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THE STABILITY OF THE SLOVENIAN PARTY SYSTEM:
REASONS FOR THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF NEW PARTIES
Danica Fink-Hafner and Alenka Krašovec
Draft version
Addresses:
Faculty of Social Sciences University of Ljubljana Kardeljeva ploščad 5 1000 Ljubljana SLOVENIA [email protected] [email protected]
Paper presented at the section on “The State of Democracy in Europe”, panel “Political
Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Central European Countries” at the 6th ECPR
General Conference at the University of Iceland, Reykjavik
Iceland, 25-27 August 2011
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ACRONYMS
POLITICAL PARTIES
AS – Active Slovenia
DeSUS – Democratic Party of Retired Persons of Slovenia
LDS – Liberal Democracy of Slovenia
NSi – New Slovenia - Christian People's Party
SD – Social Democrats
SDS – Slovenian Democratic Party
S LS – Slovenian People's Party
SMS – Party of Youth of Slovenia
Zares-Nova politika – For Real-New Politics
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Abstract
This paper fills in the gap in the literature on new parties entering parliament
by focusing on particularities of a post-communist party system by taking Slovenia as
a case study. During the Slovenian party system’s consolidation period (1992-2011)
only four new parties (DeSUS, SMS, NSi, Zares) succeeded in entering parliament.
However, just one (DeSUS) has endured over the long term.
Based on the literature on new parties in the Western party system, the
literature on particularities of post-communist party systems embedded in
parliamentary systems and empirical research into the case of Slovenia it has been
revealed that, in general, Slovenia’s institutional rules do matter when it comes to
new parties entering the parliamentary system. However, besides the institutional
milieu there are necessary preconditions that need to be fulfilled by a new party to
enter parliament: previously existing organisational resources and/or sponsors; an
appeal to particular social groups with some elements of catch-all politics and
particular embedment in the existing system of party divisions. Nevertheless, in order
to maintain a long-term parliamentary position, newcomers also need to satisfy
sufficient preconditions. Apart from the necessary preconditions listed above they
need to focus on a long-term policy issue which is vital to a large proportion of a
targeted social group; this social group needs to represent an important share of the
electorate, there should not be other serious competitors with the same social appeal
and the party must have strong coalition potential.
INTRODUCTION
In spite of some earlier political science interest in party formation and survival (Duverger,
1954; LaPalombara and Weiner, eds.,1966), it can be said that it has not developed into a
very visible stream of research. Probably this is because in the West not many countries
have experienced a rich phenomenon of new parties’ emergence – except for the
Netherlands. The electoral success and parliamentary durability of new parties has remained
relatively under-researched. However, two waves of research can be detected so far. They
correspond with two waves of political innovation. First, during the 1980s political scientists
analysed the process of de-freezing post-WWII party systems embedded in post-modern
social movements (so-called New Social Movements), which among others also brought
about a new party family (the Greens). The most recent wave of more profound research
interest in new parties has just started (e.g. works by Allan Sikk, Tim Haugton, Kevin
Deegan-Krause).1 It has been predominantly linked to studying the dynamics of post-
1 Attempts to create more focus on new party research include a workshop on Novelty and
Endurance: Understanding Change and Stability in Central and East European Party Politics, at the Centre for East European Language Based Area Studies, UCL School of Slavonic and East European
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communist party systems, but has so far not yet produced a considerable number of
publications.
The paper’s ambition is to contribute to filling in the following research gaps: a) specifically
analysing the durability of new parties; b) looking at the durability of new parties in the
framework of the idiosyncrasies of fragmented party systems while taking account of the
characteristics of party competition according to Mair’s (2006) suggestions on analysing
party system change; c) taking the ideological characteristics of new parties into account
when comparing their success; and d) focusing on post-communist party systems.
The empirical research is based on comparisons of four cases of new parties which entered
parliament during the Slovenian party system’s consolidation period (1992-2011) (DeSUS,
SMS, NSi, Zares). Of these four parties, only one (DeSUS) has endured. The main research
question is which factors compose the necessary conditions and which factors compose the
sufficient conditions for a new party to endure.
In the following sections we first present an overview of the literature focused on new political
parties. A presentation of an analytical framework for analysing new parties in the Slovenian
party system since 1992 is followed by a section on empirical findings and a concluding
section providing a summary of our findings.
PREVIOUS THEORETICAL FINDINGS
Previous studies into new parties have varied substantially. In terms of the subject of inquiry
they have focused on only one cluster of many kinds of new parties – such as Green, left-
libertarian, right-wing populist, immigrant parties and regional parties (Hug, 2000; Selb and
Pituctin, 2010). Variations can also be found in methodological designs, involving e.g. case
studies, cross-national statistical analysis, Boolean methods and game-theoretic methods
(Selb and Pituctin, 2010). In general, the selection of cases for empirical studies stands out
as a particularly problematic methodological point (Hug, 2000).
In terms of the dynamics of new political parties two main streams of research can be found
in the literature. Some authors focus on factors of the emergence of new parties, while others
talk about both factors of the emergence and success of new parties. Looking at processes
Studies (Convenors Sean Hanley, UCL; Tim Haughton, Birmingham and Allan Sikk, UCL) held in London on 28 June 2011.
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of new party formation, there have been more studies of particular country cases than cross-
country comparisons (Harmel and Robertson, 1985).
Most of the existing literature seems to deal with factors which support the emergence of
new parties. Of these, the following are usually cited: institutional rules (particularly electoral
rules), new issues or values, various kinds of social diversity and socio-economic
inequalities, political factors involving the behaviour of existing parties, voters’ attitudes,
characteristics of party competition, the salience of new issues as well as structural
characteristics of political systems (e.g. Harmel and Robertson, 1985; Krouwel and Lucardie,
2008; Müller-Rommel, 1985). In the wave of post-modern politics, among others also
expressed in the emergence of new Green parties they have been further explained by the
link between the shift from modern industrial society to a post-modern, post-industrial society
on one hand and the emergence of new dimensions of political conflict as well as the
emergence of a new social core group supportive of new politics on the other (see e.g.
Bürklin,1985). Similarly, some authors explain the entry of new parties by a political
opportunity structure. According to Rochon (1985), this could involve a rapid dealignment of
the electorate. Alternatively, opportunity structure is viewed as a combination of an electoral
market failure and a high number of perfectly elastic voters (e.g. Lago and Martínez, 2011) or
by a combination of the positions of other relevant parties as well as institutional, socio-
economic and cultural conditions (Lucardie, 2000).
While many authors have been concerned with institutional and structural factors of new
party emergence, some have also looked at strategic calculations of elites as to whether to
enter the electoral arena or not, involving an estimation of the cost of entry, the probability of
electoral support, and the expected benefits of holding office (e.g. Cox, 1997; Tavits, 2006).
Much less research seems to have been conducted on the placement of new parties in
existing parliamentary party systems and on the long-term functioning of party systems.
Nevertheless, some researchers have dealt with the question of what are the impacts of new
parties. It has been shown that new parties may impact the political agenda even when they
are short-lived (see e.g. Krouwell and Lucardie, 2008). However, very little research seems
to have been conducted to answer the question of which factors support the durability of new
parties and their long-term presence in the party system. Examples here include an
investigation of why some new parties in Britain live and most die (Berrington, 1985). An
analysis of factors explaining the survival of the hardiest perennials in post-communist
Central Europe (e.g. Haughton and Deegan-Krause, 2010) in fact (at least as far as the
Slovenian case is concerned) also looks at parties which are new in relation to the
transformed old socio-political organisations, but may currently present the hard core of
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continuously present parties. All in all, this kind of research in the framework of a fragmented
party system and a focus on new parties in the consolidated post-communist party system
still seems to be lacking. Further, what seems to be under-researched is the explanatory
power of (changing) patterns of party competition as suggested in Mair’s (2006) analysis of
party system dynamics.
Institutional factors
A cross-country statistical analysis of data on 233 new parties formed in 19 Western
European and Anglo-American democracies from 1960 to 1980 revealed that the type of
electoral system is the key explanatory variable for new party success (Harmel and
Robertson, 1985). In addition, electoral system research often stresses that proportional
systems tend to be more open to newcomer parliamentary parties than systems with
majoritarian rules. Although stricter electoral rules may have temporary visible effects (e.g. in
getting rid of small parties), in the longer run they lose their effectiveness since political
parties tend to adapt to new rules in order to be more successful at elections – e.g. by
forming party coalitions. However, the details of electoral rules can be extremely important.
Actual district-level electoral rules may have different effects than suggested by the general
type of electoral system at the national level (see e.g. Selb and Pituctin, 2010).
When looking at post-communist countries it can be said that the level of parliamentary
threshold plays a very important role. While a 5-percent (or higher) threshold can shut out
many small parties, a 4-percent threshold (or lower) might no longer be as efficient. Of
course, the prescribed procedure for changing the electoral rules is important when it comes
to engineering the electoral rules. In the event a big majority is needed in the circumstances
of a relatively fragmented party system (e.g. in Slovenia the rule applies of a two-thirds
majority of votes in parliament), radical changes are unfeasible. Also when analysing the
timing of an electoral system change it has been shown that in fact parties with the
necessary parliamentary majority allow for the electoral system change when party systems
are already changing in practice (see e.g. Shugart, 1992).
Resources of new parties
Party resources usually include: members, brainpower and leadership, money, publicity and
a political project (Lucardie, 2000; Krouwel and Lucardie, 2008). Interestingly enough,
organisational sources in terms of networks and sponsor organisations known from the
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organisational literature (e.g. Panebianco, 1988) do not seem to have been systematically
tackled by research into new parties. As a rule, party resources seem to be understood as a
starting basis for a new party, which needs to be combined with a favourable institutional
milieu and political opportunity structures in order to make the emergence of a new party a
viable endeavour.
Party system milieu
Although institutional rules largely determine how successful competing parties are in
entering a legislature, it is also true that political parties, as a rule2, decide on electoral rules.
Researchers have been pointing out the fact that in old democracies it is difficult to determine
what comes first – a change in the party system or a change in the electoral rules. Once a
sufficient parliamentary majority is created to change the electoral rules, the adopted rules
can have negative consequences for small parties which did not have a say in the
majoritarian decision. When small political parties are needed to create a majoritarian
consensus on a particular electoral system change, they are probably also in a position to
prevent rules being adopted which would prevent them entering parliament.
Party system characteristics are also very important for the key characteristics of party
system functioning. In a two-party system only two parties have realistic chances of coming
into power. They typically alter in government or at least they have realistic expectations that
this could happen (Sartori, 1976). When both parties are weakened and voters largely turn to
a third party, we can talk about a “two and a half” party system – like in the case of the UK.
However, the third party is only rarely successful in entering government. Even where such a
party comes to office, for example, the Liberal Democrats in the UK, it has to share power
with one of the two main parties. Ideological conflicts within the coalition government and
disappointment by supporters of the third party due to it making concessions usually have
negative consequences for the third party’s public opinion and consequently electoral
support. Contrary to the UK, the American party system does not allow third parties to enter
government. Instead, political themes and policy ideas are integrated into one of the two
main parties’ politics (see e.g. Berrington, 1985 and literature on third parties in the US party
system). In multiparty systems where government coalitions are formed small parties can
come to power if their coalition capacity is acceptable to other parties. In fact, where only a
2 Referenda on electoral rules have been held in Western countries (e.g. in Italy in 1999 and 2009, in
New Zealand in 1992 and will be also be held in the UK in 2011) as well as in post-communist
countries (e.g. Slovenia in 1996).
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small gap in the proportion of parliamentary seats for a possible ruling coalition needs to be
filled, small parties can gain a relatively influential position disproportionally greater than their
parliamentary size measured by the number of seats.
Since the end of the 1970s, political scientists have tried to explain some dynamic
phenomena in party systems, such as new cleavages, new parties and changing party
system dynamics. It is exactly the appearance of new cleavages (materialism vs. post-
materialism) which did not find a proper expression in already existing parties that some
authors find the main explanation for the emergence of Green parties (e.g. Bürklin, 1985;
Müller-Rommel, 1985). Similarly, the emergence of issue-oriented parties such as pensions’
parties in the context of demographic changes and emerging intergenerational cleavages
needs to be explained (see an overview of the literature in Hanley, 2011).
Although recent debates on the classification of party systems and their changes do not
seem to be directly linked to our research agenda, we argue the opposite. Since new parties
tend to be small parties we find several aspects of Mair’s innovation in measuring party
system change potentially useful for explaining not only the entrance of new parties, but also
their durability in the party system. The main aspect of Mair’s indicators for analysing
changes in party competition patterns we find potentially useful (Mair 2006: 65-66) takes
account of the prevalent pattern of government change allowing (or not) a change in the
whole coalition government or only part of it and whether the government is made up of
parties of the same ideological colour or if it allows a wider variety of party ideology within the
same ruling coalition.
Particularities of post-communist party systems
Post-communist party systems have been characterised (compared to older Western party
systems) by high fragmentation, high volatility as well as low trust in parties and parliaments
(Lewis, ed., 2001; Jungerstam-Mulders, ed., 2006; Rose, 2009). The latter translates into
relatively widespread anti-party sentiments (Fink Hafner, 1994).
The first electoral system choice (together with the first constitutional choice) significantly
determines party system developments (Fink-Hafner and Hafner-Fink, 2009). Semi-
presidential and presidential systems have tended toward a majoritarian system, including a
tendency toward a predominant party system. The combination of a parliamentary
constitutional system and a proportional electoral system has produced very fragmented
party systems. In Hungary, the parliamentary system and the combined electoral system
together created a majoritarian tendency. In these circumstances, not only did the two main
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parties’ alternation in government prevail, but it also ensured the early “freezing of the
system” by making it very hard for new parties to enter parliament.
Although many of the main cleavages are quite similar to cleavages seen in Western party
systems (e.g. centre-periphery, urban-rural), the key cleavage in post-communist countries
has been the communist-anti-communist cleavage (see e.g. Jungerstam-Mulders, 2006: 244-
248). In the course of integration into the global economic system, the liberalism-welfare
state cleavage and also at least in some countries (e.g. Slovenia) the inter-generational
cleavage seem to have been gaining in weight.
As a rule, both parties and party systems have remained relatively dynamic phenomena
(Enyedi and Casal Bértoa, 2011) in spite of tendencies for their consolidation. It is not simply
that individual parties and the active party universe have been dynamically changing.
Patterns of party competition have as a rule also been changing. The initial two-polar
systems (communist vs. anti-communist bloc) evolved in various ways into two-polar, three-
polar or multi-polar systems. While the Czech Republic and Slovakia basically retained a
two-polar structure, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia have seen shifts toward a three-polar
system, Romania, Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria have tended to develop a multi-polar party
competition pattern (Enyedi and Casal Bértoa, 2011: 126). According to the same authors,
patterns of competition have usually also changed several times in the last 20 years in
individual countries within various time-spans. Hungary can be highlighted as a case of
moving from the initial communist vs. anti-communist polarisation towards quite a short
period of a three-polar pattern of competition and the relatively early prevalence of a two-
polar system (already since 1994). All other post-communist countries – current EU
members – seem to have kept a more vivid dynamic in party competition. Yet polarisation
has not been equally deep in all of these countries. While the Czech, Slovak and Hungarian
party systems have been the most polarised, followed by Lithuania and Poland and – after a
gap – also by Estonia, Bulgaria and Latvia, Slovenia and Romania have presented the
opposite cases (Enyedi and Casal Bértoa, 2011: 134). Also, levels of polarisation and
discipline in bloc politics as well as in innovation of a governing formulae differ among
countries, allowing newcomers possible success to varying degrees.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ANALYSIS
Our research focuses on the factors of new party success beyond winning parliamentary
seats at only one parliamentary election. For the purpose of our research, we define a new
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parliamentary party as a party which either a) results from the split of an existing party or b)
is genuinely new and in (either case) enters parliament based on its own electoral result.3
Based on the literature on new parties in the Western party system, as well as the literature
on the particularities of post-communist party systems functioning within a parliamentary
constitutional framework (Berrington, 1985; Harmel, 1985; Harmel and Robertson, 1985;
Rochon, 1985; Lucardie, 2000; Sikk, 2005; Krouwel and Lucardie, 2008; Enyedi and Casal
Bértoa, 2011) along with Mair’s approach to studying party system dynamics (Mair 1996,
2002 and 2006), the following factors of the durability of new parliamentary parties have
been taken into account:
a) the institutional rules (electoral system characteristics);
b) the characteristics of party system change, particularly a change in the pattern of party
competition (Mair, 2006);
b) contextual circumstances – the timing and political context of the entrance of new parties;
c) the organisational resources of a new party;
d) a new party’s social appeal (a focus on particular issues linked to targeting a particular
social group; the size of potential voters’ support);
e) the extent to which a new party is embedded in the political divide or engaged with a long-
term policy issue embedded in a relatively new ideological division; and
f) a new party’s coalition potential.
The empirical effects of the theoretically determined factors on the success of new
parliamentary parties and their parliamentary durability will be studied in the case of Slovenia
in the period from 1992 when elections were first held in the country on the basis of a new
constitution (adopted in 1991) until June 2011.4
The analysis is based on the following data: previous research into changes in the Slovenian
party system; interviews conducted in 2011 with representatives of some of the
3 This definition differs from Tavits' definition of a new party (Tavits 2007: 115) in the second part of the
definition. Tavits' definition (based on Simon Hug's definition from Hug, 2001) is as follows: "A new
party is one that either results from a split from an existing party or is genuinely new in the sense that it
emerges without the help from members of existing parties." Our definition excludes parties which
emerge within parliament between elections. For more on a definition of a new party, see e.g. Harmel
(1985), Hug (2000) and Sikk (2005).
4 The last parliamentary elections were held in 2008.
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abovementioned parties5; secondary analysis of Slovenian Public Opinion Poll data6;
demographic statistical data7; and reviews of party programmes.
RESEARCH FINDINGS
Institutional Rules
During the transitional period the old and new political elites first experimented with all three
main types of electoral rules. For the first free elections (held to fill the already existing, but
politically pluralised assembly at the level of the Republic of Slovenia, then still part of the
Yugoslav federation) different electoral systems were used – a different electoral system type
for each of the three chambers. For the socio-political chamber (by being composed of
political organisations it is in fact the closest institutional approximation of a parliamentary
lower chamber) a proportional system was agreed (Fink-Hafner, Lajh and Krašovec, 2005).
This first institutional choice has actually remained in place until now despite several waves
of debates on changing them. Slovenia has a proportional electoral system. Although it
seems that it has a relatively high district magnitude (11) in real life competition among
political candidates takes place at a lower level and closer to a majoritarian system. It can be
said that the parliamentary threshold has remained very low although it has slightly
increased. Up until 2000 it was three mandates/seats or approximately 3.3 percent, while
since 2000 it has been 4 percent. In 2000 the electoral formula was also changed slightly –
at the national level the d’Hondt formula has been used, while on the district level the Hare
quota was used until 2000, but was later replaced by the Droop quota (Krašovec, 2007).
Establishing a new party has been relatively easy in Slovenia. Despite the introduction of
some stricter rules in 1994, only 200 signatures along with party programme and internal
party rules are still needed to establish a new party (Fink-Hafner, 2001; current law8).
The only exception in the institutional rules seems to relate to the state financing of parties.
The public financing of political parties can to some extent also be treated as part of the
5 The interviews were conducted with the Secretary-General of the SMS and a former Secretary-
General of the DeSUS. 6 Available at http://www.cjm.si/edokumenti; http://www.cjm.si/publikacije and http://www.cjm.si/SJM.
7 Available at the homepage of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia; www.stat.si and at the
homepage of the Pension and Disabled Insurance Office of Slovenia; www.zpiz.si. 8 Zakon o političnih strankah (uradno prečiščeno besedilo) (ZPolS-UPB1) 2005, http://www.uradni-
list.si/1/objava.jsp?urlid=2005100&stevilka=4345; Zakon o spremembah in dopolnitvah Zakona o političnih strankah 2007 (ZPolS-D), http://www.uradni-list.si/1/objava.jsp?urlid=2007103&stevilka=5133.
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institutional context – this source is by far the most important source of party finances
(Krašovec, 2000). However, up until 2000 only parliamentary parties were entitled to it and
only later (after several cycles of struggles to change the rules and after Constitutional Court
decisions in 1999 and 2002) have all parties gaining at least 1 percent of votes at elections
become entitled to such public subsidies (Krašovec and Haughton, 2011).
We can conclude that Slovenia’s institutional context (a parliamentary system with
proportional representation, a relatively low threshold and fairly undemanding requirement for
establishing a new party), with the partial exception of the rules related to the public financing
of political parties, has been relatively open to new parties.
Characteristics of party competition
Based on Sartori’s typology of party systems (Sartori, 1976), one could say that the
Slovenian party system has been changing quite dynamically over the last 20 years. The
initial atomised party system that developed on the basis of changes in the law allowing
political pluralism in Slovenia since 1989 (Kranjc, 1992) was transformed into a parliamentary
party system after the first multi-party elections in April 1990. The transitional party politics
were based first of all on the communism vs. anti-communist cleavage. The 1992 elections
based on the 1991 Constitution allowed for the development of polarised pluralism with a
three-polar pattern of competition. In that system, the LDS occupied the metric centre for
about a decade. At the 2000 elections its support rose to the highest electoral support in
recent Slovenian democratic history (36.21 percent of votes). However, the more it was
approaching the position of a possible predominant party it was losing its electoral profile and
the more it was burdened by clientelism and corruption linked to its long-term governmental
position. Its electoral loss in 2004 is at the same time a milestone in a further change in the
Slovenian party system, particularly in the predominant pattern of party competition. The
2004 shift towards moderate pluralism has brought about two-polar party competition and the
alternation of centre-right and centre-left governments. However, in circumstances where the
four biggest parties attract around three-quarters of all votes (74 percent of votes at the last
elections in 2008) and no individual party within each of the two poles is able to govern on its
own, small parties are still needed to create government coalitions. These small parties can
be newcomers. In fact, new parties in the Slovenian party system seem to have been doing
both – nurturing anti-party sentiments among voters and allowing for the creation of
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majoritarian government coalitions.9 Through the lenses of Mair’s (2006) characterisation of
patterns of party competition, one can say that changes in the structure of competition for
control of the executive in Slovenia have not only been allowing the entrance of new parties
to parliament, but also the relative openness of government for new parties. Although a
tendency towards bipolarity has been visible since 2004, blocs of parties have remained
fairly malleable and more or less flexible.
Political and social contexts and new parties entering parliament – Windows of
opportunity
Despite the stable favourable institutional arrangements, the political and social context in a
country can play an equally important role in offering a chance for new parties to be
established and for their success. First of all, characteristics of political and social
environments can offer a special window of opportunity for new parties.
In general, parties in Slovenia have been seen as an integral part of democratic life. Only a
minority of people (between 13 and 15 percent) did not view them as an essential element of
the political system in the 1995–2008 period. In spite of that, relatively high levels of distrust
in both parliament and political parties have been constantly observed. Nevertheless, when
looking at the Slovenian Public Opinion Pool data for the 1991–2008 period some oscillations
can be noticed. The highest levels of distrust were seen in 1995 and 1998 (Fink-Hafner,
Krašovec, Kustec Lipicer and Filej, 2002). A more detailed insight into these periods shows
that “political” variables have the strongest impact on levels of trust in parliament and parties
(Fink-Hafner, Krašovec, Kustec Lipicer and Filej, 2002). The highest levels of distrust
correspond with periods of political scandals, political instability when interpellations of
ministers and changes of ministers were frequent and in periods of a culmination in
ideological heat among parties (the concentration of political conflicts among parties).
Although the share of undecided voters a year before elections has relatively high
oscillations (in the period from 1992 to 2008 they ranged between 25 and 35 percent, but
without a clear trend of a constant increase or decrease), it does not seem to hold any
9 According to a survey conducted by Delo Stik between 27 and 30 June 2011 on a representative
sample of 402 adult citizens and published by the daily newspaper Delo (Delo 4.7. 2011, p. 2), 52 percent of those surveyed estimated that the best time for early elections is autumn 2011; only 33 percent would vote for any of the existing parties and up to 50 percent would vote for a new party; 17 percent of those surveyed chose to answer “Don’t know”.
14
explanatory power for answering the question why some new parties have been able to enter
parliament, or why just one new party has been able to survive in the long term. According to
the public opinion poll no great enthusiasm about the need to establish a new party in
Slovenia was noticed in the 1995–2006 period. However, 10 to 15 percent of voters
constantly agreed that a new party needed to be established.
Based on the data presented above it is hard to say political and social contexts are
explanatory variables of the success of new parties. Taking into account the year of
establishing the parties under investigation (in 199010, 2000 and 2007), the concentration of
political scandals and high levels of distrust in parliament and parties per se do not seem to
offer a plausible explanation of a window of opportunity for new parties.
However, the explanation of a window of opportunity seems to be found in the growing
change in the relationship among generations and related socio-economic problems. Since
the early 1990s the population of pensioners in Slovenia, as a share of the electorate, has
constantly expanded (from 28 percent in 1992 to 31 percent in 2008), while the population of
youth11 has slowly but constantly decreased (from 29 percent/19 percent12 in 1996 to 26
percent/18 percent in 2006). Yet a dramatic decrease in youth is forecasted for the 2010–
2020 period (Lavrič, et al. 2010). In contrast, according to official statistical data for 2009 the
at-risk-of-poverty level was 11.3 percent and has generally been decreasing in Slovenia
since the mid-1990s, with retired persons (together with the unemployed) being among the
most vulnerable in this regard. Moreover, in the last six years the gap between retired
persons and the younger generation at risk of poverty has been increasing and, in the case
of retired people even reached 19 percent, even though at the beginning of the 1990s the
economic situation of retired people in Slovenia was not so bad at all (Stropnik et al., 2010).
Nonetheless, the economic situation faced by young people has also not been very optimistic
since the early 1990s. When the SMS was established in 2000 16 percent of young people
10 The DeSUS was established in 1990, but only since the 1996 elections has the party participated at
elections independently.
11 Here the problem of statistical data arises. Slovenian statistics have several statistical categories
which can be used in the examination of the youth population, yet none is completely suitable.
Namely, one statistical category includes people aged 15–19, but in Slovenia voting rights are
acquired by the age of 18. If we include this category in our calculations then also some youth without
voting rights are included in the population, but if exclude this category and use the statistical category
which follows (ages 20–24 on) then part of the youth population with voting rights is excluded from the
electorate.
12 The first calculation includes the following age statistical categories; 15–19; 20–24 and 25–29, while
the second one includes only two statistical categories, namely 20–24 and 25–29.
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(aged between 15 and 24) were unemployed, in the last decade there was first a slow
decrease up to 2008 and in the last three years a slow rise in the unemployment rate has
again been recorded (Lavrič et al., 2010). Contrary to the statistics, data from a public
opinion poll conducted among youth in 2010 (Lavrič, et al., 2010) show that the share of
young perceiving themselves as unemployed was much bigger in 2010 (25 percent) than in
2000 (18 percent of young people perceived themselves as unemployed). In addition, while
in 2000 'only' half of young people lived with their parents, in 2010 more than 60 percent of
young people were living with their parents, which is usually seen as an indicator of a youth’s
relatively bad economic situation (Lavrič et al., 2010).
These data suggest a more or less latent cleavage among generations. However, translating
that into party politics has not been automatic or equal in terms of expressing all conflicting
interests. In Slovenia, the retired represented almost one-third of the electorate at the
beginning of the 1990s and more than one-third of the electorate in 2008. In the
circumstances of a very poor economic situation in the early 1990s and with a historical
memory from socialist Yugoslavia about how to first try to handle such problems, pensioners
had expected that first pensions and their interests would come under attack. This, alongside
with the finding that pensioners would be unable to realise their interests simply with the of a
non-party organisation or by linking the political representation of their interests to another
party (the successor of the reformed League of Communists of Slovenia) comprised the main
reasons for the new party DeSUS being established. In contrast, young people needed more
time to organise themselves into a party organisation. In fact, less interest in institutional
political activities (Miheljak, 2002) along with internal political differences among youth also
reflected in many struggles between different student organisations had prevented the
establishment of a youth party for several years.
To conclude, the contextual circumstances examined above that may be expected to have
created windows of opportunity for the entrance of new parties to parliament do not seem to
hold any explanatory power, with the exception of the changing demographic structure and
related socio-economic problems.
Organisational resources and successful new parliamentary parties
Organisational resources are important for the establishment and survival of political parties
(Panebianco, 1988). We can speak about different forms of organisational resources,
especially: organisational network, cadre and finances. An analysis of the development of
16
DeSUS, SMS, NSi and Zares reveals some important information related to cadre and
network resources, while it is hard to obtain information on financial help/support.
The DeSUS first developed in Maribor, the second biggest Slovenian city, on the basis of the
Pensioners’ Association of Maribor – its first name was the Democratic Party of the
Pensioners’ Association of Maribor (in 1990). The party was established at the country level
in 1991. At the 1992 elections it cooperated with the Workers’ Party, the Social Democratic
Union and the Social Democratic Renewal (a successor of the reformed League of
Communists of Slovenia). At the start of the 1990s it also had close connections with the
Association of Disabled Persons of Slovenia as well as the League of Associations of WWII
Veterans (Zveza združenj borcev – ZZB) (Tovornik, 2001). The majority of the party’s bodies
were filled by people active in these organisations, but mainly came from pensioners’
associations throughout Slovenia. These pensioners’ associations are associated in the
umbrella organisation Union of Pensioners’ Associations of Slovenia which has a well-
developed territorial organisation network of more than 500 associations with around half of
all pensioners among its members.
The SMS was established in June 2000 on the basis of two strands of youth organisations:
a) independent candidate lists at local elections in 1998, mostly in the eastern part of
Slovenia; and b) youth organisations from the Ljubljana and Gorenjska regions under the
sponsorship of the Student Organisation of the University of Ljubljana (Goleš, 2007).
Together with other youth organisations, these structures created an organisational network
on the local level. Most of the party’s bodies were filled by the leaders of these organisations.
Those leaders also had some experience with politics (chiefly on the local level) in addition to
work involving student and youth politics.
The NSi was established in August 2000 after the split of the SLS + SKD – Slovenska ljudska
stranka. The NSi’s emergence followed the very dynamic life of parties linked to farmers’
interests and political expressions of Christian values. The SKD and SLS were both
established during the transition period (in 1989). In April 2000 they merged despite mixed
opinions about doing so. Only a few months after that merger, many people who had
formerly belonged to the SKD decided to form a new party. Further, even though the merger
between the SLS and SKD had been formally concluded, in practice local organisations
remained separated even after several months. The founders of the NSi took advantage of
this situation and linked the still alive SKD local organisations to the local NSi network.
Zares emerged in 2007 after a split within the LDS. Several MPs who had been elected on
the list of the LDS left its parliamentary party group and established a group of non-attached
MPs. In March they established a civil society association the Association For Real
17
Združenje Zares 2007) and six months later the party For Real. At the end of 2007 the party
merged with the party Active Slovenia (Aktivna Slovenija AS).13 Many of the highest positions
in the party’s bodies were taken by former LDS and AS members.
When considering the broader picture, it can be stated that all the new parties which made it
to parliament in fact needed to have relatively solid organisational resources. In all four
cases, many resources had come from pre-existing organisations and/or sponsors – either
previously existing political parties or civil society associations.
Social appeal of the successful new parliamentary parties
The SMS started with both a relatively narrow and simultaneously also a relatively broad
scope. Focusing its social appeal on youth seemed to be quite narrow due to it only directly
inviting members of one particular marginal social group. However, the fact that youth is
internally socially and politically stratified (like with pensioners) and at the same time also
less engaged in institutional politics meant that the appeal seemed to be too broad and too
optimistic. In addition, (unlike the DeSUS) the SMS did not clearly define a policy issue
important for all generations. After the split (2004) the SMS tried to broaden its social appeal
to voters by supporting the Green ideas, but without an elaborated programme and clear
idea of a targeted social basis for seeking to gain more voters for the SMS.
Unlike the SMS, the DeSUS has had a clear focus on a particular social group (pensioners)
and one overarching policy issue – pension reform in the framework of a broader set of
issues related to the socio-economic status of pensioners. This fairly narrow policy focus has
recently not only been broadened to the “socially handicapped” (as the party put it). In
particular, party leader Karel Erjavec has recently been stressing the party’s catch-all
orientation by inviting young people to join the DeSUS.
Contrary to the DeSUS and the SMS, Zares has not focused on a particular social group. In
its programmatic statement of 2007 it set out policy principles based on social and green
liberalism. Many policy proposals in various policy fields tackle a range of social interests –
e.g. those favouring social justice, the welfare state, equality before the law, equal
opportunities, an open market, intergenerational justice, and the limitation of political power.
Within particular policy proposals it has targeted various social groups such as students, the
old, the unemployed as well as organisations and politico-territorial units (such as
13 The AS emerged from part of the SMS; in May 2004 several MPs and members of the highest SMS
bodies established the AS.
18
enterprises, universities, local communities etc.) Although the party’s stress on urban
development and some postmodern values may be seen as attractive to more educated,
postmodern-oriented voters, the party has not clearly defined its particular social appeal.
Unlike the other three parties, the NSi has been identifying itself with Catholic conservative
values and a related policy orientation. However, it has not succeeded in becoming more
broadly embedded in the electorate in spite of its catch-all tendencies.
All political parties have a certain social appeal, targeting particular segments of society and
voters. A party is less likely to win sufficient long-term electoral support by appealing to a
large social segment determined by certain social circumstances (in the case of the SMS it
was the youth group, which is in fact quite a heterogeneous group that only moderately
participates at elections) than from a combination of: a) targeting a relatively large social
group; b) simultaneously focusing on a policy issue vital to the majority of such a group; and
c) choosing a group that also makes up a major share of the electorate (the DeSUS case).
Ideological issues relating to left-right divisions do not appear to have been a good long-term
currency (the NSi case; attempts by the SMS to add environmentalism to its image; probably
also the case of Zares).
Embedment in the party system’s cleavage structure and successful new
parliamentary parties
The main idea declared by the SMS’ founders was to represent the interests of youth in the
social circumstances of a newly emerging socio-political cleavage. Since the party did not
express any clear ideological position it also did not want to formally join the centre-left ruling
coalition (although it did in fact support the LDS). Because the party had declared it would
represent the interests of youth and since the population of young people was quite mixed
the party also faced internal divisions. A similar phenomenon occurred in its sponsor
organisations. The party’s declaratory shift toward Green politics by developing close
relations with the European Greens just before the European parliamentary elections in 2004
did not prove to be convincing enough to attract substantial public opinion and voters’
support.
The DeSUS has been characterising itself as a political party focusing on representing
pensioners’ interests in the social circumstances of a newly emerging inter-generational
socio-political cleavage. Although it has not clearly expressed a particular ideological position
within the existing cleavage structure the party has been perceived as a centre-left party. The
main reason for this is that, by striving for welfare state policies, it has in practice positioned
19
itself as centre-left. However, it has co-operated in all coalitions since 1996 due to the more
or less continuous discussions of pension reform. It recently partly sought to boost its catch-
all appeal by also including an emphasis that it is actually a party for both youth and
pensioners since the key policy problems the party addresses have intergenerational
aspects.
In 2007 Zares entered the Slovenian political arena by criticising the older parliamentary
political parties’ shallow politics and making promises of a new type of politics. At the
declaratory level this included transparent, inclusive and self-restricting party and party elite
functioning, consensus-building politics and some postmodern understandings of politics.
While Zares invited the involvement of active citizens and civil society to collaborate with this
“new politics” party, it kept the scope of its policy issues predominately within national
politics. Only to a limited extent has it mentioned internationally relevant policies (primarily
related to ecology). Due to the cadre involved in establishing Zares as a new party it has had
a clearly centre-left image. At the same time, it has failed to clearly identify its targeted pool
of voters in line with the general claim of new politics – especially its green aspects.
The only new parliamentary party clearly positioned on the centre-right has been the NSi. Its
programmatic orientation and specific policy stands are based on conservative, in particular
Catholic, values.
In addition, the embedding of a new party in the structure of the political divide does matter.
Again the DeSUS has proved that engaging in a specific long-term policy issue embedded in
the long-term ideological division (liberalism vs. the welfare state) that has developed since
the country’s multiple transitions pays off very well. It is involved in relatively frequent cyclical
debates and reforms of the pension system, which at least implicitly involve conflicts of
interest among generations. In Slovenia, retired people represented almost one-third of the
electorate at the start of the 1990s, and more than one-third of the electorate in 2008. Youth
represented around 20 percent of the electorate in the 1990–2008 period, and have not been
mobilised around an equally focused and ideologically embedded policy issue – making
electoral success harder for the SMS party. The other two parties (NSi and Zares) have more
or less inserted themselves into the existing system of party divisions without a particular
single policy focus.
20
All in all, one can assert that all new parties have had to compete with the already existing
parties – except the DeSUS.14 Zares has targeted educated, urban and liberal-oriented
voters to a considerable extent – like the LDS. The SDS has been able to attract most
centre-right voters, including the religious and interests close to the Catholic Church – which
has squeezed out the NSi. The SMS has been unable to develop an idiosyncratic social
appeal beyond what all of the established parties have been developing in the area of youth
policy or other policies seeking to solve particular problems of certain segments of youth.
Coalition potential
Being embedded in the party system structure is closely related to a new party’s coalition
potential.
Among the four parties, only the DeSUS has been able to be a part of all of the last four
governing party coalitions since it entered parliament (in 1996) regardless of the
government’s prevalent ideological colour.
The SMS has kept its centre-left image even though it has tried to stay out of the left-right
ideological divisions. Although it did not participate formally in the centre-left coalition of
2000–2004, its support for the LDS-led government was awarded with the position of Head
of the Youth Policy Office. After deciding to compete at the 2008 elections with a combined
list with the SLS, it lost MP seats despite the list actually entering parliament.
Both the NSi (centre-right) and Zares (centre-left) have been ideologically profiled clearly
enough to be situated to only one particular side on the left-right ideological continuum.
Zares has so far participated in one centre-left coalition, while the NSi has participated in two
centre-right coalitions (2000–2000, 2004–2008). In normal political circumstances the
positioning of either of these parties within a coalition government of the opposite ideological
colour would be difficult to imagine.
CONCLUSIONS
Our empirical research has shown that institutional rules clearly do matter in general for the
success of new parliamentary parties but, due to the stability of the institutional rules, they
have not made a substantial difference to the electoral successes of the parties investigated
14 It was only in June 2011 that the establishment of a new party (Party of Labour) was announced by
a letter from the former member of the DeSUS parliamentary club and declaring to fill in a niche that
the DeSUS and other parties have been unable to fill.
21
in a particular country (Slovenia). However, the patterns of party competition – which also do
matter – have been more dynamic. Nevertheless, in Slovenia they have been favourable to
the success of new parties. Contrary to expectations, contextual circumstances (the
presence of political scandals and high levels of distrust in parliament and political parties) do
not seem to matter.
It has been revealed that (beside the favourable institutional milieu and favourable pattern of
party competition), for a new party to enter parliament the following necessary preconditions
need to be fulfilled (preconditions that have been met by all new parties entering parliament):
previously existing organisational resources; an appeal to particular social groups with some
elements of catch-all politics and a particular embedment in the existing system of party
divisions. This has been the case for all four parties investigated – the DeSUS, SMS, NSi
and Zares. Nevertheless, in order to maintain a long-term parliamentary position newcomers
also need to satisfy the sufficient preconditions. Apart from the necessary preconditions
listed above, they also need to focus on a long-term policy issue that is vital for a large
proportion of a targeted social group; this social group needs to represent an important share
of the electorate without having serious competitors and the party needs to have high
coalition potential. Only the DeSUS has so far succeeded in fulfilling the preconditions
allowing successful endurance in the parliamentary arena.15
To conclude, the paper suggests the need to separate the analysis of new party emergence
from the analysis of the durability of new parties. While focusing on a post-communist party
system, it offers an analytical framework for examining the durability of new parties in the
framework of fragmented party systems while taking the changing characteristics of party
competition patterns into account according to Mair’s indicators (2006). Unlike much
research it has taken account of the ideological characteristics of new parties when
comparing their success, but ultimately suggests that instead of the overall ideological
positioning of new parties their particular issue orientation seems to be crucial. Further
15 What may challenge the success of the DeSUS in the future are the growing internal (ideological)
divisions leading to the emergence of a new contender with appeal to more or less the same social
groups (the fusion of resources of the non-party organisation the League of Pensioners’ Associations
led by Kožuh Novak and a newly established party the Democratic Party of Labour led by a former
member of DeSUS’ parliamentary club). To a certain extent, the DeSUS’ party leader’s (Karel Erjavec)
indirect linkage to the still unresolved/unconcluded Patria corruption scandal very much burdened by
the left-right party cleavage in the Slovenian party system might also be used in future political
campaigning against the DeSUS (In 2008, what has so far been the biggest corruption affair in
Slovenia broke out – claims of Slovenian officials having been bribed by the Finnish state-owned
company Patria to help finalise the purchase of armoured personnel carriers for the Slovenian army.
Erjavec was a defence minister at the time of signing the contract in question, but he exempted
himself from the process of selecting the provider of such vehicles).
22
comparative research is required to draw more broadly valid conclusions, involving: a) a
wider variety of both contextual circumstances (including institutional rules and patterns of
party competition) among post-communist party systems; and b) a greater variety of party
systems (both post-communist and older democracies).
23
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27
APPENDIX
Table 1: The characteristics of new parliamentary parties according to their short- and long-term parliamentary successes
SMS 2000 NSi 2000 Zares 2007 DeSUS 1990
Organisational source of the new party
Civil society organisation of students and youth
Partly former party structures (SCD) Partly former party structures (LDS) and the AS Party, plus a civil society organisation
Civil society organisation of pensioners
Existence of a sponsor organisation
- Network
- Cadre (MPs and members of the highest party body)
Yes A well-developed network of different youth organisations Yes
Yes The well-developed network of the SCD Yes
Yes An inherited network of local organisations of the AS Party Yes
Yes A well-developed network of different organisations of pensioners (and disabled persons) Yes
Party development Territorial diffusion (later combined with territorial penetration)
Territorial penetration (later combined with territorial diffusion)
Territorial penetration (later combined with territorial diffusion)
Territorial diffusion (later combined with territorial penetration)
Party appeal – social group
Youth; later also an environmental appeal
Catholics + catch-all appeal The educated and those in the education process, living in urban centres, entrepreneurs + catch-all appeal
Pensioners, later an appeal to the socially handicapped
Party appeal – share of votes
Youth – 20% of the electorate Catholic conservative stratum A segment with social-liberal and green-liberal values
Pensioners – 30% of the electorate
Party appeal – characteristics of policy focus (all issues; narrow issues)
Narrow issue – the economic situation of youth
All issues All issues Narrow issue – the economic situation of pensioners
Political embedment – Self-placement on the cleavage structure
(New) long-term cleavage + materialism vs. post-materialism
Alongside the established cleavage, but especially liberalism vs. conservatism
Alongside the established cleavage, but especially materialism vs. post-materialism
(New) long-term cleavage + liberalism vs. welfare state
Political embedment – coalition potential (L,R, both)
Centre-left Centre-right Centre-left Both
Publicly exposed political leader
No (Černjak, Krajnc) No (Bajuk, Novak) Yes (Golobič) Not at first (Sisinger, Globačnik, Kušar, Rous); Yes later (Erjavec)
