The Soviet Anti-Tank Debate

ON 21 JUNE 1339, an outnum-

bered group of Swiss infantry,armed with hand-held pikes, stood npto the cream of feudal armor, unseatedthe knights from their armoredchargers and ushered in a ~ew era ofwarfare. The Battle of Laupen was atactical innovation which not onlyestablished the defense superiority oflight infantry over the shock actionof mobile and heavily armored forces,but also announced a political and so-cial revolution. With striking similar-ity, this “democratization of warfare”was repeated 634 years later in theopening days of the 1973 Middle EastWar, when an Arab infantry forcearmed with antitank weapons met andbrought to a halt an Israeli tank of-fensive.

The implications of the Arab suc-cess have been widely discussed in theWest. Numerous commentators haveagreed that the balance has swungagainst the tank which has dominatedthe battlefield since World War II.Many have taken heart that the sameweapons which provided the Arab suc-cess, the antitank guided missile(ATGM ) and the hand-held antitankgrenade launcher, would give NATOa greatly improved chance of offset-ting the Warsaw Pact’s tank superior-ityy in Central Europe. Indeed, onestudy has cIaimed that the groundforces of the Warsaw Pact and SovietUnion are tank heavy, even tank de.pendent, suggesting that:

Soviet tables of organization are un-duly influenced b~ experiences gained

Reprinted from Survivsl [Grest Britain), Msy-June1976.

November 1976 67

SOVIET ANTITANK OEBATE

in a war of 30 year’s ago attd that acertain amount of ‘battleship think-ing’ permeates their military intellec-tual environment. 1

Another study concludes that Sovietreliance on tanks as the core of thearmy’s shock and initial strikingpower is not likely to change.

The debate in Western militar~ cir-cles that followed the Yom KippurWar over the viability of armor in abattlefield environment dominated byprecision-guided munitions has had novisible parallel in the USSR. . . .$

These conclusions reveal a na]vet6about Soviet force structure and ig-nore recent Soviet doctrinal literature.The Soviet Union is not only. aware ofthe implications of the 1973 MiddleEast War—after all, it was Sovietantitank weapons that the Arab forcesused—but demonstrates a deep appre-ciation of the potentials of antitanktechnology for the modern battlefieldin professional military writings.Changes in Soviet doctrine and forcestructure reflect this concern, and theimplications are important for West-ern defense.

In mid-November 1974, a militaryscience conference of the groundtroops was” held at tbe MalinovskyTank Academy. 8 Participating weremore than 200 marshals, generals andofficers of the central appara~s, mi li-tary districts and groups of Soviettroops stationed abroad, commandantsand instructors stationed at militaryacademiee and representatives ofscientific institutions. Their purposewas to discuss the tactical implica-tions of the 1973 Middle East War,with particular focus on the future

Phillip A. Karber is Director, Stra-tegic Studies, The BDM Corporation,Vienna, Virginia.

viability of armored vehicles on themodern battlefield. Subsequent dis-cussions raised doubts about the per-petuation of Soviet offensive doctrine.This conference was followed by anunprecedented second conference inJanuary 1975 at which A. A. Grechko,Minister of Defense, and I. G. Pav-Iovsky, Commander in Chief of theGround Troops; strongly emphasizedthe lessons and implications of the Oc-tober War, fiercely criticized currentSoviet operational exercises and calledfor a doctrinal debate on the implica-tions of antitank technology. To date,neither conference has been reported—let alone analyzed—in tbe West.

Marshal Grechko’s comments wereincorporated in the second edition ofhis recent book:

Combat actions in the Middle East,unleashed more than once in thelast10 years by the aggressive circles ofIsrarl, haoe put anew the question ofthe relationship of offense and defenseOf g~O~nd troops, and have discloseda number of characteristic phenomenain the struggle of offensive and defen-sive means and in methods of wagingthe firv battle.

It is noteworthy that modern de-fense, in connection with the appear-ance in troop armaments-of powerfuljiring means, has acquired greater

stability. This is being caused jirxt ofall by the fact that the main strikingforce of the attackers-tanks-has be-come more mdnerable, and the use ofthem on the battlefield, more compli-cated. The cent inuing process of per-fecting the anti-tank weapon haxplaced before science and technologya serious task in the business of tan-gibly raising the viability of tanktroops and developing more effectiveways and means of reliabl~ suppress-ing anti-tank defense. 4

Grechko’s provocative comments

68 Military Review

signaled the beginning of the Sovietantitank debate, and, within the lastyear, Soviet journals have publishedmore than 50 analytical articles dis-cussing the implications raised by theeffectiveness of antitank weapons asdemonstrated in tbe Middle East con-flict. J

While debate has been confinedmainly to the pages of the professionalmilitary journal Mitifary Hedd, cOn-cern over antitank technology is re-flected in the increased coverage of tbesubject in wider circulation mediasuch as Red Stars and Soviet MilitaryReview 7 (tbe latter publiehed in Eng-lish). Given the quantity of writings,the high level of authorship and tbeclear expressions of concern, the RedArmy evidently feels it has come upagainst a problem.

However, before NATO embracesthe ATGM as a deus e.r machivta, sev-eral points arising from the Sovietantitank debate need to be outlined:

● Tbe current Soviet concern overantitank weapons, and particularlyATGMs, is not a feature of the lastyear only, but dates from the Khrush-chev period.

● The Red Army has not been put-ting all of its offensive “eggs” in thetank “basket”: The basic trend in So-viet force structure over the last dec-ade has been just the reverse—a scal-ing down of the tank in favor of othercombined arms elements.

● Ironically, the system the armyperceives as most threatened by anti-tank weapons is not the tank but theirinfantry combat vehicle—the BMP.

● The Soviet debate over antitankweapons is not really a debate overantitank weapons per se—the capa-bilities and defensive potential ofthese weapons have been generallyaccepted. What ie being discussed ishow to deal with the increased anti-

SOVIET ANTITANK DEBATE

tank threat while maintaining the So-viet doctrinal preference for the of-fensive.

Each of these points needs moredetailed examination:

.THE ANTITANK THREAT

The Red Army has long been awareof the potentials of antitank weap-onry. It was, in fact, one of the firstarmies to deploy ATGMs in largenumbers, and to mount them on arm-ored vehicles. As early as 1964 (uponseeing a firing demonstration of anATGM against a tank), Khrushchevnoted:ItAurt. After all, tce are spending

a lot of money to make tanks. And if. a war breaks out, these tanks will

burst into flames even before theyreach the battle-line. 8

Throughout tbe intervening decade,Russian writers have often studiedantitank weapons and shown a keeninterest in the state of the art inWestern ATGM technology. In 1967,Soviet military writers noted “seriouschanges” resulting from the tecbno-Iogical improvements to ATGMs:

A gualitativelu new method of com-bating tanks has appeared—the aritt-tank guided projwtile, which can de-stroy ang tank at a distance of up toseveral kilometers. g

In 1972, the classic work AntitankWarfare 1“appeared, which paid par-ticular attention to ATGMs, notingtheir significantly grester range anda~mor-penetrating power in compari-son with tanks, their high kill proba-bility, and that, under operational con-ditions, ATGM vehicles could achievea favorable exchange ratio of 4 to 1against tanks and double this againstarmored personnel carriers (APCS ).In 1973, the authors of a book titledTanks pointed out that “no little dan-ger for tanks is presented by

November 1976 69


ATGMs,” 1] Following the MiddleEast War (but in advance of the cur-rent debate), Soviet authors wereq~ick to recognize that:

Guided anti-tank missiles gave totke infantry tkat wkick it never kad:tke probabilit~ of destroying tanksa,ikk one shot before tke tank coulduse its own uwapons against tke in-fantvg. Ii

SOVIET EMPHASIS ON TANKS

While the Soviet Union and the

Warsaw Pact allies have a decided ad-

vantage in tanks vis-h-vis IN’ATO,theSoviet Army has not neglected theother combat arms. Contrary to opin-

ions frequently expressed in the Westover the last decade, the Soviet Armyhas actually reduced the importanceof the tank in relation to the othercombat arms—particularly. motorizedinfantry and artillery. In the early1960s, the ratio of tank to motorizedrifle divisions wae 1 to 1.8. By 1974,the Soviet Army had increased by 20divisions—all motorized rifle-de-creasing the ratio to I to 2.2.

The increased Soviet emphasis oncombined arms has run parallel withthe doctririal shift from “one variant”nuclear war to the adoption of con-ventional options for the theaterforces and was preceded by changesin Soviet ground force organizationand command. la In the late 1950s, theSoviet Army was reorganizing to meetwhat were deemed to be the new de-mands of nuclear warfare. The artil-lery branch gave way to the nuclearrocket forces, and infantry was re-emphasized in favor of tanks whichmight survive on a nuclear battlefield.However, with the conversion of theinfantry forces to full mechanization,a rival branch to the tank troops,motorized rifle, 14was formed in 1963.At the same time, the concept of the

70

“offensive in depth,” which empha-sized mechanized infantry, was rein-stated. la This had been developed byTukhachevsky in the 1930s but purgedby Stalin. In 1967, the Soviet Armybrought back the position of Com-mander in Chief of Ground Forceswith the appointment of I. V. Pavlov-sky \vho had been in charge of thebuildup of Soviet motorized infantryforces on the Chinese border. In thesame year, the Soviet Union conductedits first exercise emphasizing conven-tional rather than nuclear combat,and, from then on, numerous Sovietwriters have stressed the importanceof ground force arms other than tanks,and there was even the suggestionthat the tank divisions be merged withmotorized rifle divisions.

Contrary to Western expectationsand predictions, it took the SovietUnion 15 years to deploy a new mainbattle tank in Central Europe follow-

ing the introduction of the T62. ( Thisis the T72 which is now undergoinginitial deployment. ) Yet, over thesame period, it designed, developedand deployed five major battlefield airdefense systems, five major artillerysystems and numerous armored per-sonnel vehicles—in particular, theBMP. Unlike its Western counterpartsor previous Soviet models, the BJ2Pis not just an “armored taxi” butwields considerable firepower. This isnot only for use against infantry andother armored personnel carriers, forthe BMP also contains three eystems

for combating tanks: an AT(2M, aturret-mounted 73mm antitank gunand at least one iW’G7 antitank gre-nade launcher carried by a trooperinside.

This emphasis on combined arms isreflected in the buildup of Sovietforces in Central Europe over thelast five years, for, while the Soviet

Military Review


sPG9 IS 7311MIcafiher, rocket assistedand very efficient

loaded RPG7. Safety pin is place on the fuse.

Sagger mounted over the 73mm smooth bore gun on BMP

November 1976 71


Union has increased the numbei ofits tanks in East Germany, artillery,logistics, antitank and air defensecapabilities have been increased bylarger margins. 16

SOVIET MOtORIZEO INFANTRY

ARE MORE VULNERABLE THAN TANKS

The threat to the Soviet combinedarms buildup is of major importancein relation to the new Soviet antitankdebate. What is clearly illustrated inrecent Soviet writings on antitankweapons is not so much concern overthe survival ability of tbe tank as ofthe operational viability of motorizedinfantry. The army had previouslyassessed APCS to be twice as vulner-able as tanks. Apparently, in exercisesand field- tests since the Middle EastWar, the’ army bas found that theBMP is even more vulnerable to the

new generation of antitank weapons

than was previously believed, Yet So-

viet writers recognize that the suc-cess of a conventional offensive ishighly dependent upon the protectionand mobility of motorized infantry.Until recently, the army assumed thatthe infantry, mounted in combat ve-hicles and ;\,ith the support of massedindirect fire artillery, could overrunNATO defenders and thus maintaina high rate of advance. However, rec-ognition of the increased vulnerabilityof the f?MP to antitank weapons startsa chain reaction which seems tothreaten the entire structure of So-viet offensive doctrine.

If f3MPs are significantly more vul-nerable than the tanks they are ac-companying, they may be destroyedat a much faster rate; the infan@ymay then have to dismount in orderto carry out the attack on foot whichmakes the infantry more vulnerable. 17Since infantry on foot are muchslower than tanks, the tanks either

72

outrun tbe infantry and arrive at the

defenders’ lines unescorted, or theymust reduce their speed and that ofthe attack. 1S In either case, the tanksbecome more vulnerable. Artillery cansuppress antitank defenses, but thisraises the possibility of a long-drawn-out “slugging match” with lower ratesof advance, greater ammunition ex-penditure and higher logistics re-quirements. Even more critical, thevulnerability of one component of theSoviet combined arms force placesmore ~train on the other elements andgreatly magnifies the problems of corn.mand and control in small units—atraditional Soviet weak point reflectedin recent exercises. IV

Ironically, then, the recent Sovietconcern over antitank weapons hasactually raised rather than loweredthe status of the tank. Practically allof the articles have emphasized thegreater vulnerability of the BMP. :0It is the BMP, not the tank, which isperceived as the weak link in the com-bined arms chain.

MAINTAINING TIIEOFFENSIVEIt is perhaps misleadi~g to classify

the recent Soviet writings as an anti-tank debate, for there is really no ar-gument over whether antitank iveap-ons are effective, and there is an ap-parently universal recognition that atactical revolution is being broughtabout by the deployment of ATGMs.Nor does there seem to be much dis-agreement between Soviet commen-tators over the implications—theygenerally agree that the ground forcecomponent most threatened is themotorized infantry which, in turn,raises serious problems for the tempoand coordination of the offensive.What is being debated is how to over-come the challenge of antitank weap-ons and retain a high rate of advance

Military Review

against a strengthened NATO defen-sive capability.

While Soviet writers do not ~fferneat “policy” packages, several pat-terns appear to be emerging. Rem-iniscent of the debates over the re-duction of ground f o r c es in theKhrushchev era, opinion groups seemto form around service branch ratherthan on the basis of personality cliquesor modernist-traditionalist arguments.The various options can be groupedinto three major categories:

THE NUCLEAR OPTION

For 30 years, the keystone of Sovietstrategic and operational concepts forthe employment of ground forces hasbeen the “ofpensive.” Starting with amassive bombardment of firepower,the ground forces would break throughthe prepared positions of the defender,and massive tank armies would followto engage the opponent’s mobile re-serves. At the end of World War II,the breakthrough phase was to be con-ducted by the massing of artilleryfires. By the late 1950s, the massiveconventional artillery barrage hadbeen replaced by multiple nuclearstrikes: by the late 1960s, the Sovietdoctrine again considered the possi-bility of a conventional breakthrough.Despite three decades of doctrinal andtechnical development, the armoredforces were still thought to be theprime means of exploiting a break-through. But ATGM technologiesthreaten the Soviet Army with a tac-tical revolution and the potentialabandonment of the armored offensive.There is consequently a strong incen-tive for the Soviet Union to return toits earlier dependence upon nuclearweapons as a means of overcomingantitank defenses.

Traditionally, the Soviet Union hasnot mirrored NATOS penchant for

November 1976

SOVIET )INTITANK DEBATE

low-yield tactical nuclear weaponsfired from self-propelled artillery, de-pending, rather, on higher yield andless accurate rocketdelivered war-heads. However, the last few yearshave seen a new interest in, and ad-mi ration for, self-propelled artilleryin Soviet writings, with some linkingof this with low-yield artillery-firedtactical nuclear weapons. *1 In addi-tion, several Soviet writers have ar-gued recently that the problems whichantitank weapons pose for the BMPdo not apply in a nuclear environment.The first reason put forward ia that,in anticipation of nuclear fires, thedefender will have to dieperse hisforces in case they fall victim to nu-clear effects. ‘J Second, with the useof highly accurate nuclear fire againstthe defensive positions, the infantrydo not have to dismount from APCSand the attack can proceed at a highrate of advance. ::+

Evidently, the Soviet Union onlysees antitank weapons as a threat“when nuclear weapons are not ueed.”Yet Soviet ground force commandersare clearly unwilling to discount theantitank problem by relying solely onnuclear weapons. For the present, thenuclear solution seems to have beenryled out by both political and opera-tional considerations.

THE ARTILLERY OPTION

In countering antitank weapons,particular importance is attached tothe role played by the artillery. ManySoviet authors, particularly thosefrom the artillery branch, argue thatonly massive suppressive fire fromartillery:

. . . is capable of reliably destroyingan enemy’s anti-tank defense. Duringfh e conduct of combat operations notinvolving the use of weapons of massdestruction such a task rests almost

73


evztimty upon the artillery. ‘JThe artillery branch apparently rel-

ishes this new role for two mainreasons: that, within the Soviet Army,supervision of ATGMs falls under theartillery branch; and that this is amajor opportunity for artillery to re-gain its pre-Khrushchev influence andcommand over resources.

In the antitank debate, the pro-armor writers insist that traditionalindirect artillery fire is not sufficientto suppress antitank weapons. z~ Theartillery advocates recognize this andrepeatedly point out that artillery fireagainst antitank positions is muchmore effective when fired in a directrather than an indirect mode. ~o But,to be truly effective in the direct-firemode, artillery will have to be decen-tralized in battery-sized units downto battalion level and “many directfire weapons are needed to” penetrate

a de fense. ” 27

To ensure that the artillery weapon

has tactical mobility and enable the

crew to survive in close proximity tothe tactical battle, the artillery mustbe armored and self-propelled. In fact,within the last year, the Soviet Unionhas deployed two new self-propelledlarge caliber artillery pieces with di-rect-fire capability. This emphasisupon decentralized direct-fire self-propelled artillery demonstrates amajor shift in traditional Sovietthought which hitherto emphasizedmassed indirect artillery barragesfired from towed equipment. ~~

As the Soviet experts themselvesare wel~-aware, parceIing out artilleryin battery-sized units and attemptingto coordinate the artillery with tanksand infantry is not witbout its poten-tial disadvantages: even a small-unittactical assault is rendered enormouslycomplex. Battalion staffs-tradition-ally lean in personnel—will have to

be expanded, and even greater strainwill be placed upon an already frugallogistic structure. The artillery itselfbecomes much more exposed, and itsdecentralization becomes a major prob-lem in coordinating massed fires.

ME MANEUVER OPTION

As might be expected, officers of

the tank troops strongly disagree with

the artillery branch. Rather than slow

the offensive down, they want to speedit up. Arguing against holding thearmored forces back as the infantrylaunch a dismounted attack, GeneralBukharenko of the tank troops states:[twould seem that in modern fast

moving combat when each minute isprecious, that this is not the best wagto use such high speed militarti rna-te~iel. ~v

Tank Troop General Skorodumovgoes even further and attributes tbevulnerability of Soviet APCS to theelowness of attack. 3~

These rejoinders by high-level tankofficers raise some interesting points.First, they do not attempt to denythe effectiveness of antitank weapons.Second, where the tank advocates takeexception to the artillery proponentsis not in the use of fire suppression,but the restrictions such- dependenceplaces upon the speed of the attack.Third, while tbe BMP was originallyperceived as a potential competitor totanks (having many of tbe character-istics of a tank and closely associatedwith the meteoric rise of the rivalmotorized infantry branch ), recentlythe tank branch has closed ranks withtheir armored brethren and becomethe most ardent defenders of theBMP. Basing their arguments on theBMP’s superior speed and antitankarmament, tbe tank commanders holdthat not only should the infantry re-main mounted, but that independent

74 Mititary Review

13iWP units should be used in daringsurprise raids deep in the enemyrear. 31 But how can the vulnerabilityof BMP units to antitank weapons bereduced by placing greater emphasisupon them ? The key to this questionmay lie in the Soviet interest in thegrowing “density” of antitank de-ployment. Soviet writers have longheld that density—the ratio of forceto space—is the key variable inffuene-ing rate of advance, The greater thequantity of force in a given area, theslower the movement, and, conversely,with a low force-to-space ratio, thebattlefield becomes granular ratherthan linear, fluid instead of static. In-stead of nuclear weapons to dispersethe defense, the armor advocates callfor preemptive maneuver—attackingthe defense before it mobilizes anddeploys a dense antitank defense. So-viet writers note that surprise attackswith conventional weapons offer thesame opportunities as nuclear strikesfor low force densities: fluidity ofmaneuver, and a high initial rate ofadvance.

There are, then, several indicationsthat, in tbe event of conflict withNATO, the Red Army would prefer to


launch a surprise attack without need-ing to rely upon massive mobilizationof the rear echelon divisions in theSoviet Union or tilling out under-strength forces of the Warsaw Pact.Such an attack, with in-place theaterforces, might have a prospect of catch-ing iVATO before, or in the processof, mobilization, thus preventing theWest from establishing a linear anddense forward-deployed antitank de-fense. This would permit the SovietUniOn to concentrate its forces in theweakest zones of the defense and somaintain their potential for a rapidrate of advance. Soviet commentatorsoften make the point that NATOground forces, particularly the WestGerman and American Armies, arenot geared to a prepared defense indepth, which would make the mostfavorable use of antitank weapons,but remain committed to the doctrineof a mobile defense based on brigadeand division-level armored counter-attacks. Thus, while the West stillseems to believe that the tank is thebest means of antitank defense, So-viet military writers are beginning tostress the offensive use of antitankweapons.

.—

NOTES

1 Colonel E B. Atkesor,, ,.1s the Sw. i,.t ArnwObsolete?,<. Amqi. May 1974, PP 10-16.

2 Jeffrey Record, .v!z, vg ttn the Soviet Amv,The Brooki. k-s Institution, Wsshmgto., UC. 1!J15,D 48.

:3 Re~.,wd ,. Red Star. 16 November 19;4, P 1,.,, also ,%ft[,taw Herald, Ja”ua IY 1975, D 16.

4 Marshal A. A. Grechko, Amed ‘F . . . . . of the.?o.wt Stat., Second Edition, MOSCOW, USSR,1976, p 198.

F, For instance, Marshal G, Peredelsky, Cmn.rnandm of Rocket Troops. and Artillery. hawarned: .,Combat actiom m the course of theKtddle East conllmt testify that modern aim-tankdefense m the pmot of d defense. It >neludes

November 1976

ATC. M ( ant, -tank mided missde. ), anti-tankmm o. a tracked base and , emdless g... 1.s arule >elf-propelled) . tanks. ..df-~mpelled umts,BMP I mecbanked infantry Combat vehmlesl,Krenade-launehem NOW not only each sub-un,thas ant,.tank means but eaeh sold,er ,, ., Theltxm=rien.e of War—Into Traintnx Practices, -,M,lztewHwczkl, July 1975.

Major Germ. [ of Tank .Troops I. Skorod.movwr, tes that : .SMore effect,”. methods mu,t befound for cmnbatuu? antbtsnk w.aPons havmwvan... fim.c ra.ws —.ATGM, w’e.ade-thrmvem,recoMess mm, and hekmwtem aimed wtb ant,-ta.k wennons The,, have become formidable‘wap.n. f., use agm.st tanks and other rn’nm?edvehmles hav, ng vario.a armor thickmeases.-, ,,A.Attack at High Speed,,, Mdttarv Herald, March1975.

Lw.tenant General Kmttchuck states cateEor.

75


8For exmnD1e, see four.e.rtmle series by ColonelA. M. Latuki., ., Weapons AEainst Tanks,,, Red.$t,w, 22 October 197.5: 12 November 1976. 4 De.ember 1976: and 13 December 1976.

7 B. Antsin, ‘,Antitank Guided Missiles m De.fense,- Sow,t M,ltt,aru Rev,etu, July 1975: andLieutenant Colonel Y. Volodin, ‘SAnt, tank Means,n Defense,,. SO”iet M,l,tarv Reman, May 1975.

8 Cited m T. W, Wolfe, S.m,et PCJWW and E“.w?ns. 194$-1970, The Job”, Hopk,ns Umvers,tyPress, Bmlt,rno, e, MD, 1970, D 175.

9 V. I. Len,,, a,, d the ,%wet Arnt.d Fovcc’s.Ed,ted by Colonel GenemJ A. S. ZheltrJv, M,htaryF’.bhsbuw House, MOSCOW, USSR, 19$7, P 264.Colonel Ge”ek+l Zheltc,, IS bead of the Len,.Mnlitary Pokttmd Academy.

10 Ma>.. General G. Biry.kov ( Ati,llew) andColonel G. Mel.ikov, A,, titwth Wnrfaro, ProgressPublmhw%, MOSCOW. USSR, 1972.

11 Y. A. KOSY,W, Y. ?& Orehkgv and N, N.Fmmn, Tank,, Moscow, USSR, 19’73.

12 Colonel N. N,k,t,n, ‘-New in tbe StrufrxleWith Tanks,,+ B.n,,er Ca+-rter, May.1974, See alsoColonel N,kitm mid Ccdo”el S. Petmv, .,lsI.ael.Awmessio. m October 1973.,, Mihtaw HistoruJon-ml, November 1974.

13 See Job” Erickson, .%.tet Thcat,e_ Warf=r,Cmrzb,l,tu Doctrww, DeIJIwww,,ta a.,d Ob,oc.t,”,.. Mo”m?rspb, March 1975; a“d John Er, ekm,r,,SOWet M, M,l,II Post,,,, and Pol,c” ,n Eu,,Jw,Stanford Research Inst,tute, Stanford, CA, 19;4.

14 1. S LYapunov, ,, Motorized Rifle Troops,.,130[akw,z Souiet Ermwbwedta, Third Ed,tion, 1970

15 Qti<,stimu of St.ategg ,md Opc,atwx,at A,t i,,SO”wt M,kta,v Wink. 1917., 9J+0. Ed,ted by A BKadisber, bfc.scow, USSR, 1965. See also CO1O..IP. Matmmov, .,017en8ive Battle ,. Depth,,, Sovt,tMdztarv Rwietu, October 1970.

18 The problem ,> so severe that SW,d Sovietwrite.. have Proposed f m%ettinz the @MP andmounti”s the troom . . tbe backs of tanks as i“World War 11. See Lm.te”a.t Colonel M. Twbko,

~“ @a ha, f .f the ~~ .r~ic,e, ..,.,, ”= ~he ,“,.

rent antitank debate ba.e focused .“ the BMPvulnerability exclusive+.. 1“ fact, when tanks arementm”ed, it ,. usually I“ a fwmable mntext-that is, that tanks are l-s vulnerable or that theyshould lead the abs=”lt. The only tank-deckmtedsrt~cle \v,thi” the last year was ColoIId N. Sha-PO,,1OV, ‘Teach,.% Crtw% to Combat Tank., Self -PmDelled Amllew and ATGMfl Mdzt.zrv Herald,June 1976.

21 Colonel P. Grigorwv, .. Development of Can-;;;l, Artiller y.,, SOetet Mdtttwv Rwteto, Anfmst

22 colonel v. Sa, k,”, ., Features of ModernCombat,,, Mdttmru Herald, March 1974.

:,) P,sbakov and K,rpach, O!J. at.

!* Colonel A, Rdi”> wtrude Between Artil-IWY and Ant&Ttmk weapons; Mdttam Herald.May 19;4.

M D,r.ct file ~. .ver o“en sight., ~ben themm.er can %.. the tarxet. ,“d, rect fire is d,-rected onto the tnmet by a“ b.,,”,,, d,mlacedsome d,,tance from tbe guns.

?7 colonel v sehvm, ,,Dire$t F!..,,, Sovzet.Mibtnw Ec”{. ”,, Novmnbe, 1976. See .1.. Colonelv Selw.v,”, .. AFtilletY Breaches [ Ant,-TanklObstacles,,, Sov,ct M{htaw R<mtotu. August 1975.

28 The .r,gina, ~t..Donent. of ,,lf.DroDelled a,.t,llew came from the tank brancb wb,ch armedthat the.. weazm”s should fall under the!r ,urk-dtctm”, appare”tl~ they lost. For a dew.ded dts-. . . . . . . . see Mtmshal of Tank TmoPs I%vel A.Rotm,>trov. ‘1’tme and the ‘Ztudc, Mmaow. USSR,1972. PO 266-69.

~:,~ieutenan~ Gene,., ~ukk,,”ko, W. the

Utility of the BMP m Battle.” .? fdttaw Hmdd.November 1975.

76 Military Review

Documents

The Soviet Anti-Tank Debate