are decided upon by the Amir-ul-Momineen

Although their government has few resources and many parts barely func-tion at all the Taliban have adopted a discourse of Afghan nationalism inaddition to their Islamic traditionalism Despite their amorphous politicalleadership the Taliban claim to be trying to recreate a centralized Afghanstate In areas under their control they have appointed provincial governorsand administrators of districts cities and towns from the center9

One of the most remarkable characteristics of the Taliban leadership is thattop government officials often switch from the battlefield to the ministry andback again each time following the orders from Mullah Omar In one sensethis produces remarkable flexibility among the Taliban hierarchy as they allact as both administrators and military commanders This flexibility in the

9 Barnett Rubin ldquoAfghanistan under the Talibanrdquo Current History vol 98 no 625 (Febru-ary 1999) p 81

NASREEN GHUFRAN 475

military command has allowed the leadership to maintain better ties with therank-and-file fighters than might otherwise be the case However theTaliban administration in Kabul has faced problems For instance while anyminister is away at the front no decisions can be taken in that ministryMoreover government ministers are working without pay something un-heard of in modern times They do not use government resources for privateuse curtailing expenses and refraining from indulgence in squandering andextravagance Regular salaries are paid only to professional civil servantsand trained soldiers drawn from the former communist army

As for the Northern Alliance until August 1998 the areas it controlled hadfour main administrative and political centers Mazar Sharif which somegroups aspired to turn into a temporary capital for a government in exile ofthe Islamic State of Afghanistan Talauqan the headquarters of MasoodrsquosSCN Shibergan the location of Dostumrsquos headquarters and Bamiyan theheadquarters of the Hizb-i-Wahadat The Taliban have made inroads intothese areas too because the entire political administrative fabric of northernAfghanistan has broken down Only one of Afghanistanrsquos provinces is nowentirely under the Northern Alliancersquos control Badakhshan an inaccessiblemountainous region in the extreme northeast of the country There are alsoneighboring valleys to the west and a few enclaves in the Afghan interiorover which the Taliban have not yet been able to consolidate control Someelements of the former state administration have survived but political powerresides individually in the various armed groups rather than in a unitary civil-ian structure The groups maintain their own military and command struc-tures they do not have a unified strategy for the joint mobilization ofresources in their struggle against the Taliban

The areas controlled by the Taliban have been subjected to drastic changesto personal behavior The Taliban have put a ban on wine and televisionwhich is perceived to be immoral There is also complete restriction on mu-sic photography and the painting of living things The shaving off of onersquosbeard or trimming it less than a fistful is prohibited as is having a Westernhairstyle Gambling betting pigeon flying dog-racing and sodomy are alsostrictly forbidden

The Taliban have gained international notoriety because they have bannedwomen from working Women are obligated to observe strict purdah (litveiling also refers to covering of bodies) Girls have been stopped fromgoing to schools The Taliban have told all women working outside theirhomes to stay at home Although women who had been working will con-tinue to receive their salaries the Taliban claim that there is no need for themto work any longer They claim that these restrictions have been put in placeto protect the honor and dignity of women At the same time Taliban offi-cials have said that they are not against women working or receiving an edu-

476 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

cation The Taliban claim that they need time and resources to create theproper environment and right texts and curriculum for womenrsquos educationThe Talibanrsquos behavior is modeled after the Islamic revolution in Iran Edu-cational establishments remained closed for many years in the aftermath ofthat revolution They remained closed until the Iranian revolutionaries for-mally established an educational syllabus conforming to their own principles

The Taliban have stated that they wish to establish a pure Islamic state Intheir view this means that women have no place in the public arena Theyare required to stay at home and take care of their husbands and childrenThe Taliban cling to the symbol of a protected woman Women have toobserve a strict dress code wearing a burqa (a garment covering the bodyfrom head to toe) and trousers fully covering their ankles While women hadworn burqa in the pre-Taliban era it had not been an enforced dress code

The Talibanrsquos edicts have had a severe impact on many other women whodo not have a close male relative to accompany them in public Hardest hithave been the countryrsquos estimated 30000 widows many of whom are thesole providers for their families Some widows have been allowed to work inareas under the Taliban control but even for them it is not easy to get permis-sion According to Taliban representatives the current restrictions are said tobe necessary because females are not safe outside their homes Many womenhave strongly reacted to the Taliban policies despite the restrictive climate inTaliban-controlled areas These women do not like what the Taliban havebeen professing They want to work and continue with their education butthese rights are being denied to them The justifications given by Taliban arenot acceptable to the working and more enlightened urban Afghan women Itis therefore not surprising that women have become the most vocal critics ofthe Taliban

The edicts against women also have predictably had a devastating impacton primary level education Before the civil war over four-fifths of primaryschool teachers were women The majority of them are now jobless Theclosure of schools has in turn affected children Many orphaned childrenwho once could make homes at schools are now forced to live on the streetsAn international aid group in 1998 estimated 28000 street children in Kabulalone

Mullah Nuruddin Turabi the Taliban minister of justice defended theTalibanrsquos domestic actions He said ldquoIt is not just a question of men wearingbeards and women wearing burqas In Afghanistan every vice has to bestopped and every virtue promulgatedrdquo10 The Taliban have established anew security service the Ministry of Enforcement of Virtue and Suppressionof Vice for eradicating corruption and other vices from Afghan society Ac-

10 Michael Fathers ldquoFrozen in Timerdquo Time May 2000

NASREEN GHUFRAN 477

cording to Taliban tenets their rules are a jihad (holy war) against sin cor-ruption and cruelty Therefore those who do not abide by the Taliban edictson personal behavior are strictly punished according to a strict application ofIslamic law Hence stoning to death amputations (in case of robbery) andother forms of punishments are carried out in front of large crowds

Nonetheless a crisis of governance remains in Afghanistan To supportersof the Taliban regime its government is one that is accountable and represen-tative of all ethnic groups To many the Taliban have restored Afghan cul-ture Afghan-style self-rule has been implemented in the provinces and theTalibanrsquos supporters note that the countryrsquos civil administration and justicesystem are now based on Islamic and Afghan traditions The opposition re-jects this opinion and condemns the Taliban government of being unrepre-sentative and unaccountable

While all the above-mentioned structures are functioning the governmentfaces tremendous challenges The most obvious one is the governmentrsquosunacceptability to and lack of recognition from the international system letalone by the opposition The political dealings that the government has hadwith others offer evidence of its credibility in the civil war While theTaliban have major control of the countryrsquos land area they have not yet hadmuch success on the political front Forming a government is not enough toend the civil war the Taliban must gain acceptability both at home andabroad

The Talibanrsquos International Legal StatusRecognition of a government in a civil war also helps in ending the conflictbecause both parties involved desire the political economic and militarysupport that can come with it Non-recognition of the Taliban government isan indicator of its standing in the international community The recognitionhas not been forthcoming because of dissatisfaction with Taliban policiesUpon taking Kabul the Taliban had immediately demanded from other statesformal recognition as the only legitimate government of Afghanistan Theyalso demanded to be granted a seat in the UN General Assembly Howeverthey received neither So far only Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UnitedArab Emirates (UAE) have recognized the Taliban government In contrastBurhanuddin Rabbanirsquos Northern Alliance regime despite its weak militaryposition has legitimacy and political backing from the world communityincluding the majority of the Islamic states Most countries preserved thestatus quo and continued to allow the diplomatic missions of the Rabbaniregime

Recognition in international law involves acceptance by a state of a givenentity that this recognized entity possesses an international legal personalityand the rights and privileges that flow from it or that it is the exclusive

478 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

representative of a body with international legal personality The decision togrant or not to grant recognition is a political one within the sovereign discre-tion of individual states Recognition in principle can be accorded to states orgovernments As far as the state of Afghanistan itself is concerned it hasbeen recognized by a large number of countries including all permanentmembers of the UN Security Council for many years However wherepolitical power has fragmented to the extent that it has in Afghanistan inrecent years there may well be more than one group claiming to be the gov-ernment In fact as has been outlined already there are two governmentswithin one country One is militarily strong and controls a large populationand territory but has no legal standing while the other is recognized but hasless control of Afghan territory

Pakistan was the first country to grant international recognition to theTalibanrsquos government Their past links provided the basis for doing so Asnoted earlier virtually all of the Taliban leadership had been refugees in Pa-kistan For several years Taliban leaders studied in the madrasas (religiousschools) affiliated with the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) headed by MaulviFazul ur Rehman Although it has not been conclusively proven that theTaliban are Pakistanrsquos creation much criticism along these lines and othershas been leveled against it Pakistan is said to have played a key role inturning Taliban into a functioning military force by providing training logis-tical support and equipment

In 1997 Pakistan rooted its decision to recognize the Taliban governmentbased on the fact that the latter was in effective control of most of Afghani-stanrsquos territory including the capital By the time recognition was given theTaliban government occupied 90 of Afghanistan and oversaw a populationthat was representative of all of the countryrsquos ethnic groups Since then Paki-stan has been striving to propagate a positive image of the student militia andworking to induce other neighboring countries to recognize them Further-more Pakistan has been making persistent attempts to get the UN to adoptthe vacant seat formula which the Organization of Islamic Conferences haddone during 1996

Pakistanrsquos ties with the Taliban have become increasingly complex owingto the influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan Pakistanmdasha country of 140million mostly poor peoplemdashhas been almost single-handedly housing andfeeding the 12 million Afghan refugees living there since 1995 the year theUN stopped providing food and housing aid Some of the Afghan refugeescurrently in Pakistan have been there since the 1980s having fled the Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan At the time an estimated 32 million refugees livedin Pakistan making it the largest caseload of refugees in the world

Some of the refugees did return to Afghanistan In 1994 approximately77000 went back with the assistance of the UN High Commission for Refu-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 479

gees (UNHCR) An additional 76000 refugees returned to Afghanistan ontheir own11 However the years since then have seen a new wave of refu-gees flowing into Pakistan from northern Afghanistan Many of the freshrefugees are fleeing the fighting there plus a devastating drought This newwave has not been officially registered with any international organizationAs a consequence the statistics regarding refugees in Pakistan are unreliableAn influx of 30000 Afghan refugees came to Pakistan in 2000 and it is esti-mated that more than 50000 have crossed the border since then In that yearPakistan decided to close its border to stop further refugees because it couldnot absorb any more However its border was later reopened because of thedeplorable condition of the refugees and pressure from international humani-tarian relief agencies

Aside from Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UAE are on the list of countriesrecognizing the Talibanrsquos government Saudi Arabiarsquos came only a few daysafter Pakistanrsquos Until mid-1998 Islamabad and Riyadh were on the samepolitical wavelength Saudi Arabia supplied heavily subsidized fuel to theTaliban through Pakistan and also provided general funding After 1998problems between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan developed over the fate ofOsama bin Laden the Saudi millionaire who had been funding the Afghanjihad The Taliban had promised Saudi Arabia that Osama bin Laden wouldnot use his refuge in Afghanistan to support any acts of violence abroadAfter Osama bin Laden was linked to the bombings of US embassies inKenya and Tanzania his continued refuge in Afghanistan became a majorsource of tension between Taliban and the US on one hand and Saudi Ara-bia on the other

Apart from these three countries the Taliban have not managed to estab-lish political ties with other states This becomes a major constraint for agovernment of a country going through civil war If the paramount objectiveis to end the civil war the government has to direct its energies in this direc-tion It cannot expect the US or other countries to come to its rescue

The United States has been a major country involved in AfghanistanAlong with the Soviets the US had fed the civil war since the days of thecold war When Taliban captured Kabul the US State Department an-nounced it would establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban by sendingan official to Kabul This announcement was quickly retracted The StateDepartment spokesman Glyn Davies said the US found nothing objectiona-ble in the steps taken by the Taliban to impose Islamic law and described theTaliban as anti-modern rather than anti-Western Some members of Con-

11 Nasreen Ghufran ldquoRefugees A Comparative Study of India and Pakistanrdquo (paperpresented at the conference ldquoThe Challenge of Cooperation South Asia and Beyondrdquo Kath-mandu Nepal December 1998)

480 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

gress supported the Taliban because their government appeared to serve theUS policy of isolating Iran A Taliban regime would create a firmly Sunnibuffer on Iranrsquos border and potentially provide security for trade routes andpipelines that would break Iranrsquos monopoly on Central Asiarsquos southern traderoutes

But from its initial policy of acquiescence vis-a-vis the Taliban the USmoved to the other extreme of rejecting them completely The US rejectionwas largely because of the pressure exerted by the feminist movement Theprominent feminist Zieba-Shorish Shamley persuaded many US feministgroups to spearhead a signature campaign to mobilize support for Afghanwomen Her efforts helped persuade former President Clinton to take atougher stance against the Taliban12 Washingtonrsquos denouncement of theTaliban also came in the backdrop of the presidential election in the US assupporting a regime that held no respect for human rights would have nega-tively affected Clintonrsquos position13

In 1998 when the Taliban made great military gains against the forces ofthe North they expected to gain recognition and a seat in the UN they hadmajor Afghan cities under their control and their rivals in retreat Talibanrepresentatives claimed that if recognition were granted to their governmentthey would allow a huge pipeline project to proceed that would carry oil andgas from Central Asia to lucrative markets in Pakistan and India This pipe-line would cut through the western part of Afghanistan ldquoEven before thecapture of Mazar-i-Sharif and Taloqan we were fully qualified for recogni-tionrdquo said deputy information minister Abdur Rahman Hotaki referring totwo key opposition bases captured by the militia ldquoThe opposition gave peo-ple an excuse to deny us recognition and prevent us having the pipeline runthrough our country but that excuse has now gonerdquo he said ldquoAll excusesblocking our recognition are gone Therefore it is predicted they will revisetheir policy in view of the current realitiesrdquo he said adding that all ldquotermsand conditions for a legitimate staterdquo have been met14

But the Taliban encountered problems with international organizations In1999 the UN proposed imposing sanctions against the Taliban when it is-sued Security Council Resolution 1267 Adopted unanimously by the Secur-ity Council on October 15 the resolution demanded that the Taliban turn overOsama bin Laden without further delay to authorities in a country where hewill be brought to justice Until the Taliban comply the resolution requiresUN member states to deny permission for Taliban-owned -leased or -oper-ated aircraft to land in or take off from their territory It also calls for the

12 Rashid Taliban pp 180ndash8213 P Stobodan ldquoThe Afghan Conflict and Regional Securityrdquo Strategic Analysis (August

1999) p 72414 Frontier Post (Peshawar) January 14 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 481

freezing of funds and other financial resources including funds derived fromproperty owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban The lat-ter had 30 days in which to comply with this resolution before sanctions wereimposed The Taliban did not comply and the sanctions came into force

Another round of sanctions was imposed on the Taliban in December 2000with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1333 The new sanc-tions called for an arms embargo on the Taliban including foreign militaryassistance It also imposed a ban on travel by the militiarsquos senior leaders abroader flight ban than the one imposed last year to force bin Ladenrsquos surren-der measures to close all Taliban offices overseas and a ban on exports toTaliban areas of acetic anhydride used to manufacture heroin Finally it alsofroze funds and other financial assets of Osama bin Laden and individualsand entities associated with him Mullah Omar reacted to this round of sanc-tions by saying his government would not back out from its stand and princi-ples even if the entire world turned against them15

The continuation of these sanctions has pushed the issue of recognition tothe backburner However the international community is also paying a pricefor not recognizing the legitimacy of the Taliban One of the principal areasin which the Taliban could provide some assistance is in the containment ofthe production of poppy Mullah Omar on several occasions emphasized hiswill to fight against opium production However it has been difficult tomaintain such policy postures in the wake of external sanctions As a resultin 1999 over 90983 hectares of poppies yielded a harvest of over 4581 tonsof dry opium an estimated 70 increase in production over the previousyearrsquos figure

The international sanctions have also affected the incentives of local farm-ers to turn away from poppy production Afghanistanrsquos socioeconomic situa-tion makes opium production one of the only available economic means foraccess to land labor and credit Currently the Afghan peasantryrsquos heavydependence upon opium production associated with the politico-territorialrealities of a tribal society typified by fragile political allegiances is makingit difficult for the Taliban to make any serious attempts at eradication16

Additionally any Taliban attempt to implement a poppy eradication policywill be severely compromised by the governmentrsquos international non-recog-nition This places restrictions on the options open to the government Eventhe UN Drug Control Program cannot legally reach any formal agreementwith the Taliban government as long as the latter is not internationally recog-nized The Taliban government faces a self-imposed catch-22 situation Its

15 Ibid16 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy ldquoTalibanrsquos Drug Dilemma Opium Production vs International

Recognitionrdquo The Analyst (Paris) (1999)

482 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

political policies and actions are deemed unacceptable by the internationalcommunity yet it cannot pursue any eradication policy with any hope ofcomplete success without the international recognition and aid that are beingdenied it owing to those policies and actions17

Future Prospects for Change in theTalibanrsquos Regime

Since 1996 the Taliban have been striving to bring the civil war to a success-ful conclusion Their domestic policies have brought about alienation andcreated fissures within the Afghan society Their inflexible stand on variouspolicies has denied them the credibility they so desire Their authoritarianismand intolerance have alienated non-Pushtun Afghans who make up morethan half the population The flow of thousands of extremist Pakistani andArab Taliban supporters into Afghanistan has fueled the resentment of thelocal populace18

The Taliban are accused of harboring terrorists and extremists who notonly support Taliban but also carry out their extremist policies in the targetedcountries According to a report that appeared in the Far Eastern EconomicReview (FEER) Afghanistan has become a sanctuary for ldquoarmed insurgentsaccused of terrorist attacks in China Iran Uzbekistan Tajikistan and Paki-stanrdquo Some 400 Arab Islamic militants from a dozen Middle Eastern andAfrican countries are said to be part of the 055 Brigade funded by Osama binLaden and fighting alongside Taliban in the current offensive The articlefurther noted that ldquo[t]he diverse groups have their own agendas mainly fo-cused on undermining the regimes at home but some share bin Ladenrsquos zealfor a global Islamic revolution The resulting web of dangerous friendshipsthreatens to export instability throughout the mineral-rich and commerciallyunder-exploited hinterland of Central Asiardquo19

It is obvious that the Taliban must improve their image both at home andabroad as perceptions play an important role in the general acceptability ornon-acceptability of governments in both arenas Currently the Taliban areperceived primarily as a negative element that is unlikely to play any positiverole in resolving the Afghan conflict If they fail in their goal the Afghannation will lose any trust that religious political forces could play any mean-ingful role in resolving the ongoing conflict The Talibanrsquos fate will be more

17 At the time of writing the Taliban were not cooperating in poppy eradication Currentlyit appears this may have changed The Taliban claim to have completely eradicated poppy pro-duction in the areas dominated by their troops and the claim is being verified under UN aus-pices

18 Peter Tomsen ldquoResponse A Chance for Peace in AfghanistanmdashThe Talibanrsquos Days areNumberedrdquo Foreign Affairs 79 (JanuaryndashFebruary 2000) p 179

19 Ahmed Rashid ldquoAfghanistan Heart of Darknessrdquo FEER August 5 1999

NASREEN GHUFRAN 483

or less the same as that which befell the mujahideen if they do not take timelyand corrective measures to improve Afghanistanrsquos deteriorating situation

The Taliban gained support from most of the populace in the beginningbecause they offered themselves a neutral force and declared their intentionto remain so However they are no longer neutral and have become anotherparty to the conflict Their policies have not only infuriated the internationalpublic but also large sections of the Afghan community The large influxesof Afghan refugees into Pakistan reflect the growing disagreement with theirpolicies This disenchantment is unlikely to change if the Taliban do notmoderate their stance The Taliban of course believe their policies to be im-portant for bringing about the change they desire but they do not realize howmuch these policies have alienated people The international community hasexplicitly voiced its criticism of the Taliban regime and consider it to be aliving nightmare for women political dissidents and anyone else who doesnot submit to the laws under the authority of the Ministry for the Fostering ofVirtue and Suppression of Vice The Taliban movement itself came about asa reaction to the self-seeking and self-destructive policies of the mujahideenwhose pretensions to Islam and leadership were discredited It was in thisideological vacuum and a Hobbesian state of anarchy that made the Talibanrsquosrule palatable to common Afghanis20 But if the Talibanrsquos government doesnot soften its present policies and complete peace is not restored it will notbe too late for the common people to turn against them

The year 2001 has seen universal outrage at the offensive launched by theTaliban rulers against Afghanistanrsquos Buddhist past Condemnation has notremained confined to non-Muslim states several Islamic countries includingPakistan have been appalled by the destruction of Buddhist statues in theprovince of Bamiyan Pakistan sent an official delegation whose aim was toprevent the Taliban from destroying the statues Pakistanrsquos foreign ministerAbdul Sattar said ldquoCertainly we believe it was a mistake a blunder and as aresult Afghanistan will suffer consequences for years to comerdquo To this headded that ldquoit is very difficult for me to make a statement as to why they didnot hearrdquo21 Iran likewise strongly condemned the statuesrsquo destruction Astatement released by Iranrsquos Cultural Heritage Organization wondered whyldquocertain Taliban-led individuals calling themselves lsquoclericrsquo have ordered de-struction of ancient sites of the mankind society citing blasphemy and idoliz-

20 Hafeez Malik ldquoPakistan Islam and the Taliban Phenomenonrdquo News International (Paki-stan) June 9 2000

21 Sattarrsquos remarks are in ibid March 11 2001

484 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

ing as reasonsrdquo22 To prevent their destruction Iran even offered to buy thestatues or move them into safekeeping

However the Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil rejectedany offer to prevent the destruction of the statues His negotiations with Pa-kistan did not bear a positive result and he rejected the Iranian offers reiterat-ing that the presence of the statues conflicted with Islamic teaching In thewake of the Talibanrsquos subsequent actions Iran led a UN initiative to takeserious action against the regime Commenting on the statuesrsquo destructionthe Iranian Foreign Ministry stated ldquoUnfortunately the Talibanrsquos destructionof the statues has cast doubts on the comprehensive views offered by Islamicideology in the world Clearly Muslims across the world pin the blame onthe rigid-minded Taliban and by no means embroil the Afghan Muslims inthis counter-cultural moverdquo23

The Bamiyan incident stirred up dual controversies about both the charac-ter of the Taliban regime and the relationship between culture religion andnational heritage in an Islamic state In his characteristic style Mullah Omarshrugged off all objections to the planned destruction of the Buddhist statuessaying ldquomy job is the implementation of Islamic orderrdquo He invoked Islamiclaw a fatwa issued by the Afghan ulama associated with this regime and thedecision of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to support his decision24

Nonetheless the destruction of the statues has further tarnished the Talibanrsquosimage While it may be the case that the Taliban undertook their actions inreaction to the tough sanctions imposed on them by the world the Talibanhave to realize that they are not going to earn any international sympathy orrecognition

Afghanistan has always been important to external powers due to its strate-gic location They have meddled in its affairs both in the past and at presentThe protracted civil war makes it more vulnerable to external penetration Insuch situations it has no other option but to seek help and support fromoutside The external powers are more than willing to do so if it serves theirnational interest The opposition is likely to adopt a similar strategy as theyhave less access to the resources of the country than the ruling authority Hadthere been no external involvement Afghanistanrsquos extended civil war wouldnot have become the protracted and complicated affair that it is

The Afghan civil war has important regional implications Various exter-nal powers are pursuing divergent objectives in Afghanistan and the outcome

22 Cultural Heritage Organization comment is in Iran News (Tehran) March 1 2001 Thisnews item is distributed via Middle East News Online available at lthttpwwwmiddleeastwirecomgt

23 Comments of the Iranian Foreign Ministry reported by the BBC World Service March 52001

24 Rahimullah Yusufzai ldquoA Question of Tolerancerdquo News International March 4 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 471

Taliban a difficult time Despite the relative isolation of the Northern Alli-ancersquos forces and their extended lines of communication they have been ableto continue owing to military assistance from outside governments This aidhas come in a variety of forms ranging from the direct transfer of materiel tothe dispatch of military advisors and support personnel albeit in limited num-bers Next to none of these transfers have been publicly documented viasubmissions to the UNrsquos register on conventional arms Ironically much ofthe Northern Alliancersquos military support comes from nations participating inthe so-called ldquoSix-Plus-Twordquo contact group (Pakistan Iran UzbekistanChina Turkmenistan Tajikistan and Russia and the United States) whosemembers have publicly pledged not to provide military support to any Af-ghan combatants and prevent the use of member state territories for suchpurposes

The Northern Alliancersquos main suppliers are Iran and Russia with secon-dary roles played by Tajikistan Uzbekistan (at least until 1998) Turkmeni-stan and Kyrgyzstan Moscow denies that it is arming the Afghan rebels Inan interview with the New York Times Masood has said that he receivesmuch of his equipment from the Russian mafia not the Russian governmentHowever Russia has reportedly provided Dostum with 500 T-55 and T-62tanks that are used against areas that oppose his rule Russia has also sup-plied him with a large number of Frog 7 and Luna M missiles8

The assistance from some Central Asian republics has been an importantsource of support to the Northern Alliance Uzbekistanrsquos president IslamKarimov has clandestinely supported his fellow Uzbeks His country hassupplied the Northern Alliance with tanks aircraft and technical personnelThis support has been provided with the expectation that Uzbek-dominatedprovinces in northern Afghanistan would provide a buffer against the spreadof fundamentalism The secular regime of Turkmenistanrsquos presidentSapamurad Niyazov has publicly joined other Central Asian republics in ar-ticulating the dangers of the Afghan civil war spreading into the neighboringstates However the government of Turkmenistan is not too keen in gettingembroiled and providing overt backing to those fighting the Taliban

Anti-Taliban forces are being trained in a dozen or so camps located alongIranrsquos eastern border Since May 1997 6000 Afghan military personnelhave been dispatched from these camps to various war fronts in northernAfghanistan Most of Iranrsquos aid has been going to the Hizb-i-Wahadat PartyIran has also purchased two Su-22 and one Su-24 fighter-bombers for AhmedShah Masood and sent Iranian pilots to help plan air operations for the North-ern Alliance

8 James Risen ldquoRussians Are Back in Afghanistan Aiding Rebelsrdquo NYT July 27 1998

472 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

Clearly the challenges to the Taliban have grown over the years particu-larly in the political and economic field They continue fighting on the onehand while on the other they are increasingly worried about their growingpolitical isolation However isolation has not moderated them Theystaunchly believe in their ideology which makes it difficult for others to un-derstand them as something other than an extremist force Economicallythey are in a vulnerable position because they are operating in a war-devas-tated country and the Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan have beentargeted for heavy international sanctions

The Formation of the Taliban Governmentand Its Effect on the Civil War

By 1997 the Taliban had accomplished major military successes in the civilwar After the capture of Kabul they also began to prove themselves in thepolitical arena They felt the need of forming an alternate government tocounter the legitimacy of Rabbanirsquos regime Aware that peace and politicalstability in the country would ultimately make them a credible force theTaliban instituted a framework of shuras (consultative bodies) to achievethose aims The most visible Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad OmarAkhund then asked the shuras to give some political shape to the movement

The Taliban also gave the country a new official name changing it fromthe Islamic State of Afghanistan to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA)in October 1997 The group justified the new name as reflecting the groundrealities However the opposition has termed the change to be an undemo-cratic move A prominent Afghan intellectual Rasul Amin in a BBC PushtoService interview spoke of the new name as something that to him felt asthough it was a transplant from the Arab world However Mullah WakilAhmed a senior Taliban leader and spokesman of the movement said it wasnot the first time that Afghanistanrsquos name has been changed In the pastwords such as ldquorepublicrdquo or ldquodemocraticrdquo were added to Afghanistanrsquos nameThe emirate system however is not acceptable to the opposition as Talibanpossess no popular or legal mandate to govern or impose such But for theTaliban changing the countryrsquos appellation represents breaking with the pastand reforming the political system

The Talibanrsquos initially loose bureaucratic structures have been trans-formed too Mullah Mohammad Omar Akhund was elected Amir-ul-Momineen (Commander of the believers) by an assembly of about 1200 in-vited ulama in the city of Kandahar in spring 1996 Since then Mullah Omarhas been at the top of the ruling structure in Afghanistan Though he remainsin the background his word is final and almost has the force of law in themovement Mullah Omar lives simply known for having few needs and withno particular taste in food or dress He is alarmingly careless about his per-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 473

TABLE 1 Ethnic Composition and Cabinet Portfolios of the 10-Member Shura Basedin Kandahar

Names Ethnicity Portfolio

Mullah Mohammad Omar Ghilzai Amir-ul-MonineenAkhund Pushtun

Mullah Mohammad Rabbani Pushtun Chairman of the Caretaker CouncilDeputy Commander of the Taliban

movementMullah Mohammad Fadel Pushtun Minister of DefenseMullah Mohammad Ghaus Pushtun Minister of Foreign AffairsMullah Mohammad Hassan Pushtun Minister of SecurityMaulvi Ghaisuddin Agha Uzbek Minister of EducationMaulvi Abdur Raqib Uzbek Minister for RefugeesQari Deen Mohammad Tajik Minister for PlanningMullah Abdul Razzaq Tajik Member Supervisory CouncilMaulvi Abdul Saleem Uzbek Deputy Minister of Education

sonal security is not a gifted orator and his study of religion is limited as hewas not able to complete his religious education because of the war Despitethis background he inspires confidence among his supporters because of hispiety and the strength of his beliefs

Mullah Omar is assisted by a loose network of shuras A central shuracomprising 10 members was established in Kandahar (see Table 1) All di-rectives and policies were initiated from here and it virtually became the cap-ital of the Taliban-controlled areas (indeed Kandahar is the currentheadquarters of the Taliban movement) Aside from the core group of 10meetings of the original shura also saw participation from military com-manders tribal leaders and ulama this indeterminate structure is one of thekey features of the Talibanrsquos central shura Mullah Omar also tried to main-tain a balance between the Pushtuns and non-Pushtuns in the shura TheTaliban have been criticized for dividing Afghanistan along ethnic linesHowever despite the effort to integrate non-Pushtuns into the shura theTaliban have not been able to shed their Pushtun moorings and have not beenconsidered as impartial regarding other ethnicities

The takeover of Kabul and the formation of a central shura reflected theTalibanrsquos desire to have a more lasting stay on the political scene The cen-tral shura is assisted by a cabinet a shura in Kabul and a military shuraThese three bodies report to the central shura in Kandahar Clearly theseadministrative structures are different from the past governments For in-stance a talib (religious student) in a ministerial post is something unknownin Afghan history Nevertheless even the Taliban have found that control-

474 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

TABLE 2 Military Command Structure of the Taliban

Position Individual

Commander in Chief Mullah Mohammad Omar AkhundMilitary Chief of Staff Mullah Mohmmad HassanChief of the Army Staff Mullah Rahmatullah AkhundArmy Division Chief Mullah Muhammad Jumma KhanArmy Division Chief Mullah Muhammad YunusArmy Division Chief Mullah Mohammad GulArmy Division Chief Mullah Mohammad Aziz KhanArmored Force No 4 Mullah Mohammad Zahir

ling a territory without a clear administrative system is not possible in con-temporary times

The formation of these shuras was aimed at creating an efficient govern-ment After they captured Kabul the Taliban formed a six-member Provi-sional Ruling Council headed by Mullah Mohammad Rabbani This wasfollowed by the formation of the Kabul Shura of Acting Ministers in 1999The Kabul Shura deals with day-to-day problems of the government the cityand the Kabul military front Important policy recommendations are con-veyed to the Kandahar Shura where decisions are actually made To restoreand maintain peace in the provinces the Taliban appoints governors who arefrom provinces other than those where they are serving This policy appearsto have been welcomed by the people As for the military shura it is a looseorganizational body that plans strategy and can implement some tactical deci-sions (see Table 2) The military shura appears to have no strategic decision-making powers Military strategy key personnel appointments and the allo-cation of funds for offensives are decided upon by the Amir-ul-Momineen

Although their government has few resources and many parts barely func-tion at all the Taliban have adopted a discourse of Afghan nationalism inaddition to their Islamic traditionalism Despite their amorphous politicalleadership the Taliban claim to be trying to recreate a centralized Afghanstate In areas under their control they have appointed provincial governorsand administrators of districts cities and towns from the center9

One of the most remarkable characteristics of the Taliban leadership is thattop government officials often switch from the battlefield to the ministry andback again each time following the orders from Mullah Omar In one sensethis produces remarkable flexibility among the Taliban hierarchy as they allact as both administrators and military commanders This flexibility in the

9 Barnett Rubin ldquoAfghanistan under the Talibanrdquo Current History vol 98 no 625 (Febru-ary 1999) p 81

NASREEN GHUFRAN 475

military command has allowed the leadership to maintain better ties with therank-and-file fighters than might otherwise be the case However theTaliban administration in Kabul has faced problems For instance while anyminister is away at the front no decisions can be taken in that ministryMoreover government ministers are working without pay something un-heard of in modern times They do not use government resources for privateuse curtailing expenses and refraining from indulgence in squandering andextravagance Regular salaries are paid only to professional civil servantsand trained soldiers drawn from the former communist army

As for the Northern Alliance until August 1998 the areas it controlled hadfour main administrative and political centers Mazar Sharif which somegroups aspired to turn into a temporary capital for a government in exile ofthe Islamic State of Afghanistan Talauqan the headquarters of MasoodrsquosSCN Shibergan the location of Dostumrsquos headquarters and Bamiyan theheadquarters of the Hizb-i-Wahadat The Taliban have made inroads intothese areas too because the entire political administrative fabric of northernAfghanistan has broken down Only one of Afghanistanrsquos provinces is nowentirely under the Northern Alliancersquos control Badakhshan an inaccessiblemountainous region in the extreme northeast of the country There are alsoneighboring valleys to the west and a few enclaves in the Afghan interiorover which the Taliban have not yet been able to consolidate control Someelements of the former state administration have survived but political powerresides individually in the various armed groups rather than in a unitary civil-ian structure The groups maintain their own military and command struc-tures they do not have a unified strategy for the joint mobilization ofresources in their struggle against the Taliban

The areas controlled by the Taliban have been subjected to drastic changesto personal behavior The Taliban have put a ban on wine and televisionwhich is perceived to be immoral There is also complete restriction on mu-sic photography and the painting of living things The shaving off of onersquosbeard or trimming it less than a fistful is prohibited as is having a Westernhairstyle Gambling betting pigeon flying dog-racing and sodomy are alsostrictly forbidden

The Taliban have gained international notoriety because they have bannedwomen from working Women are obligated to observe strict purdah (litveiling also refers to covering of bodies) Girls have been stopped fromgoing to schools The Taliban have told all women working outside theirhomes to stay at home Although women who had been working will con-tinue to receive their salaries the Taliban claim that there is no need for themto work any longer They claim that these restrictions have been put in placeto protect the honor and dignity of women At the same time Taliban offi-cials have said that they are not against women working or receiving an edu-

476 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

cation The Taliban claim that they need time and resources to create theproper environment and right texts and curriculum for womenrsquos educationThe Talibanrsquos behavior is modeled after the Islamic revolution in Iran Edu-cational establishments remained closed for many years in the aftermath ofthat revolution They remained closed until the Iranian revolutionaries for-mally established an educational syllabus conforming to their own principles

The Taliban have stated that they wish to establish a pure Islamic state Intheir view this means that women have no place in the public arena Theyare required to stay at home and take care of their husbands and childrenThe Taliban cling to the symbol of a protected woman Women have toobserve a strict dress code wearing a burqa (a garment covering the bodyfrom head to toe) and trousers fully covering their ankles While women hadworn burqa in the pre-Taliban era it had not been an enforced dress code

The Talibanrsquos edicts have had a severe impact on many other women whodo not have a close male relative to accompany them in public Hardest hithave been the countryrsquos estimated 30000 widows many of whom are thesole providers for their families Some widows have been allowed to work inareas under the Taliban control but even for them it is not easy to get permis-sion According to Taliban representatives the current restrictions are said tobe necessary because females are not safe outside their homes Many womenhave strongly reacted to the Taliban policies despite the restrictive climate inTaliban-controlled areas These women do not like what the Taliban havebeen professing They want to work and continue with their education butthese rights are being denied to them The justifications given by Taliban arenot acceptable to the working and more enlightened urban Afghan women Itis therefore not surprising that women have become the most vocal critics ofthe Taliban

The edicts against women also have predictably had a devastating impacton primary level education Before the civil war over four-fifths of primaryschool teachers were women The majority of them are now jobless Theclosure of schools has in turn affected children Many orphaned childrenwho once could make homes at schools are now forced to live on the streetsAn international aid group in 1998 estimated 28000 street children in Kabulalone

Mullah Nuruddin Turabi the Taliban minister of justice defended theTalibanrsquos domestic actions He said ldquoIt is not just a question of men wearingbeards and women wearing burqas In Afghanistan every vice has to bestopped and every virtue promulgatedrdquo10 The Taliban have established anew security service the Ministry of Enforcement of Virtue and Suppressionof Vice for eradicating corruption and other vices from Afghan society Ac-

10 Michael Fathers ldquoFrozen in Timerdquo Time May 2000

NASREEN GHUFRAN 477

cording to Taliban tenets their rules are a jihad (holy war) against sin cor-ruption and cruelty Therefore those who do not abide by the Taliban edictson personal behavior are strictly punished according to a strict application ofIslamic law Hence stoning to death amputations (in case of robbery) andother forms of punishments are carried out in front of large crowds

Nonetheless a crisis of governance remains in Afghanistan To supportersof the Taliban regime its government is one that is accountable and represen-tative of all ethnic groups To many the Taliban have restored Afghan cul-ture Afghan-style self-rule has been implemented in the provinces and theTalibanrsquos supporters note that the countryrsquos civil administration and justicesystem are now based on Islamic and Afghan traditions The opposition re-jects this opinion and condemns the Taliban government of being unrepre-sentative and unaccountable

While all the above-mentioned structures are functioning the governmentfaces tremendous challenges The most obvious one is the governmentrsquosunacceptability to and lack of recognition from the international system letalone by the opposition The political dealings that the government has hadwith others offer evidence of its credibility in the civil war While theTaliban have major control of the countryrsquos land area they have not yet hadmuch success on the political front Forming a government is not enough toend the civil war the Taliban must gain acceptability both at home andabroad

The Talibanrsquos International Legal StatusRecognition of a government in a civil war also helps in ending the conflictbecause both parties involved desire the political economic and militarysupport that can come with it Non-recognition of the Taliban government isan indicator of its standing in the international community The recognitionhas not been forthcoming because of dissatisfaction with Taliban policiesUpon taking Kabul the Taliban had immediately demanded from other statesformal recognition as the only legitimate government of Afghanistan Theyalso demanded to be granted a seat in the UN General Assembly Howeverthey received neither So far only Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UnitedArab Emirates (UAE) have recognized the Taliban government In contrastBurhanuddin Rabbanirsquos Northern Alliance regime despite its weak militaryposition has legitimacy and political backing from the world communityincluding the majority of the Islamic states Most countries preserved thestatus quo and continued to allow the diplomatic missions of the Rabbaniregime

Recognition in international law involves acceptance by a state of a givenentity that this recognized entity possesses an international legal personalityand the rights and privileges that flow from it or that it is the exclusive

478 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

representative of a body with international legal personality The decision togrant or not to grant recognition is a political one within the sovereign discre-tion of individual states Recognition in principle can be accorded to states orgovernments As far as the state of Afghanistan itself is concerned it hasbeen recognized by a large number of countries including all permanentmembers of the UN Security Council for many years However wherepolitical power has fragmented to the extent that it has in Afghanistan inrecent years there may well be more than one group claiming to be the gov-ernment In fact as has been outlined already there are two governmentswithin one country One is militarily strong and controls a large populationand territory but has no legal standing while the other is recognized but hasless control of Afghan territory

Pakistan was the first country to grant international recognition to theTalibanrsquos government Their past links provided the basis for doing so Asnoted earlier virtually all of the Taliban leadership had been refugees in Pa-kistan For several years Taliban leaders studied in the madrasas (religiousschools) affiliated with the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) headed by MaulviFazul ur Rehman Although it has not been conclusively proven that theTaliban are Pakistanrsquos creation much criticism along these lines and othershas been leveled against it Pakistan is said to have played a key role inturning Taliban into a functioning military force by providing training logis-tical support and equipment

In 1997 Pakistan rooted its decision to recognize the Taliban governmentbased on the fact that the latter was in effective control of most of Afghani-stanrsquos territory including the capital By the time recognition was given theTaliban government occupied 90 of Afghanistan and oversaw a populationthat was representative of all of the countryrsquos ethnic groups Since then Paki-stan has been striving to propagate a positive image of the student militia andworking to induce other neighboring countries to recognize them Further-more Pakistan has been making persistent attempts to get the UN to adoptthe vacant seat formula which the Organization of Islamic Conferences haddone during 1996

Pakistanrsquos ties with the Taliban have become increasingly complex owingto the influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan Pakistanmdasha country of 140million mostly poor peoplemdashhas been almost single-handedly housing andfeeding the 12 million Afghan refugees living there since 1995 the year theUN stopped providing food and housing aid Some of the Afghan refugeescurrently in Pakistan have been there since the 1980s having fled the Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan At the time an estimated 32 million refugees livedin Pakistan making it the largest caseload of refugees in the world

Some of the refugees did return to Afghanistan In 1994 approximately77000 went back with the assistance of the UN High Commission for Refu-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 479

gees (UNHCR) An additional 76000 refugees returned to Afghanistan ontheir own11 However the years since then have seen a new wave of refu-gees flowing into Pakistan from northern Afghanistan Many of the freshrefugees are fleeing the fighting there plus a devastating drought This newwave has not been officially registered with any international organizationAs a consequence the statistics regarding refugees in Pakistan are unreliableAn influx of 30000 Afghan refugees came to Pakistan in 2000 and it is esti-mated that more than 50000 have crossed the border since then In that yearPakistan decided to close its border to stop further refugees because it couldnot absorb any more However its border was later reopened because of thedeplorable condition of the refugees and pressure from international humani-tarian relief agencies

Aside from Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UAE are on the list of countriesrecognizing the Talibanrsquos government Saudi Arabiarsquos came only a few daysafter Pakistanrsquos Until mid-1998 Islamabad and Riyadh were on the samepolitical wavelength Saudi Arabia supplied heavily subsidized fuel to theTaliban through Pakistan and also provided general funding After 1998problems between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan developed over the fate ofOsama bin Laden the Saudi millionaire who had been funding the Afghanjihad The Taliban had promised Saudi Arabia that Osama bin Laden wouldnot use his refuge in Afghanistan to support any acts of violence abroadAfter Osama bin Laden was linked to the bombings of US embassies inKenya and Tanzania his continued refuge in Afghanistan became a majorsource of tension between Taliban and the US on one hand and Saudi Ara-bia on the other

Apart from these three countries the Taliban have not managed to estab-lish political ties with other states This becomes a major constraint for agovernment of a country going through civil war If the paramount objectiveis to end the civil war the government has to direct its energies in this direc-tion It cannot expect the US or other countries to come to its rescue

The United States has been a major country involved in AfghanistanAlong with the Soviets the US had fed the civil war since the days of thecold war When Taliban captured Kabul the US State Department an-nounced it would establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban by sendingan official to Kabul This announcement was quickly retracted The StateDepartment spokesman Glyn Davies said the US found nothing objectiona-ble in the steps taken by the Taliban to impose Islamic law and described theTaliban as anti-modern rather than anti-Western Some members of Con-

11 Nasreen Ghufran ldquoRefugees A Comparative Study of India and Pakistanrdquo (paperpresented at the conference ldquoThe Challenge of Cooperation South Asia and Beyondrdquo Kath-mandu Nepal December 1998)

480 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

gress supported the Taliban because their government appeared to serve theUS policy of isolating Iran A Taliban regime would create a firmly Sunnibuffer on Iranrsquos border and potentially provide security for trade routes andpipelines that would break Iranrsquos monopoly on Central Asiarsquos southern traderoutes

But from its initial policy of acquiescence vis-a-vis the Taliban the USmoved to the other extreme of rejecting them completely The US rejectionwas largely because of the pressure exerted by the feminist movement Theprominent feminist Zieba-Shorish Shamley persuaded many US feministgroups to spearhead a signature campaign to mobilize support for Afghanwomen Her efforts helped persuade former President Clinton to take atougher stance against the Taliban12 Washingtonrsquos denouncement of theTaliban also came in the backdrop of the presidential election in the US assupporting a regime that held no respect for human rights would have nega-tively affected Clintonrsquos position13

In 1998 when the Taliban made great military gains against the forces ofthe North they expected to gain recognition and a seat in the UN they hadmajor Afghan cities under their control and their rivals in retreat Talibanrepresentatives claimed that if recognition were granted to their governmentthey would allow a huge pipeline project to proceed that would carry oil andgas from Central Asia to lucrative markets in Pakistan and India This pipe-line would cut through the western part of Afghanistan ldquoEven before thecapture of Mazar-i-Sharif and Taloqan we were fully qualified for recogni-tionrdquo said deputy information minister Abdur Rahman Hotaki referring totwo key opposition bases captured by the militia ldquoThe opposition gave peo-ple an excuse to deny us recognition and prevent us having the pipeline runthrough our country but that excuse has now gonerdquo he said ldquoAll excusesblocking our recognition are gone Therefore it is predicted they will revisetheir policy in view of the current realitiesrdquo he said adding that all ldquotermsand conditions for a legitimate staterdquo have been met14

But the Taliban encountered problems with international organizations In1999 the UN proposed imposing sanctions against the Taliban when it is-sued Security Council Resolution 1267 Adopted unanimously by the Secur-ity Council on October 15 the resolution demanded that the Taliban turn overOsama bin Laden without further delay to authorities in a country where hewill be brought to justice Until the Taliban comply the resolution requiresUN member states to deny permission for Taliban-owned -leased or -oper-ated aircraft to land in or take off from their territory It also calls for the

12 Rashid Taliban pp 180ndash8213 P Stobodan ldquoThe Afghan Conflict and Regional Securityrdquo Strategic Analysis (August

1999) p 72414 Frontier Post (Peshawar) January 14 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 481

freezing of funds and other financial resources including funds derived fromproperty owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban The lat-ter had 30 days in which to comply with this resolution before sanctions wereimposed The Taliban did not comply and the sanctions came into force

Another round of sanctions was imposed on the Taliban in December 2000with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1333 The new sanc-tions called for an arms embargo on the Taliban including foreign militaryassistance It also imposed a ban on travel by the militiarsquos senior leaders abroader flight ban than the one imposed last year to force bin Ladenrsquos surren-der measures to close all Taliban offices overseas and a ban on exports toTaliban areas of acetic anhydride used to manufacture heroin Finally it alsofroze funds and other financial assets of Osama bin Laden and individualsand entities associated with him Mullah Omar reacted to this round of sanc-tions by saying his government would not back out from its stand and princi-ples even if the entire world turned against them15

The continuation of these sanctions has pushed the issue of recognition tothe backburner However the international community is also paying a pricefor not recognizing the legitimacy of the Taliban One of the principal areasin which the Taliban could provide some assistance is in the containment ofthe production of poppy Mullah Omar on several occasions emphasized hiswill to fight against opium production However it has been difficult tomaintain such policy postures in the wake of external sanctions As a resultin 1999 over 90983 hectares of poppies yielded a harvest of over 4581 tonsof dry opium an estimated 70 increase in production over the previousyearrsquos figure

The international sanctions have also affected the incentives of local farm-ers to turn away from poppy production Afghanistanrsquos socioeconomic situa-tion makes opium production one of the only available economic means foraccess to land labor and credit Currently the Afghan peasantryrsquos heavydependence upon opium production associated with the politico-territorialrealities of a tribal society typified by fragile political allegiances is makingit difficult for the Taliban to make any serious attempts at eradication16

Additionally any Taliban attempt to implement a poppy eradication policywill be severely compromised by the governmentrsquos international non-recog-nition This places restrictions on the options open to the government Eventhe UN Drug Control Program cannot legally reach any formal agreementwith the Taliban government as long as the latter is not internationally recog-nized The Taliban government faces a self-imposed catch-22 situation Its

15 Ibid16 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy ldquoTalibanrsquos Drug Dilemma Opium Production vs International

Recognitionrdquo The Analyst (Paris) (1999)

482 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

political policies and actions are deemed unacceptable by the internationalcommunity yet it cannot pursue any eradication policy with any hope ofcomplete success without the international recognition and aid that are beingdenied it owing to those policies and actions17

Future Prospects for Change in theTalibanrsquos Regime

Since 1996 the Taliban have been striving to bring the civil war to a success-ful conclusion Their domestic policies have brought about alienation andcreated fissures within the Afghan society Their inflexible stand on variouspolicies has denied them the credibility they so desire Their authoritarianismand intolerance have alienated non-Pushtun Afghans who make up morethan half the population The flow of thousands of extremist Pakistani andArab Taliban supporters into Afghanistan has fueled the resentment of thelocal populace18

The Taliban are accused of harboring terrorists and extremists who notonly support Taliban but also carry out their extremist policies in the targetedcountries According to a report that appeared in the Far Eastern EconomicReview (FEER) Afghanistan has become a sanctuary for ldquoarmed insurgentsaccused of terrorist attacks in China Iran Uzbekistan Tajikistan and Paki-stanrdquo Some 400 Arab Islamic militants from a dozen Middle Eastern andAfrican countries are said to be part of the 055 Brigade funded by Osama binLaden and fighting alongside Taliban in the current offensive The articlefurther noted that ldquo[t]he diverse groups have their own agendas mainly fo-cused on undermining the regimes at home but some share bin Ladenrsquos zealfor a global Islamic revolution The resulting web of dangerous friendshipsthreatens to export instability throughout the mineral-rich and commerciallyunder-exploited hinterland of Central Asiardquo19

It is obvious that the Taliban must improve their image both at home andabroad as perceptions play an important role in the general acceptability ornon-acceptability of governments in both arenas Currently the Taliban areperceived primarily as a negative element that is unlikely to play any positiverole in resolving the Afghan conflict If they fail in their goal the Afghannation will lose any trust that religious political forces could play any mean-ingful role in resolving the ongoing conflict The Talibanrsquos fate will be more

17 At the time of writing the Taliban were not cooperating in poppy eradication Currentlyit appears this may have changed The Taliban claim to have completely eradicated poppy pro-duction in the areas dominated by their troops and the claim is being verified under UN aus-pices

18 Peter Tomsen ldquoResponse A Chance for Peace in AfghanistanmdashThe Talibanrsquos Days areNumberedrdquo Foreign Affairs 79 (JanuaryndashFebruary 2000) p 179

19 Ahmed Rashid ldquoAfghanistan Heart of Darknessrdquo FEER August 5 1999

NASREEN GHUFRAN 483

or less the same as that which befell the mujahideen if they do not take timelyand corrective measures to improve Afghanistanrsquos deteriorating situation

The Taliban gained support from most of the populace in the beginningbecause they offered themselves a neutral force and declared their intentionto remain so However they are no longer neutral and have become anotherparty to the conflict Their policies have not only infuriated the internationalpublic but also large sections of the Afghan community The large influxesof Afghan refugees into Pakistan reflect the growing disagreement with theirpolicies This disenchantment is unlikely to change if the Taliban do notmoderate their stance The Taliban of course believe their policies to be im-portant for bringing about the change they desire but they do not realize howmuch these policies have alienated people The international community hasexplicitly voiced its criticism of the Taliban regime and consider it to be aliving nightmare for women political dissidents and anyone else who doesnot submit to the laws under the authority of the Ministry for the Fostering ofVirtue and Suppression of Vice The Taliban movement itself came about asa reaction to the self-seeking and self-destructive policies of the mujahideenwhose pretensions to Islam and leadership were discredited It was in thisideological vacuum and a Hobbesian state of anarchy that made the Talibanrsquosrule palatable to common Afghanis20 But if the Talibanrsquos government doesnot soften its present policies and complete peace is not restored it will notbe too late for the common people to turn against them

The year 2001 has seen universal outrage at the offensive launched by theTaliban rulers against Afghanistanrsquos Buddhist past Condemnation has notremained confined to non-Muslim states several Islamic countries includingPakistan have been appalled by the destruction of Buddhist statues in theprovince of Bamiyan Pakistan sent an official delegation whose aim was toprevent the Taliban from destroying the statues Pakistanrsquos foreign ministerAbdul Sattar said ldquoCertainly we believe it was a mistake a blunder and as aresult Afghanistan will suffer consequences for years to comerdquo To this headded that ldquoit is very difficult for me to make a statement as to why they didnot hearrdquo21 Iran likewise strongly condemned the statuesrsquo destruction Astatement released by Iranrsquos Cultural Heritage Organization wondered whyldquocertain Taliban-led individuals calling themselves lsquoclericrsquo have ordered de-struction of ancient sites of the mankind society citing blasphemy and idoliz-

20 Hafeez Malik ldquoPakistan Islam and the Taliban Phenomenonrdquo News International (Paki-stan) June 9 2000

21 Sattarrsquos remarks are in ibid March 11 2001

484 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

ing as reasonsrdquo22 To prevent their destruction Iran even offered to buy thestatues or move them into safekeeping

However the Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil rejectedany offer to prevent the destruction of the statues His negotiations with Pa-kistan did not bear a positive result and he rejected the Iranian offers reiterat-ing that the presence of the statues conflicted with Islamic teaching In thewake of the Talibanrsquos subsequent actions Iran led a UN initiative to takeserious action against the regime Commenting on the statuesrsquo destructionthe Iranian Foreign Ministry stated ldquoUnfortunately the Talibanrsquos destructionof the statues has cast doubts on the comprehensive views offered by Islamicideology in the world Clearly Muslims across the world pin the blame onthe rigid-minded Taliban and by no means embroil the Afghan Muslims inthis counter-cultural moverdquo23

The Bamiyan incident stirred up dual controversies about both the charac-ter of the Taliban regime and the relationship between culture religion andnational heritage in an Islamic state In his characteristic style Mullah Omarshrugged off all objections to the planned destruction of the Buddhist statuessaying ldquomy job is the implementation of Islamic orderrdquo He invoked Islamiclaw a fatwa issued by the Afghan ulama associated with this regime and thedecision of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to support his decision24

Nonetheless the destruction of the statues has further tarnished the Talibanrsquosimage While it may be the case that the Taliban undertook their actions inreaction to the tough sanctions imposed on them by the world the Talibanhave to realize that they are not going to earn any international sympathy orrecognition

Afghanistan has always been important to external powers due to its strate-gic location They have meddled in its affairs both in the past and at presentThe protracted civil war makes it more vulnerable to external penetration Insuch situations it has no other option but to seek help and support fromoutside The external powers are more than willing to do so if it serves theirnational interest The opposition is likely to adopt a similar strategy as theyhave less access to the resources of the country than the ruling authority Hadthere been no external involvement Afghanistanrsquos extended civil war wouldnot have become the protracted and complicated affair that it is

The Afghan civil war has important regional implications Various exter-nal powers are pursuing divergent objectives in Afghanistan and the outcome

22 Cultural Heritage Organization comment is in Iran News (Tehran) March 1 2001 Thisnews item is distributed via Middle East News Online available at lthttpwwwmiddleeastwirecomgt

23 Comments of the Iranian Foreign Ministry reported by the BBC World Service March 52001

24 Rahimullah Yusufzai ldquoA Question of Tolerancerdquo News International March 4 2001

472 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

Clearly the challenges to the Taliban have grown over the years particu-larly in the political and economic field They continue fighting on the onehand while on the other they are increasingly worried about their growingpolitical isolation However isolation has not moderated them Theystaunchly believe in their ideology which makes it difficult for others to un-derstand them as something other than an extremist force Economicallythey are in a vulnerable position because they are operating in a war-devas-tated country and the Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan have beentargeted for heavy international sanctions

The Formation of the Taliban Governmentand Its Effect on the Civil War

By 1997 the Taliban had accomplished major military successes in the civilwar After the capture of Kabul they also began to prove themselves in thepolitical arena They felt the need of forming an alternate government tocounter the legitimacy of Rabbanirsquos regime Aware that peace and politicalstability in the country would ultimately make them a credible force theTaliban instituted a framework of shuras (consultative bodies) to achievethose aims The most visible Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad OmarAkhund then asked the shuras to give some political shape to the movement

The Taliban also gave the country a new official name changing it fromthe Islamic State of Afghanistan to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA)in October 1997 The group justified the new name as reflecting the groundrealities However the opposition has termed the change to be an undemo-cratic move A prominent Afghan intellectual Rasul Amin in a BBC PushtoService interview spoke of the new name as something that to him felt asthough it was a transplant from the Arab world However Mullah WakilAhmed a senior Taliban leader and spokesman of the movement said it wasnot the first time that Afghanistanrsquos name has been changed In the pastwords such as ldquorepublicrdquo or ldquodemocraticrdquo were added to Afghanistanrsquos nameThe emirate system however is not acceptable to the opposition as Talibanpossess no popular or legal mandate to govern or impose such But for theTaliban changing the countryrsquos appellation represents breaking with the pastand reforming the political system

The Talibanrsquos initially loose bureaucratic structures have been trans-formed too Mullah Mohammad Omar Akhund was elected Amir-ul-Momineen (Commander of the believers) by an assembly of about 1200 in-vited ulama in the city of Kandahar in spring 1996 Since then Mullah Omarhas been at the top of the ruling structure in Afghanistan Though he remainsin the background his word is final and almost has the force of law in themovement Mullah Omar lives simply known for having few needs and withno particular taste in food or dress He is alarmingly careless about his per-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 473

TABLE 1 Ethnic Composition and Cabinet Portfolios of the 10-Member Shura Basedin Kandahar

Names Ethnicity Portfolio

Mullah Mohammad Omar Ghilzai Amir-ul-MonineenAkhund Pushtun

Mullah Mohammad Rabbani Pushtun Chairman of the Caretaker CouncilDeputy Commander of the Taliban

movementMullah Mohammad Fadel Pushtun Minister of DefenseMullah Mohammad Ghaus Pushtun Minister of Foreign AffairsMullah Mohammad Hassan Pushtun Minister of SecurityMaulvi Ghaisuddin Agha Uzbek Minister of EducationMaulvi Abdur Raqib Uzbek Minister for RefugeesQari Deen Mohammad Tajik Minister for PlanningMullah Abdul Razzaq Tajik Member Supervisory CouncilMaulvi Abdul Saleem Uzbek Deputy Minister of Education

sonal security is not a gifted orator and his study of religion is limited as hewas not able to complete his religious education because of the war Despitethis background he inspires confidence among his supporters because of hispiety and the strength of his beliefs

Mullah Omar is assisted by a loose network of shuras A central shuracomprising 10 members was established in Kandahar (see Table 1) All di-rectives and policies were initiated from here and it virtually became the cap-ital of the Taliban-controlled areas (indeed Kandahar is the currentheadquarters of the Taliban movement) Aside from the core group of 10meetings of the original shura also saw participation from military com-manders tribal leaders and ulama this indeterminate structure is one of thekey features of the Talibanrsquos central shura Mullah Omar also tried to main-tain a balance between the Pushtuns and non-Pushtuns in the shura TheTaliban have been criticized for dividing Afghanistan along ethnic linesHowever despite the effort to integrate non-Pushtuns into the shura theTaliban have not been able to shed their Pushtun moorings and have not beenconsidered as impartial regarding other ethnicities

The takeover of Kabul and the formation of a central shura reflected theTalibanrsquos desire to have a more lasting stay on the political scene The cen-tral shura is assisted by a cabinet a shura in Kabul and a military shuraThese three bodies report to the central shura in Kandahar Clearly theseadministrative structures are different from the past governments For in-stance a talib (religious student) in a ministerial post is something unknownin Afghan history Nevertheless even the Taliban have found that control-

474 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

TABLE 2 Military Command Structure of the Taliban

Position Individual

Commander in Chief Mullah Mohammad Omar AkhundMilitary Chief of Staff Mullah Mohmmad HassanChief of the Army Staff Mullah Rahmatullah AkhundArmy Division Chief Mullah Muhammad Jumma KhanArmy Division Chief Mullah Muhammad YunusArmy Division Chief Mullah Mohammad GulArmy Division Chief Mullah Mohammad Aziz KhanArmored Force No 4 Mullah Mohammad Zahir

ling a territory without a clear administrative system is not possible in con-temporary times

The formation of these shuras was aimed at creating an efficient govern-ment After they captured Kabul the Taliban formed a six-member Provi-sional Ruling Council headed by Mullah Mohammad Rabbani This wasfollowed by the formation of the Kabul Shura of Acting Ministers in 1999The Kabul Shura deals with day-to-day problems of the government the cityand the Kabul military front Important policy recommendations are con-veyed to the Kandahar Shura where decisions are actually made To restoreand maintain peace in the provinces the Taliban appoints governors who arefrom provinces other than those where they are serving This policy appearsto have been welcomed by the people As for the military shura it is a looseorganizational body that plans strategy and can implement some tactical deci-sions (see Table 2) The military shura appears to have no strategic decision-making powers Military strategy key personnel appointments and the allo-cation of funds for offensives are decided upon by the Amir-ul-Momineen

Although their government has few resources and many parts barely func-tion at all the Taliban have adopted a discourse of Afghan nationalism inaddition to their Islamic traditionalism Despite their amorphous politicalleadership the Taliban claim to be trying to recreate a centralized Afghanstate In areas under their control they have appointed provincial governorsand administrators of districts cities and towns from the center9

One of the most remarkable characteristics of the Taliban leadership is thattop government officials often switch from the battlefield to the ministry andback again each time following the orders from Mullah Omar In one sensethis produces remarkable flexibility among the Taliban hierarchy as they allact as both administrators and military commanders This flexibility in the

9 Barnett Rubin ldquoAfghanistan under the Talibanrdquo Current History vol 98 no 625 (Febru-ary 1999) p 81

NASREEN GHUFRAN 475

military command has allowed the leadership to maintain better ties with therank-and-file fighters than might otherwise be the case However theTaliban administration in Kabul has faced problems For instance while anyminister is away at the front no decisions can be taken in that ministryMoreover government ministers are working without pay something un-heard of in modern times They do not use government resources for privateuse curtailing expenses and refraining from indulgence in squandering andextravagance Regular salaries are paid only to professional civil servantsand trained soldiers drawn from the former communist army

As for the Northern Alliance until August 1998 the areas it controlled hadfour main administrative and political centers Mazar Sharif which somegroups aspired to turn into a temporary capital for a government in exile ofthe Islamic State of Afghanistan Talauqan the headquarters of MasoodrsquosSCN Shibergan the location of Dostumrsquos headquarters and Bamiyan theheadquarters of the Hizb-i-Wahadat The Taliban have made inroads intothese areas too because the entire political administrative fabric of northernAfghanistan has broken down Only one of Afghanistanrsquos provinces is nowentirely under the Northern Alliancersquos control Badakhshan an inaccessiblemountainous region in the extreme northeast of the country There are alsoneighboring valleys to the west and a few enclaves in the Afghan interiorover which the Taliban have not yet been able to consolidate control Someelements of the former state administration have survived but political powerresides individually in the various armed groups rather than in a unitary civil-ian structure The groups maintain their own military and command struc-tures they do not have a unified strategy for the joint mobilization ofresources in their struggle against the Taliban

The areas controlled by the Taliban have been subjected to drastic changesto personal behavior The Taliban have put a ban on wine and televisionwhich is perceived to be immoral There is also complete restriction on mu-sic photography and the painting of living things The shaving off of onersquosbeard or trimming it less than a fistful is prohibited as is having a Westernhairstyle Gambling betting pigeon flying dog-racing and sodomy are alsostrictly forbidden

The Taliban have gained international notoriety because they have bannedwomen from working Women are obligated to observe strict purdah (litveiling also refers to covering of bodies) Girls have been stopped fromgoing to schools The Taliban have told all women working outside theirhomes to stay at home Although women who had been working will con-tinue to receive their salaries the Taliban claim that there is no need for themto work any longer They claim that these restrictions have been put in placeto protect the honor and dignity of women At the same time Taliban offi-cials have said that they are not against women working or receiving an edu-

476 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

cation The Taliban claim that they need time and resources to create theproper environment and right texts and curriculum for womenrsquos educationThe Talibanrsquos behavior is modeled after the Islamic revolution in Iran Edu-cational establishments remained closed for many years in the aftermath ofthat revolution They remained closed until the Iranian revolutionaries for-mally established an educational syllabus conforming to their own principles

The Taliban have stated that they wish to establish a pure Islamic state Intheir view this means that women have no place in the public arena Theyare required to stay at home and take care of their husbands and childrenThe Taliban cling to the symbol of a protected woman Women have toobserve a strict dress code wearing a burqa (a garment covering the bodyfrom head to toe) and trousers fully covering their ankles While women hadworn burqa in the pre-Taliban era it had not been an enforced dress code

The Talibanrsquos edicts have had a severe impact on many other women whodo not have a close male relative to accompany them in public Hardest hithave been the countryrsquos estimated 30000 widows many of whom are thesole providers for their families Some widows have been allowed to work inareas under the Taliban control but even for them it is not easy to get permis-sion According to Taliban representatives the current restrictions are said tobe necessary because females are not safe outside their homes Many womenhave strongly reacted to the Taliban policies despite the restrictive climate inTaliban-controlled areas These women do not like what the Taliban havebeen professing They want to work and continue with their education butthese rights are being denied to them The justifications given by Taliban arenot acceptable to the working and more enlightened urban Afghan women Itis therefore not surprising that women have become the most vocal critics ofthe Taliban

The edicts against women also have predictably had a devastating impacton primary level education Before the civil war over four-fifths of primaryschool teachers were women The majority of them are now jobless Theclosure of schools has in turn affected children Many orphaned childrenwho once could make homes at schools are now forced to live on the streetsAn international aid group in 1998 estimated 28000 street children in Kabulalone

Mullah Nuruddin Turabi the Taliban minister of justice defended theTalibanrsquos domestic actions He said ldquoIt is not just a question of men wearingbeards and women wearing burqas In Afghanistan every vice has to bestopped and every virtue promulgatedrdquo10 The Taliban have established anew security service the Ministry of Enforcement of Virtue and Suppressionof Vice for eradicating corruption and other vices from Afghan society Ac-

10 Michael Fathers ldquoFrozen in Timerdquo Time May 2000

NASREEN GHUFRAN 477

cording to Taliban tenets their rules are a jihad (holy war) against sin cor-ruption and cruelty Therefore those who do not abide by the Taliban edictson personal behavior are strictly punished according to a strict application ofIslamic law Hence stoning to death amputations (in case of robbery) andother forms of punishments are carried out in front of large crowds

Nonetheless a crisis of governance remains in Afghanistan To supportersof the Taliban regime its government is one that is accountable and represen-tative of all ethnic groups To many the Taliban have restored Afghan cul-ture Afghan-style self-rule has been implemented in the provinces and theTalibanrsquos supporters note that the countryrsquos civil administration and justicesystem are now based on Islamic and Afghan traditions The opposition re-jects this opinion and condemns the Taliban government of being unrepre-sentative and unaccountable

While all the above-mentioned structures are functioning the governmentfaces tremendous challenges The most obvious one is the governmentrsquosunacceptability to and lack of recognition from the international system letalone by the opposition The political dealings that the government has hadwith others offer evidence of its credibility in the civil war While theTaliban have major control of the countryrsquos land area they have not yet hadmuch success on the political front Forming a government is not enough toend the civil war the Taliban must gain acceptability both at home andabroad

The Talibanrsquos International Legal StatusRecognition of a government in a civil war also helps in ending the conflictbecause both parties involved desire the political economic and militarysupport that can come with it Non-recognition of the Taliban government isan indicator of its standing in the international community The recognitionhas not been forthcoming because of dissatisfaction with Taliban policiesUpon taking Kabul the Taliban had immediately demanded from other statesformal recognition as the only legitimate government of Afghanistan Theyalso demanded to be granted a seat in the UN General Assembly Howeverthey received neither So far only Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UnitedArab Emirates (UAE) have recognized the Taliban government In contrastBurhanuddin Rabbanirsquos Northern Alliance regime despite its weak militaryposition has legitimacy and political backing from the world communityincluding the majority of the Islamic states Most countries preserved thestatus quo and continued to allow the diplomatic missions of the Rabbaniregime

Recognition in international law involves acceptance by a state of a givenentity that this recognized entity possesses an international legal personalityand the rights and privileges that flow from it or that it is the exclusive

478 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

representative of a body with international legal personality The decision togrant or not to grant recognition is a political one within the sovereign discre-tion of individual states Recognition in principle can be accorded to states orgovernments As far as the state of Afghanistan itself is concerned it hasbeen recognized by a large number of countries including all permanentmembers of the UN Security Council for many years However wherepolitical power has fragmented to the extent that it has in Afghanistan inrecent years there may well be more than one group claiming to be the gov-ernment In fact as has been outlined already there are two governmentswithin one country One is militarily strong and controls a large populationand territory but has no legal standing while the other is recognized but hasless control of Afghan territory

Pakistan was the first country to grant international recognition to theTalibanrsquos government Their past links provided the basis for doing so Asnoted earlier virtually all of the Taliban leadership had been refugees in Pa-kistan For several years Taliban leaders studied in the madrasas (religiousschools) affiliated with the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) headed by MaulviFazul ur Rehman Although it has not been conclusively proven that theTaliban are Pakistanrsquos creation much criticism along these lines and othershas been leveled against it Pakistan is said to have played a key role inturning Taliban into a functioning military force by providing training logis-tical support and equipment

In 1997 Pakistan rooted its decision to recognize the Taliban governmentbased on the fact that the latter was in effective control of most of Afghani-stanrsquos territory including the capital By the time recognition was given theTaliban government occupied 90 of Afghanistan and oversaw a populationthat was representative of all of the countryrsquos ethnic groups Since then Paki-stan has been striving to propagate a positive image of the student militia andworking to induce other neighboring countries to recognize them Further-more Pakistan has been making persistent attempts to get the UN to adoptthe vacant seat formula which the Organization of Islamic Conferences haddone during 1996

Pakistanrsquos ties with the Taliban have become increasingly complex owingto the influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan Pakistanmdasha country of 140million mostly poor peoplemdashhas been almost single-handedly housing andfeeding the 12 million Afghan refugees living there since 1995 the year theUN stopped providing food and housing aid Some of the Afghan refugeescurrently in Pakistan have been there since the 1980s having fled the Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan At the time an estimated 32 million refugees livedin Pakistan making it the largest caseload of refugees in the world

Some of the refugees did return to Afghanistan In 1994 approximately77000 went back with the assistance of the UN High Commission for Refu-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 479

gees (UNHCR) An additional 76000 refugees returned to Afghanistan ontheir own11 However the years since then have seen a new wave of refu-gees flowing into Pakistan from northern Afghanistan Many of the freshrefugees are fleeing the fighting there plus a devastating drought This newwave has not been officially registered with any international organizationAs a consequence the statistics regarding refugees in Pakistan are unreliableAn influx of 30000 Afghan refugees came to Pakistan in 2000 and it is esti-mated that more than 50000 have crossed the border since then In that yearPakistan decided to close its border to stop further refugees because it couldnot absorb any more However its border was later reopened because of thedeplorable condition of the refugees and pressure from international humani-tarian relief agencies

Aside from Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UAE are on the list of countriesrecognizing the Talibanrsquos government Saudi Arabiarsquos came only a few daysafter Pakistanrsquos Until mid-1998 Islamabad and Riyadh were on the samepolitical wavelength Saudi Arabia supplied heavily subsidized fuel to theTaliban through Pakistan and also provided general funding After 1998problems between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan developed over the fate ofOsama bin Laden the Saudi millionaire who had been funding the Afghanjihad The Taliban had promised Saudi Arabia that Osama bin Laden wouldnot use his refuge in Afghanistan to support any acts of violence abroadAfter Osama bin Laden was linked to the bombings of US embassies inKenya and Tanzania his continued refuge in Afghanistan became a majorsource of tension between Taliban and the US on one hand and Saudi Ara-bia on the other

Apart from these three countries the Taliban have not managed to estab-lish political ties with other states This becomes a major constraint for agovernment of a country going through civil war If the paramount objectiveis to end the civil war the government has to direct its energies in this direc-tion It cannot expect the US or other countries to come to its rescue

The United States has been a major country involved in AfghanistanAlong with the Soviets the US had fed the civil war since the days of thecold war When Taliban captured Kabul the US State Department an-nounced it would establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban by sendingan official to Kabul This announcement was quickly retracted The StateDepartment spokesman Glyn Davies said the US found nothing objectiona-ble in the steps taken by the Taliban to impose Islamic law and described theTaliban as anti-modern rather than anti-Western Some members of Con-

11 Nasreen Ghufran ldquoRefugees A Comparative Study of India and Pakistanrdquo (paperpresented at the conference ldquoThe Challenge of Cooperation South Asia and Beyondrdquo Kath-mandu Nepal December 1998)

480 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

gress supported the Taliban because their government appeared to serve theUS policy of isolating Iran A Taliban regime would create a firmly Sunnibuffer on Iranrsquos border and potentially provide security for trade routes andpipelines that would break Iranrsquos monopoly on Central Asiarsquos southern traderoutes

But from its initial policy of acquiescence vis-a-vis the Taliban the USmoved to the other extreme of rejecting them completely The US rejectionwas largely because of the pressure exerted by the feminist movement Theprominent feminist Zieba-Shorish Shamley persuaded many US feministgroups to spearhead a signature campaign to mobilize support for Afghanwomen Her efforts helped persuade former President Clinton to take atougher stance against the Taliban12 Washingtonrsquos denouncement of theTaliban also came in the backdrop of the presidential election in the US assupporting a regime that held no respect for human rights would have nega-tively affected Clintonrsquos position13

In 1998 when the Taliban made great military gains against the forces ofthe North they expected to gain recognition and a seat in the UN they hadmajor Afghan cities under their control and their rivals in retreat Talibanrepresentatives claimed that if recognition were granted to their governmentthey would allow a huge pipeline project to proceed that would carry oil andgas from Central Asia to lucrative markets in Pakistan and India This pipe-line would cut through the western part of Afghanistan ldquoEven before thecapture of Mazar-i-Sharif and Taloqan we were fully qualified for recogni-tionrdquo said deputy information minister Abdur Rahman Hotaki referring totwo key opposition bases captured by the militia ldquoThe opposition gave peo-ple an excuse to deny us recognition and prevent us having the pipeline runthrough our country but that excuse has now gonerdquo he said ldquoAll excusesblocking our recognition are gone Therefore it is predicted they will revisetheir policy in view of the current realitiesrdquo he said adding that all ldquotermsand conditions for a legitimate staterdquo have been met14

But the Taliban encountered problems with international organizations In1999 the UN proposed imposing sanctions against the Taliban when it is-sued Security Council Resolution 1267 Adopted unanimously by the Secur-ity Council on October 15 the resolution demanded that the Taliban turn overOsama bin Laden without further delay to authorities in a country where hewill be brought to justice Until the Taliban comply the resolution requiresUN member states to deny permission for Taliban-owned -leased or -oper-ated aircraft to land in or take off from their territory It also calls for the

12 Rashid Taliban pp 180ndash8213 P Stobodan ldquoThe Afghan Conflict and Regional Securityrdquo Strategic Analysis (August

1999) p 72414 Frontier Post (Peshawar) January 14 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 481

freezing of funds and other financial resources including funds derived fromproperty owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban The lat-ter had 30 days in which to comply with this resolution before sanctions wereimposed The Taliban did not comply and the sanctions came into force

Another round of sanctions was imposed on the Taliban in December 2000with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1333 The new sanc-tions called for an arms embargo on the Taliban including foreign militaryassistance It also imposed a ban on travel by the militiarsquos senior leaders abroader flight ban than the one imposed last year to force bin Ladenrsquos surren-der measures to close all Taliban offices overseas and a ban on exports toTaliban areas of acetic anhydride used to manufacture heroin Finally it alsofroze funds and other financial assets of Osama bin Laden and individualsand entities associated with him Mullah Omar reacted to this round of sanc-tions by saying his government would not back out from its stand and princi-ples even if the entire world turned against them15

The continuation of these sanctions has pushed the issue of recognition tothe backburner However the international community is also paying a pricefor not recognizing the legitimacy of the Taliban One of the principal areasin which the Taliban could provide some assistance is in the containment ofthe production of poppy Mullah Omar on several occasions emphasized hiswill to fight against opium production However it has been difficult tomaintain such policy postures in the wake of external sanctions As a resultin 1999 over 90983 hectares of poppies yielded a harvest of over 4581 tonsof dry opium an estimated 70 increase in production over the previousyearrsquos figure

The international sanctions have also affected the incentives of local farm-ers to turn away from poppy production Afghanistanrsquos socioeconomic situa-tion makes opium production one of the only available economic means foraccess to land labor and credit Currently the Afghan peasantryrsquos heavydependence upon opium production associated with the politico-territorialrealities of a tribal society typified by fragile political allegiances is makingit difficult for the Taliban to make any serious attempts at eradication16

Additionally any Taliban attempt to implement a poppy eradication policywill be severely compromised by the governmentrsquos international non-recog-nition This places restrictions on the options open to the government Eventhe UN Drug Control Program cannot legally reach any formal agreementwith the Taliban government as long as the latter is not internationally recog-nized The Taliban government faces a self-imposed catch-22 situation Its

15 Ibid16 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy ldquoTalibanrsquos Drug Dilemma Opium Production vs International

Recognitionrdquo The Analyst (Paris) (1999)

482 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

political policies and actions are deemed unacceptable by the internationalcommunity yet it cannot pursue any eradication policy with any hope ofcomplete success without the international recognition and aid that are beingdenied it owing to those policies and actions17

Future Prospects for Change in theTalibanrsquos Regime

Since 1996 the Taliban have been striving to bring the civil war to a success-ful conclusion Their domestic policies have brought about alienation andcreated fissures within the Afghan society Their inflexible stand on variouspolicies has denied them the credibility they so desire Their authoritarianismand intolerance have alienated non-Pushtun Afghans who make up morethan half the population The flow of thousands of extremist Pakistani andArab Taliban supporters into Afghanistan has fueled the resentment of thelocal populace18

The Taliban are accused of harboring terrorists and extremists who notonly support Taliban but also carry out their extremist policies in the targetedcountries According to a report that appeared in the Far Eastern EconomicReview (FEER) Afghanistan has become a sanctuary for ldquoarmed insurgentsaccused of terrorist attacks in China Iran Uzbekistan Tajikistan and Paki-stanrdquo Some 400 Arab Islamic militants from a dozen Middle Eastern andAfrican countries are said to be part of the 055 Brigade funded by Osama binLaden and fighting alongside Taliban in the current offensive The articlefurther noted that ldquo[t]he diverse groups have their own agendas mainly fo-cused on undermining the regimes at home but some share bin Ladenrsquos zealfor a global Islamic revolution The resulting web of dangerous friendshipsthreatens to export instability throughout the mineral-rich and commerciallyunder-exploited hinterland of Central Asiardquo19

It is obvious that the Taliban must improve their image both at home andabroad as perceptions play an important role in the general acceptability ornon-acceptability of governments in both arenas Currently the Taliban areperceived primarily as a negative element that is unlikely to play any positiverole in resolving the Afghan conflict If they fail in their goal the Afghannation will lose any trust that religious political forces could play any mean-ingful role in resolving the ongoing conflict The Talibanrsquos fate will be more

17 At the time of writing the Taliban were not cooperating in poppy eradication Currentlyit appears this may have changed The Taliban claim to have completely eradicated poppy pro-duction in the areas dominated by their troops and the claim is being verified under UN aus-pices

18 Peter Tomsen ldquoResponse A Chance for Peace in AfghanistanmdashThe Talibanrsquos Days areNumberedrdquo Foreign Affairs 79 (JanuaryndashFebruary 2000) p 179

19 Ahmed Rashid ldquoAfghanistan Heart of Darknessrdquo FEER August 5 1999

NASREEN GHUFRAN 483

or less the same as that which befell the mujahideen if they do not take timelyand corrective measures to improve Afghanistanrsquos deteriorating situation

The Taliban gained support from most of the populace in the beginningbecause they offered themselves a neutral force and declared their intentionto remain so However they are no longer neutral and have become anotherparty to the conflict Their policies have not only infuriated the internationalpublic but also large sections of the Afghan community The large influxesof Afghan refugees into Pakistan reflect the growing disagreement with theirpolicies This disenchantment is unlikely to change if the Taliban do notmoderate their stance The Taliban of course believe their policies to be im-portant for bringing about the change they desire but they do not realize howmuch these policies have alienated people The international community hasexplicitly voiced its criticism of the Taliban regime and consider it to be aliving nightmare for women political dissidents and anyone else who doesnot submit to the laws under the authority of the Ministry for the Fostering ofVirtue and Suppression of Vice The Taliban movement itself came about asa reaction to the self-seeking and self-destructive policies of the mujahideenwhose pretensions to Islam and leadership were discredited It was in thisideological vacuum and a Hobbesian state of anarchy that made the Talibanrsquosrule palatable to common Afghanis20 But if the Talibanrsquos government doesnot soften its present policies and complete peace is not restored it will notbe too late for the common people to turn against them

The year 2001 has seen universal outrage at the offensive launched by theTaliban rulers against Afghanistanrsquos Buddhist past Condemnation has notremained confined to non-Muslim states several Islamic countries includingPakistan have been appalled by the destruction of Buddhist statues in theprovince of Bamiyan Pakistan sent an official delegation whose aim was toprevent the Taliban from destroying the statues Pakistanrsquos foreign ministerAbdul Sattar said ldquoCertainly we believe it was a mistake a blunder and as aresult Afghanistan will suffer consequences for years to comerdquo To this headded that ldquoit is very difficult for me to make a statement as to why they didnot hearrdquo21 Iran likewise strongly condemned the statuesrsquo destruction Astatement released by Iranrsquos Cultural Heritage Organization wondered whyldquocertain Taliban-led individuals calling themselves lsquoclericrsquo have ordered de-struction of ancient sites of the mankind society citing blasphemy and idoliz-

20 Hafeez Malik ldquoPakistan Islam and the Taliban Phenomenonrdquo News International (Paki-stan) June 9 2000

21 Sattarrsquos remarks are in ibid March 11 2001

484 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

ing as reasonsrdquo22 To prevent their destruction Iran even offered to buy thestatues or move them into safekeeping

However the Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil rejectedany offer to prevent the destruction of the statues His negotiations with Pa-kistan did not bear a positive result and he rejected the Iranian offers reiterat-ing that the presence of the statues conflicted with Islamic teaching In thewake of the Talibanrsquos subsequent actions Iran led a UN initiative to takeserious action against the regime Commenting on the statuesrsquo destructionthe Iranian Foreign Ministry stated ldquoUnfortunately the Talibanrsquos destructionof the statues has cast doubts on the comprehensive views offered by Islamicideology in the world Clearly Muslims across the world pin the blame onthe rigid-minded Taliban and by no means embroil the Afghan Muslims inthis counter-cultural moverdquo23

The Bamiyan incident stirred up dual controversies about both the charac-ter of the Taliban regime and the relationship between culture religion andnational heritage in an Islamic state In his characteristic style Mullah Omarshrugged off all objections to the planned destruction of the Buddhist statuessaying ldquomy job is the implementation of Islamic orderrdquo He invoked Islamiclaw a fatwa issued by the Afghan ulama associated with this regime and thedecision of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to support his decision24

Nonetheless the destruction of the statues has further tarnished the Talibanrsquosimage While it may be the case that the Taliban undertook their actions inreaction to the tough sanctions imposed on them by the world the Talibanhave to realize that they are not going to earn any international sympathy orrecognition

Afghanistan has always been important to external powers due to its strate-gic location They have meddled in its affairs both in the past and at presentThe protracted civil war makes it more vulnerable to external penetration Insuch situations it has no other option but to seek help and support fromoutside The external powers are more than willing to do so if it serves theirnational interest The opposition is likely to adopt a similar strategy as theyhave less access to the resources of the country than the ruling authority Hadthere been no external involvement Afghanistanrsquos extended civil war wouldnot have become the protracted and complicated affair that it is

The Afghan civil war has important regional implications Various exter-nal powers are pursuing divergent objectives in Afghanistan and the outcome

22 Cultural Heritage Organization comment is in Iran News (Tehran) March 1 2001 Thisnews item is distributed via Middle East News Online available at lthttpwwwmiddleeastwirecomgt

23 Comments of the Iranian Foreign Ministry reported by the BBC World Service March 52001

24 Rahimullah Yusufzai ldquoA Question of Tolerancerdquo News International March 4 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 473

TABLE 1 Ethnic Composition and Cabinet Portfolios of the 10-Member Shura Basedin Kandahar

Names Ethnicity Portfolio

Mullah Mohammad Omar Ghilzai Amir-ul-MonineenAkhund Pushtun

Mullah Mohammad Rabbani Pushtun Chairman of the Caretaker CouncilDeputy Commander of the Taliban

movementMullah Mohammad Fadel Pushtun Minister of DefenseMullah Mohammad Ghaus Pushtun Minister of Foreign AffairsMullah Mohammad Hassan Pushtun Minister of SecurityMaulvi Ghaisuddin Agha Uzbek Minister of EducationMaulvi Abdur Raqib Uzbek Minister for RefugeesQari Deen Mohammad Tajik Minister for PlanningMullah Abdul Razzaq Tajik Member Supervisory CouncilMaulvi Abdul Saleem Uzbek Deputy Minister of Education

sonal security is not a gifted orator and his study of religion is limited as hewas not able to complete his religious education because of the war Despitethis background he inspires confidence among his supporters because of hispiety and the strength of his beliefs

Mullah Omar is assisted by a loose network of shuras A central shuracomprising 10 members was established in Kandahar (see Table 1) All di-rectives and policies were initiated from here and it virtually became the cap-ital of the Taliban-controlled areas (indeed Kandahar is the currentheadquarters of the Taliban movement) Aside from the core group of 10meetings of the original shura also saw participation from military com-manders tribal leaders and ulama this indeterminate structure is one of thekey features of the Talibanrsquos central shura Mullah Omar also tried to main-tain a balance between the Pushtuns and non-Pushtuns in the shura TheTaliban have been criticized for dividing Afghanistan along ethnic linesHowever despite the effort to integrate non-Pushtuns into the shura theTaliban have not been able to shed their Pushtun moorings and have not beenconsidered as impartial regarding other ethnicities

The takeover of Kabul and the formation of a central shura reflected theTalibanrsquos desire to have a more lasting stay on the political scene The cen-tral shura is assisted by a cabinet a shura in Kabul and a military shuraThese three bodies report to the central shura in Kandahar Clearly theseadministrative structures are different from the past governments For in-stance a talib (religious student) in a ministerial post is something unknownin Afghan history Nevertheless even the Taliban have found that control-

474 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

TABLE 2 Military Command Structure of the Taliban

Position Individual

Commander in Chief Mullah Mohammad Omar AkhundMilitary Chief of Staff Mullah Mohmmad HassanChief of the Army Staff Mullah Rahmatullah AkhundArmy Division Chief Mullah Muhammad Jumma KhanArmy Division Chief Mullah Muhammad YunusArmy Division Chief Mullah Mohammad GulArmy Division Chief Mullah Mohammad Aziz KhanArmored Force No 4 Mullah Mohammad Zahir

ling a territory without a clear administrative system is not possible in con-temporary times

The formation of these shuras was aimed at creating an efficient govern-ment After they captured Kabul the Taliban formed a six-member Provi-sional Ruling Council headed by Mullah Mohammad Rabbani This wasfollowed by the formation of the Kabul Shura of Acting Ministers in 1999The Kabul Shura deals with day-to-day problems of the government the cityand the Kabul military front Important policy recommendations are con-veyed to the Kandahar Shura where decisions are actually made To restoreand maintain peace in the provinces the Taliban appoints governors who arefrom provinces other than those where they are serving This policy appearsto have been welcomed by the people As for the military shura it is a looseorganizational body that plans strategy and can implement some tactical deci-sions (see Table 2) The military shura appears to have no strategic decision-making powers Military strategy key personnel appointments and the allo-cation of funds for offensives are decided upon by the Amir-ul-Momineen

Although their government has few resources and many parts barely func-tion at all the Taliban have adopted a discourse of Afghan nationalism inaddition to their Islamic traditionalism Despite their amorphous politicalleadership the Taliban claim to be trying to recreate a centralized Afghanstate In areas under their control they have appointed provincial governorsand administrators of districts cities and towns from the center9

One of the most remarkable characteristics of the Taliban leadership is thattop government officials often switch from the battlefield to the ministry andback again each time following the orders from Mullah Omar In one sensethis produces remarkable flexibility among the Taliban hierarchy as they allact as both administrators and military commanders This flexibility in the

9 Barnett Rubin ldquoAfghanistan under the Talibanrdquo Current History vol 98 no 625 (Febru-ary 1999) p 81

NASREEN GHUFRAN 475

military command has allowed the leadership to maintain better ties with therank-and-file fighters than might otherwise be the case However theTaliban administration in Kabul has faced problems For instance while anyminister is away at the front no decisions can be taken in that ministryMoreover government ministers are working without pay something un-heard of in modern times They do not use government resources for privateuse curtailing expenses and refraining from indulgence in squandering andextravagance Regular salaries are paid only to professional civil servantsand trained soldiers drawn from the former communist army

As for the Northern Alliance until August 1998 the areas it controlled hadfour main administrative and political centers Mazar Sharif which somegroups aspired to turn into a temporary capital for a government in exile ofthe Islamic State of Afghanistan Talauqan the headquarters of MasoodrsquosSCN Shibergan the location of Dostumrsquos headquarters and Bamiyan theheadquarters of the Hizb-i-Wahadat The Taliban have made inroads intothese areas too because the entire political administrative fabric of northernAfghanistan has broken down Only one of Afghanistanrsquos provinces is nowentirely under the Northern Alliancersquos control Badakhshan an inaccessiblemountainous region in the extreme northeast of the country There are alsoneighboring valleys to the west and a few enclaves in the Afghan interiorover which the Taliban have not yet been able to consolidate control Someelements of the former state administration have survived but political powerresides individually in the various armed groups rather than in a unitary civil-ian structure The groups maintain their own military and command struc-tures they do not have a unified strategy for the joint mobilization ofresources in their struggle against the Taliban

The areas controlled by the Taliban have been subjected to drastic changesto personal behavior The Taliban have put a ban on wine and televisionwhich is perceived to be immoral There is also complete restriction on mu-sic photography and the painting of living things The shaving off of onersquosbeard or trimming it less than a fistful is prohibited as is having a Westernhairstyle Gambling betting pigeon flying dog-racing and sodomy are alsostrictly forbidden

The Taliban have gained international notoriety because they have bannedwomen from working Women are obligated to observe strict purdah (litveiling also refers to covering of bodies) Girls have been stopped fromgoing to schools The Taliban have told all women working outside theirhomes to stay at home Although women who had been working will con-tinue to receive their salaries the Taliban claim that there is no need for themto work any longer They claim that these restrictions have been put in placeto protect the honor and dignity of women At the same time Taliban offi-cials have said that they are not against women working or receiving an edu-

476 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

cation The Taliban claim that they need time and resources to create theproper environment and right texts and curriculum for womenrsquos educationThe Talibanrsquos behavior is modeled after the Islamic revolution in Iran Edu-cational establishments remained closed for many years in the aftermath ofthat revolution They remained closed until the Iranian revolutionaries for-mally established an educational syllabus conforming to their own principles

The Taliban have stated that they wish to establish a pure Islamic state Intheir view this means that women have no place in the public arena Theyare required to stay at home and take care of their husbands and childrenThe Taliban cling to the symbol of a protected woman Women have toobserve a strict dress code wearing a burqa (a garment covering the bodyfrom head to toe) and trousers fully covering their ankles While women hadworn burqa in the pre-Taliban era it had not been an enforced dress code

The Talibanrsquos edicts have had a severe impact on many other women whodo not have a close male relative to accompany them in public Hardest hithave been the countryrsquos estimated 30000 widows many of whom are thesole providers for their families Some widows have been allowed to work inareas under the Taliban control but even for them it is not easy to get permis-sion According to Taliban representatives the current restrictions are said tobe necessary because females are not safe outside their homes Many womenhave strongly reacted to the Taliban policies despite the restrictive climate inTaliban-controlled areas These women do not like what the Taliban havebeen professing They want to work and continue with their education butthese rights are being denied to them The justifications given by Taliban arenot acceptable to the working and more enlightened urban Afghan women Itis therefore not surprising that women have become the most vocal critics ofthe Taliban

The edicts against women also have predictably had a devastating impacton primary level education Before the civil war over four-fifths of primaryschool teachers were women The majority of them are now jobless Theclosure of schools has in turn affected children Many orphaned childrenwho once could make homes at schools are now forced to live on the streetsAn international aid group in 1998 estimated 28000 street children in Kabulalone

Mullah Nuruddin Turabi the Taliban minister of justice defended theTalibanrsquos domestic actions He said ldquoIt is not just a question of men wearingbeards and women wearing burqas In Afghanistan every vice has to bestopped and every virtue promulgatedrdquo10 The Taliban have established anew security service the Ministry of Enforcement of Virtue and Suppressionof Vice for eradicating corruption and other vices from Afghan society Ac-

10 Michael Fathers ldquoFrozen in Timerdquo Time May 2000

NASREEN GHUFRAN 477

cording to Taliban tenets their rules are a jihad (holy war) against sin cor-ruption and cruelty Therefore those who do not abide by the Taliban edictson personal behavior are strictly punished according to a strict application ofIslamic law Hence stoning to death amputations (in case of robbery) andother forms of punishments are carried out in front of large crowds

Nonetheless a crisis of governance remains in Afghanistan To supportersof the Taliban regime its government is one that is accountable and represen-tative of all ethnic groups To many the Taliban have restored Afghan cul-ture Afghan-style self-rule has been implemented in the provinces and theTalibanrsquos supporters note that the countryrsquos civil administration and justicesystem are now based on Islamic and Afghan traditions The opposition re-jects this opinion and condemns the Taliban government of being unrepre-sentative and unaccountable

While all the above-mentioned structures are functioning the governmentfaces tremendous challenges The most obvious one is the governmentrsquosunacceptability to and lack of recognition from the international system letalone by the opposition The political dealings that the government has hadwith others offer evidence of its credibility in the civil war While theTaliban have major control of the countryrsquos land area they have not yet hadmuch success on the political front Forming a government is not enough toend the civil war the Taliban must gain acceptability both at home andabroad

The Talibanrsquos International Legal StatusRecognition of a government in a civil war also helps in ending the conflictbecause both parties involved desire the political economic and militarysupport that can come with it Non-recognition of the Taliban government isan indicator of its standing in the international community The recognitionhas not been forthcoming because of dissatisfaction with Taliban policiesUpon taking Kabul the Taliban had immediately demanded from other statesformal recognition as the only legitimate government of Afghanistan Theyalso demanded to be granted a seat in the UN General Assembly Howeverthey received neither So far only Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UnitedArab Emirates (UAE) have recognized the Taliban government In contrastBurhanuddin Rabbanirsquos Northern Alliance regime despite its weak militaryposition has legitimacy and political backing from the world communityincluding the majority of the Islamic states Most countries preserved thestatus quo and continued to allow the diplomatic missions of the Rabbaniregime

Recognition in international law involves acceptance by a state of a givenentity that this recognized entity possesses an international legal personalityand the rights and privileges that flow from it or that it is the exclusive

478 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

representative of a body with international legal personality The decision togrant or not to grant recognition is a political one within the sovereign discre-tion of individual states Recognition in principle can be accorded to states orgovernments As far as the state of Afghanistan itself is concerned it hasbeen recognized by a large number of countries including all permanentmembers of the UN Security Council for many years However wherepolitical power has fragmented to the extent that it has in Afghanistan inrecent years there may well be more than one group claiming to be the gov-ernment In fact as has been outlined already there are two governmentswithin one country One is militarily strong and controls a large populationand territory but has no legal standing while the other is recognized but hasless control of Afghan territory

Pakistan was the first country to grant international recognition to theTalibanrsquos government Their past links provided the basis for doing so Asnoted earlier virtually all of the Taliban leadership had been refugees in Pa-kistan For several years Taliban leaders studied in the madrasas (religiousschools) affiliated with the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) headed by MaulviFazul ur Rehman Although it has not been conclusively proven that theTaliban are Pakistanrsquos creation much criticism along these lines and othershas been leveled against it Pakistan is said to have played a key role inturning Taliban into a functioning military force by providing training logis-tical support and equipment

In 1997 Pakistan rooted its decision to recognize the Taliban governmentbased on the fact that the latter was in effective control of most of Afghani-stanrsquos territory including the capital By the time recognition was given theTaliban government occupied 90 of Afghanistan and oversaw a populationthat was representative of all of the countryrsquos ethnic groups Since then Paki-stan has been striving to propagate a positive image of the student militia andworking to induce other neighboring countries to recognize them Further-more Pakistan has been making persistent attempts to get the UN to adoptthe vacant seat formula which the Organization of Islamic Conferences haddone during 1996

Pakistanrsquos ties with the Taliban have become increasingly complex owingto the influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan Pakistanmdasha country of 140million mostly poor peoplemdashhas been almost single-handedly housing andfeeding the 12 million Afghan refugees living there since 1995 the year theUN stopped providing food and housing aid Some of the Afghan refugeescurrently in Pakistan have been there since the 1980s having fled the Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan At the time an estimated 32 million refugees livedin Pakistan making it the largest caseload of refugees in the world

Some of the refugees did return to Afghanistan In 1994 approximately77000 went back with the assistance of the UN High Commission for Refu-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 479

gees (UNHCR) An additional 76000 refugees returned to Afghanistan ontheir own11 However the years since then have seen a new wave of refu-gees flowing into Pakistan from northern Afghanistan Many of the freshrefugees are fleeing the fighting there plus a devastating drought This newwave has not been officially registered with any international organizationAs a consequence the statistics regarding refugees in Pakistan are unreliableAn influx of 30000 Afghan refugees came to Pakistan in 2000 and it is esti-mated that more than 50000 have crossed the border since then In that yearPakistan decided to close its border to stop further refugees because it couldnot absorb any more However its border was later reopened because of thedeplorable condition of the refugees and pressure from international humani-tarian relief agencies

Aside from Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UAE are on the list of countriesrecognizing the Talibanrsquos government Saudi Arabiarsquos came only a few daysafter Pakistanrsquos Until mid-1998 Islamabad and Riyadh were on the samepolitical wavelength Saudi Arabia supplied heavily subsidized fuel to theTaliban through Pakistan and also provided general funding After 1998problems between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan developed over the fate ofOsama bin Laden the Saudi millionaire who had been funding the Afghanjihad The Taliban had promised Saudi Arabia that Osama bin Laden wouldnot use his refuge in Afghanistan to support any acts of violence abroadAfter Osama bin Laden was linked to the bombings of US embassies inKenya and Tanzania his continued refuge in Afghanistan became a majorsource of tension between Taliban and the US on one hand and Saudi Ara-bia on the other

Apart from these three countries the Taliban have not managed to estab-lish political ties with other states This becomes a major constraint for agovernment of a country going through civil war If the paramount objectiveis to end the civil war the government has to direct its energies in this direc-tion It cannot expect the US or other countries to come to its rescue

The United States has been a major country involved in AfghanistanAlong with the Soviets the US had fed the civil war since the days of thecold war When Taliban captured Kabul the US State Department an-nounced it would establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban by sendingan official to Kabul This announcement was quickly retracted The StateDepartment spokesman Glyn Davies said the US found nothing objectiona-ble in the steps taken by the Taliban to impose Islamic law and described theTaliban as anti-modern rather than anti-Western Some members of Con-

11 Nasreen Ghufran ldquoRefugees A Comparative Study of India and Pakistanrdquo (paperpresented at the conference ldquoThe Challenge of Cooperation South Asia and Beyondrdquo Kath-mandu Nepal December 1998)

480 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

gress supported the Taliban because their government appeared to serve theUS policy of isolating Iran A Taliban regime would create a firmly Sunnibuffer on Iranrsquos border and potentially provide security for trade routes andpipelines that would break Iranrsquos monopoly on Central Asiarsquos southern traderoutes

But from its initial policy of acquiescence vis-a-vis the Taliban the USmoved to the other extreme of rejecting them completely The US rejectionwas largely because of the pressure exerted by the feminist movement Theprominent feminist Zieba-Shorish Shamley persuaded many US feministgroups to spearhead a signature campaign to mobilize support for Afghanwomen Her efforts helped persuade former President Clinton to take atougher stance against the Taliban12 Washingtonrsquos denouncement of theTaliban also came in the backdrop of the presidential election in the US assupporting a regime that held no respect for human rights would have nega-tively affected Clintonrsquos position13

In 1998 when the Taliban made great military gains against the forces ofthe North they expected to gain recognition and a seat in the UN they hadmajor Afghan cities under their control and their rivals in retreat Talibanrepresentatives claimed that if recognition were granted to their governmentthey would allow a huge pipeline project to proceed that would carry oil andgas from Central Asia to lucrative markets in Pakistan and India This pipe-line would cut through the western part of Afghanistan ldquoEven before thecapture of Mazar-i-Sharif and Taloqan we were fully qualified for recogni-tionrdquo said deputy information minister Abdur Rahman Hotaki referring totwo key opposition bases captured by the militia ldquoThe opposition gave peo-ple an excuse to deny us recognition and prevent us having the pipeline runthrough our country but that excuse has now gonerdquo he said ldquoAll excusesblocking our recognition are gone Therefore it is predicted they will revisetheir policy in view of the current realitiesrdquo he said adding that all ldquotermsand conditions for a legitimate staterdquo have been met14

But the Taliban encountered problems with international organizations In1999 the UN proposed imposing sanctions against the Taliban when it is-sued Security Council Resolution 1267 Adopted unanimously by the Secur-ity Council on October 15 the resolution demanded that the Taliban turn overOsama bin Laden without further delay to authorities in a country where hewill be brought to justice Until the Taliban comply the resolution requiresUN member states to deny permission for Taliban-owned -leased or -oper-ated aircraft to land in or take off from their territory It also calls for the

12 Rashid Taliban pp 180ndash8213 P Stobodan ldquoThe Afghan Conflict and Regional Securityrdquo Strategic Analysis (August

1999) p 72414 Frontier Post (Peshawar) January 14 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 481

freezing of funds and other financial resources including funds derived fromproperty owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban The lat-ter had 30 days in which to comply with this resolution before sanctions wereimposed The Taliban did not comply and the sanctions came into force

Another round of sanctions was imposed on the Taliban in December 2000with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1333 The new sanc-tions called for an arms embargo on the Taliban including foreign militaryassistance It also imposed a ban on travel by the militiarsquos senior leaders abroader flight ban than the one imposed last year to force bin Ladenrsquos surren-der measures to close all Taliban offices overseas and a ban on exports toTaliban areas of acetic anhydride used to manufacture heroin Finally it alsofroze funds and other financial assets of Osama bin Laden and individualsand entities associated with him Mullah Omar reacted to this round of sanc-tions by saying his government would not back out from its stand and princi-ples even if the entire world turned against them15

The continuation of these sanctions has pushed the issue of recognition tothe backburner However the international community is also paying a pricefor not recognizing the legitimacy of the Taliban One of the principal areasin which the Taliban could provide some assistance is in the containment ofthe production of poppy Mullah Omar on several occasions emphasized hiswill to fight against opium production However it has been difficult tomaintain such policy postures in the wake of external sanctions As a resultin 1999 over 90983 hectares of poppies yielded a harvest of over 4581 tonsof dry opium an estimated 70 increase in production over the previousyearrsquos figure

The international sanctions have also affected the incentives of local farm-ers to turn away from poppy production Afghanistanrsquos socioeconomic situa-tion makes opium production one of the only available economic means foraccess to land labor and credit Currently the Afghan peasantryrsquos heavydependence upon opium production associated with the politico-territorialrealities of a tribal society typified by fragile political allegiances is makingit difficult for the Taliban to make any serious attempts at eradication16

Additionally any Taliban attempt to implement a poppy eradication policywill be severely compromised by the governmentrsquos international non-recog-nition This places restrictions on the options open to the government Eventhe UN Drug Control Program cannot legally reach any formal agreementwith the Taliban government as long as the latter is not internationally recog-nized The Taliban government faces a self-imposed catch-22 situation Its

15 Ibid16 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy ldquoTalibanrsquos Drug Dilemma Opium Production vs International

Recognitionrdquo The Analyst (Paris) (1999)

482 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

political policies and actions are deemed unacceptable by the internationalcommunity yet it cannot pursue any eradication policy with any hope ofcomplete success without the international recognition and aid that are beingdenied it owing to those policies and actions17

Future Prospects for Change in theTalibanrsquos Regime

Since 1996 the Taliban have been striving to bring the civil war to a success-ful conclusion Their domestic policies have brought about alienation andcreated fissures within the Afghan society Their inflexible stand on variouspolicies has denied them the credibility they so desire Their authoritarianismand intolerance have alienated non-Pushtun Afghans who make up morethan half the population The flow of thousands of extremist Pakistani andArab Taliban supporters into Afghanistan has fueled the resentment of thelocal populace18

The Taliban are accused of harboring terrorists and extremists who notonly support Taliban but also carry out their extremist policies in the targetedcountries According to a report that appeared in the Far Eastern EconomicReview (FEER) Afghanistan has become a sanctuary for ldquoarmed insurgentsaccused of terrorist attacks in China Iran Uzbekistan Tajikistan and Paki-stanrdquo Some 400 Arab Islamic militants from a dozen Middle Eastern andAfrican countries are said to be part of the 055 Brigade funded by Osama binLaden and fighting alongside Taliban in the current offensive The articlefurther noted that ldquo[t]he diverse groups have their own agendas mainly fo-cused on undermining the regimes at home but some share bin Ladenrsquos zealfor a global Islamic revolution The resulting web of dangerous friendshipsthreatens to export instability throughout the mineral-rich and commerciallyunder-exploited hinterland of Central Asiardquo19

It is obvious that the Taliban must improve their image both at home andabroad as perceptions play an important role in the general acceptability ornon-acceptability of governments in both arenas Currently the Taliban areperceived primarily as a negative element that is unlikely to play any positiverole in resolving the Afghan conflict If they fail in their goal the Afghannation will lose any trust that religious political forces could play any mean-ingful role in resolving the ongoing conflict The Talibanrsquos fate will be more

17 At the time of writing the Taliban were not cooperating in poppy eradication Currentlyit appears this may have changed The Taliban claim to have completely eradicated poppy pro-duction in the areas dominated by their troops and the claim is being verified under UN aus-pices

18 Peter Tomsen ldquoResponse A Chance for Peace in AfghanistanmdashThe Talibanrsquos Days areNumberedrdquo Foreign Affairs 79 (JanuaryndashFebruary 2000) p 179

19 Ahmed Rashid ldquoAfghanistan Heart of Darknessrdquo FEER August 5 1999

NASREEN GHUFRAN 483

or less the same as that which befell the mujahideen if they do not take timelyand corrective measures to improve Afghanistanrsquos deteriorating situation

The Taliban gained support from most of the populace in the beginningbecause they offered themselves a neutral force and declared their intentionto remain so However they are no longer neutral and have become anotherparty to the conflict Their policies have not only infuriated the internationalpublic but also large sections of the Afghan community The large influxesof Afghan refugees into Pakistan reflect the growing disagreement with theirpolicies This disenchantment is unlikely to change if the Taliban do notmoderate their stance The Taliban of course believe their policies to be im-portant for bringing about the change they desire but they do not realize howmuch these policies have alienated people The international community hasexplicitly voiced its criticism of the Taliban regime and consider it to be aliving nightmare for women political dissidents and anyone else who doesnot submit to the laws under the authority of the Ministry for the Fostering ofVirtue and Suppression of Vice The Taliban movement itself came about asa reaction to the self-seeking and self-destructive policies of the mujahideenwhose pretensions to Islam and leadership were discredited It was in thisideological vacuum and a Hobbesian state of anarchy that made the Talibanrsquosrule palatable to common Afghanis20 But if the Talibanrsquos government doesnot soften its present policies and complete peace is not restored it will notbe too late for the common people to turn against them

The year 2001 has seen universal outrage at the offensive launched by theTaliban rulers against Afghanistanrsquos Buddhist past Condemnation has notremained confined to non-Muslim states several Islamic countries includingPakistan have been appalled by the destruction of Buddhist statues in theprovince of Bamiyan Pakistan sent an official delegation whose aim was toprevent the Taliban from destroying the statues Pakistanrsquos foreign ministerAbdul Sattar said ldquoCertainly we believe it was a mistake a blunder and as aresult Afghanistan will suffer consequences for years to comerdquo To this headded that ldquoit is very difficult for me to make a statement as to why they didnot hearrdquo21 Iran likewise strongly condemned the statuesrsquo destruction Astatement released by Iranrsquos Cultural Heritage Organization wondered whyldquocertain Taliban-led individuals calling themselves lsquoclericrsquo have ordered de-struction of ancient sites of the mankind society citing blasphemy and idoliz-

20 Hafeez Malik ldquoPakistan Islam and the Taliban Phenomenonrdquo News International (Paki-stan) June 9 2000

21 Sattarrsquos remarks are in ibid March 11 2001

484 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

ing as reasonsrdquo22 To prevent their destruction Iran even offered to buy thestatues or move them into safekeeping

However the Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil rejectedany offer to prevent the destruction of the statues His negotiations with Pa-kistan did not bear a positive result and he rejected the Iranian offers reiterat-ing that the presence of the statues conflicted with Islamic teaching In thewake of the Talibanrsquos subsequent actions Iran led a UN initiative to takeserious action against the regime Commenting on the statuesrsquo destructionthe Iranian Foreign Ministry stated ldquoUnfortunately the Talibanrsquos destructionof the statues has cast doubts on the comprehensive views offered by Islamicideology in the world Clearly Muslims across the world pin the blame onthe rigid-minded Taliban and by no means embroil the Afghan Muslims inthis counter-cultural moverdquo23

The Bamiyan incident stirred up dual controversies about both the charac-ter of the Taliban regime and the relationship between culture religion andnational heritage in an Islamic state In his characteristic style Mullah Omarshrugged off all objections to the planned destruction of the Buddhist statuessaying ldquomy job is the implementation of Islamic orderrdquo He invoked Islamiclaw a fatwa issued by the Afghan ulama associated with this regime and thedecision of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to support his decision24

Nonetheless the destruction of the statues has further tarnished the Talibanrsquosimage While it may be the case that the Taliban undertook their actions inreaction to the tough sanctions imposed on them by the world the Talibanhave to realize that they are not going to earn any international sympathy orrecognition

Afghanistan has always been important to external powers due to its strate-gic location They have meddled in its affairs both in the past and at presentThe protracted civil war makes it more vulnerable to external penetration Insuch situations it has no other option but to seek help and support fromoutside The external powers are more than willing to do so if it serves theirnational interest The opposition is likely to adopt a similar strategy as theyhave less access to the resources of the country than the ruling authority Hadthere been no external involvement Afghanistanrsquos extended civil war wouldnot have become the protracted and complicated affair that it is

The Afghan civil war has important regional implications Various exter-nal powers are pursuing divergent objectives in Afghanistan and the outcome

22 Cultural Heritage Organization comment is in Iran News (Tehran) March 1 2001 Thisnews item is distributed via Middle East News Online available at lthttpwwwmiddleeastwirecomgt

23 Comments of the Iranian Foreign Ministry reported by the BBC World Service March 52001

24 Rahimullah Yusufzai ldquoA Question of Tolerancerdquo News International March 4 2001

474 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

TABLE 2 Military Command Structure of the Taliban

Position Individual

Commander in Chief Mullah Mohammad Omar AkhundMilitary Chief of Staff Mullah Mohmmad HassanChief of the Army Staff Mullah Rahmatullah AkhundArmy Division Chief Mullah Muhammad Jumma KhanArmy Division Chief Mullah Muhammad YunusArmy Division Chief Mullah Mohammad GulArmy Division Chief Mullah Mohammad Aziz KhanArmored Force No 4 Mullah Mohammad Zahir

ling a territory without a clear administrative system is not possible in con-temporary times

The formation of these shuras was aimed at creating an efficient govern-ment After they captured Kabul the Taliban formed a six-member Provi-sional Ruling Council headed by Mullah Mohammad Rabbani This wasfollowed by the formation of the Kabul Shura of Acting Ministers in 1999The Kabul Shura deals with day-to-day problems of the government the cityand the Kabul military front Important policy recommendations are con-veyed to the Kandahar Shura where decisions are actually made To restoreand maintain peace in the provinces the Taliban appoints governors who arefrom provinces other than those where they are serving This policy appearsto have been welcomed by the people As for the military shura it is a looseorganizational body that plans strategy and can implement some tactical deci-sions (see Table 2) The military shura appears to have no strategic decision-making powers Military strategy key personnel appointments and the allo-cation of funds for offensives are decided upon by the Amir-ul-Momineen

Although their government has few resources and many parts barely func-tion at all the Taliban have adopted a discourse of Afghan nationalism inaddition to their Islamic traditionalism Despite their amorphous politicalleadership the Taliban claim to be trying to recreate a centralized Afghanstate In areas under their control they have appointed provincial governorsand administrators of districts cities and towns from the center9

One of the most remarkable characteristics of the Taliban leadership is thattop government officials often switch from the battlefield to the ministry andback again each time following the orders from Mullah Omar In one sensethis produces remarkable flexibility among the Taliban hierarchy as they allact as both administrators and military commanders This flexibility in the

9 Barnett Rubin ldquoAfghanistan under the Talibanrdquo Current History vol 98 no 625 (Febru-ary 1999) p 81

NASREEN GHUFRAN 475

military command has allowed the leadership to maintain better ties with therank-and-file fighters than might otherwise be the case However theTaliban administration in Kabul has faced problems For instance while anyminister is away at the front no decisions can be taken in that ministryMoreover government ministers are working without pay something un-heard of in modern times They do not use government resources for privateuse curtailing expenses and refraining from indulgence in squandering andextravagance Regular salaries are paid only to professional civil servantsand trained soldiers drawn from the former communist army

As for the Northern Alliance until August 1998 the areas it controlled hadfour main administrative and political centers Mazar Sharif which somegroups aspired to turn into a temporary capital for a government in exile ofthe Islamic State of Afghanistan Talauqan the headquarters of MasoodrsquosSCN Shibergan the location of Dostumrsquos headquarters and Bamiyan theheadquarters of the Hizb-i-Wahadat The Taliban have made inroads intothese areas too because the entire political administrative fabric of northernAfghanistan has broken down Only one of Afghanistanrsquos provinces is nowentirely under the Northern Alliancersquos control Badakhshan an inaccessiblemountainous region in the extreme northeast of the country There are alsoneighboring valleys to the west and a few enclaves in the Afghan interiorover which the Taliban have not yet been able to consolidate control Someelements of the former state administration have survived but political powerresides individually in the various armed groups rather than in a unitary civil-ian structure The groups maintain their own military and command struc-tures they do not have a unified strategy for the joint mobilization ofresources in their struggle against the Taliban

The areas controlled by the Taliban have been subjected to drastic changesto personal behavior The Taliban have put a ban on wine and televisionwhich is perceived to be immoral There is also complete restriction on mu-sic photography and the painting of living things The shaving off of onersquosbeard or trimming it less than a fistful is prohibited as is having a Westernhairstyle Gambling betting pigeon flying dog-racing and sodomy are alsostrictly forbidden

The Taliban have gained international notoriety because they have bannedwomen from working Women are obligated to observe strict purdah (litveiling also refers to covering of bodies) Girls have been stopped fromgoing to schools The Taliban have told all women working outside theirhomes to stay at home Although women who had been working will con-tinue to receive their salaries the Taliban claim that there is no need for themto work any longer They claim that these restrictions have been put in placeto protect the honor and dignity of women At the same time Taliban offi-cials have said that they are not against women working or receiving an edu-

476 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

cation The Taliban claim that they need time and resources to create theproper environment and right texts and curriculum for womenrsquos educationThe Talibanrsquos behavior is modeled after the Islamic revolution in Iran Edu-cational establishments remained closed for many years in the aftermath ofthat revolution They remained closed until the Iranian revolutionaries for-mally established an educational syllabus conforming to their own principles

The Taliban have stated that they wish to establish a pure Islamic state Intheir view this means that women have no place in the public arena Theyare required to stay at home and take care of their husbands and childrenThe Taliban cling to the symbol of a protected woman Women have toobserve a strict dress code wearing a burqa (a garment covering the bodyfrom head to toe) and trousers fully covering their ankles While women hadworn burqa in the pre-Taliban era it had not been an enforced dress code

The Talibanrsquos edicts have had a severe impact on many other women whodo not have a close male relative to accompany them in public Hardest hithave been the countryrsquos estimated 30000 widows many of whom are thesole providers for their families Some widows have been allowed to work inareas under the Taliban control but even for them it is not easy to get permis-sion According to Taliban representatives the current restrictions are said tobe necessary because females are not safe outside their homes Many womenhave strongly reacted to the Taliban policies despite the restrictive climate inTaliban-controlled areas These women do not like what the Taliban havebeen professing They want to work and continue with their education butthese rights are being denied to them The justifications given by Taliban arenot acceptable to the working and more enlightened urban Afghan women Itis therefore not surprising that women have become the most vocal critics ofthe Taliban

The edicts against women also have predictably had a devastating impacton primary level education Before the civil war over four-fifths of primaryschool teachers were women The majority of them are now jobless Theclosure of schools has in turn affected children Many orphaned childrenwho once could make homes at schools are now forced to live on the streetsAn international aid group in 1998 estimated 28000 street children in Kabulalone

Mullah Nuruddin Turabi the Taliban minister of justice defended theTalibanrsquos domestic actions He said ldquoIt is not just a question of men wearingbeards and women wearing burqas In Afghanistan every vice has to bestopped and every virtue promulgatedrdquo10 The Taliban have established anew security service the Ministry of Enforcement of Virtue and Suppressionof Vice for eradicating corruption and other vices from Afghan society Ac-

10 Michael Fathers ldquoFrozen in Timerdquo Time May 2000

NASREEN GHUFRAN 477

cording to Taliban tenets their rules are a jihad (holy war) against sin cor-ruption and cruelty Therefore those who do not abide by the Taliban edictson personal behavior are strictly punished according to a strict application ofIslamic law Hence stoning to death amputations (in case of robbery) andother forms of punishments are carried out in front of large crowds

Nonetheless a crisis of governance remains in Afghanistan To supportersof the Taliban regime its government is one that is accountable and represen-tative of all ethnic groups To many the Taliban have restored Afghan cul-ture Afghan-style self-rule has been implemented in the provinces and theTalibanrsquos supporters note that the countryrsquos civil administration and justicesystem are now based on Islamic and Afghan traditions The opposition re-jects this opinion and condemns the Taliban government of being unrepre-sentative and unaccountable

While all the above-mentioned structures are functioning the governmentfaces tremendous challenges The most obvious one is the governmentrsquosunacceptability to and lack of recognition from the international system letalone by the opposition The political dealings that the government has hadwith others offer evidence of its credibility in the civil war While theTaliban have major control of the countryrsquos land area they have not yet hadmuch success on the political front Forming a government is not enough toend the civil war the Taliban must gain acceptability both at home andabroad

The Talibanrsquos International Legal StatusRecognition of a government in a civil war also helps in ending the conflictbecause both parties involved desire the political economic and militarysupport that can come with it Non-recognition of the Taliban government isan indicator of its standing in the international community The recognitionhas not been forthcoming because of dissatisfaction with Taliban policiesUpon taking Kabul the Taliban had immediately demanded from other statesformal recognition as the only legitimate government of Afghanistan Theyalso demanded to be granted a seat in the UN General Assembly Howeverthey received neither So far only Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UnitedArab Emirates (UAE) have recognized the Taliban government In contrastBurhanuddin Rabbanirsquos Northern Alliance regime despite its weak militaryposition has legitimacy and political backing from the world communityincluding the majority of the Islamic states Most countries preserved thestatus quo and continued to allow the diplomatic missions of the Rabbaniregime

Recognition in international law involves acceptance by a state of a givenentity that this recognized entity possesses an international legal personalityand the rights and privileges that flow from it or that it is the exclusive

478 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

representative of a body with international legal personality The decision togrant or not to grant recognition is a political one within the sovereign discre-tion of individual states Recognition in principle can be accorded to states orgovernments As far as the state of Afghanistan itself is concerned it hasbeen recognized by a large number of countries including all permanentmembers of the UN Security Council for many years However wherepolitical power has fragmented to the extent that it has in Afghanistan inrecent years there may well be more than one group claiming to be the gov-ernment In fact as has been outlined already there are two governmentswithin one country One is militarily strong and controls a large populationand territory but has no legal standing while the other is recognized but hasless control of Afghan territory

Pakistan was the first country to grant international recognition to theTalibanrsquos government Their past links provided the basis for doing so Asnoted earlier virtually all of the Taliban leadership had been refugees in Pa-kistan For several years Taliban leaders studied in the madrasas (religiousschools) affiliated with the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) headed by MaulviFazul ur Rehman Although it has not been conclusively proven that theTaliban are Pakistanrsquos creation much criticism along these lines and othershas been leveled against it Pakistan is said to have played a key role inturning Taliban into a functioning military force by providing training logis-tical support and equipment

In 1997 Pakistan rooted its decision to recognize the Taliban governmentbased on the fact that the latter was in effective control of most of Afghani-stanrsquos territory including the capital By the time recognition was given theTaliban government occupied 90 of Afghanistan and oversaw a populationthat was representative of all of the countryrsquos ethnic groups Since then Paki-stan has been striving to propagate a positive image of the student militia andworking to induce other neighboring countries to recognize them Further-more Pakistan has been making persistent attempts to get the UN to adoptthe vacant seat formula which the Organization of Islamic Conferences haddone during 1996

Pakistanrsquos ties with the Taliban have become increasingly complex owingto the influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan Pakistanmdasha country of 140million mostly poor peoplemdashhas been almost single-handedly housing andfeeding the 12 million Afghan refugees living there since 1995 the year theUN stopped providing food and housing aid Some of the Afghan refugeescurrently in Pakistan have been there since the 1980s having fled the Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan At the time an estimated 32 million refugees livedin Pakistan making it the largest caseload of refugees in the world

Some of the refugees did return to Afghanistan In 1994 approximately77000 went back with the assistance of the UN High Commission for Refu-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 479

gees (UNHCR) An additional 76000 refugees returned to Afghanistan ontheir own11 However the years since then have seen a new wave of refu-gees flowing into Pakistan from northern Afghanistan Many of the freshrefugees are fleeing the fighting there plus a devastating drought This newwave has not been officially registered with any international organizationAs a consequence the statistics regarding refugees in Pakistan are unreliableAn influx of 30000 Afghan refugees came to Pakistan in 2000 and it is esti-mated that more than 50000 have crossed the border since then In that yearPakistan decided to close its border to stop further refugees because it couldnot absorb any more However its border was later reopened because of thedeplorable condition of the refugees and pressure from international humani-tarian relief agencies

Aside from Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UAE are on the list of countriesrecognizing the Talibanrsquos government Saudi Arabiarsquos came only a few daysafter Pakistanrsquos Until mid-1998 Islamabad and Riyadh were on the samepolitical wavelength Saudi Arabia supplied heavily subsidized fuel to theTaliban through Pakistan and also provided general funding After 1998problems between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan developed over the fate ofOsama bin Laden the Saudi millionaire who had been funding the Afghanjihad The Taliban had promised Saudi Arabia that Osama bin Laden wouldnot use his refuge in Afghanistan to support any acts of violence abroadAfter Osama bin Laden was linked to the bombings of US embassies inKenya and Tanzania his continued refuge in Afghanistan became a majorsource of tension between Taliban and the US on one hand and Saudi Ara-bia on the other

Apart from these three countries the Taliban have not managed to estab-lish political ties with other states This becomes a major constraint for agovernment of a country going through civil war If the paramount objectiveis to end the civil war the government has to direct its energies in this direc-tion It cannot expect the US or other countries to come to its rescue

The United States has been a major country involved in AfghanistanAlong with the Soviets the US had fed the civil war since the days of thecold war When Taliban captured Kabul the US State Department an-nounced it would establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban by sendingan official to Kabul This announcement was quickly retracted The StateDepartment spokesman Glyn Davies said the US found nothing objectiona-ble in the steps taken by the Taliban to impose Islamic law and described theTaliban as anti-modern rather than anti-Western Some members of Con-

11 Nasreen Ghufran ldquoRefugees A Comparative Study of India and Pakistanrdquo (paperpresented at the conference ldquoThe Challenge of Cooperation South Asia and Beyondrdquo Kath-mandu Nepal December 1998)

480 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

gress supported the Taliban because their government appeared to serve theUS policy of isolating Iran A Taliban regime would create a firmly Sunnibuffer on Iranrsquos border and potentially provide security for trade routes andpipelines that would break Iranrsquos monopoly on Central Asiarsquos southern traderoutes

But from its initial policy of acquiescence vis-a-vis the Taliban the USmoved to the other extreme of rejecting them completely The US rejectionwas largely because of the pressure exerted by the feminist movement Theprominent feminist Zieba-Shorish Shamley persuaded many US feministgroups to spearhead a signature campaign to mobilize support for Afghanwomen Her efforts helped persuade former President Clinton to take atougher stance against the Taliban12 Washingtonrsquos denouncement of theTaliban also came in the backdrop of the presidential election in the US assupporting a regime that held no respect for human rights would have nega-tively affected Clintonrsquos position13

In 1998 when the Taliban made great military gains against the forces ofthe North they expected to gain recognition and a seat in the UN they hadmajor Afghan cities under their control and their rivals in retreat Talibanrepresentatives claimed that if recognition were granted to their governmentthey would allow a huge pipeline project to proceed that would carry oil andgas from Central Asia to lucrative markets in Pakistan and India This pipe-line would cut through the western part of Afghanistan ldquoEven before thecapture of Mazar-i-Sharif and Taloqan we were fully qualified for recogni-tionrdquo said deputy information minister Abdur Rahman Hotaki referring totwo key opposition bases captured by the militia ldquoThe opposition gave peo-ple an excuse to deny us recognition and prevent us having the pipeline runthrough our country but that excuse has now gonerdquo he said ldquoAll excusesblocking our recognition are gone Therefore it is predicted they will revisetheir policy in view of the current realitiesrdquo he said adding that all ldquotermsand conditions for a legitimate staterdquo have been met14

But the Taliban encountered problems with international organizations In1999 the UN proposed imposing sanctions against the Taliban when it is-sued Security Council Resolution 1267 Adopted unanimously by the Secur-ity Council on October 15 the resolution demanded that the Taliban turn overOsama bin Laden without further delay to authorities in a country where hewill be brought to justice Until the Taliban comply the resolution requiresUN member states to deny permission for Taliban-owned -leased or -oper-ated aircraft to land in or take off from their territory It also calls for the

12 Rashid Taliban pp 180ndash8213 P Stobodan ldquoThe Afghan Conflict and Regional Securityrdquo Strategic Analysis (August

1999) p 72414 Frontier Post (Peshawar) January 14 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 481

freezing of funds and other financial resources including funds derived fromproperty owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban The lat-ter had 30 days in which to comply with this resolution before sanctions wereimposed The Taliban did not comply and the sanctions came into force

Another round of sanctions was imposed on the Taliban in December 2000with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1333 The new sanc-tions called for an arms embargo on the Taliban including foreign militaryassistance It also imposed a ban on travel by the militiarsquos senior leaders abroader flight ban than the one imposed last year to force bin Ladenrsquos surren-der measures to close all Taliban offices overseas and a ban on exports toTaliban areas of acetic anhydride used to manufacture heroin Finally it alsofroze funds and other financial assets of Osama bin Laden and individualsand entities associated with him Mullah Omar reacted to this round of sanc-tions by saying his government would not back out from its stand and princi-ples even if the entire world turned against them15

The continuation of these sanctions has pushed the issue of recognition tothe backburner However the international community is also paying a pricefor not recognizing the legitimacy of the Taliban One of the principal areasin which the Taliban could provide some assistance is in the containment ofthe production of poppy Mullah Omar on several occasions emphasized hiswill to fight against opium production However it has been difficult tomaintain such policy postures in the wake of external sanctions As a resultin 1999 over 90983 hectares of poppies yielded a harvest of over 4581 tonsof dry opium an estimated 70 increase in production over the previousyearrsquos figure

The international sanctions have also affected the incentives of local farm-ers to turn away from poppy production Afghanistanrsquos socioeconomic situa-tion makes opium production one of the only available economic means foraccess to land labor and credit Currently the Afghan peasantryrsquos heavydependence upon opium production associated with the politico-territorialrealities of a tribal society typified by fragile political allegiances is makingit difficult for the Taliban to make any serious attempts at eradication16

Additionally any Taliban attempt to implement a poppy eradication policywill be severely compromised by the governmentrsquos international non-recog-nition This places restrictions on the options open to the government Eventhe UN Drug Control Program cannot legally reach any formal agreementwith the Taliban government as long as the latter is not internationally recog-nized The Taliban government faces a self-imposed catch-22 situation Its

15 Ibid16 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy ldquoTalibanrsquos Drug Dilemma Opium Production vs International

Recognitionrdquo The Analyst (Paris) (1999)

482 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

political policies and actions are deemed unacceptable by the internationalcommunity yet it cannot pursue any eradication policy with any hope ofcomplete success without the international recognition and aid that are beingdenied it owing to those policies and actions17

Future Prospects for Change in theTalibanrsquos Regime

Since 1996 the Taliban have been striving to bring the civil war to a success-ful conclusion Their domestic policies have brought about alienation andcreated fissures within the Afghan society Their inflexible stand on variouspolicies has denied them the credibility they so desire Their authoritarianismand intolerance have alienated non-Pushtun Afghans who make up morethan half the population The flow of thousands of extremist Pakistani andArab Taliban supporters into Afghanistan has fueled the resentment of thelocal populace18

The Taliban are accused of harboring terrorists and extremists who notonly support Taliban but also carry out their extremist policies in the targetedcountries According to a report that appeared in the Far Eastern EconomicReview (FEER) Afghanistan has become a sanctuary for ldquoarmed insurgentsaccused of terrorist attacks in China Iran Uzbekistan Tajikistan and Paki-stanrdquo Some 400 Arab Islamic militants from a dozen Middle Eastern andAfrican countries are said to be part of the 055 Brigade funded by Osama binLaden and fighting alongside Taliban in the current offensive The articlefurther noted that ldquo[t]he diverse groups have their own agendas mainly fo-cused on undermining the regimes at home but some share bin Ladenrsquos zealfor a global Islamic revolution The resulting web of dangerous friendshipsthreatens to export instability throughout the mineral-rich and commerciallyunder-exploited hinterland of Central Asiardquo19

It is obvious that the Taliban must improve their image both at home andabroad as perceptions play an important role in the general acceptability ornon-acceptability of governments in both arenas Currently the Taliban areperceived primarily as a negative element that is unlikely to play any positiverole in resolving the Afghan conflict If they fail in their goal the Afghannation will lose any trust that religious political forces could play any mean-ingful role in resolving the ongoing conflict The Talibanrsquos fate will be more

17 At the time of writing the Taliban were not cooperating in poppy eradication Currentlyit appears this may have changed The Taliban claim to have completely eradicated poppy pro-duction in the areas dominated by their troops and the claim is being verified under UN aus-pices

18 Peter Tomsen ldquoResponse A Chance for Peace in AfghanistanmdashThe Talibanrsquos Days areNumberedrdquo Foreign Affairs 79 (JanuaryndashFebruary 2000) p 179

19 Ahmed Rashid ldquoAfghanistan Heart of Darknessrdquo FEER August 5 1999

NASREEN GHUFRAN 483

or less the same as that which befell the mujahideen if they do not take timelyand corrective measures to improve Afghanistanrsquos deteriorating situation

The Taliban gained support from most of the populace in the beginningbecause they offered themselves a neutral force and declared their intentionto remain so However they are no longer neutral and have become anotherparty to the conflict Their policies have not only infuriated the internationalpublic but also large sections of the Afghan community The large influxesof Afghan refugees into Pakistan reflect the growing disagreement with theirpolicies This disenchantment is unlikely to change if the Taliban do notmoderate their stance The Taliban of course believe their policies to be im-portant for bringing about the change they desire but they do not realize howmuch these policies have alienated people The international community hasexplicitly voiced its criticism of the Taliban regime and consider it to be aliving nightmare for women political dissidents and anyone else who doesnot submit to the laws under the authority of the Ministry for the Fostering ofVirtue and Suppression of Vice The Taliban movement itself came about asa reaction to the self-seeking and self-destructive policies of the mujahideenwhose pretensions to Islam and leadership were discredited It was in thisideological vacuum and a Hobbesian state of anarchy that made the Talibanrsquosrule palatable to common Afghanis20 But if the Talibanrsquos government doesnot soften its present policies and complete peace is not restored it will notbe too late for the common people to turn against them

The year 2001 has seen universal outrage at the offensive launched by theTaliban rulers against Afghanistanrsquos Buddhist past Condemnation has notremained confined to non-Muslim states several Islamic countries includingPakistan have been appalled by the destruction of Buddhist statues in theprovince of Bamiyan Pakistan sent an official delegation whose aim was toprevent the Taliban from destroying the statues Pakistanrsquos foreign ministerAbdul Sattar said ldquoCertainly we believe it was a mistake a blunder and as aresult Afghanistan will suffer consequences for years to comerdquo To this headded that ldquoit is very difficult for me to make a statement as to why they didnot hearrdquo21 Iran likewise strongly condemned the statuesrsquo destruction Astatement released by Iranrsquos Cultural Heritage Organization wondered whyldquocertain Taliban-led individuals calling themselves lsquoclericrsquo have ordered de-struction of ancient sites of the mankind society citing blasphemy and idoliz-

20 Hafeez Malik ldquoPakistan Islam and the Taliban Phenomenonrdquo News International (Paki-stan) June 9 2000

21 Sattarrsquos remarks are in ibid March 11 2001

484 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

ing as reasonsrdquo22 To prevent their destruction Iran even offered to buy thestatues or move them into safekeeping

However the Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil rejectedany offer to prevent the destruction of the statues His negotiations with Pa-kistan did not bear a positive result and he rejected the Iranian offers reiterat-ing that the presence of the statues conflicted with Islamic teaching In thewake of the Talibanrsquos subsequent actions Iran led a UN initiative to takeserious action against the regime Commenting on the statuesrsquo destructionthe Iranian Foreign Ministry stated ldquoUnfortunately the Talibanrsquos destructionof the statues has cast doubts on the comprehensive views offered by Islamicideology in the world Clearly Muslims across the world pin the blame onthe rigid-minded Taliban and by no means embroil the Afghan Muslims inthis counter-cultural moverdquo23

The Bamiyan incident stirred up dual controversies about both the charac-ter of the Taliban regime and the relationship between culture religion andnational heritage in an Islamic state In his characteristic style Mullah Omarshrugged off all objections to the planned destruction of the Buddhist statuessaying ldquomy job is the implementation of Islamic orderrdquo He invoked Islamiclaw a fatwa issued by the Afghan ulama associated with this regime and thedecision of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to support his decision24

Nonetheless the destruction of the statues has further tarnished the Talibanrsquosimage While it may be the case that the Taliban undertook their actions inreaction to the tough sanctions imposed on them by the world the Talibanhave to realize that they are not going to earn any international sympathy orrecognition

Afghanistan has always been important to external powers due to its strate-gic location They have meddled in its affairs both in the past and at presentThe protracted civil war makes it more vulnerable to external penetration Insuch situations it has no other option but to seek help and support fromoutside The external powers are more than willing to do so if it serves theirnational interest The opposition is likely to adopt a similar strategy as theyhave less access to the resources of the country than the ruling authority Hadthere been no external involvement Afghanistanrsquos extended civil war wouldnot have become the protracted and complicated affair that it is

The Afghan civil war has important regional implications Various exter-nal powers are pursuing divergent objectives in Afghanistan and the outcome

22 Cultural Heritage Organization comment is in Iran News (Tehran) March 1 2001 Thisnews item is distributed via Middle East News Online available at lthttpwwwmiddleeastwirecomgt

23 Comments of the Iranian Foreign Ministry reported by the BBC World Service March 52001

24 Rahimullah Yusufzai ldquoA Question of Tolerancerdquo News International March 4 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 475

military command has allowed the leadership to maintain better ties with therank-and-file fighters than might otherwise be the case However theTaliban administration in Kabul has faced problems For instance while anyminister is away at the front no decisions can be taken in that ministryMoreover government ministers are working without pay something un-heard of in modern times They do not use government resources for privateuse curtailing expenses and refraining from indulgence in squandering andextravagance Regular salaries are paid only to professional civil servantsand trained soldiers drawn from the former communist army

As for the Northern Alliance until August 1998 the areas it controlled hadfour main administrative and political centers Mazar Sharif which somegroups aspired to turn into a temporary capital for a government in exile ofthe Islamic State of Afghanistan Talauqan the headquarters of MasoodrsquosSCN Shibergan the location of Dostumrsquos headquarters and Bamiyan theheadquarters of the Hizb-i-Wahadat The Taliban have made inroads intothese areas too because the entire political administrative fabric of northernAfghanistan has broken down Only one of Afghanistanrsquos provinces is nowentirely under the Northern Alliancersquos control Badakhshan an inaccessiblemountainous region in the extreme northeast of the country There are alsoneighboring valleys to the west and a few enclaves in the Afghan interiorover which the Taliban have not yet been able to consolidate control Someelements of the former state administration have survived but political powerresides individually in the various armed groups rather than in a unitary civil-ian structure The groups maintain their own military and command struc-tures they do not have a unified strategy for the joint mobilization ofresources in their struggle against the Taliban

The areas controlled by the Taliban have been subjected to drastic changesto personal behavior The Taliban have put a ban on wine and televisionwhich is perceived to be immoral There is also complete restriction on mu-sic photography and the painting of living things The shaving off of onersquosbeard or trimming it less than a fistful is prohibited as is having a Westernhairstyle Gambling betting pigeon flying dog-racing and sodomy are alsostrictly forbidden

The Taliban have gained international notoriety because they have bannedwomen from working Women are obligated to observe strict purdah (litveiling also refers to covering of bodies) Girls have been stopped fromgoing to schools The Taliban have told all women working outside theirhomes to stay at home Although women who had been working will con-tinue to receive their salaries the Taliban claim that there is no need for themto work any longer They claim that these restrictions have been put in placeto protect the honor and dignity of women At the same time Taliban offi-cials have said that they are not against women working or receiving an edu-

476 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

cation The Taliban claim that they need time and resources to create theproper environment and right texts and curriculum for womenrsquos educationThe Talibanrsquos behavior is modeled after the Islamic revolution in Iran Edu-cational establishments remained closed for many years in the aftermath ofthat revolution They remained closed until the Iranian revolutionaries for-mally established an educational syllabus conforming to their own principles

The Taliban have stated that they wish to establish a pure Islamic state Intheir view this means that women have no place in the public arena Theyare required to stay at home and take care of their husbands and childrenThe Taliban cling to the symbol of a protected woman Women have toobserve a strict dress code wearing a burqa (a garment covering the bodyfrom head to toe) and trousers fully covering their ankles While women hadworn burqa in the pre-Taliban era it had not been an enforced dress code

The Talibanrsquos edicts have had a severe impact on many other women whodo not have a close male relative to accompany them in public Hardest hithave been the countryrsquos estimated 30000 widows many of whom are thesole providers for their families Some widows have been allowed to work inareas under the Taliban control but even for them it is not easy to get permis-sion According to Taliban representatives the current restrictions are said tobe necessary because females are not safe outside their homes Many womenhave strongly reacted to the Taliban policies despite the restrictive climate inTaliban-controlled areas These women do not like what the Taliban havebeen professing They want to work and continue with their education butthese rights are being denied to them The justifications given by Taliban arenot acceptable to the working and more enlightened urban Afghan women Itis therefore not surprising that women have become the most vocal critics ofthe Taliban

The edicts against women also have predictably had a devastating impacton primary level education Before the civil war over four-fifths of primaryschool teachers were women The majority of them are now jobless Theclosure of schools has in turn affected children Many orphaned childrenwho once could make homes at schools are now forced to live on the streetsAn international aid group in 1998 estimated 28000 street children in Kabulalone

Mullah Nuruddin Turabi the Taliban minister of justice defended theTalibanrsquos domestic actions He said ldquoIt is not just a question of men wearingbeards and women wearing burqas In Afghanistan every vice has to bestopped and every virtue promulgatedrdquo10 The Taliban have established anew security service the Ministry of Enforcement of Virtue and Suppressionof Vice for eradicating corruption and other vices from Afghan society Ac-

10 Michael Fathers ldquoFrozen in Timerdquo Time May 2000

NASREEN GHUFRAN 477

cording to Taliban tenets their rules are a jihad (holy war) against sin cor-ruption and cruelty Therefore those who do not abide by the Taliban edictson personal behavior are strictly punished according to a strict application ofIslamic law Hence stoning to death amputations (in case of robbery) andother forms of punishments are carried out in front of large crowds

Nonetheless a crisis of governance remains in Afghanistan To supportersof the Taliban regime its government is one that is accountable and represen-tative of all ethnic groups To many the Taliban have restored Afghan cul-ture Afghan-style self-rule has been implemented in the provinces and theTalibanrsquos supporters note that the countryrsquos civil administration and justicesystem are now based on Islamic and Afghan traditions The opposition re-jects this opinion and condemns the Taliban government of being unrepre-sentative and unaccountable

While all the above-mentioned structures are functioning the governmentfaces tremendous challenges The most obvious one is the governmentrsquosunacceptability to and lack of recognition from the international system letalone by the opposition The political dealings that the government has hadwith others offer evidence of its credibility in the civil war While theTaliban have major control of the countryrsquos land area they have not yet hadmuch success on the political front Forming a government is not enough toend the civil war the Taliban must gain acceptability both at home andabroad

The Talibanrsquos International Legal StatusRecognition of a government in a civil war also helps in ending the conflictbecause both parties involved desire the political economic and militarysupport that can come with it Non-recognition of the Taliban government isan indicator of its standing in the international community The recognitionhas not been forthcoming because of dissatisfaction with Taliban policiesUpon taking Kabul the Taliban had immediately demanded from other statesformal recognition as the only legitimate government of Afghanistan Theyalso demanded to be granted a seat in the UN General Assembly Howeverthey received neither So far only Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UnitedArab Emirates (UAE) have recognized the Taliban government In contrastBurhanuddin Rabbanirsquos Northern Alliance regime despite its weak militaryposition has legitimacy and political backing from the world communityincluding the majority of the Islamic states Most countries preserved thestatus quo and continued to allow the diplomatic missions of the Rabbaniregime

Recognition in international law involves acceptance by a state of a givenentity that this recognized entity possesses an international legal personalityand the rights and privileges that flow from it or that it is the exclusive

478 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

representative of a body with international legal personality The decision togrant or not to grant recognition is a political one within the sovereign discre-tion of individual states Recognition in principle can be accorded to states orgovernments As far as the state of Afghanistan itself is concerned it hasbeen recognized by a large number of countries including all permanentmembers of the UN Security Council for many years However wherepolitical power has fragmented to the extent that it has in Afghanistan inrecent years there may well be more than one group claiming to be the gov-ernment In fact as has been outlined already there are two governmentswithin one country One is militarily strong and controls a large populationand territory but has no legal standing while the other is recognized but hasless control of Afghan territory

Pakistan was the first country to grant international recognition to theTalibanrsquos government Their past links provided the basis for doing so Asnoted earlier virtually all of the Taliban leadership had been refugees in Pa-kistan For several years Taliban leaders studied in the madrasas (religiousschools) affiliated with the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) headed by MaulviFazul ur Rehman Although it has not been conclusively proven that theTaliban are Pakistanrsquos creation much criticism along these lines and othershas been leveled against it Pakistan is said to have played a key role inturning Taliban into a functioning military force by providing training logis-tical support and equipment

In 1997 Pakistan rooted its decision to recognize the Taliban governmentbased on the fact that the latter was in effective control of most of Afghani-stanrsquos territory including the capital By the time recognition was given theTaliban government occupied 90 of Afghanistan and oversaw a populationthat was representative of all of the countryrsquos ethnic groups Since then Paki-stan has been striving to propagate a positive image of the student militia andworking to induce other neighboring countries to recognize them Further-more Pakistan has been making persistent attempts to get the UN to adoptthe vacant seat formula which the Organization of Islamic Conferences haddone during 1996

Pakistanrsquos ties with the Taliban have become increasingly complex owingto the influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan Pakistanmdasha country of 140million mostly poor peoplemdashhas been almost single-handedly housing andfeeding the 12 million Afghan refugees living there since 1995 the year theUN stopped providing food and housing aid Some of the Afghan refugeescurrently in Pakistan have been there since the 1980s having fled the Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan At the time an estimated 32 million refugees livedin Pakistan making it the largest caseload of refugees in the world

Some of the refugees did return to Afghanistan In 1994 approximately77000 went back with the assistance of the UN High Commission for Refu-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 479

gees (UNHCR) An additional 76000 refugees returned to Afghanistan ontheir own11 However the years since then have seen a new wave of refu-gees flowing into Pakistan from northern Afghanistan Many of the freshrefugees are fleeing the fighting there plus a devastating drought This newwave has not been officially registered with any international organizationAs a consequence the statistics regarding refugees in Pakistan are unreliableAn influx of 30000 Afghan refugees came to Pakistan in 2000 and it is esti-mated that more than 50000 have crossed the border since then In that yearPakistan decided to close its border to stop further refugees because it couldnot absorb any more However its border was later reopened because of thedeplorable condition of the refugees and pressure from international humani-tarian relief agencies

Aside from Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UAE are on the list of countriesrecognizing the Talibanrsquos government Saudi Arabiarsquos came only a few daysafter Pakistanrsquos Until mid-1998 Islamabad and Riyadh were on the samepolitical wavelength Saudi Arabia supplied heavily subsidized fuel to theTaliban through Pakistan and also provided general funding After 1998problems between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan developed over the fate ofOsama bin Laden the Saudi millionaire who had been funding the Afghanjihad The Taliban had promised Saudi Arabia that Osama bin Laden wouldnot use his refuge in Afghanistan to support any acts of violence abroadAfter Osama bin Laden was linked to the bombings of US embassies inKenya and Tanzania his continued refuge in Afghanistan became a majorsource of tension between Taliban and the US on one hand and Saudi Ara-bia on the other

Apart from these three countries the Taliban have not managed to estab-lish political ties with other states This becomes a major constraint for agovernment of a country going through civil war If the paramount objectiveis to end the civil war the government has to direct its energies in this direc-tion It cannot expect the US or other countries to come to its rescue

The United States has been a major country involved in AfghanistanAlong with the Soviets the US had fed the civil war since the days of thecold war When Taliban captured Kabul the US State Department an-nounced it would establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban by sendingan official to Kabul This announcement was quickly retracted The StateDepartment spokesman Glyn Davies said the US found nothing objectiona-ble in the steps taken by the Taliban to impose Islamic law and described theTaliban as anti-modern rather than anti-Western Some members of Con-

11 Nasreen Ghufran ldquoRefugees A Comparative Study of India and Pakistanrdquo (paperpresented at the conference ldquoThe Challenge of Cooperation South Asia and Beyondrdquo Kath-mandu Nepal December 1998)

480 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

gress supported the Taliban because their government appeared to serve theUS policy of isolating Iran A Taliban regime would create a firmly Sunnibuffer on Iranrsquos border and potentially provide security for trade routes andpipelines that would break Iranrsquos monopoly on Central Asiarsquos southern traderoutes

But from its initial policy of acquiescence vis-a-vis the Taliban the USmoved to the other extreme of rejecting them completely The US rejectionwas largely because of the pressure exerted by the feminist movement Theprominent feminist Zieba-Shorish Shamley persuaded many US feministgroups to spearhead a signature campaign to mobilize support for Afghanwomen Her efforts helped persuade former President Clinton to take atougher stance against the Taliban12 Washingtonrsquos denouncement of theTaliban also came in the backdrop of the presidential election in the US assupporting a regime that held no respect for human rights would have nega-tively affected Clintonrsquos position13

In 1998 when the Taliban made great military gains against the forces ofthe North they expected to gain recognition and a seat in the UN they hadmajor Afghan cities under their control and their rivals in retreat Talibanrepresentatives claimed that if recognition were granted to their governmentthey would allow a huge pipeline project to proceed that would carry oil andgas from Central Asia to lucrative markets in Pakistan and India This pipe-line would cut through the western part of Afghanistan ldquoEven before thecapture of Mazar-i-Sharif and Taloqan we were fully qualified for recogni-tionrdquo said deputy information minister Abdur Rahman Hotaki referring totwo key opposition bases captured by the militia ldquoThe opposition gave peo-ple an excuse to deny us recognition and prevent us having the pipeline runthrough our country but that excuse has now gonerdquo he said ldquoAll excusesblocking our recognition are gone Therefore it is predicted they will revisetheir policy in view of the current realitiesrdquo he said adding that all ldquotermsand conditions for a legitimate staterdquo have been met14

But the Taliban encountered problems with international organizations In1999 the UN proposed imposing sanctions against the Taliban when it is-sued Security Council Resolution 1267 Adopted unanimously by the Secur-ity Council on October 15 the resolution demanded that the Taliban turn overOsama bin Laden without further delay to authorities in a country where hewill be brought to justice Until the Taliban comply the resolution requiresUN member states to deny permission for Taliban-owned -leased or -oper-ated aircraft to land in or take off from their territory It also calls for the

12 Rashid Taliban pp 180ndash8213 P Stobodan ldquoThe Afghan Conflict and Regional Securityrdquo Strategic Analysis (August

1999) p 72414 Frontier Post (Peshawar) January 14 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 481

freezing of funds and other financial resources including funds derived fromproperty owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban The lat-ter had 30 days in which to comply with this resolution before sanctions wereimposed The Taliban did not comply and the sanctions came into force

Another round of sanctions was imposed on the Taliban in December 2000with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1333 The new sanc-tions called for an arms embargo on the Taliban including foreign militaryassistance It also imposed a ban on travel by the militiarsquos senior leaders abroader flight ban than the one imposed last year to force bin Ladenrsquos surren-der measures to close all Taliban offices overseas and a ban on exports toTaliban areas of acetic anhydride used to manufacture heroin Finally it alsofroze funds and other financial assets of Osama bin Laden and individualsand entities associated with him Mullah Omar reacted to this round of sanc-tions by saying his government would not back out from its stand and princi-ples even if the entire world turned against them15

The continuation of these sanctions has pushed the issue of recognition tothe backburner However the international community is also paying a pricefor not recognizing the legitimacy of the Taliban One of the principal areasin which the Taliban could provide some assistance is in the containment ofthe production of poppy Mullah Omar on several occasions emphasized hiswill to fight against opium production However it has been difficult tomaintain such policy postures in the wake of external sanctions As a resultin 1999 over 90983 hectares of poppies yielded a harvest of over 4581 tonsof dry opium an estimated 70 increase in production over the previousyearrsquos figure

The international sanctions have also affected the incentives of local farm-ers to turn away from poppy production Afghanistanrsquos socioeconomic situa-tion makes opium production one of the only available economic means foraccess to land labor and credit Currently the Afghan peasantryrsquos heavydependence upon opium production associated with the politico-territorialrealities of a tribal society typified by fragile political allegiances is makingit difficult for the Taliban to make any serious attempts at eradication16

Additionally any Taliban attempt to implement a poppy eradication policywill be severely compromised by the governmentrsquos international non-recog-nition This places restrictions on the options open to the government Eventhe UN Drug Control Program cannot legally reach any formal agreementwith the Taliban government as long as the latter is not internationally recog-nized The Taliban government faces a self-imposed catch-22 situation Its

15 Ibid16 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy ldquoTalibanrsquos Drug Dilemma Opium Production vs International

Recognitionrdquo The Analyst (Paris) (1999)

482 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

political policies and actions are deemed unacceptable by the internationalcommunity yet it cannot pursue any eradication policy with any hope ofcomplete success without the international recognition and aid that are beingdenied it owing to those policies and actions17

Future Prospects for Change in theTalibanrsquos Regime

Since 1996 the Taliban have been striving to bring the civil war to a success-ful conclusion Their domestic policies have brought about alienation andcreated fissures within the Afghan society Their inflexible stand on variouspolicies has denied them the credibility they so desire Their authoritarianismand intolerance have alienated non-Pushtun Afghans who make up morethan half the population The flow of thousands of extremist Pakistani andArab Taliban supporters into Afghanistan has fueled the resentment of thelocal populace18

The Taliban are accused of harboring terrorists and extremists who notonly support Taliban but also carry out their extremist policies in the targetedcountries According to a report that appeared in the Far Eastern EconomicReview (FEER) Afghanistan has become a sanctuary for ldquoarmed insurgentsaccused of terrorist attacks in China Iran Uzbekistan Tajikistan and Paki-stanrdquo Some 400 Arab Islamic militants from a dozen Middle Eastern andAfrican countries are said to be part of the 055 Brigade funded by Osama binLaden and fighting alongside Taliban in the current offensive The articlefurther noted that ldquo[t]he diverse groups have their own agendas mainly fo-cused on undermining the regimes at home but some share bin Ladenrsquos zealfor a global Islamic revolution The resulting web of dangerous friendshipsthreatens to export instability throughout the mineral-rich and commerciallyunder-exploited hinterland of Central Asiardquo19

It is obvious that the Taliban must improve their image both at home andabroad as perceptions play an important role in the general acceptability ornon-acceptability of governments in both arenas Currently the Taliban areperceived primarily as a negative element that is unlikely to play any positiverole in resolving the Afghan conflict If they fail in their goal the Afghannation will lose any trust that religious political forces could play any mean-ingful role in resolving the ongoing conflict The Talibanrsquos fate will be more

17 At the time of writing the Taliban were not cooperating in poppy eradication Currentlyit appears this may have changed The Taliban claim to have completely eradicated poppy pro-duction in the areas dominated by their troops and the claim is being verified under UN aus-pices

18 Peter Tomsen ldquoResponse A Chance for Peace in AfghanistanmdashThe Talibanrsquos Days areNumberedrdquo Foreign Affairs 79 (JanuaryndashFebruary 2000) p 179

19 Ahmed Rashid ldquoAfghanistan Heart of Darknessrdquo FEER August 5 1999

NASREEN GHUFRAN 483

or less the same as that which befell the mujahideen if they do not take timelyand corrective measures to improve Afghanistanrsquos deteriorating situation

The Taliban gained support from most of the populace in the beginningbecause they offered themselves a neutral force and declared their intentionto remain so However they are no longer neutral and have become anotherparty to the conflict Their policies have not only infuriated the internationalpublic but also large sections of the Afghan community The large influxesof Afghan refugees into Pakistan reflect the growing disagreement with theirpolicies This disenchantment is unlikely to change if the Taliban do notmoderate their stance The Taliban of course believe their policies to be im-portant for bringing about the change they desire but they do not realize howmuch these policies have alienated people The international community hasexplicitly voiced its criticism of the Taliban regime and consider it to be aliving nightmare for women political dissidents and anyone else who doesnot submit to the laws under the authority of the Ministry for the Fostering ofVirtue and Suppression of Vice The Taliban movement itself came about asa reaction to the self-seeking and self-destructive policies of the mujahideenwhose pretensions to Islam and leadership were discredited It was in thisideological vacuum and a Hobbesian state of anarchy that made the Talibanrsquosrule palatable to common Afghanis20 But if the Talibanrsquos government doesnot soften its present policies and complete peace is not restored it will notbe too late for the common people to turn against them

The year 2001 has seen universal outrage at the offensive launched by theTaliban rulers against Afghanistanrsquos Buddhist past Condemnation has notremained confined to non-Muslim states several Islamic countries includingPakistan have been appalled by the destruction of Buddhist statues in theprovince of Bamiyan Pakistan sent an official delegation whose aim was toprevent the Taliban from destroying the statues Pakistanrsquos foreign ministerAbdul Sattar said ldquoCertainly we believe it was a mistake a blunder and as aresult Afghanistan will suffer consequences for years to comerdquo To this headded that ldquoit is very difficult for me to make a statement as to why they didnot hearrdquo21 Iran likewise strongly condemned the statuesrsquo destruction Astatement released by Iranrsquos Cultural Heritage Organization wondered whyldquocertain Taliban-led individuals calling themselves lsquoclericrsquo have ordered de-struction of ancient sites of the mankind society citing blasphemy and idoliz-

20 Hafeez Malik ldquoPakistan Islam and the Taliban Phenomenonrdquo News International (Paki-stan) June 9 2000

21 Sattarrsquos remarks are in ibid March 11 2001

484 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

ing as reasonsrdquo22 To prevent their destruction Iran even offered to buy thestatues or move them into safekeeping

However the Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil rejectedany offer to prevent the destruction of the statues His negotiations with Pa-kistan did not bear a positive result and he rejected the Iranian offers reiterat-ing that the presence of the statues conflicted with Islamic teaching In thewake of the Talibanrsquos subsequent actions Iran led a UN initiative to takeserious action against the regime Commenting on the statuesrsquo destructionthe Iranian Foreign Ministry stated ldquoUnfortunately the Talibanrsquos destructionof the statues has cast doubts on the comprehensive views offered by Islamicideology in the world Clearly Muslims across the world pin the blame onthe rigid-minded Taliban and by no means embroil the Afghan Muslims inthis counter-cultural moverdquo23

The Bamiyan incident stirred up dual controversies about both the charac-ter of the Taliban regime and the relationship between culture religion andnational heritage in an Islamic state In his characteristic style Mullah Omarshrugged off all objections to the planned destruction of the Buddhist statuessaying ldquomy job is the implementation of Islamic orderrdquo He invoked Islamiclaw a fatwa issued by the Afghan ulama associated with this regime and thedecision of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to support his decision24

Nonetheless the destruction of the statues has further tarnished the Talibanrsquosimage While it may be the case that the Taliban undertook their actions inreaction to the tough sanctions imposed on them by the world the Talibanhave to realize that they are not going to earn any international sympathy orrecognition

Afghanistan has always been important to external powers due to its strate-gic location They have meddled in its affairs both in the past and at presentThe protracted civil war makes it more vulnerable to external penetration Insuch situations it has no other option but to seek help and support fromoutside The external powers are more than willing to do so if it serves theirnational interest The opposition is likely to adopt a similar strategy as theyhave less access to the resources of the country than the ruling authority Hadthere been no external involvement Afghanistanrsquos extended civil war wouldnot have become the protracted and complicated affair that it is

The Afghan civil war has important regional implications Various exter-nal powers are pursuing divergent objectives in Afghanistan and the outcome

22 Cultural Heritage Organization comment is in Iran News (Tehran) March 1 2001 Thisnews item is distributed via Middle East News Online available at lthttpwwwmiddleeastwirecomgt

23 Comments of the Iranian Foreign Ministry reported by the BBC World Service March 52001

24 Rahimullah Yusufzai ldquoA Question of Tolerancerdquo News International March 4 2001

476 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

cation The Taliban claim that they need time and resources to create theproper environment and right texts and curriculum for womenrsquos educationThe Talibanrsquos behavior is modeled after the Islamic revolution in Iran Edu-cational establishments remained closed for many years in the aftermath ofthat revolution They remained closed until the Iranian revolutionaries for-mally established an educational syllabus conforming to their own principles

The Taliban have stated that they wish to establish a pure Islamic state Intheir view this means that women have no place in the public arena Theyare required to stay at home and take care of their husbands and childrenThe Taliban cling to the symbol of a protected woman Women have toobserve a strict dress code wearing a burqa (a garment covering the bodyfrom head to toe) and trousers fully covering their ankles While women hadworn burqa in the pre-Taliban era it had not been an enforced dress code

The Talibanrsquos edicts have had a severe impact on many other women whodo not have a close male relative to accompany them in public Hardest hithave been the countryrsquos estimated 30000 widows many of whom are thesole providers for their families Some widows have been allowed to work inareas under the Taliban control but even for them it is not easy to get permis-sion According to Taliban representatives the current restrictions are said tobe necessary because females are not safe outside their homes Many womenhave strongly reacted to the Taliban policies despite the restrictive climate inTaliban-controlled areas These women do not like what the Taliban havebeen professing They want to work and continue with their education butthese rights are being denied to them The justifications given by Taliban arenot acceptable to the working and more enlightened urban Afghan women Itis therefore not surprising that women have become the most vocal critics ofthe Taliban

The edicts against women also have predictably had a devastating impacton primary level education Before the civil war over four-fifths of primaryschool teachers were women The majority of them are now jobless Theclosure of schools has in turn affected children Many orphaned childrenwho once could make homes at schools are now forced to live on the streetsAn international aid group in 1998 estimated 28000 street children in Kabulalone

Mullah Nuruddin Turabi the Taliban minister of justice defended theTalibanrsquos domestic actions He said ldquoIt is not just a question of men wearingbeards and women wearing burqas In Afghanistan every vice has to bestopped and every virtue promulgatedrdquo10 The Taliban have established anew security service the Ministry of Enforcement of Virtue and Suppressionof Vice for eradicating corruption and other vices from Afghan society Ac-

10 Michael Fathers ldquoFrozen in Timerdquo Time May 2000

NASREEN GHUFRAN 477

cording to Taliban tenets their rules are a jihad (holy war) against sin cor-ruption and cruelty Therefore those who do not abide by the Taliban edictson personal behavior are strictly punished according to a strict application ofIslamic law Hence stoning to death amputations (in case of robbery) andother forms of punishments are carried out in front of large crowds

Nonetheless a crisis of governance remains in Afghanistan To supportersof the Taliban regime its government is one that is accountable and represen-tative of all ethnic groups To many the Taliban have restored Afghan cul-ture Afghan-style self-rule has been implemented in the provinces and theTalibanrsquos supporters note that the countryrsquos civil administration and justicesystem are now based on Islamic and Afghan traditions The opposition re-jects this opinion and condemns the Taliban government of being unrepre-sentative and unaccountable

While all the above-mentioned structures are functioning the governmentfaces tremendous challenges The most obvious one is the governmentrsquosunacceptability to and lack of recognition from the international system letalone by the opposition The political dealings that the government has hadwith others offer evidence of its credibility in the civil war While theTaliban have major control of the countryrsquos land area they have not yet hadmuch success on the political front Forming a government is not enough toend the civil war the Taliban must gain acceptability both at home andabroad

The Talibanrsquos International Legal StatusRecognition of a government in a civil war also helps in ending the conflictbecause both parties involved desire the political economic and militarysupport that can come with it Non-recognition of the Taliban government isan indicator of its standing in the international community The recognitionhas not been forthcoming because of dissatisfaction with Taliban policiesUpon taking Kabul the Taliban had immediately demanded from other statesformal recognition as the only legitimate government of Afghanistan Theyalso demanded to be granted a seat in the UN General Assembly Howeverthey received neither So far only Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UnitedArab Emirates (UAE) have recognized the Taliban government In contrastBurhanuddin Rabbanirsquos Northern Alliance regime despite its weak militaryposition has legitimacy and political backing from the world communityincluding the majority of the Islamic states Most countries preserved thestatus quo and continued to allow the diplomatic missions of the Rabbaniregime

Recognition in international law involves acceptance by a state of a givenentity that this recognized entity possesses an international legal personalityand the rights and privileges that flow from it or that it is the exclusive

478 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

representative of a body with international legal personality The decision togrant or not to grant recognition is a political one within the sovereign discre-tion of individual states Recognition in principle can be accorded to states orgovernments As far as the state of Afghanistan itself is concerned it hasbeen recognized by a large number of countries including all permanentmembers of the UN Security Council for many years However wherepolitical power has fragmented to the extent that it has in Afghanistan inrecent years there may well be more than one group claiming to be the gov-ernment In fact as has been outlined already there are two governmentswithin one country One is militarily strong and controls a large populationand territory but has no legal standing while the other is recognized but hasless control of Afghan territory

Pakistan was the first country to grant international recognition to theTalibanrsquos government Their past links provided the basis for doing so Asnoted earlier virtually all of the Taliban leadership had been refugees in Pa-kistan For several years Taliban leaders studied in the madrasas (religiousschools) affiliated with the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) headed by MaulviFazul ur Rehman Although it has not been conclusively proven that theTaliban are Pakistanrsquos creation much criticism along these lines and othershas been leveled against it Pakistan is said to have played a key role inturning Taliban into a functioning military force by providing training logis-tical support and equipment

In 1997 Pakistan rooted its decision to recognize the Taliban governmentbased on the fact that the latter was in effective control of most of Afghani-stanrsquos territory including the capital By the time recognition was given theTaliban government occupied 90 of Afghanistan and oversaw a populationthat was representative of all of the countryrsquos ethnic groups Since then Paki-stan has been striving to propagate a positive image of the student militia andworking to induce other neighboring countries to recognize them Further-more Pakistan has been making persistent attempts to get the UN to adoptthe vacant seat formula which the Organization of Islamic Conferences haddone during 1996

Pakistanrsquos ties with the Taliban have become increasingly complex owingto the influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan Pakistanmdasha country of 140million mostly poor peoplemdashhas been almost single-handedly housing andfeeding the 12 million Afghan refugees living there since 1995 the year theUN stopped providing food and housing aid Some of the Afghan refugeescurrently in Pakistan have been there since the 1980s having fled the Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan At the time an estimated 32 million refugees livedin Pakistan making it the largest caseload of refugees in the world

Some of the refugees did return to Afghanistan In 1994 approximately77000 went back with the assistance of the UN High Commission for Refu-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 479

gees (UNHCR) An additional 76000 refugees returned to Afghanistan ontheir own11 However the years since then have seen a new wave of refu-gees flowing into Pakistan from northern Afghanistan Many of the freshrefugees are fleeing the fighting there plus a devastating drought This newwave has not been officially registered with any international organizationAs a consequence the statistics regarding refugees in Pakistan are unreliableAn influx of 30000 Afghan refugees came to Pakistan in 2000 and it is esti-mated that more than 50000 have crossed the border since then In that yearPakistan decided to close its border to stop further refugees because it couldnot absorb any more However its border was later reopened because of thedeplorable condition of the refugees and pressure from international humani-tarian relief agencies

Aside from Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UAE are on the list of countriesrecognizing the Talibanrsquos government Saudi Arabiarsquos came only a few daysafter Pakistanrsquos Until mid-1998 Islamabad and Riyadh were on the samepolitical wavelength Saudi Arabia supplied heavily subsidized fuel to theTaliban through Pakistan and also provided general funding After 1998problems between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan developed over the fate ofOsama bin Laden the Saudi millionaire who had been funding the Afghanjihad The Taliban had promised Saudi Arabia that Osama bin Laden wouldnot use his refuge in Afghanistan to support any acts of violence abroadAfter Osama bin Laden was linked to the bombings of US embassies inKenya and Tanzania his continued refuge in Afghanistan became a majorsource of tension between Taliban and the US on one hand and Saudi Ara-bia on the other

Apart from these three countries the Taliban have not managed to estab-lish political ties with other states This becomes a major constraint for agovernment of a country going through civil war If the paramount objectiveis to end the civil war the government has to direct its energies in this direc-tion It cannot expect the US or other countries to come to its rescue

The United States has been a major country involved in AfghanistanAlong with the Soviets the US had fed the civil war since the days of thecold war When Taliban captured Kabul the US State Department an-nounced it would establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban by sendingan official to Kabul This announcement was quickly retracted The StateDepartment spokesman Glyn Davies said the US found nothing objectiona-ble in the steps taken by the Taliban to impose Islamic law and described theTaliban as anti-modern rather than anti-Western Some members of Con-

11 Nasreen Ghufran ldquoRefugees A Comparative Study of India and Pakistanrdquo (paperpresented at the conference ldquoThe Challenge of Cooperation South Asia and Beyondrdquo Kath-mandu Nepal December 1998)

480 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

gress supported the Taliban because their government appeared to serve theUS policy of isolating Iran A Taliban regime would create a firmly Sunnibuffer on Iranrsquos border and potentially provide security for trade routes andpipelines that would break Iranrsquos monopoly on Central Asiarsquos southern traderoutes

But from its initial policy of acquiescence vis-a-vis the Taliban the USmoved to the other extreme of rejecting them completely The US rejectionwas largely because of the pressure exerted by the feminist movement Theprominent feminist Zieba-Shorish Shamley persuaded many US feministgroups to spearhead a signature campaign to mobilize support for Afghanwomen Her efforts helped persuade former President Clinton to take atougher stance against the Taliban12 Washingtonrsquos denouncement of theTaliban also came in the backdrop of the presidential election in the US assupporting a regime that held no respect for human rights would have nega-tively affected Clintonrsquos position13

In 1998 when the Taliban made great military gains against the forces ofthe North they expected to gain recognition and a seat in the UN they hadmajor Afghan cities under their control and their rivals in retreat Talibanrepresentatives claimed that if recognition were granted to their governmentthey would allow a huge pipeline project to proceed that would carry oil andgas from Central Asia to lucrative markets in Pakistan and India This pipe-line would cut through the western part of Afghanistan ldquoEven before thecapture of Mazar-i-Sharif and Taloqan we were fully qualified for recogni-tionrdquo said deputy information minister Abdur Rahman Hotaki referring totwo key opposition bases captured by the militia ldquoThe opposition gave peo-ple an excuse to deny us recognition and prevent us having the pipeline runthrough our country but that excuse has now gonerdquo he said ldquoAll excusesblocking our recognition are gone Therefore it is predicted they will revisetheir policy in view of the current realitiesrdquo he said adding that all ldquotermsand conditions for a legitimate staterdquo have been met14

But the Taliban encountered problems with international organizations In1999 the UN proposed imposing sanctions against the Taliban when it is-sued Security Council Resolution 1267 Adopted unanimously by the Secur-ity Council on October 15 the resolution demanded that the Taliban turn overOsama bin Laden without further delay to authorities in a country where hewill be brought to justice Until the Taliban comply the resolution requiresUN member states to deny permission for Taliban-owned -leased or -oper-ated aircraft to land in or take off from their territory It also calls for the

12 Rashid Taliban pp 180ndash8213 P Stobodan ldquoThe Afghan Conflict and Regional Securityrdquo Strategic Analysis (August

1999) p 72414 Frontier Post (Peshawar) January 14 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 481

freezing of funds and other financial resources including funds derived fromproperty owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban The lat-ter had 30 days in which to comply with this resolution before sanctions wereimposed The Taliban did not comply and the sanctions came into force

Another round of sanctions was imposed on the Taliban in December 2000with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1333 The new sanc-tions called for an arms embargo on the Taliban including foreign militaryassistance It also imposed a ban on travel by the militiarsquos senior leaders abroader flight ban than the one imposed last year to force bin Ladenrsquos surren-der measures to close all Taliban offices overseas and a ban on exports toTaliban areas of acetic anhydride used to manufacture heroin Finally it alsofroze funds and other financial assets of Osama bin Laden and individualsand entities associated with him Mullah Omar reacted to this round of sanc-tions by saying his government would not back out from its stand and princi-ples even if the entire world turned against them15

The continuation of these sanctions has pushed the issue of recognition tothe backburner However the international community is also paying a pricefor not recognizing the legitimacy of the Taliban One of the principal areasin which the Taliban could provide some assistance is in the containment ofthe production of poppy Mullah Omar on several occasions emphasized hiswill to fight against opium production However it has been difficult tomaintain such policy postures in the wake of external sanctions As a resultin 1999 over 90983 hectares of poppies yielded a harvest of over 4581 tonsof dry opium an estimated 70 increase in production over the previousyearrsquos figure

The international sanctions have also affected the incentives of local farm-ers to turn away from poppy production Afghanistanrsquos socioeconomic situa-tion makes opium production one of the only available economic means foraccess to land labor and credit Currently the Afghan peasantryrsquos heavydependence upon opium production associated with the politico-territorialrealities of a tribal society typified by fragile political allegiances is makingit difficult for the Taliban to make any serious attempts at eradication16

Additionally any Taliban attempt to implement a poppy eradication policywill be severely compromised by the governmentrsquos international non-recog-nition This places restrictions on the options open to the government Eventhe UN Drug Control Program cannot legally reach any formal agreementwith the Taliban government as long as the latter is not internationally recog-nized The Taliban government faces a self-imposed catch-22 situation Its

15 Ibid16 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy ldquoTalibanrsquos Drug Dilemma Opium Production vs International

Recognitionrdquo The Analyst (Paris) (1999)

482 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

political policies and actions are deemed unacceptable by the internationalcommunity yet it cannot pursue any eradication policy with any hope ofcomplete success without the international recognition and aid that are beingdenied it owing to those policies and actions17

Future Prospects for Change in theTalibanrsquos Regime

Since 1996 the Taliban have been striving to bring the civil war to a success-ful conclusion Their domestic policies have brought about alienation andcreated fissures within the Afghan society Their inflexible stand on variouspolicies has denied them the credibility they so desire Their authoritarianismand intolerance have alienated non-Pushtun Afghans who make up morethan half the population The flow of thousands of extremist Pakistani andArab Taliban supporters into Afghanistan has fueled the resentment of thelocal populace18

The Taliban are accused of harboring terrorists and extremists who notonly support Taliban but also carry out their extremist policies in the targetedcountries According to a report that appeared in the Far Eastern EconomicReview (FEER) Afghanistan has become a sanctuary for ldquoarmed insurgentsaccused of terrorist attacks in China Iran Uzbekistan Tajikistan and Paki-stanrdquo Some 400 Arab Islamic militants from a dozen Middle Eastern andAfrican countries are said to be part of the 055 Brigade funded by Osama binLaden and fighting alongside Taliban in the current offensive The articlefurther noted that ldquo[t]he diverse groups have their own agendas mainly fo-cused on undermining the regimes at home but some share bin Ladenrsquos zealfor a global Islamic revolution The resulting web of dangerous friendshipsthreatens to export instability throughout the mineral-rich and commerciallyunder-exploited hinterland of Central Asiardquo19

It is obvious that the Taliban must improve their image both at home andabroad as perceptions play an important role in the general acceptability ornon-acceptability of governments in both arenas Currently the Taliban areperceived primarily as a negative element that is unlikely to play any positiverole in resolving the Afghan conflict If they fail in their goal the Afghannation will lose any trust that religious political forces could play any mean-ingful role in resolving the ongoing conflict The Talibanrsquos fate will be more

17 At the time of writing the Taliban were not cooperating in poppy eradication Currentlyit appears this may have changed The Taliban claim to have completely eradicated poppy pro-duction in the areas dominated by their troops and the claim is being verified under UN aus-pices

18 Peter Tomsen ldquoResponse A Chance for Peace in AfghanistanmdashThe Talibanrsquos Days areNumberedrdquo Foreign Affairs 79 (JanuaryndashFebruary 2000) p 179

19 Ahmed Rashid ldquoAfghanistan Heart of Darknessrdquo FEER August 5 1999

NASREEN GHUFRAN 483

or less the same as that which befell the mujahideen if they do not take timelyand corrective measures to improve Afghanistanrsquos deteriorating situation

The Taliban gained support from most of the populace in the beginningbecause they offered themselves a neutral force and declared their intentionto remain so However they are no longer neutral and have become anotherparty to the conflict Their policies have not only infuriated the internationalpublic but also large sections of the Afghan community The large influxesof Afghan refugees into Pakistan reflect the growing disagreement with theirpolicies This disenchantment is unlikely to change if the Taliban do notmoderate their stance The Taliban of course believe their policies to be im-portant for bringing about the change they desire but they do not realize howmuch these policies have alienated people The international community hasexplicitly voiced its criticism of the Taliban regime and consider it to be aliving nightmare for women political dissidents and anyone else who doesnot submit to the laws under the authority of the Ministry for the Fostering ofVirtue and Suppression of Vice The Taliban movement itself came about asa reaction to the self-seeking and self-destructive policies of the mujahideenwhose pretensions to Islam and leadership were discredited It was in thisideological vacuum and a Hobbesian state of anarchy that made the Talibanrsquosrule palatable to common Afghanis20 But if the Talibanrsquos government doesnot soften its present policies and complete peace is not restored it will notbe too late for the common people to turn against them

The year 2001 has seen universal outrage at the offensive launched by theTaliban rulers against Afghanistanrsquos Buddhist past Condemnation has notremained confined to non-Muslim states several Islamic countries includingPakistan have been appalled by the destruction of Buddhist statues in theprovince of Bamiyan Pakistan sent an official delegation whose aim was toprevent the Taliban from destroying the statues Pakistanrsquos foreign ministerAbdul Sattar said ldquoCertainly we believe it was a mistake a blunder and as aresult Afghanistan will suffer consequences for years to comerdquo To this headded that ldquoit is very difficult for me to make a statement as to why they didnot hearrdquo21 Iran likewise strongly condemned the statuesrsquo destruction Astatement released by Iranrsquos Cultural Heritage Organization wondered whyldquocertain Taliban-led individuals calling themselves lsquoclericrsquo have ordered de-struction of ancient sites of the mankind society citing blasphemy and idoliz-

20 Hafeez Malik ldquoPakistan Islam and the Taliban Phenomenonrdquo News International (Paki-stan) June 9 2000

21 Sattarrsquos remarks are in ibid March 11 2001

484 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

ing as reasonsrdquo22 To prevent their destruction Iran even offered to buy thestatues or move them into safekeeping

However the Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil rejectedany offer to prevent the destruction of the statues His negotiations with Pa-kistan did not bear a positive result and he rejected the Iranian offers reiterat-ing that the presence of the statues conflicted with Islamic teaching In thewake of the Talibanrsquos subsequent actions Iran led a UN initiative to takeserious action against the regime Commenting on the statuesrsquo destructionthe Iranian Foreign Ministry stated ldquoUnfortunately the Talibanrsquos destructionof the statues has cast doubts on the comprehensive views offered by Islamicideology in the world Clearly Muslims across the world pin the blame onthe rigid-minded Taliban and by no means embroil the Afghan Muslims inthis counter-cultural moverdquo23

The Bamiyan incident stirred up dual controversies about both the charac-ter of the Taliban regime and the relationship between culture religion andnational heritage in an Islamic state In his characteristic style Mullah Omarshrugged off all objections to the planned destruction of the Buddhist statuessaying ldquomy job is the implementation of Islamic orderrdquo He invoked Islamiclaw a fatwa issued by the Afghan ulama associated with this regime and thedecision of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to support his decision24

Nonetheless the destruction of the statues has further tarnished the Talibanrsquosimage While it may be the case that the Taliban undertook their actions inreaction to the tough sanctions imposed on them by the world the Talibanhave to realize that they are not going to earn any international sympathy orrecognition

Afghanistan has always been important to external powers due to its strate-gic location They have meddled in its affairs both in the past and at presentThe protracted civil war makes it more vulnerable to external penetration Insuch situations it has no other option but to seek help and support fromoutside The external powers are more than willing to do so if it serves theirnational interest The opposition is likely to adopt a similar strategy as theyhave less access to the resources of the country than the ruling authority Hadthere been no external involvement Afghanistanrsquos extended civil war wouldnot have become the protracted and complicated affair that it is

The Afghan civil war has important regional implications Various exter-nal powers are pursuing divergent objectives in Afghanistan and the outcome

22 Cultural Heritage Organization comment is in Iran News (Tehran) March 1 2001 Thisnews item is distributed via Middle East News Online available at lthttpwwwmiddleeastwirecomgt

23 Comments of the Iranian Foreign Ministry reported by the BBC World Service March 52001

24 Rahimullah Yusufzai ldquoA Question of Tolerancerdquo News International March 4 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 477

cording to Taliban tenets their rules are a jihad (holy war) against sin cor-ruption and cruelty Therefore those who do not abide by the Taliban edictson personal behavior are strictly punished according to a strict application ofIslamic law Hence stoning to death amputations (in case of robbery) andother forms of punishments are carried out in front of large crowds

Nonetheless a crisis of governance remains in Afghanistan To supportersof the Taliban regime its government is one that is accountable and represen-tative of all ethnic groups To many the Taliban have restored Afghan cul-ture Afghan-style self-rule has been implemented in the provinces and theTalibanrsquos supporters note that the countryrsquos civil administration and justicesystem are now based on Islamic and Afghan traditions The opposition re-jects this opinion and condemns the Taliban government of being unrepre-sentative and unaccountable

While all the above-mentioned structures are functioning the governmentfaces tremendous challenges The most obvious one is the governmentrsquosunacceptability to and lack of recognition from the international system letalone by the opposition The political dealings that the government has hadwith others offer evidence of its credibility in the civil war While theTaliban have major control of the countryrsquos land area they have not yet hadmuch success on the political front Forming a government is not enough toend the civil war the Taliban must gain acceptability both at home andabroad

The Talibanrsquos International Legal StatusRecognition of a government in a civil war also helps in ending the conflictbecause both parties involved desire the political economic and militarysupport that can come with it Non-recognition of the Taliban government isan indicator of its standing in the international community The recognitionhas not been forthcoming because of dissatisfaction with Taliban policiesUpon taking Kabul the Taliban had immediately demanded from other statesformal recognition as the only legitimate government of Afghanistan Theyalso demanded to be granted a seat in the UN General Assembly Howeverthey received neither So far only Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UnitedArab Emirates (UAE) have recognized the Taliban government In contrastBurhanuddin Rabbanirsquos Northern Alliance regime despite its weak militaryposition has legitimacy and political backing from the world communityincluding the majority of the Islamic states Most countries preserved thestatus quo and continued to allow the diplomatic missions of the Rabbaniregime

Recognition in international law involves acceptance by a state of a givenentity that this recognized entity possesses an international legal personalityand the rights and privileges that flow from it or that it is the exclusive

478 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

representative of a body with international legal personality The decision togrant or not to grant recognition is a political one within the sovereign discre-tion of individual states Recognition in principle can be accorded to states orgovernments As far as the state of Afghanistan itself is concerned it hasbeen recognized by a large number of countries including all permanentmembers of the UN Security Council for many years However wherepolitical power has fragmented to the extent that it has in Afghanistan inrecent years there may well be more than one group claiming to be the gov-ernment In fact as has been outlined already there are two governmentswithin one country One is militarily strong and controls a large populationand territory but has no legal standing while the other is recognized but hasless control of Afghan territory

Pakistan was the first country to grant international recognition to theTalibanrsquos government Their past links provided the basis for doing so Asnoted earlier virtually all of the Taliban leadership had been refugees in Pa-kistan For several years Taliban leaders studied in the madrasas (religiousschools) affiliated with the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) headed by MaulviFazul ur Rehman Although it has not been conclusively proven that theTaliban are Pakistanrsquos creation much criticism along these lines and othershas been leveled against it Pakistan is said to have played a key role inturning Taliban into a functioning military force by providing training logis-tical support and equipment

In 1997 Pakistan rooted its decision to recognize the Taliban governmentbased on the fact that the latter was in effective control of most of Afghani-stanrsquos territory including the capital By the time recognition was given theTaliban government occupied 90 of Afghanistan and oversaw a populationthat was representative of all of the countryrsquos ethnic groups Since then Paki-stan has been striving to propagate a positive image of the student militia andworking to induce other neighboring countries to recognize them Further-more Pakistan has been making persistent attempts to get the UN to adoptthe vacant seat formula which the Organization of Islamic Conferences haddone during 1996

Pakistanrsquos ties with the Taliban have become increasingly complex owingto the influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan Pakistanmdasha country of 140million mostly poor peoplemdashhas been almost single-handedly housing andfeeding the 12 million Afghan refugees living there since 1995 the year theUN stopped providing food and housing aid Some of the Afghan refugeescurrently in Pakistan have been there since the 1980s having fled the Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan At the time an estimated 32 million refugees livedin Pakistan making it the largest caseload of refugees in the world

Some of the refugees did return to Afghanistan In 1994 approximately77000 went back with the assistance of the UN High Commission for Refu-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 479

gees (UNHCR) An additional 76000 refugees returned to Afghanistan ontheir own11 However the years since then have seen a new wave of refu-gees flowing into Pakistan from northern Afghanistan Many of the freshrefugees are fleeing the fighting there plus a devastating drought This newwave has not been officially registered with any international organizationAs a consequence the statistics regarding refugees in Pakistan are unreliableAn influx of 30000 Afghan refugees came to Pakistan in 2000 and it is esti-mated that more than 50000 have crossed the border since then In that yearPakistan decided to close its border to stop further refugees because it couldnot absorb any more However its border was later reopened because of thedeplorable condition of the refugees and pressure from international humani-tarian relief agencies

Aside from Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UAE are on the list of countriesrecognizing the Talibanrsquos government Saudi Arabiarsquos came only a few daysafter Pakistanrsquos Until mid-1998 Islamabad and Riyadh were on the samepolitical wavelength Saudi Arabia supplied heavily subsidized fuel to theTaliban through Pakistan and also provided general funding After 1998problems between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan developed over the fate ofOsama bin Laden the Saudi millionaire who had been funding the Afghanjihad The Taliban had promised Saudi Arabia that Osama bin Laden wouldnot use his refuge in Afghanistan to support any acts of violence abroadAfter Osama bin Laden was linked to the bombings of US embassies inKenya and Tanzania his continued refuge in Afghanistan became a majorsource of tension between Taliban and the US on one hand and Saudi Ara-bia on the other

Apart from these three countries the Taliban have not managed to estab-lish political ties with other states This becomes a major constraint for agovernment of a country going through civil war If the paramount objectiveis to end the civil war the government has to direct its energies in this direc-tion It cannot expect the US or other countries to come to its rescue

The United States has been a major country involved in AfghanistanAlong with the Soviets the US had fed the civil war since the days of thecold war When Taliban captured Kabul the US State Department an-nounced it would establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban by sendingan official to Kabul This announcement was quickly retracted The StateDepartment spokesman Glyn Davies said the US found nothing objectiona-ble in the steps taken by the Taliban to impose Islamic law and described theTaliban as anti-modern rather than anti-Western Some members of Con-

11 Nasreen Ghufran ldquoRefugees A Comparative Study of India and Pakistanrdquo (paperpresented at the conference ldquoThe Challenge of Cooperation South Asia and Beyondrdquo Kath-mandu Nepal December 1998)

480 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

gress supported the Taliban because their government appeared to serve theUS policy of isolating Iran A Taliban regime would create a firmly Sunnibuffer on Iranrsquos border and potentially provide security for trade routes andpipelines that would break Iranrsquos monopoly on Central Asiarsquos southern traderoutes

But from its initial policy of acquiescence vis-a-vis the Taliban the USmoved to the other extreme of rejecting them completely The US rejectionwas largely because of the pressure exerted by the feminist movement Theprominent feminist Zieba-Shorish Shamley persuaded many US feministgroups to spearhead a signature campaign to mobilize support for Afghanwomen Her efforts helped persuade former President Clinton to take atougher stance against the Taliban12 Washingtonrsquos denouncement of theTaliban also came in the backdrop of the presidential election in the US assupporting a regime that held no respect for human rights would have nega-tively affected Clintonrsquos position13

In 1998 when the Taliban made great military gains against the forces ofthe North they expected to gain recognition and a seat in the UN they hadmajor Afghan cities under their control and their rivals in retreat Talibanrepresentatives claimed that if recognition were granted to their governmentthey would allow a huge pipeline project to proceed that would carry oil andgas from Central Asia to lucrative markets in Pakistan and India This pipe-line would cut through the western part of Afghanistan ldquoEven before thecapture of Mazar-i-Sharif and Taloqan we were fully qualified for recogni-tionrdquo said deputy information minister Abdur Rahman Hotaki referring totwo key opposition bases captured by the militia ldquoThe opposition gave peo-ple an excuse to deny us recognition and prevent us having the pipeline runthrough our country but that excuse has now gonerdquo he said ldquoAll excusesblocking our recognition are gone Therefore it is predicted they will revisetheir policy in view of the current realitiesrdquo he said adding that all ldquotermsand conditions for a legitimate staterdquo have been met14

But the Taliban encountered problems with international organizations In1999 the UN proposed imposing sanctions against the Taliban when it is-sued Security Council Resolution 1267 Adopted unanimously by the Secur-ity Council on October 15 the resolution demanded that the Taliban turn overOsama bin Laden without further delay to authorities in a country where hewill be brought to justice Until the Taliban comply the resolution requiresUN member states to deny permission for Taliban-owned -leased or -oper-ated aircraft to land in or take off from their territory It also calls for the

12 Rashid Taliban pp 180ndash8213 P Stobodan ldquoThe Afghan Conflict and Regional Securityrdquo Strategic Analysis (August

1999) p 72414 Frontier Post (Peshawar) January 14 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 481

freezing of funds and other financial resources including funds derived fromproperty owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban The lat-ter had 30 days in which to comply with this resolution before sanctions wereimposed The Taliban did not comply and the sanctions came into force

Another round of sanctions was imposed on the Taliban in December 2000with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1333 The new sanc-tions called for an arms embargo on the Taliban including foreign militaryassistance It also imposed a ban on travel by the militiarsquos senior leaders abroader flight ban than the one imposed last year to force bin Ladenrsquos surren-der measures to close all Taliban offices overseas and a ban on exports toTaliban areas of acetic anhydride used to manufacture heroin Finally it alsofroze funds and other financial assets of Osama bin Laden and individualsand entities associated with him Mullah Omar reacted to this round of sanc-tions by saying his government would not back out from its stand and princi-ples even if the entire world turned against them15

The continuation of these sanctions has pushed the issue of recognition tothe backburner However the international community is also paying a pricefor not recognizing the legitimacy of the Taliban One of the principal areasin which the Taliban could provide some assistance is in the containment ofthe production of poppy Mullah Omar on several occasions emphasized hiswill to fight against opium production However it has been difficult tomaintain such policy postures in the wake of external sanctions As a resultin 1999 over 90983 hectares of poppies yielded a harvest of over 4581 tonsof dry opium an estimated 70 increase in production over the previousyearrsquos figure

The international sanctions have also affected the incentives of local farm-ers to turn away from poppy production Afghanistanrsquos socioeconomic situa-tion makes opium production one of the only available economic means foraccess to land labor and credit Currently the Afghan peasantryrsquos heavydependence upon opium production associated with the politico-territorialrealities of a tribal society typified by fragile political allegiances is makingit difficult for the Taliban to make any serious attempts at eradication16

Additionally any Taliban attempt to implement a poppy eradication policywill be severely compromised by the governmentrsquos international non-recog-nition This places restrictions on the options open to the government Eventhe UN Drug Control Program cannot legally reach any formal agreementwith the Taliban government as long as the latter is not internationally recog-nized The Taliban government faces a self-imposed catch-22 situation Its

15 Ibid16 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy ldquoTalibanrsquos Drug Dilemma Opium Production vs International

Recognitionrdquo The Analyst (Paris) (1999)

482 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

political policies and actions are deemed unacceptable by the internationalcommunity yet it cannot pursue any eradication policy with any hope ofcomplete success without the international recognition and aid that are beingdenied it owing to those policies and actions17

Future Prospects for Change in theTalibanrsquos Regime

Since 1996 the Taliban have been striving to bring the civil war to a success-ful conclusion Their domestic policies have brought about alienation andcreated fissures within the Afghan society Their inflexible stand on variouspolicies has denied them the credibility they so desire Their authoritarianismand intolerance have alienated non-Pushtun Afghans who make up morethan half the population The flow of thousands of extremist Pakistani andArab Taliban supporters into Afghanistan has fueled the resentment of thelocal populace18

The Taliban are accused of harboring terrorists and extremists who notonly support Taliban but also carry out their extremist policies in the targetedcountries According to a report that appeared in the Far Eastern EconomicReview (FEER) Afghanistan has become a sanctuary for ldquoarmed insurgentsaccused of terrorist attacks in China Iran Uzbekistan Tajikistan and Paki-stanrdquo Some 400 Arab Islamic militants from a dozen Middle Eastern andAfrican countries are said to be part of the 055 Brigade funded by Osama binLaden and fighting alongside Taliban in the current offensive The articlefurther noted that ldquo[t]he diverse groups have their own agendas mainly fo-cused on undermining the regimes at home but some share bin Ladenrsquos zealfor a global Islamic revolution The resulting web of dangerous friendshipsthreatens to export instability throughout the mineral-rich and commerciallyunder-exploited hinterland of Central Asiardquo19

It is obvious that the Taliban must improve their image both at home andabroad as perceptions play an important role in the general acceptability ornon-acceptability of governments in both arenas Currently the Taliban areperceived primarily as a negative element that is unlikely to play any positiverole in resolving the Afghan conflict If they fail in their goal the Afghannation will lose any trust that religious political forces could play any mean-ingful role in resolving the ongoing conflict The Talibanrsquos fate will be more

17 At the time of writing the Taliban were not cooperating in poppy eradication Currentlyit appears this may have changed The Taliban claim to have completely eradicated poppy pro-duction in the areas dominated by their troops and the claim is being verified under UN aus-pices

18 Peter Tomsen ldquoResponse A Chance for Peace in AfghanistanmdashThe Talibanrsquos Days areNumberedrdquo Foreign Affairs 79 (JanuaryndashFebruary 2000) p 179

19 Ahmed Rashid ldquoAfghanistan Heart of Darknessrdquo FEER August 5 1999

NASREEN GHUFRAN 483

or less the same as that which befell the mujahideen if they do not take timelyand corrective measures to improve Afghanistanrsquos deteriorating situation

The Taliban gained support from most of the populace in the beginningbecause they offered themselves a neutral force and declared their intentionto remain so However they are no longer neutral and have become anotherparty to the conflict Their policies have not only infuriated the internationalpublic but also large sections of the Afghan community The large influxesof Afghan refugees into Pakistan reflect the growing disagreement with theirpolicies This disenchantment is unlikely to change if the Taliban do notmoderate their stance The Taliban of course believe their policies to be im-portant for bringing about the change they desire but they do not realize howmuch these policies have alienated people The international community hasexplicitly voiced its criticism of the Taliban regime and consider it to be aliving nightmare for women political dissidents and anyone else who doesnot submit to the laws under the authority of the Ministry for the Fostering ofVirtue and Suppression of Vice The Taliban movement itself came about asa reaction to the self-seeking and self-destructive policies of the mujahideenwhose pretensions to Islam and leadership were discredited It was in thisideological vacuum and a Hobbesian state of anarchy that made the Talibanrsquosrule palatable to common Afghanis20 But if the Talibanrsquos government doesnot soften its present policies and complete peace is not restored it will notbe too late for the common people to turn against them

The year 2001 has seen universal outrage at the offensive launched by theTaliban rulers against Afghanistanrsquos Buddhist past Condemnation has notremained confined to non-Muslim states several Islamic countries includingPakistan have been appalled by the destruction of Buddhist statues in theprovince of Bamiyan Pakistan sent an official delegation whose aim was toprevent the Taliban from destroying the statues Pakistanrsquos foreign ministerAbdul Sattar said ldquoCertainly we believe it was a mistake a blunder and as aresult Afghanistan will suffer consequences for years to comerdquo To this headded that ldquoit is very difficult for me to make a statement as to why they didnot hearrdquo21 Iran likewise strongly condemned the statuesrsquo destruction Astatement released by Iranrsquos Cultural Heritage Organization wondered whyldquocertain Taliban-led individuals calling themselves lsquoclericrsquo have ordered de-struction of ancient sites of the mankind society citing blasphemy and idoliz-

20 Hafeez Malik ldquoPakistan Islam and the Taliban Phenomenonrdquo News International (Paki-stan) June 9 2000

21 Sattarrsquos remarks are in ibid March 11 2001

484 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

ing as reasonsrdquo22 To prevent their destruction Iran even offered to buy thestatues or move them into safekeeping

However the Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil rejectedany offer to prevent the destruction of the statues His negotiations with Pa-kistan did not bear a positive result and he rejected the Iranian offers reiterat-ing that the presence of the statues conflicted with Islamic teaching In thewake of the Talibanrsquos subsequent actions Iran led a UN initiative to takeserious action against the regime Commenting on the statuesrsquo destructionthe Iranian Foreign Ministry stated ldquoUnfortunately the Talibanrsquos destructionof the statues has cast doubts on the comprehensive views offered by Islamicideology in the world Clearly Muslims across the world pin the blame onthe rigid-minded Taliban and by no means embroil the Afghan Muslims inthis counter-cultural moverdquo23

The Bamiyan incident stirred up dual controversies about both the charac-ter of the Taliban regime and the relationship between culture religion andnational heritage in an Islamic state In his characteristic style Mullah Omarshrugged off all objections to the planned destruction of the Buddhist statuessaying ldquomy job is the implementation of Islamic orderrdquo He invoked Islamiclaw a fatwa issued by the Afghan ulama associated with this regime and thedecision of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to support his decision24

Nonetheless the destruction of the statues has further tarnished the Talibanrsquosimage While it may be the case that the Taliban undertook their actions inreaction to the tough sanctions imposed on them by the world the Talibanhave to realize that they are not going to earn any international sympathy orrecognition

Afghanistan has always been important to external powers due to its strate-gic location They have meddled in its affairs both in the past and at presentThe protracted civil war makes it more vulnerable to external penetration Insuch situations it has no other option but to seek help and support fromoutside The external powers are more than willing to do so if it serves theirnational interest The opposition is likely to adopt a similar strategy as theyhave less access to the resources of the country than the ruling authority Hadthere been no external involvement Afghanistanrsquos extended civil war wouldnot have become the protracted and complicated affair that it is

The Afghan civil war has important regional implications Various exter-nal powers are pursuing divergent objectives in Afghanistan and the outcome

22 Cultural Heritage Organization comment is in Iran News (Tehran) March 1 2001 Thisnews item is distributed via Middle East News Online available at lthttpwwwmiddleeastwirecomgt

23 Comments of the Iranian Foreign Ministry reported by the BBC World Service March 52001

24 Rahimullah Yusufzai ldquoA Question of Tolerancerdquo News International March 4 2001

478 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

representative of a body with international legal personality The decision togrant or not to grant recognition is a political one within the sovereign discre-tion of individual states Recognition in principle can be accorded to states orgovernments As far as the state of Afghanistan itself is concerned it hasbeen recognized by a large number of countries including all permanentmembers of the UN Security Council for many years However wherepolitical power has fragmented to the extent that it has in Afghanistan inrecent years there may well be more than one group claiming to be the gov-ernment In fact as has been outlined already there are two governmentswithin one country One is militarily strong and controls a large populationand territory but has no legal standing while the other is recognized but hasless control of Afghan territory

Pakistan was the first country to grant international recognition to theTalibanrsquos government Their past links provided the basis for doing so Asnoted earlier virtually all of the Taliban leadership had been refugees in Pa-kistan For several years Taliban leaders studied in the madrasas (religiousschools) affiliated with the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) headed by MaulviFazul ur Rehman Although it has not been conclusively proven that theTaliban are Pakistanrsquos creation much criticism along these lines and othershas been leveled against it Pakistan is said to have played a key role inturning Taliban into a functioning military force by providing training logis-tical support and equipment

In 1997 Pakistan rooted its decision to recognize the Taliban governmentbased on the fact that the latter was in effective control of most of Afghani-stanrsquos territory including the capital By the time recognition was given theTaliban government occupied 90 of Afghanistan and oversaw a populationthat was representative of all of the countryrsquos ethnic groups Since then Paki-stan has been striving to propagate a positive image of the student militia andworking to induce other neighboring countries to recognize them Further-more Pakistan has been making persistent attempts to get the UN to adoptthe vacant seat formula which the Organization of Islamic Conferences haddone during 1996

Pakistanrsquos ties with the Taliban have become increasingly complex owingto the influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan Pakistanmdasha country of 140million mostly poor peoplemdashhas been almost single-handedly housing andfeeding the 12 million Afghan refugees living there since 1995 the year theUN stopped providing food and housing aid Some of the Afghan refugeescurrently in Pakistan have been there since the 1980s having fled the Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan At the time an estimated 32 million refugees livedin Pakistan making it the largest caseload of refugees in the world

Some of the refugees did return to Afghanistan In 1994 approximately77000 went back with the assistance of the UN High Commission for Refu-

NASREEN GHUFRAN 479

gees (UNHCR) An additional 76000 refugees returned to Afghanistan ontheir own11 However the years since then have seen a new wave of refu-gees flowing into Pakistan from northern Afghanistan Many of the freshrefugees are fleeing the fighting there plus a devastating drought This newwave has not been officially registered with any international organizationAs a consequence the statistics regarding refugees in Pakistan are unreliableAn influx of 30000 Afghan refugees came to Pakistan in 2000 and it is esti-mated that more than 50000 have crossed the border since then In that yearPakistan decided to close its border to stop further refugees because it couldnot absorb any more However its border was later reopened because of thedeplorable condition of the refugees and pressure from international humani-tarian relief agencies

Aside from Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UAE are on the list of countriesrecognizing the Talibanrsquos government Saudi Arabiarsquos came only a few daysafter Pakistanrsquos Until mid-1998 Islamabad and Riyadh were on the samepolitical wavelength Saudi Arabia supplied heavily subsidized fuel to theTaliban through Pakistan and also provided general funding After 1998problems between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan developed over the fate ofOsama bin Laden the Saudi millionaire who had been funding the Afghanjihad The Taliban had promised Saudi Arabia that Osama bin Laden wouldnot use his refuge in Afghanistan to support any acts of violence abroadAfter Osama bin Laden was linked to the bombings of US embassies inKenya and Tanzania his continued refuge in Afghanistan became a majorsource of tension between Taliban and the US on one hand and Saudi Ara-bia on the other

Apart from these three countries the Taliban have not managed to estab-lish political ties with other states This becomes a major constraint for agovernment of a country going through civil war If the paramount objectiveis to end the civil war the government has to direct its energies in this direc-tion It cannot expect the US or other countries to come to its rescue

The United States has been a major country involved in AfghanistanAlong with the Soviets the US had fed the civil war since the days of thecold war When Taliban captured Kabul the US State Department an-nounced it would establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban by sendingan official to Kabul This announcement was quickly retracted The StateDepartment spokesman Glyn Davies said the US found nothing objectiona-ble in the steps taken by the Taliban to impose Islamic law and described theTaliban as anti-modern rather than anti-Western Some members of Con-

11 Nasreen Ghufran ldquoRefugees A Comparative Study of India and Pakistanrdquo (paperpresented at the conference ldquoThe Challenge of Cooperation South Asia and Beyondrdquo Kath-mandu Nepal December 1998)

480 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

gress supported the Taliban because their government appeared to serve theUS policy of isolating Iran A Taliban regime would create a firmly Sunnibuffer on Iranrsquos border and potentially provide security for trade routes andpipelines that would break Iranrsquos monopoly on Central Asiarsquos southern traderoutes

But from its initial policy of acquiescence vis-a-vis the Taliban the USmoved to the other extreme of rejecting them completely The US rejectionwas largely because of the pressure exerted by the feminist movement Theprominent feminist Zieba-Shorish Shamley persuaded many US feministgroups to spearhead a signature campaign to mobilize support for Afghanwomen Her efforts helped persuade former President Clinton to take atougher stance against the Taliban12 Washingtonrsquos denouncement of theTaliban also came in the backdrop of the presidential election in the US assupporting a regime that held no respect for human rights would have nega-tively affected Clintonrsquos position13

In 1998 when the Taliban made great military gains against the forces ofthe North they expected to gain recognition and a seat in the UN they hadmajor Afghan cities under their control and their rivals in retreat Talibanrepresentatives claimed that if recognition were granted to their governmentthey would allow a huge pipeline project to proceed that would carry oil andgas from Central Asia to lucrative markets in Pakistan and India This pipe-line would cut through the western part of Afghanistan ldquoEven before thecapture of Mazar-i-Sharif and Taloqan we were fully qualified for recogni-tionrdquo said deputy information minister Abdur Rahman Hotaki referring totwo key opposition bases captured by the militia ldquoThe opposition gave peo-ple an excuse to deny us recognition and prevent us having the pipeline runthrough our country but that excuse has now gonerdquo he said ldquoAll excusesblocking our recognition are gone Therefore it is predicted they will revisetheir policy in view of the current realitiesrdquo he said adding that all ldquotermsand conditions for a legitimate staterdquo have been met14

But the Taliban encountered problems with international organizations In1999 the UN proposed imposing sanctions against the Taliban when it is-sued Security Council Resolution 1267 Adopted unanimously by the Secur-ity Council on October 15 the resolution demanded that the Taliban turn overOsama bin Laden without further delay to authorities in a country where hewill be brought to justice Until the Taliban comply the resolution requiresUN member states to deny permission for Taliban-owned -leased or -oper-ated aircraft to land in or take off from their territory It also calls for the

12 Rashid Taliban pp 180ndash8213 P Stobodan ldquoThe Afghan Conflict and Regional Securityrdquo Strategic Analysis (August

1999) p 72414 Frontier Post (Peshawar) January 14 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 481

freezing of funds and other financial resources including funds derived fromproperty owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban The lat-ter had 30 days in which to comply with this resolution before sanctions wereimposed The Taliban did not comply and the sanctions came into force

Another round of sanctions was imposed on the Taliban in December 2000with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1333 The new sanc-tions called for an arms embargo on the Taliban including foreign militaryassistance It also imposed a ban on travel by the militiarsquos senior leaders abroader flight ban than the one imposed last year to force bin Ladenrsquos surren-der measures to close all Taliban offices overseas and a ban on exports toTaliban areas of acetic anhydride used to manufacture heroin Finally it alsofroze funds and other financial assets of Osama bin Laden and individualsand entities associated with him Mullah Omar reacted to this round of sanc-tions by saying his government would not back out from its stand and princi-ples even if the entire world turned against them15

The continuation of these sanctions has pushed the issue of recognition tothe backburner However the international community is also paying a pricefor not recognizing the legitimacy of the Taliban One of the principal areasin which the Taliban could provide some assistance is in the containment ofthe production of poppy Mullah Omar on several occasions emphasized hiswill to fight against opium production However it has been difficult tomaintain such policy postures in the wake of external sanctions As a resultin 1999 over 90983 hectares of poppies yielded a harvest of over 4581 tonsof dry opium an estimated 70 increase in production over the previousyearrsquos figure

The international sanctions have also affected the incentives of local farm-ers to turn away from poppy production Afghanistanrsquos socioeconomic situa-tion makes opium production one of the only available economic means foraccess to land labor and credit Currently the Afghan peasantryrsquos heavydependence upon opium production associated with the politico-territorialrealities of a tribal society typified by fragile political allegiances is makingit difficult for the Taliban to make any serious attempts at eradication16

Additionally any Taliban attempt to implement a poppy eradication policywill be severely compromised by the governmentrsquos international non-recog-nition This places restrictions on the options open to the government Eventhe UN Drug Control Program cannot legally reach any formal agreementwith the Taliban government as long as the latter is not internationally recog-nized The Taliban government faces a self-imposed catch-22 situation Its

15 Ibid16 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy ldquoTalibanrsquos Drug Dilemma Opium Production vs International

Recognitionrdquo The Analyst (Paris) (1999)

482 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

political policies and actions are deemed unacceptable by the internationalcommunity yet it cannot pursue any eradication policy with any hope ofcomplete success without the international recognition and aid that are beingdenied it owing to those policies and actions17

Future Prospects for Change in theTalibanrsquos Regime

Since 1996 the Taliban have been striving to bring the civil war to a success-ful conclusion Their domestic policies have brought about alienation andcreated fissures within the Afghan society Their inflexible stand on variouspolicies has denied them the credibility they so desire Their authoritarianismand intolerance have alienated non-Pushtun Afghans who make up morethan half the population The flow of thousands of extremist Pakistani andArab Taliban supporters into Afghanistan has fueled the resentment of thelocal populace18

The Taliban are accused of harboring terrorists and extremists who notonly support Taliban but also carry out their extremist policies in the targetedcountries According to a report that appeared in the Far Eastern EconomicReview (FEER) Afghanistan has become a sanctuary for ldquoarmed insurgentsaccused of terrorist attacks in China Iran Uzbekistan Tajikistan and Paki-stanrdquo Some 400 Arab Islamic militants from a dozen Middle Eastern andAfrican countries are said to be part of the 055 Brigade funded by Osama binLaden and fighting alongside Taliban in the current offensive The articlefurther noted that ldquo[t]he diverse groups have their own agendas mainly fo-cused on undermining the regimes at home but some share bin Ladenrsquos zealfor a global Islamic revolution The resulting web of dangerous friendshipsthreatens to export instability throughout the mineral-rich and commerciallyunder-exploited hinterland of Central Asiardquo19

It is obvious that the Taliban must improve their image both at home andabroad as perceptions play an important role in the general acceptability ornon-acceptability of governments in both arenas Currently the Taliban areperceived primarily as a negative element that is unlikely to play any positiverole in resolving the Afghan conflict If they fail in their goal the Afghannation will lose any trust that religious political forces could play any mean-ingful role in resolving the ongoing conflict The Talibanrsquos fate will be more

17 At the time of writing the Taliban were not cooperating in poppy eradication Currentlyit appears this may have changed The Taliban claim to have completely eradicated poppy pro-duction in the areas dominated by their troops and the claim is being verified under UN aus-pices

18 Peter Tomsen ldquoResponse A Chance for Peace in AfghanistanmdashThe Talibanrsquos Days areNumberedrdquo Foreign Affairs 79 (JanuaryndashFebruary 2000) p 179

19 Ahmed Rashid ldquoAfghanistan Heart of Darknessrdquo FEER August 5 1999

NASREEN GHUFRAN 483

or less the same as that which befell the mujahideen if they do not take timelyand corrective measures to improve Afghanistanrsquos deteriorating situation

The Taliban gained support from most of the populace in the beginningbecause they offered themselves a neutral force and declared their intentionto remain so However they are no longer neutral and have become anotherparty to the conflict Their policies have not only infuriated the internationalpublic but also large sections of the Afghan community The large influxesof Afghan refugees into Pakistan reflect the growing disagreement with theirpolicies This disenchantment is unlikely to change if the Taliban do notmoderate their stance The Taliban of course believe their policies to be im-portant for bringing about the change they desire but they do not realize howmuch these policies have alienated people The international community hasexplicitly voiced its criticism of the Taliban regime and consider it to be aliving nightmare for women political dissidents and anyone else who doesnot submit to the laws under the authority of the Ministry for the Fostering ofVirtue and Suppression of Vice The Taliban movement itself came about asa reaction to the self-seeking and self-destructive policies of the mujahideenwhose pretensions to Islam and leadership were discredited It was in thisideological vacuum and a Hobbesian state of anarchy that made the Talibanrsquosrule palatable to common Afghanis20 But if the Talibanrsquos government doesnot soften its present policies and complete peace is not restored it will notbe too late for the common people to turn against them

The year 2001 has seen universal outrage at the offensive launched by theTaliban rulers against Afghanistanrsquos Buddhist past Condemnation has notremained confined to non-Muslim states several Islamic countries includingPakistan have been appalled by the destruction of Buddhist statues in theprovince of Bamiyan Pakistan sent an official delegation whose aim was toprevent the Taliban from destroying the statues Pakistanrsquos foreign ministerAbdul Sattar said ldquoCertainly we believe it was a mistake a blunder and as aresult Afghanistan will suffer consequences for years to comerdquo To this headded that ldquoit is very difficult for me to make a statement as to why they didnot hearrdquo21 Iran likewise strongly condemned the statuesrsquo destruction Astatement released by Iranrsquos Cultural Heritage Organization wondered whyldquocertain Taliban-led individuals calling themselves lsquoclericrsquo have ordered de-struction of ancient sites of the mankind society citing blasphemy and idoliz-

20 Hafeez Malik ldquoPakistan Islam and the Taliban Phenomenonrdquo News International (Paki-stan) June 9 2000

21 Sattarrsquos remarks are in ibid March 11 2001

484 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

ing as reasonsrdquo22 To prevent their destruction Iran even offered to buy thestatues or move them into safekeeping

However the Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil rejectedany offer to prevent the destruction of the statues His negotiations with Pa-kistan did not bear a positive result and he rejected the Iranian offers reiterat-ing that the presence of the statues conflicted with Islamic teaching In thewake of the Talibanrsquos subsequent actions Iran led a UN initiative to takeserious action against the regime Commenting on the statuesrsquo destructionthe Iranian Foreign Ministry stated ldquoUnfortunately the Talibanrsquos destructionof the statues has cast doubts on the comprehensive views offered by Islamicideology in the world Clearly Muslims across the world pin the blame onthe rigid-minded Taliban and by no means embroil the Afghan Muslims inthis counter-cultural moverdquo23

The Bamiyan incident stirred up dual controversies about both the charac-ter of the Taliban regime and the relationship between culture religion andnational heritage in an Islamic state In his characteristic style Mullah Omarshrugged off all objections to the planned destruction of the Buddhist statuessaying ldquomy job is the implementation of Islamic orderrdquo He invoked Islamiclaw a fatwa issued by the Afghan ulama associated with this regime and thedecision of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to support his decision24

Nonetheless the destruction of the statues has further tarnished the Talibanrsquosimage While it may be the case that the Taliban undertook their actions inreaction to the tough sanctions imposed on them by the world the Talibanhave to realize that they are not going to earn any international sympathy orrecognition

Afghanistan has always been important to external powers due to its strate-gic location They have meddled in its affairs both in the past and at presentThe protracted civil war makes it more vulnerable to external penetration Insuch situations it has no other option but to seek help and support fromoutside The external powers are more than willing to do so if it serves theirnational interest The opposition is likely to adopt a similar strategy as theyhave less access to the resources of the country than the ruling authority Hadthere been no external involvement Afghanistanrsquos extended civil war wouldnot have become the protracted and complicated affair that it is

The Afghan civil war has important regional implications Various exter-nal powers are pursuing divergent objectives in Afghanistan and the outcome

22 Cultural Heritage Organization comment is in Iran News (Tehran) March 1 2001 Thisnews item is distributed via Middle East News Online available at lthttpwwwmiddleeastwirecomgt

23 Comments of the Iranian Foreign Ministry reported by the BBC World Service March 52001

24 Rahimullah Yusufzai ldquoA Question of Tolerancerdquo News International March 4 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 479

gees (UNHCR) An additional 76000 refugees returned to Afghanistan ontheir own11 However the years since then have seen a new wave of refu-gees flowing into Pakistan from northern Afghanistan Many of the freshrefugees are fleeing the fighting there plus a devastating drought This newwave has not been officially registered with any international organizationAs a consequence the statistics regarding refugees in Pakistan are unreliableAn influx of 30000 Afghan refugees came to Pakistan in 2000 and it is esti-mated that more than 50000 have crossed the border since then In that yearPakistan decided to close its border to stop further refugees because it couldnot absorb any more However its border was later reopened because of thedeplorable condition of the refugees and pressure from international humani-tarian relief agencies

Aside from Pakistan Saudi Arabia and the UAE are on the list of countriesrecognizing the Talibanrsquos government Saudi Arabiarsquos came only a few daysafter Pakistanrsquos Until mid-1998 Islamabad and Riyadh were on the samepolitical wavelength Saudi Arabia supplied heavily subsidized fuel to theTaliban through Pakistan and also provided general funding After 1998problems between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan developed over the fate ofOsama bin Laden the Saudi millionaire who had been funding the Afghanjihad The Taliban had promised Saudi Arabia that Osama bin Laden wouldnot use his refuge in Afghanistan to support any acts of violence abroadAfter Osama bin Laden was linked to the bombings of US embassies inKenya and Tanzania his continued refuge in Afghanistan became a majorsource of tension between Taliban and the US on one hand and Saudi Ara-bia on the other

Apart from these three countries the Taliban have not managed to estab-lish political ties with other states This becomes a major constraint for agovernment of a country going through civil war If the paramount objectiveis to end the civil war the government has to direct its energies in this direc-tion It cannot expect the US or other countries to come to its rescue

The United States has been a major country involved in AfghanistanAlong with the Soviets the US had fed the civil war since the days of thecold war When Taliban captured Kabul the US State Department an-nounced it would establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban by sendingan official to Kabul This announcement was quickly retracted The StateDepartment spokesman Glyn Davies said the US found nothing objectiona-ble in the steps taken by the Taliban to impose Islamic law and described theTaliban as anti-modern rather than anti-Western Some members of Con-

11 Nasreen Ghufran ldquoRefugees A Comparative Study of India and Pakistanrdquo (paperpresented at the conference ldquoThe Challenge of Cooperation South Asia and Beyondrdquo Kath-mandu Nepal December 1998)

480 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

gress supported the Taliban because their government appeared to serve theUS policy of isolating Iran A Taliban regime would create a firmly Sunnibuffer on Iranrsquos border and potentially provide security for trade routes andpipelines that would break Iranrsquos monopoly on Central Asiarsquos southern traderoutes

But from its initial policy of acquiescence vis-a-vis the Taliban the USmoved to the other extreme of rejecting them completely The US rejectionwas largely because of the pressure exerted by the feminist movement Theprominent feminist Zieba-Shorish Shamley persuaded many US feministgroups to spearhead a signature campaign to mobilize support for Afghanwomen Her efforts helped persuade former President Clinton to take atougher stance against the Taliban12 Washingtonrsquos denouncement of theTaliban also came in the backdrop of the presidential election in the US assupporting a regime that held no respect for human rights would have nega-tively affected Clintonrsquos position13

In 1998 when the Taliban made great military gains against the forces ofthe North they expected to gain recognition and a seat in the UN they hadmajor Afghan cities under their control and their rivals in retreat Talibanrepresentatives claimed that if recognition were granted to their governmentthey would allow a huge pipeline project to proceed that would carry oil andgas from Central Asia to lucrative markets in Pakistan and India This pipe-line would cut through the western part of Afghanistan ldquoEven before thecapture of Mazar-i-Sharif and Taloqan we were fully qualified for recogni-tionrdquo said deputy information minister Abdur Rahman Hotaki referring totwo key opposition bases captured by the militia ldquoThe opposition gave peo-ple an excuse to deny us recognition and prevent us having the pipeline runthrough our country but that excuse has now gonerdquo he said ldquoAll excusesblocking our recognition are gone Therefore it is predicted they will revisetheir policy in view of the current realitiesrdquo he said adding that all ldquotermsand conditions for a legitimate staterdquo have been met14

But the Taliban encountered problems with international organizations In1999 the UN proposed imposing sanctions against the Taliban when it is-sued Security Council Resolution 1267 Adopted unanimously by the Secur-ity Council on October 15 the resolution demanded that the Taliban turn overOsama bin Laden without further delay to authorities in a country where hewill be brought to justice Until the Taliban comply the resolution requiresUN member states to deny permission for Taliban-owned -leased or -oper-ated aircraft to land in or take off from their territory It also calls for the

12 Rashid Taliban pp 180ndash8213 P Stobodan ldquoThe Afghan Conflict and Regional Securityrdquo Strategic Analysis (August

1999) p 72414 Frontier Post (Peshawar) January 14 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 481

freezing of funds and other financial resources including funds derived fromproperty owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban The lat-ter had 30 days in which to comply with this resolution before sanctions wereimposed The Taliban did not comply and the sanctions came into force

Another round of sanctions was imposed on the Taliban in December 2000with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1333 The new sanc-tions called for an arms embargo on the Taliban including foreign militaryassistance It also imposed a ban on travel by the militiarsquos senior leaders abroader flight ban than the one imposed last year to force bin Ladenrsquos surren-der measures to close all Taliban offices overseas and a ban on exports toTaliban areas of acetic anhydride used to manufacture heroin Finally it alsofroze funds and other financial assets of Osama bin Laden and individualsand entities associated with him Mullah Omar reacted to this round of sanc-tions by saying his government would not back out from its stand and princi-ples even if the entire world turned against them15

The continuation of these sanctions has pushed the issue of recognition tothe backburner However the international community is also paying a pricefor not recognizing the legitimacy of the Taliban One of the principal areasin which the Taliban could provide some assistance is in the containment ofthe production of poppy Mullah Omar on several occasions emphasized hiswill to fight against opium production However it has been difficult tomaintain such policy postures in the wake of external sanctions As a resultin 1999 over 90983 hectares of poppies yielded a harvest of over 4581 tonsof dry opium an estimated 70 increase in production over the previousyearrsquos figure

The international sanctions have also affected the incentives of local farm-ers to turn away from poppy production Afghanistanrsquos socioeconomic situa-tion makes opium production one of the only available economic means foraccess to land labor and credit Currently the Afghan peasantryrsquos heavydependence upon opium production associated with the politico-territorialrealities of a tribal society typified by fragile political allegiances is makingit difficult for the Taliban to make any serious attempts at eradication16

Additionally any Taliban attempt to implement a poppy eradication policywill be severely compromised by the governmentrsquos international non-recog-nition This places restrictions on the options open to the government Eventhe UN Drug Control Program cannot legally reach any formal agreementwith the Taliban government as long as the latter is not internationally recog-nized The Taliban government faces a self-imposed catch-22 situation Its

15 Ibid16 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy ldquoTalibanrsquos Drug Dilemma Opium Production vs International

Recognitionrdquo The Analyst (Paris) (1999)

482 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

political policies and actions are deemed unacceptable by the internationalcommunity yet it cannot pursue any eradication policy with any hope ofcomplete success without the international recognition and aid that are beingdenied it owing to those policies and actions17

Future Prospects for Change in theTalibanrsquos Regime

Since 1996 the Taliban have been striving to bring the civil war to a success-ful conclusion Their domestic policies have brought about alienation andcreated fissures within the Afghan society Their inflexible stand on variouspolicies has denied them the credibility they so desire Their authoritarianismand intolerance have alienated non-Pushtun Afghans who make up morethan half the population The flow of thousands of extremist Pakistani andArab Taliban supporters into Afghanistan has fueled the resentment of thelocal populace18

The Taliban are accused of harboring terrorists and extremists who notonly support Taliban but also carry out their extremist policies in the targetedcountries According to a report that appeared in the Far Eastern EconomicReview (FEER) Afghanistan has become a sanctuary for ldquoarmed insurgentsaccused of terrorist attacks in China Iran Uzbekistan Tajikistan and Paki-stanrdquo Some 400 Arab Islamic militants from a dozen Middle Eastern andAfrican countries are said to be part of the 055 Brigade funded by Osama binLaden and fighting alongside Taliban in the current offensive The articlefurther noted that ldquo[t]he diverse groups have their own agendas mainly fo-cused on undermining the regimes at home but some share bin Ladenrsquos zealfor a global Islamic revolution The resulting web of dangerous friendshipsthreatens to export instability throughout the mineral-rich and commerciallyunder-exploited hinterland of Central Asiardquo19

It is obvious that the Taliban must improve their image both at home andabroad as perceptions play an important role in the general acceptability ornon-acceptability of governments in both arenas Currently the Taliban areperceived primarily as a negative element that is unlikely to play any positiverole in resolving the Afghan conflict If they fail in their goal the Afghannation will lose any trust that religious political forces could play any mean-ingful role in resolving the ongoing conflict The Talibanrsquos fate will be more

17 At the time of writing the Taliban were not cooperating in poppy eradication Currentlyit appears this may have changed The Taliban claim to have completely eradicated poppy pro-duction in the areas dominated by their troops and the claim is being verified under UN aus-pices

18 Peter Tomsen ldquoResponse A Chance for Peace in AfghanistanmdashThe Talibanrsquos Days areNumberedrdquo Foreign Affairs 79 (JanuaryndashFebruary 2000) p 179

19 Ahmed Rashid ldquoAfghanistan Heart of Darknessrdquo FEER August 5 1999

NASREEN GHUFRAN 483

or less the same as that which befell the mujahideen if they do not take timelyand corrective measures to improve Afghanistanrsquos deteriorating situation

The Taliban gained support from most of the populace in the beginningbecause they offered themselves a neutral force and declared their intentionto remain so However they are no longer neutral and have become anotherparty to the conflict Their policies have not only infuriated the internationalpublic but also large sections of the Afghan community The large influxesof Afghan refugees into Pakistan reflect the growing disagreement with theirpolicies This disenchantment is unlikely to change if the Taliban do notmoderate their stance The Taliban of course believe their policies to be im-portant for bringing about the change they desire but they do not realize howmuch these policies have alienated people The international community hasexplicitly voiced its criticism of the Taliban regime and consider it to be aliving nightmare for women political dissidents and anyone else who doesnot submit to the laws under the authority of the Ministry for the Fostering ofVirtue and Suppression of Vice The Taliban movement itself came about asa reaction to the self-seeking and self-destructive policies of the mujahideenwhose pretensions to Islam and leadership were discredited It was in thisideological vacuum and a Hobbesian state of anarchy that made the Talibanrsquosrule palatable to common Afghanis20 But if the Talibanrsquos government doesnot soften its present policies and complete peace is not restored it will notbe too late for the common people to turn against them

The year 2001 has seen universal outrage at the offensive launched by theTaliban rulers against Afghanistanrsquos Buddhist past Condemnation has notremained confined to non-Muslim states several Islamic countries includingPakistan have been appalled by the destruction of Buddhist statues in theprovince of Bamiyan Pakistan sent an official delegation whose aim was toprevent the Taliban from destroying the statues Pakistanrsquos foreign ministerAbdul Sattar said ldquoCertainly we believe it was a mistake a blunder and as aresult Afghanistan will suffer consequences for years to comerdquo To this headded that ldquoit is very difficult for me to make a statement as to why they didnot hearrdquo21 Iran likewise strongly condemned the statuesrsquo destruction Astatement released by Iranrsquos Cultural Heritage Organization wondered whyldquocertain Taliban-led individuals calling themselves lsquoclericrsquo have ordered de-struction of ancient sites of the mankind society citing blasphemy and idoliz-

20 Hafeez Malik ldquoPakistan Islam and the Taliban Phenomenonrdquo News International (Paki-stan) June 9 2000

21 Sattarrsquos remarks are in ibid March 11 2001

484 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

ing as reasonsrdquo22 To prevent their destruction Iran even offered to buy thestatues or move them into safekeeping

However the Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil rejectedany offer to prevent the destruction of the statues His negotiations with Pa-kistan did not bear a positive result and he rejected the Iranian offers reiterat-ing that the presence of the statues conflicted with Islamic teaching In thewake of the Talibanrsquos subsequent actions Iran led a UN initiative to takeserious action against the regime Commenting on the statuesrsquo destructionthe Iranian Foreign Ministry stated ldquoUnfortunately the Talibanrsquos destructionof the statues has cast doubts on the comprehensive views offered by Islamicideology in the world Clearly Muslims across the world pin the blame onthe rigid-minded Taliban and by no means embroil the Afghan Muslims inthis counter-cultural moverdquo23

The Bamiyan incident stirred up dual controversies about both the charac-ter of the Taliban regime and the relationship between culture religion andnational heritage in an Islamic state In his characteristic style Mullah Omarshrugged off all objections to the planned destruction of the Buddhist statuessaying ldquomy job is the implementation of Islamic orderrdquo He invoked Islamiclaw a fatwa issued by the Afghan ulama associated with this regime and thedecision of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to support his decision24

Nonetheless the destruction of the statues has further tarnished the Talibanrsquosimage While it may be the case that the Taliban undertook their actions inreaction to the tough sanctions imposed on them by the world the Talibanhave to realize that they are not going to earn any international sympathy orrecognition

Afghanistan has always been important to external powers due to its strate-gic location They have meddled in its affairs both in the past and at presentThe protracted civil war makes it more vulnerable to external penetration Insuch situations it has no other option but to seek help and support fromoutside The external powers are more than willing to do so if it serves theirnational interest The opposition is likely to adopt a similar strategy as theyhave less access to the resources of the country than the ruling authority Hadthere been no external involvement Afghanistanrsquos extended civil war wouldnot have become the protracted and complicated affair that it is

The Afghan civil war has important regional implications Various exter-nal powers are pursuing divergent objectives in Afghanistan and the outcome

22 Cultural Heritage Organization comment is in Iran News (Tehran) March 1 2001 Thisnews item is distributed via Middle East News Online available at lthttpwwwmiddleeastwirecomgt

23 Comments of the Iranian Foreign Ministry reported by the BBC World Service March 52001

24 Rahimullah Yusufzai ldquoA Question of Tolerancerdquo News International March 4 2001

480 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

gress supported the Taliban because their government appeared to serve theUS policy of isolating Iran A Taliban regime would create a firmly Sunnibuffer on Iranrsquos border and potentially provide security for trade routes andpipelines that would break Iranrsquos monopoly on Central Asiarsquos southern traderoutes

But from its initial policy of acquiescence vis-a-vis the Taliban the USmoved to the other extreme of rejecting them completely The US rejectionwas largely because of the pressure exerted by the feminist movement Theprominent feminist Zieba-Shorish Shamley persuaded many US feministgroups to spearhead a signature campaign to mobilize support for Afghanwomen Her efforts helped persuade former President Clinton to take atougher stance against the Taliban12 Washingtonrsquos denouncement of theTaliban also came in the backdrop of the presidential election in the US assupporting a regime that held no respect for human rights would have nega-tively affected Clintonrsquos position13

In 1998 when the Taliban made great military gains against the forces ofthe North they expected to gain recognition and a seat in the UN they hadmajor Afghan cities under their control and their rivals in retreat Talibanrepresentatives claimed that if recognition were granted to their governmentthey would allow a huge pipeline project to proceed that would carry oil andgas from Central Asia to lucrative markets in Pakistan and India This pipe-line would cut through the western part of Afghanistan ldquoEven before thecapture of Mazar-i-Sharif and Taloqan we were fully qualified for recogni-tionrdquo said deputy information minister Abdur Rahman Hotaki referring totwo key opposition bases captured by the militia ldquoThe opposition gave peo-ple an excuse to deny us recognition and prevent us having the pipeline runthrough our country but that excuse has now gonerdquo he said ldquoAll excusesblocking our recognition are gone Therefore it is predicted they will revisetheir policy in view of the current realitiesrdquo he said adding that all ldquotermsand conditions for a legitimate staterdquo have been met14

But the Taliban encountered problems with international organizations In1999 the UN proposed imposing sanctions against the Taliban when it is-sued Security Council Resolution 1267 Adopted unanimously by the Secur-ity Council on October 15 the resolution demanded that the Taliban turn overOsama bin Laden without further delay to authorities in a country where hewill be brought to justice Until the Taliban comply the resolution requiresUN member states to deny permission for Taliban-owned -leased or -oper-ated aircraft to land in or take off from their territory It also calls for the

12 Rashid Taliban pp 180ndash8213 P Stobodan ldquoThe Afghan Conflict and Regional Securityrdquo Strategic Analysis (August

1999) p 72414 Frontier Post (Peshawar) January 14 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 481

freezing of funds and other financial resources including funds derived fromproperty owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban The lat-ter had 30 days in which to comply with this resolution before sanctions wereimposed The Taliban did not comply and the sanctions came into force

Another round of sanctions was imposed on the Taliban in December 2000with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1333 The new sanc-tions called for an arms embargo on the Taliban including foreign militaryassistance It also imposed a ban on travel by the militiarsquos senior leaders abroader flight ban than the one imposed last year to force bin Ladenrsquos surren-der measures to close all Taliban offices overseas and a ban on exports toTaliban areas of acetic anhydride used to manufacture heroin Finally it alsofroze funds and other financial assets of Osama bin Laden and individualsand entities associated with him Mullah Omar reacted to this round of sanc-tions by saying his government would not back out from its stand and princi-ples even if the entire world turned against them15

The continuation of these sanctions has pushed the issue of recognition tothe backburner However the international community is also paying a pricefor not recognizing the legitimacy of the Taliban One of the principal areasin which the Taliban could provide some assistance is in the containment ofthe production of poppy Mullah Omar on several occasions emphasized hiswill to fight against opium production However it has been difficult tomaintain such policy postures in the wake of external sanctions As a resultin 1999 over 90983 hectares of poppies yielded a harvest of over 4581 tonsof dry opium an estimated 70 increase in production over the previousyearrsquos figure

The international sanctions have also affected the incentives of local farm-ers to turn away from poppy production Afghanistanrsquos socioeconomic situa-tion makes opium production one of the only available economic means foraccess to land labor and credit Currently the Afghan peasantryrsquos heavydependence upon opium production associated with the politico-territorialrealities of a tribal society typified by fragile political allegiances is makingit difficult for the Taliban to make any serious attempts at eradication16

Additionally any Taliban attempt to implement a poppy eradication policywill be severely compromised by the governmentrsquos international non-recog-nition This places restrictions on the options open to the government Eventhe UN Drug Control Program cannot legally reach any formal agreementwith the Taliban government as long as the latter is not internationally recog-nized The Taliban government faces a self-imposed catch-22 situation Its

15 Ibid16 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy ldquoTalibanrsquos Drug Dilemma Opium Production vs International

Recognitionrdquo The Analyst (Paris) (1999)

482 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

political policies and actions are deemed unacceptable by the internationalcommunity yet it cannot pursue any eradication policy with any hope ofcomplete success without the international recognition and aid that are beingdenied it owing to those policies and actions17

Future Prospects for Change in theTalibanrsquos Regime

Since 1996 the Taliban have been striving to bring the civil war to a success-ful conclusion Their domestic policies have brought about alienation andcreated fissures within the Afghan society Their inflexible stand on variouspolicies has denied them the credibility they so desire Their authoritarianismand intolerance have alienated non-Pushtun Afghans who make up morethan half the population The flow of thousands of extremist Pakistani andArab Taliban supporters into Afghanistan has fueled the resentment of thelocal populace18

The Taliban are accused of harboring terrorists and extremists who notonly support Taliban but also carry out their extremist policies in the targetedcountries According to a report that appeared in the Far Eastern EconomicReview (FEER) Afghanistan has become a sanctuary for ldquoarmed insurgentsaccused of terrorist attacks in China Iran Uzbekistan Tajikistan and Paki-stanrdquo Some 400 Arab Islamic militants from a dozen Middle Eastern andAfrican countries are said to be part of the 055 Brigade funded by Osama binLaden and fighting alongside Taliban in the current offensive The articlefurther noted that ldquo[t]he diverse groups have their own agendas mainly fo-cused on undermining the regimes at home but some share bin Ladenrsquos zealfor a global Islamic revolution The resulting web of dangerous friendshipsthreatens to export instability throughout the mineral-rich and commerciallyunder-exploited hinterland of Central Asiardquo19

It is obvious that the Taliban must improve their image both at home andabroad as perceptions play an important role in the general acceptability ornon-acceptability of governments in both arenas Currently the Taliban areperceived primarily as a negative element that is unlikely to play any positiverole in resolving the Afghan conflict If they fail in their goal the Afghannation will lose any trust that religious political forces could play any mean-ingful role in resolving the ongoing conflict The Talibanrsquos fate will be more

17 At the time of writing the Taliban were not cooperating in poppy eradication Currentlyit appears this may have changed The Taliban claim to have completely eradicated poppy pro-duction in the areas dominated by their troops and the claim is being verified under UN aus-pices

18 Peter Tomsen ldquoResponse A Chance for Peace in AfghanistanmdashThe Talibanrsquos Days areNumberedrdquo Foreign Affairs 79 (JanuaryndashFebruary 2000) p 179

19 Ahmed Rashid ldquoAfghanistan Heart of Darknessrdquo FEER August 5 1999

NASREEN GHUFRAN 483

or less the same as that which befell the mujahideen if they do not take timelyand corrective measures to improve Afghanistanrsquos deteriorating situation

The Taliban gained support from most of the populace in the beginningbecause they offered themselves a neutral force and declared their intentionto remain so However they are no longer neutral and have become anotherparty to the conflict Their policies have not only infuriated the internationalpublic but also large sections of the Afghan community The large influxesof Afghan refugees into Pakistan reflect the growing disagreement with theirpolicies This disenchantment is unlikely to change if the Taliban do notmoderate their stance The Taliban of course believe their policies to be im-portant for bringing about the change they desire but they do not realize howmuch these policies have alienated people The international community hasexplicitly voiced its criticism of the Taliban regime and consider it to be aliving nightmare for women political dissidents and anyone else who doesnot submit to the laws under the authority of the Ministry for the Fostering ofVirtue and Suppression of Vice The Taliban movement itself came about asa reaction to the self-seeking and self-destructive policies of the mujahideenwhose pretensions to Islam and leadership were discredited It was in thisideological vacuum and a Hobbesian state of anarchy that made the Talibanrsquosrule palatable to common Afghanis20 But if the Talibanrsquos government doesnot soften its present policies and complete peace is not restored it will notbe too late for the common people to turn against them

The year 2001 has seen universal outrage at the offensive launched by theTaliban rulers against Afghanistanrsquos Buddhist past Condemnation has notremained confined to non-Muslim states several Islamic countries includingPakistan have been appalled by the destruction of Buddhist statues in theprovince of Bamiyan Pakistan sent an official delegation whose aim was toprevent the Taliban from destroying the statues Pakistanrsquos foreign ministerAbdul Sattar said ldquoCertainly we believe it was a mistake a blunder and as aresult Afghanistan will suffer consequences for years to comerdquo To this headded that ldquoit is very difficult for me to make a statement as to why they didnot hearrdquo21 Iran likewise strongly condemned the statuesrsquo destruction Astatement released by Iranrsquos Cultural Heritage Organization wondered whyldquocertain Taliban-led individuals calling themselves lsquoclericrsquo have ordered de-struction of ancient sites of the mankind society citing blasphemy and idoliz-

20 Hafeez Malik ldquoPakistan Islam and the Taliban Phenomenonrdquo News International (Paki-stan) June 9 2000

21 Sattarrsquos remarks are in ibid March 11 2001

484 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

ing as reasonsrdquo22 To prevent their destruction Iran even offered to buy thestatues or move them into safekeeping

However the Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil rejectedany offer to prevent the destruction of the statues His negotiations with Pa-kistan did not bear a positive result and he rejected the Iranian offers reiterat-ing that the presence of the statues conflicted with Islamic teaching In thewake of the Talibanrsquos subsequent actions Iran led a UN initiative to takeserious action against the regime Commenting on the statuesrsquo destructionthe Iranian Foreign Ministry stated ldquoUnfortunately the Talibanrsquos destructionof the statues has cast doubts on the comprehensive views offered by Islamicideology in the world Clearly Muslims across the world pin the blame onthe rigid-minded Taliban and by no means embroil the Afghan Muslims inthis counter-cultural moverdquo23

The Bamiyan incident stirred up dual controversies about both the charac-ter of the Taliban regime and the relationship between culture religion andnational heritage in an Islamic state In his characteristic style Mullah Omarshrugged off all objections to the planned destruction of the Buddhist statuessaying ldquomy job is the implementation of Islamic orderrdquo He invoked Islamiclaw a fatwa issued by the Afghan ulama associated with this regime and thedecision of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to support his decision24

Nonetheless the destruction of the statues has further tarnished the Talibanrsquosimage While it may be the case that the Taliban undertook their actions inreaction to the tough sanctions imposed on them by the world the Talibanhave to realize that they are not going to earn any international sympathy orrecognition

Afghanistan has always been important to external powers due to its strate-gic location They have meddled in its affairs both in the past and at presentThe protracted civil war makes it more vulnerable to external penetration Insuch situations it has no other option but to seek help and support fromoutside The external powers are more than willing to do so if it serves theirnational interest The opposition is likely to adopt a similar strategy as theyhave less access to the resources of the country than the ruling authority Hadthere been no external involvement Afghanistanrsquos extended civil war wouldnot have become the protracted and complicated affair that it is

The Afghan civil war has important regional implications Various exter-nal powers are pursuing divergent objectives in Afghanistan and the outcome

22 Cultural Heritage Organization comment is in Iran News (Tehran) March 1 2001 Thisnews item is distributed via Middle East News Online available at lthttpwwwmiddleeastwirecomgt

23 Comments of the Iranian Foreign Ministry reported by the BBC World Service March 52001

24 Rahimullah Yusufzai ldquoA Question of Tolerancerdquo News International March 4 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 481

freezing of funds and other financial resources including funds derived fromproperty owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban The lat-ter had 30 days in which to comply with this resolution before sanctions wereimposed The Taliban did not comply and the sanctions came into force

Another round of sanctions was imposed on the Taliban in December 2000with the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1333 The new sanc-tions called for an arms embargo on the Taliban including foreign militaryassistance It also imposed a ban on travel by the militiarsquos senior leaders abroader flight ban than the one imposed last year to force bin Ladenrsquos surren-der measures to close all Taliban offices overseas and a ban on exports toTaliban areas of acetic anhydride used to manufacture heroin Finally it alsofroze funds and other financial assets of Osama bin Laden and individualsand entities associated with him Mullah Omar reacted to this round of sanc-tions by saying his government would not back out from its stand and princi-ples even if the entire world turned against them15

The continuation of these sanctions has pushed the issue of recognition tothe backburner However the international community is also paying a pricefor not recognizing the legitimacy of the Taliban One of the principal areasin which the Taliban could provide some assistance is in the containment ofthe production of poppy Mullah Omar on several occasions emphasized hiswill to fight against opium production However it has been difficult tomaintain such policy postures in the wake of external sanctions As a resultin 1999 over 90983 hectares of poppies yielded a harvest of over 4581 tonsof dry opium an estimated 70 increase in production over the previousyearrsquos figure

The international sanctions have also affected the incentives of local farm-ers to turn away from poppy production Afghanistanrsquos socioeconomic situa-tion makes opium production one of the only available economic means foraccess to land labor and credit Currently the Afghan peasantryrsquos heavydependence upon opium production associated with the politico-territorialrealities of a tribal society typified by fragile political allegiances is makingit difficult for the Taliban to make any serious attempts at eradication16

Additionally any Taliban attempt to implement a poppy eradication policywill be severely compromised by the governmentrsquos international non-recog-nition This places restrictions on the options open to the government Eventhe UN Drug Control Program cannot legally reach any formal agreementwith the Taliban government as long as the latter is not internationally recog-nized The Taliban government faces a self-imposed catch-22 situation Its

15 Ibid16 Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy ldquoTalibanrsquos Drug Dilemma Opium Production vs International

Recognitionrdquo The Analyst (Paris) (1999)

482 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

political policies and actions are deemed unacceptable by the internationalcommunity yet it cannot pursue any eradication policy with any hope ofcomplete success without the international recognition and aid that are beingdenied it owing to those policies and actions17

Future Prospects for Change in theTalibanrsquos Regime

Since 1996 the Taliban have been striving to bring the civil war to a success-ful conclusion Their domestic policies have brought about alienation andcreated fissures within the Afghan society Their inflexible stand on variouspolicies has denied them the credibility they so desire Their authoritarianismand intolerance have alienated non-Pushtun Afghans who make up morethan half the population The flow of thousands of extremist Pakistani andArab Taliban supporters into Afghanistan has fueled the resentment of thelocal populace18

The Taliban are accused of harboring terrorists and extremists who notonly support Taliban but also carry out their extremist policies in the targetedcountries According to a report that appeared in the Far Eastern EconomicReview (FEER) Afghanistan has become a sanctuary for ldquoarmed insurgentsaccused of terrorist attacks in China Iran Uzbekistan Tajikistan and Paki-stanrdquo Some 400 Arab Islamic militants from a dozen Middle Eastern andAfrican countries are said to be part of the 055 Brigade funded by Osama binLaden and fighting alongside Taliban in the current offensive The articlefurther noted that ldquo[t]he diverse groups have their own agendas mainly fo-cused on undermining the regimes at home but some share bin Ladenrsquos zealfor a global Islamic revolution The resulting web of dangerous friendshipsthreatens to export instability throughout the mineral-rich and commerciallyunder-exploited hinterland of Central Asiardquo19

It is obvious that the Taliban must improve their image both at home andabroad as perceptions play an important role in the general acceptability ornon-acceptability of governments in both arenas Currently the Taliban areperceived primarily as a negative element that is unlikely to play any positiverole in resolving the Afghan conflict If they fail in their goal the Afghannation will lose any trust that religious political forces could play any mean-ingful role in resolving the ongoing conflict The Talibanrsquos fate will be more

17 At the time of writing the Taliban were not cooperating in poppy eradication Currentlyit appears this may have changed The Taliban claim to have completely eradicated poppy pro-duction in the areas dominated by their troops and the claim is being verified under UN aus-pices

18 Peter Tomsen ldquoResponse A Chance for Peace in AfghanistanmdashThe Talibanrsquos Days areNumberedrdquo Foreign Affairs 79 (JanuaryndashFebruary 2000) p 179

19 Ahmed Rashid ldquoAfghanistan Heart of Darknessrdquo FEER August 5 1999

NASREEN GHUFRAN 483

or less the same as that which befell the mujahideen if they do not take timelyand corrective measures to improve Afghanistanrsquos deteriorating situation

The Taliban gained support from most of the populace in the beginningbecause they offered themselves a neutral force and declared their intentionto remain so However they are no longer neutral and have become anotherparty to the conflict Their policies have not only infuriated the internationalpublic but also large sections of the Afghan community The large influxesof Afghan refugees into Pakistan reflect the growing disagreement with theirpolicies This disenchantment is unlikely to change if the Taliban do notmoderate their stance The Taliban of course believe their policies to be im-portant for bringing about the change they desire but they do not realize howmuch these policies have alienated people The international community hasexplicitly voiced its criticism of the Taliban regime and consider it to be aliving nightmare for women political dissidents and anyone else who doesnot submit to the laws under the authority of the Ministry for the Fostering ofVirtue and Suppression of Vice The Taliban movement itself came about asa reaction to the self-seeking and self-destructive policies of the mujahideenwhose pretensions to Islam and leadership were discredited It was in thisideological vacuum and a Hobbesian state of anarchy that made the Talibanrsquosrule palatable to common Afghanis20 But if the Talibanrsquos government doesnot soften its present policies and complete peace is not restored it will notbe too late for the common people to turn against them

The year 2001 has seen universal outrage at the offensive launched by theTaliban rulers against Afghanistanrsquos Buddhist past Condemnation has notremained confined to non-Muslim states several Islamic countries includingPakistan have been appalled by the destruction of Buddhist statues in theprovince of Bamiyan Pakistan sent an official delegation whose aim was toprevent the Taliban from destroying the statues Pakistanrsquos foreign ministerAbdul Sattar said ldquoCertainly we believe it was a mistake a blunder and as aresult Afghanistan will suffer consequences for years to comerdquo To this headded that ldquoit is very difficult for me to make a statement as to why they didnot hearrdquo21 Iran likewise strongly condemned the statuesrsquo destruction Astatement released by Iranrsquos Cultural Heritage Organization wondered whyldquocertain Taliban-led individuals calling themselves lsquoclericrsquo have ordered de-struction of ancient sites of the mankind society citing blasphemy and idoliz-

20 Hafeez Malik ldquoPakistan Islam and the Taliban Phenomenonrdquo News International (Paki-stan) June 9 2000

21 Sattarrsquos remarks are in ibid March 11 2001

484 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

ing as reasonsrdquo22 To prevent their destruction Iran even offered to buy thestatues or move them into safekeeping

However the Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil rejectedany offer to prevent the destruction of the statues His negotiations with Pa-kistan did not bear a positive result and he rejected the Iranian offers reiterat-ing that the presence of the statues conflicted with Islamic teaching In thewake of the Talibanrsquos subsequent actions Iran led a UN initiative to takeserious action against the regime Commenting on the statuesrsquo destructionthe Iranian Foreign Ministry stated ldquoUnfortunately the Talibanrsquos destructionof the statues has cast doubts on the comprehensive views offered by Islamicideology in the world Clearly Muslims across the world pin the blame onthe rigid-minded Taliban and by no means embroil the Afghan Muslims inthis counter-cultural moverdquo23

The Bamiyan incident stirred up dual controversies about both the charac-ter of the Taliban regime and the relationship between culture religion andnational heritage in an Islamic state In his characteristic style Mullah Omarshrugged off all objections to the planned destruction of the Buddhist statuessaying ldquomy job is the implementation of Islamic orderrdquo He invoked Islamiclaw a fatwa issued by the Afghan ulama associated with this regime and thedecision of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to support his decision24

Nonetheless the destruction of the statues has further tarnished the Talibanrsquosimage While it may be the case that the Taliban undertook their actions inreaction to the tough sanctions imposed on them by the world the Talibanhave to realize that they are not going to earn any international sympathy orrecognition

Afghanistan has always been important to external powers due to its strate-gic location They have meddled in its affairs both in the past and at presentThe protracted civil war makes it more vulnerable to external penetration Insuch situations it has no other option but to seek help and support fromoutside The external powers are more than willing to do so if it serves theirnational interest The opposition is likely to adopt a similar strategy as theyhave less access to the resources of the country than the ruling authority Hadthere been no external involvement Afghanistanrsquos extended civil war wouldnot have become the protracted and complicated affair that it is

The Afghan civil war has important regional implications Various exter-nal powers are pursuing divergent objectives in Afghanistan and the outcome

22 Cultural Heritage Organization comment is in Iran News (Tehran) March 1 2001 Thisnews item is distributed via Middle East News Online available at lthttpwwwmiddleeastwirecomgt

23 Comments of the Iranian Foreign Ministry reported by the BBC World Service March 52001

24 Rahimullah Yusufzai ldquoA Question of Tolerancerdquo News International March 4 2001

482 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

political policies and actions are deemed unacceptable by the internationalcommunity yet it cannot pursue any eradication policy with any hope ofcomplete success without the international recognition and aid that are beingdenied it owing to those policies and actions17

Future Prospects for Change in theTalibanrsquos Regime

Since 1996 the Taliban have been striving to bring the civil war to a success-ful conclusion Their domestic policies have brought about alienation andcreated fissures within the Afghan society Their inflexible stand on variouspolicies has denied them the credibility they so desire Their authoritarianismand intolerance have alienated non-Pushtun Afghans who make up morethan half the population The flow of thousands of extremist Pakistani andArab Taliban supporters into Afghanistan has fueled the resentment of thelocal populace18

The Taliban are accused of harboring terrorists and extremists who notonly support Taliban but also carry out their extremist policies in the targetedcountries According to a report that appeared in the Far Eastern EconomicReview (FEER) Afghanistan has become a sanctuary for ldquoarmed insurgentsaccused of terrorist attacks in China Iran Uzbekistan Tajikistan and Paki-stanrdquo Some 400 Arab Islamic militants from a dozen Middle Eastern andAfrican countries are said to be part of the 055 Brigade funded by Osama binLaden and fighting alongside Taliban in the current offensive The articlefurther noted that ldquo[t]he diverse groups have their own agendas mainly fo-cused on undermining the regimes at home but some share bin Ladenrsquos zealfor a global Islamic revolution The resulting web of dangerous friendshipsthreatens to export instability throughout the mineral-rich and commerciallyunder-exploited hinterland of Central Asiardquo19

It is obvious that the Taliban must improve their image both at home andabroad as perceptions play an important role in the general acceptability ornon-acceptability of governments in both arenas Currently the Taliban areperceived primarily as a negative element that is unlikely to play any positiverole in resolving the Afghan conflict If they fail in their goal the Afghannation will lose any trust that religious political forces could play any mean-ingful role in resolving the ongoing conflict The Talibanrsquos fate will be more

17 At the time of writing the Taliban were not cooperating in poppy eradication Currentlyit appears this may have changed The Taliban claim to have completely eradicated poppy pro-duction in the areas dominated by their troops and the claim is being verified under UN aus-pices

18 Peter Tomsen ldquoResponse A Chance for Peace in AfghanistanmdashThe Talibanrsquos Days areNumberedrdquo Foreign Affairs 79 (JanuaryndashFebruary 2000) p 179

19 Ahmed Rashid ldquoAfghanistan Heart of Darknessrdquo FEER August 5 1999

NASREEN GHUFRAN 483

or less the same as that which befell the mujahideen if they do not take timelyand corrective measures to improve Afghanistanrsquos deteriorating situation

The Taliban gained support from most of the populace in the beginningbecause they offered themselves a neutral force and declared their intentionto remain so However they are no longer neutral and have become anotherparty to the conflict Their policies have not only infuriated the internationalpublic but also large sections of the Afghan community The large influxesof Afghan refugees into Pakistan reflect the growing disagreement with theirpolicies This disenchantment is unlikely to change if the Taliban do notmoderate their stance The Taliban of course believe their policies to be im-portant for bringing about the change they desire but they do not realize howmuch these policies have alienated people The international community hasexplicitly voiced its criticism of the Taliban regime and consider it to be aliving nightmare for women political dissidents and anyone else who doesnot submit to the laws under the authority of the Ministry for the Fostering ofVirtue and Suppression of Vice The Taliban movement itself came about asa reaction to the self-seeking and self-destructive policies of the mujahideenwhose pretensions to Islam and leadership were discredited It was in thisideological vacuum and a Hobbesian state of anarchy that made the Talibanrsquosrule palatable to common Afghanis20 But if the Talibanrsquos government doesnot soften its present policies and complete peace is not restored it will notbe too late for the common people to turn against them

The year 2001 has seen universal outrage at the offensive launched by theTaliban rulers against Afghanistanrsquos Buddhist past Condemnation has notremained confined to non-Muslim states several Islamic countries includingPakistan have been appalled by the destruction of Buddhist statues in theprovince of Bamiyan Pakistan sent an official delegation whose aim was toprevent the Taliban from destroying the statues Pakistanrsquos foreign ministerAbdul Sattar said ldquoCertainly we believe it was a mistake a blunder and as aresult Afghanistan will suffer consequences for years to comerdquo To this headded that ldquoit is very difficult for me to make a statement as to why they didnot hearrdquo21 Iran likewise strongly condemned the statuesrsquo destruction Astatement released by Iranrsquos Cultural Heritage Organization wondered whyldquocertain Taliban-led individuals calling themselves lsquoclericrsquo have ordered de-struction of ancient sites of the mankind society citing blasphemy and idoliz-

20 Hafeez Malik ldquoPakistan Islam and the Taliban Phenomenonrdquo News International (Paki-stan) June 9 2000

21 Sattarrsquos remarks are in ibid March 11 2001

484 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

ing as reasonsrdquo22 To prevent their destruction Iran even offered to buy thestatues or move them into safekeeping

However the Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil rejectedany offer to prevent the destruction of the statues His negotiations with Pa-kistan did not bear a positive result and he rejected the Iranian offers reiterat-ing that the presence of the statues conflicted with Islamic teaching In thewake of the Talibanrsquos subsequent actions Iran led a UN initiative to takeserious action against the regime Commenting on the statuesrsquo destructionthe Iranian Foreign Ministry stated ldquoUnfortunately the Talibanrsquos destructionof the statues has cast doubts on the comprehensive views offered by Islamicideology in the world Clearly Muslims across the world pin the blame onthe rigid-minded Taliban and by no means embroil the Afghan Muslims inthis counter-cultural moverdquo23

The Bamiyan incident stirred up dual controversies about both the charac-ter of the Taliban regime and the relationship between culture religion andnational heritage in an Islamic state In his characteristic style Mullah Omarshrugged off all objections to the planned destruction of the Buddhist statuessaying ldquomy job is the implementation of Islamic orderrdquo He invoked Islamiclaw a fatwa issued by the Afghan ulama associated with this regime and thedecision of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to support his decision24

Nonetheless the destruction of the statues has further tarnished the Talibanrsquosimage While it may be the case that the Taliban undertook their actions inreaction to the tough sanctions imposed on them by the world the Talibanhave to realize that they are not going to earn any international sympathy orrecognition

Afghanistan has always been important to external powers due to its strate-gic location They have meddled in its affairs both in the past and at presentThe protracted civil war makes it more vulnerable to external penetration Insuch situations it has no other option but to seek help and support fromoutside The external powers are more than willing to do so if it serves theirnational interest The opposition is likely to adopt a similar strategy as theyhave less access to the resources of the country than the ruling authority Hadthere been no external involvement Afghanistanrsquos extended civil war wouldnot have become the protracted and complicated affair that it is

The Afghan civil war has important regional implications Various exter-nal powers are pursuing divergent objectives in Afghanistan and the outcome

22 Cultural Heritage Organization comment is in Iran News (Tehran) March 1 2001 Thisnews item is distributed via Middle East News Online available at lthttpwwwmiddleeastwirecomgt

23 Comments of the Iranian Foreign Ministry reported by the BBC World Service March 52001

24 Rahimullah Yusufzai ldquoA Question of Tolerancerdquo News International March 4 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 483

or less the same as that which befell the mujahideen if they do not take timelyand corrective measures to improve Afghanistanrsquos deteriorating situation

The Taliban gained support from most of the populace in the beginningbecause they offered themselves a neutral force and declared their intentionto remain so However they are no longer neutral and have become anotherparty to the conflict Their policies have not only infuriated the internationalpublic but also large sections of the Afghan community The large influxesof Afghan refugees into Pakistan reflect the growing disagreement with theirpolicies This disenchantment is unlikely to change if the Taliban do notmoderate their stance The Taliban of course believe their policies to be im-portant for bringing about the change they desire but they do not realize howmuch these policies have alienated people The international community hasexplicitly voiced its criticism of the Taliban regime and consider it to be aliving nightmare for women political dissidents and anyone else who doesnot submit to the laws under the authority of the Ministry for the Fostering ofVirtue and Suppression of Vice The Taliban movement itself came about asa reaction to the self-seeking and self-destructive policies of the mujahideenwhose pretensions to Islam and leadership were discredited It was in thisideological vacuum and a Hobbesian state of anarchy that made the Talibanrsquosrule palatable to common Afghanis20 But if the Talibanrsquos government doesnot soften its present policies and complete peace is not restored it will notbe too late for the common people to turn against them

The year 2001 has seen universal outrage at the offensive launched by theTaliban rulers against Afghanistanrsquos Buddhist past Condemnation has notremained confined to non-Muslim states several Islamic countries includingPakistan have been appalled by the destruction of Buddhist statues in theprovince of Bamiyan Pakistan sent an official delegation whose aim was toprevent the Taliban from destroying the statues Pakistanrsquos foreign ministerAbdul Sattar said ldquoCertainly we believe it was a mistake a blunder and as aresult Afghanistan will suffer consequences for years to comerdquo To this headded that ldquoit is very difficult for me to make a statement as to why they didnot hearrdquo21 Iran likewise strongly condemned the statuesrsquo destruction Astatement released by Iranrsquos Cultural Heritage Organization wondered whyldquocertain Taliban-led individuals calling themselves lsquoclericrsquo have ordered de-struction of ancient sites of the mankind society citing blasphemy and idoliz-

20 Hafeez Malik ldquoPakistan Islam and the Taliban Phenomenonrdquo News International (Paki-stan) June 9 2000

21 Sattarrsquos remarks are in ibid March 11 2001

484 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

ing as reasonsrdquo22 To prevent their destruction Iran even offered to buy thestatues or move them into safekeeping

However the Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil rejectedany offer to prevent the destruction of the statues His negotiations with Pa-kistan did not bear a positive result and he rejected the Iranian offers reiterat-ing that the presence of the statues conflicted with Islamic teaching In thewake of the Talibanrsquos subsequent actions Iran led a UN initiative to takeserious action against the regime Commenting on the statuesrsquo destructionthe Iranian Foreign Ministry stated ldquoUnfortunately the Talibanrsquos destructionof the statues has cast doubts on the comprehensive views offered by Islamicideology in the world Clearly Muslims across the world pin the blame onthe rigid-minded Taliban and by no means embroil the Afghan Muslims inthis counter-cultural moverdquo23

The Bamiyan incident stirred up dual controversies about both the charac-ter of the Taliban regime and the relationship between culture religion andnational heritage in an Islamic state In his characteristic style Mullah Omarshrugged off all objections to the planned destruction of the Buddhist statuessaying ldquomy job is the implementation of Islamic orderrdquo He invoked Islamiclaw a fatwa issued by the Afghan ulama associated with this regime and thedecision of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to support his decision24

Nonetheless the destruction of the statues has further tarnished the Talibanrsquosimage While it may be the case that the Taliban undertook their actions inreaction to the tough sanctions imposed on them by the world the Talibanhave to realize that they are not going to earn any international sympathy orrecognition

Afghanistan has always been important to external powers due to its strate-gic location They have meddled in its affairs both in the past and at presentThe protracted civil war makes it more vulnerable to external penetration Insuch situations it has no other option but to seek help and support fromoutside The external powers are more than willing to do so if it serves theirnational interest The opposition is likely to adopt a similar strategy as theyhave less access to the resources of the country than the ruling authority Hadthere been no external involvement Afghanistanrsquos extended civil war wouldnot have become the protracted and complicated affair that it is

The Afghan civil war has important regional implications Various exter-nal powers are pursuing divergent objectives in Afghanistan and the outcome

22 Cultural Heritage Organization comment is in Iran News (Tehran) March 1 2001 Thisnews item is distributed via Middle East News Online available at lthttpwwwmiddleeastwirecomgt

23 Comments of the Iranian Foreign Ministry reported by the BBC World Service March 52001

24 Rahimullah Yusufzai ldquoA Question of Tolerancerdquo News International March 4 2001

484 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

ing as reasonsrdquo22 To prevent their destruction Iran even offered to buy thestatues or move them into safekeeping

However the Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil rejectedany offer to prevent the destruction of the statues His negotiations with Pa-kistan did not bear a positive result and he rejected the Iranian offers reiterat-ing that the presence of the statues conflicted with Islamic teaching In thewake of the Talibanrsquos subsequent actions Iran led a UN initiative to takeserious action against the regime Commenting on the statuesrsquo destructionthe Iranian Foreign Ministry stated ldquoUnfortunately the Talibanrsquos destructionof the statues has cast doubts on the comprehensive views offered by Islamicideology in the world Clearly Muslims across the world pin the blame onthe rigid-minded Taliban and by no means embroil the Afghan Muslims inthis counter-cultural moverdquo23

The Bamiyan incident stirred up dual controversies about both the charac-ter of the Taliban regime and the relationship between culture religion andnational heritage in an Islamic state In his characteristic style Mullah Omarshrugged off all objections to the planned destruction of the Buddhist statuessaying ldquomy job is the implementation of Islamic orderrdquo He invoked Islamiclaw a fatwa issued by the Afghan ulama associated with this regime and thedecision of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to support his decision24

Nonetheless the destruction of the statues has further tarnished the Talibanrsquosimage While it may be the case that the Taliban undertook their actions inreaction to the tough sanctions imposed on them by the world the Talibanhave to realize that they are not going to earn any international sympathy orrecognition

Afghanistan has always been important to external powers due to its strate-gic location They have meddled in its affairs both in the past and at presentThe protracted civil war makes it more vulnerable to external penetration Insuch situations it has no other option but to seek help and support fromoutside The external powers are more than willing to do so if it serves theirnational interest The opposition is likely to adopt a similar strategy as theyhave less access to the resources of the country than the ruling authority Hadthere been no external involvement Afghanistanrsquos extended civil war wouldnot have become the protracted and complicated affair that it is

The Afghan civil war has important regional implications Various exter-nal powers are pursuing divergent objectives in Afghanistan and the outcome

22 Cultural Heritage Organization comment is in Iran News (Tehran) March 1 2001 Thisnews item is distributed via Middle East News Online available at lthttpwwwmiddleeastwirecomgt

23 Comments of the Iranian Foreign Ministry reported by the BBC World Service March 52001

24 Rahimullah Yusufzai ldquoA Question of Tolerancerdquo News International March 4 2001

NASREEN GHUFRAN 485

of these playersrsquo pursuits may determine the continuation of the conflict Themost influential such player Pakistan is aiming to establish a friendly gov-ernment in Afghanistan Pakistan wants to attain strategic depth against In-dia A complete victory by the Taliban would give Pakistan greater access toCentral Asian markets and a safe route for the planned oil and gas pipelinefrom Turkmenistan to the Arabian Sea

The end of the civil war in Afghanistan would also lead to the repatriationof Afghan refugees in Pakistan Pakistan is growing impatient with the ef-fects of having these refugees on its soil Economically Pakistanis arealarmed because some of the refugees have been able to monopolize varioustrades The vast influx of refugees has kept labor wages low Their largenumbers have contributed to the overcrowding of cities and villages therebyoverstretching the infrastructure and contributing to an increase in rents HajiAbdul Haleem the president of Sarhad Chamber of Commerce and Industryexpressed the exasperation felt by many Pakistanis ldquoThe local traders arepaying taxes while their businesses have come to a standstill due to [the] freehand given to Afghan traders in the trading activities as they do not pay anytaxesrdquo25 Many of the refugees have also been blamed for increased crimeespecially gunrunning drug smuggling prostitution and theft The Pakistanigovernment has launched intermittent operations against those Afghan refu-gees involved in heinous crimes Statistics compiled by the crime branch ofthe police in the North West Frontier Province revealed that the refugeescommitted 11 times more crimes than the local population during the year1998 Nearly eight out of every 1000 Afghan refugees have been formallyaccused of committing a crime26

Pakistanrsquos major competitor for influence in Afghanistan is Iran Iran hassought to give the Northern Alliance support as a way to express its solidaritywith Afghanistanrsquos Shirsquoa population On the other hand Saudi Arabia is pro-viding financial support to the Taliban to limit Iranian influence in Afghani-stan Saudi Arabia has an affinity to the Talibanrsquos interpretation of IslamHowever the Saudi government has specific concerns over the activities ofSaudi dissident Osama bin Laden currently residing in the Taliban-occupiedareas of Afghanistan The stated objectives of the US are for the civil warto end with the establishment of a representative government However it ismost interested in driving international terrorists out of Afghanistan and put-ting a stop to drug trafficking To prevent a spread of the Talibanrsquos brand ofIslamic fundamentalism the US is tacitly cooperating with the Northern Al-liance

25 Haleem in ibid January 4 1998

26 Police statistics in ibid March 5 1999

486 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

The Taliban face other obstacles among the neighboring Central Asian re-publics of Turkmenistan Uzbekistan and Tajikistan These republics con-sider the Taliban a direct threat to their security For that reason they arecooperating with the Northern Alliance through a complex network of ethnicallegiances However the continuation of the Afghan conflict poses a majorconstraint to the development of communication linkages and energy pipe-lines to the south Russia is similarly motivated by a desire to deter thespread of fundamentalist elements and it too is supporting the Northern Alli-ance groups in the conflict

ConclusionAfghanistanrsquos protracted domestic conflict has not ended because the mainprotagonists continue to pursue their objectives on the battlefield That saidat this point it is unclear whether the end of the conflict would even helpAfghanistan Subjugation is not in the nature of Afghans they cannot beforced to accept things whether they be religious or secular Disillusionmentis gaining ground even in areas under the Talibanrsquos control Given where theTalibanrsquos leadership received their training many Afghans consider them tobe a foreign-trained force imposed upon them by Pakistan The growing res-ervations about and resentment over Pakistanrsquos involvement in the countryare not going to favor the Taliban regime However the opposition NorthernAlliancersquos reluctance to seek a negotiated settlement to the civil war onlyreflects their own inability to bring about unity and peace in the countryMoreover the civil war has hardened ethnic differences in AfghanistanBridging these cleavages will take years to overcome

Despite their ground successes the Taliban do not have widespread inter-national recognition Although the Taliban purportedly wish to cultivate rela-tions with other nations their political rigidity is not contributing positivelyto this aim Afghanistan has paid a high price for its past isolation and itcertainly cannot afford it in the 21st century The regime will have to changeits approach and policies if it is to be accepted by the international commu-nity Whatrsquos more international sanctions have further complicated an eco-nomic situation already made difficult by the destruction to the Afghaneconomy wrought by the years of civil war The Talibanrsquos totalitarian poli-cies have alienated many of its own people Under the conditions those poli-cies impose the refugees currently residing in Pakistan and Iran are unlikelyto return to their homeland At the same time as long as the civil war contin-ues external powers will meddle in Afghanistanrsquos internal affairs A weakgovernment cannot prevent foreign interference in Afghanistan and adopt in-dependent policies

If the Taliban desire a stable peace a political solution has to be a toppriority They could make a great contribution to achieving such by holding

NASREEN GHUFRAN 487

a referendum in areas under their control This action would also encouragethe Northern Alliance to do the same in areas under their control A referen-dum could be carried out with the supervision of the UN While it is theresponsibility of the Taliban to make major changes to their domestic poli-cies the rest of the world should also come forward to assist AfghanistanBy recognizing the mobile government of President Rabbani and ignoring theground realities in Afghanistan the world is not helping to reduce the ten-sions One cannot encourage any change to the Talibanrsquos policies by treatingthem like pariahs Only by engaging the Taliban in the international commu-nity will they be able to moderate their worldview

486 ASIAN SURVEY VOL XLI NO 3 MAYJUNE 2001

The Taliban face other obstacles among the neighboring Central Asian re-publics of Turkmenistan Uzbekistan and Tajikistan These republics con-sider the Taliban a direct threat to their security For that reason they arecooperating with the Northern Alliance through a complex network of ethnicallegiances However the continuation of the Afghan conflict poses a majorconstraint to the development of communication linkages and energy pipe-lines to the south Russia is similarly motivated by a desire to deter thespread of fundamentalist elements and it too is supporting the Northern Alli-ance groups in the conflict

ConclusionAfghanistanrsquos protracted domestic conflict has not ended because the mainprotagonists continue to pursue their objectives on the battlefield That saidat this point it is unclear whether the end of the conflict would even helpAfghanistan Subjugation is not in the nature of Afghans they cannot beforced to accept things whether they be religious or secular Disillusionmentis gaining ground even in areas under the Talibanrsquos control Given where theTalibanrsquos leadership received their training many Afghans consider them tobe a foreign-trained force imposed upon them by Pakistan The growing res-ervations about and resentment over Pakistanrsquos involvement in the countryare not going to favor the Taliban regime However the opposition NorthernAlliancersquos reluctance to seek a negotiated settlement to the civil war onlyreflects their own inability to bring about unity and peace in the countryMoreover the civil war has hardened ethnic differences in AfghanistanBridging these cleavages will take years to overcome

Despite their ground successes the Taliban do not have widespread inter-national recognition Although the Taliban purportedly wish to cultivate rela-tions with other nations their political rigidity is not contributing positivelyto this aim Afghanistan has paid a high price for its past isolation and itcertainly cannot afford it in the 21st century The regime will have to changeits approach and policies if it is to be accepted by the international commu-nity Whatrsquos more international sanctions have further complicated an eco-nomic situation already made difficult by the destruction to the Afghaneconomy wrought by the years of civil war The Talibanrsquos totalitarian poli-cies have alienated many of its own people Under the conditions those poli-cies impose the refugees currently residing in Pakistan and Iran are unlikelyto return to their homeland At the same time as long as the civil war contin-ues external powers will meddle in Afghanistanrsquos internal affairs A weakgovernment cannot prevent foreign interference in Afghanistan and adopt in-dependent policies

If the Taliban desire a stable peace a political solution has to be a toppriority They could make a great contribution to achieving such by holding

NASREEN GHUFRAN 487

a referendum in areas under their control This action would also encouragethe Northern Alliance to do the same in areas under their control A referen-dum could be carried out with the supervision of the UN While it is theresponsibility of the Taliban to make major changes to their domestic poli-cies the rest of the world should also come forward to assist AfghanistanBy recognizing the mobile government of President Rabbani and ignoring theground realities in Afghanistan the world is not helping to reduce the ten-sions One cannot encourage any change to the Talibanrsquos policies by treatingthem like pariahs Only by engaging the Taliban in the international commu-nity will they be able to moderate their worldview

NASREEN GHUFRAN 487

a referendum in areas under their control This action would also encouragethe Northern Alliance to do the same in areas under their control A referen-dum could be carried out with the supervision of the UN While it is theresponsibility of the Taliban to make major changes to their domestic poli-cies the rest of the world should also come forward to assist AfghanistanBy recognizing the mobile government of President Rabbani and ignoring theground realities in Afghanistan the world is not helping to reduce the ten-sions One cannot encourage any change to the Talibanrsquos policies by treatingthem like pariahs Only by engaging the Taliban in the international commu-nity will they be able to moderate their worldview