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Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars

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The struggle in Bangladesh

Feroz Ahmed

To cite this article: Feroz Ahmed (1972) The struggle in Bangladesh, Bulletin of Concerned AsianScholars, 4:1, 2-22, DOI: 10.1080/14672715.1972.10406271

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.1972.10406271

Published online: 05 Jul 2019.

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The Struggle in Bangladesh

by Feroz Ahmed

Ever since its creation in 1947,Pakistan has been a geographical absurd­ity, with its two parts separated by onethousand miles of unfriendly Indian ter­ritory. Greater than the spatial distancewas the difference in the social structure,economy and culture. Adherance to a connnonreligion, Islam, was never sufficient tomake these two dissimilar parts a singlenation. But for almost twenty-four yearsPakistan weathered all storms and main­tained a precarious unity. That unity wasfinally broken in March 1971 when theWest Pakistani military launched an all­out war to suppress the movement forregional autonomy in East Pakistan,forcing the region to declare itselfan independent People's Republic ofBangladesh. The genocidal attacks ofthe West Pakistani army against the Ben­gali people and the agony of the millionsof refugees who were forced to flee toIndia have now become a familiar story.lWhile focussing their attention on themassacre and the inhuman conditions ofthe refugees, the Western media have byand large ignored the roots of the crisis.The most common explanation of the con­flict, i.e. traditional hatred betweenthe Bengalis and Punjabis, misses thepoint entirely. In this brief article Ishall attempt to show that the conflictin Pakistan is a synergetic product ofthe United States' foreign policy operat­ing within Pakistan's social structure.

Social Structure

Basic to the understanding of politi­cal developments in any country is theanalysis of its social structure. Here Ishall not attempt to discuss the economic

2

rationale for the creat ion 0 f Pakis tan,2but shall begin with the social structure'inherited by Pakistan at the time of itscreation.

The regions which came to constitut~

the state of Pakistan had traditionaIlybeen the suppliers of raw materials tothe industries located in other partsof India and in England. East Bengal (0East Pakistan) grew jute, the so-calledgolden fiber, for West Bengal factoriesIt did not have a single jute mill ofits own. West Pakistan produced wheatand cotton which it exchanged for manu­factured goods produced elsewhere. Theemerging industrial capitalist classof India was almost totally non-Muslim,and the commercial life of the regionswhich later became Pakistan was dominateby Hindu and other non-Muslim businessmanWhile landlords and peasants in the Weswere Muslims, in East Pakistan rural lifewas stratified along religious lines,with almost all landlords being Hindusand almost all rural Muslims being pea­sants.

The partition and the consequent e~

gration of Hindu l&ldlords to Indiacreated an enormous power vacuum in EastBengal. The land left behind by theHindus was redistributed among the pea­sants, 52 per cent of whom own their oW1lland, with family farms averaging 3.5acres. In the urban areas, the Bengalielite consisted of the elements of thedecaying Muslim aristocracy, representeby the regional Muslim League. In theabsence of an urban bourgeois class andreal economic power of the aris tocracy,the emerging petty-bourgeoisie, constite

ted of small traders, shopkeepers, pro­fessional people, teachers and clerks,became the potentially most importantclass. Culturally, the influence of thisclass was predominant, but economicallyit was weak.

In West Pakistan, which also lackeda bourgeois class, the absentee land­lords became the most powerful class.However, the landlords were not politi­cally well-organized and they lacked thecapability of running a state which hadinherited many modern institutions fromthe British colonialists. The bureaucracy,which was trained by the British as aninstrument of colonial rule, became themost effective political force in itsown right. Al though this bureaucracyhad strong links with the landlord class,the needs of a modem state and thechaotic conditions of the partitionenabled it to become a s emf-eautonono ussocial force and to fill the vacuumcreated by the departure of the British.The bureaucracy was drawn almost entirelyfrom the Punj ab province and the Urdu­speaking refugees who had settled inSind. The third political force was themilitary, again British-trained and drawnmainly from the Punj ab . But the politicalinfluence of the military was limited inthe beginning. 3

West Pakistan also received, amongits immigrants, traders belonging to theMemon, Bohra and Khoja communities ofGUjrat and Bombay who settled in Karachi.These and other commercial elements latertransformed themselves into an industrialcapitalist class. Because of their smallsize, narrow community base, and lack ofroots in Pakistan, these industrial entre­preneurs never asserted themselves as apolitical force. Their marriage of con­venience with the bureaucrats at leastensured them policies supporting theirenterprise.

Because of the virtual absence ofcapitalists, feudal landlords, bureau­cracy and the military in East Pakistan,the West Pakistani power structure becamethe national power structure as well,

ruling the eastern part with the collabora­tion of the dying Muslim aristocracy.

Colonization of East Bengal

At independence, the Gross DomesticProduct (GDP) of East Pakistan exceededthe GDP of West Pakistan (Table 1). Ed­ucation was also more extensive in theEast than in the West (Table 2). Butgiven the economic disruption of thepartition and the difference in the socialstructures in East and West Pakistan, inaddition to certain advantages of economicinfrastructure in West Pakistan, inevitablythe industrialization of Pakistan turnedthe eastern region into a colony of theWest and created disparities in economicand social development of the two regions.

The process of industrialization inPakistan began with the investment ofcapital in cotton textile industries inWest Pakistan and jute mills in EastPakistan by the commercial bourgeoisieof West Pakistan. The development ofindustries in East Pakistan was carriedout only to the extent that it benefitedthe West Pakistani capitalists. It wasnot simply a profit-making enterprisebut an essential condition for the in­dustrial development of West Pakistanitself. Availability of certain rawmaterials, such as cotton; presence ofeconomic infras tructure, such as the sea­port of Karachi, railways and roads;location of the central government and .financial institutions; and lesser mili­tancy of the proletariat offered a moresuitable climate for investment in WestPakistan. But such industrializationrequired importation of capital goodsand some .essential raw materials. Develop­ment of the jute industry in the Eastby West Pakistani capitalists, therefore,amounted to increasing the capacity offoreign exchange earning, since EastPakistan, producer of more than 80% ofthe world's jute, had ready-made worldmarkets. In the early years, the exportof raw and processed jute accounted for70% of Pakistan's foreign exchange earning.This foreign exchange was used for theindustrialization of West Pakistan. East

3

Pakistan received only 25-30% of the totalimports (Table 3).

Thus penetration of West Pakistan-basedcapital into East Pakistan not only estab­lished an antagonistic relationship betweenthe Bengali worker and the West Pakistanicapitalist, but it set off a process ofdraining East Pakistan's resources for theindustrial development of West Pakistan.Policies imposed in order to guaranteeCheap raw materials for the factories re­sulted in the exploitation and increasedimpoverishment of the Bengali peasants.Such policies were adopted and enforcedon behalf of the West Pakistani capitalistsby the bureaucracy which was also largelyWest Pakistani. Not trusting the Bengalis,the West Pakistani capitalists broughtalong with them West Pakistani managersfor their factories, many of them trainedin the University of Pennsylvania-initiatedbusiness school in Karachi.

The members of the Bengali petty-bour­geoisie who aspired to have a slice of theindustrial cake or to obtain civil andmilitary positions and managerial jobs inindustry found the West Pakistani rulingstructure and its local allies obstructing

. their development. Thus all the classesof East Pakistan -- the proletariat, thepeasantry and the petty-bourgeoisie -­stood in an antagonistic relationship withthe West Pakistani power structure andtheir local collaborators.

In addition to the exploitation ofEas t Pakis tan's raw materials and cheaplabor, the third important ingredientof classical colonialism -- using thecolony as a market for the mother COtmtry'smanufactures -- was also present from theinception of Pakistan. Table 4 shows therelative values of exports of one regionto the other, with West Pakistan consist­ently having a favorable balance of trade.With the industrialization of ~.jest Pakis­tan, the need for the captive market inEast Pakistan grew more acute, and manu­factured goods began to occupy a muchlarger share of the exports to EastPakis tan. The pattern of industrial de­velopment was based on the assumption thatthe East Pakistani market would consume

4

a significant part of West Pakistanimanufactures, since these high-cost products could not compete in the world mar­ket. Cotton textiles, which constitutedthe largest single item in West Pakistanexports to East Pakistan, faced stiffcompetition in the world market. On theother hand, the largest item in EastPakistan's list of exports to the Westwas tea, which is a popular item ofconsumption in West Pakistan but whichcould always find a place in the worldmarket. In fact, in recent years Pakist~n

had drastically curtailed her exports oftea, leaving the market largely to twoneighboring countries, Indi!]. and Ceylon

Thus in t~e context of Pakistan'sgiven social structure, economic prog~m

amoun t ed to tightening West Pakistan I spower structure and perpetuating furtherexploitation of East Pakistan. The onlyway to break this vicious cycle was toredefine the social relationships andorganize production along socialist l~cly

That was the only guarantee of nationaunity. But such a program could not pos­sibly be conceived by the exploitingclasses. They chose a path which onlyaggravated the existing relationshipsbetween the two regions.

Imperialism from Without PromotesColonialism from Within

The colonization of East Bengal wasinherent in the power vacuum created bythe partition, especially in the absenof an indigenous bourgeois class, andthe exigencies of capitalist developmetltin West Pakistan. But capitalism itselfcould not have experienced such an un­bridled growth had not an external ele­ment been introduced into Pakistan'spolitical dynamics and into the relatianship between its two parts.

The celebrated "robber barons" ofWest Pakistan would have faced competfrom, and yielded some ground to, theemerging bourgeoisie in Bengal had therules of "free enterprise" and competL­tive capitalism prevailed. After all,West Pakistani entrepreneurs were notso invincible in the beginning as to bte

able to impose monopolistic control overEast Pakistan, despite the support theyreceived from the all-powerful bureau­cracy. The emergence of A.K. Khan, whoserved as a minister in Ayub Khan'sfirst cabinet, and a few other indus­trialists in Bengal was an indicationof the possibilities of entrepreneurshipthat existed in East Pakistan. But WestPakistan's capitalists were not a"national bourgeoisie" whose growthand prosperity would depend entirelyon the exploitation of national resourcesand domestic savings. They sought coll a­boration with foreign capital in orderto increase their fortunes and werewilling to offer benefits to the im­perialist powers at the expense of thepeople of Pakistan.

Fortunately for them, the UnitedStates, the leading money lender sinceWorld War II, was actively seeking ColdWar allies and was eager to provideeconomic and military "assistance" tothird world ruling groups willing tocollaborate with her. The Pakistanirulers seized this opportunity and in1951 began to receive economic aid -­mainly grants in the beginning -- fromthe U.S. By 1954, Pakistan was firmlyin the orbit of the United States,having signed a mutual security treatyand joined the Southeast Asian TreatyOrganization (SEATO). In 1955, it alsobecame a menber of another Americanpact, the Baghdad Pact (renamed lateras the Central Treaty Organization orCENTO) , with Iran, Turkey and Iraq asits allies. American military aid beganrolling into Pakistan, amounting to$1.5-2.0 billion by 1969. 5 As part ofher obligation to the U.S., the Pakistangovernment allowed Americ'a to build amilitary base near Peshawer, and to useits civilian airfields for espionageflights, including the ill-fated U-2plane which was shot down in the SovietUnion, causing a major internationalcrisis. Pakistan's leaders repeatedlyassured the U.S. of their complete alle­giance. In a 1961 address to the U.S.Congress, Pakistan's then-PresidentAyub Khan said, "if there is real trou­ble, there is no country in Asia where

you will be able to put your foot in.The only people who will stand by youare the people of Pakistan. ,,6

Although U.S. economic aid, like itsmilitary aid, was designed to maintain"a position of influence and controlaround the world, ,,7 the economic benefitsto the U.S. were not unimportant. Withits aid pro gram as an entering wedge,the U.S. expanded its share of Pakistan'simports from 6% in 1952 to as much as40% in the early sixties. Aid as anins trument of economic imperialism hasbeen treated extensively by many scholars,including Magdoff8 and Alavi. 9

What we are mainly concerned with hereis the effect of foreign economic andmilitary aid on political developmentsin Pakistan, especially the relationshipbetween East and West Pakistan.

Economic Aid

By 1969 the United States had pro­vided $3 billion in grants and loans -­mainly loans in the later years -- forPakis tan's economic development. l O Amongthe many strings attached to U.S. aidwas the explicit guideline to encourage"private enterprise." For this purposeUS advisors under Harvard's DevelopmentAdvisory Service (D.A.S.) were sentto Pakistan to influence the policiesof the Planning Commission and othereconomic decision-making agencies. l lThe U.S. aid mission in Pakistan playedno small role in initiating economicpolicies for Pakistan. 12 In the interestof Pakistan's robber barons, Pakistan'sbureaucrats -- and later military offi­cers as well -- followed American advice.So faithfully did the Pakistani rulersabide by the U.S. advice that one of thetop advisors to Pakistan had this to sayabout her development.

Poliaies have been framed to assurethat the goveT'Ylment intervenes inthe eaonomy when such interventionis in theo!y desi~le~ while leavingin private hands deaisions whiah~

aaaording to theo!y~ should be leftto private initiative. 13 (Emphasisadded)

5

Paki~tan's dependence on foreigneconomic aid was so colossal that 35%of her first Five-year plan, 50% of hersecond plan and 26% of the third planwas supported by extemal loans andgrants. The lower percentage in the lastplan does not indicate relative self­sufficiency; it was necessitated bystrains in the Pakistan-U.S. allianceas a result of the Sino-Pakistan "friend­ship." Pakistan's economic success washeralded throughout the capitalistworld, and Pakistan was often citedas the "show-case" of non-communistdevelopment. 14 According to ProfessorEdward Mason, foreign aid was the singlemost important factor in Pakistan'seconomic growth. 15

But a model of economic developmentwhich envisaged growth through theagency of a handful of robber baronswas bound to lead to contradictionsand to negate the limited gains alreadyachieved. As ~ result of the capitalistmodel followed by Pakistan, 20 familiescame to control 80% of the banking, 70%of the insurance and 66% of the indus­trial assets of Pakistan. 16 The gulfin income created by such accumulationof wealth, the disruption of traditionallife, and the consequent alienation ofthe masses found their expression inthe massive countrYWide upsurge thatlasted for five months in 1968-69 andoverthrew Ayub Khan's dictatorship.The volcano was tranquilized by theimposition of martial law and the pro­mise of free elections. But the momen­tum of economic growth lost in 1968 hasnot been regained since. 17

These developments not only intensi­fied the' class struggle but aggravatedalready existing regional strains. Therobber barons were all West Pakistani;given their preference to invest in WestPakistan, the growth of this class amountedto increased disparity between the tworegions. By the end of the notorious"decade of development" (1958-68), WestPakistan's GDP exceeded that of EastPakistan by 34%, the official disparityin per capita income had become 62%, andthe real difference in the average stan-

6

dard of living had widened to 126%.18Table 1 shows the widening economicgap between the two regions over aperiod of twenty years.

The manner in which foreign aidand foreign advice helped in wideningthis gulf may be stated simply: privateenterprise, being mainly West Pakistani,preferred to invest in the more "condu­cive" atmosphere of West Pakistan; thepublic sector followed suit by heavyallocations for the economic infra­structure centered in West Pakistan;the growing power of the West Pakistanicapitalists and the prevailing philoso­phy of economic development preventedhigher taxes on ~he rich. Insufficientpublic resources meant insufficientallocation to East Pakistan -- even ifit had received its due share of publicresources. 19

Regional disparities in allocation,and therefore in economic growth, havebeen given a great deal of attention byEast Pakistani economists, who were thesupporters of the Awami League. But inview of the fact that the private sec­tor was almost entirely West Pakistani20and the public sector existed merely toaugment the private sector,' removal ofdisparities would have led only to theequalization of the superficial economicindicators, such as GnP and per capitaincome. It would not have changed thecolonial nature of the economy.

Militan Aid

From 1954 Pakistan's status as anactive ally of the United S~ates in theCold War necessitated altering the in­temal balance of forces:

From a poZiticaZ viewpoint, u.s.miUtaPy aid has strengthenedPakistan's armed sezvices, ~he

greatest stabiZizing force in thecountry J and has encouraged Pakis ta;tl

to participate in aoZZective def~£

agreements. 21

The U.s. military assistance convertedPakistan's army into the paramount

political force in the country -- thegreat defender of the propertied classesand a deterrent to a possible socialrevolution. In 1958 the army assertedits hegemony by staging a coup in orderto prevent the scheduled general elections.The leader of the coup, General Ayub Khan,later revealed that he had consultedofficials in Washington, including CIAchief Allen Dulles, before declaringmartial law in Pakistan. 22

In terms of the regional relations inPakistan, the ascendency of the militaryamounted to greater enslavement of EastPakistan. Military rule not only pre­cluded any possibility of East Pakistanasserting her demographic strength inparliamentary elections, but the army'sgrowth also led to more brutal exp Lot ta­tion of East Pakistan. The overgrownmilitary establishment consumed as muchas 60% of the country's revenue budget.Not only did it consume resources of bothregions, but East Pakistan's foreign ex­change was vi tal to its survival,especially after 1965 when it had tobuy spare parts and new weapons in theblack market. Since military head­quarters were located in West Pakistanand 90% 0 f its ranks and alm:>s t 100% 0 fits top positions were held by WestPakistanis, East Pakistan was denieda share in the local expenditure of themilitary and the job opportunities itcreated. Above all, the military'srole as the guardian of capitalism andthe pulverizer of the popular willexpedited the colonization of EastBengal and diminished the possibilitiesof peaceful change in the regionalrelationships.

It is evident from the above dis­cussion that Pakistan's social structurewas predisposed to creating colonialrelationships between her two regions.But the possibilities of altering suchrelations were greatly reduced by theimperialist interference in Pakistan.While the Pakis tani approach to economicdevelopment based on foreign aid andadvice exacerbated the existing contra­dictions between the mother country and

the colony, the political power of theWest Pakistani military, resulting fromAmerican military alliances, made itimpossible for East Pakistan to secureits rights through parliamentary processes.

Cultural Imperialism

No discussion of the conflict be­tween East and West Pakistan would becomplete without refering to East Ben­gal's national question. Althoughlinked intimately wi th the colonialquestion, the cultural issue by itselfwas an important source of regionaltensions.

Geographical and historical condi­tions produced enormous cultural differ­ences between East and West Pakistan.Whereas the West was greatly influencedby the Middle East, with all of itswrit ten languages using modified Arabicscripts, East Pakistan was culturallyhomogeneous with West Bengal in Indiawith who~ it shared a long common history,a rich cultural heritage and a Sanskrit­like script. The centrifugal potentialof this cultural gap was recognizedright /Nay by the ruling classes of WestPakistan who feared that religious unityalone might not be able to maintain"national unity. It

True to colonial traditions, theWes t Pakistani rulers embarked upon acampaign of Itassimilating" the Bengalisinto Pakistan's "mainstream." As aresult, Urdu, a language of.3.7% ofPakistanis, was imposed as the solenational language, despite Bengali pro­tests. Bengali legislators trying tospeak in their own language in the assem­bly were warned that they could be triedfor treason. The political and economicimplications of this cultural imperialismwere seen cl.eazl.y by the Bengali masseswhose spontaneous movement in 1947-48and again in 1952 resulted in theacceptance of Bengali as the secondnational language of Pakistan. But thiswas not accomplished without a massacreof the Bengali protesters. 23

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With the emergence of the WestPakistani (more accurately Punjabi)military as the paramount politicalforce, and with the acceleration ofcapitalist development, the onslaughtagainst Bengali culture and attemptsat "Islamization" and "Pakis tanization"also intensified. Former President AyubKhan remarked several times that theBengalis should be freed from the "evilinfluence" of the Hindu culture. He evenbanned the playing of Tagore I s songson Radio Pakistan because Tagore wasHindu and, therefore, an evil influence.But the Nobel prize-winning Tagore wasthe national poet of Bengalis, loved andadmired by Hindus and Muslims alike. 24The Bengali masses considered thisassault against their culture a weaponin West Pakistan's colonial dominationover East Pakistan.

In order to set back East Pakistan'scultural development, not only were thereofficial attempts at "national integration,"but educational progress in the region wasretarded and Bengalis, who were previouslymore educated than the West Pakistanis,were forced into a secondary position,as can be seen in Table 2. This educa­tional disparity was then used to ration­alize lower participation of Bengalisin the civil service and the fewerscholarships awarded to Bengalis foradvanced studies in foreign countries.In a survey I conducted in 1966-67, Ifound that barely 20% of Pakistani stu­dents enrolled in U.S. universities camefrom East Pakistani institutions. 25

Colonial ruling classes, in order toexact the support of their own oppressedmasses, not only throw them a few crumbs,but try to justify their conquest by in­venting and perpetuating myths about theracial and cul, tural inferiority of thecolonized people. The British had alreadyleft behind myths about the lethargy,cowardice and untrustworthiness of theBengalis, to which the West Pakistanirulers added the promiscuity and semi­Hinduism of the Bengali Muslims. Thesestereotypes were readily accepted by alarge segment of the West Pakistaniintelligentsia who benefit ted from dis.,...

8

crimination against Bengalis. 26 One ofthe favorite right-wing "scholars" of theruling alliance, l.H.Qureshi, went to ~extent of stating that Bengalis were adifferent (implying inferior) race fromthe West Pakistanis.

The results of this indoctrinationof West Pakistanis were reflected in thevengeance, pride and venom with whichWest Pakistani military officers carriedout the carnage in East Bengal afterMarch 25, 1971. Particularly illuminatiIlgwere the remarks of a Major Kamal whotold an American construction worker,interviewed on CBS television, thatafter the West Pakistanis had conqueredEast Bengal, each of his soldiers wouldhave a Bengali mistress and that no dogsand Bengalis would be allowed in theexclusive 01it tagong Club. As a memberof the West Pakistani "educated class"I can testify that this is by no meansan isolated case. Anti-Bengali and anti­Hindu bigotry is rampant in West Pakistanand it has now been adopted as theofficial doctrine of the regime.

Political Response

The colonial relationship betweenEast and West Pakistan overshadowed theclass struggle and united virtually allclasses of Bengali society against WestPakistani domination. The urban petty­bourgeoisie, because of its commercial,industrial and bureaucratic aspirationsin addition to its self-image as thepreserver of Bengali culture, was in theforefront of the struggle.

The first manifestation of Bengaliresistance appeared in the form of thelanguage movements of 1947-48 and 1952.But the growing political strength of thepetty-bourgeoisie was demonstrated mostclearly in the 1954 regional electionswhen the petty-bourgeois United Front,with the Awami League as its majorcomponent, gave a crushing defeat tothe Muslim League, the party of the WeSPakistani landlords, commercial bour­geoisie and the bureaucracy, represente

in East Pakistan by the dying Muslimaristocracy. The United Front program

essentially envisaged a bourgeois demo­cratic revolution in East Pakistan andreflected the hope of the petty-bour­geoisie for a peaceful sharing of thecake with West Pakistani capitalism. Bythat time, West Pakistani capitalism hadnot exerted its monopolistic power. EastPakistan still had a slight edge in GDPover West Pakistan. Bengali nationalismhad not grown as intense as it did after­wards, and class issues were still verymuch al i ve. The Communis t Party, cam­paigning on the basis of class issues,won four of the ten seats it contested.Twenty-two other menbers of the partyand several sympathizers were electedto the assembly on the ticket of theAwami League or as independents.

But 1954 was the decisive year inwhich Pakistan's ruling classes threwin their lot unequivocally with theUnited States by joining Cold War pacts.The stage was set for the development ofWest Pakistani monopolies with a triplingof foreign economic aid and for the con­version of the military into the para­lllOunt political force through massivemilitary assistance from the UnitedStates. The election results in EastPakistan provided a serious warning tothe West Pakistani rulers. The latterqUickly rendered the Bengali challengeineffective by paralyzing the parliamen­tary process with the dismissal ofministries and dissolution of the parlia­ment, and by the co-optation of selectedleaders of the United Front into thecentral government. The Communist Partywas declared illegal in 1954.

With the old aristocracy conplete1yrouted and the opportunism of the Bengalipetty-bourgeois leadership exposed, therewas a growing frustration anx:mg the mass esand a serious split within the ranks ofthe petty-bourgeoisie. Not only was theUnited Front dismembered but a largefaction of the Awami League, with itscomponent of Communists, left the partyto merge with several nationalist groupsin West Pakistan and a tiny left-liberalorganization, the Ganatantri Dal, in Eas tPakistan, forming the National Awami Party(NAP) in 1957. Besides advocating manybourgeois democratic reforms in both parts

of the country, the NAP became the onlyparty to demand Pakistan's withdrawalfrom SEATO and the Baghdad Pact andpursuance of a non-aligned foreignpolicy. The growing influence of theNAP threatened the interests of theUnited States and its West Pakistanicollaborators. But before electionscould be held in 1958, the militaryled by General Ayub Khan staged a coup,abrogated the constitution and bannedall political parties.

The subsequent "decade of development"was a period of unbridled growth of theWest Pakistani monopoly capitalists. TheBengalis not only faced nore b rutal, ex­ploitation, but were deprived of theforum for airing their grievances, theparliament. The Khan regime did not evenconsider it necessary to co-opt membersof the Bengali petty-bourgeoisie inorder to provide an appearance ofBengali representation.

With the intensification of economicexploitation and political repression,the Bengali nationalism also grew morevirulent, clouding the class issuesand leading towards a generalized hatredof West Pakistanis. The Bengali left,represented by the NAP, partly becauseof its insistence on nationwide socialjustice and partly due to its cooperationwith the regime on account of its "friend;"ship" with China, alienated itself fromthe national movement. The NAP was anational party which was concerned notonly with the regional grievances ofEast Pakistan but which sought to endthe imperialist grip over Pakistan asa whole. But political cons ciousness inEast Bengal was essentially Bengalinationalist. Any support for the govern­ment was, therefore, viewed by Bengalisas collaboration with the enemy. UnderChinese influence, the NAP went beyondaccording a principled support for theregime's "anti-imperialist" policies;it shied away from confronting the WestPakistani ruling structure on all sub­stantive issues.

The Awami League (AL), with itssix-point program of regional autonomy,27became the unchallenged standard-bearer

9

of the Bengali movement. The AL programwas essentially a bill of rights for theBengali petty-bourgeoisie, but by demand­ing the right of negotiating foreign aidand trade for the province, it threatenedthe vested interests of the West Pakistanimilitary and bourgeoisie. Its program ofabolishing the central civil service andreplacing it with proportional repre­sentation from the provinces ran counterto the interests of the West Pakistanibureaucracy. The Ayub regime respondedto that program by jailing several mem­bers of the AL and indicting its leader,Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, for treason.

But in 1968-69, before a judgementagainst Mujib could be handed down, bothparts of Pakistan were shaken by a massivepopular upsurge against the regime. Thecharges against Mujib were dropped, mostof the political prisoners were freed,Ayub Khan resigned, and the new militaryruler, General Yahya Khan, declaredmartial law, with a promise of futureelections. 28

General, Yahya Khan fulfilled hispromise by holding elections in December1970 -- the first direct countrywideelections in Pakistan's history. TheAwami League, campaigning on the plat­form of its six-point program of regionalautonomy, was expected to emerge as thelargest single party in the new assembly.But no one expected this regional partyto win a simple majority nationwide. Adevastating cyclone and tidal wave --this century's worst natural disaster -­hit the coastal areas of East Pakistanthree weeks before the elections, leavingapproximately half a million people deadand another three million marooned. Themilitary government's gallous inefficiencyin providing relief to the affected peopleinflamed Bengali passions and dashed theprospects of the political parties whichdid not support the demand for autonomy.Maulana Bhashani, the octogenerian pea­sant leader and the President of the NAP,demanded independence for East Pakistanand boycotted the elections. A combinationof these factors gave the AL 160 out of162 contested National Assembly seats inEast Pakistan -- a clear majority nation-

10

wide in a house of 300 members. The waywas now open for the AL to frame a newconstitution on the basis of its six­point program.

But, as the world knows today, theAL was never allowed to frame a constitl:l:tetion or to form a government. InsteadEast Bengal has become a theater of themos t gruesome drama 0 f death and des trul'­tion since Auschwitz. This 'catastrophicend of Pakistan's honeymoon with democ­racy can only be expl ained in terms ofthe colonial relations between Eas tand West Pakistan and the semi-Fascistcharacter of the West Pakistani military,

On the b as is 0 f the analys is 0 f theAwami League's class character and poli­tical program, I had asserted earlierthat the AL sought the limited objecti~

of controlling East Pakistan's resourcesbut in order to develop itself into anindustrial capitalist class, the Bengalipetty-bourgeoisie needed the cooperationof West Pakistani and foreign capita1. 29By implication I suggested that indepen­dence was not on the AL's .agenda sincegiven the peculiar class structure ofEast Pakistan, independence could leadto a rapid collapse of the nascentbourgeois political power and pave theway for a possible popular revolutionwhose objective would be socialism.

There is evidence that the AwamiLeague had contemplated a compromise withthe West Pakistani power structure. 30But the absolute majority won by the ~

in the assembly, the increasingly uncom­promising mood of the Bengali masses 31

and the fear that Bhashani' s demand forindependence might des troy the credibilityof the AL made it almost impossible forSheikh Mujib to give in to the WestPakistani rulers during the constitutio..,talks. The West Pakistani bourgeois poli­ticians probably understood the dilemmaof the AL and continued to support itdespite its insistence on including allof the six points in the constitution.It is not unusual in Pakistani politiCSto go back on election promises. Probablythe West Pakistani capitalists had reas~1\

to believe that partnership with the ~

would be possible even if the constitu­tion were drafted on the basis of thesix points.

The military, however, believed itwould be impossible to perpetuate WestPakistani dominance and win other con­cessions from the Awami League oncethe constitution incorporated the sixpoints. Even if the Awami League com­promised with the military afterassuming the governmental responsibili­ties, there was no guarantee that theNAP or a future leadership of the ALwould not demand implementation ofEast Pakistan's constitutional rights.Clearly the Awami League's policy ofseeking a detente with India, basicallythrough the provincial control offoreign trade, militated against themilitary's raison d'etre. 33 The militaryhad two possibilities of sabotaging anunfavorable constitution: to nullifythe elections or to refuse to validatethe constitution after it had beenpassed by the AL-dominated assembly.In view of the popular sentiment forreturn to parliamentary politics, bothof these alternatives were somewhatrisky.

The military refused to convene theassembly before the AL had yielded toit in the extra-parliamentary talksinitiated by Yahya Khan between him­self, Mujib and the Pakistan People'sParty chief, Ali Bhutto. But Yahya'sblatant support for Bhutto' s anno uncedboycott of the session scheduled forMarch 3, his indefinite postponementof the assembly session without consul­tation with Mujib and his highly pro­vo~ative speech of March 6, made itevident that the military was not pre­pared for a ''business-like'' deal. Itwanted an outright surrender from theAwami League. The non-cooperation move­ment in East Bengal, started in responseto the military's arbitrary actions,convinced the semi-Fascist hardcore inthe jtmta that brute force, which hadpreviously been used in Baluchistan andthe Northwest Frontier Province, wasthe only answer to Bengali nationalism.The dismissal of East Pakistan's moderate

Governor, Admiral Ahsan, the appointmentof the notorious General Tikka Khan asthe new Governor, and the dissolution ofthe semi-civilian central cabinet werethe signals warning of the impendingmilitary onslaught. Only the logisticalproblem of transporting troops from WestP.akistan via the over-water route aroundCeylon had to be solved. In a tacticalmove General Yahya flew to Dacca fortalks with the AL leaders in which heappeared very conciliatory. As soon asthe troop build-up was completed, withapproximately 50,000 West Pakistanisoldiers in East Bengal, General Yahyaleft for West Pakistan and a reign ofterror was tmleashed on the people ofEast Bengal.

Interes tingly enough, in his March26 speech, the General made no mentionof any .Awami League conspiracy to separ­ate East Pakistan from the tmion;instead, he used the AL's alleged pro­posal of calling separate sessions ofEast and west Pakistani legislators andthe non-cooperation movement as the~of the AL's intention to ''breakawaycompletely from the country. "34 ThePrime Minister of the "Provisional Govern­ment of Bangladesh," Tajuddin Ahmed, laterstated that the proposal for the separatesessions was Yahya' s own and that "atno stage was there any breakdown oftalks or any indication by General Yahyaor his team that they had a final posi­tion which coul.d not be abandoned. 1135Indeed, it took six weeks for the militaryto fabricate charges and to issue its"official expose" of the Awami League's"secessionis t plot."

AZ Z evidenoe goes to show tiaat: theemal/l: hours of Marah 26 had been setas the zero hou» for an armed up­rieinq, and the fOI'lTlaZ Zaunahingof 'the Lndependent: RepubZia ofBanql.adeeh, r The pl-an was to seizeDacca and Chittagong~ Zying astridethe a:romy's aiv/eea ZifeZines toWest Pakistan• • • . . the AI'ITled fox-oeemade a series of pre-empt-ive strikesaround midnight of Marah 25-26~

seized the initiative and savedthe oountiru, 36

11

If there was indeed a plot for seces­sion, it is a very poor reflection on theAmerican-trained Pakistani intelligencecorps to have discovered it six weeksafter the fact, or on the celebrated"Information" Ministry to have revealedit that late. But the "evidence" themilitary government is referring to hasbeen presented nowhere.

Simultaneous with the crackdownagains t the Bengali autonomy novement ,the army launChed repression in WestPakistan, where a number of leftistpoliticians and working class leaderswere thrown into jail. 37 The army thenannounced the decision to appoint legis­lators to frame the constitution, todisallow regional political parties,and to continue martial law even afterthe formal transfer of government tocivilians. 38 These developments werecons is tent with the army's role in 1958and 1969 in sabotaging the possibilitiesof freeing Pakis tan from the imperialis tnoose and e f bringing radical socialchanges within the country.

.!!!!. Struggle Ahead

The Pakistan army's decision to seeka "final solution" of the "Bengal prob­lem" by a genocidal attack, besides re­sulting iD. the massacre of hundreds ofthousands of innocent civilians, theburning and strafing of thousands oftowns and villages and the exodus ofmillions of refugees, has qualitativelychanged the nature of the struggle inBangladesh and has generated new possi­bilities and dangers throughout SouthAsia.

For the struggle in East Bengal itself,the military operation proved the futilityof the parliamentary politics of the petty­bourgeois Awami League and vindicated theleft groups which had demanded independenceor resorted to guerrilla training insteadof participating in the elections. Thedream of achieving regional autonomywithin the union of Pakistan died withthe first blast of canons on the nightof March 25, 1971. Instead, an armednational liberation struggle was b orn ,

12

The military's offensive has alreadyliquidated or put out of action a num­ber of important Awami League leaders.Others, at the first sight of nn rt ar filt'fled across the border to form the so­called "Provisional Government" in thesafe haven of West Bengal. From thepublished reports, messages receivedfrom our colleagues on the scene andinterviews with Bengalis who have returnefrom West Bengal, it appears that the"Provisional Government" is firmly in thegrip of the Indian government, which hasprevented the AL from including anyleftists in it, and which has carefullyscrutinized the guerrillas training onIndian soil. Besides having nominal tieswith the Mukti Fo.& or Mukti Bahini[Liberation Army], consisting of theBengali elements of the former ~ast

Pakistan Rifles and Bengal Regiment,the Provisional Government is mainlyoccupied with obtaining internationalrecognition, appealing to the humani­tarianism of the people of the worldand co-sponsoring conferences on genocidewith Western liberal organizations .

As the struggle intensifies, thereis no doubt that the legitimacy of theAwami League will be progressivelyeroded. 'lhe legitimacy gained as a resullof an election vic;tory will no longer berelevant. The new legitimacy will haveto be gained in the battlefield and itis here that the Awami League has beenweakest.

The Left Groups

The inability of the petty-bourgeoisAwami League to lead armed struggle forindependence is readily recognized bymost observers of the Pakistani scene.Given the class make-up of East BengaliSsociety, a tradition of working classmilitancy ,. and the change in the natureof struggle since March 25, if the inde­pendence of Bangladesh does n'ot comeabout quickly as a result of the economicollapse of West Pakistan or Indo­Pakistan war or big power pressure, itseems likely that the leadership of themovement will pass to the revolutionaryleft.

Before considering the possibilityof the transformation of the Bengalinationalist movement into a genuinerevolutionary national liberation strug­gle, it is useful to glance at the stateof the left in East Bengal. After thebanning of the Communist Party in 1954,party workers either operated under­ground or inside the Awami League andthe small left-liberal Ganatantri Dal.In 1957, the leftist faction of theAwami League, with its component ofcommunists, left the party in protestagainst its pro-Western foreign policy.It then merged with the Ganatantri Daland various nationalist parties inWest Pakistan to form the NationalAwami Party (NAP) under the leadershipof the Bengali peasant leader, MaulanaBhashani. Little is known about theunderground activities of the Commun­ist Party. However, many communistswere active in the trade unions, theKIoishnik Samity [peasants' committee],the East Pakistan Students' Union,various cultural bodies and other massorganizations •

Differences appeared among the com­munists over the Sino-Soviet ideologicaldispute, the Sino-Indian border clashof 1962 and the Indo-Pakistan war of1965. By the beginning of 1968, boththe mderground party and the NAP hadsplit into "pro-Moscow" and "pro-Peking"factions. The "pro-Moscow" wing of theNAP was led by Wali Khan, a Pathan lead­er, on the national level and by Prof.Muzaffar Ahmed, a long time communist,in East Pakistan. Maulana Bhashani be­came the national leader of the "pro­Peking" wing of the NAP. The under­ground organization of the "pro-~scow"

communists was headed by Moni Singh, aveteran of peasant revolts of the 1940's.Whereas the policies of the "pr o-Hos cow"communists remained consistent withthe declaration of the 1960 Moscow con­ference of 81 communist parties,39 theSo-called "pro-Peking" group, despiteits revolutionary rhetoric, failed tooffer a coherent alternative program.

The esteem and organization of the"pro-Peking" leftists were seriouslydamaged by their reluctance to opposethe dictatorial regime of Ayub Khan

and to clearly support the demand forEast Pakistan's autonomy. Maulana Bha­shani's idiosyncracies had alienatedmany radical members of the NAP and theKrishik Samity. The country-wide massspontaneous upsurge in 1968-69 broughtthe conflicts among the pro-Peking left­ists into the open. Those advocatingthe formation of a genuine working classparty separated themselves from the NAPand split into at least three majorfactions in 1970. The Pabna-based Matin­Allaudin group called itself the PurboBangIa Communist Party; the Toha-AbdulHuq group , based mainly in Jessore andNoakhali, presented itself as the EastPak~stani counterpart of the West Ben­gali Naxalites and assumed the name ofEast Pakistan Communist Party (Marxist­Leninist); and two former student lead­ers, Kazi Zafar Ahmed and Rashid KhanMenon, formed the Communist Revolution­aries' East Bengal Co-ordinating Commit­tee (C.R.E.B.C.C.). All of them opposedparticipation in the elections. TheE.P.C.P. (M-L) even rejected mass andclass organizations and concentratedon organizing guerrilla actions afainstclass enemies in the countryside. 0Those staying with Bhashani did somainly because of their interest in theelections. Thus when Bhashani withdrewhis party from the elections and demand­ed independence for East Pakis tan inthe wake of the devastating cyclone ofNovember 1970, a large number of partyleaders, including Haji Danesh and An­war Zahid, left the NAP.41

The "pro-Peking" left was in astate of complete disarray when the mili­tary launched its offensive agains t theBengali people in March 1971. As a re­sult of the military action, tacticaldifferences in the left began to dis­appear, and it was expected that theleft would once again forge its unityon the basis of a program for armednational liberation. However, personaldifferences among the leaders led tothe further fragmentation of the exist­ing factions. Bhashani, despite his age(89), managed to escape to India andurged the world leaders to recognize theProvisional Government set up by theAwami League leaders. 42 He also met withthe leaders of all "Maoist" factions,

13

except the E.P.C.P.(M-L), on April 25to press for the formation of a Nation­al Liberation Front. 43 On June 1 thesegroups announced the formation of the"Bangladesh National Liberation Strug­gle Co-ordination Committee," urged theformation of a national liberation frontof all parties, including the AwamiLeague, and issued a declaration whichcalled for the establishment of an "anti­imperialist, anti-feudal and anti-monop­oly" social system in Bangladesh. 44

Pro-M:lscow leaders, Muzaffar Ahmedand Moni Singh--the latter having es­caped from the Rajshani prison--endors­ed the Awami League's Provisional Gov­ernment and extended their cooperationto the League and the Mukti Bahini(Awami League-affiliated liberationarmy) ., without publicly calling forthe formation of a national liberationfront.

The E.P.C.P.(M-L), unlike the other"Maoists" and the pro-Mos cow communis ts,termed the struggle in East Bengal aconflict between the West Pakistanimonopoly capitalists and the East Pak­istani nascent bourgeoisie. They remain­ed inside East Bengal and refused tohave any contact with the Awami Leagueand the Indian government. Their atti­tude was interpreted by their criticsas Peking-directed opposition to theindependence movement. Many non-Commun­ist reporters have carried stories con­cerning E.P.C.P. 's encounters with thePakistan Army and cooperation with MuktiBabini at the local level. 45 But Prof.Muzaffar Ahmed insis ts that the partydoes not support independence and thattheir actions consist only cf killinglandlords and distributing land to thepeasants. 46 .

The organizational strength of theE.P.C.P.(M-L) and the support it iscapable of drawing from its Naxalitecomrades across the border have worriedthe Indian government, the AL and thepro-Moscow communists. The Indiangovernment fears a radical Marxist, es­pecially Maoist, Bangladesh on its bor­ders. The Indian leaders have made itclear in their pronouncements that theywant an Awami League-led government

14

installed in Bangladesh. Such a gov­ernment will be similar to their ownin terms of its class character andideology. The AL hopes for a quick vic­tory--preferably the result of an Indo­Pakistan war--to establish its rule beforit has lost its legitimacy. The pro­Moscow communists, who are quite adeptat forming united fronts with bourgeoisparties, would prefer a route to inde­pendence which ensured increased Indianand Awami League dependence on the So­viet Union.

The signing of the 20-year Friend­ship Treaty between India and the Soviet'Union, which was necessitated, amongother thing, by the continuing U.S. andChinese support· for Pakistan, represents'a significant victory for Soviet strat-'egy in the region. Soon after the sign-.ing of the treaty, the Awami League, 'under pressure from New Delhi, agreedto the formation of a five-party Consul­tative Committee of Bangladesh Struggle.This committee, which is expected to bethe precursor of a united front, givespro-Moscow communists representationout of proportion to their strength.It includes one member each from thepro-Moscow Bangladesh Communist Partyand its front organization, the NAP(Muzaffar). Maulana Bhashand has beenincluded in it in an individual capa­city because of hisenornous popularityand for creating a facade of all-partyrepresentation. The Hindu BangladeshNational Congress, which had submergeditself in the AL, also has one repre­sentative. The Awami League has fourmembers. All members of the committeehave accepted the all-Awami LeagueProvisional Government as the sole legitimate authority in Bangaldesh. All "Mao­ist" groups, which had originally calledfor the formation of a national libera­tion front, have been excluded from theConsultative Committee.

The strategy of the pro-Moscow com­munists seems to be consistent with thettpolicy of achieving "independent nation­al democracy" as the first stage of thetwo-stage socialist revolution. Theindependence of Bangladesh is supposedto accomplish only the first stage inthis process of transition. One of the

two main ingredients of this line, asapplied to the present situation, isthe acceptance of the hegemony of theAwami League, as discussed earlier. Theother important ingredient is the pur­suance of a military strategy which doesnot entail radicalization of the masses.Both the Awami League and the pro-llis­cow left consider self-sustained andprotracted guerrilla warfare inimicalto their interests since such strategywill not only postpone the independenceof Bangladesh but will require in tenseideological education of the masses andcreate conditions favorable to the no reradical "Maoist" groups. A slight pro­longation of the struggle, however,will enable the pro-MOscow left to takeadvantage of the inertia of the AwamiLeague leadership, consolidate its in~

fluence in the Mukti Bahini and amongthe Awami League political cadres, andacquire greater leverage within thecoalition. The gains thus made willpresumably place the pro-lliscow commun­ists in a favorable position to carryindependent Bangladesh toward the pathof independent national deno cracy andeventually toward socialism.

The military strategy employed bythe Awami League and the pro-MOscow leftat this stage has consisted mainly ofthe Mukti Bahini commandos and leftistguerrillas disrupting the communicationsand power aupp.Ly in the interior and theMukti Bahini regulars, operating fromsanctuaries in India, making incursionsalong the border and trying to hold afew liberated areas. It is quite ob­vious that the Bangladesh coalitiondoes not envisage Mukti Bahini alone de­feating the Pakistani army. It will re­quire lengthy training mfd costly equip­ment for the Mukti Bahini regulars tobecome a match for the BO,OOO-strongwell-trained and well-equipped occupa­tion army of Pakis tan. The Bangladeshstrategy, therefore, implies involve­ment of Indian troops against the Pak­istani army at some point. The chancesof Indian intervention grow in directproportion to the erosion of the AwamiLeague's legitimacy and the radicaliza­tion 0 f the liberation novement • Un­less the Bangladesh crisis is solved

quickly, the chances of having a friend­ly petty-bourgeois regime in East Ben­gal will be greatly reduced. Interna­tional support for India's actions cancome mainly from the Soviet-bloc coun­tries. Acceptance of pro-Moscow commun­ists in the Bangladesh coalition is,therefore, a small price to pay forSoviet material and moral support in aventure designed to protect the classinterests of the Indian rulers.

For the success of Soviet strat-egy in South Asia--which includes dom­ination of the Indian Ocean and contain­ment of Chinese influence, it is moreimportant to have friendly and depen­dent--preferably petty-bourgeois-commun­ist coalition--governments than equalityand freedom for the peoples of the re­gion. Ceylon, where the pro-MOscowcommunists have formed a coalition gov­ernment with the petty-bourgeois SriLanka Freedom Party, is the archetypeof the kinds of governments the Sovietswould like to have in Bangladesh andIndia. Such a development would consti­tute a major breakthrough for the Sovietpolicy of establishing a regional se­curity alliance against China, firs tpropounded in June 1969.

The growing Soviet influence inSouth Asia makes it imperative for theUnited States to not only attempt aneutralization of India, Ceylon andBangladesh, but to strengthen its stran~

glehold in West Pakistan. This leavesChina limited alternatives in the region.It is difficult for China to supportthe independence of Bangladesh, sincesuch independence is likely to streng­then the Indo-Soviet front agains t her.On the other hand, despite friendlystate relations between Pakistan andChina, the West Pakistani ruling oli­garchy is unmistakably fascist and pro­imperialist. China's denunciations ofIndia notwithstanding, she is not ex­pected to involve herself militarily onPakistan's side. Unlike 1965 when theChinese diverted India from launchinga major assault against Pakistan, todayChina feels seriously threatened bypossible Soviet moves against her terri­tory and her nuclear installations.

15

see Congressman Galla­in Congressional Recotf'

---.;:

The dilemna of China is reflectedin the dilemna 0 f the Bangladesh "Mao­ists." The objective conditions inBangladesh offer an opportunity of car­rying out a protracted people's warwhich would radicalize the masses andallow the development of revolutionaryinfrastructures during the course ofstruggle. But such developments are con­trary to the interests of the EastBengali petty-bourgeoisie, the Indianruling classes and the Soviet Union.The "Haoists" know that if independencecomes quickly as a result of Indo-Sovietpressure, it will substitute new ex­ploiters for the old. But at the sametime they cannot sit idly by and watchtheir country being ravaged, theirpeople being slaughtered and their womenbeing raped by the fascist hordes fromWest Pakistan.

Whether or not the Chinese openlysupport the "Maoist" insurrectionistsin Bangladesh, the E.P.C.P.(M-L) andother "Maoists" are likely to continuebuilding bases, training guerrillas,forming administrative infrastructuresin the villages and eliminating classenemies. The AL-pro-Moscow coalition,which has now excluded the "Maois ts ,"will have to face the reality of theirpresence. If an accommodation is notbrought about soon enough, an indepen­dent Bangladesh will most likely beripe for a civil war of its own inwhich Soviet and Indian arms, suppliedto the AL-pro-Moscow coalition, may beused against the "Maoist" peasants de­manding radical restructuring of thesociety in place of the Awami League'sparliamentary democracy and the pro­Moscow communists' "independent nation­al demo2'racy."

FOOTNOTES

Editor's note: This article was com­pleted prior to the outbreak of theIndo-Pakistan war.

1. The most authentic report of thegenocide is to be found in the accountof a West Pakistani journalist, AnthonyMascarenhas: "Genocide: Why the Refu­gees Fled," Sunday Times, June 13,1971;for a reliable account of the conditions

16

of the refugees,gher's testimonyJune 11, 1971.

2. See Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama,Pantheon, New York, 1968, Vol. I, p.234.244; and Tariq Ali, Pakistan: MilitarzRule £.E. People's Power?, William Morrow& Co. , New York, 1970, pp. 25-36.

3. For a discussion of the militaIyand the bureaucracy as semi-autonomoussocial forces, see Hamza Alavi, "Armyand Bureaucracy in Pakistan," Interna­tional Socialis t Journal, March-April,1966.

4. Since the launching of the mili­t ary operation in Eas t Bengal, theGovernment of Pakistan has engaged in awild propaganda,war which attempts todisprove the widely accepted factsabout the economic exploitation of EastBengal. As part of this propaganda, theGovernment controlled news agency, PPI,released an item which was printed inall the Pakistani papers on June 14,1971 and circulated by Pakistani mis­sions abroad. It read in part as follows"The latest figures of trade betweenEast and West Pakistan disprove the myt±West Pakis tan has turned East Pakistaninto a market for its industrial pro­ducts." Even if the figures used forthis story are taken at face value, thesurplus of East Pakistan's export ofmanufactures over that of the West Pak­istan amounts to only Ra. 100,000 forthe year 1969-70, whereas the overallsurplus of West Pakistani exports comesto Rs , 740 million. Two additional factsregarding inter-regional trade need tobe taken into account: (1) East Pakis­tan's largest item of export to WestPakistan, i.e. tea, is counted as amanufactured good and (2) most of theindustry and plantations in East Pakis­tan are owned by West Pakistanis andforeigners anyway. No amount of statis­tical juggling can change the factsabout colonialism.

5. Figures cited in Mason, Dorfmanand Marglin, "Conflict in East PakistanBackground and Prospects," Congression,2:Record, April 7, 1971.

6. This well-known statement hasbeen quoted widely, including in theU.S. government's manual for militarypersonnel: Area Handbook For Pakist~,

DA Pam No. 550-48, Washington, D.C.:

superintendent of Documents, October1965, p , 339.

7. America's late President Kennedy,quoted by Harry Magdoff in The Age ~I!JIPerialism, Monthly Review Press,New York, 1969, p. 117.

8. Magaoff, op. cit.9. Hamza Alavi, "Pakistan: the Bur­

den of U.S. Aid," in Imperialism andUnderdevelopment, edited by Robert I.Rhodes, Monthly Review Press, New York,1970.

·10. M.A. Sattar, United States Aidand Pakistan's Economic Developmen~unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, TuftsUniversity, 1969.

11. For a discussion of the role ofHarvard's Development Advisory Servicein Pakistan, see "Underdeveloping theWorld," a pamplet prepared by studentsand movement research people in Cam­bridge, Mass.; reprinted in Forum(Dacca), September 26, 1970.

12. Hamza Alavi, "Pakis tan: theBurden of U.S. Aid," op , cit.

13. Gustav Papanek, Pakistan'sDevelopment, Harvard University Press,Caubridge, 1967, p , 226.

14. Among the numerous favorable re­ports and commentaries about Pakistan'seconomic development, one needs specialmention, i.e. the World Bank-sponsoredPearson Report: Lester B. Pearson, Part­~~ Development, Praeger, New York,1969.

15. Edward S. Mason, Economic Develop­ment in India and Pakistan, Center forInternational Affairs, Harvard University,no. 13, September 1966. M.A. Sattar's re­cent study showed that Pakistan's economicgrowth rate would have been much slowerwithout U.S. aid.

16. This widely quoted revelation byPakistan's Chief Economist, Mahbub-ul Haq ,appears in a number of places, including"Underdeveloping the World," op , cit.

17. For a discussion of the consequen­ces of Pakistan's model of economic devel­opment, see Arthur MacEwan, "Contradictionsin Capitalist Development: the Case ofPakistan," paper read at the Conferenceon Economic Growth and Distributive Justicein Pakistan, University of Rochester,July 29-31, 1970; abstract published inPakistan Forum, October-November 1970.

18. A.R. Khan, "A New Look at Dispar­ity," Forum, January 3, 1970.

19. A confidential report on regionaldisparities singled out the policies ofthe central government as the most im­portant cause of the Widening gap betweenthe two regions: Government 0 f Eas tPakistan-Planning Department, EconomicDisparities between~ and West Pakistan,Officer on Special Duty, S. & G.A. Depart­ment, In-charge, East Pakistan GovernmentPress, Dacca, 1963, p. 15. For more recentdiscussion of the governmental policies,see several articles by Rahman Sobhan inForum: "Fourth Plan Fiasco," February 14,1970; "Doing Justice in the Fourth Plan,"June 6, 1970; "Forced Five Year Plan,"June 13, 1970j and "Budget from the Past,"July 11,1970; also, a number of unsignedarticles in Forum: "Fourth Plan Maneuvers,"November 29, 1969; "Finance Committee:Accused as the Judge," May 23, 1970;"Budget Anti-Climax," July 4, 19 70j and"Past Panels and Committees: An Appraisal,"September 5, 1970.

20. Papanek, op. cit.21. Department of State and Department

of Defense, The Mutual Security ProgramFiscal Year 1958, Washington D.C., 1962,Vol. I, p , 359.

22. M. Ayub Khan, Friends, Not Masters,Oxford University Press, New York, 1967,p , 59.

23. An authoritative account of thelanguage movement appears in BadruddinUmar, The Language Movement in Eas t Ben­gal and its Contemporary Politics, [inBengali], published in November 1970;English serialization of the book wasterminated by the events of February­March 1971 in East Pakistan. The firstinstallment appeared in Forum of February20, 1971-

24. After declaring their independence,the people of East Bengal adopted one ofTagore's songs as their" national anthem.

25. Pakistan Student, May-Jtme 1967.26. The recent massacre, flight and

purging of Bengali intelligentsia haveopened up many job opportunities forunemployed West Pakistanis and promotionsfor others. If the attitude of the WestPakistani employees of the Pakistan Em­bassy in Washington is any indicator ofthe mood of the West Pakistani educatedsegment, the Bengal carnage has beengreeted as a blessing in that region.

27. These points are: 1) a federal andparliamentary form of government, with

17

supremacy of the legislature, based ondirect adult franchise and proportionalrepresentation, 2) the federal govern­ment to have responsibilities of de-fense and foreign policy only, 3) separatecurrencies or other alternate means ofpreventing the transfer of resources fromone region to the other, 4) fiscal policyand power of taxation to be in the handsof the regional governments, 5) regionalgovernments to control their foreign ex­change earnings and to have the power ofnegotiating foreign aid and trade and6) para-military forces to be providedto the regions. For details, see A.H.M.Kamruzzaman, Manifesto of All PakistanAwami League, Dacca, June 1970.

28. For a graphic account of the eventsof 1968-69, see Tariq Ali, Ope cit.,chapters V, VI, and VII.

29. Feroz Ahmed, "Vei11ee d ' Armes E1ec­tora1e au Pakistan," Africasia, November9, 1970.

30. Feroz Ahmed, "The Struggle in WestPakistan," manuscript prepared for aforthcoming book to be published underthe sponsorship of the Committee of Con­cerned Asian Scholars; see also, GeneralYahya lO:1.an '5 statement of June 28, 1971,Pakistan Affairs, June 30, 1971.

31. Rashed Akhtar, "From Non-cooperationto the People's Raj," Forum, March 13,1971.

32. The West Pakis tani right-wingparties not only insisted that the AwamiLeague be allowed to frame a constitutionon the basis of the six points but sup­ported the AI. , s four supplementary de­mands which included the transfer of theinterim government to the elected repre­sentatives, Pakistan Times, March 14, 1971.

33. Sheikh MUjibur Rahman's nationwidetelevision speech, Dawn, October 29, 1970.

34. Pakistan Affairs, March 31, 1971.35. Tajuddin Ahmed's statement of April

17, 1971, mimeo, distributed by the Missionof Bangladesh in Calcutta.

36. Pakistan (Affairs], May 11, 1971.37. Pakistan Forum, June-July, 1971.38. Yahya Khan's June 28 speech.39. For the pro-Moscow position, see,

"Leninism is our Guide," World MarxistReview, May, 1970.

40. For a critical analysis of thesplits in the East Bengali left, see the

18

three part article by A.H. Khan in Fo~

(Dacca), December 19 and 26, 1970 andJanuary 2, 1971-

41. MOst of these leaders have now ~

fused to support independence and havejoined hands with West Pakistan-basedparties.

42. "Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan BhashanAppeal to World Leaders," published bythe Provisional Government of Bang1ades~

43. Far Eastern Economic Review, May15, 1971.

44. Sphulinga: Bulletin of the BangIaDesh Association of Quebec, Vol. I, NO.9

45. Far East ern Economic Review, Aptil4, 19 n7and Economis t, July 10, 1971'.

. 46. Interview with the author, Pakis:tQnForum, October, .1971.

Table 1

Gross Domestic Product in 1959-60 Constant Prices

(in million rupees)

East West

1949-50 13,130 11,830

1954-55 14,320 14,310

1959-60 15,550 16,790

1964-65 18,014 21,788

1968-69 20,670 27,744

Sources: Gustav Papanek, Pakistan's Development, Harvard, 1967, p. 317; and A.R. Khan,

"A New Look at Disparity," Forum, January 3, 1970.

Ta'

II H D I

A R A BlAIN SEA

...

11· '.

c

10·

.e·

1/

$.

MAP OF

1P~STAN• • • - 'r............... -

II'

19

1947

Table 2

Educational Disparities

East Pakistan

1967 1947

West Pakistan

1967

Primary level

Number of insts. 29,633 28,225 8,413 33,271

Number of students 2,020,000 4,310~000 550,000 2,740,000

Secondary level

Institutions 3,481 4,390 2,598 4,563

Students 53,000 107,000 51,000 153,000

" General College

Institutions 50 173 40 239

Enrollment 19,000 138,000 13,000 142,000

General University

Institutions 1 2 2 4

Enrollment 1,600 8,000 700 10,000

Source: Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan, Education Statistics of

Pakistan (1947-57); and A.O. Huque, "Educational Disparities in Pakistan," Forum,

December 20, 1969.

20

Table 3

Some Economic Indicators

Area (in square miles)

Population, (1970 estimate)

Five-year plan allocations

1st

2nd

3rd

4th (unlikely to be implemented)

Foreign aid allocation

Export earning

Import expenditure

Industrial assets owned by Bengalis

Civil service jobs

Military jobs

Resources transferred from East

to West between 1948-49 and 1968-69

Per capita income, official

1964-65

1968-69

Regional difference in p.c.i., official

1959-60

1964-65

1968-69

Real difference in p.c.i., 1968-69

East Pakistan

54,501

70 million

32%

32%

36%

52.5%

20-30r.

50-70r.

25-30r.

11%

16-20%

10%

*Rs.31,120 million

Rs.285.5

Rs. 291. 5

32%

47%

62%

95%

West Pakistan

310,236

60 million

68%

68%

64%

47.5%

70-80%

30-50%

70-75%

80-84%

90%

Rs.419.0

Rs.473.4

21

Real difference in average standard

of living, 1968-69

Proportion of income spent on food by

industrial workers (1955-56 survey) 69-75%

126%

60-63%

*At the official rate, u.s. $1 = 4.76 rupees (Rs.); current market exchange rate,

$1 = Rs.ll.

Sources: Pakistan Statistical Yearbooks and Pakistan Economic Survey for the various

years, Government of East Pakistan (1963), Papanek (1967), A.R. Khan (1970), Interim

Reports (May 1970) and Forum (Feb. 27,1971).

Table 4

Inter-regional trade (exports)

Year

1948-49

1950-51

1955-56

1960-61

1965-66

1969-70

East Pakistan

(in millions of rupees)

18.8

46.0

220.7

355.9

649.7

915.7

West Pakistan

137.6

210.8

318.9

800.5

1,189.8

1,656.2

Sources: Pakistan Economic Survey 1967-68 and Pakistan Times, June 14, 1971.

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