The Space Station-Laboratory for Policy Sustainment

8/6/2019 The Space Station-Laboratory for Policy Sustainment

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The Space Station: A Laboratory for Policy Sustainment

by

Jeff M. Bingham

Abstract

Since January 2001, when a nearly $4 billion cost over-run was identified by the Bush-Cheney Transition Team, and subsequently verified by NASA, the International SpaceStation has been a focus of criticism and complaint. In the past year, as attention hasbeen focused on the notion of leaving Earth orbit, within the framework of the newVision for Exploration articulated by President George W. Bush, the space station hasbeen viewed by some as perhaps the single greatest impediment to returning to the Moonand going on to Mars. A review of the policy history of the space station, and especiallythe manner in which that policy grew from concept to program and was sustained, despiteserious and consistent opposition, to the reality of hardware--and crews--on orbit suggeststhat assessment to be inaccurate. This paper traces some of the highlights of that

historical path, and points out a number of lessons learned from that experience whichhave relevance to the challenge of sustaining any long-term space exploration policyinitiative in the future.

Conceptual History

In 1869, south-central Maine became the fanciful launch site of a 200-foot diameter spacestation, made of clay bricks, and occupied by thirty-seven individuals who had taken upresidence in the thirteen named modules within the structure to escape the NewEngland cold. The premature launch was the result of a sudden strong downpour, whichcaused the Brick Moon to be dislodged from its supports and roll onto the hugecounter-rotating flywheels that had been spinning up for two years to build up the energyneeded to propel the sphere into orbit.

The entertaining tale told by Edward Everett Hale in the Atlantic Monthly magazine doesnot appear to have influenced future contemplation of a space station as a serioustheoretical construct. It is doubtful that Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, then about twelve yearsold living in Kaluga, Russia, had access to the magazine, though it is widely held that themore widely-known and read Jules Verne had caused sparks in Tsiolkovksys fertilemind. In 1898, Tsiolkovsky wrote an article entitled Exploration of the Universe withReaction Machines, which was published in 1903, and represents the first seriousdiscussion of the potential for a manned space station.

Other writers followed and expanded on Hales fantasy and Tsiolkovskys informedspeculation over the years: Herman Oberth, in 1923, Herman Noordung and Baron Guidovon Pirquet in 1928, H.E. Ross and R.A. Smith in 1948, H.H. Koelle in 1951 and, ofcourse, Wernher von Braun in 1952.

It was not until late 1959, however, that a space station found expression, at least in theUnited States, in what may be seen as a preliminary policy document of a government


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agency. Issued on December 15, 1959, when NASA was just a little over a year old, itsLong-Range Plan for space exploration envisioned, among other things, the launchingof satellites and proving of launch vehicles in 1960 and 1961, the attainment of mannedspace flight with Project Mercury in 1961 or 1962, the launching of unmanned probes toVenus and/or Mars in 1962, launching of an unmanned vehicle for a controlled landing

on the Moon in 1963 or 1964, followed by launching of an robotic circumlunar vehicleand returning it to Earth in 1964, the establishment of a program in the 1965-1967 timeframe leading to circumlunar flight and to a permanent near-Earth space station, followedby a piloted flight to the Moon Beyond 1970. In short, from the human spaceflightpoint of view, develop man-rated space vehicles, get to orbit, establish a permanent spacestation in orbit, and then go to the Moon.

Early Russian space successes and the geopolitical realities of the day led to thejuxtaposition of the last two stated goals, of course, and thus Apollo became the priorityfrom May 25, 1961 to 1969. Despite Apollos clear priority, however, a great deal ofwork was done in NASA and within the aerospace contractor community on space station

concepts throughout the sixties. Over one hundred space station studies were conductedby NASA and industry between 1961 and 1967. The eventual expression of much of thatwork became the Skylab Program, which provided the United States with its first realoperational space station between its launch in May 1973 and the departure of its thirdcrew in February 1974.

Though it demonstrated the capability and viability of a space station, Skylab was neverarticulated as the embodiment of a policy of maintaining a permanent presence in orbit,as envisioned in the 1959 plan. Though some hope existed for several years that it mightbe reconstituted with the advent of shuttle flights, delays in the shuttle developmentschedule made it impossible to return to Skylab before it de-orbited in July 1979.

April 12, 1981 saw the launch of Space Shuttle Columbia on her maiden voyage, and theshuttle era began, opening the door for discussion of the next logical step in the USmanned space program. At the same time, the new Administration of Ronald Reaganwas assuming the reins of power in the White House, and NASAs new Administratorand Deputy Administrator, James Beggs and Hans Mark, both identified a permanentmanned space station as that logical next step in their confirmation hearing in June 1981.

Within months of assuming their positions, they created a Space Station Task Force tobegin to focus on the kind of space station program that could be presented to thePresident as a proposed major space policy initiative.

Finally, a Policy

NASA leadership was ready, by the end of 1983, to press for a favorable presidentialdecision on space station development. Through a creative and effective process that hasbeen amply described by Dr. Howard McCurdy, that decision was obtained andannounced by the President in his State of the Union address on January 25, 1984. TheUS government, especially NASA, finally had a space station development policy.


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The next three years saw the movement from design concepts to engineering drawings.Moving from concept to hardware on orbit has been a complex path for the space station,as illustrated in the following diagram.

Design and Development

Through the period of August 1981 to the end of 1985, competitive studies wereconducted by primary aerospace corporations leading to the selection of a referenceconfiguration for the space station. In 1986, a baseline configuration was adopted andinitial contracts were issued for hardware design and development.

Fits and Starts

As annual funding levels for NASA fluctuated, and as NASAs congressional committeeslevied additional design requirements and changes, both the design features anddevelopment schedules were adjusted. In 1987, the Congress required a restructuring ofthe space station which resulted in modifications in module size and internalconfigurations. In 1988, the Congress mandated a rephrasing of the programdevelopment schedule and elimination of some program elements, such as the free-flyingpolar observation platform, and the Flight-Telerobotic Servicing system. Other planned


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missions were dropped from the program, such as orbital servicing and the associatedorbital maneuvering vehicle. The following chart provides a visual representation of thesort of congressional direction provide to the space station.

Last Chance/Redesign

By late 1992 it was obvious that the changes in the program and rescheduling--orstretching out of development, along with management inefficiencies, was leading to aprojected cost increase of nearly $2 billion. November 1992 also marked a change inAdministration, with the election of former Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton and SenatorAl Gore as President and Vice President. Senator Gore had been chairman of NASAsauthorizing committee in the Senate and had demonstrated a continuing interest in spaceprojects, though the issue was never a matter of debate during the campaign.

With the emerging evidence of a serious cost increase in the space station, the first space-related action of the Clinton Administration was to mandate a redesign of the spacestation to reduce costs. The White House appointed a committee headed by Dr. CharlesVest to examine redesign options provided by separate NASA teams. Between Marchand June of 1993, NASA and its contractors prepared three separate options for reviewby the Vest Committee. On June 7, 1993, the Commission made its recommendation tothe White House for further consideration of Options A and C. This position was clearly


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at odds with the preference stated by several key members of Congress, who supportedthe more Freedom-derived option B, which, they felt, protected the significant financialinvestment in the program to that date. That position was clearly reflected in theCommittee Report accompanying H.R. 2200, the NASA Authorization Legislation forFY 1994/1995, which was issued on June 10, 1993. (See pages 28-31) It was also clearly

stated on the House floor by several members during consideration of VA-HUD-IA 1974Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2491) on June 28, 1993. (See Congressional Record, Vol. 139,No. 92, pages H4154-H4155.)

On June 17th, the President announced his support for a Scaled-down version ofFreedom, described as Option A-2 and directed NASA to work with the Congress andwith international partners to refine the redesign configuration over a ninety-day period,including consideration for adding Russia to the international space station partnership.

Expanded Partnership

On September 9, 1993, a modified configuration known as Russian Alpha was releasedby NASA. Formal negotiations between and among NASAs traditional station partnersand Russia continued, and in December the Russians were formally invited into theinternational partnership dedicated to developing and using the space station.

The Russians, of course, brought enormous experience in space station operations, havingchosen to focus their space efforts in that arena at about the same time the US chose thedevelopment of the space shuttle as the next step after the successful Apollo program.They also brought existing hardware and systems that could be used to offset thedevelopment of new capabilities by the previous partners and the US, most notably, fcourse, the propulsion/reboost system via the Service Module, which had been the baseblock for Mir 2, and the Soyuz crew vehicle and Progress resupply modules. At the time,estimates were that these capabilities would save almost $2 billion in development costsand fifteen months in deployment schedule for the space station. Those savings estimateswere probably fairly accurate, but, to the extent they were realized they were offset bysubsequent delays and requirements that have given some critics cause to suggest thatbringing Russia into the program was more a liability than an asset. That may be adebatable issue, but recent events make it clear that without the Russian capabilities thespace station would, at this writing, be an abandoned and deteriorating vehicle anxiouslyawaiting the return of the US space shuttle to prevent its premature and possiblydisastrous de-orbit and restore it to functionality.

There were other ramifications of the Russian participation that will be noted below,relevant to the matter of the coalition of political support for the space station in thedebates that have occurred in the years since 1993.

Near-Death Experience?

While the redesign and subsequent partnership negotiations were under way, thecongressional schedule for consideration of NASA--and space station-- authorizations


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and appropriations continued. The redesign teams had briefed key members and staffmembers as the redesign progressed, but the NASA authorization bill came to the floor ofthe House of Representatives not long after the Vest Committee recommendations, onJune 23, 1993. NASA and space station advocates were at a decided disadvantage inarguing for support of a space station that had not yet been fully redefined. Key members

of the House authorization committee had made it clear during the redesign that whateverthe new configuration would be, it should rely heavily on making use of the design anddevelopment already completed--and paid for--within the Freedom program. While itappeared that objective, at least, had been met in the Vest Committee recommendations,enough uncertainty continued to make the outcome of the debate unclear. In the end, thevote against the Roemer amendment to kill the space station program was 224-225--a onevote margin in favor of keeping the program alive.

Many cite this near-death experience as evidence of how close the space station cameto being terminated by the U.S. Congress. The fact is that, while a close vote, it was avote on an amendment to an authorization bill--the kind of legislation that has become

less and less necessary for program support. NASA has gone eight years at a stretchwithout having an authorization bill passed by both houses of Congress. Programs live ordie more on the basis of funding than formal authorization. That is a peculiarity--and inthe authors view, an aberration--of the federal budget process that suggests a separatearea of commentary and inquiry beyond the scope of this paper.

With respect to the FY 1994 appropriation the attempted amendment to deny funding forthe space station was defeated by a vote of 220 to 196 on June 28, 1993. A healthiermargin, of course. More telling, however, is the subsequent vote in the US Senate on asimilar effort to deny space station funding, which was defeated on September 21, 1993by a vote of 59 to 40. That margin of support in the US Senate has been relativelyconstant throughout the life of the space station program. The author is convinced that,even had the station been defeated in the authorization bill--a bill that never came to avote in the Senate, it would still have been sustained in the appropriations legislation inthe House and in the Senate. And had the authorization bill passed the House withoutincluding the space station, the station would likely have been reinstated by the Senateand the issue resolved in favor of the space station in the final conference report of theauthorization bill.

It should be recalled that two years before, the House Appropriations Subcommittee withresponsibility for NASA funding had actually terminated the funding for the space stationin its report of the NASA appropriations bill. Most often, such an action by the cognizantappropriations subcommittee has sufficient authority to be sustained by the fulllegislative body. However, an amendment on the floor of the House restored the spacestation funding by a vote of 240 to 173 on June 6, 1991. In 1992, the Chairman of theHouse VA-HUD-IA Subcommittee attempted again to delete space station funding via anamendment to the appropriations legislation. That amendment was rejected by the Houseon July 29, 1992, by a vote of 181-237.


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Elements of a Strategy for Sustainment

Despite the probability that the space station would have survived the 1993 congressionaldeliberations, in the final analysis, the narrow margin in the vote on June 8 causedsufficient alarm within NASA and the supporting contractor community to prompt the

initiation of an expanded, focused effort to prepare for future anticipated stationtermination in the Congress. Efforts within the aerospace contractor community centeredheavily around two primary efforts: The National Keep It Sold effort and, in theWashington, DC area, the Space Station Associates. These corporate-based coalitions hadtheir governmental counterparts within NASA.

At NASA Headquarters, in anticipation of the 1994 congressional debates on spacestation, the NASA White House Liaison, Chris Dunn, and the Associate Administratorfor Legislative Affairs, Jeff Lawrence, established a loosely-organized structure whichthey referred to as the War Room (more formally referred to as the Space StationInformation Center or, in its 1996 iteration, the NASA Information Center) to prepare

informational materials that could be made available to Members of Congress in responseto issues raised about the space station prior to and during the debate. Organized underthe combined authority of the Administrators Office, and the Office of LegislativeAffairs, the War Room included representation from other Headquarters offices, namely,the Office of Space Flight, the Office of Public Affairs, the Office of External Affairs(International), and the Office of Life and Microgravity Sciences. Representation of theseoffices was generally provided by a Deputy Associate Administrator from thoseorganizations or another senior staff designee. A common work area for the War Roomwas established in a conference room provided by the Office of Spaceflight, with severalwork-stations established there and used by designated staff support from theparticipating organizations. Personnel from the space station program office in Houstonwere sent on temporary duty assignments to support the War Room for several weeksprior to anticipated floor consideration of space station-related legislation.

In early 1994, the Space Station Program manager, Randy Brinkley, began assessing themeans by which the Program Office, located at Johnson Space Center (JSC), could moreeffectively provide support to NASA Headquarters efforts to keep the Congress moreadequately informed about the space station program. In midsummer a agreement wasreached with the NASA Chief of Staff, Michael Mott, and Jeff Lawrence, the AssociateAdministrator for Legislative Affairs, to create a position of Legislative AffairsCoordinator within the Program Office at JSC. The position was a Headquarters position,formally within the Liaison Division of the Office of Legislative Affairs, but physicallylocated at JSC in the office of the Program Manager. This enabled the Office ofLegislative affairs to have a representative who was integrated into the technical anddevelopmental management activity of the space station program, and in a position toidentify and address emerging issues that would be of interest or concern to Members ofCongress and develop, in conjunction with the technical expertise at the program officelevel, appropriate briefing materials and response materials to communicate those issues--and their resolution--to the Congress, as needed. This arrangement also enabled thespace station management team to be better informed about the interests and concerns of


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the Congress vis--vis the space station, and to better understand the accountabilityrequirements and obligations of the Agency to the Congress.

Between 1994 and late 1996 a number of congressional staff and Member visits to JSCand the space station program office were conducted which effectively addressed known

and emerging issues and kept the staff and Members well-informed about the progress ofthe space station program. Potentially controversial problems were identified early and inmany cases mitigated or avoided altogether as a result of the close interaction andcommunication. More will be said about the significance of this activity below.

During 1994 and 1995 the space station legislative coordinator was temporarily relocatedat NASA Headquarters to support the War Room effort at Headquarters for brief periodsof time leading up to, and including, active floor consideration of space station-relatedlegislation in the Congress. In 1996, that individual was tasked by the Office oflegislative Affairs to manage the War Room effort, beginning in April of that year. InSeptember 1996, the War Room/Space Station Information Center was made a permanent

entity at Headquarters, managed by the space station legislative coordinator, who wasthen permanently relocated to NASA Headquarters.

During the same time period, the Office of Space Flight underwent some organizationalchanges, and increased program management responsibility for the space station programwas delegated to the JSC Center Director. Within that framework, and with the departureof the legislative affairs coordinator from the Program Office, that function was largelymaintained by the Space Station Program Chief of Staff, working in close cooperationwith the Space Station Information Center at Headquarters, and with JSC personneldesignated by the Center Director. In late 1997, that activity was augmented andformalized in the Program Office with the establishment of an External CommunicationsControl Board (ECCB). The charter for this activity stated its purpose as:

The ECCB is an executive level board which establishes a baseline for andcontrols subsequent changes to delegated the ISSP Integrated ExternalCommunications Plan. This control board provides a forum for identifyingcommon messages/themes in order to optimize participation by ECCB memberorganizations. Not only will the ECCB serve as a decision making forum, it willalso play a significant role in the initial planning among the following disciplines:

Congressional Liaison (House and Senate activities, ISSP themes, etc.) Education (Curriculum, On-orbit educational projects, etc.)

General Public (Outreach, Informational Products, etc.) Research Media (Videos, Fact Sheets, Roundup Articles, Media Relations, etc.) Review Panels (ASAP, ACISS, SSUAS, IIAP, Stafford, IAR) -- Ad Hoc

basis

Members of the Board included both NASA and contractor employees with primaryresponsibility for the space station-related activities within the identified disciplines,


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whether at JSC or at NASA Headquarters, including participation from the WarRoom/NASA/Space Station Information Center. Thus, the ECCB was intended to assistin coordinating and supplementing those activities, rather than duplicating them orsupplanting them.

From December of 1997 to late 1998, this organization met roughly weekly to considerthemes and messages for presenting the space station story to the media and externalinterests. By early 1999, the ECCB activity was absorbed into the structured publicaffairs operations at JSC.

The primary missions of both the ECCB and War Room were:

Identify issues and emerging areas of concern regarding space station design,development, cost and schedule.

Develop coordinated and uniform responses to those issues, both within thecontractor and governmental participants respectively, and between thegovernment and contractors.

Establish a systematic method of providing rapid responses to new issues thatmay be raised in the course of debates on space station.

Develop or review the development of materials that effectively communicatedthe roles and missions of the space station.

At NASA Headquarters, an additional role for the War Room, acting through and underthe auspices of the Office of Legislative Affairs, was liaison with the Congress. The

primary activities of the War Room in the conduct of this role were:

Development of Space Station Status summary and Whip Card for use byMembers of Congress in discussion and debate.

Attendance at and interaction with Whip meetings organized by Members ofCongress in support of space station.

Identification and scheduling of Member Visits by the NASA Administrator todiscuss space station status and issues.

Preparation of Fact Sheets and Talking Points related to identified issues andconcerns. Development of responses to media articles or statements regarding space station

issues

Compilation of briefing books and structured reference materials and visual aidsfor use by requesting Members of Congress.


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Establishment of real-time rapid response capability to address emerging issues.Some elaboration on several of the above-listed activities is in order to more completelyillustrate the implementation of key elements of what was, in effect, a strategy for

sustainment of the space station as a policy objective. For purposes of this summary, fouraction categories are identified, within which the various activities fall--and whichserve as the primary elements of the generic sustainment strategy suggested by the spacestation experience.

Information

Fundamental to any public policy, of course, is its articulation and justification. This mustbe done both internally to the agency or organization responsible for implementing thepolicy and externally, to the public, to the Congress, and to other interested and investedindividuals and organizations, using vehicles appropriate to the respective audiences.

With regard to internal information dissemination suffice it to say, for purposes of thisdiscussion, that they obviously should be consistent in general content with externalinformation instruments. Essential to information conveyed to external audiences is theidentification and consistent use of major themes and messages conveying the nature,purpose and value of the policy and its instruments of implementation.

The space station experience illustrates both failures and successes in the disseminationof information to external audiences. Where the effort has failed it has often been due to alack of consistency in the messages about the roles, missions and justifications of thespace station. This inconsistency was not always the fault of NASA or space stationmanagement, since the space station was subjected to numerous modifications and

changes directed by the Congress, especially in the years from 1985 to 1992. Additionalchanges were mandated within the various Administrations, most often by budgetaryconsiderations and evolving priorities. As budgets were reduced or limited, features wereremoved, modified or development schedules were extended. Documentation,explanation and impacts of these changes were often not effectively communicated toexternal interests, resulting not only in uncertainty and confusion about goals, roles ormissions, but also occasionally leading to conflict and controversy between and amonginstitutions of interest. (An interesting case in point is the effort in 1987-1988 to developa free-flying orbital laboratory known first as the Industrial Space Facility, as proposedby the Space Industries Corporation, and then referred to, generically, as aCommercially-Developed Space Facility. Space does not permit an elaboration of thatexample, but the reader is invited to explore it independently.)

As will be noted below, the competition for elements and facilities to survive the ebb andflow of resources and priorities sometimes made it difficult to sustain consistent themesand messages among the various constituencies interested and involved in space stationdevelopment. The establishment of the ECCB at JSC was an effort to address these kindsof consensus-undermining pressures.


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In addition, at NASA Headquarters, a counterpart effort was maintained from roughly1994 to the present, to interact with an organized activity of contractors involved in spacestation development, known as the Space Station Associates. This coalition of corporaterepresentatives met generally on a weekly basis to discuss space station status and issuesand, when possible, coordinate responses and address developments being raised in the

media or within the Congress. Representatives of the NASA Office of LegislativeAffairs, the War Room, and the Office of Space Flight frequently participated in thosediscussions, providing information on space station development status and issues beingaddressed by NASA and the space station program.

Collaboration

The breadth and scope of any major public policy implementation results in a significantnumber of separate entities becoming interested and involved, at varying levels ofactivity. This is especially true of a large-scale and multi-faceted project such as theInternational Space Station.

Internal to NASA, a number of distinct organizational entities are involved directly in thespace station program, including the Offices of Space Flight, the Office of Biological andPhysical Research, the Office of Mission Safety and Quality Assurance and, now theOffice of Exploration Technology. In addition, there are Center management offices,program offices, and policy offices, and matrixed--assigned support--elements, such asportions of engineering directorates, financial management staff, etc. These also, ofcourse, have changed and evolved over time as structural changes have been madethroughout the agency and its Centers. Maintaining institutional memory and effectivecollaborative efforts in such a situation is a Herculean task. The details of how that hasbeen managed over time are not within the scope of this paper. The relevance here is thatthe success or failure of those internal efforts have an impact on the ability to consistentlyand accurately convey the status of the program to external interests.

In addition to the many elements of NASA involved with the space station program thereare a host of contractor personnel, ranging from the prime contractor to subcontractorsand vendors all across the country and in participating partner nations. To a large extent,representatives of the major contractor organizations are integrated with the NASA/civilservant work-force within the primary space station organizational elements at theprogram level, though the degree of such integration has varied over the life of theprogram. At a higher, or policy level, senior NASA managers and senior contractorrepresentatives have maintained collaborative efforts and communication and integrationon a regular basis, in a variety of forums over the life of the program, (SDOM-SpaceStation Development and Operations Meetings 1995-1997; Program Manager Reviews,etc.) most recently in the Space Station Control Board. The bulk of material and issuesconsidered in these forums were of a technical nature, affecting hardware and softwaredesign and development, as well as managerial, including schedule and budget-related orcontract-related issues of performance and accountability.


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From its beginning as an announced policy of the US government, the space station hasbeen viewed as an international endeavor, combining the resources and expertise of nowsixteen nations. Beginning with the 1992 discussions between President Bush andRussian President Yeltsin regarding shuttle and Mir flight exchange visits, leadingeventually to the Phase One Shuttle-Mir Program, and the 1993 formal invitation for

Russia to join the space station partnership, the interaction between the US and Russia inthe station program has become highly involved.

All members of any partnership bring both assets and burdens. The chief burden is theexpanded necessity for collaboration and effective integration of what may be verydifferent management, development and operational approaches and supportinginfrastructures. Other collateral issues may also impact the partnership, such as real orperceived policy differences between and among various partners in areas not evenrelated to the program itself, as has been the case with US and Russian policy on missiletechnology controls.

Regardless of the specific nature of collateral issues impacting international partnerships,vehicles must be developed for managing the collaborative activities. In the case of thespace station, these vehicles have been established and maintained through the use of anIntergovernmental Agreement (IGA) signed by all participants and through Memorandaof Understanding (MOUs) formally signed by senior representatives of the governmentsand agencies involved. Those agreements have been implemented, in turn, through theuse of coordinating vehicles such as the Multilateral Coordinating Board (MCB), theSpace Station Control Board (SSCB) and, at the more technical level, bi-lateral andmulti-lateral Joint Program Reviews (JPRs) and Technical Information Meetings (TIMs),as well as daily interactions among counterpart entities and individuals throughcorrespondence, email, or in direct meetings or via teleconference.

Yet another area of collaboration regarding the space station lies in the realm of non-governmental interest groups and organizations interested in space station developmentand utilization, and in space policy and space exploration in general. These organizationshave members and supporting constituencies from a wide range of backgrounds andinterests, and have their own short-term and long-term goals and missions that may bedifferent from, and sometimes in conflict with, the stated policy underlying andsupporting the space station.

An essential element of successful policy sustainment is to make every effort to ensurethat the wide array of active participants in the support and implementation of that policymaintain the maximum level of collaboration in efforts at the lowest commondenominator of their interests--those matters upon which they are able to agree and whichare mutually beneficial to their interests. That much is obvious. The challenge is to findthe means to secure that collaboration. In the post-1993 space station experience, thateffort was largely coordinated through the War Room and conducted by itsparticipating organizations.


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A final comment about collaboration, which will be elaborated upon in portions of thepaper to follow, regards the matter of collaboration with--and within--the Congress.

All too frequently, in the authors view, the relationship between legislative andexecutive branches is conducted in an adversarial atmosphere. To a certain extent, it was

undoubtedly the view of Americas Founding Fathers that there should be a healthytension between those elected to Congress to enact the public will and those elected--andespecially those appointed--to carry out the mandates agreed upon by the Congress. Tothe extent there is a healthy skepticism between elected officials and the bureaucraticstructures of an increasingly large and complex government that can work against thepotential abuses of centralized authority, that tension should be preserved.

There are times, however, when that tensions and skepticism leads to unnecessary andcounterproductive conflict, or at the very least to a reduction in the ability to takeconcerted action when it is clearly in the best interests of the country to do so. Theexploration of space is not, and has never been, the subject of partisan political discord.

Major space policies have been articulated and supported by both major political partieswithin the US political structure since the beginning of the Space Age, and while therehave been differences in view regarding the priority for space-related expenditures ofpublic funds versus expenditures for other public programs, space exploration has beenbroadly accepted as an important national objective. Space policy is a realm of publicpolicy activity that therefore is an appropriate venue for greater collaboration between theExecutive and Legislative branches of government within the US political and policy-making process.

The history of congressional interaction with NASA contains numerous examples of ahigh degree of collaborative interaction versus antagonistic or adversarial conduct. Theauthor spent sixteen years as Chief of Staff to a U.S. Senator who was both personallyinterested in space exploration activities and had formal legislative responsibilities vis--vis the civil space programs between 1975 and 1992, first as a member of the SenateAeronautics and Space Committee, and then as a member, Ranking Member, andChairman of the Appropriations subcommittee responsible for NASA funding. ThatSenator, Jake Garn, from the state of Utah, believed strongly in developing open andcooperative relationships with the agencies with which he had a jurisdictionalrelationship. Examples of the success and value of that collaborative relationship are toonumerous to begin to recount here. What is relevant is that it was demonstrably possibleto establish and maintain such a relationship without compromising the respectivelegislative and executive roles as defined in the US Constitution and to achieve importantresults in support of the nations interests in space exploration.

As will be seen below, a fundamental contributing feature to the success of suchlegislative-executive collaboration is thorough, ongoing and honest two-waycommunications. This seems almost too obvious to state, but in an adversarialrelationship, free and open communications are the first casualty, followed rapidly by theloss of trust and mutual confidence which make it difficult if not impossible to build


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effective policy consensus between the separate but equal branches of the USgovernment.

Anticipation

The most visible arena for policy debate in the US political system is the Congress.

Under the US Constitution, it is the Legislative Branch that creates the law, authorizes thecreation of Executive Departments and Agencies outside the White House, establishes thebudget authority for those departments, agencies and programs, and appropriates thefunding for all government activity. The bicameral nature of the Congress, and therespective composition, authority and functions of the House and Senate, make for whatis often seen as a confusing and agonizingly slow-moving deliberative process. Coupledwith the competing political agendas of the 535 individual Members of the House andSenate and the two major party organizations in each chamber, the entire process oflegislative consideration and enactment of legislation (i.e., policy) seems to defy analysisand understanding, even for those who follow it closely or are even a part of the process.(The author spent seventeen years as a senior staff member in the U.S. Senate and can

still find elements of the congressional process beyond comprehension.) Attempts toprovide abbreviated summary descriptions of the process abound, such as The Presidentproposes; the Congress disposes, or No President spends a dime not appropriated bythe Congress, and so on. Unfortunately, no catch-phrase can adequately capture thetotality of the process or the dynamics of the interaction of all the various elements.

The need to monitor and assess the actions of the Congress has spawned an ever-growingindustry of congressional representational organizations, loosely described aslobbyists who attempt to track issues and legislation through the Congress, and engagein efforts to affect the outcome of the process on behalf of their client corporations,individuals, interest-groups or associations. In addition to these specializedrepresentational entities, corporations and government agencies typically maintainGovernmental Affairs or Legislative Affairs elements within their organizationalstructure. Such units in federal governmental entities are somewhat restricted in thedegree of lobbying they can conduct, in the sense of trying to influence votes, andprimarily focus their activity in providing pertinent information to interested Members ofCongress. Executive Branch organizations are also limited in the messages they are ableto convey to the Congress by virtue of the incumbent Administration in the White Houseand its policy objectives and priorities. Formal testimony of agency officials, forexample, must be reviewed and approved by White House personnel--usually the Officeof Management and Budget--before being presented in hearings. The same is true ofmajor policy-related correspondence to the Congress.

The early stages of public policy formulation in the US system generally move at arelatively slow pace. The internal discussions are generally limited and closely-held, asoptions are considered before the final adoption of a policy position. If the policy lieswithin the scope of Executive Authority granted exclusively to the President, itspromulgation is usually carried out through public announcement and publication in theFederal Register. If the policy requires additional authority to be granted by theCongress, then it must be submitted as a proposed policy, either in the form of draft


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legislation, incorporated within the budget proposed by the President each year, or insome other formal way, such as an Agency Operating Plan or notification tocongressional committees of jurisdiction. In all these cases, it then becomes subject tosome form of congressional--and therefore public--response.

Before turning to the relevant space station policy history vis--vis congressionalconsideration, a brief synopsis of the elements of the legislative process may be useful.Budget proposals and proposed legislation are referred to the appropriate committees ofjurisdiction within the House, the Senate, or both, whether originating from the WhiteHouse or from individual Members of Congress. Appropriations legislation must, by theConstitution, originate in the House of Representatives. The committees of jurisdictionwill most often then prepare background materials for their members and conduct one ormore hearings regarding the issues addressed in the legislation. These can be at either orboth the subcommittee level or the full committee level, at the discretion of theCommittee Chair. The final committee action is generally referred to as a mark-up inwhich amendments to the proposed legislation are considered and, if agreeable to a

majority of members, a final version is then reported back to the full House or Senate forfloor deliberation. All legislation intended to have the force of law, must eventually passboth chambers in a form agreeable to both--most often after a conference committeecomprised of members of the relevant committees of jurisdiction of both chambers hasresolved any differences between House and Senate versions of the legislation. The resultof these conference committees, known as a Conference Report are placed before eachchamber for a vote and, if adopted, establish the language for drafting into the finallegislation to be sent forward for the action of the President, either signing it into law orvetoing it and returning it to the Congress for further action.

A further element of the general legislative process is important to note. In addition tothe consideration of legislation described above, the committees within both chambers ofthe Congress conduct what are referred to as oversight activities. These are essentiallymeasures taken by the committees--most actively by the authorizing committees--tomonitor and asses the manner in which previous authority and funding is implemented bythe recipients. These activities take the form of program reviews, in which agencypersonnel provide status information on programs for which they are responsible tocommittee staff and Members, committee investigations, which are more in-depth andfocused reviews of program details, hearings, in which program managers formallytestify regarding the status and their management of the programs, and special studies andreports requested by the committees of such entities as the General Accounting Office,the Office of Technology Assessment (No longer in existence, but relevant in the spacestation policy history), the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress,and sometimes independent reviewing entities established by the Congress or theAdministration or requested studies from organizations such as the National Academy ofScience or its subordinate Boards.

Eventually, the congressional process leads to its bottom line--the debate anddisposition of legislation on the floor of each chamber. A wide range of considerationsdetermine how the leadership of each chamber fix the schedule for floor debate. Very


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often that schedule is volatile and unpredictable. Consequently, the relatively slow,ponderous process of investigations, reports and hearings can suddenly transform into arapid-fire, almost breathtakingly rapid process of floor consideration. The enormouspress of legislative business results in very limited time to actually engage in floor debateon any given item of legislation. It is in the context of this final step in the process that

the element of anticipation manifests its essential necessity.

The post-1993 approach taken by NASA and external space station advocates focused agreat deal of effort in taking the steps necessary to be as prepared and equipped aspossible for the final floor debate on the space station, which included, every year from1993 to 2000, a concerted effort by space station opponents to kill the space station.Within NASA, responsibility for supporting this effort was focused in the WarRoom/Space Station Information Center, described above, which supported the Office ofLegislative Affairs in its congressional liaison function.

Activities to fulfill the function of issues anticipation and preparation centered around

three primary areas of interest: Emerging Issues, Statements by space station opponents,and major media articles.

Emerging issues were identified by close attention to the preparatory stages of legislationnoted previously: the results of studies or investigations conducted by or at the request ofcongressional committees or Members and testimony and commentary in relevanthearings. In addition, close attention was paid to internal developments within the spacestation program, in areas of cost, schedule, and technical issues, with a view toidentifying areas of concern.

Statements by space station opponents were collected, analyzed, and responses preparedand, where appropriate, provided to external interests or to staff or Members of Congress.Those responses were also catalogued for potential use during floor consideration oflegislation, should the issues be raised again in that context.

Major media articles, such as those appearing in major national or internationalmagazines, journals, or other news publications, were examined and responses preparedwhich addressed each salient point raised in the article, either by providing correct factualinformation, countervailing information, or alternative interpretations or conclusionsderived from the information included in the article. These were also distributed in real-time, as appropriate, to space station supporters and other interested staff and/or Membersof Congress, as well as catalogued and maintained for use during the consideration oflegislation on the floor of Congress.

The body of information collected and developed during the anticipatory processbecame a significant component of the fourth category of category, which is describedbelow.


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Communication

The fourth and perhaps most important category of activity is communication. This, asthe saying goes, is where the rubber meets the road in securing and sustaining a policy

commitment. The aggregation of information, the collaborative mechanisms andparticipants, and the anticipated issues and responses all flow together into the activitiesdesigned to communicate the content of and justifications for the stated policy.

Several key elements of successful communications can be identified. Among the mostimportant of these are Accuracy, Relevance, Responsiveness and Timing. The first twoare obvious on their face; the content of communications, in whatever form, must beaccurate and relevant to the interests of the recipient. Responsiveness and timing, ascontemplated in this paper, warrant some brief elaboration.

There is an unfortunate tendency within many large organizations, and especially, it

seems, within large government organizations, to develop boilerplate or templateresponses to requests for information or answers to frequently asked questions, especiallywhen there are large numbers of requests for similar information. Short, highly filteredminimal responses are developed and used to respond to key words or broad topical areasfound in incoming correspondence or requests for information. These products of whatcan be described as a mail-room mentality can be seriously counterproductive in theattempts to build support for a policy and to build a level of confidence in the Agency--inthis case, NASA--and its willingness and ability to impart useful and meaningfulinformation. Often, this approach is adopted in order to meet an objective for rapid andtimely responses. Obviously, the less time required to generate a response to an inquiry,the more quickly that response can be communicated. However, while a rapid responseby an agency to an inquiry is highly valued by a congressional staff member or Memberof Congress, for example, few things are less appreciated by them than an agencyresponse that leaves them wondering not only what is truly meant by the response, butwhy it appears that whoever generated the response could not have read or understood theinitial inquiry.

Maintaining effective communications with the Congress requires that considerable effortbe made to acknowledge the right--even the duty--of members of congress and their staffto obtain clear, complete and accurate program and policy-related information from afederal agency spending taxpayer dollars authorized and appropriated by the Congressand to prepare responses accordingly. If an incoming request appears vague or isotherwise unclearly stated, it should be incumbent on the agency to seek immediateclarification of what is being requested and what expectations are held for the agencyresponse. Telephones, emails, and even face-to-face meetings, if necessary, are quiteuseful in securing the necessary clarification. If an agency finds that difficult to do, it hasfailed badly in fulfilling its part of the collaborative activities mentioned above. Itshould also be noted that effective anticipatory activities, as described above, areintended to ensure that the information and materials needed for both responsive andtimely communications are already available.


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Among the effective tools for carrying out effective communications activities areagency briefing materials, talking points, fact sheets or white papers, speeches and/orstatements, either as delivered by senior agency officials or as drafted for use by externalsupporters and advocates, individual conversations, correspondence and meetings, and

material design for broader, mass audiences, such as audio-visual or multimediapresentations. During the post-1993 space station experience, all of these kinds of toolswere utilized in an effective, highly-coordinated manner.

Results

Without interviewing each Member of Congress who voted on space station amendmentsover the years, it is impossible to measure with certainty the impact of the steps andefforts described above. What is measurable is the record of votes cast over the period oftime discussed within the scope of this paper. The following charts provide a visualrepresentation of the shift in vote patterns over time in congressional deliberations on

space station:


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Numerous analyses exist which identify the major voting blocs and visible trends withinthe larger total numbers illustrated by these charts. As with almost any vote in theCongress, a wide range of considerations determine how and why any given Member willvote on a specific amendment or piece of legislation. Explanations abound as to whythere were dramatic swings in station-related vote outcomes in the House ofRepresentatives, while the outcomes in the Senate remained relatively constant. Someappear fairly obvious, such as the higher degree of member continuity in the Senate over

time, where there are six-year terms and only a third of the body is up for reelection everytwo years, versus the greater fluctuation in membership composition in the House, whichis up for re-election, in its entirety, every two years. Generally, when voting postures areestablished in the Senate it requires something fairly significant to prompt a change inthat posture over time.

What is important to note, for purposes of this paper, is that the vast majority of thepreviously-described efforts invested by NASA and its partners in the post-1993 periodwas directed at staff and Members of the House of Representatives rather than the Senate.The same basic information and material was made available to the Senate, but there wassimply less demand for its use in the context of the sort of stable vote outcomes reflected

in the above chart.

An additional point to remember is that the progress of the space station program did notsuddenly become trouble-free after 1994. Indeed, it could be argued that it faced evenmore difficult and complex issues than it had before the time, as contractors moved intoproduction, testing and integration of actual flight hardware and software, both within theUS and its partner nations, which included Russia as a key and, some would argue,difficult new partner in a significant and often controversial role in the redesigned space


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station. There was certainly no reduction in the number or aggressiveness of spacestation opponents during that period, both within the Congress and in the private,academic and scientific communities. Yet there was a clear, measurable and steadyincrease in the margins of support for the space station throughout the post-1993 period.

It is the authors belief and contention that the elements of a strategy of sustainmentbriefly outlined in this paper played an important role in securing that increased marginof support, at least through the end of 1998.

Hardware on Orbit

November 20, 1998 marked the initiation of on-orbit space station assembly with the firstelement launch. As would never have been imagined in 1984, that launch occurred fromthe steppes of Kazakhstan, with the launch of the Russian-built, U.S.-owned Zaryamodule--formerly known as the FGB, or Functional Cargo Block. Thirteen days later,on December 3rd, the space shuttle Endeavour launched, carrying the Unity Node on

what was the first true assembly flight, during which a new module was mated tohardware already on orbit. Zarya and Unity were mated on December 6, 1998, an eventthat marked the birth of what would become a New Star in the heavens.

With these two events, after almost 16 years, the policy statement uttered by PresidentReagan on January 25, 1984 had its visible manifestation in orbit. Subsequent to thecommencement of space station assembly, three more half-hearted attempts were made inthe House of Representatives by Representative Tim Roemer and others, to terminate thespace station. But, as has been illustrated, the wind was fairly well out of the sails ofthose attempts even before the first element launch. With hardware on orbit and muchmore completed hardware awaiting launch, there was little likelihood that the programwould be terminated, and the vote outcomes in 1999 and 2000 demonstrated the vastmajoritys acceptance of that fact. In July 2001, Representative Roemer offered and thenwithdrew without debate or vote an amendment to terminate the space station duringfloor consideration of NASA appropriations legislation. He then offered an amendmentwhich would have required NASA not to defer funding for several station elements whileforcing it to abide by a total funding cap--which would have created an impossiblesituation for the space station. That amendment was defeated by a voice vote.Representative Roemer retired from Congress at the end of 2002 without making anyfurther attempt to terminate the space station, and none have been made by otherMembers since that time. In the Senate, since the retirement of Senator Dale Bumpers atthe end of 1998, no further attempts have been made to terminate the station. Criticismand concerns about the space station, however, have not disappeared along with theformal attempts to kill it.

New Challenges, Tragedy and a New Policy Environment

The first week of November 2000 brought two major developments for spaceexploration; one that was obvious; another that wouldnt become so until more than threeyears later. The first came on November 2, 2000, when the Soyuz-TM module, launched


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on October 31, docked at the aft docking port of the Zvezda Service Module and theExpedition One crew entered the nascent space station to begin permanent habitation ofthe growing on-orbit facility.

The second development was the presidential election of 2000 which brought about a

change in the US Administration with the election of George W. Bush as President of theUnited States. A little over three years later, on January 14, 2004, President Bush wouldgo to NASA Headquarters and announce the initiation of a new Vision for Explorationwhich would redirect the US human space exploration effort on a path that would beintended to lead, eventually, far beyond the space station; back to the Moon, on to Mars,and beyond. It is, as has been noted earlier, the challenge of sustaining that vision whichhas prompted this review of the lessons learned from the space station experience.

It has not been a direct path of course, from the election of 2000 to the new Vision forExploration. More lessons--some extraordinarily painful--had yet to be learned. The firststeps began with the transition from the Clinton Administration to the Bush

Administration. The Bush-Cheney Transition Team asked former Bush (41)Administration official and commercial space entrepreneur Courtney Stadd to lead aNASA Transition Team to conduct a review of NASA, its programs, budget andmanagement, and prepare a review of its findings and recommendations for the newAdministration, to be sworn in the following January. This paper will not attempt toaddress the breadth and scope of the Transition effort. Suffice it so say that, during thecourse of that effort it became clear that the space station program was facing adisturbingly higher-than-expected estimate of the funding levels needed to complete itsassembly. As the numbers were checked--and double-checked by NASA--in the earlyweeks of 2001, it was announced that the shortfall for future funding requirements was$4 billion.

Needless to say, this created shock-waves of concern throughout the space stationconstituency, the Congress and the new Bush White House--especially the Office ofManagement and Budget. The initial response of the Administration to the space stationnews was reflected in the Budget Blueprint document, which was released on February28, 2001. For the space station, it meant a redefinition of assembly complete with theintroduction of the term US core complete, defined as that point at which the spacestation would be ready to accept major international hardware elements. Morespecifically--and of greater concern to space station supporters and potential researchers--was the elimination of funding for the Habitation Module, Crew Return Vehicle, andPropulsion Module, and the realignment of funding for U.S. research equipment andassociated support with assembly build-up. The net effect of those changes was alimitation of crew size to three, rather than the previously planned seven, posing thethreat of severe limitations on crew time for research. A carrot was offered that wasintended to force NASA to address cost and management issues that had led to the largedown-stream cost growth: future funding decisions to develop and deploy any U.S.elements or enhancements beyond completion of the U.S. core would depend on thequality of cost estimates, resolution of technical issues, and the availability of fundingthrough budget efficiencies. The Blueprint also spelled out specific reforms that NASA


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was expected to undertake in financial and program management, required anindependent review to validate cost estimates and other reform options, and transferredspace station program management reporting from JSC to Headquarters pendingdevelopment of a new program management plan.

The independent review called for began on July 30, 2001 with the appointment of theInternational Space Station Management and Cost Evaluation (IMCE) Task Force, whichwas tasked to report its findings and recommendations by November 1, 2001.

By the time the IMCE began its work, NASA had secured agreement with the WhiteHouse that efforts could be undertaken to explore opportunities to increase space stationcrew size, depending on success in financial reform efforts.

The combination of IMCE recommendations and FY 2003 Budget request led to creationof an effort to review space station research options and priorities in the context ofanticipated assembly schedules and on-orbit capabilities. The creation of a Research

Maximization and Prioritization Task Force (ReMAP) was announced on March 28, 2002and directed to complete its review and report by September 2002, with a preliminaryreport due in July to enable consideration of revised research objectives for the FY 2004budget submission.

NASA began 2003 with perhaps the best understanding of the true challenges andrealistic potential for space station development that it had had in many years--possiblyfor the life of the program. It did not yet have all the answers, but at least knew most ofthe questions. February 1, 2003 brought a terrible tragedy with the loss of the spaceshuttle Columbia and her crew, the grounding of the space shuttle fleet and, with it, theinterruption of space station assembly for what will eventually have been more than twoyears.

The accident was followed by an intense and comprehensive examination of the factorscausing and relating to the loss of the orbiter and crew, conducted by the ColumbiaAccident Investigation Board (CAIB), which released its findings on August 26, 2004. Inresponse to the Boards findings, and in consequence of its own internal investigations,NASA has initiated Return to Flight activities, including an additional independentReturn to Flight Task Group (RTFTG) to evaluate NASAs efforts to implement therecommendations of the CAIB. With respect to the space station, NASA initiated aContinuing Flight Team (CFT) to review the CAIB report and its applicability to thespace station and to ensure continuation of space station operations and development in amanner consistent with both the CAIB and IMCE recommendations. The CFT issuesperiodically-updated status reports on those activities, as Volume 2 of NASAs formalresponse to the CAIB.

All of these activities are crucial to the successful re-establishment and continuation ofUS space flight capability under any circumstances following the Columbia accident.With the announcement of the new Vision for Exploration in January of this year,


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however, they now serve as a sort of back-drop for that new Vision, which is now takingcenter stage in the US space policy arena.

That new Vision statement was accompanied by the creation of the PresidentsCommission on Implementation of United States Exploration Policy, created, as its title

states, to make recommendations for implementation of the new Vision. TheCommission, commonly referred to as the Aldridge Commission, after its Chairman, PeteAldridge, Jr., issued its report on June 4, 2004. That report offers a wide array ofsuggestions and recommendations regarding the next steps to be taken on what itdescribes as a journey to inspire, innovate and discover.

First among the Commissions Imperatives for Success in implementing the Vision isSustainability of the initiative over several decades, requiring the support of multiplePresidents, multiple Congresses, and a couple of generations of American taxpayers.The exact nature of a broad strategy to ensure that sustainment is, as yet, unknown. Thispaper has attempted to demonstrate that the space station policy sustainment experience

can be a source of valuable input into the evolution and implementation of that strategy.

Documents

The Space Station-Laboratory for Policy Sustainment