University of Florida Levin College of LawUF Law Scholarship RepositoryFaculty Publications Faculty Scholarship10-1-2003Te Symbols of Governance: Turman Arnold andPost-Realist Legal TeoryMark FensterUniversity of Florida Levin College of Law, fenster@law.uf.eduFollow this and additional works at: htp://scholarship.law.uf.edu/facultypubPart of the Jurisprudence Commons, and the Legal History, Teory and Process CommonsTis Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusionin Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact outler@law.uf.edu.Recommended CitationMark Fenster, Te Symbols of Governance: Turman Arnold and Post-Realist Legal Teory, 51 Bufalo Law Review 1053 (2003), availableat htp://scholarship.law.uf.edu/facultypub/87ARTICLETheSymbolsofGovernance:Thurman Arnoldand Post-RealistLegalTheoryMARKFENSTERtIamchieflyinterestedineditorials,judicialdecisions,TheSaturdayEveningPost,themovies,speechesbyuniversityprofessors,The NewRepublic, TheNation-in fact,thatstreamofcurrentliteraturewhichIamtryingtoanalyzetogetattitudesofthetime.Ireadthemandclipthemtotheexclusionofalmosteverything else.-ThurmanArnold'tAssistantProfessor,LevinCollegeofLaw,Universityof Florida.J.D.YaleLawSchool,1998;Ph.D.UniversityofIllinoisatUrbana-Champaign(mediaandculturalstudies),1992.EarlierversionswerepresentedattheAmericanBar Foundationin October2002;at the first Columbia,USC& GeorgetownLaw& HumanitiesInterdisciplinaryJuniorScholarWorkshop,heldinJune2002;andattheLawandSocietyAssociationannualmeetinginChicagoinJune1999.ThanksespeciallytohelpfulcommentsIreceivedfromBryantGarth,ArielaGross,WilliamNovak,RobertPost, AustinSarat,JohnHenrySchlegel,JonathanSimon,ClydeSpillenger,ChristopherTomlins,SpencerWeberWaller,RobertWeisberg,G.EdwardWhite,andTryshTravis,andfrommycolleaguesBillPageandChrisSlobogin.Financialsupportwasprovidedbyasummerresearchgrant from the LevinCollegeof Law.1.BooKsTHATCHANGEDOUR MINDS7-8(MalcolmCowley& BernardSmitheds.,1939).1053BUFFALO LAW REVIEWINTRODUCTIONThoughrootedinthelegalrealismwithwhichheistypicallyassociated,2ThurmanArnold'smid-1930smonographs,TheSymbolsof Government andTheFolkloreofCapitalism,3 infactattemptedtoestablishanewapproachinAmericanlegaltheory:thecriticalstudyof thesymbolicdomainof governance.'Whilethetraditionallegalrealistcritiquerevealedthehistoricallyconstructedandcontingentnatureofthelegalformsthatlegalformalistsessentialized,SymbolsandFolklore insteadinquiredintotheimportanceofthecultural"symbols"and"folklore"ofgovernance.Arnoldthusalignedhimselfwithlegalformalistsandtraditionaleconomists(whoseworkrealistsalsocritiqued)byarguingthatcertainassumptionsregardinglegaldoctrine,politicalstructure,anda capitalisteconomyseemedessentialtothegoverninginstitutionsofthe UnitedStates,evenas heagreedwithlegalrealiststhatmanyofthoseassumptionswereoutdated,inefficient,andunjust.Unlikeconventionalrealists,Arnoldhadlittlefaiththat merereformwouldcuregoverninginstitutionsandthepublicoftheirirrationalinvestmentsinthesymbolsofgovernmentandcapitalism.Suchsymbols,heargued,formtheterrainuponwhichthestruggleforpoliticalandlegal2.SeeLAURAKALMAN,LEGALREALISMATYALE,1927-1960,at34-35(1986);WILLIAMTWINING,KARLLLEWELLYNANDTHEREALISTMOVEMENT67-69(1973);DouglasAyer,InQuestofEfficiency:TheIdeological JourneyofThurmanArnoldintheInterwar Period, 23STAN.L.REV.1049(1971);NeilDuxbury,SomeRadicalism AboutRealism? Thurman Arnold and thePolitics of ModernJurisprudence, 10OXFORDJ.LEGALSTUD.11,12(1990);JohnHenrySchlegel,AmericanLegalRealismandEmpiricalSocialScience:FromtheYaleExperience, 28BUFF.L.REV.459,511-12,568-70 & n.585,589(1979).3.THURMANARNOLD,THEFOLKLOREOFCAPITALISM(1937)[hereinafterFOLKLORE];THURMANARNOLD,THESYMBOLSOFGOVERNMENT(1935)[hereinafterSYMBOLS].4.By"governance"Irefertothe expansionof thestrategiesof politicalrulebeyonditstraditionalinstitutionalconfineswithinthepoliticalandlegalapparatusesof thestate.InNikolasRose'sterms,thisconceptionof governance"rejectsthe viewthatonemustaccountforthepoliticalassemblagesof ruleintermsofthephilosophicalandconstitutionallanguageofthenineteenthcentury,orthatonemustunderpinthismisleadingaccountwithatheoreticalinfrastructurederivedfromnineteenth-centurysocialandpoliticaltheory."NIKOLASROSE,POWERSOFFREEDOM:REFRAMINGPOLITICALTHOUGHT17-18(1999).Governanceincludes"anyprogram,discourse,or strategythat attemptstoalterorshapetheactionsofothersoroneself."BARBARACRUIKSHANK,THEWILL TOEMPOWER:DEMOCRATICCITIZENSANDOTHERSUBJECTS4 (1999).1054[Vol.51SYMBOLSOF GOVERNANCEchangetakesplace.Realistssoughttodebunksymbols;Arnoldsoughttounderstandandusethemtoreshapethepublic'sbeliefs.Readingand,astheepigraphnotes,"clipping" thelegal,political,andpopularliterature ofhistime,Arnoldsought"[a]nemotionalcomprehensionofascienceabout law"insteadof arealistorformalist"scienceof law.'SymbolsandFolklorealsodepartedfromrealismintheirmockingcriticismofeliteandpopularideologies.BeforeFredRodellbeganmakingacareeroutof it,6 Arnoldservedasthelegalacademy'scourtjester,tweakingthepretensionsoflegalformalismandthelegalprofessoriatebylikeningthedominant"jurisprudence"ofhistimetoa"shiningbutunfulfilled dreamofaworldgovernedbyreason."'Working attorneysmay appreciatetheexistenceofthejurisprudentialdream,heexplained,buttheyhopetheir sonsdon't wastetheir timestudyingthe subjectin lawschool.8 Hisironyextendedtothepretensionsofgoverningideologygenerally.Whereasprimitiveculturesbasetheirrationallawsonirrational,"magical"premises,moderncapitalistdemocraciessufferirrationallegalandpoliticalregimesconstructedthroughhyper-rationaltheoriesanddeliberation:9InourrationalandsophisticatedagetheDevilandHellbecomeverycomplicated.ThetruefaithisCapitalism.Itspriestsarelawyersandeconomists.TheDevilconsistsofanabstractmancalledademagogue.Heisthekindofpersonwhorefusestobemovedbysoundeconomistsandlawyersandwhoisconstantlymisleadingthepeoplebymakingtheworseappearthebetterreason.Arnolddidnotmerelyproposeatheorydistinctfromrealism;hecombineda detachedsocialscientificanalysisofthesymbolsofgovernancewithadetached,ironicvoice.Together,hisapproachandvoicesuggestedthattheintellectuallyandfunctionallyefficaciousreformermust5.Thurman W.Arnold,Book Review,36COLUM.L.REv.687,690(1936).6.SeeFREDRODELL,WOEUNTOYou,LAWYERS!(1939);NeilDuxbury, IntheTwilightof LegalRealism: Fred RodellandtheLimitsof LegalCritique, 11OXFORDJ.LEGALSTUD.354(1991).7.SYMBOLS,supra note 3,at 57-59.8.Id.at 59.9.Id.at 4.10.FOLKLORE,supra note3,at5.2003]1055BUFFALO LAW REVIEWoperatewithinthesymbolsof governancewhileremainingsufficientlyremovedtonotethosesymbols'contingentconstructionandemptinessofmeaning.Hecouldspeaktointellectualandpopularaudiencesoutsidethetraditionalconfinesoflegalacademiaandpresenthimselfandhisideasasthemodern,humorousantidotetoastultifyinglegal,political,andeconomiccommonsense.Symbolsand Folklore arehistoricallyimportanteffortstoconsidertheimplicationsof legalrealismand1930s-eraqualitativesocialsciencesforthestudyofthesymbolsoflawspecificallyandgovernancegenerally.Inthem,Arnolddecenteredlawandtraditionallegal-andeventraditionally legalrealist-objectsandmethodsin thestudyofgovernance,aneffortthatcontinuestodayinthe"Lawand"scholarshipthatproliferatesthroughoutthelegalacademyand socialsciences.11 To theextentthat"we arealllegalrealistsnow,"12SymbolsandFolkloreremainsignificantasearlypost-realistworksthatengagedinawide-ranginginterdisciplinaryinquiryintolaw'splacewithinawidercultural,social,andpoliticalcontextthanlegalacademiatypicallyconsidered.Assuch,SymbolsandFolkloreaskmanyofthesamequestionsregardinglaw'ssignificanceandsignifyingpracticesthatscholarscontinueto consider.ThisisnottosaythatArnold'smonographswereanunqualifiedsuccess.Theirultimatefailuretoestablishacoherentandrecognizablefieldof inquirywithareplicablemethodologydemonstratesnotonlythelimitsofArnold'sapproach,butalsothelimitsofthesocialsciencesfromwhichhedrew.Thisfailurehelpsexplainthewaningof hisreputation.Despitetheprominenceofhiscareer-whichincludedstintsasaYaleLawSchoolprofessor,afederalappealscourtjudge,aNewDeal"trustbuster,"andaco-founderoftheWashingtonD.C.firmArnold,Fortas&Porter(laterrenamedArnold&PorterafteroneofitspartnersmovedtotheSupremeCourt)"3-hisworkhasnot11.SeeArthurA.Leff,Lawand, 87YALEL.J.989(1978)(meditatingonlaw'scomplexrelationshipwiththewebsofhumanculture,andontheinevitablyproliferatinghumaneffortstostudy the relationship).12.JosephWilliamSinger,ReviewEssay,LegalRealism Now,76CAL.L.REV.465,467(1988).13.Accountsof Arnold'slifeappearin his autobiography,THURMANARNOLD,FAIRFIGHTSANDFOUL(1965),inSpencerWeberWaller,TheShort UnhappyJudgeship ofThurman Arnold,3Wyo.L.REV.233(2003)aswellasinthe1056[Vol.512003] SYMBOLSOF GOVERNANCE 1057receivedtheattentionthatotherrealistshavegarnered.14Whentheydiscusshimatall,contemporarylegalcommentatorschideArnoldforhisintoleranceandarrogance,"his"abidingsocialconservatism '"andhisintellectual"attentionspanofatwo-year-old.1 7 Asalegaltheorist,heisconsideredanoutlier,arepresentativeofa"peripheral orradicalstrand"oftherealistmovementwhosecurrentrelevancelieslargelyinits indirectinfluenceonCriticalLegalStudies.8 Moreoften,contemporaryscholarsquoteinstancesofhiscaustic,amusingcritiqueoftheunquestionedassumptionsoflegalformalismwithoutplacingsuchquipswithinhislargeracademicandpoliticalproject.ThisArticleisanefforttoprovideboththeintellectualcontextof Arnold'sworkand,throughhis work,abettersenseof whereandhowthestudyoflawturnedafter realism.TheArticleisinfiveparts.PartIdescribesArnold'srelationshipwithlegalrealism,lookingattheearliestpartof hisacademiccareerwhen,asamainstreamrealist,heintroductiontoacollectionofhisletters,GENEM.GRESSLEY,Introduction,VOLTAIREANDTHECOWBOY:THELETTERSOFTHURMANARNOLD1-94(GeneM.Gressleyed.,1977),andinEDWARDN.KEARNY,THURMANARNOLD,SOCIALCRITIC39-62(1970).14.Arnoldhasnotbeenthesubjectofafull-lengthbiography,whilehisworkisgenerallymarginalizedwithinhistoriesof legalrealismandhasnotevenbeenthe principalsubjectof an articlein anAmericanlaw reviewin thirtyyears.15.SeeNEILDUXBURY,PATTERNSOFAMERICANJURISPRUDENCE240-41(1995).16.Ayer, supra note2,at 1052.17.Schlegel,supra note2,at512n.264(1979).ButseeLauraKalman,Eating Spaghetti withaSpoon,49STAN.L.REV.1547,1557(1997)(reviewingDUXBURY,supranote15)(praisingArnold'sworkas"provocative,"hispersonalityas"compelling," and his personallettersas"lively").18.Duxbury, supra note2,at12,39-41.19.See,e.g.,DouglasG.Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested Axioms,108YALEL.J.573,593(1998)(quotingArnold'ssarcasticdescriptionof thenegotiationssurroundingcorporatereorganizations);AnthonyV.Baker,"So Extraordinary,SoUnprecedented an Authority": AConceptual Reconsideration of theSingularDoctrine of JudicialReview,39DUQ.L. REV.729,729n.2 (2001)(citing Arnold'ssarcasticdescriptionof the SupremeCourtasa"great Delphicoracle");HerbertA.Eastman,Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators,104YALEL.J.763,805(1995)(quotingArnold'sdescriptionof how,forNewDealopponents,theConstitutionhadbecome"asortofabracadabrawhichwouldcureall disease");EricTalley, Precedential Cascades:AnAppraisal, 73S.CAL.L.REV.87,108&n.68(1999)(citingArnold,amongotherrealists,for hiscritique of the insincerityof judicial decision-making).BUFFALO LAW REVIEWperformedempiricalstudiesoflocalandstatecourtsystems.Itthentraceshisshifttowardsthetheoreticalwingofrealismashebegantoattackthecontradictionsandfailingsof classicallegalformalism,andas heextendedrealismbeyondits focusonprivate commonlawdoctrinestoacritiqueofformalistconceptionsofpublicandconstitutionallaw,withanemphasisondefendingtheconstitutionalauthorityofNewDealadministrativeagencies.It closesbyexplicatingArnold'scritiqueof realisminSymbolsandFolklore,wherehecondemnedrealists'inability tograspthefundamentalrolethat formalconceptsplay in modernsocietyand governance.ThesubjectofPartIIisArnold'sproposedfieldof"PoliticalDynamics,"aninterdisciplinaryapproachtothesymbolsoflaw,politics,andeconomics.IcloselytraceArnold'spromiscuoususeofthesocialsciencesprevalentduringtheinterwaryears,especiallythestudyofpoliticalpropagandaandideologies,anthropology,andinstitutionaleconomics.PartIIIconsidersArnold'sauthorialvoiceinSymbolsandFolklore, whichestablishedhimasanironicobserveroftheodd,self-destructivefolkwaysof1930sAmericangovernance.Apasticheof popularMenckenesquecommentator,criticalandqualitativesocialscientist,andNewDealproponent,theArnoldofSymbolsandFolkloredifferedsharplyfromhisrealistcontemporaries.FocusingontwoareasoflegaldoctrineandpracticethatArnoldstudiedinSymbolsandFolklore,PartIVexplainshowArnoldappliedhistheorytothecriminaltrialandtotheemergingfieldof administrativelaw(or,morespecifically,thejudicialreviewofadministrativeagencies).Inbothinstances,Arnoldfocusednotmerelyonthefunctionalandinstrumentalvalueof realistlawreformandenforcement,butalsoconsideredthewaygoverninginstitutionsstruggleoverthemeaningof thesymbolsthatconditiontheirveryexistenceandoperations.Whileremarkablyprescientinitsself-reflexivity,Arnold'sexpansivecritiqueof realismwasdistinguishedbysignificantblindspots.IappraisetheseinPartV,concentratingonhisanti-democratictendenciesandthelimitationsofhisoftenham-fistedcriticalapproach.Arnold'sweaknessesweresymptomaticnotonlyof hisownshortcomingsasacriticandscholar,butalsoofthelegalrealismandsocialsciencesfromwhichhedrew.ThroughoutthisArticleandespeciallyintheConclusion,I1058[Vol.51SYMBOLSOF GOVERNANCEconsiderArnold'svalueasanhistoricalfigureandmaketwoclaims.First,totheextentthatArnoldbothbuiltonandbrokefrom hisrealistcolleagues,Symbolsand Folkloreforceustoconsiderthelimitsofrealism'scontinuingrelevanceasafoundationofcontemporaryscholarship.Second,inhisironicandaccessiblemonographs,Arnoldestablishedacriticalpublicvoiceforthelegalacademic;thatvoiceremainsacompelling,if limited,modelforlegalscholarshipthathopestointerveneinthepublicsphere.Ultimately,themonographs'positionwithinthenarrativeof Americanlegaltheory providesboth aninspiringaccountofcross-disciplinaryinquiryandacautionarytaleofinterdisciplinarity'sperils.I.ARNOLD ANDREALISMDespitehisprotestationstothecontrary,"Arnoldisgenerallyconsideredarealist.21 HearrivedatYale,oneofrealism'scorestrongholds,in1930,22havingalreadyproducedacoherent,socialscience-influencedseriesofstudiesofcivilcourtprocedure.23 SoonafterhisarrivalinNewHaven,hisworkbegantoshiftfromtheempiricalrealismof hispre-Yalearticlestoamodeof realismfocusedmoreontheoreticalanddoctrinalissues.24 Thisshiftwas20.Seeinfra Part I.C.21.Seesourcescited supra note2.22.See GRESSLEY,supra note13,at 29.23.See generally Ayer,supra note2,at1058-64(describingworkfromtheearlyperiodof Arnold'scareerasadopting"the ideologyof proceduralreformSchlegel,supranote2,at511-12,569-70&n.589,585(describingArnold'srecruitmentbyYale);see,e.g.,ThurmanArnold,TheCollection ofJudicialStatisticsinWestVirginia, 36W.VA.L.Q.184(1930)(describingprojectofcollectinginformationonall casescomingbeforelowercourtsto aidin effortsincourtreform);ThurmanArnold,Judicial Councils,35W.VA.L.Q.193,194(1929)(describingascommongoalof judgesandthebartoadministerjustice"efficiently,speedilyandeconomically");ThurmanArnoldetal.,ReporttotheCommittee onJudicial Administration and LegalReformoftheWestVirginiaBar Association Containing Suggestions Concerning Pleading andPractice inWestVirginia, 36W.VA.L.Q.1,10(1929)(promotingformationof judicialcouncilstostudyWestVirginiacourts"withaviewofimprovingtheadministration of justice,and submit reformsuggestions tothe courts").24.SeeKALMAN,supra note2,at34-35(1986);Schlegel,supra note2,at511-12,569-70& n.589,585;seealso Duxbury,supra note2,at19(attributingArnold'sshifttointerdisciplinarytheoreticalworktohisopportunism);TWINING,supra note2,at 67-69(1973)(using Arnoldasacentral exampleof thedifferencesbetweenColumbiaLawSchool'sempiricalstrainof realisminthe2003] 10591060BUFFALOLAWREVIEW[Vol.51itself withinthe mainstreamof realism,especiallyasit waspracticedatYale,wheretheleadingrealistsmovedawayfromsocialscienceandtowardsdoctrinaltheoryandcritique .25Articlesfromhis early(i.e.,pre-monograph)Yaleperiodincludedattacks uponthethen-prevailingLangdellianlegalformalism'6 aswellasmorespecificcritiquesof prevailingdoctrinalconceptionsoftrustlaw,criminalattempts,andtherelationshipbetweensubstantiveandprocedurallaw.27late1920sand thestrainof realismthat Yaleexemplifiedin the1930s,whichwasmore explicitlypolitical,moreinterestedin therulesof civilprocedure,andmoreinfluencedbypsychologyandpsychiatry).Onthedistinctionbetweenrealism'sempiricalandtheoreticaltendencies,seeinfranotes31,35andaccompanyingtext.25.SeeJOHNHENRYSCHLEGEL,AMERICANLEGALREALISMANDEMPIRICALSOCIALSCIENCE19(1995)(noting that onlyUnderhillMoorewouldundertakeamajorempiricalresearchprojectafter1933);JohnHenrySchlegel,TheTenThousandDollarQuestion,41STAN.L.REV.435,462(1989)(reviewingKALMAN,supra note2)(noting the shift among the Yale realists).26.Iusetheterm"formalism" torefertothe"classicalorthodox"theoryoflegalthoughtof thelate-nineteenthandearly-twentiethcenturymostcloselyassociatedwithHarvardLawSchoolDeanChristopherLangdell.SeeThomasC.Grey,Langdell'sOrthodoxy,45U.PITT. L.REV.1(1983).Theclassicalorthodoxtheoryaspiredtoaquasi-scientific,comprehensive,complete,formal,and conceptuallyorderedsystem baseduponasmallnumberof principlesfromwhich a largenumberof rules,found and utilizedin establishedprecedents,canbederived.SeeWILLIAMP. LAPIANA,LOGICANDEXPERIENCE:THEORIGINOFMODERNAMERICANLEGALEDUCATION70-78(1994);Wai-CheeDimock,RulesofLaw,LawsofScience,13YALEJ.L.&HUMAN.203,204-09(2001);MartinP.Golding,Jurisprudence and LegalPhilosophy inTwentieth-Century America-Major Themesand Developments, 36J.LEGAL.EDUC.441,442-43(1986);Grey,supra, at7-13.Despitetheanalyticaldistinctionbetween"formalist" theories,whichstriveforhighlypredictiverule-orprinciple-bounddecisions,and"conceptualist"theories,whichstriveforalegalsystembaseduponasmallnumber of principlesandconcepts(see Grey,supra, at 9-10),my useof the term"formalism"isintendedto reflectthehistoricuseof thetermtorepresenttheclassicalorthodoxtheory,and itscontinuedusebydiversehistoriansandlegaltheorists.See,e.g.,BRUCEA.ACKERMAN,RECONSTRUCTINGAMERICANLAW66-67(1983)(describingrealists'oppositiontoformalism,anddecryingcontinuingresistancetoallnotionsofformalism);GARYMINDA,POSTMODERNLEGALMOVEMENTS:LAWANDJURISPRUDENCEATCENTURY'SEND24-25(1995)(presentinghistoryof"modernconceptualjurisprudence"asreactionto"formalism");RICHARDA.POSNER,THEPROBLEMSOFJURISPRUDENCE39-41(1990)(describingcompetingdefinitionsand uses of the term"formalism").27.SeeThurmanArnold,The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure intheLegalProcess, 45HARV.L.REV.617(1932)[hereinafterArnold,SubstantiveLaw and Procedure]; Thurman Arnold,The Restatement of the Law of Trusts, 31COLUM.L.REV.800,(1931)[hereinafterArnold,Trusts];ThurmanArnold,2003] SYMBOLSOF GOVERNANCE1061Therefore,although Arnoldwasnotamongthemost visiblelegalrealistsduringtheearly1930sandwasnotevenamongthosenamedinKarlLlewellyn'slegendarylists,28his1930swork,includingSymbolsandFolkloreandthearticlesleadinguptothosetwomonographs,mustbeunderstoodas rootedinand reactingto legalrealism.A.Arnold's RealismTherealismtowhichArnoldresponded29 wasbasedontwocoreassertions:first,thatformalismand"alldogmasCriminalAttempts-The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction, 40 YALEL.J.53(1930)[hereinafterArnold,CriminalAttempts].28.SeeKarlLlewellyn,ARealisticJurisprudence-The NextStep,30COLUM.L.REV.431,454 (1930);Karl Llewellyn,SomeRealism About Realism-RespondingtoDeanPound,44HARv.L.REV.1222(1931)[hereinafterLlewellyn,Some Realism About Realism]. ThestorybehindArnold'sinvisibilityontheselistsistelling.AfterRoscoePound'scritiqueof realismappearedin1931(seeRoscoePound,TheCall for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44HARV.L. REV.697(1931)),following Llewellyn'sA Realistic Jurisprudence articlesandthe listincludedtherein,ArnoldwasoneoftherecipientsofanappealsentbyLlewellynand JeromeFrankseeking assistanceindevelopingareply to Pound.At leastonehistorianspeculatesthatArnoldneverresponded.SeeAyer,supranote2,at1065&n.76.Nevertheless,followinghiscorrespondencewithPound,LlewellynattemptedtoaddArnold'snametothelistinthefollowingyear'sSomeRealism About Realism article.Arnoldrequestedthathenot beincludedinthelaterlist,however,andLlewellyncomplied.N.E.H.HULL,ROSCOEPOUNDAND KARLLLEWELLYN:SEARCHINGFOR ANAMERICANJURISPRUDENCE211-12(1997).InhisprivatecorrespondencewithPound,Arnoldcontinuedtoexpressdiscomfortwithbeingidentifiedasarealist, atleastthrough1935.Seeid.at247.ThisapparentprivateambivalencewasconsistentwithArnold'spublishedworkin themid- andlate-1930s,whichclaimstobreak withrealism.See infra Part I.C.Bythe endof his life,however,Arnoldwasmore thanwillingtodescribehimself asamemberof Yale'sgroupof realistsfromthe timeof hisarrivalin NewHaven.SeeARNOLD,FAIR FIGHTSANDFOUL,supra note13,at 54-70.29.Mypurposehereisnot to summarizethediverseworkof legalrealism-a largely impossibleproject,as realists, opponentsof realism,and contemporaryhistorianshaveconcludedanddemonstrated.See,e.g.,DUXBURY,supra note15,at65-71(1995)(describingdifficultyofdefiningrealism,andfailureofearlierattemptstodoso);L.L.Fuller, American LegalRealism, 82U.PA.L.REV.429,430(1934)(criticizingrealismbyfocusingonLlewellyn'sworkbecauseofthemovement'sheterogeneity);Llewellyn,SomeRealismAboutRealism,supra note28,at1254(1931)(denyingexistenceof coherentrealist"school").NorisittoacceptorrejectJohnHenrySchlegel'scontentionthatrealismmustbeunderstoodintheinstitutionalcontextof theinterwarlegalacademyratherthan asaschoolof jurisprudence.SeeSCHLEGEL,supra note25,at6-8.Rather,whatfollowsisadescriptionof thosetendenciesof thegeneralintellectual projectidentifiedas realismtowhich Arnold'sworkcontributedandBUFFALOLAW REVIEWanddevicesthatcannotbetranslatedintotermsofactualexperience"mustberejected;andsecond,that afunctionalapproachmustreplaceformalismtorebuildlegaldoctrinesthat wouldreflectand berelevanttothepresumed"real" oflawinpracticeoraction.3'AsRobertGordonhasexplained,therealistconceptionof"evolutionaryfunctionalism"assumesboth theinherentsuperiorityof themodernliberalcapitalismtowardswhichWesternsocietieshadbeen"evolving," and"that thenaturalandproperfunctionofalegalsystemistofacilitatesuchanevolution."32 Realism'sfunctionalistapproachstrovetounderstandlaw"intermsof[law's]factualcontextandeconomicandsocialconsequences";assuch,itwasanattempttopeerbehindandultimatelydiscardformalism'sabstractionsinordertofind,explain,andmakelawrelevantto realitiesthat lurkedintheknowableworldbeyondthefoggymistsofformallegaldoctrines.3 3 Aswith itscritiqueof formalism,realism'sfunctionalistagendawasan extensionof similartendenciesinsociologicaljurisprudencetowardsa"pragmaticinstrumentalism."'Realistsunderstoodthisfunctionalistapproachinpartasthebasisforasocialscientificstudyoflawthatwould"demandobservationandstudyoftheactualstructureandfunctioningof modernsocial,economic,and politicallife."'"fromwhichArnoldclaimedultimatelytobreak. Inthissense,Idoassumetheexistenceofadiscernible"realism,"butamasinterestedinArnold'sunderstandingof whatthatrealismwasasIaminwhatitmay,ormaynot,haveactuallybeen.30.FelixCohen,Transcendental Nonsense and theFunctionalApproach, 35COLUM.L.REV.809,822 (1935).31.Seegenerally DUXBURY,supra note15,at132-33(arguingthatnotallrealistswerefunctionalists);KALMAN,supranote2,at3(distinguishingbetweennegativeandpositive sidesof realism);GaryPeller, The Metaphysics ofAmerican Law,73CAL.L.REV.1151,1220-26(1985)(distinguishingbetweenlegalrealism's"deconstructive,debunkingstrand"anditsconsequentialistor"constructive" strand).32.RobertW.Gordon,Critical LegalHistories, 36STAN.L.REV.57,59(1984).33.KALMAN,supra note2,at3.34.SeegenerallyROBERTSAMUELSUMMERS,INSTRUMENTALISMANDAMERICANLEGALTHEORY(1982)(drawing connectionsbetweentherealistsandGray,Holmes, and Pound,aswellas John Dewey).35.WalterW.Cook,Scientific Method and theLaw,13A.B.A.J.303,308(1927);see,e.g.,William0.Douglas,AFunctional ApproachtotheLawofBusiness Associations, 23ILL.L.REV.673(1929)(declaringthatthe studyandreformofbusinessorganizationslawshouldfocuson"theorganizationand1062[Vol.51SYMBOLSOF GOVERNANCEInplaceof itsformalistbatenoire,realismclaimedtoofferamodernandprogressiveapproachtolegalformsandpracticesthat was bothepistemologicallydistinctfrom legalformalismandmoreengagedinthepoliticsof itstime.6 Aspartof theirreconstructiveprojectof findingandstudyingthelawinsociety,realistsprivilegedthestudyof lawasapart of society,ratherthanasanisolatedphenomenonandintellectualpursuit.Theyfocusedonsocialandeconomic"facts"ratherthanontimelessconcepts,andstudiedlaw'soperationsmorethanitsforms.37 Morebroadly,realistssoughttoabandontheformalistprojectofcollectingandteachingasingularlegaltaxonomyinfavorofscholarshipandpedagogythatwouldbemorerelevanttolegalpractice.3'Furthermore,realistsgenerallyalliedthemselveswiththeprogressiveliberalismofthe1930s-itselfhistoricallyrelatedtothealready-establishedProgressivetraditionin legalthoughtassociatedwith the workof OliverWendellHolmesandtheearlyRoscoePound-whichwaspoised inthemid-1930stoassumean intimaterelationshipwith the NewDeal.39Twoimportantconclusionsthatfollowfromrealism'scriticalandreconstructiveprojectarecentraltoArnold'swork.First, the judicialandacademiceffortrequiredtofilltheinevitablegapsandindeterminacyoflegalrulesoperationof abusiness[rather]than[on]the mereformitself of business").Onrealism'sdifficult relationshipwithsocialscience disciplinesandmethodologies,seegenerallySCHLEGEL,supranote25.Ontheepistemologicaldifferencesbetweenthesocialscienceandtheoreticalwingsof realism,see,forexample,TWINING,supranote2,at195-96(describinghowLlewellyn,whowasmorecloselyidentifiedwiththetheoreticalwingof realism,wasambivalenttowardssocialscientific approachesto law);HesselE. Yntema,TheImplications of LegalScience,10N.Y.U.L.Q.279,309(1933)(describingsplitbetweensocialscientificandtheoreticalbranchesof realism,and dismissingthe latterin favorof theformer).36.SeeAMERICANLEGALREALISM,at xiii-xiv(WilliamW.Fisheretal.eds.,1993).37.KALMAN,supra note2,at37-38.Becauseof itsembraceof"facts"and"results"insteadofabsolutestandardsofjudgment,realismhasbeencharacterizedasrelativistic.SeeEDWARDA.PURCELL,JR.,THECRISISOFDEMOCRATICTHEORY:SCIENTIFICNATURALISM&THEPROBLEMOFVALUE43(1973).Onsimilar, and worse,chargesagainst Arnold,see infra Part V.38.See JeromeFrank, WhyNot aClinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U.PA.L. REV.907(1933);RoscoePoundetal.,WhatConstitutes aGood Legal Education, 7AM.L. SCH.REV.887,894(1933).39.SeeMORTONJ.HORWITZ,THETRANSFORMATIONOFAMERICANLAW,1870-1960:THECRISISOF LEGALORTHODOXY169-70(1992).20031 1063BUFFALOLAW REVIEWrevealedasfalsethepresumptionthataruleoflawabovemenandwithouthumaninterventionwaspossible,muchlessdesirable. Second,realistsgenerallyrejectedthepervasiveearlytwentieth-century"legal-economicmyth"thatdistinguishedthepresumptivelyfree,privaterealmofthemarketplacefromtheinherentcoercionofgovernmentintervention,andthat sought to protecttheformerfrom thelatter.41 ToArnoldandtherealists,thisobservationledtotheconclusionthatlaw,anditsprivatecorollary,themarket,arehumaninstitutionssubjecttounevenpoliticalandeconomicinfluence.Inthisregard,Arnoldsharedwithotherrealists-andespeciallywith RobertHale-aswellaswiththeinstitutionalisteconomistsoftheearlytwentieth-century(includingThorsteinVeblen,JohnCommons,AdolphBerle,andGardinerMeans)asubstantiveintellectualandpoliticalagendathatassumedlawtobesubjecttochangeandintervention,andcapableofinstrumentaluseforprogressiveends.42Arnold'searliestpublishedarticlesfromhistenureatYaleenactedthe familiarrealisttrope of demonstratingtheillogicandimpracticalityoflegalconceptualism,andprovidedthetypicalrealistcallforamorefunctionalistapproachtospecificlegalproblems.In"TheRestatementof40.PURCELL,supra note37,at88;seealsoBrianLeiter,Rethinking LegalRealism: Toward aNaturalized Jurisprudence,76TEX.L. REV.267,269,277-78(1997)(contrasting whathetermsrealism's"coreclaim,"that"judges respondprimarilytothestimulusoffacts"whendecidingcases,withtheformalistcommitmentto"the descriptiveclaimthat judgesrespondprimarily-indeed,perhapsexclusively-tothe rationaldemandsof theapplicablerulesof lawandmodesof reasoning").41.SeeDUXBURY,supra note15,at106-11;Kalman, supra note17,at1559(reviewingDUXBURY,supranote15);JosephWilliamSinger,LegalRealismNow,76CAL.L.REV.465,487-91(1988)(bookreview);HORWITZ,supra note39,at 207.42.SeeBARBARAH.FRIED,THEPROGRESSIVEASSAULTONLAISSEZFAIRE:ROBERTHALEANDTHEFIRSTLAWANDECONOMICSMOVEMENT9-15,210(1998);NeilDuxbury,Robert Hale andthe Economyof Legal Force,53MOD.L.REV.421(1990).Hale,aneconomistbytrainingandaprofessoratColumbiaLawSchoolfrom1919-1949,wasinstrumentalamongtherealistsin developingthislatterargument.SeeFRIED,supra, at3,210;RobertL.Hale,CoercionandDistribution inaSupposedlyNon-Coercive State,38POL.SCI.Q.470(1923);Robert L.Hale,Force and the State: AComparison of "Political"and "Economic"Compulsion, 35COLUM.L.REV.149(1935).Foradiscussionof Hale's relevanceforcontemporarylegaltheory,seeDUNCANKENNEDY,SEXYDRESSING,ETC.83-125(1993).OninstitutionaleconomicsanditsinfluenceonArnold,seeinfranotes162-181and accompanyingtext.[Vol.511064SYMBOLSOF GOVERNANCEtheLawofTrusts,"ArnoldcondemnedtherecentlyissuedRestatementofTrustsforitsconstructionofa"systemofabstractions"baseduponcomplicatedandinappropriatecommonlawrules,andproposedinitssteadaproper-andproperlyrealist-approachthatwouldentirelyreconsiderwhether the"ancient languageof trusts" was atall practical"insolvingmodernproblems."43 In"CriminalAttempts-TheRiseandFallofanAbstraction,"hecriticizedtheformalisttendencyto"reformulate...rules,"makebroadandvaguegeneralizations,andcreate"elaboratelogicalmachineryforsorting... dissimilarsituations.""Heproposedanewapproachtounderstandingandadjudicatingcriminalattemptsbasedontheunderlyingsubstantivecrime.5 Ashe explainedin "Law Enforcement-An Attemptat SocialDissection," hisgeneralprojectatthisjunctureofhiscareerwasto"unitethestudyoflawinactionwithlawinbooks"byenablingnotonlytheproductionoffunctionallegalformsandconcepts,butalso"thestudyoftheseveryprinciplesoncetheyareformulated."'ArnoldcontinuedtodemonstratethesefamiliarrealisttendenciesinSymbols,inwhichheincludedrevisedversionsofanumberofhisrecentarticles.Symbolsalsoextendedtherealistcritiquetoattackamoreabstractnotionofformalist"jurisprudence"-astrawmanArnoldconstructed(largelywithoutthebenefitofexamples)thatservedasasymbolofthegeneralassumptionsofclassiclegalformalism.8 Arnoldsardonicallydefined"jurispru-43.Arnold,Trusts,supra note27,at803,806.Arnoldprovidedamoregeneralcritiqueof theRestatementprojectasawholein Institute Priests andYale Observers-A Reply to Dean Goodrich, 84 U.PA.L. REV.811(1936).44.Arnold,CriminalAttempts,supra note27.45.Id.46.SeeThurmanW.Arnold,LawEnforcement-AnAttemptatSocialDissection, 42 YALEL.J.1,23(1932)[hereinafterArnold, Law Enforcement]; seealsoArnold,CriminalAttempts,supranote27,at58,79-80(decryingformalism's"uselessandmisleading" logic,andcallingforcourts"togetridofuselessabstractionsandtoreclassifythe situationswhichcomebeforethem forjudgment"). See generally Ayer,supra note2,at1066-68.47.See,SYMBOLS,supra note3,ch.3(revisionofArnold,ApologiaforJurisprudence, 44YALEL.J.729(1935)[hereinafterArnold, Apologia]);id.atch. 7(revisionof Arnold, Law Enforcement, supra note46);id.at ch.8(revisionof Arnold,Trial byCombat and theNewDeal,47HARv.L.REV.913(1934)[hereinafterArnold,Trial byCombat]); id.at ch.9(includedportionsof Arnold,Substantive Law and Procedure,supra note27).48.Arnold, Law Enforcement, supra note 46,at 23.2003] 1065BUFFALO LAW REVIEWdence"as"thescienceofthatgreatsymmetricalbodyofprincipleswhichissupposedtoconstitutethelaw,thedescriptionof itsdeepestsourcesandtheunifyingelementofthelawthroughouthistory."'' Because"jurisprudence"claimedtoperformtheimpossiblefunctionofreconcilingtheinternalcontradictionsandindeterminaciesoflawwithinagrandsystemofhumanendeavor,Arnolddismisseditaslargelywishfulthinking.9 AndbecauseitfailedtoadmitwhatforArnoldwasobvious-thatlegaldoctrinescannotbemadeconsistent,leastofallinacomplexmodernworld-jurisprudencewasmerelyaseriesof"ceremonialobservances"ratherthanasystematicprojectbasedupon"scientific observations."51Arnold'sacerbicanti-formalismfaultedequallyconservativeandliberalpractitionersofjurisprudence.Conservativelegaltheoristsrelieduponabstractprinciplestodefendwhatheconsidered,duringtheDepression,tobeanunjust,inefficient,andultimatelyinoperativeeconomicsystem,whileliberallegaltheoristsrelieduponequallyabstractideastoconstructutopianimagesofaperfectsociety.2 PlacidconservativesandfoolishliberalsbothconsideredtheintegrityoftheiroutdatedsystemsoflegalthoughttobemoreimportantthanthepracticalsolutionsArnoldfeltwerenecessarytosolvetherealproblemsof theDepression.53 Thus,alllawreformmovementswouldfail,Arnoldargued,iftheyremainedbasedon"ageneralexaminationandrestatementof generalprinciples,"ratherthanonaproperlyrealist"constantattempttoformulateand clarifyrules anddirections."5449.SYMBOLS,supra note3,at 46.50.See,e.g.,id.at 56(describingjurisprudenceas"the efforttoconstructalogicalheavenbehind thecourts, whereincontradictoryidealsaremadetoseemconsistent").51.Id.at 70;seeid.at46(distinguishing jurisprudence"fromanotherwayof thinking whichmaybedescribedaspractical,orbenevolent,whichproducesentirely different socialresults").52.See FOLKLORE,supra note 3at 224.53.SeeSYMBOLS,supra note3,at2;seealsoid.at19(notingsimilarparallelsbetweenconservativeand liberaleconomists).54.Id.at 84.1066[Vol.51SYMBOLSOF GOVERNANCEB.Arnold's Extension of RealismInSymbolsandFolklore,whichextendedrealists'functionalistcritiqueof formalismtoadvocacyonbehalf oftheNewDeal, Arnoldappliedrealismto legaldoctrinesandpracticesbesidesprivatesubstantivelawandcivilprocedure,themainobjectsofrealism'sfocus.5"BothmonographsspecificallyattackedformalisticdogmasthatheconsideredtobeinthewayofnecessaryNewDealefforts,includinglegalformalistapproachestopubliclawandtoeconomists'inabilitytoconsideractualeconomicconditionsthattheirtheorieswereunabletopredictorexplain.Arnold'scritiqueofpubliclawwasnotsimplyintendedtoenableamorefunctionallegalpractice,buttoenablea moreefficienteconomyandsociety.Arnold'shard-corefunctionalism,whichwasfundamentaltoFolkloreandSymbols,shapedhisblithelyutilitarian definitionof a governingregime'sefficiency:[Iunordertomake judgmentsastowhetheranyactivityisagoodorabadthing,itisnecessarytohavestandards.Forthetimebeingweareadoptingthestandardthatitisagoodthingtoproduceanddistributeasmuchgoodsastheinventiveandorganizing genius of manmakes possible.Althoughthisseemedtohimthecommonsensegoalofgovernance,herecognizedthatnotallgoverning55.SymbolsandFolklorefocusedonadministrative,seeinfraPartIV-B,tax,seeSYMBOLS,supra note3,at116;FOLKLORE,supra note3,ch.12,andantitrustlaw,seeFOLKLORE,supra note3,ch.9,whicharebodiesof publiclawthat realists ignoredor underplayed.56.SYMBOLS,supra note3,at102-03.57.FOLKLORE,supra note3,at177;seealso SYMBOLS,supra note3,at 266-67(arguingthatfunctional,temporalgovernancewasthemostimportantgoalof governmentandthebasisofa"newhumanitariancreed"hehopedwouldsweeptheU.S.);KEARNY,supranote13,at136(notingefficientandfairproductionanddistributionofgoodsasArnold'sexplicitnormativestandard).Arnold's"standard"isclosertoautilitariannormthanitistotheclassicdefinitionof"wealthmaximization"asmaximizingthedollar(ordollarequivalent)valueof"everythinginsociety."RichardPosner,Utilitarianism,Economics, and LegalTheory,8J.LEGALSTUD.103,119(1979).CritiquesofPosner'sdefinitionanduseoftheconceptofwealthmaximizationinclude:RobinF.Grant,JudgeRichardPosner'sWealthMaximizationPrinciple:Another FormofUtilitarianism?,10CARDOZOL.REV.815(1989),AnthonyT.Kronman,Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9J.LEGALSTUD.227(1980),andJeanneL.Schroeder,TheMidas Touch: The Lethal Effect of WealthMaximization, 1999WIs.L.REV.687 (1999).2003]1067BUFFALO LAW REVIEWinstitutionssoughtthisend directly.Inexplainingthisodd,butapparentlycommon,irrationality,hedistinguishedbetweenthe"temporal"and"spiritual"planesofgovernance.ForArnold,thetemporalconstitutedtheprivileged,practicalrealmwhereactorsachievemutualgoals-"thestageonwhichtheidealsofsocietyaregivenconcretereality."58 Opposedtothetemporal,the"spiritual"approachwasforArnoldthestageuponwhichasociety'sidealsremaininthemistyuniverseofformalistprinciples,andwhereprofessionalandarmchairphilosophersobsessoverthefuture,debatelogicalprinciples,andwage"holywars"betweendifferenteconomicandpoliticalmodels. 9Becausethe"stage"onwhichitperformedwaslargelyoutsideof publicview,temporal,practicalgovernmentcouldbefluidanddynamic,andcould"muddl[e]through"crisesbyexperimentationwithoutthepretenseof consistencyanddevotiontoregressiveand limitingprinciples."Arnold concludedthat an effectiveregimemustperformefficientlyonthe temporalplanebymasteringthetechnicalandpracticaltasksof distributinggoodstoitscitizensandincreasingoverallsocialwealth.AsDouglasAyerhasexplained,Arnold'squestfor morefunctionallegaldoctrinesinhisearlywork,whichwasconsistentwithhislaterexplicitadvocacyonbehalf of theNewDeal,arosefromhis"efficiency-oriented reformeffort... [that]soughttopreventthewasteofnaturalandhumanresourcesbymaximizingtheproductionanddistributionofgoods."Arnoldpredictedthat AmericanswouldultimatelyembracetheNewDeal's"neweconomiccreed"and"socialideals,"whichwerebased"onthebeliefthatthereexistsahugereservoiroftechnicalskill,capableofrunningagreatproductivemachinewithnewenergyandefficiency."HeexplicitlypromotedtheNewDeal'seffortstobringthe"greatproductive machine" intobeingasanecessary58.FOLKLORE,supra note 3,at127.59.Id.at14,20,42;SYMBOLS,supra note3,at126-27.60.SYMBOLS,supra note 3,at 2,123.61.Ayer,supra note2,at1077.TheNewDealwasnottheonlyregimeheappreciatedforitsattentiontohisvisionof efficiency;Arnoldalsocelebratedwhatheclaimedwasthedisreputableandsubrosa practicalgovernmentthatexistedunderthe"spiritualgovernment"of economicandlegalformality,aswellascertainaspectsoffascistandtotalitarianregimesinstatementsthatwould becomestandardparts of critiques of his work.See infra Part V.62.SYMBOLS,supra note3,at 266-67.1068[Vol.51SYMBOLSOF GOVERNANCEresponsetotheDepression.Hearguedthatacomplexmodernsocietyof privateinstitutions-or,ashecalledit,"an industrial feudalism"-had produced aneconomiccrisisandthenfailedtorespondtotheplightofthelegionsofunemployedworkersthecrisishadproduced.63 Liketherealists,hesoughtmodern,practicalsolutionstotheconservative,conceptualmorassofformalisminallitsinstantiations.C.The Break from RealismArnold'sbreakfromrealismandattempttobringaninterdisciplinary,interpretiveapproachtothestudyof law,politics,andeconomicsultimatelydistinguisheshimfromotherrealistsandlegaltheoristsofhistime.64 InSymbolsandFolklore, hemovedawayfromalegal-centricvisionofanti-formalistrealismthatstudiedthegapbetweenwhatcourtssay they doand whatthey actuallydo,andtowardsamorecomprehensivecritiqueofformalistrhetoricandpracticeinallpolitical,social,andeconomic institutions.6563.Id.at106-07;seealsoid.at114(predictingthatas"[t]henewadministrativemachine...graduallyacquir[es]competence,"resistancetotheNewDeal wouldfadeaway).64.Evenlateinlife,hisacademiccareerlongbehindhim,Arnoldemphasizedinterdisciplinarityasrealism'skeyinnovation.InareviewofWilfridRumble'searlyhistoryof legalrealismwrittenduringthelastyearofArnold'slife,Arnoldclaimedthattherealists'turntootheracademicdisciplines,includingpsychology,anthropology,andeconomics,wastheirmostimportantresponsetothecrisisoflegalformalism'slegitimacy.SeeThurmanW.Arnold,Book Review,84POL.ScI. Q.668,669(1969)(reviewingWILFRIDE.RUMBLE,JR.,AMERICANLEGALREALISM:SKEPTICISM,REFORM,ANDTHEJUDICIALPROCESS(1968)).65.SeeFelixCohen,BookReview,inTHELEGALCONSCIENCE:SELECTEDPAPERSOFFELIXS.COHEN442,446(Lucy KramerCohened.1960)(reviewingFOLKLORE,supra note3)(reprinting1 NAT'LLAW.GUILD Q.161(1938)).Arnold'sefforttoconceptualizegovernmentandcapitalismasdrivenby"symbols"and"folklore" appearedinhisworkbeforethepublicationof Symbols.SeeArnold,LawEnforcement, supra note46,at24(describingmainpurposeof courtsasdramatizinglawenforcement,ratherthanactuallyenforcingthelaw);Arnold,Substantive Law and Procedure, supra note27,at 646(describingoperationsofjudicialinstitutionsassimilarto"thepresentationofaplay").Nevertheless,theseearlierarticlesfocusedmainlyonparticularissuesorlegaldoctrinesandincludedsuggestedreforms,whileSymbolsandFolkloreoperateatahigherlevelof abstractionbycollectingindividualstudiesand placingthemwithinanoverarchingtheoreticalapparatus.SeeSYMBOLS,supranote3,at127(introducingChapters 6-9ascasestudiesdetailingthefunctionsof the civilandcriminaltrial). Symbols,forexample,placesarevisedversionof Arnold's19342003] 1069BUFFALO LAW REVIEWArnold casthimself in Folklore asadiagnosticianseeking tounderstandandexplainthecontextandpathologiesofthepoliticaldebatesofthemid-tolate-1930s,and,ultimately,tointerveneonthesideoftheNewDeal.66 Indeed,hedescribedhisprojectinFolkloreasanattempttounderstandthecrisisincapitalismand"toexplaintheideologicaldifficultieswhichpreventthecreatingoforganizationswhichwillgivethatprotection."67 If aregimewished tosucceedon the temporalplane,heargued,itcouldnotsimplyignorethespiritualplane.Adiagnosisofwhathecalled"thetaboosandcustomsofthetribe"-thesymptomsofthedominantpoliticalculturethatstructurepoliticaldiscourseandextendintoallofasociety'sinstitutions-wasanecessaryprerequisitetoaproperlyfunctional,practicalsolutiontotheDepressionoranyothercrisisor problemfacedby modernsociety.8 Arnold thereforeproposedashiftfromthemerecritiqueoflaw'ssurfaceformsandpractices,oritstemporalinefficiencies,toaninquiryintothedeeperspiritual,symbolicformsandpracticesthat shape"Law" asa field of governance.ThisshiftledArnoldawayfromrealism.Realism'sreformistanti-formalism,hebelieved,blindedittothepervasivenessofsymbolsinthediscourseoflawandgovernancegenerally.Althoughitsdebunkingofformalism'smostdeeplyheldattachmentstoconceptsandrulesenableda betterunderstandingof lawand otherbasicprinciplesofgovernanceandeconomics,realismunfairlyassumedattorneysandordinarylaypeopletobe"unconscious hypocrites" or"dupes,"" andtherefore resultedarticleontheemergingNewDeal,whichitselfconsidersthesymbolic,institutional,andpsychologicalcausesof judicialresistanceto theNewDeal,inthecontextofhismoreextensivedevelopmentofaculturalinstitutionalistapproachin themonograph.See Arnold,Trial byCombat, supra note 47,at 931-34,945-47;SYMBOLS,supra note3,ch.8.Similarly,Symbolsplaceshiscritiqueof jurisprudencethatoriginallyappearedinArnold,Apologia, supra note47,withinthemonograph'sbroaderargumentsregardinggovernmentgenerallyandalongsidethemonograph'snarrowerdiscussionof particularareasof lawand governance.SeeSYMBOLS,supra note3,ch. 3.66.FOLKLORE,supra note3,at 205.67.Id.68.Id.69.SYMBOLS,supra note3,at7.Ironically,Arnold'scriticswouldmaintainthatArnoldhimselfsufferedfromthesameelitistassumptionsaboutthemalleability of themasspoliticalwill. Seeinfra Part V.1070[Vol.51SYMBOLSOF GOVERNANCEin"makingtheworldlookunpleasant.7 Arnoldalsotriedtounderstandgovernanceand economicsassetsof symbolicconstructionswhosemeaningopposinggroupsattemptedtodefinetotheirrespectiveadvantages.Realistsandtheircounterpartsinotherdisciplineserroneouslyassumedthepossibilityofaneworderdevoidofformal,overarching"symbols," whereaccurateandworkablemethodsoforganizingandresolvingfactualproblemswouldleadtoamodernhfunctional,andtransparentlegalandpoliticalsystem.But symbolswerecentraltogovernancegenerally,andtolawinparticular.Nomatterhoweffective,reformcould noteradicatefolklore.2Tobedisillusionedwiththejudicial,political,andpopularattachmenttofoolishprinciplesandsymbolsis"futile,"Arnoldargued.3 "Solongasourbeliefinrationalmoralgovernmentdependsuponthelaw,itmustcontinuetobalancelogicallythecontradictoryidealswhichthatgovernmentmustexpress.74 Instead, thecorrectdiagnosticapproachisfirstto"recognize"thenecessaryfrailtythatleadshumanstoclingtofolkloreandsecond,to"utilize"thatfrailtyforpoliticalends.75 Debunkingwasmerelyafirststeptowardsagreaterpoliticalgoal.AndArnoldspecificallysoughttoutilizethespiritualplanetoadvocateinfavorofthefunctionalprogramsoftheNewDealthatoperatedonthetemporalplane."Arnold'sbreakfromrealismthereforewasbasedonhisassumptionthattheeffective"diagnostician" mustunderstandthesymbolicandinstitutionalcontextofformalism'sgreatandongoing70.SYMBOLS,supra note 3,at 6.Ina letterto HaroldLaskidated January9,1936,Arnoldassociatedthe unpleasant,extreme"hardboiled" positionwiththerealistWalterWheelerCook.SeeGRESSLEY,supra note13,at217(reprintingletterfromArnoldtoHaroldJ.Laski,Jan.9,1936).Cook,who"aloneamongtheRealists...hadawellworkedoutunderstandingof whatitwastoapplyscientificmethodto law,"hadleft YalebeforeArnold'sarrivaltohelpestablishtheInstituteofJusticeatJohnsHopkins,wherehehopedtodevelopanemergentstudyoflawthatwouldbeanalytic,functional,andcommittedtosocialscience.SCHLEGEL,supra note25,at228;seealsoid.at158(discussingCook'shopesfor the Institute of Law).71.See FOLKLORE,supra note 3,at131;SYMBOLS,supra note3,at 15.72.See SYMBOLS,supra note3,at 69.73.See FOLKLORE,supra note3,at131.74.SYMBOLS,supra note3, at69.75.See FOLKLORE,supra note3,at 161,343-44.76.See SYMBOLS,supra note3,at 252.2003] 1071BUFFALO LAW REVIEWsuccess,andmustperformhercriticalandpoliticalworkwithan awarenessof that context.D.ConclusionInhisfunctionalistanti-formalism,Arnolddrewfromtherealismofhiscontemporaries.Butevenwhenhisrealismwasrecognizableassuch,Arnoldwasunconstrainedbyrealism'straditionaldomainofprivatelaw.Althoughhesharedhiscontemporaries'assumptions,SymbolsandFolklorecarriedrealismintonewdoctrinalareasofpubliclawandintoananti-formalistcritiqueofeconomics.ThismovementwasclearlyrelatedtoArnold'scommitmenttotheNewDealasapoliticalresponsetotheDepression,andhisavowedbeliefthatonlythroughgovernmentalinterventioninthemarketasregulatorand,possibly,asparticipantcouldthecurrenteconomicandsocialcrisisbesuccessfullyaddressed.Muchwasatstake.Legalandeconomicformalism,hearguedinbothSymbolsandFolklore,didnotmerelyimpedelaw'sfunctionality;its privilegingof "word-symbols"overgovernmentalresponsibilitywasdangeroustothehealthoftherepublic."7 AtthesametimethatArnoldmovedrealism,hewasalsomovingawayfromrealism'srelativelynarrowfocusonlegaldoctrinesandpracticeandtowardsabroadercritiqueof legalandeconomicformalismassymptomaticof a popularneedforasymbolicdomainofgovernance.Lawwasmerelyonepartofthesystemofgovernancethat stood intheway of afunctionalmodernity.TheDepressionandNewDealledhimtoextendrealism;resistanceto the NewDealled him ultimatelyto break fromrealism'slegal-centric,criticalapproach.WitnessingthesuccessopponentstotheNewDealenjoyedinfrustratingtheRooseveltadministration'seffortstoaddresstheeconomicandsocialcrisesoftheDepression,Arnoldrecognizedthelimitsofrealism'santi-formalism.Aspoliticalandsocialtheoryandasareformistprogram,realismwastoolimitedandlimiting.Toreplaceit,Arnoldsought anapproachthat couldcounterformalismon itsowntermsbyrecognizingformalism'spersuasivepower.Idiscussthis approachinPart II.77.Seeid.at118.[Vol.51 1072SYMBOLSOF GOVERNANCEII.POLITICALDYNAMICSANDTHESTUDYOFGOVERNANCEINTHESYMBOLICREALMThisPartsummarizesArnold'scriticalapproach,developedinSymbolsandFolklore, whichfocusedonthesymbolsandinstitutionsofgovernance.Heintendedhisproposedfieldof "PoliticalDynamics"(whichheintroducedand describedin Folklore) to be"a scienceabout societythattreatsits ideals,itsliterature,its principlesof religion,law,economics,politicalsystems,creeds,andmythologiesaspartofasinglewholeandnotasseparatesubjects,eachwith itsown independentuniverseof principles."8Informedbynewdevelopmentsinthesocialsciences,PoliticalDynamicswasaprovocative,critical,andinterdisciplinaryconceptionof legalstudy as qualitativesocialscience,andoflawandgovernanceassymbolicpractice.Boththewidefieldheidentifiedashisobjectofstudyandthetoolsheused toconductthat study weredistinctfromthoseof mostrealists.79 IbeginbydiscussingwhatArnoldmeantby"symbols," andthen describehowArnoldsawthosesymbolsassituated withinsocialand ideologicalinstitutions.A.The Symbols of GovernanceThetitlesof SymbolsandFolklore madeplainArnold'sshiftawayfromrealism.Inthenotionofthe"symbolsofgovernment,"Arnoldattemptedtoencapsulate"theceremoniesandthetheoriesofsocialinstitutions,"andtoexaminethem"assymbolicthinkingandconductwhichconditionthebehaviorofmeningroups."8 Hesprinkledanecdotalexamplesof symbolsthroughoutthemonographs.78.FOLKLORE,supra note3,at 349.79.ThisdistinctionisclearestinthedifferencesbetweenSymbolsandFolklore, and acontemporaryvolumeby HuntingtonCairns,titledLAW ANDTHESOCIALSCIENCES(1935).Cairnsnotedinhisintroductionboththatinterdisciplinarystudieswere"part of the recognizedtrendinall departmentsofknowledge"duringthisperiod,andthata"youngergeneration"oflegalscholarswere"turning withincreasingfrequencytothe socialsciencesforaid."Id.at1,3.Buthisbookmerelycatalogshowsomesocialsciencedisciplinesmight beappliedtothe studyof law,and generallyconceivedof legalstudies asaseparatepursuitfromthe studyof othersubjects.See,e.g.,id. at122(notingthat economics"has some definitecontributionstomaketothe law");id. at160(notingmutualinfluencesbetweenlawandpoliticaltheory).AsIexplaininfra,Arnold generallyrejects the disciplinaryseparationon which Cairnsrelies.80.SYMBOLS,supra note 3,at iv.2003]1073BUFFALO LAW REVIEWInSymbols,forexample,heillustratedtheconceptwithabriefdiscussionoftheTennesseeValleyAuthority,whichhadbroughtelectricalpowertoruralpopulationsthroughanelaborateandultimatelywastefulsetoffinancialandorganizationalstructuresinordertoavoidtheappearanceofaffectingadirectredistributionofwealth.1 ThesestructuressymbolizedaprivatecorporateentityandassuchwerenecessaryfortheTVA'sexistence.Similarly,ArnoldbeganFolklore withanextensivediscussionof hownewspapers,magazines,andothermainstreamopinion-makersutilizedthesymbolicspectersof"Capitalism,Communism,andFascism"tolimitpublicinterventioninthe marketbydefining theouterlimitsof a properresponsetotheDepression.82 Inbothinstances,the"dramaticspectacle"of"politicalgovernment,"83 thesymbolsthatdefinethemeaningofanyprivateorpublicinstitution,organizedthe possibilitiesand interpretationof governance.Thesymbolsofgovernancethusconstituteadynamicsymboliclanguageandpracticeby whichlegaland politicalclaimsmadewithinthedominantlegalandpoliticalregimeshavemeaningandeffect.84 Asonespecificcomponentofgovernance,"Law"servesasa"reservoirofemotionallyimportantsocialsymbols."85 Arnold'sclaimreliedupon,andemergedfrom,twokeydisciplinarysources,thestudyofpropagandaandanthropology.AfterpresentingArnold'sapproach,Idiscussthosesources-whichArnoldhimself onlybarelyacknowledgedinpublic-thatundergirdandalso,ultimately,limited"PoliticalDynamics"asanhistoricallyspecificexpressionoftheassumptionsand interestsof 1930ssocialscience.1.Political Dynamics and theSymbolsof Governance.Hebeganbydeflatinglaw'spretensionsofgrandeuranddistinction.JurisprudencerepresentedforArnoldtheacademicfieldthatsupportedandpolicedtheabstractionsthatdominatedlaw,andthatwontheallegianceofpoliticians,jurists,attorneys,andlaypeoplealike.Jurisprudence'sconceptionof "Law" asa formal,distinctive81.SYMBOLS,supra note3,at 16-17.82.FOLKLORE,supra note3,at 1-20.83.Id.at 343-44.84.SeeSYMBOLS,supra note3,at 34,103-04.85.SYMBOLS,supra note3,at 34.[Vol.511074SYMBOLSOF GOVERNANCEsystemremoved fromhumanaction wasa significantsiteofsymbolicprinciples"represent [ing]thebeliefthattheremustbesomethingbehindandabovegovernmentwithoutwhichitcannothavepermanenceorrespect."8 Assuch,jurisprudenceisanenormouslyproductiveenterprisebecauseitspractitionersmustcontinuallyprovetherationalityof"Law"'sconsistencies,explainawayitsinconsistencies,anddecrythefallenprinciplesthathaveresultedorcouldresultfromtheimpositionofanopposition's challenge toaparticular conception of "Law.8 7Intimesofcrisis(liketheDepression),"Law"becomesafraughtenterpriseproducinganendless,spiritualdiscoursethatwoulduphold"Law"'stimelessprinciplesforthestabilityand legitimacyof politicaland socialorder.88Jurisprudence'shyperactiveintellectualpracticeisnotmerelysignificantfortheelitelegalcommunity;"Law"'sfantasyalso"meetsadeep-seatedpopular demand"for"abeautifuldream"of transcendentprinciplesof governance.89Tothe "man on thestreet," elitelegalacademicsrepresenta"priesthood whosedutyitistoexpound thatscience,unmovedbytheirrelevanciesofpracticalday-to-daygovernmentalaction."9 "It isenoughforthepublictohavefaithininstitutionsoflegallearningasguarantiesthatprinciples,forgotteninthewickednessofapoliticalworld,arebeingconstantlyrefinedandmademoreusefulfortheworldoftomorrow."'Inaddition,Arnoldargued,legalacademicscultivate"Law"'sillusoryperfectionbecauseitconfersstatusontheirinstitutions,distinguishinglawschoolasanintellectualenterprisefrommerevocationaltraining.92 Merelydisavowingparticipationintheself-righteousworldof"jurisprudence"-amovethatwascentraltotherealist'sresponsetoformalism-wasinadequatefortheproperlyArnoldiandiagnostician86.Id.at 44.87.SeeId.at17;seealsoN.E.SIMMONDS,THEDECLINEOFJURIDICALREASON:DOCTRINEANDTHEORYINTHELEGALORDER91-93(1984)(describingArnold'sconceptionof jurisprudenceas emphasizingits presenceratherthan itscontentin maintainingthe appearanceof consistencyin legalthought).88.SeeFOLKLORE,supra note3,at8;62-63;78-79;83-117;SYMBOLS,supranote3,at 36-37.89.SYMBOLS,supra note3,at33 (emphasisadded).90.SYMBOLS,supra note3,at49.91.Id.at 52.92.See id.at 57.2003]1075BUFFALO LAW REVIEWbecauseoftherolejurisprudenceplaysbothinsideandoutsidethe halls of thelegalpriesthood.Thefantasyofeconomicsisnodifferentfromthatof"Law,"Arnoldasserted.Neoclassicaleconomics'utopianimagesofafree,"unimpededcompetitive"marketplace,arationalman"whowouldworkonlyforprofit,"andanessential,biologicallydeterminedhumanselfishness,"supplements thelawasoneof ourmost importantsymbolsofgovernment."3 Like"Law,"withitsassumptionofanabstract"legal man"whorequiresacomplexseriesof rulestoguidebehavior,economicsassumesanequallyabstract"economicman,"theautomatonwhofollows,andshouldbeallowedtofollow,hisself-interest.94 TheseabstractionshinderedpossiblelegalandpoliticalsolutionstotheDepression,whentheassumptionsuponwhichtheyarebasednolongerhold.If aspecificinstanceoflaw-breakingoraprivatedisputerequiresalegalsolution,Arnoldargued,"it becomesourdutytoformulatelogicalrulesandsystems";butifaspecificinstanceofmarketfailurerequiresa regulatorysolution,"it becomesourdutyto let italone"inordertoprotecttheabstractnotionofthe"market"frominterference." Asaresult,thedominantsymbolssurroundingeconomicsandlawstymiedpracticalgovernanceandinterventionintothemarket.Governmentcouldnotparticipateinthemarketinthesameinnovative,experimentalmannerasprivateindustrybecauseanysuchlegalinnovationswouldcontradicttheestablishedsymbolicpresenceofgovernmentas"bureaucracy"andwouldbefoundunconstitutionalundertheformalistsymbolsof"Law."96 Similarly,governmentcouldnotinterferewiththeeconomic"laws"ofsupplyanddemand,thefreemarket,andthenaturalefficiencyofprivateenterprisewithoutfacingthewrathofdominanteconomictheories.97Nevertheless,justashemustworkwiththeprevailingformalistlegaltheory,sotheArnoldiandiagnosticianmustutilizetheprevailingeconomictheories:""Hischoiceoftheoriescannotbemadeonanyothergroundthanthatofexpediencyingainingtheendshedesires.Legaland93.Id.at 74.94.Id.at 78,84.95.Id.at 85-86.96.Seeid.at 99-100.97.Seeid.at 98-99.98.See id.at 103.[Vol.511076SYMBOLSOF GOVERNANCEeconomictheory, whetherradicalorconservative,can nevermakehimaprophet.Theymay,however,makehimasuccessfuladvocate.99ArnoldnotedthisnecessityinthepoliticalandlegalstrugglesforlegitimationandimplementationoftheNewDeal.Helamentedthefactthat"government," asa symbolopposedto"ruggedindividuals,"wasoneofthemostpowerfulnegativesymbolsof hisday,whereastheprivatecorporation,asa symbolopposedtogovernmentand akintotheruggedindividualinthemarketplace,remainedaremarkablydurableandpowerfulsymbolofefficiencyandfreedomeveninthedepthsoftheDepression.' Assuch,the"polarwords,""government"(andsimilarsymbolsinvokingamonolithicstate),anditsoppositethe"ruggedindividual" (along with othersymbols invokingtheheroof apopularizedandromanticclassicalliberalism)organizedgovernancebyestablishingtheconditionsunder whichanylegal,economic,orpoliticaltheoryormovementcoulddescribeor act uponthe world.Withinthe historicalcontextof theDepression,polarwordsservedasingenious,binarysymbols.OpponentsoftheNewDealcouldconjuretheshibbolethsof"paternalism"or"bureaucracy"or,worse,"socialism" or"totalitarianism," todescribe proposedgovernmentprograms,therebydemonizinglegislativeandregulatoryinterventioninthemarket.1 Forexample,intheearlyNewDeal,"privateinvestment"inindustrialinfrastructurebyindividualsandprivatecorporationsservedasaprivileged,celebratedterm,while"governmentexpenditure"intopublicinfrastructure,althoughan"investment"byagovernmentinstitution,hadstrongnegativeconnotationsasanartificialanddestructiveintrusion into thenaturalorder.0 2 Underthe weightof such99.Id.at104.100.See FOLKLORE,supra note 3,at107-08.101.Seeid.at167-70;seealso SYMBOLS,supra note3,at127(listing"theruleof lawvs.bureaucracy,freedomvs.regimentation,[and]individualismvs.socialism" ascentralbinariesin judicialresistancetotheNewDeal)(emphasisomitted).102.SYMBOLS,supra note3,at112.Seealso id.at116(describingtaxationasdemonizedterm);id.at120-22(describingprocessbywhichSocialSecuritybillof 1935wassuccessfullypassedbyredefiningthe programas"insurance");id.at152-53(describing"lawenforcement"asaprivilegedtermformaintenanceof moralorder).2003]1077BUFFALO LAW REVIEWfolklore,NewDealproponentscouldnotpresenttheirownsymbolsin a positivecontext."3Nevertheless,theseseeminglyimmutableideologicalbarrierstochangecouldbecontested.Fromobservingthestrugglesof theNewDealtoestablishitself inthesymbolicrealm,Arnoldconcludedthatinthemidstof asocialcrisis,aspecific"socialneed"leftunaddressedbyaprevailingorderwillgounmetuntil"newabstractions"emergetojustifyfillingthisneed."'Thatis,emergingpoliticalmovementsandideaswillfacealagbetweentheirfirstappearanceandtheirultimatesuccess.Neworcompeting"creeds"orideological formations, suchastheNewDeal,facethe"obstacle"ofexisting,dominantcreeds;butwhentheemergentcreedsbegintodominateandolderinstitutionsfade,theresidualsymbols remain incirculationwithinthenewlydominantregime,"5 andmay evenbeusedbybelieversinthe displacedregimeor bya newlyemergentopposition.0 6 HearguedthattheNewDealmustadopt,oratleastadapt,theprevailingtheoriesofitstimetobesuccessful.0 7 Thesymbolsof governancethusinsureagainstradicalsocialandpoliticalchangebyprovidinganhistoricallystablemediumthroughwhichthedemandsofoutsiderscanachieverecognitionandapprovalwithoutupsettingthestructuresofpowerandthedistributionof108resources.2.Political DynamicsandtheStudyofIdeologyandPropaganda.Otheracademicsandintellectualssought,likeArnold,toconceptualize"culture"and"ideology"assubstancesthatweremanipulablebypropagandaexpertstomeetspecificorgeneralends.ThesociologistKarlMannheim,whose book Ideology and Utopia wastranslatedinto Englishin 1936,soughtto movethestudy of "how menactuallythink" from"how thinkingappearsintextbooksonlogic" to"how itreallyfunctionsinpubliclifeand in politicsasaninstrumentofcollectiveaction."' 9 Toachievethis,103. SeeFOLKLORE,supra note 3,at 2.104. Id.at 378-79.105. Seeid.at118-19.106. See id.at 119-20.107.SYMBOLS,supra note3,at 235.108. Seeid.at 35.109. KARLMANNHEIM,IDEOLOGYANDUTOPIA:ANINTRODUCTIONTOTHESOCIOLOGYOFKNOWLEDGE1 (LouisWirth &EdwardShils trans.,1936).1078 [Vol.512003] SYMBOLSOF GOVERNANCE 1079Mannheimpromotedthestudyof"ideology"asatermofapprobationofanopponent'sviews,asaformoffalseconsciousness,andinthemoretotalizingconceptionofideologyas"the characteristicsandcompositionof thetotalstructure ofthemindof[an]epochorof[a]group.11 Mannheim's"ideologies,"likeArnold'ssymbolsand folklore,providedaconceptualframeworkforanalyzingbothpoliticalbattlesandthetermswithwhichthesebattleswereengaged.WhetherArnoldknewoforreadMannheimisunclear.111 Bycontrast,ArnoldwasclearlyawareoftheinfluentialworkonpropagandaofthepoliticalscientistHaroldLasswell,andtheparallelsbetweenArnold'sandLasswell'sworkarecertain."2Lasswellappliedthe110.Id.at55-56.111.AccordingtoDuxburyandSchlegel,ArnoldhadnoaccesstoMannheim'swork,whichwasnottranslatedintoEnglishuntil1936.SeeDuxbury,supra note2,at21n.64(describingpersonalcommunicationwithJohnHenrySchlegel).Assuch,ArnoldmayhavereadtheworkwhilewritingFolklore,whichwasnotpublisheduntil1937,especiallygivenArnold'sconnectionstoscholarsin thesocialsciences.MyargumentislesspointedthanthenotionthatArnoldwasinfluencedbyMannheim,however.Others-includingMannheimandhisAmericantranslators,whowereprominentsociologists-wereraisingmanyofthesameissuesthatinterestedArnoldregardingthepartialityofhumanknowledgeandperspective.Indeed,onereviewer of both booksin1939notedthe similarities betweenArnold'sworkandMannheim'sworkonideologies.SeeMaxRheinstein,TheRoleof ReasoninPolitics-AccordingtoThurman Arnold, 49 ETHICS212,214(1939).112.LasswellandArnoldcorresponded;inoneletter,ArnoldpraisedLasswell'swork.See,e.g.,GRESSLEY,supra note13,at204(reprintingletterfromArnoldtoHaroldD.Lasswell,Feb.22,1935)(praisingLasswell,TheMoralVocationoftheMiddle-IncomeSkillGroup,45INT'LJ.ETHICS127(1935)).Lasswell,in turn, admiredArnold'sanalysisof politicalsymbolsfor his"think[ing]withunconventionalfreedomaboutgovernment."SeeHaroldD.Lasswell,BookReview,2PUB.OP.Q.687,689(1938)(reviewingSYMBOLSandFOLKLORE).Furthermore,theirworkhaslongbeencompared.See,e.g.,J.MICHAELSPROULE,PROPAGANDAANDDEMOCRACY:THEAMERICANEXPERIENCEOFMEDIAANDMASSPERSUASION70,102-06(1997)(placing ArnoldwithinfieldofpoliticalscientistslikeLasswellandsemanticistslikeS.I.Hayakawastudyingmanipulability of languageandsymbolsinthe1930sandearly1940s);MARKC.SMITH,SOCIALSCIENCEINTHECRUCIBLE215(1994)(notingthatLasswell,likeArnold,"consciouslyusedmythsanduntruthstomanipulatethe publicintheserviceofanallegedlymoralorganization");WARRENI.SUSMAN,CULTUREASHISTORY:THETRANSFORMATIONOFAMERICANSOCIETYINTHETWENTIETHCENTURY161(1984)(associating ArnoldandLasswellassimilarcontemporaryanalystsof "politicallife"duringthe1930s);LowellDittmer,Political Cultureand Political Symbolism:Toward aTheoretical Synthesis,29WORLDPOL.552,559-60(1977)(describingArnold'sworkas"continu[ing]theLasswellian1080 BUFFALOLAWREVIEW [Vol.51prevailingpsychologicalandpsychoanalytictheoriesof thetimetoconcludethatthepubliccould-andindeedmust-bepersuadedandcontrolledthroughtheuseofculturalsymbols."'ThusforLasswell,propaganda,"themanagementofcollectiveattitudesbythemanipulationofsignificantsymbols,"enablesbenignsocialcontrolbypresentinganissue"in sucha mannerthatcertain culturalattitudeswillbeorganizedtowardit.""' ArnoldapprovedofLasswell'sfocuson propagandaasa criticalforcein politics,andembracedLasswell'smethodologicalcombinationofquantitativestudiesoftheeffectsofpropagandaandtextualinterpretationof literatureandnewspapers.5 LikethepublicintellectualandnewspapercolumnistWalterLippmann,whoseearlier,enormouslyinfluentialbookPublicOpinion(1922)similarlyarguedthatthepublicreliedonlargelyirrationalmentalimagesandstereotypedsymbolstoformtheiropinions,"'Lasswellattractedandtradition").LongafterArnoldhadleftYale,LasswelljoinedwithArnold'sstudentMyresMcDougalinestablishingthefirstformalpost-realistinterdisciplinaryschoolof legaltheoryandeducation,"policyscience,"whichsoughttocombinelegalandsocialscientificstudytomeetclearlyarticulatedliberalends.SeeDUXBURY,supra note15,at171-81;KALMAN,supra note2,at178-86.113.SeeHaroldD.Lasswell,TheFunction of thePropagandist,38INT'LJ.ETHICS258(1928);HaroldD.Lasswell,The Theoryof Political Propaganda,21AM.POL.ScI.REV.627(1927)[hereinafterLasswell,PoliticalPropaganda].ThebestsummariesofLasswell'sworkonpropagandaareBRETTGARY,THENERVOUSLIBERALS:PROPAGANDAANXIETIESFROMWORLDWARITOTHECOLDWAR55-84(1999);MARKC.SMITH,supra note112,at212-52(1994);SPROULE,supra note112,at 67-71.114.Lasswell,Political Propaganda,supra note113,at627,629;seealsoHAROLDD.LASSWELL,PSYCHOPATHOLOGYANDPOLITICS183-93(1930)(describing"irrationality"inpoliticalmovements,specificallyinthe"displacement" of privateaffectsupon publicobjectssuch aspoliticalsymbols).115.Ina1935letter toLasswell,respondingtoanumberof articlereprintsthepoliticalscientisthadsenthim,Arnoldpraisedonearticlewhicharguedthat theAmericanmiddleclass-subjecttoconstantpropagandaorganizedby,and inthe interestof, the"plutocracy"-waslikelytobecomeincreasinglyself-consciousaboutits economicandpolitical vulnerabilitytothe elitesabovethemandthelowerclassesbelowthem.SeeGRESSLEY,supranote13,at204(reprintingletterfromArnoldtoHaroldD.Lasswell,Feb.22,1935)(praisingLasswell,TheMoralVocationof theMiddle-IncomeSkillGroup,45INT'LJ.ETHICS127,133-34,137(1935)).Althoughmuchof Lasswell'sworkrelieduponquantitativemethodologies,seeSPROULE,supra note112,at71,infactasignificantamountof hispropagandaanalysisandtheorydidnotrelyuponquantitativestudy.116.WALTERLIPPMANN,PUBLICOPINION365(1922).Todealwiththecomplexitiesofthemodern"worldbeyondourreach,"Lippmannargued,SYMBOLSOF GOVERNANCEinfluencedArnoldasasocialcriticwhorecognizedpropaganda'spowerfulroleinmass society.LippmannwasnottheonlyimportantprecursortoArnold'sandLasswell'sinterestinsymbolicgovernance.InSymbols,ArnoldexplicitlypraisedtheItaliansociologistandeconomistVilfredoPareto.Pareto'ssociologicalwritingshadbecomefashionableamongintellectualsandacademicsatHarvardandYaleduringtheearly1930s,"'whenEnglishtranslationsandcommentariesonPareto'ssociologyfirstwidelyappearedinprint."8 Betterknowninlegalacademiatodayforhisearliercareerasaneconomist,Paretothesociologistsoughttosupplementclassicaleconomicassumptionsof individualbehaviorasthe rationalsatisfactionofwantsbystressingthenon-logical,passionateaspectsofbeliefsandactions."9Pareto'ssociologicaltheoryalsopositedeliteleadershipasastructuralandnecessaryfeatureofpoliticalandsocialeffectiveleadersmustbeprotectedfromthevicissitudesofthepublicwhileemployingthetechniquesof psychologicalresearchandthetechnologyof masscommunicationstoachieve"themanufactureofconsent"throughpersuasionandpropaganda.Id.at238-39.OntherelationshipbetweenLippmann'sandArnold'swork,seeLouisHartz, TheComing of Ageof America, 51AM.POL.SCI.REV.474,479(1957);ontherelationshipbetweenLippmann'sandLasswell'swork,seePURCELL,supra note37,at107.Goodsummariesof Public OpinionanditsplacewithinLippmann'slongandprominentcareerincludeD.STEVENBLUM,WALTERLIPPMANN:COSMOPOLITANISMIN THECENTURYOF TOTALWAR60-69,80-84(1984);LARRY L. ADAMS,WALTERLIPPMANN94-122(1977).117.SeeArthur Livingston,Editor'sNote,in1VILFREDOPARETO,THEMINDANDSOCIETYatv,v-vi(AndrewBongiorno&ArthurLivingston,trans.,Livingstoned.,1935);BarbaraS.Heyl,TheHarvard "ParetoCircle," 4 J.HIST.BEHAV.SCI.316(1968);JosephLopreato&SandraRusher,VilfredoPareto'sInfluenceonU.S.A.Sociology,65REVUEEUROPO9ENEDESSCIENCESSOCIALES69,at71-73(1983);BernardDeVoto,SentimentandtheSocialOrder, 167HARPER'SMONTHLYMAGAZINE569(1933).MorerecentdiscussionsofPareto'ssociologyincludePatrikAspers,Crossing theBoundaryofEconomicsandSociology:TheCaseof VilfredoPareto, 60AM.J.ECON.&SOC.519(2001);JosephFemia,Pareto'sConceptofDemagogicPlutocracy,30GOV'T&OPPOSITION370(1995);andN.S.Timasheff, Law inPareto's Sociology,46AM.J.SOC.139(1940).118.In1934,KnopfpublishedAnIntroduction toPareto, apopularizingsummaryofPareto'ssociologybytwoleadersoftheHarvardParetoseminar.GEORGEC.HOMANS&CHARLESP.CURTIS,JR.,Preface toANINTRODUCTIONTOPARETO:HISSOCIOLOGY(1934).Ayearlater,Pareto'sTrattato diSociologiagenerale appearedin fourvolumesasTheMind and Society. SeePARETO,supranote117.119.SeeDONALDN.LEVINE,VISIONSOFTHESOCIOLOGICALTRADITION238-39(1995).2003] 1081BUFFALOLAWREVIEWsystems.12 Arnold reveledin what hesawas Pareto'sroleasa"prophet[]of thehard-boileduseof power"whomade"thehumanitarianideals,which[popular]sloganscalledupinthemindsofmassesofpeople,. . . disappear.1 21 "Withpitilesslogic,"Arnoldproclaimed,Paretohaddiscovered"thatthereisnorealitybehindpoliticalandeconomictheories.'22 Thisexuberance,aswellastheprominenceofboth thesymbolicrealmof governanceand theroleof elitesinArnold'swork,suggeststhatPareto'sworkservedasanimportantinfluenceonArnold'sapproach.ConsiderationofPareto'ssociologyhelpsfillinsomeofthetheoreticalgapsin Arnold's work.123Paretobasedhistheoryofhumanbehavioronthedistinctionhesawbetween"logicalactions,"which"logicallyconjoinmeanstoends"fromanobjective,scientificstandpoint,' 24 and"non-logical"actions,whichseemlogicaltothepersonsperformingthembutare"meremanifestationsofinstincts.021"Humanbeings,"Paretowrote,"have averyconspicuoustendencytopaintavarnishof logicovertheir conduct,12 andheconsideredhis workanefforttostudyandstripawaythe"disfigure[ment]"ofrealityatworkinrationalizingtheoriesthatmakenon-logicalconductappearlogicaltohumanactors.7 Pareto's120.See id.at 239-40.121.SYMBOLS,supra note 3,at250.122.Id.123.Arnold'srecognitionof akindredspiritinParetoisclearinaletterhewrotetoTheNewRepublic, whichsolicitedfromhimwhilehewasstillat Yaleacontributiontoaseriescalled"BooksThatChangedOurMinds."Inresponsetotheletter,Arnoldwrotethat"Paretoseemedtomeanelaborationof theobvious,soIdroppeditafteraverycursoryexamination."BOOKSTHATCHANGEDOURMINDS,supra note1,at 8.Myelaborationof Pareto'swork,then,isto elucidatewhatfor Arnoldwas"the obvious,"inorderbettertounderstandArnold'swork.Theconnectionbetweenthetwowascertainlyobvioustosomecarefulreaders.Onecontemporaryreviewerof Symbols foundPareto'sinfluenceonArnoldtobesoprofoundastoapproachplagiarism.SeePeterH.Odegard,Symbolsof Government ByThomas Arnold,21CORNELLL.Q.686(1936)(bookreview).Amore recentcommentatorhasnoted thesimilarities betweenPareto'ssociologyand HaroldLasswell'sworkduring thisperiod.See JohnE.Tashjean,Politics: Lasswelland Pareto, CAHIERSVILFREDOPARETONo.22-23,at267(1970).124.1 PARETO,supra note117, 150,at 77.125.4PARETO,supra note117,app.at 1915.126.1 PARETO,supra note117, 154,at79.127.Id.249,253,at171,172-73.ForPareto,themanifestationsofsentimentsinnon-logicalactionsare"residues";whiletherationalizationsconstructedtolegitimizeaparticularlineof conduct,makingmoreacceptable1082 [Vol.51SYMBOLSOF GOVERNANCEtheoryof non-logicalactionswasnotpsychological,becausehehadnointerestinthecausesorinternalworkingsof"psychicstates.,128 Norwasithistorical ormaterialist,becauseunlikeMarxisttheoriesofideologythatsituatefalseconsciousnesswithinaspecifichistoricalcontext,Paretoassertedthatderivationsandnon-logicalactionsoriginatefrom"innate tendenciesofanunchanginghumannature"ratherthananhistoricallysituated"falseconsciousness.."129 ForPareto,non-logicalbehaviorandposthocrationalizationsweresimplyessentialattributesofhumanaction.TheywerealsocentraltoPareto'stheoryofelitesandpoliticalandsocialorder.LikeMachiavelli,Paretostressedthattoobtainandholdpoliticalpower,elitesmustsuccessfullypersuadetheirsubjectsbyutilizingthesymbolsofmoralandpoliticaldoctrines,ratherthanobjective,scientifictruth.3 Anditwasimperativethatelitesdoso;forPareto,"theartofgovernmentliesinfindingwaystotakeadvantageof...sentiments,notinwastingone'senergiesinfutileeffortstodestroythem,thesoleeffectofwhich,frequently,issimplytostrengthenthem."''Elitesmustengageinabeneficialformofmanipulationbyclothingtherealinterestsof themassesinfictionalformsto appealtothe masses'base sentiments.'32Pareto'sultimatenormativeendwasastable,wealth-maximizingpoliticalorderrunbycompetenteliteswhomaintaintheirauthoritythroughpersuasivetechniquesnarrowanddestructiveinterests,are"derivations."S.E.Finer, Introduction toVILFREDOPARETO:SOCIOLOGICALWRITINGS3,14(S.E.Findered.&DerickMirfintrans.,1966).TherelationshipbetweenresiduesandsentimentsinPareto'swork isunclear, and attimes nonexistent;at minimum,sentimentsarethereligious,moral,legal,andcustomarynormsthatresultfromthecombinationof humannature,individualcircumstances,and historicalcontext.See2RONALDFLETCHER,THEMAKINGOFSOCIOLOGY:ASTUDYOFSOCIOLOGICALTHEORY596-97(1971).128.1 PARETO,supra note117, 161,at 87-88.129.INORossi,FROMTHESOCIOLOGYOFSYMBOLSTOTHESOCIOLOGYOFSIGNS:TOWARDADIALECTICALSOCIOLOGY92(1983).OntherelationshipbetweenParetoandMarxisttheoriesofideology,seeNORBERTOBOBBIO,IDEOLOGICALPROFILEOFTWENTIETH-CENTURYITALY38(LydiaG. Cochranetrans.,1995);Finer, supra note127,at 77-78.130.SeeJOSEPHV.FEMIA,THEMACHIAVELLIANLEGACY:ESSAYSINITALIANPOLITICALTHOUGHT51(1998);LEVINE,supranote119,at241;TALCOTTPARSONS,THESTRUCTUREOFSOCIALACTION178-79(1937).131.3 PARETO,supra note117,1843,at 1281.132.See4 PARETO,supra note117, 2250,at1572.2003] 1083BUFFALO LAWREVIEWand, ultimately,the realthreatof force.13 His utilitarianismpositedacleardistinctionbetweenthe"experiential'truth'of certaintheories"andtheir"social'utility"'-thesebeing"twothings[that]arenotonlyoneandthesamebutmay,andoftendo,standinflat contradiction.134 Rulers'identitiesandapproachesmaychangecontinually,withoccasional"sudden andviolentdisturbances" leadingtoleadershipchangesamongpoliticalandeconomicelites.135 Whatmatteredmorethantheprecisecomposition,orevenapproach,ofaparticularrulingelitewaslesssignificantthanthat elite's abilitytomaximizewealthandhold power.At bottom,Paretohadlittle interestinofferingtherapeuticapproachestopurgethenon-logicalfrompoliticalandpubliclife;instead,heattemptedtoremoveconsiderationsof themoralandnormativefromhispoliticalanalysis.136 InthewordsofoneofhisAmericanmid-1930sadmirers,Pareto"write[s]whatmendoandnotwhattheyoughttodo."137 ThestatementencapsulatesArnold'sown"hard-boiled"approach:anemergentpoliticalorder,specificallytheNewDeal,shouldputasideboththeformalists'impossibledesireandthe realists'debunkingandreformisteffortsin favorof articulatingreformintheformof popularsymbolsand desire.3.Political Dynamics, Anthropology, and theStudyofSymbols.Arnoldalsoconceivedof thissymbolicstruggleinanthropologicalterms.138Althoughhecitednoanthropologistsineitherof hismid-1930smonographs,thewordsfolkloreandsymbolsinhistitlesclearlyevoketheanthropologicalapproach.Inaddition,heironicallyandwithgreatdelightappliedanthropologicalconceptsof"primitive"culturestothethoroughlymoderninstitutions133.SeeRICHARDBELLAMY,MODERNITALIANSOCIALTHEORY:IDEOLOGYANDPOLITICSFROMPARETOTOTHEPRESENT30(1987);LEVINE,supra note119,at240-41.134.2PARETO,supra note117, 843,at 500.135.3PARETO,supra note117,2056,at1431;seealsoFiner, supra note127,at55-62(summarizingPareto'sconceptualizationofgoverningclasses,economicforces,and theirrelationship).136.See4 PARETO,supra note117,2239,2394,at 1567,1726-27.137.SeeLAWRENCEJ.HENDERSON,PARETO'SGENERALSOCIOLOGY:APHYSIOLOGIST'SINTERPRETATION57(1937).138.OntherelevanceofArnold'sworkforanthropologists,seeLauraNader'simportantarticleTheAnthropologicalStudyofLaw,67AM.ANTHROPOLOGIST3,19 (1965).1084[Vol.51SYMBOLSOF GOVERNANCEof "government"and"capitalism."InSymbols,forexample,hecomparedprimitivesocieties'rationallawsbasedonirrationalpremisestomodernsocieties'irrationallawsbasedonseeminglyrationalbases,'139 andheassociatedthemodernritualofthecriminaltrialwiththetaboosandmagicof "primitivesocieties."'4 At thesametime, in privatecorrespondence,hecomparedhisperspectiveinFolklore tothatofananthropologiststudyingFilipino"customsandtaboos."''Arnoldthusutilizedtheideaofanthropologytoilluminatesomeuniversalgeneralitiesofhumanculture,andappropriatedtheanthropologicalnotionofcultureasanintegratedwholethatwaswidelysharedduringthe1920sand1930s.42 HesharedthecentralassumptionsoftheAmericanistanthropologicaltradition,establishedintheearlytwentiethcentury.Theseincludedthenotionsthatcultureisnotmerelybehaviorbutthesetofsymbolspeopleusetoexplaintheirbehaviors;thatcultureisaconstructed,symbolicworldofhabitsandcustomsthatstructurehumanthoughtandaction;andthatlanguage,thought,andrealitycombineinwaysthatcanbestudied,understood, andanalyzedbysocialscientists.4'Arnold'schoiceoftheterm"folklore"isespeciallytelling.ForFranzBoas,themostsignificantAmericananthropologistofthelatenineteenthandearlytwentieth139.SeeSYMBOLS,supra note 3,at 4.140.Id. at 131.Arnold,likehis fellowrealists, wasapparentlynot drawnto,or perhapswasunawareof, thehistoricalandsociologicalscholarshipof HenryMaineorMaxWeberwhichalsosoughttounderstandthepresentinitsrelationship tothe past. See SCHLEGEL,supra note25, at 235.141.GRESSLEY,supranote13,at231(reprintingletterfromArnoldtoEpaphroditusPeck,attorney, Bristol,Conn.,July 13,1936).142.SeeJohnS.Gilkeson,Jr.,TheDomestication of"Culture"in InterwarAmerica1919-1941, inTHEESTATEOFSOCIALKNOWLEDGE153(JoAnneBrown& DavidK.van Keureneds.,1991).ThefactthatArnoldusedanthropologytodemonstratethefoiblesofmodernityisconsistentnotonlywithhowtheanthropologistsofthe1930soccasionallywieldedtheirwork,butalsowithVeblen'sstancetowardsthe"leisureclass"andmodernitygenerally.Seeid.at161,168;seealso AnneMayhew,Veblenand the Anthropological Perspective, inTHEFOUNDINGOFINSTITUTIONALECONOMICS234,241-42(WarrenJ.Samuelsed.,1998)(describingthe influenceof anthropologyon Veblenandinstitutionaleconomics).143.SeeREGNADARNELL,INVISIBLEGENEALOGIES:AHISTORYOFAMERICANISTANTHROPOLOGY12-14(2001);PETERNOVICK,THATNOBLEDREAM:THE"OBJECTIVITYQUESTION"ANDTHEAMERICANHISTORICALPROFESSION144(1988).2003] 1085BUFFALO LAW REVIEWcenturies,"folklore"was"thetotalmassoftraditionalmatterpresentinthemindof agivenpeopleatanygiventime,"144 and"thescienceofallofthemanifestationsofpopularlife."' 145 Folkloricbeliefsandpracticesthathadbegunintheunconsciousbecamecentraltoaspecificculturebecausetheyrationalized,andthereforemaintained,traditionalformsof behavior,and becausetheyremainedrelevanttomoreadvancedculturesthroughmodernreinterpretationand use.'46 If folklorewasthe studyofeverything,everywhere,nomatterhowbanaland"popular," andif,forArnold,capitalism andgovernmentweredefinedby theirsymbols,thenthe study of governancecouldnot belimitedtothe studyof rationalactormodelsorthelegalformsthatemergefromappellateopinionsorlegislation-or,forthatmatter,thedebunkingofsuchmodelsandforms.Thestudyofgovernancemustconsidereverythingfromthepropagandaofmassculture(in,forexample,TheSaturday Evening Post andthe movies)to theinnerworkingsandself-importantdiscourseoftheacademy,thecourts,andthelegislature(in,forexample,judicialdecisionsandthepublicpronouncementsofprofessorsandintellectuals).47Notwithstandingthe centralityof BoasiananthropologyintheAmericanacademyinthemid-1930s,ArnoldandotherrealistsseemedespeciallydrawntothemorefunctionalistsocialanthropologyassociatedatthetimewithBronislawMalinowski,whosemonographCrime andCustominSavageSocietyhadbeenpublished in1926.148Theattractionisnotsurprising,giventherealists'owncommitmenttofunctionalism.Functionalistsocial144.FrankBoas,TheMind ofPrimitive Man,14J.AM.FOLKLORE1,2-3(1901).145.FranzBoas,The History of Anthropology, 20Sci. 512,519 (1904).146.SeeGEORGEW.STOCKING,JR.,Franz Boasand theCulture Concept inHistorical Perspective,inRACE,CULTURE,ANDEVOLUTION:ESSAYSINTHEHISTORYOFANTHROPOLOGY195,225-27(1968).Indeed,anthropologistEdwardSapir,whosetenureatYaleoverlappedwithArnold's,appliedconceptionsofcultureandpersonalityfromtheanthropologyof simplerculturestothoseofmodernindustrialsociety.See DARNELL,supra note143,at127.147.Seesupra text accompanyingnote1.148.SeeFrancisG.Snyder,Anthropology,Dispute Processes andLaw: ACriticalIntroduction,8BRIT.J.L.&SOC.141,142-43(1981)(notingMalinowski'semphasisonfunctionoverforminCrime and CustominSavageSociety).149.See supra Part I.A.1086[Vol.51SYMBOLSOF GOVERNANCEanthropologyassumedaculturetobeadynamic,organicwholewhoseparts,includingitslaws,relatetoeachotherbymeetingsocialinterestsandneeds.15 Tostudynatives,oneconsideredtheirsymbolicformsandpracticesassupportingthecultureandsocietyofwhichtheywereanintegralpart.Thefunctionalists'insightservedpracticalgoalsforearlytwentiethcenturycolonialstatesasanimportanttoolofcolonialadministration.Theyenabledcolonialpowerstounderstandbetter,andadministermoreefficientlyand peaceably,"the peculiaritiesof theparticularterritory...[and]theprinciplesofsocialorganizationwhichobtaininotherprimitivecommunities."1Arnold'sconceptionoflawasoneaspectofthelargersymbolsofgovernancethussharedwiththeprevailinganthropologythatdriftedinto thelegalacademyheinhabitedthenotionthatlawwasanecessaryandfunctionalpartofalargerculturalsymbolicsystem.Thosewhohopedtoimposesocialordermustunderstandand followthespecificdoctrinesandritualsofthepopulationtheywishedtopersuadeor152conquer.4.Conclusion. TheNewDealrepresentedforArnoldtheparadigmaticexampleofanemergentconstellationofsymbols.153 Indeed,theNewDeal'smostpopularsymbolwasPresidentRoosevelthimself, who"expressesforamajorityof the publicthe currentdistrust of oldmythsand thebeliefthat theGovernmenthasa newroletoplay in providingforsecurityof individualsintheir jobsandinthedistributionofgoods.TheNewDealwasanelite,managedpoliticalmovementthatsuccessfullydeployedsymbolsforafunctionalendtoreplacewhat Arnoldsawastheoutmodedidealsofanoldercreedwithamodernandcapitalisteconomic,political,andlegalorder.Itsultimatesuccessonthespiritualplaneofsymbolsaswellasonthetemporalplaneofobjectiveresultscamenotsimplyfromarational150.SeeHuntingtonCairns,Lawand Anthropology, 31COLUM.L.REV.32,35 (1931).151.Id.at 53.152.Arnold'swillingnesstoconsiderlawwithinalargersocio-culturalcontextdistinguisheshimfromLlewellyn'santhropologicalmonograph,co-authoredwithHoebelandpublishedseveralyearsafterSymbolsandFolklore,which isolatedlawfrom other socialcontrolsystems.SeeNader, supra note138,at18(discussingKARLN.LLEWELLYN&E.A.HOEBEL,THECHEYENNEWAY:CONFLICTANDCASE LAWINPRIMITIVEJURISPRUDENCE(1941)).2003] 1087BUFFALO LAW REVIEWdebunkingofitsopposition,butalso,andequallyimportantly,fromitscredibleadaptationandmanipulationofprevailingsymbols.ThetoolsArnoldadoptedtounderstandhowthesesymbolsworked,andhowthesesymbolscouldbemanipulated,werereadily availablein thesociological,psychological,andanthropologicalstudyof thecultureand controlof modernandprimitivesocieties.B.The Symbolsof Institutions:The Dynamics of CollectiveSymbolic ActionIf symbolsconstitutedforArnoldtheculturaltoolsandmeaningsofgovernance,thentheorganizationorinstitution,'ratherthantheindividual,wasthecentralagentandlocusof meaning,productionand socialchange.5"TheshiftfromwhatArnoldcalledthe"individualisticera"ofpre-andearly-IndustrialAmericatothe"interdependence"ofmodernityrequiredthatthediagnosticianfocusontheinstitutionasproduceroftheindividual,andtherefore,ontheindividualsubjectasamerereflectionoftheinstitutionorinstitutionstowhichshebelongs.'57Heurgedthat,"wemustconsiderinstitutionsandthemasspsychologysurroundingthemasliving organisms,notdissimilarto humanpersonalities,...neverquiteunderstandingthemselvesortheparttheyareactuallyplayingbecauseofthenecessaryillusionswithwhichtheymustsurroundthemselvestopreservetheirprestigeandself-respect."'5 8 Thestudyofgroupbehavior153.See FOLKLORE,supra note3,at 390.154.Seeid.at 390-91.155.Arnoldfailedtoprovideacleardistinctionbetween,ordefinitionsof,"institution" and"organization,"and insteadseemedtoconfusethem. Attimes,heused"organizations"torefertoformallyorganized,voluntarygroupsand"institutions" torefertotheirinternalhabitsandcustoms.Seeid.at 24-26.Atothertimes,however,heusedthetermsinterchangeably.See,e.g.,id.at351,355(usingboth"organization"and"institution"torefertoformalgroups);SYMBOLS,supra note3,at iv (using"institution" toreferto formalorganizationsandentitieslike"courts,commercialbanks,orgovernmentalbureaus").Becausethefieldofinstitutionaleconomics,withwhichArnoldwasquitefamiliar,usedtheterm"institution" torefertobothinterchangeably,Iwillsimplyusetheterm"institution."Seeinfranotes162-181andaccompanyingtext.156.SeeFOLKLORE,supra note3,at 10,23,25-26,350-88.157.Seeid.at 349.158.SYMBOLS,supra note 3,at 25-26.1088[Vol.51SYMBOLSOF GOVERNANCEthereforemustfocusuponthe"habits,disciplines,andmorale"thatunifyinstitutions,andthesymbolic"personality orcharacter" institutionsdevelop.5 9HepresentedinFolkloreanentirehierarchyofthesalientinstitutionsof mid-1930sAmerica,fromthelargestnationalinstitutions,suchasthenation-stateandthefederalgovernment,tosmallerandlesspowerfulnationalinstitutionsliketheRotaryClubandnationalassociationsofacademics.Eventhesmallestinstitutions,Arnoldargued,resembledthelargestinstructuresandhabits.6'HeproposedstudyingthesymptomsofthesocialpathologiesproducedintheeconomicandpoliticalcrisisoftheDepression,pathologiesthatmarkedwhathesawasthedeaththroesof anoldera.Researchwouldfocusontheinternaldynamicsof institutions,aswellasonthestrugglebetweenemergentandresidualinstitutionsforsymboliccontrol.16Arnoldborrowedhisconceptionof institutionsand theirplaceinsymbolsandgovernancefromthefieldofinstitutionaleconomics,'whichthrivedinthelatenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturiesintheinfluentialworkof suchdiversefiguresasThorsteinVeblen,'63 JohnR.159.FOLKLORE,supra note 3,at350.160.Id.at 24.161.Id.at 364.162.Oninstitutionalismgenerally,seeHEATHPEARSON,ORIGINSOFLAWANDECONOMICS:THEECONOMISTS'NEWSCIENCEOFLAW,1830-1930,154-57(1997);DOROTHYROSS,THEORIGINSOFAMERICANSOCIALSCIENCE207(1991);PaulT.Homan,TheInstitutional School[of Economics] 5ENCYCLOPAEDIAOFTHESOCIALSCIENCES387(EdwinR.A.Seligmaned.,1932).Ontheintellectualandacademicrelationshipbetweeninstitutionalismandlegalrealism,seeDUXBURY,supra note15,at98-106;FRIED,supra note42,10-15;SCHLEGEL,supra note25,at63;HerbertHovenkamp,TheFirst Great Law&EconomicsMovement,42STAN.L.REV.993,1013-31(1990);HerbertHovenkamp,KnowledgeAboutWelfare:LegalRealismandtheSeparation ofLawandEconomics, 84MINN.L.REV.805,850-60(2000).163.Veblen'smajorworksinclude:THEPLACEOFSCIENCEINMODERNCIVILISATIONANDOTHERESSAYS(1919)[hereinafterVEBLEN,THEPLACEOFSCIENCE];THETHEORYOFTHELEISURECLASS:ANECONOMICSTUDYOFINSTITUTIONS(ModernLibrary1934)(1898)[hereinafterVEBLEN,THEORYOFTHELEISURECLASS];THEVESTEDINTERESTSANDTHECOMMONMAN(VikingPress1964)(1919)[hereinafterVEBLEN,THEVESTEDINTERESTS];and ThorsteinVeblen,WhyIsEconomics Notan Evolutionary Science?12Q.J.ECON.373(1898).Thesecondaryliteratureon Veblen isimmense;some commentariesandsummariesarecitedinthenotesinfra.Forawell-respectedintellectualandpersonalbiography,see JOSEPH DORFMAN,THORSTEINVEBLENANDHISAMERICA(1934).2003]10891090 BUFFALOLAW REVIEW [Vol.51Commons,"'andWaltonHamilton,..thelatterofwhomwasArnold'scolleagueatYale.16 Institutionalistsdefined"institution"broadlynotonlytoincludetheformalorganizationbutas"awayofthoughtoractionofsomeprevalenceandpermanence,whichisembeddedinthehabitsof agrouporthecustomsof apeople...[andwhich]fix[es]theconfinesof andimpose[s]formupontheactivitiesofhumanbeings."'6 7 Withinthisamorphousconception,widelyrecognizedorganizationalarrangements-fromtypesof financialtransactionstothemodelsof educationalinstitutions,andfromdemocracytoreligiousbeliefs-are"institutions.'68Ininstitutionaleconomics,Arnoldfounda modelforhisinterdisciplinaryprojectofstudyingtheinstitutional164.Commons'smajorworksinclude:INSTITUTIONALECONOMICS:ITSPLACEIN POLITICALECONOMY(1934);LEGALFOUNDATIONSOFCAPITALISM(1924);andASOCIOLOGICALVIEWOFSOVEREIGNTY(AugustusM.Kelley1965).ForageneralintroductiontoCommons,seeJosephDorfman,John R.Commons'GeneralTheoryofInstitutions, IntroductiontoCOMMONS,ASOCIOLOGICALVIEWOFSOVEREIGNTY(AugustusM.Kelley1965).ArecentcollectioncomparesthemajorearlyworksofVeblenandCommonsandtheirroleinestablishinginstitutionaleconomics.SeeTHEFOUNDINGOFINSTITUTIONALECONOMICS:THELEISURECLASS ANDSOVEREIGNTY(Warren J.Samuelsed.,1998).165.Hamilton'smajorworksinclude:HAMILTON,INDUSTRIALPOLICYANDINSTITUTIONALISM:SELECTEDESSAYS(JosephDorfmaned.,1974);Hamilton,Institution, in8ENCYCLOPAEDIAOFTHESOCIALSCIENCES84(EdwinR.A.Seligmaned.,1932);WALTONHALEHAMILTON&HELENR.WRIGHT,AWAYOFORDERFORBITUMINOUSCOAL(1928).ForageneralintroductiontoHamilton'swork,seeLaurenceShute,Walton Hale Hamilton, in THEELGARCOMPANIONTOINSTITUTIONALANDEVOLUTIONARYECONOMICS310-14(GeoffreyM.Hodgsonetal.eds.,1994);JosephDorfman,WaltonHale Hamilton and Industrial Policy,inINDUSTRIALPOLICY ANDINSTITUTIONALISM,supra.166.ArnoldwasclosetoHamiltonat Yaleand throughouthisprofessionallife.See ThurmanArnold,Walton Hale Hamilton, 68YALE L.J.399,399(1959).167.Hamilton,supranote165,at84;seealsoJohnR.Commons,Institutional Economics, 21AM.ECON.REV.648,650(1931)(defining institutionas"collectiveactionincontrol,liberation,andexpansionof individualaction").Veblen'sdefinitionwassimilarlyinclusive.See,e.g.,VEBLEN,THEPLACEOFSCIENCE,supranote163,at239(defininginstitutionsas"settledhabitsofthoughtcommontothegeneralityofmen");VEBLEN,THEORYOFTHELEISURECLASS,supra note163,at119(defininginstitutionsas"prevalenthabitsofthoughtwithrespecttoparticularrelationsandparticularfunctionsoftheindividualandof thecommunity");seegenerally STANLEYMATTHEWDAUGERT,THEPHILOSOPHYOFTHORSTEINVEBLEN49(1950)(explainingthatVeblen'snotionofinstitutiondescribedmorewidelyprevalenthabitsofthought,includingprinciples,customs,laws,andideologies,aswellastheproductsorresults of theseprinciples,customs, laws,and ideologies).168.Hamilton,supra note165,at 84.SYMBOLSOF GOVERNANCEstructureandcontextwithinwhichthesymbolsofgovernancehavemeaning.169 Forinstitutionaleconomists,theaggregateofthedistincthumaninstitutionsofagivenplaceandtimeconstituteasociety'sculture,andtheinterplaybetweencollectiveinstitutionsandtheactionsofindividualsactionsisatthecoreof "the dramaof thesocialprocess.""17 Thus, historical,cultural,andsymboliccontexts,aswellastheprevailingcontemporarycommonsenseand"thepracticalcommitmentsofthemoment,"affectinstitutionalbehavior.171Arnold'sbreakfromtraditionallegalstudyparalleledinstitutionalism'sbreakfromtraditionaleconomics.Institutionalismrejectedthenarrowstudyofindividualeconomicbehaviorandtheconceptoftheself-regulatingmarket.Veblendespisedthelatterforitsabstractmodelsthat"t[ook]forgranted,denied,orexplainedaway"thecollectiveandsocialinstitutionsof moderncapitalism;..2 hechampionedinsteadamorebroadlyconceivedprojectthatconsideredeconomicswithinawiderconceptionofculture.173 Institutionaleconomistsexplicitlyconsideredindividualsassocialbeings locatedwithinspecifichistoricalcontexts,rather thanas isolatedrationalactors.'74169.In1938,ArnoldidentifiedVeblen's"analysisof Americanbusiness"asakeyinfluenceonhis work.SeeBOOKSTHATCHANGEDOURMINDS,supra note1,at 8; seealso DAVIDRIESMAN,THORSTEINVEBLEN:ACRITICAL INTERPRETATIONiii,94(1960)(noting thatArnoldknewof Veblen'sworkwhilehewasat Yale).Inaddition,therewasawell-establishedsocialandintellectualrelationshipbetweeninstitutionaleconomists