The State and Evil

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The State and Evil Author(s): H. J. McCloskey , UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNESource: Ethics, Vol. 69, No. 3 (Apr., 1959), pp. 182-195

THE STATE AND EVILH. J. McCLOSKEY

IN THIS paper I wish to defend the type of views favored by Aquinas and traditional, orthodoxThomists and summed up by them in the slogan " rror has no rights," and the formula "Thefun!tion of the state !onsists in the promotion of the well being of the !iti#ens$" That is to say, Iwish to argue that the individual has, in the abstra!t, no moral right to propagate erroneous viewsor to a!t evilly and that it is part of the right and duty of the state to !ombat error and evil and to

promote good and truth where it may su!!essfully do so$ I hope to show that if the politi!al andmoral questions are !onsidered in the abstra!t, without referen!e to the pra!ti!al diffi!ulties whi!hmight, or might not, be en!ountered in implementing these !on!lusions, and independently of areligious !reed, my !ontentions appear not as perni!ious and dangerous do!trines but as!ontentions whi!h are virtually the statements of platitudes to whi!h most people give eitherimpli!it or expli!it assent$ They are virtually statements of platitudes be!ause, or in the sense that,they amount to statements of many presuppositions of the modern demo!rati! state$ The statementof these presuppositions is important be!ause it brings out the fa!t that a great deal of the a!tivityof the state viewed by many modern demo!rats with !onsiderable distrust may admit of

%ustifi!ation and even be demanded by the very prin!iples whi!h provide the %ustifi!ation of mostof the more generally !ondoned state a!tivity$This general thesis will be developed in three stages$&$ The !on!ept of a right will be examined, and the manner in whi!h rights are grounded will be!onsidered$ It will be argued that these inquiries show that people have no moral rights to evil$'$ It will be argued that the !on!ept of good !arries with it the impli!ation that the good should be

brought into being and the evil eliminated where this is possible$($ It will then be !ontended that the very a!!eptan!e of politi!al so!iety involves a!!eptan!e of theview that organi#ed for!e may properly be used to promote goods and eliminate evils and thatthose who have traditionally opposed the general views to be developed here liberals su!h as)o!*e, +ill, Hobhouse, et!$ impli!itly a!!ept these general views, but in a very muddled way andin !on%un!tion with a set of ethi!al %udgments whi!h are transparently untenable, on!e they are

brought into the light of day$Thus my !ase for arguing that "error has no rights," i$e$, that the individual has no abstra!t right toevil and error, will rest on an examination of the notion of a moral right and on the manner inwhi!h !laims to su!h rights are, and ought to be, %ustified while my !ase for arguing that the state

has the right and duty of promoting good will rests on an examination of the notion of good, the presuppositions of politi!al life, and the untenability of the !ases urged by the main opponents tomy view, namely, the liberals$I shall therefore be primarily !on!erned with the general ethi!al and politi!al questions as to therights and duties of the individual and of the state in the abstra!t$ I shall not !on!ern myself to thesame extent with the pra!ti!al question as to whether, in fa!t, the state should ever exer!ise itsright and if so, when although it will, I thin*, be !learly apparent that if the state has the abstra!tright I !laim it to have, it will very often be entitled and even obliged to exer!ise it and that it !anexer!ise it in various ways, not merely by suppressing error and evil but by aiding truth and good$However, how the abstra!t right of the state will wor* out in pra!ti!e is a problem distin!t fromthat with whi!h I wish to !on!ern myself in this paper$ -n this pra!ti!al question I shall !onfine

myself to a few brief general observations$


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I$ TH .-N. /T -0 A +-1A) 1I2HT3 21-4N5S -0 .)AI+S T- 1I2HTS

6hat is a moral right7 And how is a !laim to a general moral right to be defended7 A moral rightis a moral authority or liberty possessed by a rational being, to a!t in !ertain ways without

interferen!e from others without due !ause$ It is a moral authority whi!h, it is almost !ontradi!toryto say, !ould be a moral evil$ The bald statement that men have a moral right to promote moralevil is not perhaps a straight !ontradi!tion, but near to it$ There is an obvious antagonism betweenthe notion of a right and evil$ How this !omes about is seen by !onsidering how !laims to rightsmay be and have been %ustified$a8 0rom natural law$ Thomists, probably the foremost of the philosophi!al exponents of moralrights, derive them from the natural law$ The prin!iple of the natural law or its primary pre!ept is3"See* good and avoid evil$" It is not our purpose here to follow the sophisti!ated argument bymeans of whi!h Thomists !ome to interpret this primary pre!ept as !ommanding "the natural$"6hat is relevant to our purpose is that rights are derived from the natural law, whi!h, in the firstinstan!e, !ommands good and forbids evil$ 5uties are primary and rights se!ondary, the rights

being rights to fulfil the duties imposed by the natural law$ The various duties are !ontained in thegeneral duty "See* good and avoid evil" hen!e the right is a right to see* good and avoid evil, nota right to avoid good and see* evil$ 0urther, the word "see*" here is misleading$ "/romote" goodor bring good into being would be a more a!!urate formulation of what the Thomists ta*e to be the

primary pre!ept of the natural law$.learly, in arguing for a general right to promote good and avoid evil, from the general duty to

promote good and avoid evil, the Thomist is arguing in an unex!eptionable way$ His theory is notexposed to diffi!ulties until he !omes to give !ontent to the !on!ept "good$" The strength of his!ase rests in his relating rights and good via duties and this brings out the fa!t that those whoargue that, in the abstra!t, evil has rights and people have an abstra!t right to promote evil deriveno support from the Thomist defense of rights$ The theory of the natural law represents the!ontrary !ontention$

b8 If we loo* at what I thin* !an, not unfairly, be !alled a statement of the liberal view of rights orof the !on!ept of right, namely, the a!!ount given by /lamenat# in his wor*, .onsent, 0reedom,and /oliti!al -bligation, we find again that rights are explained and %ustified by referen!e togoods$ /lamenat# defines a right as "a power whi!h a !reature ought to possess either be!ause itsexer!ise by him is itself good or else be!ause it is a means to what is good, and in the exer!ise ofwhi!h all rational beings ought to prote!t him$" &

-b%e!tions !ould be urged against this definition on various a!!ounts$ ' However, in the aspe!t ofthe definition whi!h !on!erns us here, in his relating of a right and a good, /lamenat# is !learlysummari#ing the liberal tradition on rights, and, with one qualifi!ation, he would seem to be

!orre!t in this aspe!t of his definition$ The one qualifi!ation whi!h it is ne!essary to add is that aright is a moral authority not merely to see* the good but also to perform that whi!h is intrinsi!allyobligatory$ The good and the intrinsi!ally obligatory are, as 1oss brings out, not ne!essarily thesame things and we have rights both to see* the good and to perform the intrinsi!ally obligatory$ (

This qualifi!ation is essential, but it in no way detra!ts from the general !ontention that rights are

1 J. P. Plamenatz, Consent, Freedom, and Political Obligation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1938).2 A right is a moral authority which creates the right to the power which the creature ought to possess, ratherthan the power which the creature ought to possess, as Plamenatz' definition implies. And it is not clearwhether a right is something in the exercise of which all rational beings ought to protect the possessor. Itmight perhaps be contended that a right is something that rational beings should not infringe rather than

something they should actively aid others to possess.3 See W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), and Foundations of Ethics (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1939).


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moral rights, meant to promote goods or to fulfil duties, as opposed to their being rightsindis!riminately to goods and evils$This brief !onsideration of two of the histori!ally important a!!ounts of the nature and grounds ofrights is, I thin*, suffi!ient to bring out the strength of the !ase for !laiming that the formula " rrorand evil have no rights" is, in general, an a!!urate statement of the !ase, that there are no abstra!trights to evil as there are to goods su!h as virtue, *nowledge, and goods su!h as happiness$ The

!ase for this !ontention appears stronger if !onsideration is given to alternative ways of groundingrights$ The great diffi!ulties en!ountered in attempting to provide %ustifi!ations for rights in someway other than in terms of goods and means to good are evident from the fa!t that all thehistori!ally important a!!ounts of rights exe!ept perhaps the so!ial !onvention theoriesrelaterights to goods$ The theories referred to here in!lude the Thomist, the )o!*ean and subsequentliberal views, the utilitarian, and Hegelian 9radleyian theories$ The so!ial !onvention type oftheory e$g$, 2reen:s theory that rights are !reated by the re!ognition of so!iety !ould perhapsavoid relating rights and goods, but 2reen himself in!ludes a referen!e to the !ommon good in hisdefinition3 "A right is a power !laimed and re!ogni#ed as !ontributing to a !ommon good," and "A

power of whi!h the exer!ise by the individual or by some body of men is re!ogni#ed by So!iety,either as itself dire!tly essential to a !ommon good or as !onferred by an authority of whi!h themaintenan!e is re!ogni#ed as essential$" ; In any !ase, so!ial rights theories do usually relate rightsto so!ially !reated goods$ 0urther, on other grounds, they are ineffe!tive as a basis for re%e!ting theslogan " rror has no rights," for on su!h a view, if a parti!ular so!iety denied rights to error andevil, then error and evil would have no rights in su!h a so!iety$ This means that, on the so!ial!onvention theory of rights, evil had no rights in the +iddle Ages and that it has very limitedrights in Spain today, rather more in the 4nited States and 2reat 9ritain, but fewer rights thangood in all so!ieties$However, the so!ial !onvention theory need not !on!ern us, as it is fundamentally unsound as a

basis for an analysis of a right$ The expression "an unre!ogni#ed right" is a perfe!tly properexpression, of whi!h any serious a!!ount must give a meaningful analysis$ In fa!t, in terms of theso!ial !onvention theory, the expression "unre!ogni#ed right" is, ex!ept in some limited !ontexts,meaningless$It would seem, therefore, that rights have been and must be grounded on what is good andobligatory and hen!e that rights are not rights to evil and to being immoral, but only to what isgood and to what is obligatory where "obligatory" means "intrinsi!ally obligatory$" Hen!e theslogan " rror has no rights" does seem to express, in a stri*ing way, a real truth$It is to be noted here that a right is, in the abstra!t at least, a right to what is good or intrinsi!allyobligatory and not to what is merely thought to be so$ The !ontention that rights are grounded inthe beliefs of individuals would lead to all sorts of absurdities one:s rights would !hange withone:s beliefs, and different people would have different rights a!!ording to their varying beliefs$The man who believes that life is evil or that people should be put out of their misery and who a!ts

a!!ordingly has no more of a !laim to an abstra!t right to *ill than has the person who rightly believes that the ta*ing of a life of an inno!ent person against his wishes is wrong$ So, too, thefree lover, who believes that sexual inter!ourse should not be !ontained within any bounds andthat those who resist are a!ting improperly, depriving others of goods whi!h are rightly their own,and who a!!ordingly sedu!es and rapes whenever he !an without ris* of harm to himself !annot,

by virtue of his beliefs, !laim to have the right to rape and sedu!e at will$ So, too, many thievesfeel that they are not a!ting wrongly in stealing but that again hardly shows that they en%oy anabstra!t right whi!h the morally enlightened person does not possess$1ights, therefore, are rights to what is in reality good and in reality obligatory$ 6here it !annot be*nown with reasonable assuran!e what is really obligatory and really good, the abstra!t right maygive rise to a derivative right to a!t in a!!ordan!e with one:s beliefs$ < Sometimes it will, but

4 See T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London: Longmans Green & Co., 1895), Secs. A and H.5 Criteria of what constitutes "reasonable assurance" are indicated later in the paper (p. 193).


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sometimes it will not$ How we determine this in any parti!ular situation is a distin!t questionwhi!h !annot be dis!ussed here$ However, enough has been said to bring out what good itself isand also the real obligations whi!h are the bases of rights$So mu!h, then, !on!erning the la!* of abstra!t rights to evil and error in individuals$ Theremainder of my !ase involves showing that the state has the right and perhaps the duty of

promoting good and eliminating evil$

II$ TH 2--5 AS THAT 6HI.H -42HT T- 9 /1-+-T 5

The first point with whi!h I wish to support this !ontention is a very simple one, yet it is a vital,telling point$ It is simply that the very !on!ept of "good" !arries with it the impli!ation that itought to be brought into being, and "evil," that it ought to be eliminated$ This would seem to be a!lear tautology but if it is not, it is alternatively an obvious syntheti! a priori proposition$ This

point forms the basis of the "attitude," emotive meaning a!!ounts of "good," and gives them what plausibility they possess$ = That the good is that whi!h ought to be brought into being implies %ust that3 that it ought to be

brought into being by whatever agen!y !an best do it, be it 2od, the state, or the individual$Thus the very notions of good and evil !arry with them the impli!ation that if the state !ansu!!essfully promote good or eliminate evil, then it ought to do so$ It now remains to be shownthat the very a!!eptan!e of politi!al so!iety involves a!!eptan!e of the view that organi#ed for!emay properly be used to promote goods and eliminate evils and that those liberals who havetraditionally opposed the general views I am supporting impli!itly a!!ept these views in amuddled way and in !on%un!tion with a set of moral %udgments whi!h are only too obviouslyuntenable, on!e they are made expli!it$

III$ /-)ITI.A) )I0 AN5 TH )I9 1A) 5 0 NS -0 TH STAT

+ost politi!al philosophers have argued that the state was instituted by men to ma*e possible theattaining or se!uring of !ertain goods$ If su!h is its fun!tion, then it seems reasonable to go on andargue that the state should a!t in a positive way to bring these goods into being if and when it !ando so by positive a!tion$)o!*e, 1ousseau, and other demo!rats thin* of the state as !oming into being to ma*e !ertaingoods possible or to ma*e se!ure other goods not se!ure in the state of nature$ And demo!ratshave not unreasonably !on!luded from this that the state ought therefore to a!t in su!h a way as to

promote su!h goods as freedom, se!urity, and %usti!e$ )o!*e spo*e of the end of government as being the preservation of property, i$e$, the preservation of the rights to life, health, liberty, and

private possessions$ 1ousseau thought the fun!tion of the state to be the ma*ing possible of thesingle good freedom this being viewed as a means to other goods$ And demo!rats su!h as +illand )indsay have e!hoed 1ousseau:s !ontention, although they have interpreted its impli!ations indifferent ways$ > Thus it is a !ommon feature of demo!rati! thin*ers to explain the origin and

%ustifi!ation of the state in terms of the se!uring or promoting of !ertain goods and the eliminationof !ertain evils$Again, if we loo* at the !ommon sense view about the role of the state, we find mu!h the samesort of thing to hold$ No ordinary person seriously ob%e!ts to the state:s promoting material goodswhi!h !annot be so effe!tively promoted by other agen!ies$ No one, that is, thin*s of the role ofthe state as being !onfined to merely preserving law and order$ 6e thin* that the state ought to

provide essential servi!es, water supply and sewerage, roads and basi! transport fa!ilities,

6 E.g., the theory expounded by C. L. Stevenson in Ethics and Language (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1944).7 See A. D. Lindsay, Modern Democratic State (London: Oxford University Press, 1943), esp. chap. xi.


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domesti! and perhaps !ommer!ial power, as well as maintain !ertain minimum health servi!esmeasures against epidemi!s, the maintenan!e of !ertain standards in publi! food supplies, et!$ 6efeel that if the state !an really produ!e signifi!ant goods, su!h as se!urity, health, and %usti!e, oreliminate serious evils, su!h as diseases, poliomyelitis, or tuber!ulosis, and perhaps also grievousin%usti!es, it ought to a!t positively to promote the good or to eliminate the evil$ There would, of!ourse, be some disagreement as to how far, in its promotion of su!h goods or in the prevention of

su!h evils, it should rely on the use of for!e and !oer!ion and how far it should rely on edu!ation, persuasion, and indu!ement$ Some would thin* that the elimination of poliomyelitis, if it !ould besu!!essfully eradi!ated from the !ommunity by state a!tivity, would %ustify !oer!ion by the state,

%ust as fully as it is %ustified by the elimination of illitera!y and by means of the same sort of!oer!ion as is now employed against it$ -thers would suggest that the state should rely on

persuasion and edu!ation alone$ 6ith in%usti!es, there would be more disagreement, but, aboutextreme in%usti!es and about gross moral evils, there would be a !onsiderable agreement amongordinary men on the belief that the state should a!t to !orre!t the evil and to prevent its re!urren!e,if it !ould do so su!!essfully and without thereby !reating other evils and if no other agen!y !ouldeffe!tively a!t in the matter$Thus in ea!h type of !ase there is agreement on the state:s being entitled to, and even obliged to,!on!ern itself with the promotion of goods other than merely law and order, and even other thanfreedom and any disagreement would be found on analysis to !enter around whether state!oer!ion dire!ted at promoting these various goods was !ompatible with preserving to the fullsome other good, su!h as freedom or order or material well being$ The !ommonsense view,therefore, does seem to be to the effe!t that the state should a!t to bring goods into being and toeliminate evil$ This is thought to be espe!ially true where the goods and evils are of physi!al*inds$ 6hy, then, should it not be allowed that the state should a!t to promote other goods, su!h astruth, morality, and right order, where it !an do so su!!essfully7 .learly, right belief and rightliving are goods and higher goods$ Surely, if the state is %ustified in exer!ising for!e and usingrepressive measures for the sa*e of the se!urity of life, possessions, health, and edu!ation, then itis even more %ustified in using for!e for the sa*e of greater goods, su!h as true *nowledge andmoral living, and goods su!h as %usti!e, in!luding so!ial %usti!e, and happiness$Here there seems to be a gross in!onsisten!y in the thin*ing of the ordinary person and of theliberal politi!al philosophers$ The ordinary person not only does not !ondemn the state for

preventing su!h evils as !ruelty to animals, varieties of sadism, murder, assault, stealing, and rape, but rather he !ondemns those states whi!h are remiss in these matters$ ?et if it is permissible for,and even in!umbent on, the state to regulate these *inds of behavior for the sa*e of preventing evilor safeguarding good, why should it be denied that the state should promote all the good and

prevent all the evil that it !an su!!essfully promote or prevent, in!luding moral goods and evils7Against my !ontention, it might perhaps be argued that, without su!h laws as have %ust beenindi!ated, we !ould not have an orderly so!iety$ 9ut this %ust is not the !ase$ 6e !learly !ould have

a so!iety and one that was orderly on quite different presuppositions from those of the liberal:s so!alled "law and order" state$ No doubt, it is true that we !ould not, without su!h laws, have the sortof order ordinary people seem to wish to have or that the traditional liberal wishes to have$ -ur so!alled minimum, indispensable, essential laws, the laws alleged solely for the sa*e of law andorder, are really laws for the sa*e of a parti!ular *ind of order, an order whi!h the ordinary manwants and whi!h he wants be!ause he thin*s it to be good or a means to good$ The "bourgeois"!hara!ter of our property laws ma*es it only too evident that the order we have is merely oneamong many possible orders$ And the same !ould be said of our laws relating to murder and tomarriage$ Hen!e the orderly so!iety whi!h the ordinary person and the liberal philosopher thin* ofas desirable needs to be %ustified so, too, does the state:s use of repressive for!e, its !onsiderableintoleran!e to thieves, murderers, rapists, and other so !alled malefa!tors$ 6hen we !onsider the

%ustifi!ation of the imposition of this order, we find that it is given in terms of the general !laimthat the order of the liberal:s "law and order" state is good or a means to good and that the good,


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forbidding !ruelty to animals would, on this view of freedom, represent an intolerable interferen!ewith the right to freedom of the individual, as would laws forbidding assaults, thefts, and perhapsalso rapes$ /eople who suffer assaults, thefts, and even rapes are still !apable of self dire!tion asfully as if not assaulted, robbed, or raped unless we limit the definition of self dire!tion to selfdire!tion of a spe!ial *ind$+any obviously desirable laws would therefore be !ondemned as representing unwarranted

interferen!es with the rights of the individual, if this view were !onsistently wor*ed out$ And thisis one !lear ground for ob%e!ting to it$ 9ut it may be seen to be unsound on a quite distin!t ground$It might very properly be as*ed "6hy should the state promote freedom in this sense of freedom7"The answer must be in terms of its value$ 9ut if this is the answer, it is !on!eding the point I ammost !on!erned to ma*e, and it is at the same time deriving from it untenable !on!lusions or,alternatively, asso!iating it with a very queer normative theory$ This is be!ause the liberal:s!on!lusions involve asserting that self determination is either the supreme good or the sole goodi$e$, it involves either admitting that other things besides self determination may be valuable butdenying that these other things !an ever outweigh self determination, or asserting that selfdetermination is the sole ultimate good$ .learly, it is neither the supreme good whi!h must alwaysoutweigh all other goods, nor is it the sole good$ There are other goods besides self determination

pleasure, physi!al well being, and spiritual goods su!h as %usti!e and so!ial %usti!e, right living,and *nowledge and freedom does not outweigh these other goods in a *no!*down way$ 1ather, ina !onfli!t, it would seem that happiness, for instan!e, might well be the greater good$ .ertainly,the development of the state and, in parti!ular, of representative demo!ra!ies and now ofmammoth states for the sa*e of effi!ien!y suggests that, in the %udgment of ordinary men, %usti!eand so!ial %usti!e, happiness, *nowledge, !ulture, and the material well being whi!h !ome with theredu!ed freedom of the large modern state ex!eed in value the freedom sa!rifi!ed in a!hievingthem$ In any !ase it is !lear that few of us would ex!hange, for a barren freedom at baresubsisten!e level and without various other goods, these various goods, even where they were not!on%oined with freedom$9ut even if I were wrong in these !ontentions and this I should not readily admit it remains truethat the liberal who argues that the fun!tion of the state !onsists in promoting freedom a!!epts mygeneral !ontention that the state should promote good and suppress evil, for he is, in fa!t, urgingthat freedom is good and intoleran!e evil and that the state should a!t against those who, li*e+arxian .ommunists, fas!ists, and !riminals, are thought to endanger the freedom of the people$Thus the disagreement is not a politi!al disagreement but an ethi!al one and the point that is beingmade here is that, if the ethi!al issues are made !lear, the liberal would be a!utely embarrassed indefending his impli!it value %udgments and that anyone without an ax to grind would find itimpossible to a!!ept these value %udgments$It is worth noting in passing that many .hristian liberals appear to be espe!ially muddled, for, as.hristians, they regard eternal salvation and moral living as being of tremendous importan!e and

as being goods as valuable as freedom$ ?et many of them deny the state even the abstra!t right toaid truth, morality, and religion and to impede error and evil, while at the same time they insist onits duty to promote the good of freedom$ Their impli!it value %udgment is so obviously untenablethat one !annot but suspe!t that it has not been made expli!it and !onsidered in its own right$ B )et us now !onsider freedom interpreted as s!ope to en%oy one:s rights$ It is not to give a !learexplanation of freedom to explain it as s!ope to en%oy rights$ This formula !ould !over any of ado#en or more different views "s!ope" !ould be explained as en%oyment, as opportunity, asequality of opportunity, et!$ However, I do not wish to dis!uss the vagueness of su!h an a!!ount$Instead, let us naively assume that it is saying something signifi!ant to explain freedom as!onsisting in the s!ope to en%oy our rights, and let us !onfine ourselves to as*ing what our rights

9 Where the value judgment has been made explicit, as perhaps it was by Roger Williams in The Bloody Tenent, it is seen tobe only too blatantly untenable. Williams wrote that "a soul or spiritual rape is more abominable in God's eye, than to forceand ravish the bodies of all the women in the world." Could such a judgment be literally maintained ?


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a8 ven if it were the !ase that the right to promote good in!luding moral good and right beliefand to eliminate evil in!luding moral evil and erroneous beliefs were a right that the state wasnever, in fa!t, morally entitled to exer!ise in a dire!t way be!ause, for instan!e, it was alwaysoverridden or be!ause of pra!ti!al diffi!ulties this would still not render my !ontention about theright of the state in the abstra!t unimportant$ It would not be unimportant be!ause it !ould havese!ondary impli!ations$ The state might never be entitled to suppress error, but it may have the

duty to aid the truth in less dire!t ways$However, it is quite !lear that there are at least some o!!asions on whi!h the state is entitled to usefor!e to promote good otherwise the state would never be %ustified in a!ting$

b8 It is often argued that, although right behavior, i$e$, moral behavior, is a good, it is a good whi!hthe state !an never su!!essfully promote be!ause !ompulsion is in!ompatible with moral value inan a!tion$ 2reen argues in this way$ This is !learly not the !ase, and it is not the !ase for twodistin!t reasons$ The state whi!h bans murder, theft, assault, and rape does not prevent theordinary de!ent !iti#en who has a slight in!lination to murder his wealthy aunt, to evade his taxes,or to assault his business rival from refraining from these a!tivities for morally valid motives$ -nthe other hand, the law does presumably restrain a few who, while in refraining do not ne!essarilya!t for morally praiseworthy motives, equally do not ne!essarily a!t for morally reprehensiblemotives$ And these few, with the guidan!e and aid of the !ompulsion of the state, may !ome intime to abstain from su!h a!ts for morally worthy motives, seeing as evil the a!ts whi!h are so,and refraining from them a!!ordingly$It is similarly !laimed that the state may never properly "for!e the !ons!ien!e," sometimes be!auseit is said it !annot su!!essfully do so and sometimes be!ause the !ons!ien!e is said to have anabstra!t, unalienable right to freedom$It is not !lear as to exa!tly what !onstitutes "for!ing the !ons!ien!e," but it is !lear that the statemay, by edu!ation, indu!ement, !oer!ion, and exhortation as well as by "brainwashing," bringabout desirable !hanges of views$ And it is not obvious that, if it !ould prevent great evils only by"for!ing the !ons!ien!e" in one or other of these ways, it would not be morally entitled to do [email protected], for instan!e, the otherwise in!orrigible sadist who has no sense of guilt$8 However, thedangers inherent in the state:s use of su!h !onsiderable power would have to be ta*en into a!!ountin any pra!ti!al situation$!8 Again, it is !ommonly argued, in agreement with +ill, that in religion, morals, and politi!s in

parti!ular we !annot attain infallible *nowledge and that intoleran!e is only to be %ustified in termsof infallibility otherwise we may be depriving others of truth and !oer!ing them into evil

behavior$A number of points need to be made here$ 0irst, if this !ontention is sound, then no state, i$e$, no

politi!al authority and !oer!ion, is %ustified$ 6e !annot *now that freedom is good with infallible*nowledge$ Hen!e we !annot, on this view, %ustly repress those who deprive others of freedom$Similarly, we !an on this view have no property laws, no laws about *illing, about sexual

relations, about assaults, be!ause in ea!h !ase we la!* the infallible *nowledge said to be essentialas a pre!ondition for !oer!ing others$ .learly, this is nonsense$ It is nonsense partly be!ause, insome matters, we do have *nowledge whi!h we !an reasonably !laim to be !ertain e$g$, that thewilful infli!tion of suffering on !hildren and animals is evil$ And, se!ond, we do not requireinfallible *nowledge to be %ustified in interfering with others$ All we need are reasonable groundsof assuran!e$ If I see a blind man !rossing a road and possibly in danger of being *no!*ed down

by a bus, I do not need infallible *nowledge before I am entitled to push him out of the way of the bus$ And, in general, I do not need to *now with !ertainty what the total effe!ts of my a!tion will be to a!t if I did, I should never be entitled to a!t$ Similarly, if I en!ountered, say, a homi!idalmania! atta!*ing a !olleague, I should not need infallible *nowledge that my !olleague wasentitled to resist, to be %ustified in !oming to his aid and so, too, if I saw a thief attempting to steal

his !ar$ 1easonable grounds for my moral belief would be all that I would need to be %ustified ininterfering in su!h !ases$


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6hat !onstitutes "reasonable grounds for assuran!e" is in itself a large question whi!h !annot bedis!ussed here$ However, it is suffi!ient to observe that the reasons for the belief, the extent ofdisagreement about the belief in the !ommunity, and the grounds for the disagreement, as well asthe urgen!y or otherwise of the need to a!t, all bear on what !onstitutes suffi!iently "reasonablegrounds for assuran!e" to %ustify positive a!tion by a state$ And, by way of illustration, the"reasonable grounds for assuran!e" whi!h provide the %ustifi!ation for the state:s intoleran!e of

murderers, thieves, and rapists !ould be !ited$d8 +ill and others attempt to set out general, *no!*down empiri!al arguments to the effe!t that, infa!t, greater good never results or, on the whole, does not result from the state:s attemptingfor!ibly to promote it$ However, it is signifi!ant that +ill !onfines his !ontention to freedom ofspee!h and not to freedom in general and ma*es a very substantial qualifi!ation about freedom ofspee!h and it is further relevant that restri!tion on freedom of a!tion very often involvesrestri!tion on freedom of spee!h$ However, the points of importan!e here are that +ill, when heargues from the utility of liberty, is using the same type of argument as that used by Aquinas whenhe notes the qualifi!ations di!tated by moral pruden!e$ Aquinas and +ill rea!hed opposed!on!lusions about the empiri!al question as to whether toleran!e always pays, without either ofthem engaging in anything even a*in to a s!ientifi! investigation into whether liberty did, in fa!t,

promote or retard good$The absen!e of a s!ientifi! investigation is signifi!ant, and this be!ause a s!ientifi! investigation issomething whi!h it is in pra!ti!e impossible to implement and whi!h for +ill, with his denial ofinfallible *nowledge, is, in prin!iple, impossible$ This means that no !on!lusive, *no!*downeviden!e is possible here$ However, what eviden!e is available suggests that it all depends on theissue and the !ir!umstan!es$ 6ith matters su!h as drug addi!tion and propaganda advo!ating theta*ing of drugs, intoleran!e seems often to be more su!!essful than toleran!e with other matters,toleran!e !ould prove to be preferable$ /ossibly toleran!e is more su!!essful and more valuablethan intoleran!e where !ons!ien!e is involved$ However, even this is doubtful$ .ons!ien!es !an beedu!ated and remolded by or under !oer!ion and with very valuable results$e8 The diffi!ulties of avoiding abuses of power, if the state is allowed to have the authority tosuppress views as evil and erroneous, are often stressed$ There is some truth in this sort of!ontention and it !learly has more weight when dire!ted at !ensorship of ideas than it does whendire!ted at !ontrol of a!tions$ However, it does not !onstitute a *no!*down ob%e!tion to the use ofthe state:s authority in pra!ti!e, %ust be!ause all states already have to exer!ise this power to someextent and there is !lear eviden!e that it is not ne!essarily abused$ Although, if the dangers ofabuse of power were immense, then it might be that the state should not repress !ertain types ofideas$ 9ut it might still be entitled to give spe!ial aid to some views rather than to others, and inthis way, in the realm of ideas, its abstra!t right might re!eive expression$ 9ut these pra!ti!aldiffi!ulties are usually grossly exaggerated$ If we may already su!!essfully intrust to the stateextensive !ontrol of a!tion and the indire!t !ontrol of ideas that the !ontrol of a!tion involves as

well as limited !ontrol of ideas, the dangers of abuse of power, if the !ontrol is extended, need not be insuperable$f8 In determining whether the state should in any situation exer!ise its right, ethi!al questions aswell as pra!ti!al questions will have to be resolved$ +ost situations will involve !onfli!ts of goodswhi!h will have to be resolved by a purely ethi!al de!ision$ At the same time, purely empiri!alissues will have to be settled what the effe!ts of alternative a!tions would be whether, by a!ting,the state will bring new evils into being or eliminate other goods and whether the state may bestserve its purpose by non !oer!ive measures rather than by !oer!ive measures$ To as!ribe to thestate the right to promote truth and good and to eliminate evil and error is not to insist that thestate must engage in repressive measures$ There are many alternative ways in whi!h the state mayfulfil its fun!tion by means other than !oer!ive measures$ +u!h idleness, degenera!y, and vi!e in

the wealthy and mu!h !rime in the poorer !lasses have been eliminated simply by the raising ofthe standard of living of the masses, by taxing the wealthy very heavily, and in a mu!h more


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effe!tive way than by means of harsh penalties$ True beliefs in morals, politi!s, and religion maygently and painlessly be instilled by the state in the s!hools rather than by the methods of theInquisition with less su!!ess, no doubt, but without the loss of other goods$ And so with othermeans and other goods$ How the view about the rights and duties of the state developed herewould wor* out in pra!ti!e depends on a multitude of empiri!al issues$ And it is for the latterreason that it is important and illuminating to separate the politi!al and ethi!al questions from the

pra!ti!al question$5is!ussion of the pra!ti!al issues !an pro!eed only on the basis of answers to the politi!al andethi!al questions and must involve referen!e to fa!ts available only to spe!ialists in many fieldse!onomi!s, so!iology, psy!hology, politi!al s!ien!e, and history, to mention only the moreimportant$ It is impossible, therefore, to attempt to do %usti!e to the pra!ti!al questions in thelimited !ompass of this paper$However, the six points outlined here, relating to the pra!ti!al questions, do suggest that theabstra!t dis!ussion of the abstra!t rights and duties of the state and of the individual is notne!essarily merely an abstra!t dis!ussion whi!h has no pra!ti!al relevan!e$ The !on!lusions thatthe individual has no abstra!t rights to evils as he has to goods and that the state has the right andduty to promote good and eliminate evil would seem to be important !on!lusions whi!h may haveimportant pra!ti!al impli!ations not always fully appre!iated by those who, li*e the moderndemo!rat, give their impli!it assent to them$

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The State and Evil