The Soviet and Japanese Communist Parties-

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P E T E R B E R T O N

The Sov i e t and Japanese C ommuni s t Par t i e s :

Pol i c i es , Tact i cs , Negot iat ing Behavior*

What can t he J apanese Communi s t Pa r ty ' s ( JCP) r ecord o f i t s dea l i ngs

wi th t he Com m uni s t Pa r ty o f t he Sov ie t Un ion (C PSU ) te ll u s abou t

Sov ie t po l i c ie s t oward nonru ling Co mm uni s t Pa r t ie s , Sov ie t st r at egyand tac t ics , and the i r negot ia t ing techniques? Can the Japanese exper i -

ence p rov ide a g l impse i n to t he Sov ie t dec i s ionmaking p roces s? These

a re some o f t he ques t i ons t ha t t h i s e s say wi l l a t t empt t o answer . Of

course , as poin ted out in the in t roduct ion to th i s co l lec t ion of s tudies ,

t he r eve l a t i ons o f fo r e ign Communi s t s cons t i t u t e a supp lemen ta ry

source , which nonethe less i s a t t imes the on ly ava i l ab l e accoun t o f

nego t i a t i ons and may on occas ion shed l i gh t on t he Sov ie t way o f

do ing t h ings , and pe rhaps even on Sov ie t mot iva t i on . And aga in , a s

indica ted in the in t roduct ion to th i s i s sue , the mos t rewarding sources

are of f ic ia l Par ty publ ica t ions when the Par ty in ques t ion i s a t t empt ing

to p re sen t and de fend i t s pos i t i on i n a d i spu t e wi th Moscow (o r wi th

Pek ing) , inte rna l conf ident ia l Par ty docu m ents obta ined som eh ow by

government l aw enfo rcemen t agenc i e s o r r e source fu l j ou rna l i s t s , and

f ina ll y the wr i t ings o f ex -Com mu ni s t s o r pu rged Pa r ty l eade rs .

*I w i sh t o t hank m y co l leagues T hom as G reene and Jo seph N yom arkay fo r r ead ing and com -

men t ing on the in troduction to th i s issue , and esp ec ia l ly Paul L anger for he lpfu l com m ent s on

th i s s tudy . I am a l so grat efu l t o L ynn Sipe , H ead of the World A ffa i rs L ibrary a t US C, E mikoMo ff i tt , Hea d o f the Japanese Col l ec tion at t he Hoove r Ins ti tu tion , and Hisao M at sumo to , Headof the Japanese Col l ec t ion a t t he Library of Congress , for t he i r k ind ass i s t ance and computer

searche s o f pert inent docu me ntat ion. Nee dless to say, f inal responsibi li ty i s m ine alone.

STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM VO L. X V , N O. 3, AUTU MN 1982, 26 6-2 87



T H E J A P A N E S E C O M M U N I S T P A R T Y 267

Fortunately, al l o f these cate go ries o f sou rces are avai lable in Japan.

T h e J C P h a s f e u d e d w i t h b o t h t h e C P S U a n d t h e C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s tP ar t y ( CCP ) f or a l m os t t wo d ecad es an d h as m ad e p u b l i c s om e o f t h e

records of the Party ' s negot iat ions wi th Soviet and Chinese l eaders ( in -

c l u d i n g M ao T s e - t u n g h i m s e l f ) . T h e Jap an es e govern m en t i n t e l l i gen ce

community has been engaged in the surve i l lance and analys i s o f the in -

ternational C om m un is t m ov em en t and the Japanese l e f t -w ing part ies for

the pas t s ix ty years and cont inual ly i s sues documentary co l l ect ions and

analyt ica l s tudies through sem igovern m enta l or subsid iary chan nels . ~

Japanese inves t igat ive reporters a l so con s tant ly publi sh a stream o f rev-e l a t i o n s a n d e x p o s t s o f t h e J a p a n e s e C o m m u n i s t m o v e m e n t , s o m e o b -

v ious ly sensat ional ized , but o thers qui te p laus ib le . And, f ina l ly , the

Japanese Party has i ts share o f dis i l lus io ne d or purged leaders , includ -

ing former secretar ies general o f the Party and, a f ew years ago , the

v ice-chairm an o f the Presid ium o f the Pol itburo , Hakam ada Sa tom i . 2

This s tudy presents three v ignet tes g leaned from recent ly publ i shed

Japanese- language sou rces and cov ers the late Stalin era, the

Khrushchev per iod , and the Brezh nev years . T he f irs t v ign et te de -

scribes a mee t ing o f the JCP leadership w i th Sta lin in A ugu s t 1951 ,w h en h e f orced a rad ica l l e f t p o l i cy on t h e Jap an ese P ar t y ; t h e s econ d

p or t rays t h e u n s u cces s f u l JCP - CP S U n ego t i a t i on s i n M os cow i n M arch

1964; and the last concerns the conclusion of the normalization agree-

I . S ee, for exam ple, the publications of the Nikkan Rod o Tsush insha [Daily Labo r Press]and the month ly l ¢ o a n j o h o [Public Security Intelligence] edite d and pub lishe d since 195 4

by the Shakai Undo Kenkyukai [Research Group on Social Movements] .2. Japanese names appear in the Japanese sty le o f surname first.This study has relied on three groups of primary sources. The first group includes recently

published books of Hakam ada. Until his purge, he w as a long-time comrade-in-arms of thepresent Chairman Miyamoto Kenji, with whom Hakamada spent many years in prewar Japanesejails after a period of study a t the Comm unist U niversity for the Toilers of the East (KU TV)in Moscow in the mid-1920s. Hakamada's writings include W a t a k u s h i n o s e n g o s h i [My Post-war H istory] (Tok yo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1978) and K i n o n o d o s h i M i y a m o t o K e n j i i e [To Ken ji

M iyamoto---M y Erstwhile Comrade] (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1978). Th ey have been augmented b yinterviews conducted in Japanese and Russian (Hakamada speaks no English). A second helpfulgroup of primary sources consisted of official JCP publications, especially the records of press

conferences of top Party leaders, and includes the JCP daily A k a h a t a [ R e d Flag] and the En-glish-language B u l l e t i n - - I n f o r m a t i o n f o r A b r o a d (Tokyo: Japanese Co mm unist Party, CentralCommittee) (hereafter cited as Bul le t in) ; "Essential Points in the JCP-CPSU Talks---On the Joint

Statement," Miyamoto 's press conference held in Moscow on December 24, 1979, A k a l m t a ,December 27, 1979; Bulletin, No. 4 26 (December 197 9) , pp. 6-15. The most i l luminatinggroup of sources consisted of confidenfal Party documents obtained by enterprising Japanese

investigative reporters and published in book form. (Generally such documents are obtainedfrom disgruntled Party members or are leaked to the press by government agencies.) This groupincludes Mizushima Tsuyoshi, M i y a m o t o K e n j i n o i m b o - - M i s s h i t s u n o n a k a k a r a n o k o k u h a k u

[The Conspiracy o f Kenji M iyamoto----Confessions from Behind Closed Doors] (Tokyo: Ze m -

bosha, 1980).



2 68 STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM

m e n t b e t w e e n t h e t w o P a r t i e s i n D e c e m b e r 1 9 7 9 . B u t f i r s t s o m e b a c k -

g r o u n d o n J a p a n e s e - S o v i e t P a r t y r e l a t i o n s .

JCP-C PSU Relat ions

A l t h o u g h t h e J a p a n e s e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y h a s j u s t c e l e b r a t e d i ts s ix -

t ie t h a n n i v e r s a r y , 3 f o r m o r e t h a n h a l f o f t h is p e r i o d i t w a s n o m o r e

t h a n a n a p p e n d a g e o f M o s c o w . D u r i n g t h e p re w a r y e a r s , t h e P a r ty w a s

a s m a l l a n d d o c i l e b r a n c h o f t h e C o m i n t e r n w h i c h f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l p u r -

p o s e s c e a s e d t o e x i s t w h e n e f f i c ie n t l y r e p r e ss i v e J a p a n e s e g o v e r n m e n t

p o l i c i e s c a u s e d m a n y o f i t s m e m b e r s t o r e c a n t , w h i l e t h e s t u b b o r nl e a d e r s h i p ( i n c l u d i n g t h e p r e s e n t C h a i r m a n M i y a m o t o K e n j i ) l i n g e r e d

fo r more t han a d ecad e i n j a i l s t o be r e l ea sed i n t he f a l l o f 1945 by

t h e o r d e r o f G e n e r a l D o u g l a s M a c A r t h u r . 4

G i v e n t h e c o n s t r a i n t s o f t h e A m e r i c a n O c c u p a t i o n , t h e P a r t y l e a d e r s

t r i ed t o p ro j ec t t he image o f a " l ovab l e " Communi s t Pa r ty . They s t r e s sed

p a r l i a m e n t a r y t a c t i c s , w h i c h b o r e f r u i t i n 1 9 4 9 w h e n t h e P a r t y c a p -

tu r ed 10 pe rcen t o f t he e l ec to r a l vo t e . B u t s f i o rt ly t he r ea f t e r , i n J anu a ry

1 9 5 0, S t a l in ( w i t h th e s u p p o r t o f th e C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t s ) o r d e r e d a na t t a ck o n t h e s e " E u r o c o m m u n i s t " p o l i ci e s . T h e o r d e r s , t r a n s m i t te d in

t h e f o r m o f a v e r y c ri ti c a l a r ti c le in t h e C o m i n f o r m p a p e r , c a u s e d a

s p l i t i n t h e P a r t y r a n k s . E v e n t u a l l y , t h e J C P a d o p t e d a s u i c i d a l h a r d -

l i n e s t r a t e g y a n d t h e l e a d e r s h i p w e n t u n d e r g r o u n d , a n d o n t o P e k i n g .

( T h e f i r s t v i g n e t t e s h o w s h o w S t a l i n f o r c e d t h i s l e f t p r o g r a m o n t h e

J C P . )

F o r t u n a t e l y f o r t h e J a p a n e s e C o m m u n i s t m o v e m e n t , t h i s v i o l e n t

e p i s o d e w a s r a t h e r s h o r t . I n M a r c h 1 9 5 3 S t a l i n d i e d a n d t h e K o r e a n

W a r c a m e t o a n e n d , s o t h a t t h e r e w a s n o m o r e n e e d t o d i s r u p t t h eA m e r ic a n r e a r b a s e i n Ja p a n . W i t h in t w o y e a r s , m o s t o f th e C o m -

m u n i s t l e a d e r s a n d c a d r e s w e r e b a c k i n J a p a n , a n d a s e r i o u s s t r u g g l e

f o r p o w e r e n s u e d . ( S e c re t ar y G e n e r a l T o k u d a K y u i c h i d i e d i n P e k i n g

i n O c t o b e r 1 9 5 3 .) I t w a s a l s o c l e a r th a t th e o n l y h o p e f o r t h e P a r t y

i n d e m o c r a t i c J a p a n w a s t o p u r s u e t h e o l d ( p r e - C o m i n f o r m c r i t i c i s m )

E u r o c o m m u n i s t p o l i c i e s , b u t t h e d i v i s i o n s i n t h e P a r t y h i e r a r c h y w e r e

v e r y d e e p , w i t h s o m e o f t h e f o l l o w e r s o f S t a l i n ' s l i n e r e l u c t a n t t o a l l o w

3. The P arty was established on July 15, 1922.4. The standard works on the early Japanese Communistmovementare: RodgerSwearingen

and Paul Langer, Red Flag in Japan: International Communism in Action, 1919-1951 (Cam-bridge, M ass.: Harvard UniversityPress, 1952); and George M. Beckmannand Okubo Genji,The Japanese Communist Party, 1922-1945(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress, 1969). RobertA. Scalapino's The Japanese Communist Movement, 1920-1966 (Berkeley and Los Angeles:Universityof C aliforniaPress, 1967) covers he first four and a ha lfdecades,



T H E J A PA N ES E C O M M U N I S T P A R T Y 269

fu l l and publ ic c r i t ic ism of the d isas t rous course . The s t ruggle for

p o w e r w a s w o n b y t h e p r e s e n t l e a d e r M i y a m o t o w h o s w i t c h e d f a c t i o n s

in o rde r to become Sec re ta ry Gene ra l and has s ince pu rsued a so f t , pa r -

l iamentary l ine , a lbe i t by d ic ta tor ia l means .

In ano the r s tudy , I have d iv ided the evo lu tion o f M iyam oto ' s po l i -

c ie s in to th ree pe r iods : (1 ) 1955-1961 , conso l ida t ion o f pow er and re -

jec t io n o f Pa lm iro Togl ia t ti ' s s truc tural re form theor ies ; (2 ) 1961-1968 ,

g row th , r e jec tion o f the Sov ie t and Ch inese m ode l s , and dec lara t ion o f

independence ; and (3) 1968 to the presen t , na t iona l ism and growing

conv e rgence wi th Euro com m unism . 5 The t rans it iona l pe r iod f rom theo l d t o t h e n e w p o l ic i e s an d t he c o n s o li d a ti o n o f p o w e r in M i y a m o t o ' s

hands co inc ided wi th the emerg ing ideo log ica l d i spu te be tween the

Sov ie t and Ch inese Pa r t i e s , wh ich some scho la r s da te back to the

Tw en t ie th Cong re s s o f the C PS U in Feb rua ry 1956.

The JCP reac t ion to th i s sp l i t in the in te rna t iona l Communis t move -

men t was to s t ay neu t ra l and to work toward reconc i l i a t ion o f the two

Co m m unis t supe r -Pa r ti e s . 6 B y the ea r ly 1960s, ho we ve r , m os t As ian

Communis t r eg imes and Pa r t i e s ( inc lud ing the JCP) had begun to l e an

toward Pek ing . The J apanese Pa r ty ' s swi tch was mos t ly due to the fac ttha t i t s domes t i c po l i c ie s o f s t r iden t oppos i t ion to "Amer ican im-

pe r ia l i sm" were more compa t ib le wi th the Ch inese pos i t ion than wi th

K h r u s h c h e v ' s p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e l i n e . T h e C P S U ' s c r u d e p r e s s u r e i n

the in te rna t iona l Communis t movemen t may a l so have been coun te r -

p roduc t ive . Fo r example , Miyamoto re la ted an inc iden t tha t took p lace

d u r in g t h e 1 9 6 0 M o s c o w s u m m i t o f e i g h ty - o n e C o m m u n i s t a n d W o r k-

e rs ' Pa r t i e s . W hen a J apanese de lega te re sponded wi th a "no commen t"

to a ques t ion on an i s sue unde r d i spu te be tween the Russ ians and theCh inese , ch ie f Sov ie t ideo logue Mikha i l Sus lov repo r ted ly s tood up ,

banged on the t ab le , and s a id , "Tha t ' s no way fo r a Communis t to re -

spo nd. ' '7

Bu t the one i s sue in the S ino -Sov ie t d i spu te tha t ha s dec i s ive ly p i t t ed

the Japanese Par ty aga ins t the Sovie ts was the s ign ing of the par t ia l

nuc lea r t e s t ban t rea ty in Moscow in 1963 . The JCP , in l ine wi th i t s

5. Peter Berton, "Japan: Euro-Nippo-Comm unism," Chap. X V in Vern on V. Aspaturian,Jir i Va len ta, and David P. Burke (eds.) , Eurocommunism Between East an d West

(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), p. 331.6. Here I follow the narrative of events in m y article, Peter Berton, "T he Japanese C om-

munists' Rapprochement w ith the Sov iet U nion," Asian Survey, XX , 12 (December 1980),p. 121 1 ft . S ee also Sei Young Rhee, "The Impact o f the Sino-Soviet Confl ict on theJapanese C omm unist Party, 1961-1968" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Mis-souri-Columbia, 1973), 430 pp.

7. R obert Sealapino's interview with an ex-JCP leader, K asu ga Shojiro, Nove mber 26, 1963(Scalapino, The Japanese Comm unist M ovement, p. 109).



270 STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM

strident anti-Americanism, supported the Chinese rejection of the nucle-

ar treaty. Yet, the entire question of nuclear weapons is a highlycharged one for the Japanese, who are the only victims of atomic war-

fare. One top Party leader, Shiga Yoshio, broke ranks and voted in the

National Diet for Japan's adherence to the treaty. The CPSU hailed the

"courageous" stand of a Japanese patriot and "faithful son of the

Japanese people." The CPSU also took sides against the JCP in the

various Japanese front organizations that reflected the split between

Moscow and Peking. As the second vignette will describe, a high-ranking

JCP delegation traveled to Moscow in February 1964 in a futileattempt to reconcile the differences between the two Parties and to stop

the CPSU's disruptive activities in Japan. Shortly thereafter, the JCP

purged Shiga and his pro-Soviet followers, who formed a rival

Japanese Communist Party--Voice of Japan (Nihon no koe), a rather

strange name for a group which should have been called more correctly

"Voice of the Soviet Union." The JCP weathered this defection rather

well, as most of the rank and file held, and the Ninth Party Congress

in November 1964 all but ratified the split between the Japanese and

Soviet Parties, which was to last for fifteen years, sThe break with the CPSU should have led to much closer relations

with the CCP. And indeed for a while it did, but in early 1966 Mao

Tse-tung personally intervened in the talks between the Japanese and

Chinese Parties and insisted that the JCP endorse his rather extreme

anti-Soviet positions. The Japanese delegation, headed by Miyamoto,

refused to sign on the dotted line and returned home. 9 Thereafter rela-

tions between the two Parties continued to deteriorate and with the

onset of the Cultural Revolution were completely broken off. Cut off

from both Communist super-Parties, the JCP began to search for allies

among other Communist Parties who were also trying to steer a neutral

course and to assert their independence from both Moscow andPeking. io

I have elsewhere characterized JCP relations with the CPSU after the

Japanese Party's break with the CCP as "The Long Road to Normaliza-

tion with Moscow. '~t Essentially, between 1968 and 1979, the Soviets

made three unsuccessful attempts at reconciliation with the obstreperous

8. Berton, "The Japanese Communists," pp. 1211-1212.9. For a detailed account of the Sino-Japanese talks, see C. L. Chiou and Tsiu-shuang

Han, "Ideology and Politics in the 1966-1967 Split Between the Communist Parties of China

and Japan," Studies in Comparative Communism, XI, 4 (Winter 1978), pp. 361-387.10. Berton, "Japan: Euro-Nippo-Communism," pp. 344-351; and idem., "The Japanese

Communists," pp. 1213-1214.

I1. ib id . , pp. 1214-1221.



T H E J A P A N E S E C O M M U N I S T P A R T Y 271

Japanese Pa r ty be fo re g rudg ing ly mak ing a ca r e fu l l y -p l anned , l im i t ed

conci l i a tory ges ture which suf f iced to br ing the two Par t i es to agree-ment . T he un succe ss fu l contac t s be tw een 1968 and 1977 involved v i s i ts

t o Tokyo by Sus lov and o the r Sov i e t Pa r ty o f f i c i a l s and mos t l y unof f i -c ia l a n d b r i e f m e e ti n g s in M o s c o w b e t w e e n M i y a m o t o a nd o t h e r

Japanese P re s id ium member s and Sus lov ( a l so Brezhnev on one occa -

s ion). A l though the m ain reason fo r the fa ilure of negot ia t ions until

1979 was Sov i e t r e l uc t ance t o come a round t o t he bas i c JCP pos i t i on

tha t Sov i e t suppor t o f " an t i -Pa r ty e l emen t s " (no t ab ly t he p ro -Sov i e t

Shiga group) mus t be repudia ted , o ther i s sues cont r ibuted to the es -

t r angemen t be tween t he two Pa r t i e s . These i nc luded Japanese condem-

na t i on o f t he Sov i e t i nvas ion o f Czechos lovak i a , t he expu l s ion o f Alek -

sandr So l zhen i t syn , t he a t t acks on Span i sh Communi s t l e ade r San t i ago

Car r i l lo , and mos t impor tan t ly the h igh-handed pol ic ies toward Japan ,

esp ecia l ly the terr itor ia l dispu te , the fishery neg ot ia t ions , and So vie tbo m bing exerc i se s in the v ic in i ty of Japan . 12

The conc lus ion o f t he S ino - Japanese Trea ty o f Peace and Fr i endsh ip

in Augus t 1978 and t he spec t e r o f c l ose r co l l abora t i on be tween t hese

two count r ies may have served as a ca ta lys t for the Sovie t dec i s ion tomake some conces s ions i n o rde r t o no rma l i ze r e l a t i ons wi th t he JCP .

The CPSU sen t two s i gna l s : a Cen t r a l Commi t t ee congra tu l a to ry cab l e

on t he occas ion o f Miyamoto ' s s even t i e th b i r t hday i n Oc tobe r and a

posi t ive ar t ic le in Pravda i n December wh ich con t a ined t he h igh ly s i g -

n i f i cant observa t ion tha t " the JCP cont inues i t s s t ruggle aga ins t an t i -

Par ty e leme nts . ''~3 Bu t there is m any a s l ip be tw een the cup and the

l ip . Whi le "ant i -Par ty e lements" could re fe r to the pro-CCP fac t ions

and the u l t ra le f t Tro t sk yis t s , they def in i te ly a lso inc luded , o f cou rse ,

t he p ro -Sov i e t Sh iga g roup , and t he Sov i e t s were de t e rmined t o o f f e r

t he l ea s t damag ing conces s ions and a s f ew o f t hem as pos s ib l e .

Over t he nex t s eve ra l mon ths , nego t i a t i ons were conduc t ed i n Tokyo

and i n Moscow, wi th t he Sov i e t s d r agg ing t he i r f e e t . 14 At the first

m eet ing in Tok yo, they re fused to s ign a jo in t com m uniqu6 , l eaving it

to the JC P nego t ia tor to p resent the pos i t ions o f both s ides (he inti-

mated tha t the CPSU had admi t ted the incor rec tness of the i r previous

act ion in publ ishing ar t ic les in Pravda suppor t ive of the Shiga c l ique) .

At the next meet ing in M os co w , the tw o Par t ies s igned a jo in t s t a te -men t i n wh ich t he CPSU admi t t ed t o no wrongdo ing bu t a l l owed t he

12 . F o r a de t a i l ed desc r ip t i on and ana l y s i s o f t he se i s sues s ee B e r t on , " Japan : E u ro -N i ppo -

C o m m u n i s m , " p p . 3 3 9 - 3 4 3 .

13. Pravda, D ec em ber 27 , 1978 .

14 . B e r t on , " T he Japan ese C om m u ni s t s , " p . 1216 f t .



2 7 2 S T U D I ES I N C O M P A R A T I V E C O M M U N I S M

Japanese s ide to s ta te tha t they "eva lua ted pos i t ive ly the cons t ruc t ive

approach o f t he C PS U rep re sen t a ti ves a t t he p re l im ina ry t a lks i n Tok yo" e 15to the pas t i s sues in t he r e la t ions be tw een t he two Pa r l a s . Bu t

Pravda conven i en t l y omi t t ed t he words " t he pas t i s sues , " l eav ing no

t r ace o f any pos s ib l e pas t wrongdo ing , head l i ned t he r epor t a s a "work -

ing d i scuss ion" (not an agreement ) , and bur ied i t on the ins ide in te rna-

t iona l page (Akahata gave t he acco rd f ron t -page cove rage ) . Even tua l l y

the Sov i e t s r e l uc t an t l y gave i n t o p r e s su re f rom the JCP and pub l i shed

the en t i r e t ex t i n t he CPSU Cen t r a l Commi t t ee o rgan Parti inaia zhizn,

wi th an adve r t i s emen t i n Pravda drawing a t t en t ion to the publ ica t ionof t he fu l l t ex t o f t he documen t . I n a f u r t he r a t t empt t o downgrade

these pre l iminary negot ia t ions , the ed i tors of Parti inaia zhizn headl ined

the r epor t a s a "Work ing Mee t ing o f t he Represen t a t i ves o f t he CPSU

and the JC P" and not as an agreem ent , t6 A f ina l round o f pre liminary

nego t i a t i ons i n Tokyo i n Augus t undoub ted ly dea l t wi th t he agenda fo r

t he fo r t hcoming summi t mee t i ng t o be he ld i n Moscow. Bu t a s t he

th i rd v igne t t e wi l l conv inc ing ly demons t r a t e , Sov i e t occupa t i on o f t he

nor thern i s lands , a pol i t i ca l ly impor tan t i s sue for the JCP, was summar-

i ly d i smissed by the Sovie t negot ia tors . Nor d id the f ina l agreementconf i rm any pas t Sovie t cu lpabi l i ty in suppor t ing "ant i -Par ty e lements ."

Al though t he December 1979 ag reemen t d id no rma l i ze r e l a t i ons be -

tween t he Sov i e t and J apanese Pa r t i e s , hopes fo r a genu ine r approche -

men t were sha t t e r ed by t he a lmos t s imul t aneous Sov i e t occupa t i on o f

Afghan i s t an , wh ich t he JCP condemned , demand ing t he immedia t e

w i t h d r a w a l o f S o v i e t t r o o p s , t7 In the three years s ince the normal iza-

t ion ag reemen t , po l em ics be tw een t he tw o Pa r t ie s hav e con t i nued , t s

The mos t r ecen t man i f e s t a t i ons o f bas i c d i s ag reemen t s be tween t he

JCP and t he CPSU a re v i s i b l e i n t he s l ogans o f t he F i f t y - t h i rd JCP May

Day ce lebra t ions in 1982 and in the speeches a t the Six teenth Par ty

Co ngres s he ld a t the end o f Ju ly 1982 . O f the e igh t een s l ogans , f ou r

15. Emphasis added.16 . Ber ton , "The Japanese Com m unis ts ," p . 1218.17 . "On the S i tua t ion in Afghanis tan ," Akaha ta , January 11 , 1980; Bul l e t i n , No. 427 (Jan-

uary 1980).18. See, for example, the report of the Par is correspondent of A k a h a t a ent i t led "On e Year

Since the Afgh anis tan In te rven t ion ," Akaha ta , Decem ber 16 , 1980; and the exchange of le t -

te r s be tween the JCP and the CPSU on the Pol ish and o ther i s sues in the summer of 1981 ,particular ly the June 15 and July 4 le tters f rom the JCP Central Com mittee (Akahata , June16-18, and Akahata Commentary Edition, July 13, 1981, respectively; Bul l e t i n , Nos . 461 and466) and the CPSU Central Com mit tee le t te r da ted Ju ly 30 ( P a r t i in a i a z h i z n , No . 16 [August

1981] , pp. 21-27; Radio Moscow, August 8 , 1981) . The JCP also immediately reacted tothe imposi tion of m ar t ia l law in P oland with an a rt ic le en t i t led "A Grave Si tua t ion Unbecom -ing of Soc ia lism: On the Es tab l ishment o f Mar tial Law in Poland ," Akaha ta , D ecem ber 15 ,1981.



THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY 27 3

contained ant i -Soviet poin ts : a demand for the wi thdrawal f rom Asia

of the SS-20 and o ther Soviet nuclear weapons (Slo gan 2 al so de-manded the wi thdrawal of American nuclear-armed t roops and nuclear

weapons) ; the im me diate re turn of Habom ai a nd Shikotan i s lands , and

the return of the ent i re Kuri le island chain upon the conclusion of a

Japan ese-So viet peace t reaty (Slogan 12); the dissolut ion Of al l mil i tary

blocs and al l iances (Slogan 13); and the immediate terminat ion of the

mi l i tary government in Poland, wi thdrawal of Soviet t roops f rom Af-

ghanis tan , and opposi t ion to a l l hegem onism an d "great powerism' .'

(Slogan 15). 19 In his speech at the Party Co ngress, M iya m oto singledout twenty-three theoret ical ly and pol i t ical ly signif icant documents is-

sued by the Par ty s ince the 1970s. One of these documen ts was "A

Cr i t ique o f Hegemoni sm in the In t e rna t iona l Communis t Movement - -

The Problems of Afghanis tan and Poland. '2°

Ag ainst ,this back grou nd o f relat ions between the Japa nese a nd S oviet

Part ies, let us proceed with our three vignet tes.

The Late Stalin Era

Some four months af ter h is ar r ival in Moscow, Hakamada was v is-

i ted in ear ly A ugust 1951 by a Soviet of fic ia l who m he had not met

before121 The emissary, who turned out to be the deputy director of

the CPS U International Depar tmen t , thrus t a docu men t in to

Hakamada ' s hand and sa id , "Comrade Hakamada , I wou ld l i ke you to

tell me i f you approve th is documen t , and i f you do, w e ' l l imm ediately

go together to Stal in ' s p lace. ''22 T he do cu m en t was ent i t ied "Imm ediate

Dem ands o f the Japanese C omm unis t Par ty - -A New Program. ''23

In the Soviet Union in 195! , i t was d is t inct ly unheal thy to decl inean invi ta t ion to see Stal in , and Hakamada reluctant ly said "yes ." Al-

though i t was almost 9 :00 P.M. , i t was common knowledge that Stal in

was up unt i l 2:00 or 3:00 A.M. His well-protected dacha at Kuntsevo

19. Akahata. May 1, 1982.20. Text of Miyamot o's speech on July 27, 1982. Akahata, July 28, 1982.

21. Tokuda, No sa ka Sanzo, and other top JC P leaders left Japan secretly in September

1950 and set up "the Toku da Organization" Tokuda kikan) in Peking. Ha ka ma da , at the time

an influential em b e r of the Party Central Committee, left o kyo secretly n De ce mb er I

and arrived in Peking (via K o b e and Ho ng Kon g) on Dec emb er 25. In early April 1951,Tokuda, Nosaka, Nishizawa Tomio, and H ak am ad a left Peking for Mo sc ow . Hak ama da,

Watakushi no s engo shi, Chronology, pp. 302-343.

22. This account is based on "T he Fateful untsevo Conference" in ibid.,pp. 93-102.

23. For the text of this "1951 Thesis," see "ImmediateDemands of the CommunistPartyof Japan--New Programme,"For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy, November23, 1951, p. 3. See also Chap. HI, "The Shift o the Left: GuerrillaWarfare, Japanese Style"in Scalapino,The Japanese Communist Movement, pp. 79-96.



2 7 3. STUDIES IN COM PAR ATI VE COM MU NI SM

was located in a forest near the Moscow River, some ten miles from

the Kremlin. The Japanese visitors (other leaders of the JCP arrived al-most simultaneously) were ushered into a large living room on the first

floor, which, except for a large conference table, a chandelier, and a

thick carpet, was very sparsely furnished. The Soviet leaders were al-

ready assembled in the room and after a round of handshakes invited

the Japanese to take their places at the conference table. Stalin seated

himself at the end of the table opposite Tokuda. To Stalin's right were

Georgii Malenkov (opposite Nosaka), Lavrentii Beria (opposite

Nishizawa Tomio), and Viacheslav Molotov (opposite Hakamada). Aninterpreter was seated between Stalin and Tokuda, and Wang Chia-

hsiang, c hief o f the CCP International D epartme nt, sat next to

Hakamada. ~

Stalin began in a quiet tone: '~'hcre were good reasons for the Corn-

inform criticism, and I think that it was correct." He said nothing about

why the criticism was correct. Hakamada claims that he stood up and

appealed to Stalin about the splitting machinations of the Tokuda group,

complaining about Tokuda's violent character and his autocratic be-

havior in purging duly elected Central Committee members and thussplitt ing the Party. At this po int Tokuda jum ped up and shouted, "H ey ,

what the hell are y o u saying!" Without hesitation, H akam ada said,

"Here, see for yourself . I f he can do this in front of all of you, you

can imagine how he behaves at the meetings of the Japanese Polit-

buro." After a si lence, Hakamada continued to expound on his differ-

ences with the Tokuda group, whereupon Nosaka accusingly said,

"Hakamada, what did you actually do this past year? You didn' t do a

thing, did you?" At this point Molotov, who sat opposite Hakamada,

murmured in a quiet tone, "Isn' t this because you didn' t give any work

to Comrade Hakamada?" Although this offhand remark was not trans-

lated, H akam ada unde rstood it. ~

Stalin, in the meantime , was quiet, doodling on a piece of pape r be-

fore him. Then he got up and, walking behind Malenkov and Beria and

puffing on his pipe, spoke very, ve ry slowly,

Comrade Hakamada, You arc now creating an opposit ion group to the

Party Center . This is not good. Aren' t you a metal worker? That 's

why you should well understand that there can be no victory withoutworkers ' solidarity. As far as this thesis is concerned, we have also

cooperated in drawing i t up. I would l ike the 'Japanese Party to go

forward on this basis.

24. Hakamada, Watakuahi no sen so shi, pp. 95-96.25. IBM., pp. 97-98.



THE JAPANESE COMM UNI ST PARTY 275

Nervously, Hakamada was about to l ight up a cigarette , but Wang,

who sat next to him, pushed down his hand intimating that it was for-

bidden to smoke in Stalin's presence. Hakamada then noticed that the

only ashtray on the table was in front of Stalin. 26

During the conference Stalin did most of the talking, enunciating

every word, while slowly walking back and forth. Although his tone

was very quiet , there was no allowance for any compromise. Later ,

Stalin directly addressed Hakamada:

Tovadshch Khakamada, [ have heard from our Japanese comrades that

there is a fierce factional str ife in Japan. This is not good. It mustbe stopped. I would like the Party to unite on the bas is of the pres-ently adopted directive. Therefore it is imperative to have ComradeHakamada's self-criticism. I think you should write it now and sendit to the comrades in Japan.

All those present (both Russians and Japanese) stared at Hakamada,

reinforcing Stalin's dictum, and Hakamada promptly agreed to prepare

a self-cr i t ic ism. The meeting ended after 11:00 P.M., without any ex-

pression of opinion by the Ch inese representative. On parting Stalin

turned to Hakamada and said, "Comrade Khakamada, I 've heard that

your health is not too good. How about recuperating in the Soviet

Un ion? '27

In fact, Hakamada's tuberculosis was worse than originally diag-

nosed, and he was sent to the Crimea for recuperation.

T h e K h r u s h c h e v E r a

The Japanese delegation arrived in Moscow in late February 1964.

I t was headed by Hakamada and included Presidium member Ma-

tsushima Harushige, Central Committee member Nishizawa Tomio, and

Yonehara I taru w ho joined the group from Prague, where he was

stationed as A k a h a t a correspondent. The JCP's objective was to stop

the high-handed interference of the CPSU and organizations under its

influence in the affairs of the Japanese Party and its affiliated organiza-

tions.The Soviet delegation was headed by Brezhnev and included, among

others, member of the Politburo and of the Secretar iat Otto Kuusinenand the Head of the International Department Boris Ponomarev. The

real negotiator, however, was none other than Suslov. The meeting

took place in Brezhnev's off ice, who opened the proceedings by invit-

26. Ibid., pp. 98-99.27. Ibid., ¢¢. 99-102.



276 S T U D IE S I N C O M P A R A T I V E C O M M U N I S M

i n g t h e g u e s t d e l e g a t i o n t o b e g i n . 28 H a k a m a d a s ta r te d h is s p e e c h b y

p a y i n g h o m a g e t o t h e r o l e t h a t t h e S o v i e t P a r t y , " t h e f i r s t P a r t y i n t h e

w o r l d t o s u c c e e d i n a s o c i a l is t r e v o l u t i o n , " h a d p l a y e d v i s- i~ - vis t h e

f r a te r n a l P a r ti e s . B u t h e n o t e d t h a t

recent ly , our Party 's relat ionship with the Soviet Embassy and thePravda correspondent w as not as good as before. H ow did i t get that

way? Wasn ' t i t because ever s ince the Part ial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

problem , the Soviets w ere supporting only th os e people w ho agreewith them and do as they are told? Wasn ' t i t because the Soviets wereengaging in splitting operations and interfering in our internal affairs?

We have our own way of do ing th ings , and we cannot suppor t all

C PS U decisions. A nd it is a mistake to cri ticize and attack u s sim ply

because we do not always support you.

A t th is p o i n t , S u s l o v s h o u t e d o u t , " W e a r e n o t d o i n g a n y s u c h

t h i n g ," b u t H a k a m a d a p r e s se d o n , " C o m m u n i s t s m u s t b e h o n e s t w i t h

e a c h o t h e r . A t p r e s e n t y o u a r e e n g a g i n g in h a r m f u l a c t i v i ty w h i c h is

g i v i n g u s t r o u b l e . " S u s l o v p r o t e s t e d , " I d o n ' t k n o w o f a n y in t e r fe r e n c e

i n t h e in t e r n a l a f f a i rs o f a n y P a r t y " a n d a s s e r t e d t h a t, " f a r f r o m h a r m -

i n g , i n t h e p a s t w e h a v e g i v e n a l l k i n d s o f a s s i s ta n c e t o o t h e r C o m -m u n i s t P a r t i e s. I d o n ' t k n o w h o w m u c h a id w e h a v e g i v e n t o t h e

C h i n e s e P a r t y . ' '2 9

W i t h o u t h e s it a t io n , H a k a m a d a r e s p o n d e d ,

Isn ' t i t better n ot to blow constant ly yo ur ow n horn about giving aidto other Part ies . People who receive aid don ' t want to hear i t . And

speaking of aid to China, the Soviet Union did not give aid for noth-ing; there mu st hav e been a reciprocal agreement. A nd when relations

with China worsened, yo u quic kly withdrew all yo ur technicians. I

wonder how severe a b low th i s was , and how i t harmed China--ayo un g social is t cou ntry. 3°

P o n o m a r e v , w h o s a t n e x t to H a k a m a d a , s h o u t e d o u t, " T h i s i s a n ul -

t i m a t u m ! " a w o r d t h a t w a s r e p e a t ed in u n i s o n b y B r e z h n e v a n d S u s l o v .

H a k a m a d a r e s p o n d e d , " W e d i d n o t c o m e h e r e to b r e a k o f f r e la t i o ns b e -

t w e e n o u r t w o P a r t i es . T a k e y o u r w o r d s b a c k . " H e a l s o r e m i n d e d t h e

S o v i e t h o s t s t h a t t h e 1 9 5 0 C o m i n f o r m c r i ti c is m h a d c o m e a s a b o l t o u t

o f th e b l u e a n d c o n s t i t u t e d b l a t a n t C P S U i n t e r f e r e n c e i n t h e a f f a i rs o f

t h e J a p a n e s e P a r t y , f o r c i n g ( jo i n t ly w i t h t h e C C P ) t h e 1 9 51 t h e s i s o fe x t r e m e l ef t a d v e n t u r i s m u p o n t h e J C P . A t th is p o in t , S u s l o v , v i g o r -

o u s l y w a v i n g h is h a n d s i n d e n i a l, p r o t e st e d , " W e h a v e a b s o l u t e l y n o t h -

2 8 . T h i s a c c o u n t i s b a s e d o n " T h e G r e a t D i s p u t e w i t h S u s l o v " i n H a k a m a d a , W a t a k u s h i

n o s e n g o s h i , p p . 1 8 4 - 1 9 0 .

2 9 . I b i d . , p. 188.

3 0 . I b i d . , p. 189.



THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY 2 7 7

i n g t o d o w i t h t h a t, T h a t w a s a ll S t a l i n 's w o r k . I f y o u p u r p o s e l y b r i n g

u p t h e s e p r o b l e m s n o w , y o u m u s t h a v e o t h e r m o t i v e s . " H a k a m a d a d i dn o t f li n c h , " Y o u a ll b l a m e e v e ry th in g o n S ta l in , b u t e v e n i f i t wa s h i s

d o i n g , i s n ' t i t p r o p e r f o r t h e S o v i e t P a r t y t o a s s u m e s o m e r e s p o n s i b i l i -ty?,,31

T h e n e g o t i a t io n s c o n t in u e d in t e rmi t t e n t ly f ro m M a rc h 2 u n t il t he

l l t h w i th o u t a n y a g re e m e n t . 3z Ye t, i n sp i t e o f t h e l a c k o f a n a g re e -

m e n t , t h e S o v i e t s i n s is t ed o n i s su i n g a j o i n t c o m m u n i q u 6 . T h e J a p a n e s e

r e f u se d t o d r a ft o r t o s i g n o n e , c i t in g t h e l a c k o f a n y a g r e e m e n t t h a t

c o u l d b e m e n t i o n e d i n s u c h a c o m m u n i q u 6 . B u t t h e S o v i e t d e l e g a t i o n

w a s d e t e r m i n e d t o g e t a c o m m u n i q u 6 s i g n e d , a n d P o n o m a r e v s t u b -

b o r n l y p e r s i s t e d i n h i s e f f o r t s t o g e t H a k a m a d a t o s i g n a c o m m u n i q u 6 ,

p u l l in g h i s s l e e v e e v e n a s t h e J a p a n e se d e l e g a t io n wa s g e t t i n g o n th e

p l a n e , s a y i n g , " C o m r a d e H a k a m a d a , p l e as e s ig n a j o i n t c o m m u n i q u 6 ;

o th e rw ise I ' l l b e in t ro u b le ! ''3 3

T h e B r e z h n e v E r a

T h e J a p a n e s e d e l e g a t i o n l e f t N a r i t a A i r p o r t n e a r T o k y o i n t h e m o r n -

i n g o f D e c e m b e r 1 5, 1 9 7 9 , o n a d i re c t J a p a n A i r L i n e s f li g ht to M o s -

c o w , a r r i v i n g s h o r tl y a ft e r 3 : 0 0 P . M I ( 9 : 0 0 P . M . J a p a n e s e t i m e ). T h e

f o l l o w i n g d a y , t h e 1 6 t h, w a s a S u n d a y , a n d th e S o v i e t - J a p a n e s e c o n f e r -

e n c e b e g a n o n M o n d a y , t h e 1 7 t h, a t 1 1 :0 0 A . M . i n t h e c o n f e r e n c e

r o o m a d j o i n i n g S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l B r e z h n e v ' s o f f ic e in th e K r e m l i n . 34

T h e J a p a n es e d e l eg a t io n , h e a d e d b y C h a i r m a n o f th e P r e s i d i u m

M i y a m o t o , h a d f iv e o t h e r P r e s i d i u m m e m b e r s , i n c l u d i n g tw o v i c e-

c h a i r m e n : U e d a K o i c h i r o ( t h e b r o t h e r o f F i rs t S e c r e ta r y F u w a T e -

t su z o ) 35 a n d th e R u s s i a n - sp e a k in g Ni s h iz a wa T o mio (wh o i s a lso in31. Ibid. Actually, the 1951 docum ent was reportedly drafted by Suslov , and after Stalin's

approval translated by No sak a in to Japanese. Fukuyama Hideharu, "S ore n no talnichiseisaku--sono rekishi to genjo" [Soviet Policy Toward Japan: Its H istory and Present Stateof Affairs], Koanjoho, No. 346 (July 1982), p. 18.

32. Som e of the topics taken up at these secret talks were revealed when the Soviet Partymade public on July 1I, 1964, its April 18 letter to the JCP and the Japanese Party repliedon August 26, 1964 (Akahata, September 2). For an analysis of the issues in the dispute,see Scalapino, The Japanese Communist Movement, p. 169 ft. See also "On Interventions inand Subversive Activities Against the Democratic Movements of Our Country and Our Partyby the CP SU Leadership and the Institutions and Organizations Un der Its Guidance,"

Akahata, June 22, 1965;Bulletin, No. 41 (June 1965); also published as a pam phlet by theForeign Languages Press in Peking in 1966, 47 pp.

33. Hakamada, Watakushi no sengo shi, p. 190.34. Except as noted, this account is based on Chap. 1, "Nisso ryo Kyosanto kaldan to

kuppuku shita Miyamoto Kenji" [The Conference of the Japanese and Soviet Communist Par-ties and Kenji Miyamoto's Surrender] in Mizushima, Miyamoto Kenji no imbo, pp. 12-35.

35. At the Sixteenth Party Congress held at the end o f Ju ly 1982, Fuwa became chairmanof the Presidium, while Miyamoto assumed the chairmanship of the Central Committee.



2 7 8 S T U D IE S I N C O M P A R A T I V E C O M M U N I S M

cha rge o f t he Com m i t tee on In t e rna ti onal Dip loma t i c R e l a ti ons ) , a s

we l l a s Uno Saburo , Miyamoto ' s pe r sona l s ec r e t a ry , who i s a Cen t r a l

C o m m i t te e m e m b e r.

T h e S o v i e t d el eg a ti o n w a s h e a d e d b y B r e z h n e v a n d i n c lu d e d S u s l o v ,

P o n o m a r e v , D e p u t y o f t h e C P S U I n te rn a ti on a l D e p a r tm e n t R . A .

U l i a n o v s k ii , t w o C e nt ra l C o m m i t t ee m e m b e r s - - B . G . A f a n a s y e v ( c h i ef

edi tor of Pravda) and P . N . Fedo seev (v i ce-p re s iden t o f the A cadem y

of Sc i e nce s ) - - and Ivan K ova l enko , h ead o f t he J apanese S ec t i on o f t heIn te rna t iona l D epar tme nt . a6

Pe rhaps fo r t he bene f i t o f t he J apanese co r r e sponden t s who accom-pan i ed t he Miyamoto mi s s ion and were b r i e f l y a l l owed i n t he confe r -

ence room, t he Russ i an hos t s ex t ended a mos t co rd i a l we l come to t he

Japanese de l ega t i on . I n an exagge ra t ed ges tu r e Brezhnev g r ee t ed

Miyamoto wi th open a rms , a bea r hug , and a handshake . He l ed t he

way t o t he t ab l e , po in t ed t o t he t ea s e rv i ce , and ac t ed a s a cha rming

ho s t to the Japan ese v i s i tor s . 37

The f i r s t sess ion s ta r ted as soon as the doors were c losed; Brezhnev

a rose t o de l i ve r a f i f t y -minu t e we l come and open ing s t a t emen t . He ex -

pressed h i s joy tha t the pre l iminary conferences had a f f i rmed the nor -ma l i za t i on o f r e l a t i ons be tween t he two Pa r t i e s and we l comed t he JCP

de l ega t i on t o t he Sov i e t Un ion . Af t e r a t ou r d 'ho r i zon o f t he i n t e rna -

t iona l s i tua t ion f rom the So v i e t po in t o f v i ew , w h ich i nc luded r e f e r-

ences t o Europe , I ndoch ina , and Ch ina , Brezhnev a sked t he J apanese

to suppor t t he Sov i e t p roposa l made t o t he J apanese gove rnmen t f o r a

t rea ty o f "good-ne ighbo rhood and coope ra t i on" and ended wi th an ex -

p re s s ion o f hope t ha t r e l a t i ons be tween t he two Pa r t i e s wou ld expand

in t he fu tu r e and a p romise t ha t t he Sov i e t s i de wou ld do i t s u tmos tt o mee t t he expec t a t ions o f t he J apanese s i de . Brezhnev na tu ra l ly ma de

no r e f e r ence wha t soeve r t o t he "Nor the rn Te r r i t o r i e s P rob l em," wh ich

w a s u p p e r m o s t o n M i y a m o t o ' s m i n d. a s

M i y a m o t o r e s p o n d e d b y e x p r e s s i n g his pleasure tha t the present t a lks

wou ld conf i rm the no rma l i za t i on o f r e l a t i ons be tween t he two Pa r t i e s

agreed upon in the pre l iminary conferences and ta lked a t l ength about

" the Sh iga p rob l em" which , acco rd ing t o t he JCP , was a t t he cen t e r

o f r e l a t i ons be tween t he two Pa r t i e s and wh ich a l so a f f ec t ed t he move-

men t f o r t he p roh ib i t i on o f a t omic and hydrogen bombs , t he J apanese -

36. "Jo in t S ta tement on the Ta lks Be tween the Delega t ion of the Japanese Communis tPar ty and the Delega t ion of the Communis t Par ty of the Sovie t Union ," Akaha ta , December

25, 1979; Bulletin, No. 426 (December 1979) , p . 1 ; Pravda, Decem ber 25 , 1979 , pp . I and4 .

3 7 . Miz u s h ima , Miyamoto K enji no imbo, p. 16,38 . Ibid., pp. 16-17.



THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY 27 9

So v i e t f r i e n d s h i p mo v e me n t , a n d o t h e r ma s s mo v e me n t s i n J a p a n .

After touching upon the in ternat ional s i tua t ion (especia l ly in Asia) , thepol i t ica l scene in Japan, the recent pol ic ies and developments in the

J a p a n e se Pa r t y , a n d t h e i n t ern at io n a l C o m mu n i s t m o v e m e n t , M i y a m o t o

t o o k u p t h e p ro b l ems " o f c o n c e rn to t h e p e o p l e o f Ja p a n a n d t h e So v i e t

Union , " namely the so -ca l l ed Nor the rn Ter r i to r ie s p rob lem, f i sh ing ,

f ishermen deta ined by the Sovie t author i t ies , v is i t s to the graves and

the ga the r ing o f a shes o f J apanese Wor ld War I I p r i soners -o f -war and

de ta inees who d ied in S ibe r ia .

Dur ing the t rans la t ion o f Miyamoto ' s remarks , Sus lov andKo va lenko feve r i sh ly took no tes , whi le Brezhnev , s eem ing ly pay ing no

at tent ion to the proceedings , sa t express ionless wi th c losed eyes . The

m ee t ing ad journed fo r lunch a t 1 :00 P.M . 39

Although dur ing the p re l iminary confe rences the Japanese had in -

s i s t ed and been led to be l i eve tha t th i s would be a summi t mee t ing be -

tween M iyam oto and B rezhnev , the in itia l two-h our m orn ing sess ion

was the on ly one a t t ended by Brezhnev in the e igh t -day nego t ia t ions ,

ove r wh ich Sus lov the rea f te r p res ided .

T h e f ir st d a y ' s m e e t i n g r e c o n v e n e d at 3 :0 0 P . M . in t h e c o n fe re n c ero o m o f th e C P SU M o s c o w P a r ty H e a d q u a rt e rs a n d w e n t o n fo r a l mo s t

th ree hours . Sus lov anno unced tha t Bre zhn ev ' s absence was due to " ad-

minis t ra t ive dut ies" and took over as the deputy head of the Sovie t de le-

gat ion.A t t h i s me e t i n g M i y a m o t o ' s p l an w a s t o r e c o n f irm a n d n a il d o w n t h e

po in t s agreed upon dur ing the p re l iminary nego t ia t ions rega rd ing thenormal iza t ion of re la t ions be tween the two Par t ies , leaving the d i f f icul t

Northern Terr i tor ies problem for la ter d iscuss ions , so as not to jeopar-

d ize the norm al izat ion agreem ent . He spoke a t l eng th abo u t the Sh iga

prob lem , s t re s s ing the po in t s o f agreem ent reached dur ing the p re l imi -na ry t a lks and the des i rab i li ty o f reun i fy ing and s t reng then ing the

J a p a n e s e ma s s m o v e m e n t s w h i c h h a d b e e n sp lit i n t h e pa st . M i y a m o t o

also t r ied to mol l i fy h is Sovie t hos ts by agree ing wi th the i r pos i t ion

on re la t ions wi th the Uni ted S ta tes , and espec ia l ly on Indoch ina wheret h e J C P s u p p o r te d V i e t n a m a g a in s t C h i n a J ° A f t e r t h is l o n g d e t o u r ,

M iyam oto began h i s expos i t ion o f the N or the rn Terr ito ries i ssue and re -

la ted problems. Essent ia l ly , he re i te ra ted the Japanese Par ty ' s a rgu-ments a s ou t l ined in i t s "Open Le t te r to the CPSU" of May 1977

(which the Sovie ts ignored) , c i t ing his tor ica l c la ims based on the

Ru sso-Japane se t rea t ies o f 1 85 5 and 1875, and propos ing a two-s tage

39. I b i d . , p. 17.4 0 . I b i d . , pp. 17-19.



2 8 0 STUDIES IN COMPAR ATIVE COMMUNISM

r e t u r n o f t h e t e r r it o r i e s. 41 H a b o m a i a n d S h i k o t a n i s la n d s , w h i c h a r e

p a r t o f H o k k a i d o ( a n d n o t p a r t o f t h e c o n t r o v e r s i a l K u r i l e I s l a n d

c h a i n ) , w e r e t o b e r e t u r n e d a s s o o n a s p o s s i b l e , w h i l e t h e e n t i r e c h a i n

o f K u r i t e I s l a n d s s h o u l d r e v e r t t o J a p a n u p o n t h e e m e r g e n c e o f a

" d e m o c r a t i c " J ap a n i n th e f u t u re , p r e s u m a b l y w i t h t h e J C P i n t h e g o v -

e r n m e n t a n d f r i e n d l y t o t h e S o v i e t U n i o n . 42 ( S i g n i f i c a n t ly , t h e J C P

s o u g h t t o a p p e a r t o b e m o r e p a t r i o t i c t h a n t h e J a p a n e s e g o v e r n m e n t

d o m i n a t e d b y t h e L i b e ra l - D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y , w h i c h h a s c l ai m e d f o r

J a p a n o n l y t h e t w o s o u t h e r n m o s t K u r i l e I s la n d s o f K u n a s h i r i a n d

E t o r o f u . ) 4 3T h e S o v i e t d e l e g a t i o n ' s r e a c ti o n w a s u n d e r s t a n d a b l y e x t r e m e l y c o o l ,

w i t h e v e r y o n e f r o m S u s l o v d o w n s ta r in g a s i f t h e y w o r e N o h m a s k s ,

a n d t h e r e w a s n o r e s p o n s e a t a l l w h e n M i y a m o t o f i n i s h e d h i s l o n g i m -

p a s s i o n e d s p e e c h . T h e J a p a n e s e d e l e g a t i o n r e m a i n e d s i le n t w a i ti n g f o r

t h e S o v i e t r e s p o n s e . F i n a l l y , a f t e r a n a w k w a r d s i l e n c e , a c h e e r l e s s S u s -

l o v s a i d , " M i y a m o t o - s a n , s i n c e t h is i s a d i ff i c u lt p r o b l e m , l e t u s t a c k l e

i t l a t e r . " B u t w h i l e S u s l o v d e l i b e r a t e l y s k i r t e d o v e r t h e t e r r i t o r i a l i s s u e ,

h e t r i e d t o a p p e a s e t h e J a p a n e s e b y s a y i n g ,

We also understand the problems of fishing, detained fishermen, andgrave visits in Siberia. Let's try to find a solution to these problems.Le t's create a subcom mittee for thi s purpose, and I w ould like theJapanese delegates to meet w ith the M inister of Fishing Industry Via-dimir K amentsev. We'll arrange such a m eeting.

K a n e k o M i t s u h i r o a n d T a c h i k i H i r o s h i w e r e a s s i g n e d t o m e e t w i t h t h e

S o v i e t m i n i s t e r t h e f o l l o w i n g d a y . A s f o r t h e d e t a i n e e s , S u s l o v p r o m -

i s e d t o t e l e p h o n e i m m e d i a t e l y t h e S i b e r i a n M a r i t i m e P a t r o l H e a d q u a r -

t e r s t o s e e a b o u t t h e i r r e l e a s e . H e a l s o p r o m i s e d t o h a v e t h e M i n i s t r yo f F o r e i g n A f f a ir s l o o k i n to t h e m a t t e r o f g r a v e v i s it a ti o n . T h e s e p r o m -

i se s g a v e t h e S o v i e t s a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o st a ll o n th e m a i n i s s u e - - t h e

N o r t h e r n T e r r i t o r i e s p r o b l e m - - l e a v i n g i t f o r t h e n e x t s e s s io n . 44

B e f o r e t h e s e c o n d s e s si o n , t h e J a p a n e s e d e l e g a t io n g a t h e r e d i n

M i y a m o t o ' s s u i t e f o r a s t r a t e g y m e e t i n g o n t h e t e r r i t o r i a l i s s u e . ( T h e y

t o o k c a r e t o k e e p t h i s m e e t i n g s e c r e t f r o m t h e a c c o m p a n y i n g J a p a n e s e

41. "T he O pen Letter of the Japanese Communist Party to the Comm unist Party of the

Soviet Union on [the] Chishima (Kurile) Islands Issue ," Akahata, May 28, 1977;Bulletin,No. 371 (Jun e 1977). See also Chishima mondai to Nihon Kyosanto [Th e Kuriles Problemand the JCPI published by the Pa rty Cen tral Com mittee n 1974.

42. Mizushima,Miyamoto Kenji no imbo, pp. 19-20.43. Japa n, Prime Minister's Office, NorthernCountermeasuresHeadquarters,Hoppo Ryodo

[Northern Territories] (Tokyo,M arch 1973), 48 pp ., and Japan, M inistry of Foreign Affairs,Japan's Northern Territories (Toky o, 1982), 20 pp.

44. Mizushima,Miyamoto Kenji no imbo, pp. 20-21.



THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY 281

j o u r n a l i s t s . ) T h e m e e t i n g w o r k e d o u t a t h r e e - p r o n g e d a p p r o a c h :

(1) Although it is totally unlikely that the Soviet side will agree tothe Japanese Pa rty's plan for a two-stage re turn of the N orthern Ter-ritories, the delegation should continue to advocate forcefully theJapanese position (including the historical record) from the point ofview of future talks and in order to "educate" the Soviet negotiators;

(2) Even if the Soviet side rejects the Japanese position, the delega-tion should try to get them to agree on the inclusion in the fin al join tcommuniqu6 the views of both sides on this question;

(3) the delegation should seek to obtain a pledge from the Soviet

side that even though they do not accept the Japanese position on theNo rthern Territories issue at the present time , bo th sides w ill continueto c onsider this m atter, as

T h e s e c o n d m e e t i n g to o k p l a c e t w o d a y s l a te r o n D e c e m b e r 1 9th a t

3 :3 0 P . M . in t he s a m e C P S U M o s c o w P a r ty H e a d q u a r te r s c o n f e r e n c e

r o o m . T h e S o v i e t s p r o v e d t o b e t o t a l l y i n d i f f e r e n t t o t h e J a p a n e s e d e l e -

g a t i o n ' s s e r io u s c o n c e r n a b o u t th e N o r t h e r n T e r r i to r i e s i ss u e , a n d S u s -

l o v s l a m m e d t h e d o o r o n f u r t h e r n e g o t i a t i o n s o n t h e s u b j e c t b y s a y i n g ,

M iyamoto-san, T he problem w hic h you have raised last time is verydifficult to solve. We have thought about it but there is just no wayout. This is because there is really no territorial problem between theSoviet Union and Japan. This is an issue which has been already set-tied. Let 's take up another agenda item. We think we can cooperatewith y ou a nd be o f service to the Japan ese Party. 46

M i y a m o t o w a s s p e e c h l e s s a n d m a y h a v e th o u g h t to h i m s e lf , " T h a t ' s

n o t r ig h t , w e ' v e b e e n d e c e i v e d . " W h e n h e re c o v e r e d , h e p o i nt e d o u t

t h a t , a t t h e r e c e n t l y h e l d p r e p a r a t o r y t a l k s , t h e S o v i e t s i d e h a d a t t h e

e n d a g r e e d t o p l a c e t h e p r o b l e m o f th e N o r t h e r n T e r r i to r i e s o n t h e o ff i-c i a l a g e n d a a n d t o t a c k l e i t a t t h e s u m m i t c o n f e r e n c e . M i y a m o t o a l s o

o b s e r v e d t h a t S o v i e t i n s i s t e n c e t h a t " t h e [ t e r r i t o r i a l ] p r o b l e m i s a l r e a d y

s e t t le d " o n l y p r o v i d e s a g o o d e x c u s e f o r th e r e a c t io n a r y f o r c e s w h o a r e

t r y i n g t o e x p l o i t t h i s p r o b l e m t o e s t r a n g e J a p a n a n d t h e S o v i e t U n i o n

f r o m e a c h o t h e r , a n d t h a t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n w o u l d " l o s e t h e u n d e r s t a n d -

i n g o f th e J a p a n e s e p e o p l e . " T h e S o v i e t U n i o n s h o u l d n o t t a k e th e a t-

t it u d e o f " h a v i n g n o e a r s t o l i st e n " b u t s h o u l d t a k e t h e a t ti tu d e o f l is -

t e n i n g s e r i o u s l y . 47

S u s l o v i n t e r p o s e d , " I t i s t r u e t h a t w e h a v e a g r e e d t o t a k e u p t h i s

p r o b l e m o f f i c i a l l y a t t h i s c o n f e r e n c e . A n d t h a t i s r e a l l y w h y a t o u r l a s t

45. Ib id . , pp. 21-22.

46. Ib id .

47. Miyamoto's press conference in Moscow, December 24, 1979, Akahata, December 27,

1979; Bulletin, No. 426 (December 1979), pp. I0 and 12.



282 S T U D IE S I N C O M P A R A T I V E C O M M U N I S M

se s s ion we have l i s t ened to you r v iews on the sub jec t fo r such a long

t ime . And now we have g iven you ou r answer . The re i s no d i f fe rence

in ou r a t ti tude . I sn ' t i t s o , M iyam oto -san?" M iyam oto coun te red , " I t

s eems tha t you have s imp ly no t unde rs tood ou r pos i t ion . Le t me ex -

plain i t on ce m ore in detai l . ''48

At h i s p re s s con fe rence a t the conc lus ion o f the Moscow mee t ing

Miyamoto repo r ted tha t he had spoken fo r f ive hou rs ou t o f the t en

hours t aken up by the Sov ie t - J apanese t a lk s , and tha t he had devo ted

ha lf o f h is t ime to the te rr itor ia l i s sue . H e a lso recounted one o f the

l igh te r momen ts a t the con fe rence when , a f t e r a long p re sen ta t ion onthe t e r r i to r i a l ques t ion , one o f the Sov ie t nego t ia to r s s a id , "W e have

l is tened to you care fu l ly and pa t ien t ly . This i s the ev idence tha t we

have ea rs to l i s ten ," a remark tha t p rov ok ed a burs t o f laughte r . 49

Bu t a t th i s s e s s ion , Sus lov showed no reac t ion a t a l l to Miyamoto ' s

s ti rr ing presen ta t ion o f abo ut an hour . Th e Japanese de lega t ion c ould

no t even ge t to the i r f a l l -back pos i t ion . A t a su i t ab le momen t , Sus lov

s a i d , " M i y a m o t o - s a n , l e t ' s e n d f o r t o d a y a n d m e e t a g a i n t o m o r r o w .

And le t ' s d i s cus s o the r p rob lems wh ich a re ea s ie r to re so lve . "

The th i rd s e s s ion , on D ecem ber 20 , l a s ted a lmos t fou r hou rs f rom11 :00 A .M. to 3 :00 P .M. The J apanese de lega t ion p repa red ano the r

fa l l -back pos i t ion on the ter ri to rial i s sue , bu t no mat te r how m uch

M iyam oto a rgued abo u t the two-s tage retu rn o f the is l ands, the Sov ie t

s ide s tuck to i t s pos i t ion tha t " there i s no te r r i to r ia l p rob lem be tween

the Sovie t U nion and Japa n" and tha t " the ter ri to rial p ro b lem is a l ready

se t t led . '5° Su s lov a lso brou ght up the secu r i ty aspec ts o f the nor thern

islands: "Japan , the U ni ted S ta tes , and C hina a re t igh ten ing the enc i r -

c lemen t o f the Sov ie t Un ion , u s ing the J apan -U.S . mi l i t a ry a l l i ance a sthe co re . I f Ha bom a i and Sh iko tan a re re tu rned , the re is the conseq uen t

dange r tha t they wou ld be made in to a s t ra teg ic s t rongho ld , a imed a t

a t tack ing the Sovie t Union , wi th a mi l i ta ry bu i ldup tha t th rea tens the

s e c u r i t y o f t h e U . S . S . R . " M i y a m o t o t r i e d t o r e a s s u r e t h e S o v i e t s t h a t

the i sl ands .wou ld no t be u sed , o r be a l low ed to be u sed , fo r m i l it a ry

bases , tha t ne i the r the J apanese Se l f -Defense Fo rces no r the U .S .

fo rce s wou ld u se them, tha t the i s l ands wou ld be kep t ou t o f the a rea

cove red by the U .S . - J apan Secu r i ty Trea ty , and tha t the i s l ands wou ld

be re tu rned on ly a f t er the rece ip t o f such a s su rances . 5 ! The Sov ie tnego t ia to r s , meanwhi le , d id no t coun te r the J apanese c la im tha t

48. Mizush ima, Miyamoto Kenji no imbo, p. 23.49 . See Miyamoto 's p ress conference , Bulletin, No. 426 (December 1979) , p . 12.50 . Mizush ima, Miyamoto Kenji no imbo, p. 24.51 . Ibid., pp. 26-27.



THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY 283

H a b o m a i a n d S h i k o t an w e r e p a rt o f H o k k a l d o , a n d n o t p a rt o f th e

K u r i l e c h a i n .

S i n c e t h e S o v i e t d e l e g a t i o n o b j e c t e d e v e n t o t h e w o r d " t e r r i t o r y , "

M i y a m o t o , a s a t a c t i c a l m a n e u v e r , s u b s t i t u t e d t h e w o r d s " p e a c e t r e a t y "

as a t op i c fo r fu tu re d i s cus s ions , f o r t he conc lus ion o f a peace t r ea ty

b e t w e e n J a p a n a n d t h e S o v i e t U n i o n w a s s t y m i e d l a r g e l y o n a c c o u n t

o f t he t e r r i t o r i a l i s sue . Whi l e i n s i s t i ng tha t t he t e r r i t o r i a l p rob lem had

a l r e a d y b e e n s e t t l e d , S u s l o v a g r e e d t h a t t h e " p e a c e t r e a t y " w a s n o t y e t

s e t t l e d , a n d t h a t i n t h e f u t u r e t h e r e w o u l d b e a n e x c h a n g e o f o p i n i o n

b e t w e e n t h e tw o P a n i c s o n t h is to p i c . T h i s w a s , o f c o u r s e , a m a t t e ro f s e m a n t i c s . T h e J a p a n e s e i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e w o r d s " p e a c e t r e a t y " i n -

c luded the te r r i to r ia l i s sue , whi le the Russ ians he ld tha t the "peace t rea-

ty" d id no t i nc lude the t ho rny t e rr it o ri a l p rob lem, s2

A t t h is po in t , t he nego t i a t i ons tu rned to t he p repa ra t ion o f the j o in t

c o m m u n i q u d a n d a s u b c o m m i t te e c o n s is ti n g o f th e R u s s i a n - s p ea k i n g

N i s h i z a w a a n d P o n o m a r e v w a s a s s i g n e d t o t h e t a s k . T h e f i n a l s e s s i o n

t o i r o n o u t t h e d i f f e r e n c e s o v e r t h e c o m m u n i q u 6 a n d t o s i g n i t w a s

s c h e d u l e d f o r D e c e m b e r 2 4 . M i y a m o t o a g a i n p r o t e s t e d B r e z h n e v ' s a b -

s e n c e , n o t i n g t h a t t h e S o v i e t s i d e h a d a g r e e d a t t h e p r e l i m i n a r y t a l k st h at B r e z h n e v w o u l d l e ad t h e S o v i e t d e l e g at io n a t t h e M o s c o w " s u m m i t

c o n f e r e n c e , " a n d t h a t , o f t h e th r e e f o r m a l s e s s io n s , B m z h n e v h a d a t -

t e n d e d o n l y t h e f i r s t , a n d e v e n t h e n o n l y t h e m o r n i n g s e s s i o n . S u s l o v

s e e m e d a n n o y e d a n d , a f t e r e x c h a n g i n g g l a n c e s w i t h P o n o m a r e v w h o

s a t n e x t to h i m , q u i e t l y sa i d ,

Secretary Ge neral Brezhnev is an old m an . [Suslov was, of course,several years Brezhnev's sen ior.] A lso his health is n ot very good.

W henever various chiefs of s tate visit him, we try to limit the confer-ences to one h ou r. And w he n the conferences run over one hour, w estep in for him and carry on. Ple ase try to understand. How ever, hewill definitely attend the final session of Decem ber 24th.s3

S u s l o v c o u l d h a v e a l s o a d d e d t h a t t h e f i r s t m e e t i n g w i t h t h e J a p a n e s e

d e l e g a t i o n l a s t ed a l m o s t t w o h o u r s . M i y a m o t o h a l f - s a rc a s t ic a l l y r e-

s p o n d e d , " P l e a s e d o a r r a n g e t h e m e e t i n g . I w a s a b o u t t o f o r g e t w h a t

C h a i r m a n B r e z h n e v l o o k s l i k e . B u t I a m r e l i e v e d t o h e a r t h a t I ' l l b e

a b l e t o s e e h i m o n t h e 2 4 t h . "

T h e f o l l o w i n g d a y , D e c e m b e r 2 1 , o n e o f t h e R u s s i a n in t e rp r e te r s

d r o p p e d b y t h e J a p a n e s e d e l e g a t i o n ' s q u a r t e r s a n d r e p o r t e d t h a t " u n f o r -

tuna t e ly Sec re t a ry Gene ra l Brezhnev i s s t i l l r ecupe ra t ing f rom h i s co ld

and m ay no t be ab l e t o a t t end the f i na l mee t ing on the 24 th . '' s' )

52. Mizushima, Miyamoto Kenji no imbo, pp. 25-26.

53. Ibid., pp. 26-27.

54. Ibid., pp. 27-28.



284 STUDIES IN COMPARATIVECOMMUNISM

The subcommittee to draft the final joint communiqu6 worked on it

from the evening of December 20 to the 23rd. The Soviet side

suggested that the Japanese delegation prepare a draft of the joint com-

muniqu6, which was then subjected, sentence by sentence, to minute

negotiat ions. 55 A lot of time was devoted to the territorial issue, and

since the Soviets refused even to mention the word "territory" in the

communiqu6, the following compromise wording was adopted:

Both sides recognized that the conclusion of a peace treaty betweenJapan and the U.S.S.R. is necessary for the friendly development of

relations between the two countries on a stable long-term basis,frankly expressed their views, and agreed that the exchange of viewswould continue in the future.56

Two other Japanese points were strongly resisted by th e Soviet side,

but in the end Suslov agreed to include both of them in the final com-muniqu6:

In order that the people of each country, in the existing complicatedinternational situation, may effectively promote the truly independentand democratic undertaking of transformation and construction of itsown country, based on the fight to national self-determination, bothsides oppose both "export of counterrevolution" and "the export ofrevolution,"

and

Both sides confirm that each party has the fight to independently de-cide in its choice of road of social progress, transformation, transitionto socialism, and building socialism and Communism in its own coun-try, based on the historical conditions and concrete situation of the

country, and guided by the principles of scientific socialism, Com-munism. In this, no outside interference whatsoever is permissible. 57

Of course, during these Soviet-Japanese negotiations Soviet troops were

in the final stages of both "outside interference" in and the "export of

revolution" to Afghanistan.

The fourth and final session started at 2:00 P.M. on December 24.

Brezhnev was absent, "recuperating from a cold" (but in fact involved

in the final preparations for the invasion of Afghanistan), and the joint

communiqu6 was signed by Miyamoto and Suslov. Following the sign-ing ceremony, the meeting moved to another room for a small, low-key

farewell party of fewer than twenty participants. Here Suslov an-

55. Ibid.. p. 29.56. For an analysis of the agreement, see Berton, "The Japanese Communists." See also

the "Joint Statement,"Bulletin, No. 426 (December 1979), p. 4.57. Ibid.. pp. 4 and 5.



THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY 2 8 5

nounced Brezhnev ' s message abou t h i s co ld . Th i s was a f i t t ing conc lu -

s ion to a con fe rence , l ike a p lay , d i rec ted and ac ted by Sus lov .M i y a m o t o d i d n o t g e t h i s " s u m m i t m e e t i n g " w i t h B r e z h n e v , n o r d i d

he rece iv e any p ledge regard ing the No rthern T err i to r ies . 5s

Som e F ina l Observa tions

Heinz T im m ermann a rgues tha t the Sov ie t l e ade rsh ip m akes a c lea r

d i s t inc t ion be tween l a rge and po l i t i c a l ly impor tan t non ru l ing Com-

munis t Par t ies on the one hand , and the smal l and ins ign if ican t ones

on the o the r . 59 The JC P ranks som ew here in the m idd le : i t is one o fthe ve ry l a rges t non ru l ing Communis t Pa r t i e s in the wor ld , bu t r a the r

impoten t on the Japanese po l i t ica l scene . Yet Japan , in sp i te o f i t s mi l i -

t a ry weaknes s , i s ve ry impor tan t to the Sov ie t Un ion fo r a who le range

of reasons : s t ra teg ic , econ om ic , technologica l , and po l i tica l . Neve r the-

le s s, the S ov ie t t r eatmen t o f the JCP has been ju s t a s c lumsy and coun -

te rp roduc t ive a s i ts t r eatmen t o f the J apanese gove rnmen t : h igh -handed ,

t r i cky , in f l ex ib le . Of cou rse , Sov ie t nego t ia t ions wi th the J apanese gov -

e rnmen t have occu r red in a con tex t o f chang ing p ow er re lat ionsh ips,rang ing f rom the pe r iod o f Bo lshev ik he lp le s snes s and J apanese power

ove r a l a rge a rea o f the Sov ie t Fa r Eas t in the pos t -Oc tobe r Revo lu t ion

pe r iod , to the e ra o f re la t ive J apanese weaknes s in the immed ia te pos t -

Occupa t ion e ra , to one o f g rowing J apanese economic s t reng th in the

1960s and 1970s . No such ebb and f low in power has cha rac te r i zed

the re la t ionsh ip be tween the CPSU and the JCP . A c rea tu re o f the

Comin te rn , the J apanese Pa r ty was subse rv ien t to the Pa r ty o f the Oc -

tobe r Revo lu t ion and pe rsona l ly to S ta lin . The re co u ld be no negotia-

t ions with S ta l in , on ly a diktat, as the f i rs t v igne t te p resen ted here cor-robora tes .

In the pos t -S ta l in pe r iod , Sus lov emerged a s the p r imary nego t ia to r

wi th non ru l ing Pa r t i e s and appa ren t ly had ve ry wide power and l a t i tude

in such ta lks . I t i s d i f f icu l t to ascer ta in the ex ten t to which he was a lso

the p r imary dec i s ionmake r , g iven the absence o f minu te s o f Po l i tbu ro

mee t ings , bu t ce r ta in ly he had the ma jo r s ay wi th in an ag reed upon

genera l po l i t ica l l ine , w hich he no d ou bt a lso de c is ive ly in f luenced . 6°

The l a s t two v igne t t e s p re sen ted above c lea r ly ind ica te Sus lov ' s p reem-

58. Mizushima, M i y a m o t o K e n j i n o i m b o , p. 30.59. See a special section, "Varying Behavior TOward Small and Large Parties" in his con-

cluding comment below.60. Suslov has been rumored to have been largely responsible for choreographing

Khrushchev's ouster in 1964. See, for example, Roy Medvedev, A s c e s a e c a d u t a d i N i k i t a

C h r u s c e v (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1982), p. 316 ft.



286 S T U D I ES I N C O M P A R A T I V E C O M M U N I S M

inent role in the 1964 and 1979 negotiations with the Japanese Party.

From the Japanese sources Ponomarev emerges as Suslov's right-hand man in charge of technical matters, such as the drafting of com-

muniqu6s. He is probably responsible for Soviet success in avoiding

any a pologies fo r Sovie t interference in the internal affairs of fraternal

Parties and any explicit admission of past errors, as well as in exclud-

ing sensitive issues from the final comrnuniqu6s.As for negotiating tactics, the Japanese case clearly brings out that

Soviet negotiators or their superiors are not above going back on their

word to publicize in Soviet organs the agreements reached in prelimi-nary talks. In their subsequent announcements, the Soviets have omit-

ted crucial words, thereby emasculating the agreements. They have

mislabeled "agreements" as "meetings," and have done everything else

in their power to bury unpleasant agreements in obscure publications

or specialized organs with limited circulation, reserving the central

mass dailies of Pravda and lzvestiia for "posit ive" news. Indeed, one

of the lessons to be drawn from the JCP's experience in i ts Soviet

negotiations is the need to specify in the preliminary agreement that the

Soviet side will reproduce the agreement in its entirety and where andhow it will do so.

Another element in the Soviet negotiating style, as evidenced in

negotiations with the Japanese Communists, is the Soviet tactic of

evading resolution of a thorny issue by agreeing to place it on the

agenda of the next level of negotiations and then immediately rejecting

the issue when it arises. Such rejection of an important issue is often

accompanied by Soviet will ingness to consider or promise help on sec-

ondary issues (which they may have purposely created in order to have

the opportun ity to show a spirit of conciliation at a later stage). Th e

Soviet side is reluctant (if not unwilling) to admit errors or interference

in the internal affairs of fraternal Parties. The demolition of "the cult

of personali ty," beginning with Khrushchev's secret speech at the

Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, conveniently allows the Soviet

negotiators to blame all policies pursued before 1953 on the late dic-

tator . (Of course, a ll Communis t Part ies--including the JC P- -en ga ge

in such historical revisionism, witness the treatment of Mao Tse-tnng

in po st-M ao China). 61The history of relations between the CPSU and the JCP also demon-

61. See the treatment of JCP policies before Miyamoto's advent to power in the official

Patty history on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary. Fifty Years of the Japanese Com-munist Party, rev. and enlarged ed. (Tokyo: Japanese Communist Party, Central Committee,

1980), 295 pp.



T H E J A P AN E S E C O M M U N I S T P A R T Y 287

strates the willingness of the Soviet leaders to split obstreperous Par-

ties, to support pro-Soviet splinter groups editorially in Pravda and

other Soviet organs (and also no doubt financially), while at the same

time keeping an eye on the power relationship between the official

Party and the splinter groups. When it became obvious that the JCP

had weathered the defection of both pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese ele-

ments, the Soviet Party began to mend its relations with the official

JCP. Th ey pro ceeded cautiously and slowly, al ternating overtures with

verbal attacks. The attacks, in response to JCP criticisms of Soviet pol-

icies, sometimes took the form of direct statements in the Soviet pressand at other times used the subterfuge of reprinting attacks on the JCP

by third Parties (usually minor, politically insignificant, and servile Par-

ties, like the Argentine or American Parties). The Soviet Union has

also been willing to support non-Communist political parties in its con-

flict with a Communist Party, as the record of Soviet support of the

Japanese Socialist Party (and its affiliated organizations and mass

move men ts) demonstrates.

Behind these Soviet tactics lie the imperatives of foreign and domes-

t ic propaganda. The Soviet Union must maintain the myth of i ts om-nipotence and omniscience by always stressing the positive, minimizing

the negative, and blaming someone else for i ts problems. The CPSU

must maintain the fiction that all "progressive" forces acknowledge the

primacy of the Party of the October Revolution which ushered in "a

new stage in the history of hum anity."Soviet negotiating partners should appreciate this reality, learn from

the record of Soviet negotiations (especially those with nonruling Com-

munist Parties in advanced industrial democratic societies), be prepared

to dot all the "i"s and cross all the "t"s, and display great patience.That may not always be possible in a free democratic society, with all

its public opinion and electoral pressures, but it is essential for success.

Documents

The Soviet and Japanese Communist Parties-