Corina Dimitriu

The Sino-Soviet relationship collapsed due to ideological differences. To what extent do you agree?

When Mao broadcasted the Chinese Communist victory in 1949, it was widely believed that the USSR and PRC would establish a monolithic Eurasian Communist bloc, which was reinforced by the 1950 Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. However, by 1958, their relations had become strained and deteriorated almost to the point of war. The growing rift between the USSR and PRC was caused by a combination of ideological clashes, national self-interest and personality. Ultimately, the continuing hostility after the deposition of Khrushchev suggests that personality had more of a peripheral role, and the idea of ideological divisions being the central cause is weakened by the USSR’s refusal to involve themselves in the Korean and Sino-Indian Wars for the cause of world communism. Therefore, it really was national self-interest that stemmed Sino-Soviet divisions, with their issues often being expressed in ideological and personal terms.

Inherently weak from the start due to ideological differences, the relationship between the PRC and the USSR ‘was neither pleasant nor gratifying’, with Mao’s ‘unorthodox method of revolution, based on peasant mobilisation in the countryside, tolerated by Moscow as legitimate only because all other types of communist insurrection in China had failed’. Khrushchev saw Mao’s peasant-led communism as straying away from Marxism, while the Chinese leader accused the USSR of revisionism at the 1957 Conference of Communist Parties as Deng Xiaoping outargued the moderate Soviet theorist. Mao was highly critical of the Secret Speech calling for destalinisation as well as Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence as he had respected and imitated Stalin’s personality cult and thought any kind of cooperation with the US was a betrayal of communism. The Taiwan Straits crises’ also provided an ideological clash with the PRC, as Mao’s regime was proclaimed Trotskyist and Mao a fanatic due to his willingness to ‘sacrifice half the world’s

Corina Dimitriu

population to eliminate capitalism in exchange for socialism’ and his readiness to engage in conflict with the US. Khrushchev’s reluctance to get involved both in the Quemoy Crisis and the Sino-Indian war both show his private commitment to peaceful coexistence and how little he thought of the Chinese Communists. Mao’s 1958 relinquishment of the Soviet Five Year Plan in favour of his own Great Leap Forward was particularly important in creating an ideological rift due to the radically different approaches taken to industrialisation, of high-quality heavy-industry steel compared to Chinese back-yard furnace pig-iron. Economic advisers were withdrawn and commercial contracts were cancelled, which marked the beginning of the official undoing of their alliance. Feeling humiliated and undermined due to the Soviets branding GLF as ‘faulty in design and erroneous in practice’, the PRC now needed to assert itself in the international Communist community and was willing to support any Communist countries that dissented from Moscow’s lead. This led to Mao encouraging Ceauşescu, the Romanian Communist president, to assert its independence from Moscow, as well as replacing Soviet aid and technical assistance in Albania when the latter was accused of being ‘Stalinist’ and ‘backward’. Furthermore, Khrushchev’s $800 million aid to India during the Sino-Indian as well as Mao’s criticism over the Soviet leader’s handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis reinforced Mao’s belief that Khrushchev was a coward and a ‘redundant old boot’ and led to the Cultural Revolution which purged China of Soviet revisionism and ‘bureaucracy’. Ideological differences can therefore be seen as having had an important role in the Sino-Soviet collapse as neither side believed in the Communist authenticity of the other or considered the other a true communist brother.

Personality clashes have also been seen as another corrosive factor that led to the Sino-Soviet break. Mao held Stalin in high respect and considered him a true Communist revolutionary despite Stalin’s drawing out of the Korean War and Treaty negotiations. The death of Stalin in 1953 brought about a short-

Corina Dimitriu

lived ‘honeymoon’ period in terms of treaties, but Mao had always borne little respect for Khrushchev due to his revisionist policies, considering him a cowardly bureaucrat. The Secret Speech served to erase the little respect Mao had due to Khrushchev’s denounce of Stalin’s personality cult and destalinisation. Mao saw this as a personal affront due to having established his own personality cult. The public embarrassment of Khrushchev’s visit to Beijing, where he was forced to humiliate himself had an enormous impact on Khrushchev’s attitude towards Mao as it served to inflame the already present hostility between the two. Khrushchev’s offers of aid following the GLF and his desire to establish military bases in China, as well as his suggestion of a joint control over China’s nuclear programme were seen as patronising and degrading. The Soviet leader even went as far as to call Mao ‘the Asian Hitler’, showing just how much their personal relationship had deteriorated by 1961. However, it is important not to exaggerate the role of personality – even after the removal of Khrushchev in 1964, relations continued to deteriorate further.

National self-interest was particularly crucial for the Sino-Soviet collapse. From the very beginning, during the Chinese Civil War, the USSR had supported Chiang Kai Shek due to Stalin’s need of a strong leadership against Japan as well as the extended border recognition the GMD would have given the USSR. Stalin was also responsible for encouraging China to enter the Korean War on behalf of the communists, which left China exhausted and heavily dependent on aid. The terms of the 1950 Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance could also be seen as having been governed by national security interests rather than socialist brotherhood, as China desperately needed economic aid after the Korean War as well as the Soviet nuclear umbrella, while the USSR needed trade partners. The Treaty was also seen by Mao and the US as strongly favouring the USSR, with US claiming ‘Moscow is making puppets out of China’. This was due to the economic help being loaned with high interest rather than gifted as well as the Soviet’s refusal to

Corina Dimitriu

negotiate over Mongolia. The USSR also repeatedly refused to support the PRC into peripheral expansion into Taiwan, India and Pakistan, refusing to involve themselves in the Quemoy and Matsu Crises’ and supplying India with weapons and aid during the Sino-Indian war. Even the policy of peaceful coexistence was said to have been pursued for national self-interest, as it allowed the USSR to divert sources from military spending to raising living standards as well as isolating China from the west. The Soviets also refused to share nuclear knowledge with China, claiming that due to their friendship the Chinese had no need for it. The Czechoslovakian coup and Brezhnev doctrine in particular played an important role in the deterioration of their relationship, as the PRC, while claiming they condemned it for ideological reasons, felt threatened by the USSR’s entitlement to invade states that seemed to ‘undermine socialism’. The last straw was undoubtedly the border conflict over Damansky, while on the surface ideological - ‘imperialistic USSR’ – escalated because of existing tensions and the USSR’s desire to expand. Still under the banner of ideology, the PRC and USSR fought to bring Vietnam to ‘their’ side of the ideological split. While this seemed ideological in nature, it really was about asserting power in the communist world as well as gaining an ally against the other ‘side’.

Other reasons for the split include the power struggle in the communist world, with China wanting to assert itself as a Communist world power by denouncing the USSR’s ‘revisionist’ policies, as demonstrated by the PRC’s support for Albania and their Conference of the Communist Parties debates. Furthermore, domestic issues might have played a part as well, with the disaster of the GLF (14 million dead) as well as the Cultural Revolution’s purge of Soviet influence speeding up the already imminent end of the Sino-Soviet Relationship.

All in all, the role of personality, domestic issues, struggle in the communist world and even ideological differences come subordinate to national self-interests in the cause of the Sino-Soviet split. The role of personality, while often overplayed,

Corina Dimitriu

loses its edge due to the continuing worsening relationship under the more cooperative Brezhna. Additionally, while straying from ‘true communism’ was what made the relationship half-hearted from the beginning, ideology eventually came to be used more as a pretext to mask the pursuit of national self-interest rather than as a reason in itself. Therefore, on the whole, national self-interests were most important in the Sino-Soviet collapse, despite the issues raised by it being concealed in ideological or personality garments.