The social psychology of project management conflict

216 European Journal of Operational Research 64 (1993) 216-228 North-Holland

The social psychology of project management conflict

Robert E. Jones

University of Wyoming, 125 College Drive, Casper, WY 82601, USA

Richard F. Deckro

Portland State University, Portland, OR, 97207-0751, USA

Received July 1990; received September 1991

Abstract: Project management conflict is examined in terms of role theory. Four types of role conflict - intersender, intrasender, interrole and person- ro le - are examined in light of four organizational sources: bifurcation of authority, technical complexity, internal politics, and project life cycle. Remedies are then proposed for reducing role conflict.

Keywords: Project management; Role conflict; Matrix structure

1. Introduct ion

Today the major difficulty in effectively managing an organization whose structural design for achieving integration is either the full project management or matrix form is that our understanding of the behavioral implications of these forms has not kept pace with the development of operations research techniques designed to solve the non-behavioral aspects of management . In commenting on the project-driven matrix structure - the form generally considered to be the most complex organization structure - Kolodny (1981, p. 18) states: "Managers must realize that ultimately matrix is as much or more a change in the behavior of the organization's members as it is a new structural design'. ' Cleland (1988, p. 973) goes even further in declaring that " the matrix organization is more a state of mind than any- thing else!". To help gain a bet ter understanding of the human factor implications of this complex structural form, this paper will examine the ma-

Correspondence to: R.E. Jones, University of Wyoming, 125 College Drive, Casper, WY 82601, USA.

trix form from the perspective of social psychology, with exclusive emphasis on role theory. Man- agerial prescriptions will be offered for prevent- ing or reducing the problems gleaned from the role theory analysis.

2. The evolution to the matrix form

Each organizational form affords its own set of advantages and disadvantages. As we look back in time we can see that each primary organizational form - the functional, product and matrix - emerged in response to changing environmental conditions. These forms are still with us today, so it is worthwhile to recognize why each came to be and what advantages and disadvantages each has.

The least complex (in terms of creating management problems) and most traditional organizational form is the functional structure, whereby departments are formed based upon technical expertise. It came into being at a time when the external environment was relatively stable and when the key to a sustainable strategic advantage was to be more efficient than the competition. The primary benefit of this form is that for a

0377-2217/93/$06.00 © 1993 - Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. All rights reserved

R.E. Jones, R.F. Deckro / Social psychology of project management conflict 217

given organizational size it maximizes the accu- mulation of technological expertise and mini- mizes overlaps among the areas of expertise. The functional structure also capitalizes on the natu- ral tendency of all labor to develop (as a result of our education system and experience) specialized skills and to follow career paths which provide intrinsic satisfaction through the exercising of these specialized skills. The primary disadvantage of the functional form is the high cost of coordination across functional units. In addition, the ability of the organization to change itself is very limited. Long lead times are usually necessary to achieve significant organizational changes since each department typically will defend its own functional territory.

The product or divisional form emerged as the external environment became less stable and as organizations began to pursue conglomerate di- versification strategies in order to reduce risk. In general the product form has advantages and disadvantages opposite those of the functional form. The product form, which groups specialists around a product, is able to better achieve coordination and on-time delivery, as well as to respond more rapidly to environmental distur- bances. Specialists can focus on task problems associated with product development and timely delivery. The benefit of timely delivery and reduced coordination costs, however, is only achieved by either incurring the cost of lower product quality (each specialist is less specialized) or greater duplication costs (each product has a complete set of specialists, some of whom are idle at any given point in time).

Beginning in the late 1950s organizations faced a new set of conditions. The external environment increased both in complexity and in its rate of change. This phenomenon was encountered first in the aerospace industry but eventually spread to a number of other industries as well. As a result managers began looking for alternative structural arrangements which would offer the benefits of both the functional and product structures without also incurring all the associated costs. Thus was born the matrix form.

Previous to this time elements of the matrix structure could be found in all organizations. Any structural mechanism whether localized or orga- nizationally pervasive is designed to achieve integration among the differentiated units which have

some type of interdependence. The greater the differentiation and the more complex the interdependency, the stronger the integrating mechanism needs to be. Morris (1988) identifies a number of integrating mechanisms. These include: liaison positions, task forces, special teams, per- manent integrators, full project management and matrix structures. Each mechanism provides stronger integrating force than the previous.

The problem an aerospace company faced in the 1950s was the delivery of highly complex long lead-time projects, where each project manager had considerable authority for negotiating and transacting for services outside the organization. To provide the requisite integrating force the matrix structure was developed. This structure Davis and Lawrence (1977, p. 3) define as "any organization that employs a multiple command system that includes not only a multiple command structure but also related support mechanisms and an associated organizational culture and behavior pattern". In a matrix structure the project manager (PM) has primary responsibility for achieving project objectives. In order to carry out this responsibility the PM must first assemble a project management staff (PMS) whose function it is to aid in organizing and overseeing the running of the project from its inception to its completion. Next the PM must obtain the necessary skilled labor to complete the myriad of project tasks. These skills are possessed by the functional specialists (FS) who until assigned to a project, report exclusively to a functional manager (FM). All FSs, the PMS and the PM consti- tute the project team (PT). All PMs and all FMs typically report to a general manager (GM) whose primary function is strategic in nature.

The advantage of the matrix form is that a wide variety of technical expertise can be focused on a problem without incurring all the cost of coordination typically associated with a purely functional form. To help solve some of the technical complexities inherent in trying to schedule tasks and technical experts throughout the project, a number of sophisticated operations research based techniques have been developed throughout the years.

As a result of its adaptive advantages, a large number of companies in a wide variety of industries have adopted some form of project structure. Yet management ranks also contain a num-

218 R.E. Jones, R.F. Deckro / Social psychology of project management conflict

ber of dissenters regarding the more complex project structures. Peters and Waterman (1982) in their study of excellent companies note that none of the fifty companies in their sample had a matrix structure. Kolodny (1981) also observes that such international giants as Philips and Citibank have abandoned the elaborate matrix form in favor of a simpler and more manageable structure.

One of the primary reasons that many firms have abandoned the matrix form is because of the behavioral problems which tend to arise through its use. To gain a better understanding of many of these behavioral problems we turn to social psychology.

3. Role theory: A social psychological perspective

The discipline of social psychology deals with the study of social behavior. It focuses on all areas of interaction between people, as well as human behavior related to others not present. This, of course, is a very broad field.

The area of social psychology that seems particularly fruitful in terms of lending insight into human behavior in a project context is role theory. Role theory has emerged from an attempt to explain how an individual becomes a member of a social group and how a social structure is formed out of the patterned actions of the group's members. While there are numerous definitions of a role, most definitions refer to a role as a set of desired and undesired behaviors of an individual occupying a position or office. In an organization an individual occupies a position (has a job) and associated with this position is a set of activities that make up an individual's role.

In a matrix organization each position is directly linked to a number of other positions. For example, the position of an FS is directly linked to the FM, PM, the PMS and other FSs. These linkages exist because an organization is a system of interdependent activities. The occupant of a particular role is interdependent with occupants of other roles. The set of roles directly linked to a focal role is referred to as the role set (Merton, 1957).

All members of a particular FS's role set hold behavioral prescriptions and proscriptions for the

individual occupying the FS role. The desired and undesired behaviors held by role set members regarding a role incumbent is referred to as role expectations. These members engage in verbal and non-verbal communication with the role incumbent concerning what they regard as appropriate behaviors. These communicated expectations are referred to as the sent role (Rom- metveit, 1955). The role incumbent also has a received role, which consists of his or her percep- tions of the totality of sent roles regarding the position.

3.1. Role Conflict

From a role theory perspective, an organization is a system of social constraints, whereby each office holder or position occupant is strongly influenced by that occupant's role set. This system of social constraints, however, is not always internally consistent. As a result there exists role conflict which Katz and Kahn (1966, p. 84) define as " the simultaneous occurrence of two (or more) role sendings such that compliance with one would make more difficult compliance with the other". Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn and Snoek (1964) identify four major types of role conflict.

1. Intersender conflict: the expectations of one member of the person's role set are incompatible with the expectations of another member in the role set.

2. Intrasender conflict: the expectations from a single role set member are mutually contradictory.

3. Interrole conflict: the sent expectations for one role contradict the sent expectations for another role played by the same person. This is because a focal person occupies a number of roles, such as functional specialist, husband, father, community leader, softball team member and so on.

4. Person-role conflict: the expectations associated with fulfilling a role contradict the needs, values and ethical beliefs of the focal person.

3.2. Sources of role conflict

In any organization there are a number of factors which contribute to the various types of role conflict. A matrix organization is no differ-


ent. However, four particularly identifiable role conflict sources are as follows:

l. Bifurcation of authority. One of the most commonly identified sources of conflict in matrix organizations is the division of authority that exists between a PM and an FM. In a matrix organization the traditional principle of unity of command - a one-subordinate, one-superior relationship - is violated.

The most affected role is that of the FS. The FS must simultaneously try to satisfy the role expectations of both the PM and FM, each of whom have different goals and power sources. The PM is concerned with project task accom- plishment and is in control of budgetary resources for contracting with various sources for the services needed to effect task accomplish- ment. The FM is responsible for adhering to a set of procedures and functional standards - which the FM is often instrumental in formulating and interpreting - across projects and for supplying services and personnel to the projects.

2. Technical complexity of the project. Technical complexity refers to:

a) the variety of tasks to be undertaken, b) the degree of interdependencies of these

tasks, and c) the instability of the assumptions upon which

tasks are based. A project first of all consists of a number of

different tasks, each of which can only be com- pleted in part or in whole by calling upon the technical expertise of different individuals. The wider the variety of skills needed to bring about project completion, the greater the complexity.

Second, complexity is determined by the degree of task interdependency. Thompson (1967) identifies three types of interdependencies - pooled, sequential and reciprocal. With pooled interdependence each position renders a discrete contribution to the project and a position occupant can proceed without regard to the actions of other occupants. With sequential interdependence the output from one position occupant becomes the input to another. Project adjustments may be necessary if any role occupant fails to fulfill expectations. With reciprocal interdependence each position occupant's output becomes the input for other positions, such that the actions of each must be modified to the actions of others. Technical complexity is greater when pro-

ject tasks are reciprocally rather than sequentially or pooled interdependent.

Third, a project is undertaken based upon a set of assumptions. These assumptions shape and guide the strategic and tactical decisions. Shifts in environmental conditions create the necessity for re-evaluating the assumptions upon which a project is based. As assumptions shift the project must be replanned, with tasks redesigned and the interrelationships among tasks reformulated. Some of the assumption shifting can be anticipated by developing contingency plans as alternative environmental states are identified and re- sponses formulated. However, not all contingen- cies can be anticipated; in general the more unstable the assumptions, the greater the project complexity.

3. Internal organizational politics. Porter, Allen and Angle (1983, p. 409) define organizational political behavior as:

(i) social influence attempts (ii) that are discretionary (i.e. that are outside

the behavioral zones prescribed or prohibited by the formal organization)

(iii) that are intended (designed) to promote or protect the self interest of individuals or groups (units), and

(iv) that threaten the self interest of others (individuals, unit).

Political activity can take place both within the project and within the larger organizational context in which a project must operate. Political game playing takes place for a reason. Mintzberg (1983, p. 182) identifies the following reasons: "Those played to resist authority, to counter its resistance, to build a power base, to defeat a rival, and to effect a change in the organization". Mintzberg (1983) also identifies thirteen different political games. These include the insurgency game, the counterinsurgency game, the sponsor- ship game, the alliance-building game, the budgeting game, the expertise game, the lording game, the line versus staff game, the rival camps game, the strategic candidate game, the whistle- blowing game and the young Turks game. The intent of the game, the type of game employed, its intensity and the occupants involved all determine the type of role conflicts in a matrix organization.

4. Project life cycle. A project may be viewed as consisting of four distinct lifecycle phases: project


formation, project build-up, main project phase and project phase out. Research results by Thamhain and Wilemon (1975) indicate that the intensity of conflicts for project managers will vary with the phases of the project's life-cycle. Using data collected from 100 project managers, they report that the intensity of conflicts arising from project priorities, administrative procedures, technical opinions and performance trade-offs, manpower resources, cost, schedules and personality varied with the life-cycle phase. Since the importance of the various conflict producing sources will vary with the project life-cycle phase, it can also be expected that the types of roles conflicts experienced by different project members and their intensities will vary with the project life-cycle.

3.3. Role theory framework

Four different role conflicts and four different sources of role conflict have been identified and briefly discussed. The types and sources of role conflict provide a useful framework for analyzing a project-driven organization from a role theory perspective (see Figure 1). Of course within this limited space, it will not be possible to analyze all the different project roles (PM, FM, FS, PMS, GM and so on). Instead the usefulness of the framework will be illustrated by focusing on the FS role and the different role conflicts a FS is likely to experience. The analysis may be ex- tended for each of the other members of the matrix organization.

AUTHORITY BIFURCATION

T Y P E S )

INTER- INTRA- INTER- PERSON- SENDER BENDER ROLE ROLE

C1 C2 C3 C4

TECHNICAL COMPLEXITY

INTERNAL POLITICS

S o C5 C6 C7 c 8 U R C E C9 C10 C l l C12 S

LIFE 1 CYCLE C13 C14 C15 C16

Figure 1. Sources and types of project conflict

C1. Authority bifurcation - intersender conflict. The most commonly identified role conflict in a matrix organization is intersender conflict resulting from the bifurcation of authority. The PM sends one set of role demands to the FS. The content of this sent role is heavily project task oriented. The FM, on the other hand, sends an alternative set of role demands to the FS. These role demands usually emphasize the importance of adhering to functional standards and procedures. Both the PM and the FM view their role demands as very important. This causes intersender conflict for the FS because he or she cannot completely fulfill the role expectations from one sender without compromising the expectations from the other.

C2. Authority bifurcation - intrasender conflict. The dual command nature of matrix organizations encourages the PM and FM to jockey for power (Davis and Lawrence, 1978). The FS often becomes the pawn in this power struggle with both the FM and the PM issuing directives to the FS which are often designed to preserve or increase their respective power bases.

The dual command nature is likely to cause the FS to receive two different types of goal motivated role demands from either the PM or the FM. One set of demands will relate to official departmental goals. The other set will relate to preserving or increasing the manager's power base. These two role demands from the same person are often mutually contradictory.

C3. Authority bifurcation - interrole conflict. A great deal of stress is created for the FS in attempting to resolve the intersender and interrole conflicts arising from the bifurcation of authority. This is because there is no clear-cut and obviously correct solution. Often what the FS does is attempt to fulfill all the role demands. This usually requires a great deal of time. In fact it is not unusual for a FS who is experiencing high intersender and interrole conflicts to exert a great deal of time and effort at work. Ultimately all the time and effort devoted to the project results in interrole conflict for the FS, as less time and effort can be allocated to the roles outside the organization.

C4. Authority bifurcation - person-role conflict. Despite the fact that most of us were reared under a system of dual authority - mother and father - even that system does not prepare any-


one for the conflicting roles that exist in a matrix organization. Moreover, the dual command of the PM and the FM is at variance with the principle of unity of command, a principle which most have come to associate with the practice of good management.

Herzberg's (1968) two-factor theory of motivation is particularly helpful in explaining why the bifurcation of authority creates person-role conflict for so many FSs. Herzberg (1968) identifies two relatively distinct set of organizational factors associated with satisfaction. The first set, hygiene factors, causes dissatisfaction when deficient. The second set, motivators, causes satisfaction when present. Among the hygiene factors are our beliefs about what constitutes appropriate company policy and appropriate supervisory behavior.

Because the bifurcation of authority creates goal hierarchy ambiguity and the violation of the principle of unity of command is viewed by many as being at variance with good management prac- tices, dissatisfaction is created in many FSs. These individuals, conscientiously attempting to apply technical skills to project tasks, begin to experience person-role conflict as the dual command induced ambiguity and conflict is perceived as violating a time honored management principle.

C5. Technical complexi ty - intersender conflict. The more technically complex the project, the greater the number and diversity of FSs working on the project at any one point in time. Each FS will have his or her own preferred solution to a project problem. This preferred solution will be dictated by the FS's own functional background. The greater the technical complexity, the greater the likelihood of disagreement among the FSs.

It can consequently be anticipated that intersender conflict for any single FS will increase exponentially as the technical complexity increases. This is due to the large number of conflicting role sendings the focal FS will be receiv- ing from the other FSs working on the project and espousing their own functional perspectives.

C6. Technical complexi ty - intrasender conflict. The more technically complex the project, the more the PM and the PMS will experience uncer- tainty regarding the outcome of a project decision. High task variety, reciprocal task interdependency and shifting circumstances require that decisions be frequently revised and new role demands issued periodically.

As a result of adjusting to shifting circumstances, the role demands sent to an FS by the PM or a member of the PMS at one point in time will likely conflict with the role demands sent to the same FS at a different point in time. To the FS these role adjusting directives from the PM will appear inconsistent. This is because the PM seldom takes the time to fully explain the ratio- nale behind the need for the adjustments. The FS, in reviewing the role sendings received from the PM through time, will detect the inconsisten- cies and experience intrasender conflict.

C7. Technical complexi ty - interrole conflict. With greater technical complexity, increased work demands are placed on all project team members. Reciprocal task interdependency and unstable assumptions call for role adjustments by project team members. These work role demands are usually unanticipated.

As the project imposes unplanned work requirements on project team members, the requirements of roles outside the organization begin to conflict with project roles. These role conflicts increase the level of interrole conflict.

C8. Technical complexi ty - pe r so n - ro l e conflict. As the project's technical complexity increases, the FS is more likely to experience person-role conflict which centers on the FS's technically based belief system. As a large and diverse number of specialists are brought together to solve technically complex project problems, the focal FS is exposed to a number of specialized perspectives which differ widely from his or her own beliefs. Directly or indirectly other FSs will place pressure on the focal FS to make concessions regarding what the focal FS believes to be technically correct. This threat to technical integrity will cause the FS to have a heightened sense of person-role conflict.

C9. Internal politics - intersender conflict. In an organization high in internal politics each organizational member is likely to experience considerable intersender conflict. This conflict results because the organization has broken up into a number of coalitions (an alliance of people who determine among themselves the distribution of organizational power). Role demands are designed more to preserve or enhance each coali- tion's power base than to achieve organizational goals.

In a project management organization with a


great deal of political activity, any number of role occupants may be locked into power struggles. These power struggles could include PM vs. FM, PM vs. PM, FM vs. FM, project staff vs. functional staff and so on.

FMs might engage in empire-building to enhance their power bases or invoke strict adher- ence to functional standards and policies to defeat rivals. PMs are likely to use budgeting games and make liberal use of project management and scheduling techniques to buttress power enhanc- ing arguments. Both project and functional staffs will resort to line versus staff games to defeat rivals. FSs, who because of their position in the structure often have the potential for only small power bases, will rely on expertise flaunting in order to preserve career options.

More often than not, however, the FSs are the unwilling pawns for many of the political games played by the other project members. These different members of an FS's role set who are engaged in power struggles will issue demands which are designed to increase or preserve their power bases. As the political battles heat up, an FS will receive an increasing number of conflicting demands from the different role set members.

C10. Internal politics - intrasender conflict. When the level of organizational political activity is high, an FS is more likely to receive from a single member of his or her role set demands which are in conflict. This is because some demands will be designed to achieve project goals, whereas other demands will be designed to preserve or enhance the power base of the role sender.

C l l . Internal politics - interrole conflict. With high internal politics, project success becomes jeopardized. As internal politics increase, resources (particularly project member time) which would otherwise be devoted to project success are now used to preserve or increase power bases. FSs will then find that their project jobs require more of their time. Additional energy must also be devoted to their own political game playing. To meet these demands, their overall organizational requirements will increase. This will eventually conflict with the requirements of other roles outside the organization, resulting in increased interrole conflict.

C12. Internal politics - pe r son - ro l e conflict. Many organizational members find internal poli-

tics not to be in the best interest of the organization, and therefore in conflict with a belief system concerning normative organizational behavior. The FS, highly trained in a technical specialty, is particularly likely to view political game playing by the various role set members as dysfunctional to project goal attainment. Moreover, since the FS is often a pawn in these political games, he or she is particularly sensitive to these activities and will view them as in violation deeply held ethical beliefs.

C13. Li fe cycle - intersender conflict. Research by Thamhain and Wilemon (1975) indicate that conflict issues will vary with a project's life cycle. This means that for the focal FS, different members of his role set could become the more active agents in producing intersender conflict at different life cycle stages.

For example, Thamhain and Wilemon (1975) identify project priorities as the most intense conflict issue at the project formation stage. For the FS this means that project staff members will likely be the more active agents in inducing intersender conflict. During the main program stage conflict over technical opinions reaches its highest level (Thamhain and Wilemon, 1975). Conse- quently other FSs now become a significant source of intersender conflict for the focal FS.

C14. Li fe cycle - intrasender conflict. Each role set member will experience varying levels of conflict induced stress as the conflict intensity from the various sources change with the phase of the project life cycle. Each role set member will in turn create intrasender conflict for the FS in proportion to the stress each role set member experiences at the different project life cycle phases.

For example, conflict over administrative procedures (definition of responsibilities, interface relationships, administrative support procedures, and so on) is highest at the beginning phase of the project life cycle and then drops off apprecia- bly (Thamhain and Wilemon, 1975). Those most involved in establishing these administrative procedures - such as the PM and the PMS - will experience the most conflict induced stress and consequently will be the greatest inducers of intrasender conflict.

Conflicts over scheduling (the timing and se- quencing of project tasks and manpower resources (staffing of the project with personnel


from functional departments) is greatest during the early and main program phase. As a result the FS's role set members most likely to experience stress over these issues will be the PM and the FM, who in turn will be large sources of intrasender conflict for the FS.

C15. Life cycle - interrole conflict. The level of interrole conflict for the FS will vary with the phases of the project life cycle. In the early phases the work demand for most FSs will be light (except for those FSs such as design engineers who are most heavily involved in the early phases) and then become considerably heavier during the main and end of program phases. As a result the demands of the FS role will not be in conflict with the demands of other roles during the early project phases. However, during the later phases FSs can expect to experience considerable project work demands. It is at these phases when interrole conflict is likely to be sharply higher as the FS role demands conflict with the demands of the other roles.

C16. Life cycle - person-role conflict. For the FS person-role conflict intensity will also vary with the project life cycle. It will be lowest during the earlier phases and increase in intensity during the main program and end of program phases.

During the main program phase when project activity is intense and a large number of FSs are attempting to complete the bulk of task problems, interpersonal conflict among the FSs will be the highest. As a result the focal FS will experience person-ro le conflict as pressure is exerted to compromise his or her technology based integrity.

During the end of the program phase person- role conflict of a different nature will be experienced. This conflict arises from a perceived threat to the needs for both security and self-actualiza- tion. As a project draws to a close and prospects of future projects are uncertain, FSs experience anxieties about the future. While each will return to a job in the functional department, these jobs typically are less challenging and less intrinsically rewarding. More importantly a FS knows that if a new project is not in the foreseeable future (and often the FS has no knowledge of this because each project may be relatively isolated from the mainstream of organizational communications), then layoffs are also a possibility.

3.4. Remedies

A number of remedies are proposed to help prevent or reduce one or more of the role conflicts in organizations using some type of project form. These include the following.

R1. Manage the level of internal politics. Based on data from matrix organizations, research results by Jones (1990) indicate that a number of managerial actions may be taken to prevent or reduce the level of political behavior around or in a project. Most of these actions are particularly relevant for the GM, corporate strategic planning personnel, and the PM. Briefly these include:

RI.1. Develop clear organizational goals and transmit these goals to all organizational units. By developing clear organizational goals and making each organizational unit aware of these goals, the allowable range for individual interpretation of goals is reduced. Locke (1968) contends that con- scious goals are a major determinant of an individual's behavior. If clear (as opposed to vague) organizational goals have not been established and then communicated to lower planning units, then the goals of these units will not be reflective of the larger organizational concern. Lower units cannot second guess the organization's strategic goals and may have little motivation to do so. Lacking a clear understanding of the organization's overall goals, lower units are then free to develop their own goals. More often than not these goals will reflect self interest rather than the interest of the organization.

R1.2. Establish close relationships between overall goals and the performance evaluation and reward systems. Organizational members learn what is really important in an organization by observ- ing how the performance evaluation and reward systems are operated. Self interest goals are con- strained and organizational goals gain legitimacy if organizational members are evaluated and rewarded on how well they help achieve organizational goals rather than on how well they play the political games. As Christensen, Andrews, Bower, Hammermesh and Porter (1987, p. 665) state: "Since managers respond to the measures management actually takes to reward performance, mere verbal exhortations to behave in the manner required by long-range strategy carry no weight and cannot be relied upon to preclude undesir-


able actions encouraged by a poorly designed measurement and reward system."

R1.3. Develop strategic models to guide decision making. Top management should insist that the strategic information search and decision making process be guided by a strategic model. They should, in fact, be active participants in the development of such models. The broad use of models constrains internal politics by driving the strategic decision process towards comprehensive rational- ism. When little use is made of strategic models, politically motivated individuals can use the information search process to collect and emphasize only that data which supports a parochial viewpoint. In addition, when strategic models are not used to guide the making of decisions, these same individuals are free to use only those variables in the decision process which promote their own self interest. Mitroff and Emshoff (1979, p. 3) high- light this problem when they state: "Given the wealth of data that abounds in virtually all large- scale organizations, a committed proponent or particular point of view can almost always find and thereby muster significant empirical support for his policy by consciously and unconsciously selecting the evidence most favorable to his case."

R1,4. Adopt a participatory management phi- losophy. Participatory management tends to equalize power because it gives each participant an opportunity to have input into a decision. Individuals who are involved in the making of decisions then exhibit less resistance to decision implementation. Participatory management also brings political game playing out into the open where it can be addressed before it escalates to dysfunctional levels.

However, managers in project organizations must realize that participatory management is not a behavioral technique, regardless of whether the name used is management-by-objectives, quality circles, employee survey feedback, or so on. In- stead it is a way of thinking. It recognizes that people can be trusted to make important decisions about the management of work activities, provided the people are knowledgeable (and if they are not knowledgeable management is will- ing to trust them to develop the required knowledge), management shares the relevant information needed to make effective decisions, the output of the decision process is acted upon, and the organization treats all its employees fairly (equi-

table distribution of all rewards). In addition, the benefits of using participatory decision-making go far beyond constraining the level of internal political activity. In a complex, interconnected organization such as the matrix, achieving wide decision-making involvement can improve the quality of decisions at all levels in the organization (Lawler, 1986).

By reducing the level of political activity, the intensity of those role conflicts (C9-C12) directly impacted by internal politics will be reduced. Also by managing the political context in which projects operate, non-political norms will be established between the PM and the FM. This means that the political game playing which emerged as a result of the bifurcation of authority will be reduced, which in turn will reduce the intensities of intersender conflict (C1) and intrasender conflict (C2).

R2. Complementary leadership styles. As a social system a project team has two requirements - acquire production inputs and acquire maintenance inputs. The importance of both these inputs are identified by Katz and Kahn (1966, p. 32) who state: "Maintenance inputs are the energic imports which sustain the system; production inputs are the energic imports which are processed to yield a productive outcome".

The leadership style of the PM is seldom such that both system requirements can be optimally achieved. In fact, the PM, like most leaders, has a goal hierarchy which makes him either predomi- nantly relationship-motivated or task-motivated (Fiedler and Chemers, 1984). Consequently, because of the PM's leadership style primary importance will be placed on system maintenance or system production. If the PM is task-motivated, then the social needs of the project team will suffer and little project cohesion will develop. If the PM is relationship-motivated, the accomplish- ment of project objectives could be compromised.

In order to ensure optimum project performance, it is important for the PM to have on the project staff someone whose leadership style complements that of the PM's. Additionally the staff member must be given sufficient authority to be effective in providing the necessary comple- mentarity.

By satisfying both system requirements, a more fully functioning project team is created. This serves to reduce the interrole conflicts resulting


from peak project work demands (C7 and C15). It also aids in reducing those role conflicts caused by technical complexity (C5, C6 and C8).

R3. Project team building. Team building should not be used as a quick fix to a specific problem but instead should be an ongoing process (Wilemon, 1984). It should be started before the project work is ever undertaken (project formation stage) and should take place periodically during the project's life. Moreover, the project should employ the services of an outside inter- ventionist or OD expert to facilitate in some of the team building aspects. Team building should involve everyone that is to be working on the project and should address the following areas:

R3.1. Culture development. A project's culture is the shared values and beliefs among the project team members. Culture gives meaning and pur- pose to project activity and binds project members together.

A well developed project culture requires trust and commitment from project members. In order for trust and commitment to develop there must be broad sharing of information (both task and socio-emotional), wide member participation in decision making and an openness and receptivity to new ideas (Cleland, 1988).

R3.2. Goal development and clarification. There needs to be clarification and agreement on the goals the project is to accomplish. Unless project goals are clearly established and understood by its members, work efforts will be fragmented and lacking in unity of direction.

R3.3. Role analysis and clarification. Each project member will have a unique perception of his or her role as well as expectations about the roles of everyone else in the project. Often role requirements are misunderstood either by the role occupant or members of the role set or both. In order to achieve high role acceptance for the role occupant and the role set members, role analysis should take place during the project formation phase. Role definitions should then be periodically updated during the project's life.

By engaging in team building project members gain a better understanding of behavior in a project-driven structure and how to function as a cohesive group despite the tensions resulting from such a structural arrangement. As a result of team building many of the role conflicts should

be reduced, particularly those intensified by authority bifurcation (C1-C4), technical complexity (C9-C12) and certain phases of the life cycle (C13-C16).

C4. Link performance evaluation and reward systems of PM and FS. Previously the linking of performance evaluation and reward systems to overall organizational goals was addressed. These linkages were designed to achieve overall organizational integration.

In order to achieve greater cooperation between the PM and the FM, it is important that each realize the symbiotic relationship that exists between them. Project success is dependent in part upon the cooperation from the FM. Each functional department must have an adequate supply of technical labor to fulfill the project's requirements. Functional departments will also be periodically called upon to provide support services.

Similarly, the PM is partially responsible for the success of functional departments. During slack project time it might be appropriate for a PM to direct some project resources to human development. Both PM and FM should be responsible for career planning of FSs.

Project performance and the performance of functional departments should not be treated as independent. Different criteria and different weights may be appropriate for evaluating each entity. However, since these entities are interdependent, the managers should not be evaluated and rewarded as though they were independent.

By creating a more fundamental base for evaluating and rewarding both the PM and the FM, some of the dysfunctional aspects of dual command can be overcome. This should primarily impact intersender conflict (C1) and to a lesser extent intrasender conflict (C2).

C5. Equalization of power between PM and FM. The dual command nature of project management organizations invites power struggles between PMs and FMs. In order to prevent these power struggles from reaching destructive levels, it is important that power between the parties be equalized.

One way of equalizing power is to emphasize an overall organizational viewpoint and to develop and adhere to policies which reinforce this perspective. Performance evaluation and reward


systems have already been discussed within this context. Policies regarding the allocation of resources is another way of equalizing power.

Many budgeting system perpetuate power differentials by not closely linking the allocation of resources to organizational goals. Instead histori- cal patterning or existing power positions are the predominant bases for allocating resources, and these methods tend to perpetuate an unequal distribution of power. However, if resources are allocated using cost/benefit analysis then all managers could see that the treatment of re- source allocations is fair and based upon a well accepted management concept (Jones, 1990).

Management at the GM level and above have a number of other vehicles (some subtle and some not so subtle) for equalizing power. Davis and Lawrence (1978, p. 134) state that a top manager creates a power distribution by "the amount of time he spends with one side of the matrix or the other, pay differentials, velocity of promotion, direct orders issued to one dimension and not to the other, and so on".

By equalizing power between the PM and FM, power struggles are dampened and the role conflicts associated with these power struggles are reduced. These include the intersender and intrasender conflicts resulting from authority bifurcation (C1 and C2) and the role conflicts created by internal politics (C9-C12).

C6. Use correct mode for resolving interpersonal conflict. Interpersonal conflicts are inevitable in any organization. In a matrix organization they can be particularly acute. It is, therefore, important for project members to be sensitized early on in the project concerning what to expect in terms of interpersonal conflict and to receive training on the application of the appropriate mode for a given situation.

In the literature (Blake and Mouton, 1964; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) a number of conflict resolution modes have been delineated. Six of these modes are as follows:

1. Smoothing. Emphasizing areas of agreement and de-emphasizing differences.

2. Withdrawing. Denying the existence of differences or retreating from actual or potential disagreements.

3. Compromising. Searching for solutions through bargaining so that each party achieves some gains as well as incurs some losses.

TASK INTER-

DEPENDENCE

Forcing Superordinate Goals

Compromise

Withdrawing/ Confrontation L Smoothing

P L H

FUNCTIONAL SIMILARITY

Figure 2. Guide for effective conflict resolving mode

4. Forcing. Imposing one's viewpoint on another.

5. Confrontation. Openly dealing with the un- derlying issues in a problem solving manner.

6. Superordinate goal. Resolving subsystem based conflict by looking at it in relation to the functioning of the overall system.

To aid in choosing the most appropriate mode for conflict resolution, a general model based upon the degree of task interdependence and the degree of functional similarity is proposed (see Figure 2). This contingency approach to conflict resolution is based upon the following two obser- vations. First, the greater the task interdependence among project members, the more important for conflict to be resolved in a timely manner, regardless of the consequences. Second, the greater the degree of functional similarity between the conflicting parties, the easier it is for these parties communicate because they share the same technical perspective and value orienta- tion.

By learning effective methods for resolving interpersonal conflict, several role conflicts should be lessened. These include intersender conflicts resulting from dual command (C1) and technical complexity (C5), as well as the interrole conflicts arising from the four different sources (C3, C7, C l l and C15).

R7. Judicious selection of project team members. Selection of project team members should not be based exclusively upon technical competency. There are many other factors that need to

R.E. Jones, R.F. Deckro / Socml psychology of project management conflict 227

be taken into consideration in selecting members for the project team.

For example, in this paper four types of role conflicts are identified. The ability of a project member to effectively deal with these role conflicts may contribute more to the success of a project than an individual's technical expertise. This means that such factors as project experience, personality based preference for modes of conflict resolution (Bell and Blakeney, 1977; Jones and Melcher, 1982), career aspirations, ability to communicate, tolerance for ambiguity and so on should play a considerable part in team member selection.

Team composition will have a pervasive effect on project functioning. Therefore, proper member selection will affect all four types of role conflicts influenced by the four discussed sources (C1-C16).

R8. Preparing and maintaining the organization for project functioning. In order for the project to function properly, managers throughout the organization must understand the difficulties of this structural form and support the form's viability. As Cleland (1981, p. 27) states " the matrix organizational design is clearly the most complex form of organizational alignment that can be used and to change an existing design to a fully functioning matrix form takes time - perhaps several years".

All managers must realize the difficulties of the project management structure. For example, Reeser (1969) in his exploration into the human problems of the project form indicates that per- sonal development, career retardation, authority ambiguity, interpersonal conflict, employment anxiety and organizational loyalty are more acute in project organizations than in organizations em- ploying a different structural form.

To take full advantage of the positive at- tributes of the project form, management must recognize its inherent disadvantages and take steps to overcome them. Recognizing the potential role conflicts and the factors both inside the project and inside the larger organization in which the project must operate and then creating a supportive environment will help to minimize many of the role conflicts. As Murray and Stick- ney (1984, p. 238) state:

The major responsibility of top management in im- plementing and operating the matrix organizational structure is to create an environment supportive of

the working roles and relationships created by this design. Emphasis on team building, a supportive and participative internal organizational environment, deep delegation to the level of decisionmak- ing competency and information availability, and an atmosphere of open communication characterized by mutual trust and respect among all participants in the matrix structure, are prerequisites to the successful implementation and operation of a matrix organization. If the organization cannot be developed to reflect these perspectives and philoso- phies, it will inevitably encounter human problems significantly more complex and detrimental to its operations in a matrix design than the problems could be in the traditional functional design.

The general organizational climate is critical in keeping the project based human problems from reaching disastrous levels. As such, the organizational climate has a pervasive effect and will impact on all the role conflicts (C1-C16).

4. Summary

Role theory treats an organization as a system of social constraints whereby the behavior of any given position occupant is greatly influenced by the expectations of those members in the focal occupant 's role set. An individual occupying a certain role in an organization, then, will have a certain pat tern of behavior influenced in part by the expectations of the role set members. This pat tern is relatively independent of the character- istics of the individual.

Each structural form of organizing creates its own unique set of roles. One of the keys to understanding behavior in any organization is to understand the roles, role expectations, role pres- sures and resulting role conflicts peculiar to a particular structural form.

In order to bet ter manage project-driven organizations, it is necessary to understand the human problems created by this structural form. Role theory provides one such avenue for gaining greater insight.

By analyzing an organization in terms of role theory, we can better predict the types of role conflicts which will occur. Managerial measures can then be taken to prevent these conflicts from occurring or to reduce their intensities once they do occur.


References

Bell, E.C., and Blakeney, R.N., (1977), "Personality correlates of conflict resolution modes", Human Relations 30, 849- 857.

Biddle, B.J., and Thomas, E.J. (eds.) (1966), Role Theory: Concepts and Research, Wiley, New York.

Blake, R.R., and Mouton, J.S. (1964), The Managerial Grid, Gulf, Houston, TX.

Christensen, C., Andrews, K.R., Bower, J.L., Hammermesh, R.G., and Porter, M.E. (1987), Business Policy, Irwin, Homewood, IL.

Cleland, D.I. (1981), "The cultural ambience of the matrix organization", Management Review, November, 25-39.

Cleland, D.I. (1988), "The cultural ambience of the matrix organization", in: D.I. Cleland and W.R. King (eds.), Project Management Handbook, Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York, 971-989.

Davis, S.M., and Lawrence, P.R. (1977), Matrix, Addison- Wesley, Reading, MA.

Davis, S.M., and Lawrence, P.R. (1978), "Problems of matrix organizations", Harvard Business Review May/June, 131- 142.

Fiedler, F.E., and Chemers, M.M. (1984), Improving Leader- ship Effectiveness, Wiley, New York.

Herzberg, F. (1968), "One more time: How do you motivate employees?", Harvard Business Revieuw 46, 53-62.

Jones, R.E. (1990), "Managing the political context in PMS organizations", European Journal of Operational Research 49, 60-67.

Jones, R.E., and Melcher, B. (1982), "Personality and the preference for modes of conflict resolution", Human Rela- tions 35, 649-658.

Kahn, R.L., Wolfe, D.M., Quinn, R.P., and Snoek, J.D. (1964), Organizational Stress: Studies in Role Conflict and Ambigu- ity, Wiley, New York.

Katz, D., and Kahn, R.L. (1966), The Social Psychology of Organizations, Wiley, New York.

Kolodny, H.F. (1981), "Managing in a matrix", Business Hori- zons March/April, 17-24.

Lawler, III, E.E. (1986), High-Involvement Management, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA.

Lawrence, P.R., and Lorsch, J.W. (1967), Environment and Organizations, Harvard University Press, Boston, MA.

Locke, R.A. (1968), "Toward a theory of task motivation and incentives", Organizational Behavior and Human Perfor- mance, May, 157-189.

Merton, R.K. (1957), Social Theory and Social Structure, rev. ed. Free Press, New York.

Mintzberg, H. (1983), Power in and Around Organizations, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.

Mitroff, I.I., and Emshoff, J.R. (1979), "On strategic assumption-making: A dialectical approach to policy and planning", Academy of Management Review 4, 1-12.

Morris, P.W.G. (1988), "Managing project interfaces-key points for project success", in: D.I. Cleland and W.R. King (eds.), Project Management Handbook, Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York, 16-56.

Murray, J.V., and Stickney, F.A. (1984), "The human factor in matrix management", in: D.I. Cleland (ed.), Matrix Man- agement Systems Handbook, Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York, 231-254.

Peters, T.J., and Waterman, Jr., R.H. (1982), In Search of Excellence, Harper & Row, New York.

Porter, L., Allen, R., and Angle, R. (1983), "The politics of upward influences in organizations", in: R.W. Allen and L.W. Porter (eds.), Organizational Influence Processes, Scott, Foresman, Glenview, IL, 408-422.

Reeser, C. (1969), "Some potential human problems of the project form of organization", Academy of Management Journal December, 459-467.

Rommetvait, R. (1955), Social Norms and Roles, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

Thamhain, H.J., and Wilemon, D.L. (1975), "Conflict management in project life cycles", Sloan Management Review Spring, 31-50.

Thompson, J.D., (1967), Organizations in Action, McGraw-Hill, New York.

Wilemon, D. (1984), "Developing high-performance matrix teams", in: D.I. Cleland (ed.), Matrix Management Systems Handbook, Van Nostrand Reinhold, New York, 363-378.

Documents

The social psychology of project management conflict