M o b a r a k H o s s a i n 2 0 1 7

S c i e n c e s P o , P a r i s

The State of Accountability in the

Education Sector of Bangladesh:

A Critical Overview

This paper was commissioned by the Global Education Monitoring Report as background information

to assist in drafting the 2017/8 GEM Report, Accountability in education: Meeting our commitments.

It has not been edited by the team. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the

author(s) and should not be attributed to the Global Education Monitoring Report or to UNESCO. The

papers can be cited with the following reference: “Paper commissioned for the 2017/8 Global

Education Monitoring Report, Accountability in education: Meeting our commitments”. For further

information, please contact gemreport@unesco.org.

ED/GEMR/MRT/2017/C1/13

Country case study prepared for the 2017/8 Global Education Monitoring Report

Accountability in education: Meeting our commitments

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1. Defining Accountability

The word ‘accountability’ in Bengali often means ‘answerability’ for someone’s duties. Customarily, it can also mean ‘taking risks’ to accomplish a task for the well-being of the family. It even connotes the ‘liability’, for instance, of the leader(s) of a family or an organized group for its members’/followers’ actions. When used for the official purpose in the administrative system, accountability refers to the responsibility of the officials and their belonging respective organizations for assigned duties towards achieving a target. However, as the bureaucracy in Bangladesh focuses more on a set of rules and regulations or processes rather than the outcomes or citizens’ satisfaction, the notion of accountability may, in practice, be simplistically applied to maintaining rules since poor performance and quality of the service delivery often do not affect the job security of the officials, be they administrators or teachers (in public education institutions) (Mukherjee, 2001 & Rahman, 2013).

2. Introduction and country profile

An effective accountability system depends on whether the objectives of the education system aligned with the interests of its beneficiaries and other actors. Therefore, these actors must be incorporated into the decision-making process to combine a bottom-up and top-bottom policy formulation approach, which is a vital element for ensuring mutual accountability. This will create an enabling environment for grassroots actors to engage by giving them space to raise their voices and work to overcome their own challenges. Past research has also found that an effective performance management system is important to monitor the duties of both individuals and organizations at various decision-making levels (see Hanusheck & Raymond, 2002; Levin, 1974; Linn, 2008; Perie et al., 2007; Ryan, 2002; Stecher & Hanser, 1993;). Therefore, this paper broadly reviews if: the goals of the education system in Bangladesh are relevant to the interests of the stakeholders, there is an effective performance management system to monitor the activities of the actors at different levels, and the actors are equipped with required instruments necessary for creating an enabling environment. Country profile: After returning to civil rule from the military regime in 1991, Bangladesh has a multi-party parliamentary democratic system. However, the political culture and stability of democratic institutions have been marked since the beginning because of hostility and continuous violence between the two main political parties, namely the current ruling party Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Moreover, the concentration of power in the hands of a few people or offices (for instance, Prime Minister’s Office), factional politics in the institutions and the absence of opposition from the Parliament leading to fragile checks and balances have had a serious impact on the policy domain. This polarization and over centralization of power in the administrative structure leaves little space in decision-making for sub-national agencies and citizens at the grassroots level (BTI, 2016). Consequently, though the administration has been decentralized since 1987 through various legislative reforms1 to delegate power to the local government agencies for ensuring effective public service delivery, it could not bring any significant outcomes (Waheduzzaman, 2010). This dysfunctional political and administrative culture has created a sense of mistrust among the citizens towards the government (Islam & Mahmud, 2015). Like other service sectors, the functioning of the education system is also centrally controlled. Pre-primary and primary education systems are managed by the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education. Post-primary education, including secondary and higher education system covering general, madrasah, technical-vocational and professional education, is managed by the Ministry of Education under the supervision of different directorates.

1 The Local Government Ordinance 1976 was the first reform effort to decentralize administration. However, it was abolished

in 1982. Later, the 1987 ordinance was amended in 1998 and 2009.

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However, while the test for the primary education is centrally organized by the Directorate of Primary Education, there are nine education boards for organizing examinations at the secondary level. Still, the teaching materials and curricula for both levels are centrally decided. Hence, no policy related power is delegated to the local administration at the District and Upazila (sub-District) level. The University Grants Commission (UGC) is responsible for administering the activities of universities whereas the National University looks after all the colleges for higher education (BANBEIS, 2016a). Other factors that affect the accountability system and the quality of education in Bangladesh include: conflicting goals and actions, the absence of an effective performance management system leading to rampant practices of corruption, resource constraints, lack of qualified teachers and inactive bottom-up decision-making processes.

3. Actors and accountability

Depending on the socio-political and cultural setting of a country, the type of actors involved in the education sector may vary. However, in Bangladesh, final decisions regarding implementation of the education services are made through the complex interrelation of various agencies of the government. In addition, some other key actors simultaneously influence education policy decisions and their execution. These include: the international community, education providers, as well as teachers, students, parents and civil society organizations (CSOs). This section discusses the way these actors are held accountable for their responsibilities. 3.1 Government in policy formulation process

In a parliamentary democracy, effective policy formulation process involves continuous debates and discussions as well as the scrutiny of opposing views. The constant parliament boycott of the main opposition party in Bangladesh has created a vacuum in the accountability system. Out of the total 418 working days of the 9th parliament (2009-2014), the main opposition party, BNP, and its allies boycotted the parliamentary sessions for 342 days (81 percent of the total working days) (Bdnews24, 2014). The first education policy in execution was also passed in the absence of oppositions (The Daily Star, 2010). The accountability mechanism has become even more fragile as the 19 opposition parties including BNP boycotted the 10th parliamentary election, thus creating “a de facto one-party institution with no institutional checks” (BTI, 2016, p. 2). In addition, politics of ideological competition is prioritized over citizens’ interests, leading to policy changes – including those specific to education – when the regime turns over. However, the main goal remains nation building based on religious faiths, ethical perceptions, and patriotism, rather than skill-building, the liberation of individuals or human rights focused approaches (GoB, 2010; Hossain et al., 2002). Unterhalter and colleagues (2001) point out the central focus has remained on two major issues in the education policy of Bangladesh since its independence in 1971: first, building national identity based on history of the liberation war and religious beliefs; and second, economic development where “dominance of the national community’s destiny” is the primary concern (p. 92). However, the national assessment system mainly focuses on mathematics and language, not subjects related to nation building (GoB, 2014). Moreover, new education policy has come into execution without sufficiently being reached to direct beneficiaries, i.e., students, parents, and teachers. For instance, the only option kept to give feedback on the ‘policy draft’ was the ministry’s website which is not accessible to the people in hard-to-reach areas (GoB, 2010). Thus, the centralized system has created a ‘black box’ of policy process being only accessible to a few elites composed of the government and occasionally some CSOs and donors (Hossain et al., 2002). Consequently, the implementation challenges of the new education policy, including the recent concerns about the negative impact of two additional public examinations in grade-5 and grade-8, imply that the decisions might not be aligned with the needs, capacity and interests of relevant stakeholders. The frequent exams have not only impacted students

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by bringing in an unhealthy competition but also led to an increasing practice of corruption in exams including question leakage, copying and other malpractices (CAMPE, 2014; New Age, 2014; TIB, 2015). The schooling system has become ‘exam-centric’ rather than ‘learning centric’ putting more emphasis on achieving a good grade rather than gaining knowledge (CAMPE, 2014). Therefore, education goals, on one hand, do not sufficiently focus on individuals’ interests and on the other, they sometimes conflict with the government’s actions. 3.2 Role of the international community

International actors also play an important role in shaping the focus of education service in Bangladesh, since education is not only a local but also a ‘global good’ (UNESCO, 2016). In addition to the above mentioned ideological phenomena, the government prioritizes the goals of the United Nations (UN) and strategies of other international stakeholders (see Table 1). Table 1: The relationship between international goals, national strategies, and donors' action plan.

Global goals National Strategies Donor’s Action

World Conference on Education for All (EFA), 1990: 6 goals emphasizing access, equity and learning, amongst others.

1. Compulsory education act 1990. 2. Introduction of a Separate Primary and Mass Education in 1992 3. Adoption of the National Plan of Action I (NPA-I) 1991-2000 in light of EFA goals

- Support for expansion of primary education from Islamic Development Bank (IDA), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Norway, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), UNICEF, UNFPA, Germany and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). - Food for Education Project of World Food Programme (WFP) 1993-2000 - First Primary Education Development programme (PEDP-I) 1997-2002 by the above-mentioned donors.

Dakar Framework, 2000 focusing on free and compulsory education, learning outcomes, adult literacy and gender parity.

1. Second National Plan of Action (NPA-II) to ensure inclusive education and also improve the learning outcome with having gender parity. 2. Primary Education Development Programme adopted by the donors placed to the Primary and Mass Education Ministry for independent operation. 3. Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), included an item regarding the provision of quality education

- Second Primary Education Development Programme (PEDP-II), 2004-2011: funded by 11 donors. - Third Primary Education Development Programme (PEDP-III), 2011-2016: funded by 10 donors. - Support for secondary education, mainly by the ADB and IDA. - Vocational and Technical Education supported by the EU, ADB, WB and ILO.

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) focusing on universal primary education (UPE)], 2000-2015

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The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (2015-2030), goal-4 regarding inclusive, equitable and quality education and lifelong learning.

4. National Education Policy-2010 5. Sixth Five Year National Development Plan (2011-15) 6. National Skills Development Policy, 2011

Sources: IGS, 2012 & Ahmed, 2013. Bangladesh has remarkably progressed in nearly achieving the global goal of universal primary education enrolment, an important target of EFA and MDGs, reaching 97.7 percent in 2015, from 87 percent in 2005 (BANBEIS, 2016b). The structural advantage of being easily reachable to a highly dense and linguistically homogenous population has made the achievement of this target more feasible and a popular political priority (Hossain et al., 2002). As a result, other essential focuses of the international platforms, such as EFA and later SDGs-4 targets of improving learning achievements, and the inclusion of marginalized population have been a negligible part of policy decisions and actions. The assessment of government shows that only 33 percent of the students of grade-5 have competencies in mathematics while 25 percent have proficiency in Bengali language (GoB, 2014). Assessment by CSOs, such as of Campaign for Popular Education (CAMPE), finds, only 1.6% students of the grade-5 level achieved all 27 competencies set under its assessment (CAMPE, 2015). Though the government has set a target of 50% and 60% of students attaining proficiency in Bengali and mathematics by 2016, the slow progress in previous assessment results gives little optimism to reach this target (see GoB, 2014 & CAMPE, 2015 for previous assessments). Moreover, a large portion of children is excluded from schools. A recent study of Save the Children shows that 43 percent of children from extremely poor families in urban slums have never been to school (Save the Children, 2016). And shockingly, though the government provides stipends to ensure inclusion of the poorest, students, sometimes, need to make unauthorized payments to get their stipends (Mulcahy, 2015). Therefore, lack of political will appears to be the main hindrance in achieving the global education goals of equitable and quality education, or more precisely, government’s commitment towards the international community for protecting education as a ‘global good’. 3.3 Government in policy implementation

3.3.1 Financial Functions: The successful implementation of national development programmes depends on the effective allocation of resources in the respective sector. Although the size of the total budget is expanding, the overall allocation for the education sector of Bangladesh is not increasing at the same rate. An analysis by UNICEF (2012) shows that while the total budget increased at an average rate of 28.7 percent during the time between 2008-09 and 2012-13, the allocation for the education sector only increased 20.1 percent in this period. Besides, the share of the education budget in GDP is one of the lowest in the world. Bangladesh ranked third lowest among 78 countries with only 1.97 percent of GDP spent on education in 2013; compared to 4.09 percent in Nepal, 2.50 in Pakistan, 4.54 in Afghanistan and 5.59 in Bhutan (UIS, 2013). In addition to the paucity of resources, the absence of an effective participatory budgeting process hinders the identification of main challenges faced by direct beneficiaries. Consequently, the main purpose of development programmes in the education sector, to share power with a “raising level of political awareness and strength for disadvantaged people”, as World Bank suggests, remains a distant dream (Rahman, 2005: p. 2). The centralized budgeting system compounds this problem as the scope for local agency participation is very limited, indicating that congregated local problems are not a policy priority at the national level (see section 4). Moreover, because of the culture of parliament boycott by the opposition parties, only the ruling party plays an absolute role in finalizing the budget. Even non-state actors cannot participate in the discussions since the ‘Official Secrecy Act’ prevents sharing any government documents with people outside the respective offices (CEF, 2009).

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3.3.2 Administrative Functions: The administrative tasks in the education sector of Bangladesh, ranging from teacher recruitment and determination of curriculum to public examinations, are also centralized. Local administration, as well as public schools, have little or no autonomy over these decisions (see section 3.5 & 4). Thus, the scarcity of resources and rigid centralization impede the effective functioning of a mutual accountability system. 3.4 Education providers

The increasing number of students in primary education, resulting from the MDGs, has made developing a system of mutual accountability among teachers, students and parents more challenging. Bangladesh has a high Student-Teacher Ratio (STR) with a headcount of 46 students per teacher in the government controlled schools creating an ineffective learning environment (GoB, 2014). Moreover, local policy implementing agencies, including Upazila function poorly because: first, no real power concerning policy measures is delegated to them; and second, Upazila Education Officers (UEOs) rarely perform their duties to regularly monitor the performance of schools. The UEO is responsible for the overall management of schools and the Assistant Upazila Education Officer (AUEO) is in charge of inspecting a cluster of 20-30 schools in an Upazila (Rabbi, 2008). In some cases, teachers bribe their monitoring officers to have satisfactory remarks even though their duties remain unperformed. They sometimes fill in the evaluation forms by themselves instead of the AUEO (Al Mamun, 2014). The poor performance of existing duties indicates that decentralization might not be an immediate and effective solution. Rather greater autonomy to handle resources and administrative tasks might eventually cause more corruption and inefficiencies. The collection of unauthorized money by schools in the form of admission fees, fees to collect stipends, class promotion fees, sports fees, farewell fees and different day observation fees also reflects the embedded administrative culture of tolerance for corruption (Mulcahy, 2015). Moreover, the School Management Committees (SMCs) are also mostly ineffective. They do not take into account service receivers’ concerns and are mostly run by uneducated and politically muscled people (Al Mamun, 2014; Rabbi, 2008). Additionally, the ineffective application of the Right to Information Act-2009 cannot ensure schools disclose all information regarding the responsibilities of teachers, decision-making process, budget and expenditures of schools (MHHDC, 2012). Consequently, financially capable parents move to high achieving schools that have a flexible management system (Rabbi, 2008). This illustrates a sharp contrast between the goals of the state and individuals; while the state focuses on nation building mechanisms, individuals emphasize building personal skills to be competent in the job market. In short, the absence of an effective performance management system along with centralization seems to be the main obstacles for ensuring better functioning of mutual accountability between field level service providers and recipients. 3.5 Teachers

Teachers at the primary and secondary level do not have the autonomy to decide on teaching curricula, materials, or tests used to assess the students taught by them. This long-lasting centralized practice, in turn, has created an ‘inherent inactiveness’ among the stakeholders. Accountability appears as an ‘alien’ concept. The lack of autonomy has left teachers outside of the development process of the new education policy and general inefficiency has left them without adequate training on the new curriculum (GoB, 2014). More than half of the teachers are not familiar with the creative curriculum implemented under the new education policy (The Independent, 2016). Thus, most of the students either have to depend on note guides or private tutoring; though the government has proposed banning them in the draft of the new education act (New Age, 2016). The

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dependence on private tutoring affects the poorest children since education moves beyond an intellectual competition to a financial one, going against the principle of inclusion. Additionally, the training of the primary school teachers run by Primary Teachers’ Training Institute (PTI) has been found to be very ineffective where nothing is emphasized more than traditional classroom based training. “[T]eachers and school administrators do not have the authority…to innovate beyond the textbook” as every decision regarding curricula comes from the centralized administration (Moyer, 2014, p. 65). This ‘one-size-fits every human being and location’ policy leads to poor learning achievement. As a result of ineffective training, most teachers depend on traditional means of instruction such as textbooks and use of the blackboard. A study shows that only half of the teachers at the primary level use multiple instructional activities such as charts, maps and posters (DPE, 2007 mentioned in Mullick & Sheesh, 2008). While it is indispensable to create a conducive environment in the classroom, only 23 percent of the teachers in Bangladesh teach with love and affection. The untrained teachers follow the conventional teaching method, which is one-way communication. Some teachers even suggest learning lessons at home (Haq, 2006 mentioned in Mullick & Sheesh, 2008) Moreover, as shown, the internal monitoring system is not well functioning, hence, the performance of teachers is poorly monitored (Al Mamun, 2014). Therefore, teacher absenteeism, negligence of duties and other types of irregularities are commonly practiced. A study by the World Bank finds that, on average, 15.5 percent of the primary school teachers are absent from their duties, which is even more prevalent in the case of head teachers. The rate of absenteeism is higher in secondary schools averaging 17.6 percent (Chaudhury et al., 2004). To sum up, little or no autonomy over the teaching curricula due to centralized decision-making processes along with the absence of an effective performance monitoring system creates a culture of inertia among beneficiaries to hold teachers accountable. 3.5 Students and parents

Parents’ involvement in children’s education is vital for ensuring better outcomes. Schools have an even more important role in monitoring the progress of students through institutional mechanisms such as maintenance of regular home-school diaries and also contacting parents through home visits and telephone calls. However, these practices inadequately exist in most public schools of Bangladesh. Though informal home visit of the teachers happened long before in the rural areas to urge parents about the students’ learning progress, it does not occur nowadays thanks to increasing number of students and low professional motivation resulting from low salary and institutional focus on rules and duties rather than students’ performance (Islam, 2008; Kabir & Akter, 2014). In addition, financial solvency, educational level and awareness of parents also matter to perform their obligations both towards schools and students’ learning process. For instance, although schools sometimes take initiative to hear parents’ concerns through SMCs, parents do not always respond, thinking that their responsibility is only sending children to school, the rest is teachers’, which discourage schools to take such initiatives (Kabir & Akter, 2014). Poverty and less education are also common obstacles in performing the above responsibilities since poor parents need to concentrate more on providing support for the family. Moreover, parents (mostly mothers) with multiple responsibilities, i.e., job and household management, tend to invest less time in children’s home or engaging with school initiatives (ibid, 2014). 3.6 Higher education institutions: autonomy with no difference

As opposed to primary and secondary education levels that are mostly controlled by the state, universities have operational autonomy since the introduction of 1973 University Acts (IBE, 2011). Although they are supposed to be autonomous, the existing culture of political polarization in the whole country has a strong influence on the

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management of public universities. Teachers’ recruitment and promotion processes are often politicized and carried out without considering merit (Bangladesh Pratidin, 2013; Banik Barta, 2016). As a result, 2 of the 3 important characteristics of a world-class university – the quality of the teachers and the governance of the university – are rarely present in the ‘better performing’ higher education institutions in Bangladesh (Salmi, 2009). Universities are also not financially solvent and autonomous, the third criteria. Sole financial dependence on the government leads the system to be extremely politicized (Monem & Baniamin, 2010). In addition, the system of faculty evaluation “is yet to be introduced due to fear of political victimization”. Besides, “neither the chairman nor the Dean, who in terms of assigned responsibility should be authorities to take note of a teacher’s failure, whatever may be the nature of failure, is not in a position to play the expected role.” (Monem & Baniamin, 2010, p. 301). In other words, accountability both between teachers and the university management, and students and teachers are ineffective. In the absence of an effective performance management system to evaluate the teachers by students, there is a huge imbalance of power between them, which sometimes lead to unwanted events. Sexual harassment of female students is one of them (Mulcahy, 2015).

4. In-depth analysis of an issue

Rigid centralization: A channel fostering ineffectiveness

Bangladesh has attempted to bring change in the administrative system to meet the drastically growing demands of its citizens posed by rapid socio-economic and technological transformation. A number of reform initiatives have been taken including four attempts to decentralize the administration, but no effective change has been visible. Lack of political commitment, clientelist nature of administration, political polarization, bureaucratic resistance, and a volatile political culture are the main obstacles for the implementation to these reforms. Because of this rigid centralization, both internal and external accountability, transparency, inclusiveness and most notably, a citizen-centric approach is absent in public agencies (Mollah, 2014; Sarker, 2004). Therefore, service delivery processes remain ineffective having an insignificant impact on the achievement of outcomes. The education sector is a glaring example of that. In spite of experiencing huge progress in the primary education enrolment rate, learning achievement remains very poor, which is directly linked to the economy. But, some researchers argue that centrally controlled education systems are unable to promote change (Pritchett, 2013). Thus, schools have to be given enough autonomy to own the system and decide the solutions for a particular problem through ensuring mutual accountability of the relevant actors, i.e., students, teachers, parents and local administration, which is more important than just pouring more budget allocation and other logistic supports. Similarly, the 2004 World Development Report also confirms that “the relationship between public spending on health and education and the outcomes is weak or nonexistent” (World Bank, 2003, p. 11). Hence, “by giving a voice and decision-making power to local stakeholders who know more about the local education systems than do central policy makers, decentralization can improve educational outcomes and increase client satisfaction” (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2009, p. 2). However, the functional activities of the education system, ranging from planning and allocation of national budget, teacher recruitment, training and transfer, determining curricula, arranging tests, and taking policy measures are centralized in Bangladesh. The lowest tier of administration, Union Parishad, does not have any functional role related to providing education services (CAMPE, 2005). A study by the International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) shows that compared to Nepal and Sri Lanka, the budgetary process in the education sector of Bangladesh is extremely centralized where lower administrative tiers play a negligible role. Even the budget proposal is presented without providing sector specific details. Besides, “budget nomenclature seems to reflect more a concern for control of the government’s administrative

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structure and the nature of expenditure, than a concern for the programmes’ contents and outputs” (IIEP, 2009, p. 43). This budgeting system is, thus, unable to address the challenges of grassroots activists, decreasing the potential for radical change. However, some initiatives have been taken to decentralize the functional operation. Upazila Primary Education Plan (UPEP) and School Learning Improvement Plans (SLIPs) are among those that have been taken under the PEDP-III programme. But, none of these programmes have had any significant impact in decentralizing the functions more specifically or ensuring mutual accountability of the service providers and recipients, other than just refurnishing traditional duties (GoB, 2014). UNICEF finds that SLIPs initiative, which was taken to empower school management committees with an aim to increase learning outcomes, has not led to any fruitful outcomes since their roles are not directly related to the aspects of learning (ibid, 2014). This implies that the government does not have sufficient focus on involving people from the grassroots level in the policy formulation process. Instead, they continue introducing centralized operations of various activities, such as the commencement of the grade-5 public test. The government argues that the exams “certify that a child has successfully completed the primary education cycle” (GoB, 2014). The administrative certification of students is more important to the government than the creation of a learning environment. Corruption: Thanks to these highly centralized and rigid bureaucratic processes and in the absence of the single and simple transparent checks and balances, corruption has become an everyday event. Transparency International Bangladesh (TIB) finds teachers’ recruitment as one of the main sources of corruption in the education sector of Bangladesh. Among the types of corruption, nepotism and political affiliation are common and influence the recruitment and training processes of teachers (Mulcahy, 2015). Furthermore, UEO makes schools buy necessary materials from favoured vendors, which leads to poor quality construction. In addition to the political influence from the local area, the poor bidding process, short bidding periods, secrecy of the selection process create opportunities to bribe the UEO for getting construction contracts as well as other forms of corruption (ibid, 2015). Teachers are even forced to pay bribes for very simple administrative tasks such as certificate attestation, leave adjustment, and pension. Similarly, their transfer and training processes are not exempt from bribes. Additionally, non-registered schools often need to pay a large bribe to get government registration (Islam, 2008). The dysfunctional administrative culture resulting from the failure to clearly define the responsibilities of employees alongside a widespread acceptance of corruption as a norm in institutions lead to the longevity of these irregularities, negatively affecting outcomes (Collier, 2015; Kim et al., 2013).

5. Policy recommendations

The following policy recommendations are proposed to make the accountability system more effective and thereby bring more satisfactory outcomes in the education sector of Bangladesh:

Active participation of all political parties in the parliament should be the prime focus so that public policies can be dealt with through open debates and discussions.

Participation of the relevant stakeholders in the budget preparation process and other policy decisions should be ensured to get maximum results.

Actual decentralization and simultaneously the delegation of enough power to the local agencies, including schools, are necessary to create an enabling environment.

An effective performance management system should be introduced, otherwise, the organizational culture will remain trapped by corruption even if the system is decentralized and greater autonomy is provided.

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6. References

Ahmed, M. (2013). The Post-2015 MDG and EFA Agenda and the National Discourse about Goals and Targets—A Case Study of Bangladesh. NORRAG Working Paper Vol. 5. http://www.norrag.org/fileadmin/Working_Papers/Working_Paper__5_Ahmed.pdf Al Mamun, M. A. (2014). Assessing the effectiveness of school management committees (SMCs) in improving governance of primary schools in Bangladesh: a case study of selective SMCs at Gouripur Upazila in Mymensingh district. (Master’s dissertation) Institute of Governance Studies, BRAC University, Dhaka. http://dspace.bracu.ac.bd/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10361/3534/13372023.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y BANBEIS. (2016a). Educational Structure of Bangladesh. Bangladesh Bureau of Educational Information and Statistics, Ministry of Education. Dhaka. http://www.banbeis.gov.bd/es_bd.htm BANBEIS. (2016b). Bangladesh Education Statistics- 2015. Bangladesh Bureau of Educational Information and Statistics, Ministry of Education. Dhaka. http://banbeis.gov.bd/data/images/chap01.pdf Bangladesh Pratidin. (2013). Teachers’ main eligibility is to be affiliated with a political party (translated from Bengali). Bangladesh Pratidin. Dhaka. http://www.bd-pratidin.com/first-page/2013/06/22/2111 Banik Barta. (2016). Higher Education in Bangladesh is yet to Go Too Far to Reach its Aim (translated from Bengali). Banik Barta. Dhaka. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:OWz1NZsqxPgJ:www.bonikbarta.com/printpage/preview/75231.html+&cd=2&hl=fr&ct=clnk&gl=fr Barrera-Osorio et al. (2009). Decentralized Decision-Making in Schools: The Theory and Evidence on School-Based Management. The World Bank. Washington DC. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EDUCATION/Resources/278200-1099079877269/547664-1099079934475/547667-1145313948551/Decentralized_decision_making_schools.pdf Bdnews24. (2014). Parliament session on Jan 29. Bdnews24. Dhaka. http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2014/01/13/parliament-session-on-jan-29 BTI. (2016). Bangladesh Country Report- 2016. Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index. Gütersloh, Germany. https://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2016/pdf/BTI_2016_Bangladesh.pdf CAMPE. (2005). Quality with Equity: The Primary Education Agenda. Campaign for Popular Education (CAMPE). Dhaka. CAMPE. (2014). An Assessment of Primary Education Completion Examination in Bangladesh. Campaign for Popular Education (CAMPE). Dhaka. CAMPE. (2015). Moving from MDG to SDG: Accelerate Progress for Quality Primary Education. Campaign for Popular Education (CAMPE). Dhaka. CEF. (2009). Making the Budget Work for Education: Experiences, achievements and lessons from civil society budget work. The Commonwealth Education Fund. Washington DC. http://www.internationalbudget.org/wp-

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content/uploads/2011/01/Making_the_Budget_Work_for_Education.pdf & http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/resources/online-library/education-budget-monitoring Chaudhury, N., Hammer, J., Kremer, M., Mularidharan, K., & Rogers, H. (2004). Roll call: Teacher absence in Bangladesh. Unpublished, World Bank. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOUTHASIA/Resources/Roll_Call_Teacher_Absence_Bangladesh.pdf Collier, P. (2016). The cultural foundations of economic failure: A conceptual toolkit. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 126, 5-24. https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/sites/www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/files/documents/The%20Cultural%20Foundations%20of%20Economic%20Failure-%20a%20Conceptual%20Toolkit%20-%20October%202015.pdf GoB. (2010). National Education Policy 2010. Ministry of Education, Government of Bangladesh. http://www.moedu.gov.bd/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=338 GoB. (2014). Bangladesh Primary Education Annual Sector Performance Report – 2014. Monitoring and Evaluation Division, Directorate of Primary Education, Government of Bangladesh. Dhaka, Bangladesh. http://dpe.portal.gov.bd/sites/default/files/files/dpe.portal.gov.bd/publications/e59c1e65_d871_446e_a5f5_3ab69fee590b/Final%20ASPR%202014.pdf Hanushek, E. A., & Raymond, M. E. (2002). Lessons about the Design of State Accountability Systems. Paper prepared for ‘Taking Account of Accountability: Assessing Policy and Politics’, Harvard University, June 9-11, 2002. http://hanushek.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Hanushek%2BRaymond%202003%20NCLB.pdf Hossain, N., Subrahmanian, R., & Kabeer, N. (2002). The politics of educational expansion in Bangladesh. IDS Working Paper- 167, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, Sussex, England. http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/3929/Wp167.pdf IBE. (2011). World Data on Education. Revised Version. International Bureau of Education, UNESCO. http://www.ibe.unesco.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/WDE/2010/pdf-versions/Bangladesh.pdf IGS. (2012). The State of Governance in Bangladesh 2010-11: Policy, Influence, Ownership. Institute of Governance Studies, BRAC University. Dhaka, Bangladesh. http://123.49.46.157/bitstream/handle/10361/2612/SOG%202010-11.pdf?sequence=2 IIEP. (2009). Education budgeting in Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. International Institute for Educational Planning, UNESCO. http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001871/187180E.pdf Islam, S. (2008). Administration and Management of Primary Education: Problems and the Way Out (Translated from Bengali). Transparency International-Bangladesh. Dhaka. Summary of the report is here: TIB. (2008). Administration and Management of Primary Education: Problems and the Way Out (Summary). Transparency International-Bangladesh. Dhaka. https://www.ti-bangladesh.org/beta3/images/max_file/rp_es_PrimEducation_En.pdf Islam, M. S., & Mahmud, R. (2015). Trust in Governance in Bangladesh: Ideas, Issues and Solutions. Millennial Asia, 6(2), 128-146.

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Kabir, A. H., & Akter, F. (2014). Parental Involvement in the Secondary Schools in Bangladesh: Challenges and a Way Forward. International Journal of Whole Schooling, 10(2), 1-18. http://www.wholeschooling.net/Journal_of_Whole_Schooling/articles/10-2%20Kabir.pdf Kim, P. S., Monem, M., & Baniamin, H. M. (2014). Enhancing Public Service Ethics in Bangladesh: Dilemmas and Deterrents. Project supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government. http://isas.co.kr/upload/data/04_%EA%B9%80%ED%8C%90%EC%84%9D%20%EA%B3%B5%EC%A0%80.pdf?ckattempt=1 Levin, H. M. (1974). A conceptual framework for accountability in education. The School Review, 82(3), 363-391. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1084068?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents Linn, R. L. (2008). Methodological issues in achieving school accountability 1. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 40(6), 699-711. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00220270802105729#.V449xPl9670 MHHDC. (2012). Human Development in South Asia Governance for People's Empowerment. Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre. Lahore, Pakistan. http://mhhdc.org/wp-content/themes/mhdc/reports/HDSA-2012.pdf Mollah, M. A. H. (2014). Administrative Reforms and Governance in Bangladesh: How Far the Dream of Success?, Global Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences. Vol. 2; Issue 4. Ea Journals: UK. Impact Factor: 8.80. Global Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences, 2(4). http://www.eajournals.org/wp-content/uploads/Administrative-Reforms-and-Governance-in-Bangladesh-How-far-the-Dream-of-Success.pdf Monem, M., & Baniamin, H. M. (2010). Higher education in Bangladesh: Status, issues and prospects. Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences (PJSS), 30(2), 293-305. http://www.bzu.edu.pk/PJSS/Vol30No22010/Final_PJSS-30-2-09.pdf Moyer, A. L. (2014). Transferring training to practice: Improving primary school teaching in Bangladesh (Doctoral dissertation, Lehigh University). http://preserve.lehigh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2565&context=etd Mukherjee, R. (Ed.). (2001). Bangladesh: The experience and perceptions of public officials. World Bank Publications. (Vol. 23). Washington DC. https://books.google.fr/books?id=p5CRT2kinaQC&pg=PA16&lpg=PA16&dq=poor+performance+is+seldom+formally+punished&source=bl&ots=E3vD-uyZGa&sig=X1vjfsfAb2F-YzULqmUUHIfS5Zo&hl=fr&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjT3rK_hajOAhXEqxoKHcZ3ASQQ6AEIHDAA#v=onepage&q=poor%20performance%20is%20seldom%20formally%20punished&f=false Mulcahy, S. (2015). Corruption in the Education Sector in Bangladesh. Transparency International-Bangladesh. Dhaka. Mullick, J. I., & Sheesh, S. (2008). Teachers quality and teacher education at primary education sub-sector in Bangladesh. BRAC University Journal, vol. V, no. 1, 2008, pp. 77-84 New Age. (2014). Question paper leak has become a phenomenon. How to solve this menace? New Age. Dhaka, Bangladesh. http://newagebd.net/73219/question-paper-leak-has-become-a-phenomenon-how-to-solve-this-menace/

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