Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
This article was downloaded by: [UQ Library]On: 01 November 2014, At: 04:36Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK
German PoliticsPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fgrp20
The sources of institutionaltrust in East and WestGermany: civic culture oreconomic performance?William Ross Campbell Ph.D. Candidatea Department of Government , University ofStrathclydePublished online: 24 Jan 2007.
To cite this article: William Ross Campbell Ph.D. Candidate (2004) The sourcesof institutional trust in East and West Germany: civic culture or economicperformance?, German Politics, 13:3, 401-418, DOI: 10.1080/0964400042000287437
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0964400042000287437
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of allthe information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on ourplatform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensorsmake no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy,completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views ofthe authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis.The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should beindependently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor andFrancis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings,demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever
or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, inrelation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private studypurposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of accessand use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
04:
36 0
1 N
ovem
ber
2014
ASGP POST-GRADUATE PRIZE, 2004
The Sources of Institutional Trust in Eastand West Germany: Civic Culture or
Economic Performance?
WILLIAM ROSS CAMPBELL
The sources of institutional trust are contested in political science. Cul-
tural explanations focusing on engagement in civic activity compete
with rationalist theories that link institutional trust with perceptions
of economic performance. This article subjects hypotheses derived
from these competing explanations to empirical testing, using data
from European Values Surveys for East and West Germany. The
results cast considerable doubt over the ability of cultural factors to
explain institutional trust. Whilst civic engagement is lower in the
East than in the West, levels of institutional trust are indistinguishable.
Regression analysis shows that cultural factors have a relatively weak
impact on attitudes towards political institutions, and that economic
performance is a far better model for predicting institutional trust.
In recent years political scientists have been preoccupied with institutional
trust.1 It is easy to see why. Institutional trust, it is argued, confers legitimacy
on representative government.2 For this reason, it is particularly important in
societies undergoing democratic transformation, where the immediate task is
to overcome a culture of cynicism bred of sustained exposure to a socialist-
authoritarian belief system. Yet institutional trust is also equally vital to
Western democracies characterised by a pervasive dissatisfaction with poli-
tics. Despite the importance of the subject, however, and the sustained atten-
tions of political science, there is as yet no consensus on the principal factors
that explain the formation of institutional trust. The central purpose of this
article is to contribute to clarifying the debate.
Two types of theoretical explanation compete to explain the processes
involved in the formation of institutional trust. The first is derived from the
field of political culture,3 focusing on ‘civil society’, ‘civic community’ and
‘social capital’. This tradition can be traced to the writings of the Scottish
German Politics, Vol.13, No.3 (September 2004), pp.401–418ISSN 0964-4008 print=1743-8993 onlineDOI: 10.1080=0964400042000287437 # 2004 Association for the Study of German Politics
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
04:
36 0
1 N
ovem
ber
2014
philosophers Hume (1739), Smith (1759) and Ferguson (1767).4 This theoreti-
cal tradition provided the foundation for Almond and Verba’s (1963) pioneer-
ing study of democracy in Western Europe. They argued that the political and
cultural spheres of society were inextricably interlinked: the roots of a ‘civic
culture’ are found in patterns of interpersonal relations and sociability.5 More
recently, Putnam has postulated that sociability plays a key part in stimulating
democratic growth,6 and that the success of democracy depends on the exist-
ence of dense networks of civic engagement. Others have employed a similar
logic in understanding democratic consolidation in post-communist Europe.7
A second approach explains the formation of institutional trust in terms of
political economy, focusing on the structure of capitalist social relations. This
type of explanation invokes the principles of rational choice. Social trans-
actions are governed by an actor’s calculation of the costs and benefits
involved. Actors choose those actions which maximise utility in pursuit of
purposive goals that have been re-shaped by values or preferences.8 Put
simply, this line of argument conceives that institutional trust is the positive
feedback that results from citizens’ perceptions of and expectations about
institutional performance.
Surprisingly, however, these competing explanations for the formation of
institutional trust have rarely been subjected to empirical testing. This is the
purpose of this article. It will use survey data in an attempt to test two types
of linkage. First, following culturalist logic, it will test the linkage between
institutional trust and civic engagement, interposing the intermediate variable,
interpersonal trust. In short, does participation in civic associations generate a
type of interpersonal relations that underpins trust in political institutions?
Second, following the logic of the rationalist perspective we will test the prop-
osition that institutional trust is a product of self-interested evaluations of
institutional output, construed in terms of economic performance.
CULTURALIST VS. RATIONALIST EXPLANATIONS
OF INSTITUTIONAL TRUST
At its core, then, the culturalist explanation argues that institutional trust is
exogenous to the political sphere, originating in long-standing and deeply
seeded cultural norms and is an emergent property of interpersonal trust
which is projected onto political institutions. Culturalist theories, in that
sense, assume that trust is an emergent property linked to basic forms of
social relations: individuals learn to trust or distrust people by experiencing
how others in the culture treat them and how, in return, others react to their
behaviour. Of central importance to the culturalist perspective, then, is the
link between interpersonal trust and institutional trust.
402 GERMAN POLITICS
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
04:
36 0
1 N
ovem
ber
2014
A significant part of the culturalist literature stresses the importance of
associational activity. Civic engagement, it is argued, generates interpersonal
trust. Voluntary associations, in that sense, mediate between civil society and
the state: they inculcate individuals with the rules of compromise and demo-
cratic principles; they make individuals more socially active and supportive
of democratic norms; and they produce a capacity for trust, reciprocity and
co-operation, thereby strengthening democracy.9 From this perspective,
then, voluntary secondary associations form a crucial part of the social infra-
structure of society which makes the generation of trust possible: they are both
conducive to the development of trusting attitudes and reinforce them within
the population. At the core of this perspective, then, is the conviction that
involvement in voluntary associations evokes civic attitudes which are
crucial to the strengthening of democracy: ‘good government is a by-product
of singing groups and soccer clubs’.10
For Putnam, it is in voluntary associations that ‘social capital’ is generated.
This, of course, prompts three questions related to this concept. First, what
exactly is social capital? Second, is the concept analytically productive?
Third, to what extent is it empirically operationalisable? For the purposes of
this article, social capital is defined as follows. It is a democratic value
which is built up in everyday social traditions and is accrued through involve-
ment in networks of civic engagement. Through its intermediary function,
social capital can both embody and contribute to the efficiency of a democracy
by inculcating the principles of democratic political culture. It is manifested in
the form of interpersonal trust: citizens learn to trust as a consequence of
working with others in community contexts. As such, it is important in the
context of institutional trust, for when social capital is in short supply, so
too will be trust in the major representative institutions of the state. The
second question focuses on definitional diversity. In slender writings on
social capital the concept appears largely as a latent premise, uncrystallised
into deliberate or systematic formulations. As a result, ‘social capital’ has
become so vague and ambiguous a concept that its explanatory power is
weakened, and so misleading that in many cases it is a positive hindrance to
some of the central aspects which it is deployed to elucidate. The third ques-
tion turns to the challenges of measurement. Where diversity of definition
exists, it is a logical progression that an equivalent plurality of methods
to measure it will be used.11 As a consequence, questions of coherence and
validity are raised: do the survey variables measure what they are supposed
to measure?
The corollary of the culturalist position is that institutional trust cannot be
generated from the ‘top down’, that is, it is not a consequence of the character
of institutions or their perceived performance. Rather it is politically exogen-
ous and must be built up in the everyday structure of social traditions through
INSTITUTIONAL TRUST IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY 403
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
04:
36 0
1 N
ovem
ber
2014
the generation of social capital. The core of this theoretical framework is illus-
trated in Figure 1.
The rationalist perspective originates in Anthony Downs’ seminal work,
An Economic Theory of Democracy.12 It has been operationalised primarily
in the context of electoral behaviour. Himmelweit et al., argue that a central
claim of Downs’ theory is that a ‘rational’ voter is someone who votes
based upon the expected utility of voting.13 A person decides to vote only if
the expected utility of voting exceeds the cost of voting. The Downsian
model can thus be characterised as an investment decision; the cost of
voting is accepted in return for some future benefit. Clearly this introduces
the idea of consumption into the model: voters assess the utilities of, in the
case of Himmelweit et al., political parties in terms of the change to the per-
sonal welfare of the voter. This rational choice logic would clearly conceive of
actors trusting institutions to the extent that their individual wants and needs
are satisfied. It is a logic which, furthermore, informs the theory of Easton and
his concept of ‘specific’ support.14
Rationalist analysis of institutional trust can be traced to Easton’s (1963)
explanation of political support in terms of individual attitudes towards the
political regime. Easton conceived that regime support and material incentives
were reciprocally related. Regime support can be manifested in the form
of what is termed ‘specific support’; the process whereby members of a
system are predisposed to evaluate the satisfactions that they obtain from
the perceived outputs and performance of the political authorities’.15 From
this perspective, citizens are viewed as economic agents, whereby they match
perceived outputs to their demands. If citizens perceive that demands have
been met, they may be prepared to extend limited support. Conversely, if
FIGURE 1
‘BOTTOM-UP’, CULTURALIST CONCEPTION OF INSTITUTIONAL TRUST
404 GERMAN POLITICS
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
04:
36 0
1 N
ovem
ber
2014
outputs are perceived as unable to meet the demands of the citizenry, trust in
the authorities will be in short supply.16 Governments, therefore, can nourish
support through the satisfaction of demands. Institutional trust is, therefore,
rooted in the performance of the government. Clearly, from this perspective,
institutional trust is generated from the ‘top down’: it is the weighted sum of
the perception of the institutions’ performance. This top-down approach is
illustrated in Figure 2.
In sum, then, we have two models which compete as theoretical expla-
nations of the formation of institutional trust. The first model attempted to
account for the formation of institutional trust with reference to culturalist
variables. A second approach conceived of institutional trust as the emergent
property of satisfaction derived from government outputs. Clearly, these
theoretical approaches lend themselves to empirical testing. Prior to this,
however, it is important to convert them into testable hypotheses, and to
make a preliminary assessment of the empirical expectations consistent with
their testing.
RESEARCH DESIGN: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
It is possible to derive hypotheses at both an aggregate and individual level
based on these theoretical approaches. In doing this, it will be possible to
discern whether institutional trust is best explained at the aggregate or at
the individual level. At the aggregate level two hypotheses emerge:
Hypothesis 1: Societies with high levels of interpersonal trust and civic
engagement will have high levels of institutional trust.
FIGURE 2
‘TOP-DOWN’, PERFORMANCE CONCEPTION OF INSTITUTIONAL TRUST
INSTITUTIONAL TRUST IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY 405
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
04:
36 0
1 N
ovem
ber
2014
Hypothesis 2: Societies with positive economic performance evalu-
ations will have higher levels of institutional trust.
At the individual level, the conceptual frameworks also suggest firstly that cul-
tural variables (interpersonal trust and forms of civic engagement) will be stat-
istically significant predictors of institutional trust. However, in relation to the
approach derived from the Downs–Easton paradigm, two hypotheses emerge.
First, using a sociotropic variable, that there will be a positive linear relation-
ship between individual-level perceptions of the aggregate performance of the
economy. Second, that individual-level social class, income and education
variables will emerge as statistically significant predictors of institutional
trust. Thus:
Hypothesis 3: Civic engagement and interpersonal trust will be statisti-
cally significant predictors of institutional trust.
Hypothesis 4: Individual-level socio-economic indicators (social class,
income and education) will be statistically significant predictors of insti-
tutional trust.
Hypothesis 5: Individual-level perceptions of the aggregate economic
performance will be statistically significant predictors of institutional
trust.
A key question at this stage of the analysis concerns the extent to which these
hypotheses will find empirical verification in East and West Germany. Whilst
West Germany did not correspond precisely to the civic culture model when
Almond and Verba conducted their study, it did exhibit some of the character-
istics. We can, therefore, expect to find empirical verification of the culturalist
approach in West Germany. In East Germany, confirmation of the hypotheses
derived in respect to political culture is inconceivable. The GDR with its
authoritarian, state-socialist ideology and its pervasive security apparatus
seems unlikely to have created an environment conducive to the formation
of horizontal relations of reciprocity and co-operation. It is equally doubtful
whether, as Padgett argues, East Germans have developed the social and
organisational skills that constitute social capital, and, as such, will exhibit
high levels of interpersonal trust.17 Furthermore, given the authoritarian
legacy of East German society it is improbable that East Germany will have
an advanced infrastructure of social organisations. Opportunities for civic
engagement beyond the control of SED (Sozialistische Einheits Partei
Deutschlands, or Socialist Unity Party of Germany) were extremely
limited.18 So much so, in fact, that the only quasi-autonomous institutions
in the GDR were the protestant churches and the dissident organisations
which emerged in the final stages of the GDR’s existence.19 The official rheto-
406 GERMAN POLITICS
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
04:
36 0
1 N
ovem
ber
2014
ric and the ubiquitous nature of the SED, therefore, seems more likely to have
encouraged East Germans to retreat into Nischengesellschaften (a society of
niches) than into the public sphere in which social capital is created. Two
empirical expectations emerge from this analysis. First, that East Germany
will have a low level of institutional trust. Second, even those from the East
who do trust democratic institutions will still be less trusting than those
from West Germany.
MEASURES, DATA AND METHOD
The hypotheses derived make the competing theoretical frameworks testable.
In order to test them we need empirical data containing measures of insti-
tutional trust, civic engagement, interpersonal trust and economic perform-
ance. However, prior to testing these competing theoretical approaches, it is
necessary to define institutional trust, and to clarify, for the purposes of this
article, how it will be empirically operationalised.
Trust in democratic institutions, like so many concepts in the social
sciences, has given rise to a plurality of definitions. Narrowly defined, the
object of trust might simply be the political system itself, comprising the
national parliament and the legal system. A broader definition might
include the institutions which preserve public order, namely the police and
the armed forces. Broader still, institutional trust could be defined as encom-
passing the core institutions of civil society, including the educational system,
the mass media and trade unions. The narrower definition based on the
national parliament and the legal system is used in this article. There are
two important reasons for this. First, it is less ambiguous as conceptually
these institutions perform the major representational and judicial functions
of the state. Second, studies have shown that there is a clear distinction
between how, on the one hand, citizens evaluate representative state insti-
tutions and the legal system, and, on the other hand, coercive state institutions
such as the police, the armed forces and the institutions of civil society.20
A familiar social science technique containing reliable and valid data on
measures of trust and civic behaviour is the survey. For the regression analysis
this essay draws on wave three (1999) of the European Values Survey (EVS).
However, in order to facilitate a more meaningful discussion of the trends in
institutional trust, interpersonal trust, civic engagement and economic per-
formance, comparative data from the second wave (1995) of the survey
have been included in Tables 1–4. Academically driven, but designed to
feed into key debates on national policy at the European and national level,
the EVS, as a world-wide investigation of socio-cultural change, provides
representative, systematic national surveys on the political behaviour and
social values of a cross-section of the European populace, including East
INSTITUTIONAL TRUST IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY 407
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
04:
36 0
1 N
ovem
ber
2014
and West Germany. In both East and West Germany, the total number of
respondents (N) exceeded 1,000, a figure generally accepted to facilitate gen-
eralisations about the population as a whole.
In the EVS, trust in democratic institutions was measured using the follow-
ing question: ‘Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how
much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very
much or none at all?’ Included in the list were the national parliament and
the legal system, the two items which form the definition of institutional
trust.21 The items trusted, it should be noted, do not refer directly to the gov-
ernment, political parties in office, political authorities or policy outputs, but to
the major institutions of the state.
In addition to containing measures of institutional trust, the EVS also
contains measures of interpersonal trust (one manifestation of social capital),
and a diversity of measures of civic engagement.22 Following the classic way
in which questionnaires measure interpersonal trust, the EVS asks: ‘Generally
TABLE 1
TRUST IN DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS: EAST AND WEST
GERMANY, 1995 – 99
East West
1995 1999 1995 1999
Justice System 32 49 54 65National Parliament 16 40 28 35
Notes: 1995 East Germany N ¼ 1009, 1995 West Germany N ¼ 1017;1999 East Germany, N ¼ 999, 1999 West Germany, N ¼ 939.Percentage of respondents who said they had a great deal or quite alot of confidence in the justice system and the national parliament.
Source: EVS, 1995, 1999.
TABLE 2
INTERPERSONAL TRUST IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY,
1995 – 99
East West
1995 1999 1995 1999
Interpersonal Trust 24 43 40 32
Notes: 1995 East Germany N ¼ 1009, 1995 West Germany N ¼ 1017;1999 East Germany, N ¼ 999, 1999 West Germany, N ¼ 939.
Source: EVS, 1995, 1999.
408 GERMAN POLITICS
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
04:
36 0
1 N
ovem
ber
2014
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be
too careful in dealing with people?’ Analysts contend that measuring social
capital in this way neglects its ‘cognitive’ dimension.23
To facilitate testing of the performance approach, the EVS discriminates
between sociotropic and egocentric economic data. At the sociotropic level,
the survey asks for rating of the government’s economic performance using
this question: ‘People have different views about the system for governing
this country. Here is a scale for rating how well things are going: (1) means
very bad; (10) means very good’. Although there is some ambiguity about
TABLE 3
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY, 1995 – 99
East West
1995 1999 Change (%) 1995 1999 Change (%)
Percentage ofrespondents whoare a member of atleast one form ofcivic engagement
46 42 24 60 51 29
Notes: 1995 East Germany N ¼ 1009, 1995 West Germany N ¼ 1017; 1999 East Germany,N ¼ 999, 1999 West Germany, N ¼ 939.
Source: EVS, 1995, 1999.
TABLE 4
INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL EVALUATIONS OF AGGREGATE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY, 1995 – 99
East West
1995 þ/– 1999 þ/– 1995 þ/– 1999 þ/–
PerformanceEvaluationPositive
8 216 15 219 14 212 27 þ16
PerformanceEvaluationNegative
24 34 26 11
Notes: (1) 1995 East Germany N ¼ 1009, West Germany N ¼ 1017; 1999 East Germany,N ¼ 999, West Germany, N ¼ 939.(2) Percentage of respondents from a ten-point scale where 1 equals bad and 10 equalsgood. Respondents who chose options 1-3 were held to evaluate the economic perform-ance negatively; whereas respondents who chose options 8–10 were held to evaluatethe economic performance positively.
Source: EVS, 1995, 1999.
INSTITUTIONAL TRUST IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY 409
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
04:
36 0
1 N
ovem
ber
2014
what exactly this question probes, in previous analyses of political support it
has been operationalised as a performance variable.24 At the egocentric level,
there are measurements of household income, social class (operationalised in
terms of the form of employment in which the respondent is located), and edu-
cation (denoted as ‘Abitur’).25
EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL TRUST
How trusting are East and West Germans of democratic institutions? To
answer this question, we can examine the trends from the EVS.
The data from the EVS clearly show that the level of institutional trust in
East Germany in 1995 was very low: slightly less than one-third of respon-
dents (32 per cent) trusted the justice system, and even fewer (16 per cent)
trusted the national parliament. And despite increasing (in the case of the
national parliament the level of trust more than doubles over the four-year
period), on the basis of the current evidence a majority of East Germans
still do not trust the major judicial and representative institutions of the state.
In some respects, the low level of trust in the justice system is far from surpri-
sing. The politicisation of the justice system in the years of the GDR and
the trials of East German officials immediately after unification may have
reinforced the impression on East Germans that a retrospective justice of
the victorious is in operation in the unified Federal Republic.26
Turning to the West, we see a rather different picture. In 1995 a clear
majority (54 per cent) trusted the justice system. By 1999, the level of trust
in the justice system in West Germany had risen to the extent that approxi-
mately two-thirds (65 per cent) of respondents trusted it. But perhaps the
most telling and almost counter-intuitive finding is about the level of trust
exhibited in 1999 in the national parliament in West Germany (35 per cent)
compared with that of the East (40 per cent). On the basis of the present
evidence West Germany is less trustful than the post-communist and economi-
cally dislocated region of Germany. This statement, however, needs careful
qualification for a majority of East or West Germans do not trust their national
parliament.
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT; INTERPERSONAL TRUST AND INSTITUTIONAL
TRUST: THE AGGREGATE LEVEL
From the data provided in Table 2 it appears that, overall, the levels of inter-
personal trust are following quite different trajectories in East and West
Germany. Following exposure to a socialist-authoritarian belief system, the
East displayed a very low level of interpersonal trust (24 per cent) in 1995.
By 1999, however, this had risen substantially to 43 per cent. The West, by
410 GERMAN POLITICS
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
04:
36 0
1 N
ovem
ber
2014
contrast, had a fairly high level of interpersonal trust in 1995, but this reduced
considerably over the four-year period to 32 per cent by 1999. Based on this
evidence, then, East Germany, the antithesis of the civic culture model, actu-
ally has a level of interpersonal trust which exceeds that of West Germany by
over ten per cent. How do we explain this? Perhaps in line with culturalist
logic the trends in civic engagement may account for the level of interpersonal
trust. For if culturalist explanations hold true, as civic engagement increases in
East Germany so too should the level of interpersonal trust. Similarly, if there
has been an overall decline in civic engagement in West Germany so too
should the level of interpersonal trust. The trends in civic engagement are
shown in Table 3.27 The percentage change over the four-year period have
also been included to aid our analysis.
The overall trend in civic engagement has been the same in both parts of
the Federal Republic of Germany: a decline. In 1995 in the East, 46 per cent of
respondents were actively involved in at least one form of civic engagement.
By 1999, this had declined to 42 per cent. In 1995 in the West, by contrast,
60 per cent of respondents were actively involved in at least one form of
civic engagement. However, this declined by almost ten per cent over the
next four years.
To summarise our findings so far we can note the following. In 1995, civic
engagement, interpersonal trust and institutional trust were all lower in East
Germany than in West Germany. This provides some initial support to
Hypothesis one. But if we factor in our findings in relation to the 1999
trends we observe the following. In 1999 civic engagement is still lower in
East Germany compared with West Germany. However, by 1999 interper-
sonal trust is actually higher in East Germany than in West Germany. Also
by 1999, institutional trust in the national parliament is higher in East
Germany than in West Germany, but is lower in the East in relation to the
justice system.
This casts doubt on the linkage between civic engagement and interperso-
nal trust, and is, at best, inconclusive regarding the linkage between interper-
sonal trust and institutional trust. For over the 1995–99 period in the East, we
observed: (1) a decline in the level of civic engagement; (2) an increase in the
level of interpersonal trust; and (3) an increase in the level of institutional
trust. On balance, the evidence in the East justifies support for the linkage
between interpersonal trust and institutional trust, but undermines the
linkage between civic engagement on the one hand and interpersonal and insti-
tutional trust on the other. Over the 1995–99 period in the West we observed:
(1) a decline in the level of civic engagement; (2) a decline in the level of inter-
personal trust; and (3) an increase in the level of institutional trust. Clearly in
West Germany there is some support for the linkage between civic engage-
ment and interpersonal trust, but our findings undermine the linkage
INSTITUTIONAL TRUST IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY 411
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
04:
36 0
1 N
ovem
ber
2014
between interpersonal and institutional trust. Overall, then, there is grounds
for scepticism over the culturalist approach at the aggregate level. Accord-
ingly, hypothesis one cannot be accepted.
EVALUATIONS OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL
TRUST: THE AGGREGATE LEVEL
In a further attempt to account for the level of institutional trust at the aggre-
gate level, we can examine marginal, sociotropic data on aggregate percep-
tions of economic performance. This information is shown in Table 4, and
includes a positive-negative index for comparative purposes.
In the East there is a uniformly negative perception of the performance of
the economy:216 in 1995 compared with219 in 1999. This may account for
the low levels of institutional trust in 1995 in the East, but it cannot account
for the increase in institutional trust in 1999. At the aggregate level, then,
there is little support in the East for the economic output-oriented explanation
of institutional trust at the aggregate level. In the West in 1995, the slightly
less negative perception of the performance of the economy (212) is reflected
in higher levels of institutional trust. But by 1999 there was a dramatic shift
(þ16) to positive perceptions of economic performance in the West which
is also reflected in a significant increase in institutional trust. This evidence
supports the economic output-oriented explanation at the aggregate level
and also counters the general view that Westerners are more instrumental
than Easterners in attitudes to democratic institutions.
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT; INTERPERSONAL TRUST AND INSTITUTIONAL
TRUST: THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL
To determine whether or not cultural variables predict institutional trust at the
individual level it is necessary to run multiple regression models. The
regression model shown in Table 5 includes all of the forms of civic engage-
ment and interpersonal trust which are included in the third wave of the EVS.
In Table 5 we can see that in the West rather than there being a positive
linear relationship between forms of civic engagement and interpersonal
trust, in many cases the relationship is actually negative. This is shown by
examining the sign in front of the beta value (B) in the table. In the West
only political party membership, environmental group membership, youth
group membership and sports group membership have positive beta values.
Even so, only the beta value for sports group membership is statistically sig-
nificant. The beta values for all of the other forms of civic engagement are
412 GERMAN POLITICS
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
04:
36 0
1 N
ovem
ber
2014
TABLE 5
MULTIPLE REGRESSION, CULTURALIST APPROACH
West Germany, 1999 East Germany, 1999
ModelUnstandardised
Coefficients ModelUnstandardised
CoefficientsB Std. Error B Std. Error
(Constant) 1.329��� 0.097 (Constant) 0.773 0.039Member Union 20.033 0.100 Member Union 0.224� 0.103Member Sports 0.153� 0.057 Member Sports 0.176� 0.075Interpersonal Trust 20.217 0.054 Interpersonal Trust 0.167� 0.054Member Political Party 0.188 0.139 Member Political Party 20.005 0.164Member Community 20.348 0.261 Member Community 20.303 0.406Member Professional
Group20.062 0.115 Member Professional Group 20.002 0.162
Member Religious 20.0072 0.078 Member Religious 0.158 0.082Member 3rd World 20.365 0.329 Member 3rd World 20.108 0.902Member Peace 20.408 0.838 Member Peace 20.454 0.595Member Health 20.033 0.154 Member Health 0.106 0.201Member Environment 0.229 0.173 Member Environment 20.006 0.221Member Welfare 20.121 0.131 Member Welfare 0.236 0.173Member Youth 0.165 0.184 Member Youth 20.003 0.261Member Women’s Group 20.286 0.125 Member Women’s Group 20.009 0.138Member Other 20.001 0.144 Member Other 20.006 0.145R Square 5 4 per cent R Square 5 4 per cent
Notes: �sig. at 0.05 level. *** sig. at 0.0005 level.Dependent Variable: Institutional Trust.
Source: EVS, 1999.
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
04:
36 0
1 N
ovem
ber
2014
indicative of negative relationship. So rather than increasing institutional trust,
these forms of civic engagement decrease institutional trust. One explanation
for this is that these forms of civic engagement are ‘counter-cultural’ and are
likely to be frequented by individuals who are sceptical about political insti-
tutions. There is, therefore, no evidence whatsoever in support of the cultural-
ist explanation at the individual level in West Germany. In the East, there is a
linear relationship between some of the independent variables (union and
sports group membership and interpersonal trust), and the dependent variable,
institutional trust. However, caution is required for two reasons. First, it is
doubtful whether the findings at the individual level are enough to offset the
negative results found at the aggregate level. Second, the ‘R Square’ value
which denotes the overall explanatory power of the model is extremely low:
only four per cent of the variance in institutional trust is explained.
EVALUATIONS OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND
INSTITUTIONAL TRUST: THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL
To answer the question of whether or not individual-level perceptions of the
aggregate economic performance predict institutional trust, we need to run
regression models. These are shown in Table 6. The ‘R square’ value
quoted below the regressions shows the variance in the dependent variable
(institutional trust) explained by the independent variables.
In relation to the regression of the 1999 EVS, in both East and West
Germany, the performance approach appears to have found empirical verifica-
tion. The variable ‘perceptions of economic performance’, which refers to
individual-level perceptions of aggregate economic performance, attains stat-
istical significance at the .0005 level. This means that on only one occasion out
TABLE 6
MULTIPLE REGRESSION PERFORMANCE APPROACH
West BStd.
Error East BStd
Error
Constant 0.551� 0.188 Constant 20.208 0.169Abitur 20.041 0.159 Abitur 0.103 0.197Income 20.014 0.019 Income 20.003 0.021Social Class 20.025 0.019 Social Class 20.009 0.018Perceptions of
EconomicPerformance
0.104�� 0.017�� Perceptions ofEconomicPerformance
0.178�� 0.015��
R Square 5 7% R Square 5 22%
Notes: �sig. at 0.05 level. ��sig. at 0.0005 level. Dependent variable: Institutional Trust.
Source: EVS, 1999.
414 GERMAN POLITICS
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
04:
36 0
1 N
ovem
ber
2014
of 5,000 would this result be obtained by chance. We can therefore conclude
that the result is not due to chance. Economic performance is a significant pre-
dictor of institutional trust. None of the egocentric variables, by contrast,
predict institutional trust according to these results. Only education, labelled
‘Abitur’ in Table 6, has a positive beta sign. Even so, it is not a statistically
significant finding. We can therefore conclude that socio-economic variables
(social class and education) have no impact on institutional trust.
But this is not the whole story. The most telling comparison with the
regressions performed in relation to political culture is in terms of the ‘R
square’ value. We can see from the R square value that it is higher in the
West German regression than that of the culturalist regression. In the East it
explains 22 per cent of the variance of institutional trust, the highest of any
regression produced so far. So not only is economic performance a consist-
ently significant predictor of institutional trust, it is also a more powerful
explanation in the East compared with the West.
CONCLUSION
This article began by outlining two theoretical approaches which predominate
as explanations of institutional trust. An approach which contends that insti-
tutional trust is the positive feedback from citizens’ perceptions of the per-
formance of the economy has been juxtaposed to an approach which
contends that institutional trust originates outside the political sphere in
deeply seeded cultural norms and is an emergent property of interpersonal
trust. However, in light of the evidence presented in this article the claims
of the culturalist conception of institutional trust have sustained serious
damage.
True, we are examining the results from one survey. And it is questionable
whether on the basis of one survey we can discredit an entire theoretical tra-
dition. However, there is the cumulative failure, at both the aggregate and
individual level, of the culturalist approach to correspond to and provide an
analytical perspective for the empirical levels of institutional trust in East
and West Germany. At the aggregate level, this article found that there was
grounds for (at best) scepticism in relation to the culturalist perspective.
The linkage between civic engagement, interpersonal trust and institutional
trust was never consistently or conclusively established in West Germany.
Indeed the results obtained completely undermined the linkage between inter-
personal trust and institutional trust in the West German context. Equally, at
the individual level in West Germany, there was actually a negative linear
relationship between some of the forms of civic engagement and institutional
trust. This was explained by observing that in West Germany some forms of
INSTITUTIONAL TRUST IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY 415
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
04:
36 0
1 N
ovem
ber
2014
civic engagement are ‘counter-cultural’ and are likely to be made up of those
who are predisposed to be distrustful or sceptical of democratic institutions.
In East Germany, whilst there was tacit evidence of a linear relationship
between some culturalist variables, including interpersonal trust, this was dis-
missed for two reasons. First, the findings in support of the culturalist
approach at the individual level were unlikely to be offset by the negative
results which were found at the aggregate level. Second, the explanatory
power of the culturalist model was extremely poor: only a very small
amount of the variance in institutional trust was explained by the culturalist
regression. We can conclude, therefore, that culturalist explanations are an
extremely weak and ineffective predictive model for institutional trust.
This was not the case, however, in the performance approach. Whilst at the
aggregate level it did not account for the level of institutional trust in East
Germany, some evidence was found in support of it at the aggregate level
in West Germany. The increase in the percentage of West Germans who eval-
uated the performance of the economy positively coincided with an increase in
institutional trust. At the individual level, in both East and West Germany the
model worked much better compared with the culturalist model. In West
Germany its explanatory power exceeded that of the culturalist model. In
East Germany, the amount of variance explained in institutional trust was
22 per cent, more than five times better than that of the culturalist model.
And in both East and West Germany individual perceptions of the aggregate
performance of the economy were consistently the most significant predictor
of institutional trust.
In summary, three things emerge from the findings presented in this essay.
First, there is the weakness, except in the case of the performance approach in
West Germany, to explain institutional trust at the aggregate level. Second,
there is the weak performance of the culturalist approach to explain the ante-
cedents of institutional trust. Clearly this finding presents a challenge to estab-
lished perceptions about the culturalist consolidation of democracy. Third,
there is the strength, particularly in East Germany, of the performance
approach. This suggests that institutional trust in East Germany can be
‘earned’ by stimulating the economy and by avoiding policies which
depress material standards of living.
It remains to be seen whether the results of this article are replicated in
future waves of the EVS. However, clearly there is a pressing requirement
to pay sustained attention to the levels of institutional trust in East and
West Germany. At the same time, the need to re-examine afresh the logic
underpinning the culturalist perspective and the extent to which it accounts
for the level of institutional trust, particularly in the German context, has
never been greater. Based on the present evidence, the culturalist approach
has seldom looked weaker.
416 GERMAN POLITICS
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
04:
36 0
1 N
ovem
ber
2014
NOTES
Particular thanks to Professor Stephen Padgett and Professor John Curtice for commenting on aprevious draft of this essay. The author would also like to acknowledge the financial support ofthe ESRC which funded the research on which this essay is based.
1. See: R. Rohrschneider and R. Schmitt-Beck, ‘Trust in Democratic Institutions in Germany:Theory and Evidence Ten Years After Unification’, German Politics 11/3 (2002), pp.35–58;J. Maier, ‘Political Culture in East and West Germany’, Bamberger Beitrage zur Politikwis-senschaften II-14 (2003), pp.1–63; W. Mishler and R. Rose, ‘Trust, Distrust and Skepticism:Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies’, Journalof Politics 59/2 (1997), pp.418–51; W. Mishler and R. Rose, ‘Trust in Untrustworthy Insti-tutions: Culture and Institutional Performance in Post-Communist Societies’, Studies inPublic Policy 310 (Centre for the Study of Public Policy; University of Strathclyde,1998); W. Mishler and R. Rose, ‘What are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutionaland Cultural Theories in Post-Communist Societies’, Comparative Political Studies 34/1(2001), pp.30–62; T. Kunioka and G.M. Woller, ‘In (a) Democracy We Trust: Social andEconomic Determinants of Support for Democratic Procedures in Central and EasternEurope’, Journal of Socio-Economics 28 (1999), pp.577–96.
2. Mishler and Rose, ‘Trust, Distrust and Skepticism’.3. A. Portes, ‘Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology’, Annual
Review of Sociology 24 (1998), pp.1–24; R.D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Tra-ditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); R.D. Putnam,‘Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital’, Journal of Democracy 6/1 (1995),pp.65–78.
4. See L. Paterson, ‘Civil Society and Democratic Renewal’, in S. Baron, J. Field andT. Schuller (eds.), Social Capital: Critical Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2000).
5. G.A. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in FiveNations (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1963).
6. R. Putnam, Bowling Alone (New York: Simon and Schuster), p.19.7. J.L. Gibson, ‘Social Networks and Civil Society in Processes of Democratization’, Studies in
Public Policy 301 (Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1998).8. J. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1999), p.13, cited in M. Zey, Rational Choice Theory and Organizational Theory: A Critique(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998).
9. S. Roßteutscher, ‘Advocate or Reflection? Associations and Political Culture’, PoliticalStudies 50 (2002), pp.514–28.
10. Putnam, Making Democracy Work, p.176.11. J.W. Van Deth, ‘Measuring Social Capital: Orthodoxies and Continuing Controversies’,
International Journal of Social Research Methodology 6/1 (2003), p.81.12. A. Downs, An Economic theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957).13. H.T. Himmelweit, P. Humphreys, M. Jaeger and M. Katz, How Voters Decide: A Longitudi-
nal Study of Political Attitudes and Voting Extending over Fifteen Years (London: AcademicPress, 1981).
14. D. Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1963);D. Easton, ‘A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support’, British Journal of Politi-cal Science 5 (1975), pp.435–57.
15. Easton, ‘A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support’, p.437.16. Ibid.17. S. Padgett, Organizing Democracy in Eastern Germany: Interest Groups in Post-Communist
Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.14.18. J. Grix, ‘Recasting Civil Society in East Germany’, in C. Flockton, E. Kolinsky and
R. Pritchard (eds.), The New Germany in the East: Policy Agendas and Social Developmentssince Unification (London: Frank Cass, 2000).
INSTITUTIONAL TRUST IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY 417
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
04:
36 0
1 N
ovem
ber
2014
19. Ibid., p.273.20. H.-D. Klingemann, ‘Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis’, in P. Norris
(ed.), Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1999).
21. From the level of confidence expressed in the national parliament and the legal system, a trustvariable was made. This was a zero-to-two scale of the institutions trusted. Those who had agreat deal of confidence or quite a lot of confidence were said to trust the institutions. Whilstit is recognised that this particular question does not specifically mention trust, it has in pre-vious analyses been used as a measure of trust. (See, for example, Klingemann, ‘MappingPolitical Support in the 1990s’).
22. The forms of civic engagement included in the third wave of the EVS are: political partymembership, union membership, religious membership, environmental groups, professionalassociations, women’s groups, welfare groups, sports groups, health groups, 3rd WorldAction groups, peace movements, and community action groups.
23. See J. Grix, ‘Social Capital as a Concept in the Social Sciences: The Current State of theDebate’, Democratization 9/3 (2001), pp.189–210.
24. See Klingemann, ‘Mapping Political Support in the 1990s’; Mishler and Rose, ‘What are theOrigins of Political Trust?’
25. The education variable was recoded into a dummy variable in which the respondents eitherpossessed a high-school leaving certificate (Abitur), or did not.
26. B. Wegener et al., ‘Justice Ideologies, Perceptions of Reward Justice, and Transformation:East and West Germany in Comparison’, in D. Mason, J.R. Kluegel and L.A. Khakhulina(eds.), Marketing Democracy (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).
27. In this table all of the forms of civic engagement contained in the EVS have been combinedinto one variable. This was done by making a variable of the percentage of East and WestGermans in at least one form of civic engagement.
418 GERMAN POLITICS
Dow
nloa
ded
by [
UQ
Lib
rary
] at
04:
36 0
1 N
ovem
ber
2014
