The Soviet Computer Literacy Program: Problems and

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The Soviet ComputerLiteracy Program:Problems and Prospects

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An Intelligence Assessment

SecretSOV 85-10I93XNovember 1985

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An Intelligence Assessment

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This paper was prepared by 1 Office of Soviet Analysis, with a contribution from ISOVA. Comments and queries arewelcome and may be directed to the Chief, DefenseIndustries Division, SOVA,

SecretSOY 85-10193XNovember 1985


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SecretSOY 85-10193XNovember 1985

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Key JudgmentsInformation availableas of 30 September 1985was used in this report.


As part of an overall plan to speed up the rate of scientific-technicalprogress, the Politburo has endorsed a program to introduce as many as 10million personal computers (PCs) into secondary and vocational-technicalschools over the next decade, both to enhance basic understanding ofcomputer technology and its applications and to aid in the teaching of othersubjects. Technical and political problems promise to frustrate the pro-gram's implementation during the first several years, but, if these road-blocks can be overcome, the program will provide some significant long-term benefits in industrial development and modernization.

On the political side, the increased use of PCs is a potentially serious threatto party control. Equipped with word-processing software and a printer, aPC could revolutionize the samizdat (Soviet underground publication)process. Moreover, PCs provide plant managers with a sophisticated toolthat could be used to challenge production quotas and supply figures set bythe State Planning Committee and the ministries. Implementation of theliteracy program also is being slowed by opposition from officials who viewthe widespread use of PCs as a threat to the traditional state monopoly ofinformation in the USSR. There is still a significant pocket of resistancethat favors the collective departmental method of computing, which relieson large mainframe machines and allows computer use to be more easilycontrolled.'

The most serious obstacles facing the schools are the lack of trainedteachers and shortages of equipment. The Soviets' own PC will bemanufactured in small quantities for at least the next few years andprobably will continue to have reliability problems. A deal for a Western-built turnkey computer plant is the favored option under consideration bythe Soviets. COCOM restrictions pose a major obstacle, however. The saleof such a plant would involve the transfer of restricted microelectronicsproduction equipment to make high-speed microprocessors, which haveweapons applications. Importing large numbers of PCs may be the bestshort-term option, but shortages of hard currency and the fear that relyingon imports might stifle development of domestic computer production willlimit Soviet purchases of Western equipment.

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The long leadtimes that have been factored into the computer literacyprogram are indicative of the difficulties facing the USSR in its campaign.The first—or "preparatory"—stage is to take place during the upcoming12th Five-Year Plan (1986-90), but the main part of the program is notscheduled to be implemented until the 13th and 14th Five-Year Plans(1991-2000). This extremely slow developing program reflects the currentstate of affairs in Soviet computing:• Computer hardware developments lag those in the West by anywhere

from four to 10 years according to Intelligence Community estimates.• The software industry has virtually no experience in developing software

for PC applications.• The computer industry has not been able to produce reliable equipment

in significant numbers.• Computer users are consistently frustrated by poor-to-nonexistent techni-

cal service and the lack of spare parts for their computers.• There is a lack of demand for personal computers at the plant level

because industrial managers have few incentives to take the risksassociated with incorporating such new technologies.

Despite these obstacles, which will certainly postpone the payoffs of usingcomputers in the classroom, the literacy program should benefit Sovietautomation efforts in the 1990s by:• Providing the computer industry with a large domestic market for PCs

and supporting equipment. This should stimulate technical and industrialdevelopment as the industry reaps the benefits of large-scale productionand increased funding for R&D.

• Helping to alleviate the critical shortage of computer programers both bybeefing up training programs in technical schools and by creating moreinterest in computers among students.

• Breaking down some of the resistance to computer use caused by"computer phobia" and ignorance of the potential of PCs in industry.

The Soviets are aware that these benefits will not be realized for some timeand that the literacy program will not, by itself, make enterprises run moreefficiently. Despite the expected delays, the leadership sees the program asan important component of Moscow's overall effort to foster intensiveeconomic growth through the increased use of computers and automatedsystems.

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Soviet ObjectivesIn January 1985, the Politburo approved a statewideprogram for the development, production, and effec-tive use of computer technology and automated sys-tems up to the year 2000. The goal of this program isto reequip the national economy of the USSR on thebasis of computer technology and microelectronics,thereby increasing labor productivity, raising productquality, and improving management and decision-making. The first area to be targeted is the machine-building sector, where Gorbachev has given a highpriority to further automating the manufacture ofsuch complex goods as automobiles, tanks, aircraft,and electronic systems.

The CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Coun-cil of Ministers also passed a resolution 'in early 1985to foster widespread applications of computers inSoviet education. While envisioning improvements inthe teaching process for many subjects, the resolutionis targeted mainly at familiarizing students withcomputer technology, programing, and applications—thereby supporting the modernization program. Theapproach calls for "teaching students practical com-puter skills and equipping them with knowledge aboutthe broad use of computers in the national economy."According to a variety of Soviet statements, theprogram's objectives are to: (1) provide the domesticcomputer industry with a large, steady market forPCs and related equipment, (2) help ease the criticalshortage of skilled programers, and (3) break downsome of the resistance to computer use on the part ofindustrial workers and managers.

This literacy program is to be implemented on twolevels, according to a recent Soviet newspaper articleby corresponding member of the Academy of SciencesAndrey Yershov. (Yershov heads a department of thecomputer center at the academy's Siberian branch

' "On Further Improvements in General Secondary Education forYoung People and Better Operation of General EducationSchools."

and is in charge of a group of projects on computer-ization and the introduction of personal computers insecondary schools.) The first level of instruction,which will be introduced this September, consists of ageneral introduction to the basic principles of comput-ers and computer programing. This will be accom-plished in the form of a mandatory course entitled"Fundamentals of Information Science and ComputerTechnology," which is to be offered in every Sovietsecondary school. Schools which are not equippedwith computers (probably the vast majority in theearly years of the program) will offer a "computer-less" version designed to give the student a chance tomaster the theoretical and cognitive aspects of thecourse. The course will begin in the ninth grade and isexpected to occupy about 60 hours of teaching time.In addition, about 100 hours will be spent on practicalexercises in school computer laboratories (see photo).

The second level of instruction, which presumably willbe implemented during the later phase of the programas more PCs are installed in the classrooms, involvesmore intensive study of programing and computer useand will occupy 80 teaching hours and 300 hours ofpractical exercises. Yershov envisages that, by the endof the century, at least 1 million students will beparticipating in this stage of the program.

In vocational-technical schools, new specialties arebeing introduced covering the use, design, and pro-duction of computer technology. According to Yer-shov, these schools should turn out at least 200,000computer specialists a year. In addition, students whohave gone through the second-level program in asecondary school will be eligible to enroll in a techni-cal school, or tekhnikum, for advanced training assystems and applications programers.

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Students in a secondary school in Moscow Sovfoto 0

learning how to program computers.

A Soviet View of the PC Revolution

In a public lecture in Leningrad on 20 September1985, an offidal provided insights on Soviet percep-tions of personal computers.

Audience Question: What is a personal computer?

Answer: It is a computer for work or home use. Some17 million have been sold in the United States. Manyof our colleagues (referring to the speaker's panel)have them. For example, I was at the home of anAmerican, and he called up on his computer a full setof current data on the US economy. They can also beused to play computer games. A rich country like theUnited States can allow itself computers. They costperhaps $800 to $1,000. A person chooses betweenbuying a car, a television, or a computer. We here areJust beginning to approach computers in a seriousway.

after the revolution. Aleksandrov publicly lamentedthat the Soviet Union fails to make efficient use ofeven the small number of domestically producedcomputers because of a shortage of trained personneland inadequate awareness among middle- and top-

- level Soviet managers of the potential of computers.Concern over the primitive state of PC awareness inthe USSR increasingly has become a subject of publicdiscussion (see inset).

Soviet interest in computerization appears to stemfrom the concern that the USSR is forgoing many ofthe educational, industrial, and scientific advantagesthat are apparent in the Western "computer revolu-tion." The literacy program will contribute to thecomputerization effort by fostering a greater accep-tance and general knowledge of computers and theiruses. It should also help alleviate the serious shortageof skilled programers and computer users by creatinga pool of people who can more readily benefit fromadvanced training and by identifying talented stu-dents for accelerated teaching programs. USSRAcademy of Sciences President Anatoliy Aleksan-drov, one of the first to call for a literacy program, hasdescribed the achievement of computer literacy asimportant as the drive to eliminate basic illiteracy

Not all Soviet scientists are so enthusiastic about theincreased use of personal computers. The director ofthe academy's Institute of Automation and Electro-metry, Yuriy Nesterikhin, said in a recent newspaperarticle that the Soviets must approach the use of PCscarefully because they are a "borrowed idea" and"must be translated to our language and correlatedwith our conditions." Nesterikhin favors the idea ofthe collective "departmental" method of using com-puters, relying on large mainframe computers that aremore easily controlled.

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Although the Agat was produced in limited quanti- 25X1ties by late 1983, progress has been slow. We believeonly a few thousand are slated for delivery in 1985.By contrast, the Apple Ilc was introduced in April

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25X1900,000 units will be produced by the end of 1985.Moreover, in the nine years that Apple has been

25X1producing its Apple II series of PC, 3.6 million unitshave been sold.

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The Soviet Agat Personal Computer

The Agat is the Soviet Union's first and primarygeneral purpose microcomputer or PC. According to aWestern expert who has operated the Agat, the diskoperating system (DOS), read-only memory (ROM),and interface software are copied directly from thepopular Apple II. The system uses a color monitorand has a 64-kilobyte internal memory. Although thesystem is transportable, it is not truly portable.

the Soviets areexperiencing some serious problems with the Ago::

theAgat has been unreliable.

Jproblems with both the hard-ware and software and that the Soviets lacked thesophisticated technology and industrial base toproduce advanced microelectronics.

the Soviet machine ran 15to 30 percent slower than the Apple II computer onwhich it is based. the disk drivewas noisy, and the 64K of internal memory was notexpandable.

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Soviet Industrial DeficienciesThe biggest obstacle to the implementation of thecomputer literacy program is supplying and maintain-ing the necessary computer equipment. According tothe Academy of Sciences' Yershov, more than 50,000computer labs equipped with 1 million PCs will beneeded just to implement the first, or preparatory,level of the program. To give an indication of theimmensity of the task, a recent Trud article reportedthat the Soviet computer industry is scheduled todeliver about 1,300 PCs to schools this year and that200 classrooms equipped with foreign-made comput-ers for ninth-grade students will open this fall. DuringPC purchase negotiations with the Japanese andAustralians, the Soviet indicated that they plan toequip each school with a single module of 16 to 20

computers. According to this scenario, approximately265 schools (or less than 1 percent of all secondaryschools in the USSR) will have their own computersthis year.

the USSR is about eight years behind the Westin the development of computer technology.' TheSoviets have particular difficulty producing personal

21 the statementcorresponds to Intelligence Community estimates of a lag of four to10 years in the development of various aspects of computertechnology.

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Yevgeniy Velikhov

Soviet Lee 0

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computers. The primary Soviet-produced personalcomputer—a copy of the Apple—has been plaguedwith performance and production problems and isunlikely to meet the needs of the computer literacyprogram, either quantitatively or ualitativel for atleast the first phase see inset). 25X1

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The con-struction technique is prohibitively labor intensive andnot readily adaptable to mass production. Yevgeniy P.Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy ofSciences and head of the Academy's recently formedDepartment of Information Science, Computer Tech-nology, and Automation, stated in a recent journalarticle that the Soviet Union produces only "dozens"of PCs per year (see inset). In addition, a recent Sovietnewspaper article pointed out that the Soviet comput-er industry meets only 5 percent of its small-computerneeds. Yershov provided some more optimistic figureswhen he stated in a recent newspaper article thatmore than 1,300 Agat personal computers will bedelivered to Soviet schools during 1985. Even thisnumber is dwarfed in the West by IBM alone, whichsold 1.5 million of its PCs and PC Jrs. in 1984.

The Soviet computer industry also has been unable toprovide its customers with adequate maintenancesupport. According to recent articles in the Sovietopen press, industrial and economic enterprises arehaving trouble obtaining reliable technical service fortheir computers. Problems cited included a lack ofspare parts, shortage of trained personnel, and anincentive system that actually encourages shoddyrepairs. The head of the Soviet institute responsiblefor purchasing foreign-made PCs for the literacyprogram, academician Boris Naumov, admitted thatservicing computers is currently beyond the power ofmost schools. Naumov said that allocation decisions inthe early stages of the program will be based on theability of the schools to provide maintenance for thePCs.1

Acquiring Western ComputersThe most attractive vehicle for meeting long-termprogram objectives, while simultaneously improving

Yevgeniy Velikhov is an Academy of Sciences' VicePresident and Chairman of the academy's Informa-tion Science, Computer Technology, and AutomationDepartment. This department was created in March1983 to oversee the introduction of computer technol-ogy and automation into all areas of Soviet society.He also chairs the Automation of Scientific ResearchCouncil and the Interdepartmental Scientific andTechnical Council that is dually subordinate to theAcademy and the State Committee for Science andTechnology (GKNT). We believe that Velikhov super-vises a number of classified research programs thathave weapons applications—particularly the programto develop directed-energy weapons. Many Soviet andWestern observers consider Velikhov to be the mostlikely candidate for the position of Academy presi-dent when the present incumbent, Anatoliy Aleksan-drov, steps down. Velikhov is also active on the boardof the foreign trade association VIO Litsenzintorwhich imports and exports patents and licenses.I

domestic production capabilities, probably is the pur-chase of a Western-built turnkey computer plant.Such a plant could be operational within two to threeyears of a signed agreement and would prove aneffective mechanism to transfer Western production

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technology and know-how. The Soviets have alreadystarted negotiations with several Western companiesto build a PC plant in the USSR. A British journalreported that, during Gorbachev's visit to Englandlast December, Soviet officials met with representa-tives of a British computer firm to discuss the con-struction of a turnkey PC plant that could cost up to $10 million.

Soviet interest in a Western-built turnkey plant hascentered primarily on a facility to manufacture so-phisticated 16-bit machines of the IBM-PCXT class.This is the area where the Soviets need the most help,and the acquisition of an entire plant would be anattractive method of quickly obtaining an indigenouscapability. The Soviets also recognize the importanceof the more powerful PCs for industrial and economicmanagement applications and are eager to make themmore widely available as part of the industrial mod-ernization effort. They arc probably less interested ina plant to build the smaller eight-bit PCs—althoughthey would probably settle for this if necessary—bothbecause they can buy this type of computer morereadily from the West and because their own industryis capable of producing eight-bit PCs in limitednumbers and may be capable of mass-producing themin the near future with only limited Western assis-tance.

To satisfy the immediate requirement for computers,the USSR, spurred by recently relaxed COCOMtrade controls on certain PCs,' negotiated with several

' Under new rules set by COCOM, Western companies are allowedto sell low-powered, eight-bit microcomputers to the Soviets with-out a license. These machines process data eight bits at a time,rather than the 16- or 32-bit rates of more powerful businesscomputers. They have fairly small memories and would be sold inthe West for 8100 to $500 each as home computers. Sales of moresophisticated machines remain tightly controlled.1

Western and Japanese firms to buy PCs and relatedequipment. The Soviets appear to be interested inbuying modules of PCs linked together in networks of16 to 20 units, with one teacher station to monitor thestudents' activities and one printer for each module.At least two potential suppliers of these PC networkshave been approached. An Australian newspaper re-cently reported that a domestic computer manufac-turer was close to concluding a deal with the Sovietsto provide 5,000 educational microcomputers for atest run in 300 schools (16 computers per school). Ifthe trial run is successful, the Soviets have reportedlypromised longer term contracts to equip 80,000schools with the same system.

the PCs involved are small, eight-bit machines, which are not under COCOM tradecontrols.

In March 1985, representatives of a Soviet tradeorganization initiated discussions on the possibility ofbuying a large number of Apple Ile and Ilc personalcomputers. Soviet officials have also contacted com-puter firms in other Western countries, setting offintense competition. Several press reports indicated inJuly that a Japanese trading company had outbid 26computer firms from around the world (including theUS firm Apple) to win a contract to export 4,000eight-bit personal computers and an undisclosed num-ber of printers to the USSR. This is the first knowncontract that the Soviets have signed with a Westernor Japanese firm for the purchase of PCs.4[

'The Soviets have also been actively seeking more powerful PCs totrain advanced programers in technical schools and universities andto take advantage of their data base and graphics capabilities toincrease the productivity of research and design work. In December1984 the Academy of Sciences placed an initial order for 50 IBMPCXT computers, declaring that it intended to purchase a total of 10,000 during the next year or so.

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Despite the approaches being made to Western com-puter firms, the USSR probably will limit PC pur-chases to 4,000 to 5,000 machines for the comingschool year. The scale of such imports will be limitedby the need to preserve hard currency, the problem ofproviding service and spare parts for the PCs, and thedesire to develop a domestic PC production capabilityas quickly as possible4


We believe the Soviets will focus their PC purchaseson a relatively small number of suppliers to ensurethat the incoming computers are compatible, bothwith each other and with Soviet-produced models, andto reduce the complexity of the arrangements formaintenance and replacement. The Soviets will haveto work closely with Western suppliers to establish anetwork for providing spare parts and installing andservicing these machines. The Soviet record in ensur-ing follow-on support to considerably less ambitiousWestern-supported projects—such as major industrialcomplexes—has been spotty at best. These supportactivities also could drain resources from indigenousSoviet developments and could lead to a dependenceon Western equipment.

access to duplicating equipment, the prospect of mil-lions of personal computers—each a potential printingpress when coupled with a printer and word-processing software—alarms the political leadership.PCs could revolutionize the samizdat process. Floppydisks and cassette tapes would expedite the person-to-person transfer of information. Intercomputer elec-tronic communication, while probably subject to statemonitoring and control, could threaten the regime'scontrol of information. Aside from the "subversive"threat, use of PCs for transmitting data over comput-er networks or as a means of remote access to statedata bases could increase the prospects of compromis-ing state secrets or leaking embarrassing information, which the state now routinely suppresses.,

The Soviet press has also raised concerns aboutcomputer crime and the use of computers to generatefalse information. Central authorities probably fearthat, if computerization leads to electronic record-keeping replacing paper documentation, embezzle-ment or report padding by managers skilled in com-puter manipulations will become almost impossible todetect. Falsification of data by factory managers isalready a serious problem in the Soviet Union, and amajor increase would probably further erode theintegrity of the statistical data upon which the centralauthorities base their planning and management deci-sions.

Domestic OppositionImporting computers from the West appears to be anoption that is strongly opposed by some Soviet scien-tists and industrialists who fear this would stifledevelopment of indigenous computer production.[

Opposition is also likely to come from party and policeofficials who perceive widespread use of computers asa threat to the traditional state monopoly of informa-tion in the USSR. In a society which tightly controls

Increased use of computers also could provide factorymanagers with the means to evade instructions hand-ed down from central authorities. Managers mightuse their computer resources to work out alternativeproduction, supply, or marketing variations to demon-strate that the instructions from the State PlanningCommittee or the .ministries are far from optimal fortheir enterprises. If factory managers acquire comput-er skills but party officials do not, party officials couldfind themselves at a disadvantage when economicdecisions are being made. Managers might use studiesgenerated by their computer staffs to rebut advice orinstructions from the secretaries of the factory's partycommittee or higher party officials.

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Additional opposition comes from officials who fearthe social consequences of computerization. Theseconcerns have been raised with increasing frequencyas the pros and cons of computerization have becomea subject of discussion in Soviet academic journals. Aseries of articles in the scientific and theoreticaljournal of the USSR Academy of Sciences reviewedstudies of the computerization experience in the West.These and other articles have pointed out that some ofthe undesirable social effects of computerizationmight occur in the USSR. The formation of "utilitari-an, rational" values, which would undermine theofficial ideology, and greater social inequality aresome of the key concerns raised in these discussions.Some authors remind their readers of computer-created unemployment in the West and warn thatcomputerization may entail significant costs to thosesegments of society least able to meet the demands ofthe computer revolution.

Party ideologists apparently are among those mostconcerned with the social and political implications ofcomputerization. The party journal Kommunistwarned against the "computer fetishism" demonstrat-ed by officials who advocate computerization "at anyprice" and who see universal introduction of comput-ers as a cure-all for economic and organizationalproblems. A candidate of philosophy, whose articleshave appeared in both the party journal and thejournal of the Academy of Sciences, has pointed outthe need to understand clearly the dangers inherent inuncontrolled and unlimited computer application. Hecriticized the work of the Academy of Sciences andthe State Committee for Science and Technology forfocusing on the scientific and technical problems ofcomputerization while ignoring or neglecting socialand political problems.[

OutlookAlthough the payoffs are not likely to be realized untilthe 1990s, the computer literacy program is regardedby the leadership as an important component ofGorbachev's plan to revive the economy through"intensive" growth in productivity. The program willaugment industrial modernization efforts by spurringdemand for domestic PCs, increasing the supply ofcomputer programers, and eroding some of the resis-tance to computer use, mainly at the plant level. The

seriousness of the obstacles and the backwardness ofthe Soviet PC industry, however, have led the Sovietleadership to take an extremely cautious course thatwill effectively delay widespread realization of thesebenefits until at least the early 1990s.

The ultimate success, both of the literacy programand of the computerization effort in general, willdepend on the Soviets' ability to manufacture andservice at least hundreds of thousands of reliable PCsand to overcome user resistance at the enterprise level.Upgrading the performance of the computer industrywill require significant Western assistance, at least inthe short term, in the form of a turnkey plant or thedirect sale of computers and related equipment. Webelieve the Soviets will be able to mass-produce theless powerful eight-bit PCs needed for the schoolprogram in the near term, but the production of themore sophisticated 16-bit business computers, whichwill be needed for industrial applications, will contin-ue to be a problem for the near future. Productiondifficulties in this area, unless the Soviets can obtain aturnkey plant, will hinder efforts to automate indus-trial facilities.i

The pace and success of the program also will dependon the willingness of the leadership to take thepolitical risks entailed. A cautious approach, withtight controls on the provision and use of PCs, willimpede familiarization with computer technology andstifle innovative applications. On the other hand, loosecontrols could lead to unauthorized use and possiblyprecipitate a backlash.

Extension of the literacy program to include theteaching of other subjects by computer will be delayedby the need to develop Russian-language educationalsoftware. The software will have to be internallydeveloped because of the general shortage of qualitysoftware of this type, even in the West, and because ofRussian-language requirements. In view of the limitedcapabilities of the Soviet software industry, the devel-opment of course software, needed in the second phaseof the literacy program, will be a problem area forsome time.r

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The most serious threat to US interests posed by theliteracy program is the potential transfer of a turnkeyplant that would provide the Soviet computer industrywith much needed Western production know-how andequipment. A turnkey facility for even eight-bit PCscould significantly enhance Soviet production capabil-ities. Since COCOM restrictions on eight-bit comput-ers were relaxed in January 1985, the Soviets haveintensified their efforts to acquire a vertically inte-grated plant capable of producing the entire range ofmicroelectronic devices and peripheral units—such asmicroprocessors, disk drives, and printers—that makeup a personal computer. Experience in producingthese subsystems would benefit the computer industrygenerally.1

The transfer of an eight-bit PC plant could alsoprovide an opening wedge for later acquisition oftechnology to produce the more sophisticated 16-bitPCs required for many military and industrial appli-cations. The higher speed microprocessors used inthese PCs have a range of weapons signal processingand guidance applications. In manufacturing, 16-bitmicrocomputers are suitable for wide application inprocess, inventory, and machine control as well asinformation management systems. They are particu-larly useful for highly efficient computer-aided designtasks routinely applied in the West in the developmentof complex products such as custom integrated cir-cuits. Component improvements, in turn, fuel furtheradvances in computer and other advanced manufac-turing technologies vital to Soviet efforts to improveindustrial efficiency and productivity. Although PCturnkey plant sales are currently prohibited by USand COCOM regulations, West European vendors inparticular are interested in such sales.

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The Soviet Computer Literacy Program: Problems and