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University of Glasgow The Soviet Political Mind by Robert C. Tucker Review by: Allen Potter Soviet Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Jul., 1964), pp. 98-100 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/149776 . Accessed: 09/05/2014 19:48 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Taylor & Francis, Ltd. and University of Glasgow are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Soviet Studies. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 169.229.32.138 on Fri, 9 May 2014 19:48:43 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

The Soviet Political Mindby Robert C. Tucker

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Page 1: The Soviet Political Mindby Robert C. Tucker

University of Glasgow

The Soviet Political Mind by Robert C. TuckerReview by: Allen PotterSoviet Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Jul., 1964), pp. 98-100Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/149776 .

Accessed: 09/05/2014 19:48

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Taylor & Francis, Ltd. and University of Glasgow are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve andextend access to Soviet Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.138 on Fri, 9 May 2014 19:48:43 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 2: The Soviet Political Mindby Robert C. Tucker

investigations of the Reichstag on the causes of Germany s defeat. He has made no effort to explore in detail the evolution of popular senti- ment in the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands, although materials for this fascinating but unexplored subject are probably available in the form of contemporary local publications. While he does refer to a consider- able body of published primary sources, Mr. Pidhaini's main reliance- sometimes even for quotations from published sources-is on secondary works by Poles and Ukrainians. Unfortunately, too, he neglects to use such major scholarly works on the subject as those by Reshetar, Borys, and Markus.1 Consequently, while this little volume may have served the author's purpose of presenting an introduction for the reader unfamiliar with East European problems, any substantial scholarly evaluation of Mr. Pidhaini's work will have to await the appearance of the longer volume which he promises us.

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG

University of Wisconsin

Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind. London, Pall Mall Press, 1963. xiii+283 pp. 42s. Praeger paperback. I6s.

THIS is not a proper book but a collection of essays, most of which have been published before and are here reprinted with only minor changes. The studies that appear in print for the first time do not draw the material together. Professor Tucker claims that a main theme is 'the problem of Soviet change': 'The strategy of analysis has been to approach the problem of post-Stalin change through a study of Stalinism itself as a phenomenon of post-Lenin change. The result is a scheme of Soviet political development in which the concept "de- Stalinization" is defined by reference to its historical correlative, "Stalinization".' The reader is left to piece together the substance of Professor Tucker's analysis, and ought not to be blamed if he mis- interprets some of it.

The substance seems to be this. The Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917 reversed the trend of liberalization in Russian society and established a new dictatorial state authority, thereby setting 'the

1 John S. Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1952). Jury Borys, The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of the Ukraine (Stockholm,

Kunzl, Bocktryckeriet P.A. Norsteat & Sener, I960). Vasyl Markus, L' Ukraine sovietique dans les relations internationales et son statut en droit international,

1918-1923 (Paris, Editions Internationales, 1959).

investigations of the Reichstag on the causes of Germany s defeat. He has made no effort to explore in detail the evolution of popular senti- ment in the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands, although materials for this fascinating but unexplored subject are probably available in the form of contemporary local publications. While he does refer to a consider- able body of published primary sources, Mr. Pidhaini's main reliance- sometimes even for quotations from published sources-is on secondary works by Poles and Ukrainians. Unfortunately, too, he neglects to use such major scholarly works on the subject as those by Reshetar, Borys, and Markus.1 Consequently, while this little volume may have served the author's purpose of presenting an introduction for the reader unfamiliar with East European problems, any substantial scholarly evaluation of Mr. Pidhaini's work will have to await the appearance of the longer volume which he promises us.

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG

University of Wisconsin

Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind. London, Pall Mall Press, 1963. xiii+283 pp. 42s. Praeger paperback. I6s.

THIS is not a proper book but a collection of essays, most of which have been published before and are here reprinted with only minor changes. The studies that appear in print for the first time do not draw the material together. Professor Tucker claims that a main theme is 'the problem of Soviet change': 'The strategy of analysis has been to approach the problem of post-Stalin change through a study of Stalinism itself as a phenomenon of post-Lenin change. The result is a scheme of Soviet political development in which the concept "de- Stalinization" is defined by reference to its historical correlative, "Stalinization".' The reader is left to piece together the substance of Professor Tucker's analysis, and ought not to be blamed if he mis- interprets some of it.

The substance seems to be this. The Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917 reversed the trend of liberalization in Russian society and established a new dictatorial state authority, thereby setting 'the

1 John S. Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1952). Jury Borys, The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of the Ukraine (Stockholm,

Kunzl, Bocktryckeriet P.A. Norsteat & Sener, I960). Vasyl Markus, L' Ukraine sovietique dans les relations internationales et son statut en droit international,

1918-1923 (Paris, Editions Internationales, 1959).

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Page 3: The Soviet Political Mindby Robert C. Tucker

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stage for a rebirth of elements of the classical political system of Russian Czarism as it had existed before the great reforms of the mid-nineteenth century. It was Stalin, however, not Lenin, who made himself the key instrument of this process and restored the institution of the autocracy in all but name'. Although the Bolshevik party dictatorship provided a favourable milieu for Stalin's drive to absolute power, it did not make his autocracy inevitable. 'What converted the tendency into a historical reality was not the nature of Russia or the nature of Bolshevism: It was the nature of Stalin. . . . For the pathological personality of Stalin was a critically important factor iniM the outcome.'

The autocracy of Stalin replaced the authoritarian rule of the Bolshevik party. This, in effect, changed the Soviet regime from a communist to a fascist regime: 'communism differs from fascism as Leninism (or Bolshevism) differs from Stalinism'. The distinguishing characteristic of fascist revolutionary mass-movement regimes is 'a pronounced tendency to absolute autocracy, which involves the subordination of the party to the state as embodied in the leader': in a word, fiihrerism. Stalin 'transformed the original Bolshevik move- ment-regime into a new one that was fiihrerist in its inner dynamism and political tendency'.

Stalinism, however, had two phases. The first brought society totally under the command and control of the state. This was to take advantage of the 'Leninist legacy' of one-party dictatorship, and would seem to be a more certain consequence of it (though Professor Tucker is especially equivocal on this point) than the second phase of Stalin's autocracy. The 'de-Stalinization' policy of Khrushchev has attempted to repudiate and partly to rectify the situation of the second phase, without questioning the first.

But 'in actuality, the two phases were consecutive steps in a single organic process of historical development. Consequently, the repudia- tion of the [second] inescapably poses in the mind of the public the question of repudiating also the earlier phase and its consequences, such as the kolkhoz'. The implication is that Khrushchev's 'compro- mise' is inherently unstable; even after 1957 Khrushchev has been a challengeable leader. 'The Party must at all cost resist the philosophy of normalcy. If no great national cause requiring years of effort on the part of the people exists, it has to invent one.' The present leadership goes on attempting to square the circle, to make the system function well by merely tinkering with it rather than by fundamentally altering it. This is the dilemma of Russia today'. 'The attempt to operate the Soviet system if possible without the systematic use of police terror is evidently generating, as it was bound to do, a number of more or

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Page 4: The Soviet Political Mindby Robert C. Tucker

less serious problems for the regime. Not the least of these may prove to be the problem of a religious revival.'

Professor Tucker has thus been true to his strategy of analysis. Both the Bolshevik regime before and the present regime after Stalinism are analysed in terms of the differences between them and Stalinism. Stalinism is described by Professor Tucker as a viable political order. To remove one-person rule from it was to destroy its viability: 'It is not hard to see why Stalin's death had to mean de-Stalinization. The Stalinist political order was a one-person system'. But it does not follow that there are no other viable political orders or that the present Soviet regime cannot be one. That subject must be approached, however, not by defining the present regime simply with reference to Stalinism, but also in terms of its own features. Throughout the book, most noticeably in the first essay which is concerned with classifying various kinds of regimes, Professor Tucker never directly says what the characteristics of a viable communist, non-Stalinist regime would be. Is he implicitly suggesting that the only eventual outcomes of the dynamics (a favourite word of Professor Tucker's) of a communist society are a Stalinist regime or a liberal democracy? (The final sentence of the book says that 'the dialectics of coexistence may work more favourably for democratic evolution in Communist society than for Communist revolution in democratic society'.) Such a view of the alternatives in the Soviet political future is not novel, but Professor Tucker's book does nothing to dispel my doubts about its soundness.

ALLEN POTTER University of Strathclyde, Glasgow ALLEN POTTER

J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy. London, O.U.P., 1962. 332 pp. 38s.

J. M. Mackintosh's study of Soviet foreign policy is to be welcomed. It is a sober, judicious and thoroughly objective survey, so dispassionate that were it on any subject but this it could well be described as un- exciting. It sees the years from 1945 to 1961 as falling into four periods. From 1945 to 1947 Soviet policy was single-minded, although not always successful, in exploiting the victory of the Allies and in bringing the world nearer to Soviet communism. It did so by force and threats as well as by propaganda and subversion, and, in central and eastern Europe, with striking success. From 1947 to 1953 the process was halted. The west put itself on the defensive, from Berlin through Greece and Turkey to Korea. In all western countries except in Italy

less serious problems for the regime. Not the least of these may prove to be the problem of a religious revival.'

Professor Tucker has thus been true to his strategy of analysis. Both the Bolshevik regime before and the present regime after Stalinism are analysed in terms of the differences between them and Stalinism. Stalinism is described by Professor Tucker as a viable political order. To remove one-person rule from it was to destroy its viability: 'It is not hard to see why Stalin's death had to mean de-Stalinization. The Stalinist political order was a one-person system'. But it does not follow that there are no other viable political orders or that the present Soviet regime cannot be one. That subject must be approached, however, not by defining the present regime simply with reference to Stalinism, but also in terms of its own features. Throughout the book, most noticeably in the first essay which is concerned with classifying various kinds of regimes, Professor Tucker never directly says what the characteristics of a viable communist, non-Stalinist regime would be. Is he implicitly suggesting that the only eventual outcomes of the dynamics (a favourite word of Professor Tucker's) of a communist society are a Stalinist regime or a liberal democracy? (The final sentence of the book says that 'the dialectics of coexistence may work more favourably for democratic evolution in Communist society than for Communist revolution in democratic society'.) Such a view of the alternatives in the Soviet political future is not novel, but Professor Tucker's book does nothing to dispel my doubts about its soundness.

ALLEN POTTER University of Strathclyde, Glasgow ALLEN POTTER

J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy. London, O.U.P., 1962. 332 pp. 38s.

J. M. Mackintosh's study of Soviet foreign policy is to be welcomed. It is a sober, judicious and thoroughly objective survey, so dispassionate that were it on any subject but this it could well be described as un- exciting. It sees the years from 1945 to 1961 as falling into four periods. From 1945 to 1947 Soviet policy was single-minded, although not always successful, in exploiting the victory of the Allies and in bringing the world nearer to Soviet communism. It did so by force and threats as well as by propaganda and subversion, and, in central and eastern Europe, with striking success. From 1947 to 1953 the process was halted. The west put itself on the defensive, from Berlin through Greece and Turkey to Korea. In all western countries except in Italy

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