The Swedish Constitution and Social Democratic Power Immergut

8/3/2019 The Swedish Constitution and Social Democratic Power Immergut

1/27

The Swedish Constitution and SocialDemocratic Power: Measuring theMechanical Eect of a Political Institution

Ellen M. Immergut*

Recent discussions of Swedish political change have focused on the decline of SocialDemocratic `hegemony' and on the end of the `Swedish model'. In contrast to preference- orinterest-driven explanations for these developments, this paper investigates the impact ofconstitutional changes made in 1969 in Sweden, which included the elimination of the UpperHouse or First Chamber of the Swedish parliament and the introduction of a more directlyproportional electoral system. Using a simulation model, the actual electoral results from 1969through 1994 were plugged into the formulas set forth by the old constitutional rules, in orderto generate the number of parliamentary seats each party would have received under the oldsystem. This simulation shows that the Social Democratic Party would have received asignicantly larger share of parliamentary seats under the old constitutional rules than underthe current constitution. Thus one can conclude that the new constitution decreased SocialDemocratic power in Sweden.

A Change in the Rules of the GameIn 1968 and 1969, the parliamentary representatives of the Swedish SocialDemocratic Party voted together with the political opposition for a partialrevision of the Swedish constitution. This revision eliminated the indirectly

elected Upper House (or First Chamber) of the Swedish parliament, andprovided for a new, more proportional, system of electoral representation.Plans were made for incorporating these partial revisions into a totalrevision of the constitution ^ or more exactly, the 1809 Regeringsform orInstrument of Government, and the 1866 Riksdagsordning or Law onParliament ^ which was eventually approved by the Swedish Riksdag in1973 and 1974. This total revision of the constitution also includedprovisions on popular referenda and civil rights. The most important

political changes, however, were eected by the partial constitutional

Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 25 ^ No. 3, 2002ISSN 0080^6757

# Nordic Political Science Association

* Ellen M. Immergut, Department of Politics and Management, University of Konstanz,

Postfach 5560, D 9178457 Konstanz, Germany. E-mail: [email protected]

231


2/27


3/27

Governmental Strength

First, if one measures governmental `strength' in terms of the parliamentarybasis for government, one observes that whereas governments from 1936to 1969 enjoyed reliable parliamentary majorities, since that time themajorities have narrowed signicantly. Using Bergman's gures (2000, 196,200, own calculation), the average parliamentary support for the govern-ment was 52 percent from 1945 to 1969, but only 42 percent from 1970 to1998. A second, but more controversial, measure of government strengthmight be the frequency of majority government. Sannerstedt and Sjlincharacterize even minority Social Democratic governments as `majoritygovernments' because they were supported by the Communist Party. Usingthis indicator, they conclude that majority governments were in power for13 percent of the months between 1917 and 1936, 100 percent of the monthsbetween 1936 and 1973 and 54 percent of the months between 1974 and1991 (Sannerstedt & Sjlin 1992, 108).1 Strom denes majority governmentmore stringently to be a government with 50 percent active parliamentarysupport, and counts seven (out of 12) governments formed between 1945and 1969 as majority, and two (out of nine) governments formed between1970 and 1985 as majority. Notably, the average parliamentary basis formajority government declined from 54 percent to 50.5 percent between the

two periods (Strom 1990, 268, and own calculations). Thus, regardless ofthe particular indicator used, majority governments have become lessfrequent in the post-1970 period, and the margin of parliamentary supportfor all types of governments has declined (see also Ruin 1988, 321).

Governmental Stability

Like governmental strength, the degree of governmental `stability' dependsupon the indicator one uses. Here, the critical issue is what counts as onegovernment; that is, when does one consider an old government to havebeen terminated, and a new government to have been formed? Mller andStrm (2000, 584) use three criteria to determine government termination:new elections, change in Prime Minister and change in governing party orparties. They are prepared to loosen this denition, however, to discount achange in Prime Minister for non-political reasons, such as voluntaryretirement or death (Mller & Strm 2000, 12^13). By this measure, Swedenbelongs to the group of countries with moderately stable governments, witha mean duration of 771 days, as compared to the European average of 702days (Mller & Strm 2000, 584^85). If one compares cabinet stability pre-and post-1970 using this measure, there is not much of a dierence betweenthe 1945^1969 period (803 days) and the 1970^1998 period (775 days),

(Bergman 2000, 196^97, own calculations).

233


4/27

Governmental Tenure

The Mller and Strm criteria measure the degree to which governmentslast through their mandated period of government, and so the extentto which governments maintain the condence of parliament during adesignated period of rule. This measure thus pinpoints cases where politicaldisagreements lead governments to fall. However, it may also be relevantpolitically to measure the extent to which governments maintain theirtenure beyond one electoral period. This is the logic of the Damgaardmeasure of government termination, which excludes elections as a ground

of government termination, and counts only changes in the partycomposition of the government, and changes in Prime Minister caused bypolitically forced resignations (Damgaard 1994, 207). In order to dis-tinguish this measure from the previous indicator, one could perhapsspeak of government `tenure' as opposed to government stability. UsingDamgaard's criteria for government termination as the basis for a measureof the long-term tenure of government, there is indeed a large dierencebetween the two periods, with governments lasting an average of 2,945 daysfrom 1945 to 1969, and 1,260 days between 1970 and 1998. Sannerstedtand Sjlin use a similar measure of government termination (party changeand formal resignation of the cabinet), but slightly dierent periods andconclude, also, that the average tenure of government has decreased since1970: `During 1917^1936 Sweden had 11 cabinets, with an average life-spanof 21 months. During 1936^1957 Sweden had 4 cabinets with an averagelife-span of 63.5 months. During the 194 months from 1957 to 1973, onesingle cabinet continued to govern. Since 1974, Sweden has had 7 cabinets,with an average duration of 29 months' (Sannerstedt & Sjlin 1992, 109).

One-Party Dominance of Governments

Finally, the duration of government can be measured simply in terms ofchanges in the Prime Minister or changes in the political party that controlsthe post of Prime Minister. If one counts a change in Prime Minister forany reason as the end of a government, the average duration of governmentdropped from 4,417 days for 1945^69 to 1,120 for 1970^98. If one removeschanges in Prime Minister caused by death ^ and does not, for example,count the shift from Per Albin Hansson to Tage Erlander or from OlofPalme to Ingvar Carlsson as a shift in government ^ and thus measures onlychanges in the party that controls the post of Prime Minister, the durationof government was 8,834 days for 1945^69, and 1,260 for 1970^98. Here,however, we are no longer really speaking of length of tenure in government

^ as shifts between single party and coalition governments disappear ^ butmore of the `dominance' of one party over governments. In the 1946 to 1969

234


5/27

period (and indeed in the 1936 to 1969 period) the Social Democratic Partydominated governments, in that it uninterruptedly controlled the post ofPrime Minister. In fact, the party controlled this post even until 1976, whenthe rst non-socialist government of the entire postwar period came topower. Thus, whether one focuses on governmental strength, tenure, orone-party dominance, we observe a marked shift in Swedish governmentsafter 1970. Some observers have lumped these developments together, anddiscussed a decline in the stability of Swedish governments, but if we use anindicator of government stability intended to measure the survival ofgovernments through the full electoral period, we see that `stability' has

actually declined less than strength, tenure and Social Democraticdominance.2

Patterns of Swedish Policy Making

This decline in Social Democratic electoraland governmentalstrength hasbeen associated with changes in the style of Swedish policy making. Duringthe pre-1970 period, Swedish policy making was described as `deliberative',`rationalistic', `open' and `consensual' (Anton cited in Ruin 1982, 143).Particularly in the era of Social Democratic single-party governments,policy making was often removed to the executive arena, and many

decisions were made in high-level negotiations between government ocialsand interest-group representatives. Since 1970, parliamentary votingpatterns have displayed more conict, all-party coalition votes have becomeless common, and bloc-based voting more pronounced. Until 1994,3 theeects of increased party competition were exacerbated by the shorterelectoral cycle of three years, which forced each government to attempt toimplement its campaign program in an extremely short time-frame (Ruin1988; Sannerstedt & Sjlin 1992).4

Further, the traditional organizations for interest intermediation havechanged their orientation to government and politics. The labor unions havebecome less willing to maintain their blanket endorsement of the SocialDemocratic Party; and the Employers' Association has become increasinglypolitical. For a number of reasons ^ changed production methods, thegrowth of public sector unions, the problem of skill dierentials,international competition ^ corporatist institutions are breaking down,removing an alternative arena for policy making that underpinned SocialDemocratic policies.

Taken together, these changed political, social and economic conditionshave had signicant consequences for the politics and policies of Sweden'suniversalist welfare state. As Olof Petersson states in his summary of thegovernment study of power and democracy in Sweden, `The era

characterized by a strong public-sector expansion, centralized collective

235


6/27

bargaining based on a historic compromise between labor and capital,social engineering and centrally planned standard solutions has come to anend' (Petersson 1991, 190). All in all, one can speak of a decline in SocialDemocratic `hegemony' and an `end' to the Swedish model.

Explanations for the Loss of Support for the SwedishSocial Democratic Model

Voter PreferencesSwedish and international scholars have proposed three types of ex-planations for these changes in Swedish politics. The rst explanationfocuses on changes in voter preferences. First, class-based voting has de-clined. Second, voters have become more volatile, switching morefrequently between parties, and even splitting their votes for national andlocal elections held simultaneously among dierent parties, including thosefrom opposite political blocks. Consequently, one can speak of a decline inpolitical partisanship or party identication, a decline that has been evenmore extreme in Sweden than in other advanced democracies (Gilljam &

Holmberg 1993, 175).These changes in voters' preferences, in turn, have been interpreted in

dierent ways. One group of scholars focuses on what could be consideredobjective causes for these changing voting patterns. Social-structural change

^ the decline of the working class or its `embourgeoisement' ^ could leadto a decline in class voting, and hence to Social Democratic decomposition.An alternative view focuses on the impact of education: as Swedish votershave become more highly educated and better informed through the newsmedia, they may tend to base their voting choices on issues rather than onideology, thereby becoming more volatile, as issues change from election toelection. A third hypothesis to explain the decline of partisanship stressesthe increasing diculty of nding governmental solutions to the problemsthat occupy voters. The oil price shocks and ination of the 1970s, as well asthe ever increasing competition to Swedish industries caused by globaliz-ation, have drastically altered Sweden's economic environment, making itmuch more dicult for Social Democratic Keynesian solutions to work.Social changes have brought new political cleavages to the fore, such asthose centered on immigration or the environment ^ each of which has beenrepresented by a new political party, Ny Demokrati and Miljpartiet-De

grna, respectively (Stephens 1981; Petersson, 1991; Oskarson 1994).Analysts focusing on more subjective causes for these changing voter

patterns, on the other hand, have argued that, despite the objective di-culties, a great deal of room for manoeuvre remains for the political parties.

236


7/27

On these views, voters have responded directly to party strategies and partypolicies ^ particularly those of the Social Democrats ^ and, hence, theresponsibility for electoral success or failure lies with the party leadership,and the decisions it has taken in the face of various political issues andproblems (Korpi 1978; Sainsbury 1985; 1991). Nevertheless, even whileproposing very dierent arguments to explain changes in Swedish votingpatterns, all of these explanations share a common feature: individual-levelchanges in political preferences (even if ultimately accounted for by social-structural change) are responsible for the loss of popularity of the SocialDemocratic Party program.

Interests of Important Social Groups

A second type of explanation focuses on the interests of important socialgroups, and, in particular, the representatives of capital and labor. Herechanges in production and in the ways these groups perceive their interestshave resulted in a loss of support for the Swedish model, and hence for theSocial Democrats. Solidarity within the labor movement, and correspond-ingly the support for a solidaristic wage policy, has declined as white collarand public sector workers have grown in importance in the economy andin the union movement. Cleavages between public and private sector,

between skilled and unskilled workers, and between the export andsheltered domestic sectors are becoming more severe, making the logic ofthe Swedish model obsolete (Hernes 1991; Kjellberg 1992; Swenson 1992;Pontusson & Swenson 1996). Swenson (1993) in particular stresses thechanged interests of the Swedish Engineering Employers Association(Verkstadsfreningen). Whereas in the 1930s, Social Democratic policieshelped the engineering employers achieve dominance within the employers'association, and to solve wage drift problems created by the constructionindustry, by the 1980s the Social Democratic policies and corporatistarrangements no longer served their interests, especially when they lost theircontrol over the employer association. Economic interests thus accountfor the breakdown of the Swedish model of industrial relations. The impactof the industrial relations system on the electorate (whether, for example,voting patterns strictly adhere to shifts in union loyalties), however, is notfully specied in these arguments.5

Constitutional Revision

The third approach focuses on the changes in the constitution (Stjernquist1969; 1976; 1977; 1989; 1996; Westersthl 1976; Ruin 1982; 1988;Sannerstedt & Sjlin 1992, 108; Steinmo 1993, 129^31, 179^81; Lindbeck et

al. 1994). On this view, two changes in particular have reduced the strength

237


8/27

and longevity of Swedish governments. First, the electoral system has beenmade more proportional, by increasing the number of seats in each electoraldistrict, and by introducing 40 additional seats (utjmningsmandat) to bedistributed in order to bring the parliamentary distribution of seats more inline with the national electoral results. These provisions increased thenumber of seats to the smaller parties ^ especially those of the very smallest,the ex-Communists or Left Party, the Greens and the Christian Democrats and reduced those of the largest (the Social Democrats). Under a moreproportional electoral system, it should be more dicult to form a governingmajority; majorities are generally more narrow; and, consequently, morefrequent shifts in the governing coalition are to be expected.

Second, the reforms eliminated the indirectly elected First Chamber orUpper House of the Swedish parliament. The First Chamber was elected bylocal county council politicians, in elections held each year in dierent FirstChamber electoral districts. In each year, one-eighth of the seats were upfor re-election; the term of oce was also eight years. The First Chamber,in other words, introduced a lag eect in the Swedish parliament: localcounty councillors ^ who might have been elected up to four years beforethe First Chamber election in which they took part ^ elected members ofparliament that were to serve for eight years. At any one time, an MP might

be serving in oce based on electoral results from 12 years before. In theSwedish literature, this lag eect is very much stressed. But equally if notmore important was the double disproportionality resulting from indirectelections: disproportionality occurred in converting votes into seats at thecounty council election (using the modied Sainte-Lague method), andagain during the First Chamber elections (where the less proportionald'Hondt method was used) (Nyman 1966, 187).

Although it was a legacy of the transformation of the estates parliamentto a liberal parliament in 1866 ^ when it had assured the nobility of vetopower over parliamentary decision making ^ the First Chamber had provedto be very advantageous for the Social Democratic Party during thepostwar period. Since the landslide victory of the Social Democrats in 1942,the party had maintained an absolute majority of the seats in the FirstChamber, as is depicted in Figure 1.6 Indeed, if one compares the per-centage of seats held by the Social Democratic Party in the First and SecondChambers (Figure 2), as well as in the full Riksdag (Figure 3), one observesthat the Social Democratic Party generally held less than 50 percent of theseats in the Second Chamber, but that the First Chamber majority wassucient to give the Social democrats a majority in the full Riksdag (otherthan in 1956). When supported by the Communist Party (Figure 4), theSocial Democratic Party could control an absolute majority in the full

Riksdag. It should be noted, of course, that the Social Democraticgovernments of the 1950s and 1960s were based on Second Chamber

238


9/27

majority coalitions between the Social Democratic and Farmers' parties,or on Second Chamber Social Democratic minority governments that reliedon the passive support of the Communist Party. Nevertheless, the left blocmajority in the full Riksdag can be used as an indicator of Social

Democratic `veto power' (see also Bergman 1995, 62^63).

38%

40%

42%

44%

46%

48%

50%

52%

54%

56%

58%

60%

62%

1944

1945

1946

1947

1948

1949

1950

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

Percentage

ofseats

M+C+F S

Figure 1. First Chamber Real Results ^ Percentages.

38%

40%

42%

44%

46%

48%

50%

52%

54%

56%

58%

60%

62%

1944

1945

1946

1947

1948

1949

1950

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

Percentage

ofseats

M+C+F S

Figure 2. Second Chamber Real Results ^ Percentages.

239


10/27

The First Chamber majority was important for Social Democratic rulefor three reasons. First, all legislation was required to be passed by bothchambers, so that a Social Democratic majority in the First Chamber was

sucient to veto any and all legislation. Second, the First Chambermajority contributed to giving the Social Democrats a majority in the full

38%

40%

42%

44%

46%

48%

50%

52%

54%

56%

58%

60%

62%

1944

1945

1946

1947

1948

1949

1950

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

P

ercentage

ofseats

M+C+F S

Figure 3. Full Riksdag Real Results ^ Percentages.

38%

40%

42%

44%

46%

48%

50%

52%

54%

56%

58%

60%

62%

1944

1945

1946

1947

1948

1949

1950

1951

1952

1953

1954

1955

1956

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961

1962

1963

1964

1965

1966

1967

1968

Percentage

ofseats

M+C+F S+K

Figure 4. Full Riksdag ^ Percentages by Blocs.

240


11/27

Riksdag, even when the party did not enjoy a majority in the SecondChamber. As the full Riksdag voted on the yearly budget, this majorityyielded the Social Democratic Party veto power over government budgets.(In the very few years of the postwar period when the Social DemocraticParty did not enjoy an absolute majority in the full Riksdag, the votes of theCommunist Party were sucient to yield a majority to the left bloc, asshown in Figure 4, and hence to restore Social Democratic veto power overbudgets.) Third, although the Second Chamber majority was considereddecisive, the First Chamber majority was a contributing factor in decisionson forming governments, since this majority was sucient to cripple any

government based solely on a Second Chamber majority (Nyman 1966,219^20).

These political-institutional conditions (the particular conguration ofconstitutional rules and electoral results) had ramications for the style ofpolicy making in Sweden. Because the opposition parties had virtually nohope of gaining oce, they moved towards cooperation with the SocialDemocrats in order to have at least some inuence over policy ^ and to beable to demonstrate to their voters that they had accomplished somethingwhile in oce, even if only in the opposition (Stjernquist 1966, 138^46). Inaddition, the eight-year term for the Upper House made it possible tocalculate how long the majorities would last, helping to extend the time-

frame for Swedish parliamentary politics. Interest groups, as well, weremoved to work in a spirit of compromise, because it was clear that theywould be negotiating in a framework of Social Democratic rule for sometime to come. This was particularly important for moderating the views ofemployers, for instance (Immergut 1992, 210, 222^23). At the same time,the need to seek coalition partners or votes in the Second Chamber helpedto moderate both the Social Democratic Party program (for instancemoving away from a stress on nationalization in the 1930s and 1940s toplacate the Farmers' Party) and the demands of its allies, especially theunions (Steinmo 1993, 7, 121^22).

Given the important role of the First Chamber in sustaining SocialDemocratic governance in the past, it is not implausible to think that theloss of the First Chamber might be an important factor in weakening SocialDemocratic governmental capacities in the post-1970 period. Whereasbefore, one could have said that decisive parliamentary majorities providedthe Swedes with a functional equivalent of the strong governments of theWestminster system despite their proportional electoral system, since theconstitutional changes Sweden has experienced the oscillations of theWestminster system without its strong governments. The dramatic changeof the pre-1945 period was the decline of the Conservative Party and the riseof the Social Democratic Party between 1910 and 1940. In the postwar

period, the political pattern stabilized into two fairly evenly matched blocs.

241


12/27

The Social Democratic Party, however, was able to form de facto majoritygovernments, and, consequently, to remain continuously in governmentfrom 1936 to 1969. By contrast, the post-1970 period is characterized byfrequent oscillations in government, and by several periods where the twoblocs hold exactly or nearly exactly the same number of seats. Under theseconditions, it is not surprising that party competition has increased,parliamentary bargaining has become more conictual and corporatist-style interest-group negotiations no longer support a pattern of consensuspolitics (see also Hermansson 1993; Pappi & Schmitt 1994).

It is thus plausible to claim that constitutional changes can account forthe dramatic changes in Swedish political patterns. Yet, the constitutionalchanges were accompanied by a signicant decline in Social Democraticelectoral strength. How can one disentangle the eects of the changes invotes from those of the changes in constitutional structure?

Institutionalist TheorySocial Cleavages versus Political Institutions

It is precisely this dilemma that makes this case of interest not only tostudents of Swedish politics but also to those of institutionalist theory.First, the origins and impact of institutions on complex political patternsare complicated by the fact that political institutions are embedded inparticular societies with their characteristic social-structural and cleavagepatterns. For example, the political institutions we associate with con-sociational politics ^ proportional representation, bicameralism, and, in theSwiss case, direct democracy ^ are systematically located within religiouslyand ethnically divided societies (Lehmbruch 1967; Lijphart 1968; 1992;Deutsch 1976). But, if cleavages and institutions co-vary, how then are weto disentangle the impact of social cleavages versus political institutions(Knight 1992)? Constitutional change provides an exciting experimentalsituation, whereby some political and social (and even cultural) factors may(hopefully) be held constant, and the variation in institutions can beobserved in isolation.

Single Events or General Theory?

Second, the Swedish case of constitutional change is of scientic interest aswell, because it is an example of routine rather than crisis-driven con-stitutional change. The constitution of the French Fifth Republic, for

example, was drafted in the middle of the Algerian crisis, making it dicultto know whether de Gaulle's success in exploiting its provisions in its early

242


13/27

years was due to this crisis background, or to the constitutional provisionsthemselves ^ that is, whether he was exercising charismatic or legal-rationalauthority. The Swedish constitutional change, by contrast, was enacted inroutine proceedings, with two commissions of inquiry deliberating for manyyears, and parliamentary votes in two legislative periods, separated by anelection. Routine constitutional change should provide a better basis forgeneralizations than crisis-driven change, because the eect of one-timeevents is minimized. Caution should be used, nevertheless, in overextendingthe ndings to a general theory of constitutional change, as so many con-stitutions are indeed enacted under special circumstances (Oe 1996; Elster

1997). Instead, the Swedish case may serve better as an example ofthe dynamics of institutional (as opposed to constitutional) change andinstitutional redesign.

Political Preferences versus Political Institutions

Third, and nally, the Swedish case is of interest to institutionalist theory,because, as stated above, it is a good example of conscious rather thanevolutionary or accidental institutional change (Tsebelis 1990). For, despitetheir many dierences, scholars from both the `rational choice' and the`historical institutionalist' approaches agree that the problem of insti-

tutional origins and institutional change is a frontier issue for institution-alist analysis (Shepsle 1989; 2001; Hall & Taylor 1996; Rothstein 1996;Weingast 1996; Thelen 1999; Pierson 2000). It remains a frontier issue,because the scope of institutional change is so dicult to assess. As in theSwedish case, the normal situation is that many dierent constitutionalprovisions and political factors change at the same time. The picture isfurther muddied by long-term shifts in social structure and incrementalchanges in political culture. Once again, we are back to the problem ofdisentangling the impact of constitutional changes from changes in socialstructure, cultural attitudes, and other developments that may aectpolitical preferences.

A Simulation ExperimentAs a rst step to understanding the important changes in Swedish politicsthat have taken place since 1970, this paper presents the results of asimulation experiment. This simulation holds electoral results constant, andassesses the impact of the changed constitutional rules.7 The actual post-1970 electoral results were plugged into the provisions of the old con-stitutional rules in order to calculate how many seats each party would have

gained under the old system. This isolates the drop in votes after 1970 from

243


14/27

the constitutional changes, providing a measure of what Duverger calledthe `mechanical' eect of the new constitution. In order to evaluate theimpact of Swedish constitutional change on the overall Swedish pattern ofconsensus politics and social concertation, much more work would need tobe done. The research results presented here are merely the rst step in suchan evaluation. The contribution here is to provide an exact measure of theextent of institutional change, by posing a hypothetical question: whatwould have been the distribution of parliamentary seats if the constitutionnot been changed and if voters had nevertheless voted exactly as they didunder the new constitutional rules.

Strategic Voting

This last assumption cannot be made without addressing the issue ofstrategic voting. The simulation attempts to separate the eects of voterpreferences from those of constitutional rules. But as voter strategies areaected by the constitutional framework and party system, one mustconsider the impact of the constitutional rules on strategic preferences,which are dened as the impact of the constitutional rules on voter choiceswith voter preferences held constant (Riker 1982; Bawn 1993). In com-

paring the old and new constitutional rules, there are three anticipatedstrategic eects, which all go in the direction of reducing the SocialDemocratic majority. First, bourgeois voters should be more motivated togo out and vote if they feel that there is a realistic chance of knocking theSocial Democrats out of oce; the new constitutional rules should thereforeproduce higher votes for the bourgeois parties. Second, voting for smallparties makes more strategic sense in a more proportional system, wherethey will get more seats; the new constitutional rules should thereforeproduce higher votes for the Communist, Green, Christian Democratic andother small parties, and indeed should favor the formation of new parties.Third, in the case of the Communist Party, not only are votes rewarded witha higher number of seats, but the threat that the party might fall below the4 percent threshold seems to have motivated Social Democratic voters tovote for the Communist Party, for example in the 1970 election (Forsell1971, 206, 209); the new constitutional rules should therefore producehigher votes for the Communist Party. In other words, all strategicconsiderations lead one to believe that Social Democratic electoral resultsshould be better under a continuation of the old rules. That is, holdingpreferences constant, the impact of the new electoral rules on voter behavioris not expected to be advantageous for the Social Democratic Party, suchthat one would expect voter results after 1970 to be higher under the new

constitution than they would have been under the old. Consequently, asimulation of the parliamentary seats each party would have held under the

244


15/27

old rules but using the new electoral results is not anticipated to be biasedin favor of higher numbers of seats for the Social Democratic Party.

Political preferences of voters, on the other hand, may also be aectedby the new constitutional rules. If governance becomes more dicult, theappeal of the Social Democratic Party as the party of government would beexpected to weaken. One could only attribute this change in voter prefer-ence to the constitutional changes, however, if the diculties of governanceare directly caused by the constitutional changes. But if, for the sake ofargument, one does make this assumption, one again nds that the expectedimpact of constitutional change on voters' political preferences would be

unfavorable for the Social Democratic Party. Once again, using electoralresults from the post-1970 period biases the simulation against the SocialDemocratic Party. On the other hand, if the old constitution had remainedin force, and had contributed to keeping the Social Democratic Party inpower, a voter backlash might have occurred, with increasing numbers ofvoters sharing a political preference for a change of government. It is hardto imagine that such a shift in voter preferences would have been stimulatedin the early 1970s solely because the constitution was unchanged. Thus, atleast for the earlier years of the simulation experiment, even taking ahypothesized connection between the constitution and the political prefer-ences of voters, there do not seem to be grounds for arguing that plugging

post-1970 votes into pre-1970 rules biases the simulation in favor of theSocial Democratic Party. Indeed, the abrupt drop in popularity of theSocial Democratic Party that occurs in 1970 would provide prima facieevidence that the total strategic and political eects of the new constitutionweaken the electoral strength of the Social Democratic Party.

Empirical Results

The First Chamber of parliament was indirectly elected by the members ofthe county councils, the provincial governments responsible mainly forhealth care. For the majority of county councils, the number of countycouncil politicians was determined by population in each county councilelectoral district. These county councils were elected every four years, at thesame time that local municipal and rural councillors were elected. Seats wereallocated according to the modied Sainte-Lague method adopted in 1952for communal elections, and in 1954 for the Second Chamber elections. Thismethod gives less of a boost to the largest party than the d'Hondt method,since, as the votes are divided by bigger numbers, they dwindle more rapidlyto regions where the smaller parties can get seats. Because the rst divisoris 1.4, however, there remains a barrier to small parties.

The county councils were divided into 19 First Chamber electoral

districts, each generally containing one or two county councils. These

245


16/27

electoral districts were then grouped into eight groups. Each year, onegroup composed of two or three electoral districts would hold a FirstChamber election. The number of First Chamber seats to be allocated toeach electoral district was determined once every ten years, and was basedon the population within each electoral district at that time. The councillorsvoted for their First Chamber representatives, and the seats were allocatedaccording to the d'Hondt method. In 1962, for example, the 137 countycouncillors of Stockholm and Uppsala, which comprised one FirstChamber electoral district, voted together for 13 members of parliament. Inthe same year, Vsterbotten and Norrbotten, the second electoral districtthat was part of this group, held a separate First Chamber election, in whichthe 124 county councillors elected ten members of parliament.

This electoral method for the First Chamber increased the majoritiesand stabilized the governments of the Social Democrats for two reasons.First, no method of representation is purely proportional. Proportionalityin this case was particularly reduced because the disproportionalityoccurred twice: rst at the county council level, and then at the FirstChamber level. The disproportionality of the First Chamber election wasparticularly pronounced, and worked in favor of the largest party, becausethe number of voters in relation to seats was small, and the d'Hondt method

benets larger parties. The stabilizing benet came about because the FirstChamber electors had been elected at an earlier point in time. In thisexample, the electors voting in 1962 had been elected in 1958. In addition,the term of the First Chamber MPs was eight years, and only approximatelyone-eighth of the Chamber was replaced each year, leading to smoothertransitions.

The constitutional changes of 1969/1970 eliminated the First Chamberentirely, and introduced a unicameral body containing 350 seats,8 whichwas thus larger and more proportional than the old Second Chamber withits 233 seats. In addition, the proportionality of electoral representationwas further increased by providing for extra seats that would be appor-tioned based on national electoral results (utjmningsmandat). The 28Second Chamber districts were maintained as previously, but because eachdistrict received more seats the distribution of seats was more directlyproportional to electoral results. The only remaining barrier to proportion-ality was the 4 percent national threshold (or 12 percent within one electoraldistrict).

Simulation without Electoral Alliances

For the simulation experiment, actual election results from 1970 on were

plugged into the old constitutional rules, so as to calculate the number ofparliamentary seats each party would have gained using the old rules. This

246


17/27

simulation was achieved in three steps: simulation of county councilelections; simulation of First Chamber elections; simulation of SecondChamber elections. For the simulation of the county council elections, thenumber of seats that would have been accorded to each county councilelectoral district was rst calculated.9 Next, actual county council electoralresults were used to simulate the distribution of county council seats amongthe parties using the modied Sainte-Lague ( jmkade uddatals) method.10

These simulated county council elections then served as the basis for asimulation of the First Chamber elections. The seats per First Chamberelectoral district were calculated on the basis of the population in the 19

districts in January 1971, 1981, and 1991.11

Next, First Chamber d'Hondtelections were simulated using the county councillors as electors.12 Finally,the Second Chamber elections were simulated by calculating the number ofparliamentary seats that would have been awarded to each of the 28 SecondChamber electoral districts based on the population,13 and then the seatswere awarded to the political parties using the modied Sainte-Laguemethod.14 The rst simulation used only the electoral results for separateparties and did not assume any cooperation in elections at any level in thesystem.

The results of this simulation can be seen in Figures 5^7, which showthe number of seats received by each bloc in the full Riksdag (i.e. the two

chambers added together, as they would be for a joint vote), and in the Firstand Second Chambers, respectively. Under the conditions of the simulation,

38%

40%

42%

44%

46%

48%

50%

52%

54%

56%

58%

60%

62%

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

Percentage

ofseats

M+C+F S+K

Figure 5. Full Riksdag Simulation without Electoral Alliances.

247


18/27

the Social Democratic Party alone enjoys a majority in the First Chamber

for the entire period (Figure 6). This First Chamber majority is sucient togive the left bloc a majority in the full Riksdag for the entire period

38%

40%

42%

44%

46%

48%

50%

52%

54%

56%

58%

60%

62%

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

Perce

ntage

ofseats

M+C+F S

Figure 6. First Chamber Simulation without Electoral Alliances.

38%

40%

42%

44%

46%

48%

50%

52%

54%

56%

58%

60%

62%

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

Percentage

ofseats

M+C+F S

Figure 7. Second Chamber Simulation without Electoral Alliances.

248


19/27

(Figure 5), despite the loss of its majority in the Second Chamber from1976 to 1981 and from 1991 to 1994 (Figure 7). Interestingly, the SocialDemocratic advantage in the First Chamber is large enough that a leftbloc majority is preserved in the full Riksdag even after the 1991election.

Simulation with Electoral Alliances

The rst simulation is not entirely realistic, however. For the old system

provided the bourgeois parties with the opportunity to align in electoralagreements (Mller 1986; von Sydow 1989).15 This could improve theratio of seats to votes for these parties. Consequently, the simulationwas repeated, using the exact electoral agreements used in the 1960s, forthe county council, First Chamber and Second Chamber elections. Ofcourse, it is not credible to think that the same electoral agreements thatwere reached in the 1960s would have held throughout the 1970s, 1980sand 1990s. In one sense, these agreements are vastly overestimated,because the electoral results were based on campaigns by single parties,whose gains were then added together after the fact to simulate thealliance. But under the post-1952 rules, parties wishing to enter into an

electoral alliance were required to campaign under a common partylabel. It is not at all clear that in the 1970s the Center Party with itsopposition to nuclear energy, for example, could have successfully cam-paigned under a single banner together with the pro-nuclear ModerateParty. On the other hand, the ideological polarization of Swedish politicsinto two blocs (left and right) in the 1970s might have led to much moreextensive cooperation. Nevertheless, the `1960s cartels' simulation teststhe credibility of the threat posed by the bourgeois alliances, as theylooked in the 1960s.

The simulation with electoral alliances (which does not allow us to reportseats for the Social Democratic Party alone, even though they comprise anoverwhelming majority of the left bloc seats in the First Chamber and alarge majority of the seats in the Second Chamber)16 results in a left blocmajority in the First Chamber for the entire period (Figure 8). This majorityis not, however, sucient to maintain a left bloc majority in the full Riksdagfrom 1976 to 1982 (Figure 9). In 1991, on the other hand, the left bloc doesmaintain its majority in the full Riksdag, despite its poor showing in the1991 election and, consequently, in the Second Chamber (Figure 10). Thepossibility of electoral alliances signicantly reduces the Social Democraticmajorities, but, nevertheless, the First Chamber allows the Social Demo-cratic Party to control all legislation and budgets, even under this

simulation condition.

249


20/27

38%

40%

42%

44%

46%

48%

50%

52%

54%

56%

58%

60%

62%

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

Perce

ntage

ofseats

M+C+F S+K

Figure 8. First Chamber Simulation with Electoral Alliances.

38%

40%

42%

44%

46%

48%

50%

52%

54%

56%

58%

60%

62%

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

Percentage

ofseats

M+C+F S+K

Figure 9. Full Riksdag Simulation with Electoral Cooperation.

250


21/27

DiscussionThis simulation experiment shows that the mechanical eect of the 1969/1970 partial revision of the Swedish constitution is both large and politicallysignicant. As shown in Figure 11, which compares directly the proportion ofSocial Democratic seats under the two institutional arrangements, theidentical numbers of votes yield very dierent numbers of seats. Even with therelatively poor post-1970 electoral showing, the Social Democratic Partywould have received an average of 53.2 percent of the seats in the full Riksdagfrom 1970 to 1994. This average compares favorably with theaverage actuallyobtained from 1944 to 1969 (50.56 percent), and is far better than the averageactually obtained from 1970 to 1994 (44.59 percent). If we move to thesimulation with electoral alliances, the simulation yields an average of 50.95percent of seats for the left bloc from 1970 to 1994, as compared with 53.02percent actually received from 1944 to 1969 and with 49.96 percent actuallyreceived in the unicameral parliament from 1970 to 1994. Here we see that thedrop in votes does indeed aect Social Democratic parliamentary strength,but that the mechanical eect is large enough to constitute the dierencebetween a parliamentary majority versus a minority.

Moreover, the simulation without electoral alliances renders the SocialDemocratic Party an absolute majority in the First Chamber for the entireperiod. In the simulation with electoral alliances, the left bloc enjoys an

absolute majority for the entire period, and the Social Democratic Party

38%

40%

42%

44%

46%

48%

50%

52%

54%

56%

58%

60%

62%

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

Pe

rcentage

ofseats

M+C+F S+K

Figure 10. Second Chamber Simulation with Electoral Alliances.

251


22/27

alone enjoys either an absolute majority (in all years except 1976^81) or a

relative majority, and, in any case, occupies the pivotal position in thischamber for the entire period. Consequently, under the conditions of boththe simulation without electoral alliances and that with the electoralalliances of the 1960s, the Social Democratic Party would have retained itsveto position over legislation and budgets for the entire post-1970 period.

Thus, even with the decline in partisanship and in class-based voting,the old constitution would have placed the Social Democratic Party in apivotal position by virtue of its control of the First Chamber. Such asimulation cannot predict the pattern of government formation in the 1976to 1982 period, as this is an outcome of coalition politics, but a few generalobservations can be made. First, the King would have been thrust into akey political position through his right to invite a particular party to form agovernment. Second, the dierence between the two simulation conditionsdemonstrates the importance of the threat of electoral alliances, supportingthe argument of von Sydow (1989). Third, and nally, even if one assumesthat bourgeois coalition governments would have been formed in thisperiod, their room for manoeuvre would have been greatly reduced bySocial Democratic control of the First Chamber. Indeed, the First Chambermajority would have provided a considerable incentive for both cross-blocpolitical alliances and interest-group cooperation. Consequently, one canconclude that the constitutional reforms weakened not only the parlia-

mentary power of the Social Democratic Party, but also the politicalconditions for Swedish consensus politics.

38%

40%

42%

44%

46%

48%

50%

52%

54%

56%

58%

60%

62%

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

Perc

entage

ofseats

S - r ea l S - F ul l S im -n c

Figure 11. Comparison of Real Unicameral Parliament with Simulated Full Riksdag (S Only,Percentages).

252


23/27

ACKNOWLEDGMENTSI thank Olof Ruin, Jrgen Westersthl, and Gunnar Wallin for agreeing to be interviewedfor this project. I also wish to acknowledge the help of Christina Behrendt, Saskia Richter,and, especially, Bertrand Lisbach in carrying out the simulation, and that of Isabelle Schulzefor the calculation of government tenure, as well as that of Anika Rasner with the productionwork. I am grateful to the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the EuropeanUniversity Institute, the Max-Planck-Institut fr Gesellschaftsforschung in Cologne, and theWestern Societies Program at Cornell University for giving me the opportunity to presentdrafts of this paper in their seminar series, and to the participants of those seminars and thetwo anonymous reviewers for Scandinavian Political Studies for their comments.

NOTES1. Between 1936 and 1957, majority governments were in power for 71 percent of themonths; between 1957 and 1973, a single party was in power for 100 percent of themonths. Sannerstedt and Sjlin classify the Social Democratic government as majority,since it enjoyed the passive support of the Communists. Between 1974 and 1991,single-party governments ruled for 38 percent of the period, coalition governments for28 percent (Sannerstedt & Sjlin 1992, 108).

2. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for Scandinavian Political Studies for thispoint, and for providing the appropriate references.

3. Prior to the 1998 election, the Swedish constitution was revised so as to extend themandate period from three to four years. Thus, whereas elections were held in 1991 and1994, the following election was rst held in 1998 (Mller 1999, 270).

4. For an argument about the advantages of Swedish minority government since 1970,see Lewin (1998).

5. In a variation on these interest-based arguments, Rothstein (1998) suggests that adecline in trust between the social partners is of central importance to the decline of theSwedish model. This `cultural-institutionalist' view may be protably combined withthe structuralist-institutionalist' view that will be presented here.

6. All points in all gures refer to the distribution of parliamentary seats following theelection held in the year indicated on the x-axis ^ regardless of whether the seats wereactually occupied in the September of the election year, or in January of the subsequentyear. For the First Chamber, real results are depicted only for the composition of theFirst Chamber following Second Chamber election years; simulated results arereported for every year, since there was a First Chamber election held in every year.

7. Lanke & Bjurulf (1986) have conducted a similar simulation experiment, but they donot consider the impact of the First Chamber, only that of the changed electorallaw, looking specically at the additional seats (utjmningsmandaten), 1.4 divisor(jmkningen), and odd divisors (uddatalsmetoden).

8. After the parliamentary tie, with each bloc holding 175 seats from 1973 to 1975, the

number of seats was reduced to 349 in 1976.9. As laid out in the 1954 Landstingslag, 2. Kapitel, 10^11 (Svensk Frfattnings-

sammling (SFS) 1955: 138), each county council electoral district ( Landstingsvalkrets)gets one seat regardless of population, plus one for each unit of 5,000 population plusone for any remainder [integer(population/5000) + 2]. Each district must have at leastseven representatives, but no more than 13. It was obviously not possible to divide orconsolidate the electoral districts when the number of mandates fell below or surpassedthese ranges. However, more members per district increases the proportionality, whichdecreases the electoral advantages of these rules for the Social Democratic Party.Owing to the various communal consolidations, in a few rare cases estimates of thepopulation per district were made by dividing the population in the entire countycouncil in proportion to the number of eligible voters in the district as a fraction of thetotal eligible voters in the county council. One diculty in this estimation is that thecounty council mandates were calculated according to an absolute population rule (one

mandate per 5,000 population, plus two per district). Presumably, this divisor would

253


24/27

have been revised over the years. As increasing the number of county council seatsper electoral district makes the translation of votes into seats more directlyproportional, this anachronism skews the estimate against the Social Democraticmajority. For Gotland and Malm, the number of electors was estimated by dividingthe population by the proportion of eligible voters in each of the three electoral districtsto get an estimate of the total population in the electoral district for that year. Thenthe electors were estimated using the usual integer(population/5000) + 2 rule. For theelection years 1970 and 1973, it was not necessary to recalculate the number of countycouncil seats, since until that time the 1955 communal law was in force.

10. As a check of the simulation, 100 electoral districts were simulated for the year 1966and checked against actual data.

11. Following the method laid out in Riksdagsordningen (Law on Parliament) 6 5^6mom. and 7 4 mom., and revised in Kunglig Majestts kungrelse of 24 May 1957 (nr

161) [calculations published in Kunglig Majestts kungrelse of 18 May 1951 (nr 232),Kunglig Majestts kungrelse of 24 May 1957 (nr 162), Kunglig Majestts kungrelse of12 May 1961 (nr 112)], the number of First Chamber parliamentary seats in each ofthe 19 electoral districts was calculated for 1971^80, 1981^90, and 1991^94. TheSwedish population for 1 January 1971, 1981, and 1991, respectively, was divided by150. Next, the population in each electoral district was divided by this electoralquotient (Riksvalkvoten), to yield an initial distribution of seats per district. Theremaining parliamentary seats were distributed to the districts with the largestremainders after division by the electoral quotient. Finally, any districts with less thanve seats were given additional seats to bring the minimum number of seats per districtup to ve. Any First Chamber district that was entitled to a larger number of seatswhen compared with the last seat's calculation, however, received the additional seatsonly when they became free when a district that had experienced a reduction in seatsheld its First Chamber election. At that time, a ny sammanrkning was held to

determine which party would be awarded the additional seat or seats. As a check, thismethod was applied to the 1961^70 distribution of seats, and compared with the actualnumber of seats given to each district.

12. The First Chamber seats were distributed among the political parties using the d'Hondtmethod. The electors for the First Chamber were the county council politicians (or,for Malm, Gteborg and Stockholm, the city council politicians). When a FirstChamber electoral district included a city outside a county council (as in the case ofMalm) or was allowed to elect larger numbers of county councilors than as calculatedby the 5,000 population rule (as in Gotland), a separate d'Hondt election was held todetermine the number of First Chamber electors for that jurisdiction. There were 19First Chamber electoral districts, each generally composed of one or two countycouncils or cities. These 19 districts were assigned to eight groups. For each year, onegroup of the 19 First Chamber electoral districts elected its First Chamber MPs. Theseserved for eight years. This simulation was tested by simulating all 1960s First

Chamber elections.13. The number of seats were calculated according to RO 15 1 mom., RO 15 2 mom.,

and RO 15 3 mom, as described in Riksdagsmannavalen 1965^1968, Del 2, 25. Thepopulation of Sweden for 1 January in the election year was divided by 230. Thepopulation of each of the 28 Second Chamber electoral districts was divided by thiselectoral quotient (Riksvalkvot) to yield the initial number of seats per district. Next,the remaining seats were distributed to the electoral districts with the largestremainders. Finally, any districts with less than three seats were awarded additionalseats to bring their total seats up to three (Gotland); any electoral districts with three orfour seats were given extra seats to bring their total seats up to ve. In general, theelectoral district boundaries were contiguous with Landstings boundaries. For othercases (cities, lvsborgs, etc.), we went down to the primary commune level to calculatethe population gures. Where this was not possible, we divided the actual populationamong the electoral districts using the numbers eligible to vote per district.

14. The votes received in the elections to the unicameral parliament were used to estimatethe seats per party, using the previous calculation of seats from the population per

254


25/27

electoral district and the Sainte-Lague method (jmkade uddatals metoden, 1.4 as rstdivisor, then 3, 5, etc.). For 1994, votes that had been consolidated for the CountyCouncils of Stockholm, Malmhusln, and lvsborgsln, as well as the commune ofGteborg together with the County Council of Bohusln, had to be separated.

15. Up until the 1952 election, the parties could sum together their votes. After 1952, theparties had to enter the election with a common party name, such as `MedborgligSammling' or `Mittenpartierna'.

16. To separate out the seats in the First Chamber held by Social Democratic versus LeftParty deputies would require an additional step in the simulation. Namely, the seatswould need to be distributed between the parties using the d'Hondt method.Nevertheless, it is apparent from the size of the majorities that the Social DemocraticParty alone would have maintained both its majority and pivotal position in the FirstChamber for the entire period.

REFERENCESStatistical SourcesAllmnna Valen. Sveriges Ociella Statistik. Almnna Val. Stockholm: Statistiska

Centralbyrn, various years (covering national and local elections from 1970 to 1994).Kommunala Valen. Sveriges Ociella Statistik. Almnna Val. Stockholm: Statistiska

Centralbyrn, various years (covering local elections in 1963 and 1967).Riksdagsmannavalen. Sveriges Ociella Statistik. Almnna Val. Stockholm: Statistiska

Centralbyrn, various years (covering national elections from 1949 to 1968).Statistisk rsbok fr Sverige. Sveriges Ociella Statistik. Stockholm: Statistiska

Centralbyrn, various years (covering national and local population gures for 1960 to1994).

Secondary SourcesBawn, K. 1993. `The Logic of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law as a Social

Choice Outcome', American Journal of Political Science 37, 965^89.Bergman, T. 1995. Constitutional Rules and Party Goals in Coalition Formation: An Analysis

of Winning Majority Governments in Sweden. Research Report 1995: 1. Ume: Departmentof Political Science, Ume University.

Bergman, T. 2000. `Sweden: When Minority Cabinets Are the Rule and Majority Coalitionsthe Exception', in Mller, W. C. & Strm, K., eds, Coalition Governments in WesternEurope. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Damgaard, E. 1994. `Termination of Danish Government Coalitions: Theoretical andEmpirical Aspects', Scandinavian Political Studies 17, 193^211.

Deutsch, K. W. 1976. Die Schweiz als ein paradigmatischer Fall politischer Integration. Berne:Verlag Paul Haupt.

Elster, J. 1997. `Ways of Constitution-Making', in Hadenius, A., ed., Democracy's Victoryand Crisis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Erlander, T. 1982. 1960-talet. Samtal med Arvid Lagerkrantz. Stockholm: Tidens Frlag.Fahlbeck, E., Herlitz, N. & Stjernquist, N. 1955. `Die Entwicklung des entlichen Rechts

Schwedens in den Jahren 1933 bis 1953', in Leibholz, G., ed., Jahrbuch des entlichenRechts der Gegenwart 4. Tbingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

Forsell, H. 1971. `The Elections in Sweden in September 1970. Politics in a Multi-LevelElection', Scandinavian Political Studies 6, 201^11.

Gilljam, M. & Holmberg, S. 1993. Vljarna infr 90-talet. Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik.Hadenius, S., Molin, B. & Wieslander, H. 1991. Sverige efter 1900: En modern politisk

historia. Stockholm: Bonniers.Hall, P. & Taylor, R. C. R. 1996. `Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms',

Political Studies 64, 936^57.Hermansson, J. 1993. Politik Som Intressekamp: Parlamentariskt beslutsfattande och

organisierade intressen i Sverige. Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik.

255


26/27

Hernes, G. 1991. `The Dilemmas of Social Democracies: The Case of Norway and Sweden',Acta Sociologica 34, 239^60.

Immergut, E. M. 1992. Health Politics: Interests and Institutions in Western Europe.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kjellberg, A. 1992. `Sweden: Can the Model Survive?', in Ferner, A. & Hyman, R., eds,Industrial Relations in the New Europe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Knight, J. 1992. Institutions and Social Conict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Korpi, W. 1978. The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism. London: Routledge & Kegan

Paul.Lanke, J. & Bjurulf, B. 1986. `En granskning av den svenska vallagen i ljuset av riksdagsvalen

1970^1985', Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift 4, 123^29.Lehmbruch, G. 1967. Proporzdemokratie. Politisches System und politische Kultur in der

Schweiz und in sterreich. Tbingen: J. C. B. Mohr.

Lewin, L. 1998. `Majoritarian and Consensus Democracy: The Swedish Experience',Scandinavian Political Studies 21, 195^206.Lijphart, A. 1968. Politics of Accommodation. Pluralism and Democracy in The Netherlands.

Berkeley: University of California Press.Lijphart, A. 1992. `Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czecho-Slovakia,

Hungary, and Poland', Journal of Theoretical Politics 4, 207^23.Lindbeck, A., Molander, P., Persson, T., Petersson, O., Sandmo, A., Swedenborg, B. &

Thygesen, N. 1994. Turning Sweden Around. Cambridge: MIT Press.Mller, T. 1986. Borgerlig Samverkan. Uppsala: Diskurs.Mller, T. 1999. `The Swedish Election 1998: A Protest Vote and the Birth of a New Political

Landscape?', Scandinavian Political Studies 22, 261^76.Mller, W. C. & Strm, K., eds. 2000. Coalition Governments in Western Europe. Oxford:

Oxford University Press.Nyman, O. 1966. Samhlle och Riksdag. Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell.

Oe, C. 1996. `Designing Institutions in East European Transitions', in Goodin, R. E., ed.,The Theory of Institutional Design. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Oskarson, M. 1994. Klassrstning i Sverige: Rationalitet, lojalitet eller bara slentrian.Gteborg: Nerenius & Sante rus.

Pappi, F. U. & Schmitt, H. 1994. Parteien, Parlamente und Wahlen in Skandinavien. Frankfurtam Main: Campus Verlag.

Petersson, O. 1991. `Democracy and Power in Sweden', Scandinavian Political Studies 14,173^91.

Pierson, P. 2000. `The Limits of Design: Explaining Institutional Origins and Change',Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 13, 475^99.

Pontusson, J. & Swenson, P. 1996. `Labor Markets, Production Strategies, and WageBargaining Institutions: The Swedish Employer Oensive in Comparative Perspective',Comparative Political Studies 29, 223^50.

Riker, W. 1982. Liberalism against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of

Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.Rothstein, B. 1996. `Political Institutions: An Overview', in Goodin, R. E. &

Klingemann, H.-D., eds, A New Handbook of Political Science. Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.

Rothstein, B. 1998. `Den svenska modellens uppgang och fall ^ en ess', StatsvetenskapligTidskrift 101, 41^9.

Ruin, O. 1982. `Sweden in the 1970s: Policy-Making Becomes More Dicult', in Richardson,J., ed., Policy Styles in Western Europe. London: George Allen & Unwin.

Ruin, O. 1988. `Sweden: The New Constitution (1974) and the Tradition of ConsensualPolitics', in Bogdanor, V., ed., Constitutions in Democratic Politics. Aldershot, UK:Gower.

Ruin, O. 1990. Tage Erlander. Serving the Welfare State, 1946^1969. Pittsburgh: Universityof Pittsburgh Press.

Sainsbury, D. 1985. `The Electoral Diculties of the Scandinavian Social Democrats in the

1970s: The Social Bases of the Parties and Structural Explanations of Party Decline',Comparative Politics 18, 1^19.

256


27/27

Sainsbury, D. 1991. `Swedish Social Democracy in Transition: The Party's Record in the1980s and the Challenge of the 1990s', West European Politics 14, 31^57.

Sannerstedt, A. & Sjlin, M. 1992. `Sweden: Changing Party Relations in a More ActiveParliament', in Damgaard, E. et al., eds, Parliamentary Change in the Nordic Countries.Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.

Srlvik, B. 1983. `Scandinavia', in Bogdanor V. & Butler, D., eds, Democracy and Elections.Electoral Systems and Their Political Consequences. Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.

Shepsle, K. A. 1989. `Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational ChoiceApproach', Journal of Theoretical Politics 1, 131^47.

Shepsle, K. A. 2001. `A Comment on Institutional Change', Journal of Theoretical Politics13, 321^25.

Steinmo, S. 1993. Taxation and Democracy: Swedish, British and American Approaches toFinancing the Modern State. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Stephens, J. D. 1981. `The Changing Swedish Electorate. Class Voting, Contextual Eects,and Voter Volatility', Comparative Political Studies 14, 163^204.

Stjernquist, N. 1966. `Sweden: Stability or Deadlock?', in Dahl, R. A., ed., PoliticalOppositions in Western Democracies. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Stjernquist, N. 1969. `Die Entwicklung des entlichen Rechts Schwedens in den Jahren1954 bis 1969', in Leibholz, G., ed., Jahrbuch des entlichen Rechts der Gegenwart 18.Tbingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

Stjernquist, N. 1976. Statsvetenskaplig forskning kring den nya grundlagen', StatsvetenskapligTidskrift 1, 58^69.

Stjernquist, N. 1977. `Die schwedische Verfassung von 1975', in Leibholz, G., ed., Jahrbuchdes entlichen Rechts der Gegenwart 26. Tbingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).

Stjernquist, N. 1989. `Vad avsg man? Hur blev det? Den svenska regeringsformensinkrningsperiod', in v. Bergmann-Winberg et al., eds, Studier i Politisk, Historia ochEkonomi: Festskrift tillgnad Lolo Krusius-Ahrenberg. Ekonomi och Samhlle, Nr. 41.

Helsingfors: Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration.Stjernquist, N. 1996. Tvkammartiden: Sveriges riksdag 1867^1970. Stockholm: Sveriges

Riksdag.Strom, K. 1990. Minority Government and Majority Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press.Swenson, P. 1992. `Unions Politics, the Welfare State, and Intraclass Conict in Sweden and

Germany', in Golden, M. & Pontusson, J., eds, Bargaining for Change: Union Politics inNorth America and Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Swenson, P. 1993. `The End of the Swedish Model in Light of Its Beginnings: On the Roleof Engineering Employers and Their Leaders', WZB Discussion Paper FS I 93-303. Berlin:Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin.

Von Sydow, B. 1989. Vgen till enkammarriksdagen: Demokratisk frfattningspolitik i Sverige1944^1968. Stockholm: Tidens frlag.

Thelen, K. 1999. `Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics', Annual Review of

Political Science 2, 369^404.Tsebelis, G. 1990. Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics. Berkeley:University of California Press.

Weingast, B. R. 1996. `Political Institutions: Rational Choice Perspectives', in Goodin, R.E. & Klingemann, H.-D., eds, A New Handbook of Political Science. New York: OxfordUniversity Press.

Westersthl, J. 1976. `Frfattningsutredningen', Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift 1, 2^11.

257

Documents

The Swedish Constitution and Social Democratic Power Immergut