Corresponding author:Cliff HookerCliff.Hooker@

newcastle.edu.au

roes model of technical

The SimoneKartifacts and the distinction betweenscience and design

Robert Farrell and Cliff Hooker, School of Humanities and Social Sciences,

University of Newcastle, Callaghan, NSW 2305, Australia

There is a long tradition of arguing that design and science are importantly

different. One such argument is that the separation of science and design is an

implication that can be drawn from the SimoneKroes model of the nature of

technical artifacts. This paper argues that the SimoneKroes model does not

imply a radical separation between science and design: if we accept the

SimoneKroes model of the nature of technical artifacts and their production,

then we must also accept that all the sciences also produce technical artifacts,

and in importantly similar ways. Moreover, the placing of both science and

design in a naturalist framework reinforces this conclusion and opens up new

vistas for synergetic cross-disciplinary discussion of design and methodology.

� 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: artifact, design science, design methodology, design theory,

epistemology

An important class of argument intended to distinguish design from sci-

ence is focussed around the claim that design is concerned with the

making of things that do not exist naturally, whereas science is con-

cerned with the study of those things that do exist naturally. For example, Wil-

lem contends that “All human-made things, material and immaterial, were

designed at one time” (Willem, 1990, p. 44) with the implication being that

those things that are not man-made were not designed. In consequence, this

division of things into the mutually exclusive metaphysical categories of the ar-

tificial and the natural is said to bring with it important implications in relation

to the nature and status of design disciplines and science disciplines.

It is argued that scientists do not produce the natural world as the end product

of their investigations; however, designers do produce artificial things as the

end product of their investigations. It is further argued that this production

of artificial things requires different skills and a different relation to the things

under study than that which prevails in the sciences. The argument can be

summed up as follows: if disciplines produce different metaphysical things,

then the intellectual study and production of these things will be significantly

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0142-694X $ - see front matter Design Studies 33 (2012) 480e495

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Distinction between scie

different; design and science produce different metaphysical things; therefore,

design and science are distinct types of intellectual study and production.

In this paper we will examine the arguments presented for this thesis in more

detail and critically analyse their validity. We will argue that while it is legiti-

mate to make a distinction between the natural and the artificial, the further

implication that we can therefore make a distinction between the sciences of

the natural and the sciences of the artificial is unfounded. Specifically, it will

be argued that design and science do not produce metaphysically distinct types

of things; therefore, the conclusion of the argument above cannot be

supported.

Our starting point for analysis will be what we here dub the SimoneKroes

model of technical artifacts. This model was proposed by Herbert Simon in

his touchstone work on the sciences of the artificial (1969) and later defended,

in a slightly modified version, by Kroes (2002) We will argue that if we accept

this model of the nature of artificial things then we must also accept that all the

sciences also produce artificial things; consequently, any distinction that we

may want to make between science and design cannot be based upon any gen-

eral distinction between the natural and the artificial.

The strategic, constructive conception of scientific processes that our response

establishes as the basis for this critique has an importance that reaches beyond

the immediate context here. We recognise that addressing the metaphysical is-

sues underlying any proposed natural/artificial divide will still leave other dif-

ferences between design and science outstanding, in particular the descriptive-

factual/prescriptive-normative difference.1 However, while addressing these is

beyond the scope of this paper, we contend that the conception of science we

establish here forms the proper foundation for also dealing in a systematic way

with these further issues e and comes out in favour of our position concerning

the sameness of the fundamental process and kinds of products of both science

and design.

1 The SimoneKroes model of technical artifactsSimon (1969) argues for distinguishing design, or what Simon calls the sciences

of the artificial, from the natural sciences. Simon advances a number of prop-

ositions in support of this distinction but the core argument is based upon

a distinction between the artificial and the natural. Simon lists four features

that distinguish the artificial from the natural, the first two of which are that

“1. Artificial things are synthesized ... by man [and] 2. Artificial things may im-

itate appearances in natural things while lacking, in one or more respects, the

reality of the latter” (1969, p. 5.)

We have already seen that Willem follows Simon in this and it is a common

theme in design methodology literature; for example, Cross quotes Archer,

nce and design 481

482

writing in the 1960’s, as contending that design’s central concern is the “con-

ception and realization of new things” (1982, p. 221) with the unstated premise

being that these new things are conceived and realised by human beings.

Among other factors, how we are to interpret this ‘central concern’ of design

is obviously dependent upon how we define ‘things’: should ‘things’ be inter-

preted as solely referring to concrete objects, or should ‘things’ be interpreted

in a more general manner so as to include, as doesWillem, abstract objects like

theorems and theories? Simon does not deny that artificial things are also nat-

ural, at least in the sense that everything concrete, including artificial objects,

must obey the laws of physics. However, Simon sees the distinction abiding in

the fact that artificial things “are adapted to man’s goals and purposes. They

are what they are in order to satisfy his desire to fly or to eat well” (p. 3.)

Whether this distinction can be used to separate scientific things from design

things is the central topic of this paper.

Simon goes on to detail his conception of the artificial and how the artificial

differs from the natural. Simon conceives of an artifact as “a meeting point -

an ‘interface’ in today’s terms - between an ‘inner’ environment, the substance

and organization of the artifact itself, and an ‘outer’ environment, the sur-

roundings in which it operates.” (1969, pp. 6e7.) For instance, a car engine’s

inner environment is the system of fuel and air supply, valves, pistons, etc. that

constitute it while its outer environment is the vehicle it propels embedded in

the larger transportation system of roads, garages, etc. in which it functions. It

is at this interface between inner and outer environment that Simon conceives

purpose entering the picture: the fulfilment of a purpose involves a relation be-

tween the stated purpose of the artifact, the inner environment of the artifact,

and the outer environment within which the artifact is to be placed. “... if the

inner environment is appropriate to the outer environment, or vice versa, the

artifact will serve its intended purpose.” (pp. 6e7) For instance, to properly

fulfil its purpose a car engine has not only to provide wheel torque but to

do so in ways readily controlled (through accelerator pedal and gear lever)

by the human driver.

Simon contends that there are advantages in conceptualising artifacts in terms

of inner and outer environments. For example, Simon goes on to say that “an

instant corollary is that we often find quite different inner environments ac-

complishing identical or similar goals in identical or similar outer environ-

ments - airplanes and birds, dolphins and tunafish, weight-driven clocks and

spring-driven clocks, electrical relays and transistors” (1969, p. 8.) We often

do not need to worry much about the specifics of the inner environment of

an artifact: as long as we know its purpose and the external environment in

which it is meant to operate, we can ascertain whether or not it is successful

simply by observing its behaviour. Many car drivers can readily assess whether

their car engine is performing satisfactorily even though few could diagnose or

fix any fault. Consequently, designers, as opposed to scientists, only become

Design Studies Vol 33 No. 5 September 2012

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concerned with the inner environment of their artifacts when their artifacts fail

to fulfil their purpose:

In a benign environment we would learn from ... [a] motor only what it had

been called upon to do; in a taxing environment we would learn something

about its internal structure - specifically, about those aspects of the internal

structure that were chiefly instrumental in limiting performance. A bridge,

under its usual conditions of service, behaves simply as a relatively smooth

level surface on which vehicles can move. Only when it has been over-

loaded do we learn the physical properties of the materials from which

it is built (1969, p. 13.)

The points Simon is making are that science is solely concerned with the facts

about artifacts, hence i) it is solely concerned with artifacts’ inner environ-

ments and ii) it is solely concerned to describe that environment. By contrast,

Simon argues, designers are primarily concerned with the functioning of arti-

facts and hence with their outer environments and they are concerned to

achieve a purpose in that environment. Thus the inner environment of an ar-

tifact i) is only important insofar as it enables the fulfilment of its intended

outer purpose and ii) designers are less interested in describing its current in-

ner environment than in changing it as necessary to achieve its intended outer

purpose. For instance, Simon contends that “In one way or another, the de-

signer insulates the inner system from the environment, so that an invariant

relation is maintained between inner system and goal, independent of varia-

tions over a wide range in most parameters that characterize the outer envi-

ronment” (1969, p. 9.) The question to be asked is whether this picture of the

nature of the artificial, and the two features given above concerning how the

artificial differs from the natural, supports the separation of the natural sci-

ences from the sciences of the artificial.2

Kroes (2002) has presented a similar model of the nature of what he calls tech-

nical artifacts. Kroes argues that technical artifacts have a dual nature: they

are both physical and intentional. A technical artifact can be described in

a purely physical manner but this description does not fully explain its nature:

to achieve a full description it also needs to be given an explanation in terms of

its intended function and its place in an intentional human context. The differ-

ences between Simon and Kroes are that 1) Kroes replaces Simon’s use of pur-

pose associated with a technical artifact with the idea of function, arguing that

it is more apt to ascribe a function to a produced thing than a purpose because

a purpose is something associated with the human intentional context of the

technical artifact not something associated with the artifact itself; and 2) Kroes

replaces Simon’s notion of the outer environment with the more general no-

tion of an intentional human context, arguing that the physical outer environ-

ment only has importance for understanding a technical artifact within a pre-

given intentional human context.

nce and design 483

484

We can immediately see that for Kroes there are connections between the func-

tion of a technical artifact and the intentional human context, and Kroes takes

this as an advantage of his model over Simon’s because it makes explicit what

was only implicit in Simon: the dual nature of technical artifacts. Thus, Kroes

contends that “technical artefacts cannot be described exhaustively within the

physical conceptualisation, since it has no place for its functional features. But

neither can it be described exhaustively within the intentional conceptualisa-

tion since its functionality must be realised through an appropriate physical

structure and the intentional conceptualisation has no place for the physical

features of a technical artefact” (2002, p. 294.)

It is this SimoneKroes model of the nature of technical artifacts that lies at the

core of the dominant paradigm in design and design methodology. We exam-

ine the logic of the SimoneKroes model of technical artifacts and show that

scientific things e those things that scientists produce e must be classified

as technical artifacts, according to the precepts of the SimoneKroes model.

This removes one of the main planks that separate science from design.

2 Discussion of the SimoneKroes model of technicalartifactsFirstly, let us agree with Simon that the artificial concerns anything con-

structed by human beings. Secondly, we can also agree with Simon that we

live in an environment that is saturated with the artificial. But let us look at

those things that Simon includes in the class of the artificial: obvious things e

like buildings, aeroplanes and air-conditioning e are included but so also are

shell middens, farms and email messages simply because these things have been

constructed by humans to fulfil human purposes. Consequently, when we start

to think systematically about those things that are constructed by human be-

ings the class of the artificial becomes very large indeed, encompassing all in-

tentional manipulations of the natural world from a spoken word to a bank

building.

In particular, the contents of any scientific experiment are artificial, from its

laboratory structure and observing instruments to its data arrays, as are the

theories set out in journal articles to explain the results, etc. This is because

all controlled experiments and theories are constructed by human beings to

realise a function: broadly, improvement of knowledge, and so fulfil the grand

purpose of truly knowing our world and ourselves. (In fact, improvement of

knowledge fulfils many other purposes simultaneously, from achieving techni-

cal masteries to promoting careers, just as cars satisfy many purposes.) Thus

the whole of science through and through is artifactual, however it might be

divided up, since every part of it has been constructed by humans to contribute

to fulfilling the purpose of understanding our world.

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The obvious response to this line of argument is to claim that though experi-

ments, journals and so on are manipulations of the natural world and are,

therefore, artificial, this artificiality does not extend to the products of scientific

research. The distinctive products of science are theories, concepts, laws, ref-

utations, and so on and according to this line of argument these are abstract

and so not themselves artifacts. To this would be contrasted design whose dis-

tinctive products are artifacts like buildings, jewellery and advertisements. To

this proposal we make two responses.

First, it is simply not true that design has no abstract products. There are

plenty of detailed theories of engineering design based on laws, and still plenty

of abstract discussion of the concepts and principles behind the construction of

advertisements, that clearly and properly belongs to design theory in a broader

sense, not to mention the conceptual contents of design courses and journals.

Ironically, Kroes himself seems at one point to support this contention when

he argues that a design “is a plan or a description ... of a technical artefact. As

such, a design is not a technical artefact in itself but merely a representation

thereof” (2009, p. 513). So it would seem that, even granted the proposed dis-

tinction, it would not divide science from design as a matter of principle.

Second, what good reason is there to exclude abstract things from being arti-

facts? To get at this issue we ask in turn: what essential feature of artifacts does

their physicality support? Answer: it underpins their having an internal de-

scription as well as an external functional one. But this latter feature can

also be had by abstract entities. Consider any fragment of mathematics, like

a Boolean algebra or a theory of 1st order differential equations; each of these

has a distinctive internal structure that supports its intended formal function-

ing. And there does not seem to be any further, crucial feature that physicality

supports. Why then are these abstract things not equally considered artifacts?

True, Kroes defines a technical artifact as “a physical object with a technical

function” (2002, p. 294), thereby excluding abstract things, but we can now

see that this simply defines the query away by fiat rather than meeting its chal-

lenge by reasoned counter-argument. And if abstract things are accepted as ar-

tifacts we find that once again science and design are not distinguished in

respect of the kinds of products they produce; both have their abstract theo-

ries, intentional designs, methods and so on among the artifacts they produce.

We note that Simon agrees that abstract symbolic entities are artifacts, parting

company with Kroes here. For Simon the “strings of artifacts called ‘symbols’

[wherein] ... the laws that govern these strings of symbols, the laws that govern

the occasions on which we emit and receive them, the determinants of their

content are all consequences of our collective artifice” (1969, p. 3.) And “lan-

guage is the most artificial, hence also the most human of all human construc-

tions” (1969, pp. 51e2.) So for Simon abstract things not only can be artifacts

they are among our most ubiquitous and important artifacts. Central among

nce and design 485

486

the major achievements of the collective artifice of human beings are the ab-

stract conceptual cultural achievements that have allowed science, technology

and design all to flourish. Without conceptual achievements of some sorte for

example, without the ability to transcribe practical achievements into a sym-

bolic language so as to communicate theories, methods, designs and products

to future generations e these achievements would not eventuate. But these ar-

tifacts include all of those symbolic conceptualisations produced by both sci-

ence and design whence, however abstractness is understood metaphysically, it

cannot provide a principled basis for discriminating between science and

design.

In sum, there is no plausible reading of the original proposal that leaves any

principled distinction between science and design.

Nevertheless it may be argued that not all the general features that Simon as-

cribed to design artifacts also apply to scientific concepts, theories and the like,

hence there remains a principled difference between design and science

grounded in the distinction between the natural and the artificial. So let us re-

visit these features of the artificial.

1) Recall that Simon conceived of artifacts “as a meeting point ... between

an ‘inner’ environment, the substance and organization of the artifact it-

self, and an ‘outer’ environment, the surroundings in which it operates. If

the inner environment is appropriate to the outer environment, or vice

versa, the artifact will serve its intended purpose” (1969, pp. 6e7.) Trans-

posing this passage, we obtain “A scientific conceptual system can be

thought of as a meeting point between an inner environment, the semantic

and syntactic organisation of the conceptual system itself, and an outer

environment, primarily the scientific institutional contexts within which

it is meant to explain and predict, embedded in the larger context of ap-

plied science to which it is meant to contribute. If the inner environment is

appropriate to the outer environment, or vice versa, the scientific concep-

tual system will serve its intended purpose.” That is, we can surely think

of scientific conceptual systems as cognitive artifacts that either serve their

intended purpose, explaining and predicting the world and guiding our in-

terventions in it, or fail to do so in some specified manner. (And at the

same time serve other purposes, just as with cars.) Similarly, scientists

precisely view experimental instruments and experimental set-ups as arti-

ficial constructions that are intended to serve the purpose of effectively

probing nature for validatable information. Moreover, there is nothing

in Kroes’ modification of Simon’s position that militates against this con-

clusion and we could similarly rewrite passages from Kroes to the same

effect.

2) If we turn to the idea that designers are most interested in the fulfilment of

purpose in the outer environment and are not primarily interested in the

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details of the inner environment, then a similar line of reasoning can be

applied to scientists. Scientists’ primary concern is to explain and predict

the external world and they will use any system of concepts or theories

that enable them to do this. (And similarly for pursuit of prestige and ca-

reer.) This often results in a number of scientific systems that can all ex-

plain and predict the same phenomena; for example, both Newtonian and

Einsteinian physics can explain and predict physical phenomena where

the objects do not approach the speed of light. And, just like Simon’s

bridge, where “Only when it has been overloaded do we learn the physical

properties of the materials from which it is built” so too in science it is

only when scientific systems are put into taxing environments that we

learn the limitations of the semantic and syntactic organisation of their

inner environments; for example, it is only when we consider speeds ap-

proaching the speed of light that the conceptual limitations of Newtonian

theory become apparent. (Indeed, this focus on severe testing captures the

essence of Popper’s entire approach to science, e.g. (1972).) We can also

see that the invariant relation between inner environment and goal that

Simon sees as important for artifacts is also important for scientific ob-

jects: those scientific objects that are robust, that continue to apply to

the world despite great changes in the external environment e that is,

that have a broad scope of successful functioning e are exactly the sort

of scientific objects that scientists seek.

3) Finally, consider the claim that the sciences of the artificial do, whereas

the natural sciences do not, concern themselves with construction of tech-

nical artifacts. This can no longer be sustained since natural science is also

concerned with the construction of technical artifacts. The natural sci-

ences produce symbolic systems that are intended to be representations

of the external world, artificial experimental arrangements and instru-

ments for obtaining relevant information, and so on. Nor can an opposi-

tion between studying existing things unaltered and producing novel

things be sustained since science constantly produces both novel abstract

artifacts such as new concepts and theories, and new physical artifacts

such as new instruments, new technical procedures and so on.

3 Reinforcing the conclusion: the nature of intelligenceThe conclusion that science and design are not in principle distinct is rein-

forced when we consider the nature of intelligence. There is not a ‘design intel-

ligence’ in contradistinction to a ‘scientific intelligence’; rather, both design

and science are manifestations of the general human capacity for intelligent ac-

tion. Here we will enlist Simon in our defence and consider Simon’s conception

of human beings.

Recall Simon’s conception that an artifact can be thought of as a meeting

point between an inner and an outer environment. Simon goes on to say

that “this way of viewing artifacts applies equally well to many things that

nce and design 487

488

are not man-made - to all things, in fact, that can be regarded as ‘adapted’ to

some situation; and in particular, it applies to the living systems that have

evolved through the forces of organic evolution”’ (1969, p. 7.) But Simon

does not stop there, he further contends that “A generalization of the argu-

ment made here for the separability of ‘outer’ from ‘inner’ environment shows

that we should expect to find this separability, to a greater or lesser degree, in

all large and complex systems, whether they are artificial or natural” (1969,

p. 7, fn. 3.) Indeed, and with ‘large and complex’ meaning simply ‘sufficient

complexity to form adaptive processes’. The consequence of this position is

that Simon conceives human beings as complex systems: we can characterise

human cognition, for example, in terms of an inner environment of cognitive

processes (model building, planning, etc.), an outer environment of action

situations, and the purposes or goals that shape cognitive processes to success-

ful acts of pursuit of goals; just like we can characterise any artificial system.

So, in understanding human cognition we can characterise human beings

themselves as technical artifacts and psychology, as a science, becomes a sci-

ence of the artificial (1969, p. 26.) It begins to appear that the domain of the

artificial is wide indeed: human constructions, evolutionary nature, inanimate

natural systems, and now even human thought itself, all become sub-domains

of a science of the artificial. But this threatens to push the notion to banality, if

not vacuity.

If the domain of the artificial is universal, then what distinguishes science from

design? Presumably it is the manner in which artificial objects are approached.

Simon appears to see the difference along these lines: the natural sciences al-

ways explain a particular phenomenon in terms of its constituents, that is,

in terms of its ‘inner environment’ while psychology, and other ‘sciences of

the artificial’, instead engage in functional explanations of emergent phenom-

ena that concern the ‘interface’ between inner environment and outer environ-

ment. Further, these emergent principles will apply no matter what the

underlying constitutive levels happen to be in the end; though, of course, ulti-

mately they will have to be mutually consistent with functionality.

We have no problem with this general characterisation of emergent phenom-

ena for functionality as inter-environment phenomena and the idea that emer-

gent phenomena can often be fruitfully studied without first having a settled

knowledge of the underlying constitutive processes. However, we make no

commitment to Simon’s implied self-sufficiency assumptions: that inter-

environmental phenomena can always be studied independently of the inner

environment and that any emergent principles will apply no matter what the

underlying constitutive levels happen to be (current neuro-psychology seems

a counter-example); but this is a complex issue not germane to pursue here.

Rather, the germane point is this: even were all that granted, it is unclear

why this should separate science from design. There are many instances in nat-

ural science of functional explanation of emergent phenomena, e.g. it is,

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roughly, the essence of natural evolution. Moreover, if we conceive of the nat-

ural world as best explained in terms of nested, interlocking, and sometimes

overlapping complex systems, through all levels of analysis and organisation,

as science is now doing apace in nearly every discipline, then functional expla-

nations of emergent phenomena become crucial to the understanding of the

natural world.

Conversely, design also employs constitutive reasoning strategies. For in-

stance, no building design can ignore the material constitution of its compo-

nents for numerous reasons, including that weightestrength relations

typically do not scale linearly, so size matters, and that special effects, such

as curved, translucent surfaces, require specialised materials that place their

own constraints on design.

It follows that science cannot be distinguished from design upon the basis that

science employs constitutive reasoning strategies whilst design employs func-

tional reasoning strategies, since each employs both reasoning strategies. In

short, both clusters of disciplines employ the full range of intelligent adaptive

human behaviours. Thus when Simon claims that the human organism is “the

very prototype of the artificial” (1996, p. 110) our response is to say that, on

the one hand, if this is asserted in the context of a fundamental metaphysical

distinction between the natural and artificial, between matter and mind, then

this is simply false: human beings are natural biological organisms and our be-

haviours and functions should be consequently placed firmly within the spec-

trum of natural existence. On the other hand, if ‘artificial’ is here being used as

a convenient short-hand for the great variety of natural adaptive behaviour,

then we are in full agreement. But this second option brings with it a number

of consequences: if all intelligent adaptive behaviour is artificial, then both de-

sign and science are artificial because they are both examples of the process of,

and the product of, intelligent adaptive behaviour. Moreover, if we are to have

a naturalised account of human beings, then intelligent adaptive behaviour

must be linked to evolution. This last point is all-important: the success of hu-

man beings is feasibly associated with our capacity for intelligent adaptive be-

haviour and it is this general capacity for intelligent adaptive behaviour that

has been selected for over our evolutionary past. What have not been selected

are specific scientific cognitive capacities or specific design cognitive capacities;

rather, we have a general intelligent capacity which can be adapted to a variety

of different tasks, science and design among them.3

The general capacity we are considering here can be brought out if we examine

some prominent definitions of design. Simon, for example, has contended that

the theory of design is essential for “any professional whose task it is to solve

problems, to choose, to synthesise, to decide” (1969, p. 81.) And Willem de-

fines design as “the intentional development of anything ... [where] a plan or

prototype for something new is devised” (1990, p. 45.) Both of these

nce and design 489

490

characterisations apply immediately to science. Willem goes on to associate

design with creative problem-solving, equally applicable to science e espe-

cially in new physical domains where existing methods and instruments cannot

be presumed to work. Lastly, Cross quotes Archer as defining design as “the

collected experience of the material culture, and the collected body of experi-

ence, skill and understanding embodied in the arts of planning, inventing,

making and doing” (1982, p. 221.), again immediately applicable to science

whose theoretically guided laboratory equipment and complex procedures

represent a collective ‘material culture’ and body of experience and skills accu-

mulated across centuries. Thus these definitions of design do not pick out de-

sign as separate from science.

At this point readers may have in mind a still more prominent definition of de-

sign by Simon: ‘Everyone designs who devises courses of action aimed at

changing existing situations into preferred ones.’ (1996, p. 111). But of course

this leaves all scientists as designers since they all devise courses of action

aimed at making the resulting knowledge situation improved, that is, they

aim at epistemicly preferred situations. This response suffices for our purposes

here. What it most obviously leaves open is the difference in norms between

science, dominated by epistemic norms, and design, dominated by practical

norms, and related differences, e.g. with respect to patents in science and de-

sign. Our contentions are that i) the differences are not as large as may be

thought (each must also make some use of the other’s norms) and ii) whatever

differences there are do not affect our conclusion here that, in respect of its un-

derlying process (methods) and its kinds of products, no difference has been

made out between science and design. Because the matter requires substantial

further analysis we leave the supporting investigation of norms and related

matters like patents to another (planned) paper.

The upshot is that the onus is now on those who still want to distinguish design

and science to say just how to construe the definitions of artificial and artifact

so as to make out a relevant and defensible difference. It is not enough, for in-

stance, to simply claim some special interpretation of what exactly is meant by

‘material culture’ that confines it to design; in the light of the plausible charac-

terisation of the material culture of science just given above, it is necessary to

show a plausible conception that does not include science. And similarly for all

of the other parts of the definitions, for all parts seem obviously applicable to

science. For instance, no-one can conduct unplanned scientific investigations:

it is virtually synonymous with the idea of science that it requires methodical,

systematic, investigation, and such investigations must be planned. Inventing

is also an integral part of science: it is new theories, new concepts, and new

methods of investigation that constitute the most heralded and most sought

after goals of scientific investigation. And what are scientific experiments

but highly constrained exercises in making and doing that solve complex prob-

lems (in this case concerning access to information as the ‘design brief’). To

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solve problems, to synthesise, to decide and be creative, all of these things are

part of science. The main point that we are making here is that these definitions

of design are much better conceptualised as descriptions of general intelligent

adaptive capacities that are used by us in all situations requiring intelligence,

including science.

We can use Simon in our support here: Simon contends that an explanation of

the general task environment that human beings face requires a “general the-

ory of search through large combinatorial spaces”. Simon goes on to say that

“the theory of design is that general theory of search” (1969, p. 54.) Simon

sums up his view of human cognition as information-processing:

“a scientific account of human cognition describes it in terms of several

sets of invariants. First, there are the parameters of the inner environment

[short-term memory; chunks; transition of information to long-term mem-

ory; and so on]. Then, there are the general control and search-guiding

mechanisms that are used over and over again in all task domains. Finally,

there are the learning and discovery mechanisms that permit the system to

adapt with gradually increasing effectiveness to the particular environment

in which it finds itself” (1996, p. 110, our emphases.)

But Simon’s contention that humans possess general control and search-

guiding mechanisms that are used in all domains obviously implies that

both science and design would employ the same control and search and learn-

ing and discovery mechanisms.

As it stands it is unclear just what cognitive powers the control and search and

learning and discovery mechanisms confer, although Simon seems to have es-

sentially simple, small programmes like TOTE schemes (Test, Operate, Test,

Exit) in mind for at least the control and search mechanisms. However, de-

scribing the process solely in terms of searching combinatorial spaces does

have a too-mechanistic ring to it, perhaps born of the over-optimism of early

AI (artificial Intelligence) e by contrast designers emphasise learning to adapt

both search categories (the ‘design problem’) and search success criteria (the

‘design solution’) as essential to effective search processes (e.g. Goel &

Pirolli, 1992; Zamenopoulos & Alexiou, 2007). But we set that issue aside to

make the key point here that, however it is adequately construed, searching

through large sets of possibilities is exactly what scientists do when they con-

duct research.

When we come to particulars Simon similarly conceives of the design process:

as involving first the generation of alternatives and then the testing of these

alternatives against a whole array of requirements and constraints. There

need not be merely a single generate-test cycle, but there can be a whole

nested series of such cycles. The generators implicitly define the

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decomposition of the design problem, and the tests guarantee that impor-

tant indirect consequences will be noticed and weighed ... Alternatives are

also open, in organising the design process, as to how far development of

possible subsystems will be carried before the over-all coordinating design

is developed in detail; or, vice versa, how far the over-all design should be

carried before various components, or possible components, are developed

... A theory of design will include principles ... for deciding such questions

of precedence and sequence in the design process (1969, pp. 74e5.)

Again setting aside whether this account is fully adequate, this evolving inter-

active, feedback-driven, investigation of a domain is no different in science;

and this synthetic coordination of evolving constraints e both high level con-

straints and empirically discovered low level constraints, dynamically influ-

encing each other e is just as deeply characteristic of scientific investigation

as it is characteristic of the design process. (See Farrell & Hooker, 2007a,

2007b.) Think of how a newly discovered fact during an investigation e or

conversely a newly discovered error in instrumental functioning e can re-

shape, i.e. act as a constraint on, subsequent investigation, and constrain at

very different locations depending on the type of information uncovered

(e.g. facts that are about method versus subject, about focal subject versus as-

sociated subject, and confirming versus disconfirming).

And if scientists conduct an experimental investigation, following best prac-

tices in methodology, and the result of the experiment is considered to be

a ‘failure’, in some sense, then the scientists involved are rarely at a loss.

The failure of an experimental investigation is a feedback stimulus provoking

error search and it is this error search and subsequent error identification that

is a crucial driver of scientific success. The failure of a particular experimental

investigation provides crucial data for the re-evaluation of subsequent exper-

imental investigations with the modification of at least one, or more, of theo-

ries, concepts, methods, instrumentation and so on. So we might say that the

failure of an experimental investigation is most often a necessary step towards

eventual scientific success and this success will nearly always involve the mod-

ification of some aspect of methodology, considered broadly. (Even if the error

is believed to reside in theories or concepts, their modification will inevitably

lead to adjustments in methodology because of their involvement in guiding

both understanding of the material functioning of instruments and the exter-

nal conditions under which they can produce valuable outcomes through val-

idatable data.) For an extensive discussion of these points see Farrell &

Hooker, 2009.

The situationappears tobe exactly analogous indesign.First, theoft repeated tenet

that design is an iterative process is best seen asprimarily a sophisticated and evolv-

ingmisfit-searchandmisfit-identification,where themisfit is betweenmaterial con-

stitution and resulting functionality (cf. error between theoretical prediction and

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Distinction between scie

experimental outcome). Second, not only is the failure of a particular design, even

though best practices have been followed, something to be expected given the heu-

ristic nature of design (and scientific)methodologies, but the particular failure, and

the exact nature of that failure,will provide invaluable feedback to thedesigners on

potential areas of improvement that should be kept in mind and trialled in subse-

quent design practice.And these improvementsmay range fromaltering designde-

tail to transforming the design problem and outcome criteria (cf. respectively

altering theoretical detail, research problem andmethodological solution criteria).

In fact, these complex outcomes provide the limits to any sense of the process being

a simple iteration.

Finally, any roughly satisfactory design prompts investigation of local varia-

tions in design parameters to see if that will issue in further improvements

that can be extracted from the approach, just as, e.g. any new scientific inves-

tigatory procedure, say a new instrument, will lead to similar investigations of

potential improvement. Error/misfit discovery and avoidance, enhanced by

opportunistic improvement, can provide the core bootstrapping role in design

just as it does in science, and the same long-term accumulation of knowledge

considerations should be incorporated in design just as they are in science.

4 ConclusionSimon considers the science of psychology is an artificial science and conceives

of human beings as themselves artificial in nature. Thus Simon contends that

there are only a small set of intrinsic, or natural, characteristics and limitations

“that limit the adaptation of his [man’s] thought to the shape of the problem

environment. All else in his thinking and problem-solving behaviour is artificiale

is learned and is subject to improvement through the invention of improved de-

signs” (1969, p. 26, our emphasis.) The argument here appears to be settled:

all the products of human thinking and human problem-solving are designed

technical artifacts; consequently, if Simon is to avoid contradiction, then he

must include those products of human thinking and problem-solving we call

the natural sciences in the class of the artificial. Modern defenders of the Si-

moneKroes model of technical artifacts will either have to accept the conse-

quences that we have drawn out from the model, or they will have to

provide explicit arguments as to why the cognitive processes of science and de-

sign are not equally best characterised as design processes.

When Simon says that “1. Artificial things are synthesized ... by man [and] 2.

Artificial things may imitate appearances in natural things while lacking, in

one or more respects, the reality of the latter” (1969, p. 5) we must include

the products of the natural sciences within the extension of the artificial.

They too are synthesised by human beings e they are a product of human

thinking and human problem-solving designed to fulfil the purpose of repre-

senting and explaining the external world e and some of them, being theoret-

ical representations of the external world, lack the reality of the external world

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while imitating it in specified ways. (This latter would apply to physical scien-

tific artifacts also, such as working models, in respect of the limited, specialised

ways they represent the world.)

The argument presented for distinguishing science from design was that if disci-

plines produce different metaphysical objects, then the intellectual study and pro-

duction of these objects will be significantly different; design and science produce

differentmetaphysical objects; therefore, design and science are distinct types of in-

tellectual study and production.We can now see that this argument cannot be sup-

ported because the second premise is false: design and science both produce

artifacts. Moreover, since both design and science are products of the general ca-

pacity for intelligent action that characterises human intelligence, both of them

are most accurately represented, cognitively, as design processes. In sum, both de-

sign and science use design processes and reasoning strategies to produce artificial

objects, therefore, they are not different in kind.

This last is the important immediate conclusion we draw. Of more significance

in the long term, however, is the conclusion preceding it, that both design and

science use design processes and reasoning strategies to produce artificial ob-

jects, for this sets us to inquiring afresh into the nature of this common intel-

ligent problem-solving process.

Notes1. Kroes (2009), for example, also argues that (engineering) design i) has a ‘decisional’ na-

ture where the problems dealt with are ‘wicked’, or ill-structured; ii) has a greater array

of constraints, specifically social constraints, than does science, and iii) is primarily char-

acterised as employing means-end reasoning rather than the ‘theoretical’ reasoning dom-

inant in science. More detailed exposition of our responses to these other arguments will

be pursued elsewhere.

2. We note here that Simon, in his 1969, did indeed appear to separate the natural sciences

from the sciences of the artificial (design); however, Simon later came to rescind much of

this distinction (see his 1995, section 2), though this wasn’t as readily apparent in the 3rd

edition of his 1969 (1996) where there were mixed messages as to his understanding of the

relation between the natural sciences and design. We agree with Simon’s reappraisal and

this paper can be taken to be a more systematic presentation of the arguments for this

reappraisal. We have continued to use Simon as an example because his position is

well known in the design community and, as our further presentation of Kroes below

demonstrates, his position still attracts adherents.

3. There have been naturalistic approaches to design e see, for example, Hybs and Gero

(1992), who offer an evolutionary account of design, and Zamenopoulos and Alexiou

(2007) who offer an anticipatory account of design e and, without necessarily commend-

ing the particulars of these approaches, we simply note that if they are valid then they too

undermine the in-principle separation of design from science.

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